Governing Muslims and Islam in Contemporary Germany

Muslim Minorities

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Race, Time, and the German Islam Conference

By

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No person shall be favoured or disfavoured because of sex, parentage, *race*, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions. No person shall be disfavoured because of disability.

ARTICLE 3, §3, Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (emphasis added)

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List of Abbreviations

AABK	Alevite Community of Germany
AMJ	Ahmadiyya Muslim Community
AZR	Central Register of Foreigners
BAMF	Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
BVerfG	Federal Constitutional Court of Germany
BfFSFJ	Federal Office for Families, Elderly Women and Youth
BfV	Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution
BMI	Federal Ministry of the Interior
CLS	Prevention and Cooperation Clearing Point
DIK	German Islam Conference
DITIB	Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs
FADA	Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency
IGDB	Islamic Community of Bosnians in Germany
IGMG	Islamic Community Millî Görüş
IGS	Islamic Community of Shiite communities in Germany
IFB	Islamic Federation of Berlin
IR	Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany
KRM	Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany
TGD	Turkish Community in Germany
VIKS	The Union of Islamic Cultural Centers
ZMaD	Central Council of Moroccans in Germany
ZMD	Central Council of Muslims in Germany

Studies of the DIK

BI	Better Integration of Muslims in the Labor Market (*Bessere Integration von Musliminnen und Muslimen in den Arbeitsmarkt*)
DOV	Dialogue, Opening, Networking (*Dialog, Öffnung, Vernetzung*)
DJ	Three years of the German Islam Conference (DIK) 2006–2009. Muslims in Germany—German Muslims (*Drei Jahre Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK) 2006–2009. Muslime in Deutschland—deutsche Muslime*)
GzTM	Gender roles between tradition and modernity (*Geschlechterbilder zwischen Tradition und Moderne*)
IGD	Islamic Community life in Germany a study conducted on behalf of the German Conference on Islam. Research report 13 (*Islamisches*

Gemeindeleben in Deutschland im Auftrag der Deutschen Islam Konferenz. Forschungsbericht 13)

MLG   Muslim Life in Germany a study conducted on behalf of the German Islam Conference (*Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland im Auftrag der Deutschen Islam Konferenz*)

Introduction

On September 26th 2006, a day before the official establishment of the German Islam Conference (hereafter DIK: *Deutsche Islam Konferenz*), its founder and at the time current Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble gave an interview to the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, in which he touched upon a wide range of topics pertaining to Islam, Muslims, and the Conference itself. The interview, entitled "Islam is part of Germany" (Schäuble, 2006b), succinctly summarized the issues that the DIK would come to face in the ensuing years: the training of "homegrown" imams; national security concerns related to "Islamist" terrorism; the construction of Mosques on German soil; gender inequality within Muslim communities; the organization of Muslims; and the place of Shar'ia in the German legal framework, to name just a few. In the interview, Schäuble also declared that "Islam *has become* part of Germany and Europe; *it must* therefore also accept the basic rules, norms and values that make up Europe" (Schäuble, 2006b [emphasis added]).[1]

The interview likewise reveals some of the discourses foregrounding the institutionalization of the DIK and the structuring of its architecture. For instance, Schäuble used Christianity as a yardstick to assess and judge not only how Muslims organize and how Islamic organizations should function, but also how Muslims should integrate into the German social fabric, namely, the integration of Muslims should be a process akin to the Ten Biblical commandments. Far more revealing, perhaps, is the type of Muslims Schäuble longs for in Germany, and the underpinning assumptions about them, Germany, history, and time, when he declared, "We want enlightened Muslims in our enlightened country'" (Schäuble, 2006b).

The narrative of the enlightenment here functions as a historicist artifact drawing a time-based distinction and a symbolic border between Muslims and Germans thereby suggesting different historical and temporal trajectories: one more advance than the Other. The appeal to the enlightenment operates through a "we-they" narrative and has the effect to discursively produce a representation of two self-enclosed groups, the enlightened Germans vis-à-vis the benighted Muslims. It suggests that, as I argue in the following pages, until the

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1 For better readability I opted to drop the quotation marks in the words "Muslim", "Islam", "culture", "Germany", "German culture", "secular" and "religion". However, when these words are mentioned I am referring to the representation of such terms with the intention to suspend any ontological character and rather to show the over-determination of the categories as an effect of political representation.

appearance of the DIK, these two identities, being Muslim and being German were innately incompatible; divided by insurmountable historical, cultural, and temporal barriers; two different populations inhabiting German soil, or at least, two different registers carrying distinctive traditions, cultural baggage, norms, values, and understandings of the political and the religious. Thus, Islam is part of enlightened Germany and Germany wants enlightened Muslims, integration is the key, and the DIK will orchestrate the process.[2]

Schäuble's acknowledgement of Islam as becoming, as it were, part of Germany was a novel and significant intervention in the socio-political debate, which for decades denied—and at moments still does—Germany's heterogeneous social reality, by chasing dreams of a homogenous and cohesive national body. In a context in which German nationalism was associated with guilt and the remnants of a racial and violent past, the definition of German national identity rested upon the declaration of what allegedly Germany was not, i.e., an immigration country, as the former Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1991) vociferously insisted.

This specific acceptance of Islam, as Frank Peter (2010) points out, goes hand in hand with a set of conditions directed at the attempt to reshape the subjectivities of Muslims. This political process can also be seen as the paradoxical act of "exclusionary incorporation" (Partridge, 2012), understood as the attempt to include racially characterized subjects in the national body, while the same incorporation is used as a means to exclude these subjects from the nation by marking them as racially different from the national identity. Talal Asad (1993, 159) has also documented this tension, the concurrent inclusion and exclusion of Muslims within and from Europe, adding that such a contradiction is the result of "how 'Europe' is conceptualized by Europeans", or in the DIK's case how those considering themselves "true" Germans imagine and conceptualize Germany and what it means to be German.

Just as Schäuble elaborated, if Islam is to become part of Germany it has to accept the rules, norms, and values of Europe and Germany, implying that this has not happened yet, while offering a seamless imaginary about Euro-German rules and values. The symbolic incorporation of Islam in Germany, then, alternates between the promise of inclusion, and the representational

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2   Schäuble's sanitized version of the enlightenment conceals how the enlightenment as the "Age of reason" was predicated upon "the assumption that reason could historically only come to maturity in modern Europe, while the inhabitants of areas outside Europe, who were considered to be of non European racial and cultural origins, were consistently described and theorized as rationally inferior and savage" (Eze, 1997, 4).

exclusion mounted in the discursive differentiation between Islam and Muslims from Germany and Germans.

This book attends to the most ambitious project of the German state to govern Muslims and Islam, namely the German Islam Conference. Contrary to the DIK's self-presentation as merely a forum of dialogue and understanding between Muslims and Germans, I tell a different story by contending that this institution is deeply entangled in political calculations oriented towards reforming Muslims and Islam. Schäuble, again, explicitly voiced this aim, "Muslims living in Germany should end up becoming German Muslims" (Schäuble in: DIK, 2008c, 2). Transforming plain Muslims into German Muslims, furthermore, would be accompanied by the appearance of an "Islam of Germany" (Riedel in: BAMF, 2010, 31) embedded in the German state's institutional and intellectual framework. Then, Islam becomes an aspiration contained in a national mold.

But why, one wonders, is it necessary to invest—literarily and figuratively—in the creation of a nationalized version of Islam while lecturing about and supplementing Germanness, whatever this is, to Muslims by means of integration, especially since, according to the DIK's (2009d) calculations, more than a half of the Muslim population in Germany consists of German citizens? Are they not already Germans, German citizens professing Islam, say, German Muslims, Muslim Germans? What does this Germanness that Muslims need to learn, embrace, and ultimately interiorize consist of? And what does this project reveal about how Muslims are imagined, represented, and positioned as objects and subjects of governmental interventions in contemporary Germany?

By exploring the tensions and contradictions opened up by these question, I make a case for understanding the institutionalization of the DIK and its policies against the background of racial discourses and imaginaries about Muslims, which in short posit the idea that to be a Muslim is to be a problem, yet a problem that can be solved through a process of temporal alignment, bringing pre-modern Muslims into the German present by integrative means as the way to secure the future.[3] Implicitly and explicitly the DIK's discourses carry and promulgate interconnected and dislocated narratives of the past, present, and future of Muslims and Germany. Therefore, I locate the existence of this

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3 For Ann L. Stoler (2016, 255–256 [emphasis in the original]) "a discourse is racial not because it always displays shared political interests but because *it delineates a field and a set of conditions that make it impossible to talk about any range of domains—sexuality, class, moral values, sports, childcare, internet use without inscribing those relations of power with racialized distinctions and discriminations*". Precisely, I show how the DIK has talked about each one of these domains, while racially distinguishing Muslims from Germans.

institution and its highly elaborated plan to transform and reform Muslims and Islam via integration into a racially inspired meta-narrative: the DIK's politics of racial time—ideas and narratives about the past, present, and future of Muslims and Germany, which are the creation of a particular present, simultaneously looking ahead of and before time.

The notion of time politics borrows from Judith Butler's (2008, 1) discussion about secular time as a narrative whereby "hegemonic conceptions of progress define themselves over and against a pre-modern temporality that they produce for the purposes of their own self legitimation". The narratives of time molded and disseminated by the DIK precisely operate by rendering Islam and Muslims as a religion and subjects from a distant time period and geography, while locating Germany and the German subject in a more advanced, superior, and enlightened stage, which in turn, serves as the basis to call for the temporal alignment of Muslims by means of integrative measures.

Time, as Johannes Fabian (2014) fleshes out, has been of paramount relevance in the Western crafting of the Other, an Other that despite being a contemporary interlocutor remains simultaneously anchored in a distant temporal space. In this sense, Schäuble's appeal to the enlightenment exemplifies an instance where "coevalness", as the sharing "of present Time" is denied (Fabian, 2014, 32). In other words, while in the DIK Muslims are contemporary subjects in dialogue, they are also represented as inhabiting a different temporal zone. Paraphrasing Fabian (2014, 173), Muslims "are talked about in a time other that of the one who speaks" as temporarily distant religious subjects in dire need of alignment with the German enlightenment and modern times. This *denial of coevalness* thus emerges as an *allochronic* discursive device through which anthropology then (Fabian, 2014, 32) and the DIK now have fabricated the Other.[4]

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4 Notwithstanding Fabian's brilliant critique of time as constitutive of Otherness, race was not a category he considered neither in his analysis of the anthropological project, nor in how racial differences in their articulation with other categories such as gender, class, and sexuality foreground the crafting of Otherness, "I am sure that the glaring absence of the issue of race from these essays will be noted. It would be foolish to deny its importance in the rise of anthropology ... Apart from offering the lame excuse that one cannot speak about everything, I would argue that a clear conception of allochronism is the prerequisite and frame for a critique of racism. Refutations of racist thought from genetics and psychology are useful, but they will not as such do away with race as an ideological and, indeed, cosmological concept" (Fabian, 2014, 202). By analyzing not only the entanglement of time and race, but also of gender, sexuality, and nationalism I offer a critique of the complex interactions of these categories within the framework of the state and its constant reconfiguration. Very young I became aware of the imprints of racism in time and the effects of time upon racism, though;

These uses and construal of time however were not only part and parcel of anthropology, but also as Anne McClintock (1995) argues, they were fundamental for legitimizing colonial enterprises by producing narratives of progress, where "time became a geography of social power, a map from which to read a global allegory of 'natural' social difference" (McClintock, 1995, 37). McClintock then elaborates the concepts of *panoptical time* and *anachronistic space*. While the former refers to an epistemological and privileged point of view from which global history could be consume in a single glance (McClintock, 1995, 37), the latter denotes a discursive device disavowing and relegating the "agency of women, the colonized and the industrial classes" to a distant and atavistic temporality "inherently out of place in the historical time of modernity" (McClintock, 1995, 40). And Islam and Muslims have also been rendered as "out of time", temporarily deemed as having no "place in correct historical or chronological time; they are anachronistic, out of harmony with the present, and in effect they belong to an earlier time that has no relevance to the secular politics of our historical present" (Mas, 2011, 87).

In this sense, the Conference's representations about Muslims, made from a privileged point of view, advance through transitory narratives, producing three dislocated temporalities overlapping in, and delineating the present— "disjointed times, times out of joint"—as Jacques Derrida (1994, 1) would put it.

The first time concerns the traces of the past in Germany's present—a preceding time embodied in foreign subjects trapped in an anachronistic space. Those Muslim bodies traveled and brought their time into Germany's present. The past represents a first temporality in the DIK's racial politics of time and produces the Muslim subject as a flawed yet malleable figure, but also reproduces the idea of a pristine homogenous national body in two bifurcated narratives. The first refers to strategic and concealing readings of the German past in which tolerance towards "different" religions was inscribed in politics, a

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at that moment I could not understand the wider implications of such couplings. As pupils in elementary school in Mexico, my fellow peers and I were presented at class with *Casta* paintings, a colonial genre of "art" depicting the offspring of the variegated possibilities of racial mixing (*mestizaje*). Among one of these racial mixtures one could found the *"torna atrás"* or *"salta pa'trás"*—roughly translated as jump back or return backwards. As the son or daughter of a mixed couple, the *"torna atrás"* either did not present the racial characteristics of the parents, but of a previous mixture, or could be the child of a "Chino" (from the Spanish word for pig: *cochino*) and an "Indian". The *"torna atrás"*, as it were, represented a racial regression in time, a phenotypically embodied temporal-racial degeneracy. I can recall how after class we joked about which of us bore resemblance to some of the castes, unraveling a set of racial nicknames and thereby updating in our present the colonial racial hierarchies established centuries ago.

tolerance that nowadays has to be taught to Muslims. The second highlights a moment in which the national body after the Second World War was constituted by a self-enclosed and homogenous aggregate of German subjects, assuming a more cohesive German socio-political body. This moment was disrupted by the arrival of heterogeneity, the foreign subjects of the past.

The second time refers to the fractured and conflictive present. Those anachronistic foreign bodies unsettle the temporal horizon and landscape of the German nation, shattering Germany's social cohesion and posing a series of cultural conflicts within the social body. Integration then emerges as the key to align dissimilar temporal ontologies. Integration as a politics of the present aims to reform the Muslim subject of the past, to guide it so that it can catch up with the historical development of Germany and Germans.

Therefore, integration provides the basis for imaging and projecting the future, the third dislocated temporality in which a brand new subject arises: the German-Muslim. The slogan and political rationality informing the DIK is oriented towards transforming Muslims into German-Muslims. The project entails reforming the Muslim subject of the past through the integration politics of the present in order to reshape the subject of the future, the German-Muslim, a hyphenated and integrated identity. Becoming German-Muslim encompasses the reform, "improvement", and production of a subject position defined as Germany's Other, fixed by religion, culture, and integration deficits. Integration, then, fluctuates between unlearning and learning, joining tasks of undoing, reforming, and refashioning Muslims.

The imaginaries about Germany's future moreover rely on the temporal device of anticipation, understood as "the index of the temporality contained in the relation and intersection of the past and the future" (Mas, 2011, 90). According to Ruth Mas (2011, 88), and given that Islam is apprehended as causing temporal instability in the present, secular time "seems to function by making Islam the ontological terror of secularism dialectically tossed with clashing anticipation into forthcoming destruction". Setting this as a backdrop, the DIK's projection of a better and peaceful future can be seen as an act of anticipating a devastating future, which in turn, rests upon imagining that without the state's guidance and reformation of Muslims and Islam, the "cultural conflicts" of our present will inevitably escalate. The DIK's envisioned future therefore is underpinned by a "paranoid temporality" (Puar, 2007, xx) preemptively acting against futuristic and anticipated calamities.[5]

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5   Paranoid temporality is marked by a "negative exuberance—for we are never safe enough, never healthy enough, never prepared enough—driven by imitation (repetition of the same or in the service of maintaining the same)" (Puar, 2007, xx).

The DIK thus can be seen as the German institutional version of the waiting room of history (Chakrabarty, 2007), a place where upon entering it is announced that you will be included but not just yet. The DIK's historicist narratives of time produce and locate the Muslim subject as not yet ready for inclusion on account of some cultural practices dissonant with German norms. This type of rationality, as Dipesh Chakrabarty (2007, 9) has argued, posits the idea "that some people were less modern than others, and that the former needed a period of preparation and waiting before they could be recognized as full participants in political modernity". David Theo Goldberg (2002) would further add that these kinds of historicist narratives are inextricably linked with racial discourses and the crafting of racially characterized subjects and racial states.[6] For instance, Schäuble's strategic use of the enlightenment as a means to delineate a historical and temporal distinction between Germans and Muslims is a case in point of what Goldberg terms as racial historicism. Racial historicism has been a modality of racial distinction functioning by means of "contrasting claims of historical immaturity" (Goldberg, 2002, 74), advancing the idea of dissimilar ontologies as an effect of different historical developments. Thus, in racial historicist regimes those subjects conceived of as inferior were identified "as historically differentiated in maturity and development" (Goldberg, 2002, 106). Racial historicism therefore produces racially characterized bodies, cultures, and religions by drawing on historical arguments about development and progress.[7]

Furthermore, a crucial feature of racial historicist discourses entails the possibility of racial uplifting or, in other words, the prospect of leaving the waiting room of history. Integration epitomizes that condescending offer, and as such,

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6 Following Goldberg "race is integral to the emergence, development, and transformations (conceptually, philosophically, materially) of the modern nation-state … racial configuration fashions the terms of the founding myth, the fabrication of historical memory, necessary (as Charles Tilly insist) to both the discursive production and ideological rationalization of modern state power" (Goldberg, 2002, 4).

7 Among the different forms and content racism has taken, Goldberg (2002) distinguishes between two logics contingent upon the ontological status given to racially characterized subjects. Racial naturalism, on the one hand, denotes a rationale in which racially characterized subjects are deemed "in a prehistorical condition of pure Being naturally incapable of development and so historical progress" (Goldberg, 2002, 43). On the other hand, racial historicism or evolutionary is underpinned by a racial logic that "historicizes racial characterization" as the natural outcome of universal (European) history and progress. To this extent, racial historicism "elevates Europeans … over primitive or underdeveloped Others as a victory of History, of historical progress, even as it leaves open the possibility of those racial Others to historical development" (Goldberg, 2002, 43).

carries and reproduces racial discourse. Integration presents itself as the way out offered by the DIK to Muslims after the latter have reduced the cultural, temporal, and historical distances that separate them from the Germans.

Integration demands and can, following the DIK and Schäuble's rationale (DIK, 2008c, 4), "adjust" (*anpassen*) the attitudes of Muslims by attuning them to the German ones. I analyze the racial formation foregrounding this "adjustment" of attitudes, or subjectivities, in detail in the following chapters.

At the individual level, this includes several relationships: the relations between Muslim men and women; between Muslim parents and their children and with their children's teachers; with Muslims and their employers; those relations involving Muslims and Jews; and between Muslims and Germans at an intimate and emotional level. Likewise, in a collective dimension, changes are required in the way Muslims organize themselves, how they build and run their mosques, in their interactions with the state, in particular with German security authorities, as well as in the contact between Muslims and their religious guides—imams.

Hence, the planned state intervention upon Muslims ranges from structural organizational transformations to the most intimate domains of life, exemplifying the biopolitical functioning of the German state, namely, the control and discipline of productive bodies, the regulation of sexual and affective practices, and the overall regulation of life. Thus, the Conference operates both at the level of the individual, disciplining and reforming Muslims as individuals, and at the population level, reshaping and reorganizing the existent Islamic organizations and their integration with the standing structures of the state.

Race, Religion, and the State

Several high-profile cases of racial violence and discrimination against Muslims have brought attention to the fact that Muslims, and those perceived as such, in their everyday lives face an antagonistic environment in contemporary Germany, which is even more pronounced for Muslim women wearing headscarves (Soliman, 2016). This is in addition to the wider negative perceptions and attitudes towards Islam and Muslims disseminated throughout the population and fueled by the media's obsession with "Islam as news" (Said, 1997) and Islam as a scandal (Sayyid, 2014b, 1), and the articulation of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim agendas concentrated in right-wing political parties such as the National Party of Germany (NPD). More recently, these views have been expressed by the Alternative for Germany (AFD) and also in civic associations of "concerned and angry citizens" such as the anti-Islam(ist) organization

Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident (PEGIDA). This climate has been well documented, and is not exclusive to Germany.[8] In the post 9/11 era, Muslims have increasingly become the target of discrimination, exclusion, and racism, covering the wider scope of violence, from micro-aggressions, verbal insults to attacks and organized killings, but also through what can be seen as subtler means, namely, urban segregation, lack of opportunities, and specific policies against Muslims in the labor market, dissimilar treatment in the school system, special surveillance and policing of Islamic organizations and individuals, systematic but "random" stop and search policies targeting Muslims, with the end result of creating a mythos that Muslims mean trouble.

In this context a number of concepts, differently defined, try to give an account of these realities. Propositions about the mutation of biological racism into a cultural one crystalized in the notions of neo-racism (Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991), new-racism (Baker, 1981), culturalist/differentialist racism (Taguieff, 1991), and xeno-racism (Fekete, 2001; Sivanandan, 1977).[9] But other notions such as dogma-line racism (Medovoi, 2012) suggested not a mutation, rather a supplementary historical relation between racisms based on color and religion. Moreover, similarities between the current exclusion and hatred against Muslims and anti-Semitism have been highlighted (Farris, 2014a; Kalmar, 2009; Norton, 2013; Schiffer & Wagner, 2009), causing debates to flare up, particularly in Germany (Özyürek, 2016). Likewise, the concept of Islamophobia gained currency during the 1990's, and since then has become a prolific notion to understand the wide range of actions detrimentally affecting the lives of Muslims.

Roughly speaking, the academic debate about hatred and violence against Islam and Muslims can be mapped onto three conceptual lines of inquiry:

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8   For a general and recent overview of the range of racism and Islamophobia against Muslims in Germany see Anna-E. Younes's report (2016, see also: Allen & Nielsen, 2002; Hernández Aguilar, 2017a; ENAR, 2008). Andreas Zick and colleagues have conducted long-term surveys documenting the negative perceptions towards Muslims in the German population (Heeren & Zick, 2014; Krause & Zick, 2013; Zick & Heeren, 2012; Zick, Hövermann, & Krause, 2012). Regarding the negative portrayal of Muslims and Islam in German media see: (Attia & Shooman, 2010; Hafez & Richter, 2007; Schiffer, 2005, 2007; Shooman & Spielhaus, 2010; Spielhaus, 2010).

9   According to Stoler (2016, 242) the positions postulating the newness of contemporary forms of racism tend to assume "flattened, thinned out histories of what racism once looked like", as the result of thinking of the development of racism as unilinear, from "somatic racism of the past" to "a more nuanced, culturally coded, and complex racism of the present … as a more 'insidious', 'silently sophisticated', 'subtle', and 'novel', phenomenon". In this sense, the idea of new racism presupposes a single line of historical development underpinned by homogenous and progressive time.

approaches framing this phenomenon as hostility and xenophobic prejudice; studies using the concept of Islamophobia; and positions locating it in the arena of racism. Analyses focusing on prejudice and xenophobia have been mostly deployed through socio-psychological approaches, surveying perceptions and attitudes towards Islam and Muslims in the population and commonly from a qualitative perspective. In Germany, for instance, the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence, led by Wilhem Heitmeyer (2002–2010) and based in Bielefeld, has conducted surveys for almost a decade about Group-Focused Enmity, a meta-concept including the analysis of hostility against Islam and Muslims (*Islamfeindlichkeit* and *Muslimfeindlichkeit*).

The last two decades have witnessed a significant increase in studies using the concept Islamophobia, mostly focusing on empirical cases, and the representation of Muslims and Islam in the media (Sayyid 2014a, 11), which has created a variety of definitions and approaches.[10] Thus, Islamophobia has been considered a contemporary ideology demonizing Muslims (Allen, 2010; Allen & Nielsen, 2002), a crucial feature in the populist discourse of political parties (Hafez, 2009), or key in the construction of the "New Europe" project (Bunzl, 2007; Silverstein, 2005). Islamophobia has also been discussed as epistemic racism (Grosfoguel, 2010; Mignolo, 2006), as culturalist racism (Werbner, 2005, 2013), or as a continuation of Orientalism (Moosavi, 2014). Furthermore, a frequent feature of the debate relates to the comparison, analogy, and evaluation of Islamophobia vis-à-vis anti-Semitism (Bunzl, 2007; Schiffer & Wagner, 2009; Kalmar, 2009; Medovoi, 2012). Moreover, some scholars like Brian Klug (2012), Farid Hafez (2016), and Nasam Meer (2013a, 2013b) among others, have categorized Islamophobia as a form of racism.

The third line of inquiry understands hatred and violence against Muslims as racism. In the German context, Iman Attia (2007) has pioneered the concept

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10   A certain degree of consensus among academics exists in regard to the moment where Islamophobia appeared as a "neologism" to explain the contemporary hostility and hatred against Muslims (Allen, 2010; Allen & Nielsen, 2002; Bleich, 2011; Halliday, 1999). The threshold locates in Britain around 1997, and the event refers to the publication of the report, *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All: Report of the Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia* (1997). However, Salman Sayyid (2014b, 12) argues that Islamophobia as a term developed during the 1920s in the French colonial empire and later the term was mentioned in Said's (1985, 99) *Orientalism reconsidered*. Following Sayyid (2010), one of the effects caused by the Runnymede Trust report was precisely the reading of Islamophobia as a neologism, as if the concept was addressing an emergent reality. In this sense, the reception of the report also created the impression that the commission coined the term; yet, since the 1980s some Muslim communities in Britain have been using the term Islamophobia.

of anti-Muslim racism as a discourse othering the Muslim subject through the entanglement of claims of patriarchy, anti-Semitism, and lack of secularism. Furthermore, anti-Muslim racism marshals a variegated batch of stereotypes around the idea of a archetypical Muslim subject positing an innate difference and incompatibility between Muslims and Germans (see also: Shooman, 2014). In her analysis about how the Other is constructed in Germany, Attia (2009, 152) notes how cultures are organized through a linear model of development, in which Germany presents itself as the embodiment of justice, freedom, and rationality, while representing Islam in an earlier stage of this process.

While critically engaging and elaborating upon these theories and concepts, I take another conceptual route insofar as I seek to connect at least three analytical dimensions: first, the ongoing and contingent process of state crafting and the inscription and articulation of racism in the state; second, the way in which racism, as an open, contingent and polyvalent discourse, accommodates different categories and constantly rejuvenates itself; and third, how the political act of representation connects the working of racism with the structuring and functioning of a racial state.

Neither biology, nor culture and religion exhaust racism, thus, I depart from the idea that racism has never been immutable, neither completely determined by a single category nor final in its meanings and operations. This understanding of racism follows Ann L. Stoler (2016, 2002, 1995) and Michel Foucault's (1997) thoughts about racism as a discursive bricolage, namely, racism's inherent ability to recover, accommodate, and modify a wide range of ideas from different discursive archives in the process of establishing varieties of human beings and hierarchical relations among them. Thus, one of racism's defining features is its "polyvalent mobility", i.e. racism's capacity to renew itself, to be used in different ways and for diverse purposes (Stoler, 2002, 376).[11]

Approaching racism as a polyvalent and contingent process bypasses the search for and debate about its precise origin—for instance, whether it begins with the establishment of modernity through the expulsion of Jews and Muslims in 1492 from the Iberian peninsula and the "discovery" of the "New World", or in the 19th century with the establishment of science—shifting the focus on how racial formations have been produced and molded by specific and historical relations of power thereby developing different and manifold in-situ historiographies.

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11   "Racial formations combine elements of *fixity and fluidity* in ways that make them both resilient and impervious to empirical, experiential counterclaims" (Stoler, 2016, 239 [emphasis in the original]).

Furthermore, racism changes and renews itself by drawing from old vocabularies, while engaging with contemporary—and often emancipatory—political claims and projects. This framework can help to elucidate how the present-day racial characterization of Muslims, on the one hand, draws on the Orientalist archive, eugenics, the *mission civilisatrice*, racial historicism and, on the other hand, allies its arguments instrumentalizing democratic, feminist, anti-homophobic, and human rights claims.

Racism has never been only about phenotypical characteristics. Rather, it has entailed a complex and contingent discourse in which religion, culture and cultural competences, "ethnicity", time, history, class, skin color, odors, moral codes, sexuality, and gender intertwined in fixing ontologies and creating hierarchies between them, influencing processes of inclusion and exclusion, violence, discrimination, but also establishing privileges.

Another advantage resides in the particularities of the German migration and integration politics. Several authors noted a moment in the German political debate in which the category Muslim replaced the former notions of the foreigner, the Turk, the Southlander, the "guest worker" and the migrant to denote subjects and populations perceived, constructed, and interpellated as non-Germans (Attia, 2007; Schiffauer, 2014; Shooman & Spielhaus, 2010; Tezcan, 2012).

There is a vast literature, directly or indirectly, dealing with the history of the presence of Muslims, or better say, the presence of Muslim "migrants" in Germany. These accounts often trace the origin of the presence of Muslims in West Germany's "guest worker" program around the 1960's, when Muslims were not addressed as Muslims but as temporary "guest workers". Worldly circumstances, such as the first oil crisis during the unfolding Cold War, led Germany to cease the recruitment of foreign labor. The "guest workers" became migrants and "cultural foreigners" (Attia, 2009), and instead of going back home, as the government expected and incented, their families joined them.

Afterwards, integration, as a national policy, powerfully made its entrance around the 1980's, and it was presented along with tolerance, as the solution for the coexistence of people with different "mentalities", cultures, and religions (Kohl, 1982). The debate, though, was still centered on migrants, foreigners, and also refugees.

At the global and domestic levels different events such as the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the so-called Rushdie affair in Britain, and the first "headscarf debate" in France both in 1989, the Gulf War in 1990, and domestically, German reunification in 1989, changes in the German naturalization law in 1999, and the ensuing *Leitkultur* debate, prefigured the discursive rendering of migrants and foreigners into Muslims. However, it was not until the 9/11 attacks, the

subsequent "War on Terror", or "Long War" and the discovery that the attacks had been planned on German soil that the category Muslim completely took over the political debate, revealing a set of latent imaginaries about Muslims and Islam that were already well cemented. This involved the transferring of old problems and sedimented stereotypes, and the crafting of new ones into a subject position primarily defined by religion, thereby conflating different categories in the making of the Muslim subject.

However, locating the origin of the Muslim presence in the "guest worker" program is problematic in some regards. Not only there were Muslims prior to this historical episode, as thriving communities (Abdullah, 1981; Baer, 2015; Jonker, 2016), as prisoners of war and soldiers (Motadel, 2014), and as subjects of German colonial rule (Habermas, 2012; Schulze, 2000; Schwanitz, 2008; Tezcan, 2012), but also Islam and Muslims were present in the imagination and writings of key German figures of the Enlightenment referenced by Schäuble such as Kant, Hegel, and Goethe (Almond, 2010), thinkers like Weber and Marx (Farris, 2014b; Said, 1978; Turner, 1974, 1978), but also Muslims and Jews as "Semites" were fundamental in the racial crafting of the figure of the Aryan (Anidjar, 2003, 2008; Massad, 2015). Nevertheless, my central contention about locating the presence of Muslims in Germany as unfolding after the "guest worker" program resides in the political uses it can serve, in how the past becomes a political instrument for thinking for the present. In the context of the DIK it has been used to foreground statements like *Muslims just arrived in Germany recently* and *Islam is a new religion for Germany*, from which emerges the imperative of integration while rendering Muslims as alien subjects of the national body. Moreover, it enables the dissemination of fictional accounts about a homogenous and cohesive national state, in which Whiteness, Christianity, and the overcoming of anti-Semitism became the markers of German identity. The "short" time-span of Muslims on German territory constitutes one of the rationalities behind the integration imperative, and it is part and parcel of the discourse sustaining the crafting of an ontological and temporal distinction between Germans and Muslims.[12]

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12   In 1956, West Germany began to recruit foreign labor, first in Italy, Greece, and Spain in that same year and subsequently in Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia in 1961, 1964, and 1968 respectively. In East Germany, the first "contract workers" arrived from Poland in 1963. After the political division of the two Germanys, the East suffered a decrease in labor power due to the migration of workers to the West. After the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the situation intensified, which led the GDR to sign contracts in 1967 with Hungary, in 1967 with Algeria, in 1975 and 1980 with Cuba, in 1977 with Vietnam, and with Mozambique in 1980. These workers were settled in collective housing and were almost invisible in the everyday life of GDR citizens (Göktürk, Gramling & Kaes, 2007).

In addition to the understating of racism as an open contingent process, my analysis of the DIK locates the racial problematization of Muslims within the framework of the German state, its functioning and its ongoing reconfiguration. For this purpose, I approach the German state by means of two interrelated theoretical positions stressing the relation between racism and state formations, namely, Foucault's technologies of power, and Goldberg's ideas about racial states.

On the one hand, engaging with and building upon Foucault's (1990, 1997, 2007, 2008) concepts of biopower and governmentality allows me to think of the German state as a relational and contingent process. For the argument here, biopolitics refers to the technology of power producing and regulating the population as a political problem. Biopower's domains concern the control and measurement of the population in statistical terms—its illness, birth rates, etc.—but of particular interest here is that biopolitics also addresses "the control over relations between the human race" (Foucault, 1997, 245). The aim of such control concerns the equilibrium in order to defend the social body— the population—from internal dangers. Therefore, biopolitics entails both a technology of regulation and security requiring for its functioning a highly complex system of knowledge and information centralized and coordinated by the state.

Within a biopolitical state, racism performs two complementary functions. First, it enables the creation of breaks and caesuras in the continuum of the population; in other words, it allows for the subdivision of the population into races. This first function is complemented by a second one, the warfare relation, which entails the recoding of the discourse on war as a means for understanding power relations and its workings in dividing the social body, in which in order to live you must kill, for racism the sentence is translated into "if you want to live, the other must die" (Foucault, 1997, 255). Improving by eliminating, eliminating to improve.[13] Furthermore, the biopolitical preemptive strike articulated in the discourse of defending the society relies on temporal imaginaries, futuristic doomed scenarios, legitimizing the intervention of the state.

In the following I use the concept of biopower to analyze how the DIK, through the polyvalent racial discourse, divides and ranks the German

13   Killing in Foucault's terms also refers to political death, which does not entail a direct act of extermination or murdering, but to the rejection and expulsion of the inferior races from the political body, i.e., biopower also manifests itself through mechanisms of segregation, exclusion, and discrimination. Thus, racism works as the principle that justifies the death function of the technology of power aimed at the population by direct or indirect killing.

population into Germans and Muslims. Once this caesura is at work, the DIK has brought several dimensions of the social existence of Muslims into political calculations and strategies as a means to achieve its aim: the crafting of the German-Muslim subject. Though, biopolitics as a power technology requires the analytical tool to understand processes of subject formation by means of guidance and self-guidance, that is to say, governmentality.

Broadly defined as the as "the conduct of conduct" (Foucault, 2007, 93), governmentality stands for a technology of power seeking to form and reform subjectivities. Thus, governmentality "entails an attempt to affect and shape in some way who and what individuals and collectivities are and should be" (Dean, 2009, 20). Furthermore, governmentality relies on strategies and tactics and instrumentalizes laws to govern, supposing the existence of moral and normative frameworks of reference. It addresses individuals and populations. It moves with ease between state agencies and civil society, and highlights the intrinsic relation between the processes of subject and state formation. Thus, biopolitics and governmentality provide analytical tools for the understanding of some of the tactics and strategies performed by the DIK in its effort to govern Muslims and transform their subjectivities.

Governmentality, in particular, can shed light on how, after the German population was biopolitically split, the DIK has sought to conduct the conducts of Muslims in several spheres of life and with reference to a particular normative framework. Furthermore, both concepts include the analysis of how the state simultaneously redefines itself while it seeks to form subjects. According to Foucault, the biopolitical production of the population unlocked the art of government. As I show in the next chapters, something similar has been carried out by the DIK. Politically, it produced the Muslim population as an aggregate of Muslim individuals with constant characteristics, diverse in its composition but still a unity; such crafting, in turn, has allowed to the DIK, in a subsequent discursive step, to address the guidance of Muslim conducts. Thus, the German state constructs and reconstructs itself and the identities of its population through a series of representational and relational effects. Within this theoretical framework, the focus moves away from an immutable idea of the state and its institutions, allowing an emphasis on the tactics and strategies that co-determine subjects and state formation.

Three scholars in Germany, Schirin Amir-Moazami (2009a, 2009b, 2011a, 2011b), Frank Peter (2010), and Levent Tezcan (2008, 2011, 2012) have analyzed some aspects of the DIK using the frame of governmentality while exploring the DIK's regulation of Muslim gender roles, tolerance politics, and the crafting of the Muslim subject respectively. This body of literature, although problematizing the DIK's self-presented neutrality, and highlighting its presence and

work as a means to control and regulate the Muslim population in Germany, did not consider the central linkage between racism and institutional control, which constitutes a focal axis of the present book.

Racism, in Amir-Moazami, Peter, and Tezcan's critical accounts, did not figure at all as a category informing the irruption of the DIK, its integration politics, its representations about Muslims, and its interaction with some of the categories they did study such as gender, tolerance, and citizenship. The absence of race in these accounts may be the result of leaving out biopower—as the technology of power creating racial divisions within the continuum spectrum of humanity—from the framework of governmentality. However, not only biopower unlocked governmentality, but also the latter enhanced the connection between the different technologies of power analyzed by Foucault, from discipline and biopower to the techniques of the self of his later work (Foucault, 2011).

Therefore, the present work represents an attempt to contribute to these critical accounts of the DIK by emphasizing the functions of racism within the framework of the German state and the Conference. Additionally, I want to push Tezcan's argument further in regard to the DIK as a dispositif producing the Muslim subject, and explore the racial dynamics behind the intention of forming an authorized and novel subject formation. I argue that the making of the Muslim subject depends upon its racial characterization, which in turns, relates to the rendering of Muslims as atavistic figures of the past. This creates the ideological need to reform it by means of biopolitical and governmental integration. But the DIK has also produced investments in the future, the racially informed political project to turn the Muslim subject into a German-Muslim—the DIK's explicit leitmotif. In this sense, the making of the Muslim subject unfolds through different overlapping temporalities producing at least three archetypical Muslim subject formations: the traditional Muslim of the past, the un-integrated Muslim of the present, and the German-Muslim to come. Moreover, I contend that without the racial characterization and representation of Muslims, the production of the Muslim subject would be impossible, since the complex entanglement of race, gender, sexuality, and history constitute the main source that crafts the Muslim subject as racially different.

On the other hand, following Goldberg (2002), I think of the German state as a racial state because race is integral to the founding myths and the functioning of modern nation-states. Racial states are bound to the emergence of the modern state as a project imaging and sustaining homogeneity, drawing on several philosophical and political projects such as classical liberalism, colonization, secularism, Orientalism, citizenship projects, and racial segregation. Briefly, racial states refer to state formations crafted at the crossroad of projects

of modernity and racial configurations. Thus, a racial state can deploy diverse strategies to include and exclude subjects symbolically and materially.

Following Goldberg's ideas about racial states, Salman Sayyid (2014a) has unpacked the inscription and deployments of Islamophobia as a racialized governmentality in the frame of the state. The state can enact different legislation detrimentally influencing the life of Muslims, such as the ban on the headscarf, which also reveals the gendered dimension of the racial state. It also can influence racism against Muslims by inaction, that is to say, by not responding to the attacks, discrimination, and intimidation against Muslims made by sectors of the population. Moreover, the inscription can be effected by special surveillance and monitoring policies targeting in particular Muslim individuals and Islamic organizations. Nevertheless, the state can also pursue the de-Islamization of Muslims, "which would involve the erasure of a Muslim identity" (Sayyid, 2014a, 19).

The inscription of racism in the German state regarding Muslims does not entail their de-Islamization, rather the attempt to refashioning and reform Muslims and Islam in accordance with some hegemonic discourses, read, German—modern and secular—culture. Precisely, I contend the German Islam Conference can be seen as the inscription of racism against Muslims within the structures of the state.

By providing an empirical analysis of the DIK as the state's articulation and deployment of anti-Muslim racism, this book contributes to the gap, identified by Goldberg (2002), about the relation and dialogue between state and racism theories. Thus, by analyzing the empirical materialization of a racial state it seeks to contribute to a body of literature analyzing the co-determinative processes of subject formations and practices of state crafting such as Foucault's (1997) final lecture of *Society must be defended*, further expanded by Ann L. Stoler's (1995) critique, and Salman Sayyid's (2014) discussion about the inscription of Islamophobia as a form of racism in the mechanisms of the state.

Racial time is the meta-narrative organizing the three sections of the book. Each one of the sections contains either two or three chapters. Chapter 1 focuses on the DIK's attempts to define and count Muslims in Germany. I examine, in particular, the study *Muslim Life in Germany*. This document, published in 2009, became a cornerstone, as authoritative knowledge, for the unfolding work of the DIK, providing not only figures about Muslim life in Germany, but also scientifically legitimizing political interventions, and flagging those dimension of the social existence of Muslims in dire need of attention. Here, as well, I provide a reading of images and pictures produced by the DIK against the background of racial frames of representation.

Chapter 2 continues with the exploration of how the DIK represents Muslims. In this chapter, I also map the discourses positing being Muslim as being a problem, namely, I outline the general problematization of Muslims and Islam by analyzing how the structuring of the DIK responds to an epistemological and ontological rendering of Muslims as problems. The narrative of the past organizes these two chapters, operating through a bifurcated, yet complementary narrative. On the one hand, the DIK's representations of Muslims and Islam render them as atavistic subjects and religion from a distant geography and time. From this construal, on the other hand, appears the discursive need to integrate Muslims by attuning their attitudes to the German cultural and temporal framework.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 examine to the notion of integration both as the central axis articulating the DIK's different projects pertaining to Islam and Muslims, and as a project of temporal alignment. Integration, then, emerges as the task that must be completed to solve the problems of the present and to set the conditions for a peaceful and tolerant future. While in Chapter 4, I examine what integration means for the DIK, its different dimensions, and usages, Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the concrete uses of integration for national security concerns.

The two remaining chapters flesh out the imaginaries about the future to come, and the projections about how Muslims would look like after being integrated into German society and culture. Tolerance appears as a key vehicle to reshape archaic or pre-modern Muslims into modern German-Muslims, especially in relation to issues of gender equality. This is the main focus of Chapter 6. Chapter 7 pays particular attention to the figures of the imam and the secular Muslim as strategic sites for governing Muslims, reforming Islam, and setting up the basis for the future.

The research for this book is the result of my engagement, since 2011, with the overall publications of the DIK through critical discourse analysis, as an approach that seeks to examine the forms in which power and domination are practiced in social and political contexts through discourse, while emphasizing how discourses are key in shaping the social reality, including the state, its institutions, and the identities it promulgates. I covered the first two phases of the DIK, from 2006 until 2014, and I analyzed every document published by the DIK in this time frame. These include interim reports, studies, flyers, press releases, the DIK's web pages, images, and interviews with DIK's representatives.[14]

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14   I understand discourses, following Jäger & Maier (2010, 35), as "an institutionalized way of talking that regulates and reinforces action and thereby exerts power". Regarding the methodology of analysis, I also followed Jäger and Meier's (2010, see also: Jäger

I complemented this analysis of the DIK's texts by surveying how a sample of German press media received and reacted to the institutionalization of the Conference and its projects, guided by the intention to cover, firstly, the reception of the DIK and its projects, and secondly, the wandering nature of discourses, and the wide dissemination of racial portrayals about Muslims in contemporary Germany.[15] Before I advance with the arguments outlined above, I briefly describe the DIK's structure to provide a context for the following chapters.

The German Islam Conference

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the German government's reaction towards the alleged threat that Muslims and Islam represent has been articulated through national security and integration politics. Regarding the former, immediately after 9/11 the government passed a series of security packages, law amendments, initiated a system of religious profiling, and banned Islamic organizations deemed as threatening to the German nation and its constitution. Pertaining to the integration of Muslims and Islam, the German state's most overarching project has been the establishment of the German Islam Conference.

1999) methodological cycles, combining three moments in the analysis of discourses: a structural, a detailed, and a synoptic analysis. I repeated these processes until saturation was achieved, i.e. when the arguments in the texts repeated themselves. Here, "I cannot delve at length into the limits of discourse analysis, especially in regard to the tendency of granting textual coherence and its effects in obscuring internal discursive contradictions, ruptures, and struggles (Collier 2009). The DIK's functioning, in fact, relies upon the crafting of a discursive coherence. Although presented by the Minister of the Interior as a dialogue between state representatives and Muslims (Schäuble 2006), the publications of the DIK are edited by its editorial team, which tends to create a coherent representation of the institution and its procedures. The DIK's documents have been central in different aspects, producing and disseminating knowledge pertaining to Islam and Muslims, and functioning as the basis for the implementation of policies and state interventions upon Muslim communities" (Hernández Aguilar, 2017b, 624).

15   My final corpus contained the DIK's interim reports from 2008 until 2012, the press releases and flyers from 2006 until 2014, and the eight studies and reports published by the DIK. Likewise, I transformed the DIK web page into 24 documents divided by sections. On account of the interconnected nature of the DIK with other institutions, I analyzed related documents and reports of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) and the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI). For the media sample, I gathered a total of 98 articles spanning from 2006 until 2014.

In 2006 the German government established the German Islam Conference as "the first national reaction, involving federal, regional and local authorities, to the relatively recent presence in historical terms of Muslims as a significant population group in Germany" (DIK, 2010b). However, the DIK is not a governmental reaction to the mere presence of Muslims but to what has been held as the problematic nature of their presence in German society, for the DIK appeared "to solve the problems besetting the coexistence with Muslims in *our* country" (Schäuble, 2006b [emphasis added]), caused by "the coexistence of people from different cultures" after "many years of immigration from countries that have a Muslim majority" (DIK, 2008c, 4). In brief, the DIK can be thought of simultaneously as the institutionalization of Muslims and Islam as problems, and as the German government's solution to the articulation of such problems.

Furthermore, this *reaction* has involved a whole range of actions, from the planning and carrying out of studies about the Muslim population in the country to the issuing of recommendations, plans, and policies in areas such as education, the training of imams, family, marriages, gender equality, urban planning, employment, national security and more recently the welfare and care of souls.

Thus, the DIK has been defined as a reaction, as a forum of dialogue, as the most important step to recognize Muslim life as part of Germany, and as the key site to enhance the integration of Islam and Muslims. However, what is often covered up by these self-descriptions is that the DIK was designed and led by the German state and as such responds to objectives, agendas, and parameters dictated by the state, in which the Islamic organizations as carefully selected guests, and as they were invited by the Minister of the Interior, have had little room for maneuver in determining the goals and topics of the DIK's agenda. This goes often unnoticed and it is one of the effects of the DIK; it renders its own authority invisible by cloaking it in the idea of dialogue.

At the outset, then, the DIK was a staged encounter between 15 representatives of the state and 15 Muslim representatives, though, the latter were comprised of, at least, two groups: organized Muslims, namely, representatives of the Islamic organizations; and the non-organized Muslims. Whereas 5 seats were reserved for the organizations, 10 were secured for the non-organized Muslims. This numerical logic, in turn, was based on the calculations that the organizations represent only a third of the Muslim population in Germany (DIK & Chalîl Bodenstein, 2009); thus they would represent more or less 30 percent of the Muslim population and the non-organized Muslims the rest which is not affiliated to the organizations, yet, altogether, they would be the voice of the Muslim community (DIK, 2011a); or so was the DIK's plan.

According to Levent Tezcan, who was himself a participant in the first phase of the Conference as a scientific advisor, one of the structural problems that have haunted the DIK since its inception relates to the issue of political representation, that is to say, to the questions: who should represent Muslims and for what purpose? Thus, should Muslims be represented as a religious group? Through the organizations linked with Islam as a faith? Or represented as a population comprising organized groups and non-organized Muslims? (Tezcan, 2011, 118) as the DIK structure reflects. Moreover, in societies like Germany, following Tezcan, representation unfolds across three spheres: the labor-related representation through trade unions, subjects as workers; the political representation via political parties, subjects as citizens; and the religious representation concerned with issues of Islam as a religion in the public sphere—Muslim citizens as Muslims (Tezcan, 2011, 118–199).

Since the DIK aims to institutionalize Islam, the representation of Muslims as Muslims should be restricted to the third form of representation, and that following Tezcan is a genuine task insofar as it relates, for instance, to the introduction of Islamic courses in public schools. Thus, according to German Law (DIK, 2008a), the establishment of religious courses in public schools is negotiated between state representatives and religious organizations that have decided to apply for it, and does not require the creation of a new institution; in fact, it can be seen as merely a bureaucratic procedure. However, the integration of Islam within the DIK includes the "religious dimension of the social life of Muslims" (Tezcan, 2011, 119). Therefore, the intended representation of Muslims orchestrated by the DIK illustrates an art of government and regulation, producing migrants—and German citizens— as Muslims subjects (Tezcan, 2011), and I would add as racially characterized subjects. And expanding beyond the legal and bureaucratic mechanism of granting to the Islamic organizations that apply for it the status of Corporations of Public Law, whereby the state and the organizations can negotiate the introduction of Islamic courses in public schools. In fact, Islamic organizations participated in the DIK because they saw this institution as a vehicle to acquire this legal status, while the DIK sought to condition its acquisition (Lewicki, 2014; Rosenow-Williams, 2013).[16]

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16   In the DIK's (2011c) documentation about the conference on the introduction of Islamic courses there is an overview of the current variety of programs implemented in some federal states. The volume edited by Irka-Christin Mohr & Michael Kiefer (2009) offers a comprehensive outline of the undercurrent developments in the introduction of Islamic courses, including an analysis of the elaboration of textbooks for the subject, see also: (Kiefer, Gottwald, & Ucar, 2008; Ucar & Bergmann, 2010).

Since its very inception, the DIK has functioned as a lynchpin between different levels of government, institutions, and organizations of the civil society, providing "solutions" to a series of "problems" discursively linked to Islam and Muslims. Projects concerning national security, the prevention of extremism, radicalization and "Islamism" have been launched alongside initiatives to thwart gender inequality within Muslim communities, and the alleged rise of anti-Semitism among Muslims. Moreover, the DIK has also undertaken enterprises pertaining to education such as the introduction of Islamic courses in public schools and the establishment of Islamic theology centers in German universities. Whereas the programs related to national security can be seen as direct reactions of hard power, the establishment of Islamic theology centers and Islamic education in public schools hints to a softer exercise of power, imagined as a long-term solution and as a central pathway in the reformation of Muslim subjectivities. Accordingly, the universities ideally would form German Muslim imams and pedagogues who would in turn help the German state by passing on to the Muslim communities the knowledge previously offered to them, revealing the governmental pedagogy of the DIK (Hernández Aguilar, 2016).

The DIK's compulsory articulation to German universities, furthermore, reveals the intrinsic instability and contradictions of secular rule. An important yet seldom noticed feature of the German Islam Conference is that as a state institution it cannot interfere in religious interpretations due to the neutrality of the state. Therefore, the DIK cannot, strictly speaking, posit what interpretations of Islam are "good" or "bad", creating a legal obstacle to the project of creating a German Islam with German-Muslims. In this context, the universities have been imagined and deployed as significant sites that can support the enhancing of making German-Muslims (Ahmad & Hernández Aguilar, 2018).

The establishment of the DIK responded to two explicit aims of the German government: first, to foster and enhance the integration of Muslims into German society; and second, to institutionally incorporate Islam within the existing relations of the German state with religious communities. As an expected outcome of the second point, the German government foresaw the appearance of a representative Islamic organization, with whom they could enter into a dialogue on further issues regarding Islam and Muslim life in Germany.

The DIK, furthermore, can be seen as the German case of a wider trend currently transpiring in Europe, and profoundly marked by a post 9/11 world, which catapulted Islam and Muslims into the public consciousness. This trend refers to the attempt of different European governments to integrate Islam through the establishment of national councils, which ideally would work as mediators between states and Muslim populations, articulating them

with the government and civil society. Moreover, regulative and normalizing motivations inform the project of creating national councils, which seemingly would be representative of the Muslim population and moderate in regard to the interpretation of Islam.

Currently, national Islamic councils have been established in France, Belgium, Spain, and Italy, while the DIK represents the case of Germany. Among the councils, several differences exist in regard to their reach and aims in accordance with the variety of national narratives, secular frames, and colonial histories among other factors. Notwithstanding such differences, their existence illustrates a shared political concern to engage with subjects defined primarily, and sometimes exclusively, on account of their affiliation with Islam.

One of the central impetuses of the councils can be traced back to the governments' attempt to make national versions of Islam; for Germany the production of an Islam of Germany through the DIK. Refashioning Islam by adding and supplementing a national character, as Tezcan (2011) exposes, expects and foresees the elimination of "Islamist" terrorism, deemed as global in reach and unbounded to national formations. Thus, an Islam of Germany, ideally, would secure Muslim allegiance to the nation.

Though, the making of a European version of Islam is neither an invention of the DIK, nor completely novel. In the context of German imperial expansion and colonialism, the project of Europeanizing Islam as a political scheme of regulation and control of the population loomed large in the Berlin Colonial Congress' discussions at the beginning of the 20th century (Habermas, 2012; Tezcan, 2012). More recently, the German scholar Bassam Tibi (2001, 2009) proposed the idea of a Euro-Islam as a tool to enhance the integration of Muslims in Europe, to democratize Islam, and to solve the "clash of cultures" between Europeans and Muslims. These projects not only involve normative ideas about how Islam should look like, how its followers should behave, and homogenous and sanitized versions of Europeanness and Germanness, but also neglect the manifold versions of Islam developed by European Muslims and Muslims in Europe.

Hitherto, the DIK has had three phases. The first one encompassed the preliminary and preparatory steps from its foundation in 2006 until 2009. The second from 2010 until 2014 focused on the implementation of the results achieved during the first stage. A third phase was launched in 2014; yet, my analysis is restricted to the first and second phases, covering the years between 2006 and 2014. As I argue over the course of this book, the first phase can be labeled, borrowing Foucault's (2010) phrase, as the *will to know* stage, in which the emphasis rested on producing knowledge about Muslims, which subsequently are to be implemented in the second stage, the *will to govern*.

In its first phase, the work of the DIK proceeded at two levels. The first were the plenary meetings, in which the general lines of the processes were set up and recommendations about the working groups were issued. The second level was precisely the duties of the groups, focusing on specific topics and dilemmas, and the issuing of interim reports. The main foci of the working groups during the DIK's first phase were the following: 1) the German social system and German values; 2) religious issues in the German understanding of the constitution; and 3) the economy and the media as bridge-builders (DIK, 2008c). The issue of *Security and Islamism* was set aside from the working groups and established as a roundtable.

In this stage, there were four plenary sessions: the inaugural meeting in September 2006; the second one in May 2007; the third in March 2008, which already had a main topic, i.e. the introduction of Islamic courses in public schools; and the fourth focusing on Islamic theology in higher education institutions in June 2009.

The five Islamic organizations that participated in the DIK's first phase were: the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB), the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD), the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKS), the Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany (IR), and the Alevite Community of Germany (AABK). The ten non-organized Muslims invited to this phase were: Kenan Kolat, chair of the Turkish Community in Germany (TGD); Necla Kelek, sociologist and author; Seyran Ateş, lawyer; Feridun Zaimoğlu, author and co-founder of the group Kanak Attak; Djafari Nassir, expert in development politics; Badr Mohammed, politician and intercultural manager; Walid Nakschbandi, journalist and television producer; Navid Kermani, Islamic studies scholar and journalist; Ezhar Cezairli, chair of the German-Turkish clubs; Yakar Havva, teacher of Islamic courses. In addition, different scholars and experts were also invited to participate in the working groups; Kerstin Rosenow-Williams (2012, 379) calculated that around 100 scholars were engaged during the DIK's first phase.

In its second stage, the DIK changed how it functioned. The yearly plenary meetings remained, but the *task force* replaced the working groups. The distinctiveness of the task force was to be more flexible regarding the work and topics as well as to be more connected, and therefore to have more influence on the decisions of the respective authorities. The DIK's second stage began with the plenary session held in May 2010 in which the DIK's *future* program of work was written (DIK, 2010a). The topics addressed remained almost the same, forming three key areas: (1) promoting institutional co-operation and integration, (2) fostering gender equality as a shared value, and (3) preventing extremism, radicalization, and social polarization.

In this stage the DIK conducted four plenary meetings. In May 2010, it focused on the DIK's new structure and plans. In March 2011, it concentrated on the issues of the introduction of Islamic religious instruction in public schools, the establishment of Islamic theology at universities and the training of imams in the country. In April 2012, issues concerning gender equality were on the agenda. And finally, a session focused on the prevention of social polarization and extremism in May 2013. Throughout this stage, several workshops also were organized, addressing issues such as prevention work among Muslim youth, the integration of Muslims into the labor market, and the hostility against Muslims in the country.

During the DIK's second phase, several changes occurred in the representatives of Muslims due to numerous reasons. The Islamic organizations involved were the DITIB, the AABK, and the VIKS who continued their participation. The TGD, instead of representing non-organized Muslims, was classified under the rubric of organized Muslims, thus conflating nationality with religion. Finally, two more organizations joined for the first time: the Islamic Community of Bosnians in Germany (IGDB), and the Central Council of Moroccans in Germany (ZMaD).

The ZMD withdrew its participation from the DIK's second phase. The ZMD's chair explained the withdrawal by arguing that the DIK refused to support the acquisition of the status as a Corporation of Public Law to the organizations represented in the DIK, in addition to the DIK's reluctance to address the issue of the hostility against Muslims as a form of racism in contemporary Germany (Köhler, 2010). Likewise, the IR did not participate in the DIK's second phase. Thomas de Maizière suspended the invitation to the IR because one of its member organizations, the Islamic Community Millî Görüs was at that time under investigation by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) for alleged charges of fraud and support to "Islamist" terrorism, charges that were later dismissed.

Regarding the non-organized Muslims, in the DIK's second phase participated: Hamed Abdel-Samad, political scientist and author; Bernd Ridwan Bauknecht, teacher of religion; Sineb El Masrar, editor; Gönül Halal-Mec, lawyer; Abdelmalik Hibaoui, imam; Hamideh Mohagheghi, theologian; Tuba Isik-Yigit, theologian and religious studies scholar; Armina Omerika, Islamic studies scholar; Bülent Ucar, professor of Islamic studies; and Turgut Yüksel, sociologist. The changes in the non-organized Muslims tacitly addressed two of the criticisms posed to the DIK during its first phase: first, the DIK now included Muslim women wearing headscarves, and second, it excluded well-known critics of Islam who sparked heated debates during the first phase.

In 2014, the DIK launched a third phase, focusing on the "Welfare and care of souls" (DIK, 2014c), and this was also the central topic of the first plenary meeting in January of 2015. The structure and participants of the DIK has also changed. In this new phase, there are no more non-organized Muslims, but only Islamic organizations: the AABF, the IGBD, the DITIB, the TGD, the VIKS and the ZMaD who continued their participation. Both the IR and the ZMD are participating again after the suspension and withdrawal from the second phase respectively. Two organizations have joined for the first time: the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (AMJ), and the Islamic Community of Shiite Communities in Germany (IGS).

Figuring the
Past—On the Muslim Question

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Introduction to Part 1

If there is a "Muslim question", understood as the deceptive representation and addressing of Muslims as a sealed-off, homogenous, and atavistic community, living under archaic rules, disavowing secularism, and overall posing a wide range of problems to Western governments, then the DIK can be seen as the German government's answer to such a question.

Sara Farris (2014a) lays out a compelling case for understanding current discussions about Muslims as reminiscent—yet not identical—of the Jewish question in Germany and France at the beginning of the 1870s. At that moment Jews were accused of threatening the national body and unity, since it was alleged that Jews constituted a group of their own "a nation within the nation" (Farris, 2014a, 296), excluding themselves from the polity, and living under their own religious and pre-modern rules. This construal gave rise to the forceful call for assimilation. Political emancipation was therefore presented as a promise and as a reward for those Jews who assimilate themselves by disavowing their religion and pledging their allegiance to the nation.[1]

In contemporary Germany, Muslims have been accused of living in a world of their own: in unruly parallel societies (*Parallelgesellschaften*) governed not by German law but Shariʾa. Likewise, it has been argued that Muslims innately disavow secularism based on the content of the Qurʾan and Islam. Moreover, the integration of Muslims in German society has been presented as a promise not of political but rather cultural emancipation, especially for Muslim women and queer Muslims. This is because one of the most recurrent allegations about Muslim backwardness, so the argument goes, is their patriarchal understanding of gender roles and sexuality. In addition to these allegations, Muslims have also been charged with anti-Semitism. Thus, as Iman Attia (2007, 17) has critically documented, the racial representation of Muslims in Germany relies on three interrelated discourses: Muslims do not abide by secularism; they live

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1 Salman Sayyid (2014b, 3) conceptualizes the "Muslim Question" as "a series of interrogations and speculations in which Islam and/or Muslims exist as a difficulty that needs to be addressed", creating the conditions, and calling for the state's involvement in different areas of Muslim life. Anne Norton's (2013) essay *On the Muslim Question* provides an analysis and a map of the contemporary contours of the problematization of Muslims. For an argument about how the "Jewish Question" represents a failure of the idea of Europe in relation to the making of minorities vis-à-vis the crafting of nation states see Aamir Mufti's (2007) *Enlightenment in the Colony. The Jewish Question and the Crisis of Postcolonial Culture.* Wendy Brown (2008, 48–76) has also developed a poignant argument about the supplementary relation between the "Jewish Question" and the "Woman Question".

in a world of gender inequality, and they are anti-Semitic. To this, it should be added the more recent, but prominent, framing of Muslims as homophobes (El-Tayeb, 2012).[2]

However, the "Muslim question" has also been explicitly formulated in the German media. Framed in the aftermath of the London attacks and the murder of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands, an article from the national newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (*FAZ*) titled "The Muslim question" (*Die muslimische Frage*) discusses the most violent side of this issue, i.e., terrorist violence as "Islamist Jihad" (Zastrow, 2005). The author argues that the "Muslim question" is exclusive of Europe and "Islamist Jihad" is one of its answers being shaped as a civil war arising from the tensions of the inner Islamic conflict with modernity.

The author calls for the German state to confront the violent threat posed to Europe by the "Muslim Question" through an encompassing answer involving not only the use of the security apparatuses, but also all the political and legal instruments of the state with a well-defined aim:

> With decisiveness and in all seriousness, with push and pull, the democratization and liberalization of the Muslim minority must be pushed forward. An essential requirement to make this happen is to open channels of communication with this community's organizations. The Muslim minority must be articulated within the democratic state. Otherwise, we are throwing them to the wolves.
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> ZASTROW, 2005, 1 [author's translation]

The call was heard. The Islam Conference is the German state's attempt to articulate the Muslim minority—using the Islamic organizations as proxies, and seeking, among other issues, to defuse the violence, and potential violence, allegedly rising from Muslim communities.

Although the DIK's representatives have not framed this institution as the answer to the "Muslim question", different solutions have been offered to what has been deemed a problematic presence. The DIK has been predicated as the state "reaction" to a social reality marked by—cultural—conflicts between

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2   In Germany, comparing anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim racism or Islamophobia has been the source of heated polemics and debates, though, "comparison does not mean equalization" (Ünal, 2016, 35), rather "comparing always leaves the question open as to whether one will find parallels, differences, or, in most cases, both" (Hafez, 2016, 19). For an insightful analysis of the similarities and differences between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in Germany see: (Benz, 2016; Schiffer & Wagner, 2009, 2011; Shooman, 2012b).

Muslims and Germans. At the outset, the DIK departed from an inherent boundary, dividing Muslims from Germans, and it has followed the recurrent themes whereby anti-Muslim racism unfolds pointed out by Attia, namely, it addresses the disavowal of secularism, anti-Semitism, gender injustice and inequality, allegedly reigning in Muslim communities, although Muslim homophobia was never mentioned or even alluded during the whole existence of the DIK in spite of its prominence in media coverage of Islam and Muslims.

In this part, I answer the questions foregrounding the "Muslim question" in the context of the DIK, in other words, who are these Muslims fracturing the German social fabric? How they are represented as problems? Chapter 1 looks at the DIK's political act of defining Muslims, and the procedures whereby the DIK defines and counts Muslims. At first glance, defining, counting, and assessing how many Muslims live in Germany might appear simple and trivial, something that governments usually do; however, these actions are crucial in several ways. On the one hand, counting allows the calculation of risks and potential risks. Moreover, in the DIK's case, it enables the crafting of a particular representation of German society comprised of at least two different groups: population and sub-population, the German majority and the Muslim minority respectively. On the other hand, defining who is a Muslim and who counts as one not only produces demographical figures, but also reveals imaginaries about what dimensions constitute a German and a Muslim subject, symbolically enabling the establishment of fixed boundaries. As I show, being Muslim, as far as the DIK is concerned, involves not so much religiosity, rather a birthplace that becomes an inescapable destiny; the same goes for the German subject, who amidst these calculations cannot be a Muslim even if she or he truly decides to become one. In Chapter 2, I outline the general lines whereby the DIK represents Muslims and Islam as problems of governmental rule, and as different from the German population. This sketch is based on the DIK's reports, and interim résumés.

These two chapters describe the DIK's politics of the past, the discursive operations through which the DIK situates Muslims in a discordant temporal and geographical zone: IslamLand (Abu-Lughod, 2013). Making Muslims problematic subjects of an anachronistic time-world is completely necessary, for it becomes the point of departure of integrative measures seeking to transform Muslims in the present in order to secure the peaceful future to come. In this sense, my contention in these chapters is twofold, integration as a political paradigm requires for its functioning not-yet-integrated subjects, representing Muslims as figures of the past fulfills this need. And this form of representing Muslims draws on, reconfigures, and updates a racial archive.

Who are These Muslims? About the Past and the New Orient

1.1 About the New Orient

For the last two decades in Europe, the idea of Muslims as problematic has been accompanied by a growing interest in obtaining valid knowledge about Muslim populations. However, as Birgitte S. Johansen & Riem Spielhaus (2012, 81–82) argue, counting Muslims in Europe is far more complex than just reaching solid figures. The surveys are part and parcel of the process of rendering the "Muslim" into a political category, and as such the surveys are also rich sources for knowing and understanding both the number of Muslims in Europe, and "the current social imaginaries about who these 'Muslims' supposedly are" (Johansen & Spielhaus, 2012, 82).

The Islam Conference has also sought to establish the quantity of Muslims living in Germany and their religious, cultural, and even emotional and marital behaviors. In this chapter, I trace a set of racially informed imaginaries determining who is a Muslim in Germany, who can be counted as one, and who cannot—despite being Muslim—be considered as a part of the Muslim population.

In this analysis, I draw on Edward W. Said's magnum opus *Orientalism* (1978). For the argument here, Orientalism represents a stable and changing historical discourse elaborated in the West about what the West considered the Orient. As a Western enterprise, product, and archive Orientalism thus bears more relation to the West than to what is deemed to be the Orient. I show Orientalism's validity and currency by exposing how the definition of who is a Muslim depends upon the construction of a totalizing imagined geography whereby a Muslim can be identified. This chapter thus delves into the DIK's politics of the past, and the production of the Muslim as a figure external to Germany, who still lives and reproduces a past brought from a distant and problematic region.[1]

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1 *Orientalism* (1978) marked a watershed not just in the study of stereotyping the Orient, the Islam and the Muslim, but it has also provided a theoretical basis for the analysis of how the relation of knowledge and power relates to stereotypical representations justifying domination in the context of imperial expansion and the colonial administration. Since its publication

1.2 Canvassing Muslim Life in Germany

During its first years of existence the DIK found itself facing an internal difficulty, or at least, this was how the DIK framed its lack of national and methodical knowledge about Muslims living in Germany.[2] The DIK presented this quest for information as merely seeking to answer how many Muslims live in Germany? Yet it was by no means restricted to it, for it surveyed aspects of the social and religious existence of Muslims, in addition to measure the degree of their integration.

Then the DIK in cooperation with the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) commissioned Sonja Haug, Stephanie Müssig, and Anja Stichs to carry out the first national and comprehensive survey about Muslims in Germany. The DIK published the results in 2009 with the title, *Muslim Life in Germany, A study conducted on behalf of the German Conference on Islam* (DIK, 2009d [hereafter MLG]).

The MLG study represents the German government's reaction to the need to know Muslims in Germany. Thus, the MLG study can be thought of as productive knowledge for the purpose of governing the Muslim population. In this sense, the study is aligned with a wider trend of knowledge production about Muslims in Europe (Foroutan, 2012; Johansen & Spielhaus, 2012; Spielhaus, 2013), and it deployed statistics and demographical knowledge as means to achieve the goal of knowing the Muslim population.

Although the explicit purpose of the report is to provide valid knowledge about the number of Muslims living in Germany, the MLG study also explored and measured a wide range of topics related to the social existence of Muslims. For instance, it explored questions such as, how religious they are? Why do they practice what they practice? From which country did they come? Are there more men than women? Are there more youths than elderly? How representative are their institutions? Why does a Muslim woman wear a headscarf?

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in 1978, *Orientalism* has become an inspiration and a starting point for critical engagements about how knowledge about Islam, Muslims, and the Orient is deeply interwoven with power relations and racial representations. Though, Said's work has also been criticized. Bryan Turner (1994) provides a summary of the critiques of Said, while arguing for the currency of the Orientalism's thesis (see also: Anidjar, 2008, 39–63; Massad, 2008; Sayyid, 1997, 31–37).

2 The DIK's working group 1 assessed the lack of systematic and nationwide knowledge about Muslims living in Germany and their integration into society, positing the acquisition of such a knowledge as key "to eliminate shortcomings in relation to coexistence, we need to have access to reliable empirical information, particularly in relation to figures, the origin, level of education, social situation, religious beliefs and cultural perceptions of the Muslims living in Germany" (DIK, 2008c, 6).

How many of them wear it? Do they pray, fast, and if so, how often? How frequent are the contacts between Muslims and non-Muslims? Would they enter or accept an interreligious or "interethnic" marriage? These are just some few points of the questionnaire's 150 items. Thus, the study embeds in the biopolitical regulation of life by bringing into integrative-political calculations different spheres of the social, emotional, and private existence of Muslims in Germany.[3]

Roughly speaking, the MLG study unfolds in three sections. The first is a statistical exploration of different aspects of Muslim life in Germany, and a survey compilation aimed to determine the number of Muslims, their composition, and distribution throughout the country. The second concerns the assessment of the degree of Muslim integration in Germany. Finally, the third section focuses on a series of recommendations and practices to enhance and improve their integration. In addition to this, the study offers a clear but problematic, definition about what dimensions constitute the Muslim subject, i.e., one of the preliminary tasks for conducting the study was to define *a priori* who is a Muslim, and thus to develop the categories to identify them.

In accordance with the DIK's first phase—the will to know stage—the report and its publication emphasize the production of knowledge about Muslims, which subsequently, in its second phase—the will to govern—could be turned into concrete practices and policies. In the following section, I discuss some of Said's (1978) thoughts, ranging from the production of the Orient and the Oriental on account of the striking resemblances this colonial enterprise bears to how the MLG study defines Muslims, namely, through imaginative geography and othering.

Orientalism, as a cross-disciplinarian, durable, and changing discourse imposing a variegated but limited set of imaginaries about the Orient, also referred to the interdependency of academic knowledge about the Orient, and ontological and epistemological styles of thinking distinguishing the West from the Orient (Said, 1978, 2–3). Based on this, Orientalism represented a way of exercising authority and domination upon the Orient. Furthermore, Said (1978) also distinguished between latent Orientalism as the authority's stability to talk and define the Orient, and manifest Orientalism as the ruptures and changes within the discourse.

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3   According to Michel Foucault (2007, 273–275), the origins of statistics were related to the production of knowledge for the state's purpose to govern populations and, thus, crucial for the configuration of biopolitics—the technology of power producing while at the same time controlling the population as a political issue.

The MLG study anchors and reproduces latent Orientalism; it presupposes the authority of the German state to look academically via statistics upon subjects that come from a region that metonymically is labeled as "Muslim countries". Correspondingly, it reproduces and circulates an ontological distinction between this geography and its people vis-à-vis Germany and the Germans.

Cultural hegemony intrinsically attaches to the Orientalist discourse, allowing the supposition of the West's superiority over the Orient, Germany upon "Muslim countries". Integration in particular creates a gap between Germans and Muslims; culturally, Muslims have not yet arrived at the stage in which Germans are already situated by their birthright.

In order to be representative, the MLG study needed a balanced sample, particularly by distancing itself from other measurements focused mostly on the Turkish-Muslim population in Germany. This was due to the fact that the MLG study aimed to cover *all* of the Muslims in Germany regardless of their country of origin or "ethnicity" (DIK, 2009d, 34)—including Germany, but not "ethnic" Germans, i.e., from the outset, the study implicitly posits that "ethnic" Germans who are Muslims are not part of Muslim life in Germany.[4]

The first step entailed the construction of the concept of "predominantly Muslim countries of origin" (DIK, 2009d, 35). In the study, the only information provided about the construction of the category is the category itself, that is to say, countries predominantly Muslim. The MLG study just presents a list of forty-nine countries, countries forming a revisited Orient, or IslamLand as Abu-Lughod (2013, 69) has also ironically termed the "mythical" and "problematic" region from which Muslims came from.

The subsequent step in the construction of the sample is also possible only through the latent authority of the academics performing the study. From the list of 49 countries, the study created six sub-regions based on the assumption that they share a "geographical and cultural criteria" and two countries were taken as singular, resulting in eight categories: "Southeast Europe, Central Asia/CIS, South/Southeast Asia (including Afghanistan), Middle East, North Africa, other parts of Africa. Turkey and Iran were considered separately on account of their special political and religious characteristics"

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4   "The structure of the sample is a main element of the MLG study, as this is the first research project that aims to reach Muslims of all religious persuasions, from all countries of origin and ethnic groups as comprehensively as possible throughout Germany in order to obtain reliable information about the number and structure of this population group" (DIK, 2009d, 34).

(DIK, 2009d, 47)—and here, one needs to argue that every country has special political and religious characteristics.

The only information given about how the grouping was decided is minimal, namely, "geographical and cultural criteria"—parameters never explained or unpacked in the text since geography and culture already stand for the explanation. The divisions and subdivisions involve arbitrary representations about an imagined geography not only on account of the lack of explanation, but also since they constitute reductionist representations about regions and countries, their histories, and their internal and external differences. One wonders, for instance, about the cultural and geographical plausibility of the category "other parts of Africa", given that it comprises countries such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nigeria to name just a few, which are separated by thousands of kilometers, each one of them with a diversity of internal languages, religions, histories and so on. Then, what makes these geographies close, or these cultures similar but an exercise of power/knowledge? Then, the MLG study implicitly imagines "predominantly Muslim countries of origin", including "other parts of Africa", as anachronistic spaces (McClintock, 1995), countries, regions, and continents where culture can be capture at a glance, and more importantly have remained unchanged, static. The historical and cultural change of these spaces disappears, instead a view is offered in which blocks of countries—arbitrarily glued—appear with constant cultural characteristics.

The MLG study produces a homogenizing category conflating nationality, "ethnicity", culture, religion, and Islamic denomination for the purpose of knowing and classifying, comparing and contrasting. And, after all the partitions and classifications were done, what remains and sustains the categorization is the presupposed identity of the people who come from that region, a sort of Muslim and foreigner's essence, travelling with the subjects geographically from the Orient towards Germany, but also through time, which is the premise informing the notion of "migration background", the uninterrupted traveling of the racially characterized essence of being foreigner from generation to generation.

Thus, the category predominantly Muslim countries and its sub-regions resemble the production of the Orient by means of the imaginative geography procedures, i.e., the interconnection between a radical realism, an anatomic rhetoric, and paranoia (Said, 1978, 72–73). I analyze these procedures vis-à-vis the categories of the MLG study, Muslim countries and sub-regions, to illustrate the links between making the Orient and crafting the category predominantly Muslim countries.

Radical realism refers to an intellectual attitude that supposes the mere acts of naming and defining provide ontological stability to that which is being named and defined:

> Philosophically, then, the kind of language, thought, and vision that I have been calling Orientalism very generally is a form of radical realism; anyone employing Orientalism, which is the habit for dealing with questions, objects, qualities, and regions deemed Oriental, will designate, name, point to, fix what he is talking or thinking about with a word or phrase, which then is considered either to have acquired, or more simply to be, reality.
>
> SAID, 1978, 72

The MLG study deploys radical realism in the remaking of the Orient. The labeling of the six regions establishes them as concrete realities that can be fixed and further scrutinized due to their "cultural and geographical proximity". As mentioned, there is neither an explanation about what makes the geographical proximity relevant for the classification nor what it exactly means to be culturally close, yet the classification appears, or it is suggested as valid due to the scientific aura emanating from the structure of the study.[5]

The second knowledge of imaginative geography refers to a rhetoric which is "anatomical and enumerative: to use its vocabulary is to engage in the particularizing and dividing of things Oriental into manageable parts" (Said, 1978, 72). The MLG study also uses this tactic by forging the totalizing category Muslim countries, then, it subdivides it into regions that can be studied and compared, but moreover, the MLG study establishes the conditions for specific kinds of managements. Hence, enabling the deployment of tailored strategies that can be used for each one of the eight regions, and Turkey and Turkish Muslims received the lion's share of analysis and practical recommendations.[6]

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5   Stuart Hall et al. (1978, 9) pointed out the ideological function of statistics. Accordingly, this kind of knowledge has the function of fixing, "[a] free floating and controversial impression in the hard incontrovertible soil of numbers", a strategy running throughout the MLG study and which has the effect of creating the sense that the classification of regions seems plausible and real when framed in the detailed statistical data provided in the study.

6   Said (1978, 50) argued that one of the Orientalist premises was the production of an immense quantity of knowledge, "we must learn to accept enormous, indiscriminate size plus an almost infinite capacity for subdivisions as one of the chief characteristics of Orientalism—one that is evident in its confusing amalgam of imperial vagueness and precise detail".

Finally, the third type of knowledge is psychological and refers to the paranoia informing Orientalism, i.e., as the process of thinking based on fear, anxiety, and distrust. For instance, in the study, the paranoia that a high degree of religiosity can nurture radicalization processes permeates the measurements and classification about the different levels of religiosity of Muslims. Likewise, the moral panic about "Islamist" violence implicitly informs the analysis of the residential distribution of Muslims, i.e., if they live in neighborhoods with a high proportion of foreigners or "natives" (DIK, 2009d, 263). The DIK has repeatedly stated that extremism, radicalization and "Islamism" occurred in the "immediate environment" of Muslims (DIK, 2008c, 15–16; Friedrich, 2011, 3), a subtle reference to the trope of the "parallel society", alleged "ethnic" enclaves in which the security authorities reach is limited and which constitute the "breeding ground" (DIK, 2008c, 15) for "Islamists". Thus, the MLG study's measurement about the neighborhoods' quality, with a high proportion of foreigners or not, can be linked to the purpose of knowing the extent of the rowdy "parallel societies".

Once the category Muslim countries was stabilized and subdivided into regions, the MLG study, as a subsequent step, retrieved a sample from the telephone directory using an onomastic principle, namely, the selection was based on the erroneous assumption that there are typical Muslim names and surnames. These were acquired from the Central Register of Foreigners (AZR). Despite the claims that the procedure was optimal for researching "foreign populations", the outcome was far from successful. The identification of Muslim names and surnames resulted in a sample in which just half of those selected, identified themselves as Muslims, contradicting the flawed assumption that there are typical Muslim names and surnames.

Briefly put, the MLG study first imagined and discursively produced a whole region. Second, the study subdivided this region into eight analytical subdivisions. Third, the MLG study acquired a list with typical Muslim names and surnames, which finally was surveyed in the telephone directory. This constitutes the *a priori* definition of a Muslim developed by the MLG study, as a *place of origin* and a *surname*.

The names and surnames became the signifiers in the construction of two overlapping essences, the foreigner and the Muslim. Through them, the study subsumed a whole identity in a group of letters constructed as something not inherently German, but rather coming from a far away region and carrying a distinct culture and religion. This simplistic, reductionist, and racist strategy conflates millions of diverse biographical experiences under a single tautological identity, being a *Muslim from a Muslim country* with a *Muslim name*.

The MLG study's definition of the Muslim subject has several consequences. For instance, the study grouped German citizens of Islamic faith with a

population defined as a foreign. Thus, German citizens with "migration background" and Islamic faith by being grouped with foreigners are symbolically turned into non-citizens and fictive Germans. The onomastic selection allows the reification of Muslims as foreigners. Using the same figures of the MLG study, half of the almost four millions Muslims living in Germany are German citizens, yet they are citizens of a different kind, their country of origin—despite being born in Germany—and religious adscription mark them as non-citizens. As has been often stated by DIK (2008c, 2009b), Muslims just recently arrived to Germany; they belong or can fully belong on the condition of the fulfillment of integration's preconditions. These statements serve the purpose of reimaging and reifying a homogenous version of the German nation. The insistence on the short span of time of Muslim presence in Germany refers to the DIK's racial time politics, the projection of an imagined homogeneity onto the past.

Nevertheless, according to the MLG study the onomastic principle provides several advantages since it ensures "that naturalized persons originating from the countries in question are also included in the sample" (DIK, 2009d, 37–38). Likewise, it is stated that the legitimacy of the onomastic principle is based on the fact that it has been established as a standard principle for researching foreign or migrant populations (DIK, 2009d, 38). Naturalized persons constitute part of the broader category people with "migration background", covering persons born and raised in Germany and holding a German passport but whose parents or grandparents' country of origin is not Germany. The label "migration background" constitutes a crucial categorization in the production of Muslims as racially characterized subjects, as it relates to a continuous essence, in which race is cloaked in culture. Furthermore, it is a political category to identify subjects which in turn naturalizes differences, also disguised in the fuzzy category "the experience of migration" (DIK, 2009d, 110–111).[7]

Likewise, "migration background" stands as the principle for a hierarchical system of human classification, a social taxonomy that moves within the first caesura between Germans and foreigners imputing to each of them different cultural essences. Subsequently, "migration background" crafts a second binary, i.e. Germans and Germans with "migration background" and within the latter three categories: a) the first generation, the "guest workers" with a direct experience of migration, b) the second generation, the daughters and sons of the latter, with or without a direct sense of migration, and finally c) the third

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7   However, the notion of "migration background" can serve other purposes as well, e.g. the measurements of discriminatory practices, however, still carrying notions of difference since someone with "migration background" will always and strictly carry such background despite the fact that she or he has never migrated.

generation, the grandsons and granddaughters of the "guest workers", who most likely have been socialized completely on German soil.

This system of classification allows for the circulation of several assumptions, the most prominent being the different levels of integration and competences in the German language among the generations (DIK, 2009d, 233–234). Additionally, the taxonomy enables the reification and the time travelling of two essences, being a foreigner and not being German. Naturalized Germans and Germans with a "relevant migration background" have been constructed as not completely Germans or *echte Deutsche*, they are included in the political body while remaining excluded from the essence of Germanness. The differentiation is made through their grouping with a "foreign" population. "Migration background" works as an undercover form of race since it refers to ontologies determined by birthplace.

Another outcome of the MLG's definition of Muslim entails that "ethnic" and "native" Germans—as the study termed Germans without a "migration background", in other words, "pure" Germans—converted to Islam will not be taken into account. The study gave the following reason: "Germans without a migrant background who have converted to Islam are not covered by this study. This is due to the fact that the focus of this study is on determining the number of Muslims with a migrant background" (DIK, 2009d, 54). In the statements, it is clear that what it is important for the MLG study and the DIK is to know the foreign Muslims and not Muslims in general as is stated at the beginning of the study.

Therefore, in the MLG study, what ultimately determines the essence of being a Muslim is not primarily religion, rather the principle of being foreigner, which in turn, results in the construction of Muslims as racially characterized subjects. The distinction also delineates two different types of being German, having or not a migration background which results in the creation of two categories to be included and analyzed: "persons with a relevant foreign nationality" and "Germans with a relevant migrant background" (DIK, 2009d, 56); i.e., foreigners and, ironically, German foreigners.

As Spielhaus (2013) pointed out, the MLG study conflates religiosity with "ethnicity", a similar trend in surveying Muslims all over Europe (Johansen & Spielhaus, 2012), making invisible those Muslims without "migration background" or those who do not come from one of the countries listed as predominantly Muslim.

Certainly, the onomastic method used to identify "foreign" Muslims will be useless for distinguishing "ethnic" Germans who have converted to Islam. Primarily, because the list was retrieved from the foreign office, in which Germans are not registered, and which is also used as a justification for not including

them in the study. Though, that is precisely the problem with the method; it is designed on a fundamental level to produce a type of identification of the Other as a foreigner.

Another reason presented in the study for not including Germans without a "migration background" who have converted to Islam is the absence of solid figures about the precise number of cases because conversion to Islam is rarely documented. According to the MLG study, the estimations of conversions vary between 13,000 and 100,000 (DIK, 2009d, 54). Regardless if it is 13,000, 100,000 or a figure in between, these are considerable numbers, especially, because the MLG study also analyzed sub-populations of Muslims with lower figures. As stated by the MLG study, the total sum of Muslims from Albania living in Germany are 8,416 or from Bulgaria just 1,503 (DIK, 2009d, 63), yet they are included in the research project insofar as they are labeled as foreign Muslim subjects.

Although the exclusion of German converts is justified by pragmatic and methodological stances, it is important to note that the omission works within the parameters that associate being Muslim with being a foreigner. This procedure does not only work within the assumption but also reifies it, positing the idea that a White German cannot be a true Muslim and the silent corollary that a Muslim cannot be a truly German.

The German-Muslim represents the subject formation that the DIK seeks to produce; ironically, there are already German Muslims, those "ethnic" or "White" Germans who have converted to Islam. They are first Germans, and then Muslims, the exact sequence aimed for the Conference. However, these subjects are not taken into account, not only in the MLG study but also in the DIK's overall procedures. What national imaginary sustains this exclusion? It is perhaps assumed that a German who has converted to Islam already knows the German language and culture, or is it perhaps an anxiety about the incompatibility of German culture with a concept of Islam based on fixed identities that cannot easily mix. The most prominent Islamic hate preacher in the country, Pierre Vogel, is a German convert to Islam, several Salafists are also German converts to Islam, and the number of conversions in Germany has grown significantly during the last years (Özyürek, 2010, 2015). One might even argue that through that exclusion the DIK refuses to recognize those Germans as Muslims. Though, what is more salient is the circulation of two essences as the basis for a system of classification with processes of inclusion and exclusion, and the undercover conflation of race and foreignness hidden in geographical distinctions.

In the last couple of decades, the conversion to Islam in Germany has been rendered as a political issue, especially against the discursive background

positing being German and being Muslim as irreconcilable identities, as the DIK's categorizations testify. In this context, as Ezra Özyürek (2015, 3) documents, the conversion to Islam in Germany is either seen as a national betrayal or as the act of becoming a potential terrorist. The MLG study silently gives in to these anxieties by not being able to imagine, in its own terms, "native" Germans as Muslims.[8]

There is an interesting and revealing exception to the categorizations of foreign Muslims and Muslims with "migration background", and it refers to French Muslims (DIK, 2009d, 56). French Muslims do not come from the revisited Orient, yet they are also not Germans with a "migration background". Hence, they do not fit in the two categories designed by the MLG study. The offered solution grouped them among the Germans with a relevant "migration background". No explanation is given about how this decision to classify them as German was made even though they come from a foreign country.

Nevertheless, what can be inferred is the rationality that France is not so "foreign" as the category "other parts of Africa" for instance. Perhaps, the study used the principle of cultural and geographical proximity based on the assumption that Germany and France have more in common culturally and geographically as Western societies. The study imputed to Muslims from France a German nationality since France does not represent a country with a predominantly Muslim population. The case of French Muslims illustrates two points: first, the flawed methodology of the study, and second, the imaginaries about national belonging and its processes of symbolic inclusion and exclusion.

Thus, the study offers two different forms of symbolic enfranchisement. On the one hand, it grants direct nationality for those outside the Orient. On the other hand, a conditional acceptance—borrowing Frank Peter's (2010) phrase—for those "coming" from the Orient even if they are born and grew up in Germany. The latter would be part of the country once they have fulfilled the prerequisites of integration. The DIK's definition politics of the Muslim subject borrows and updates the Orientalist script by producing totalizing, reductionist, and culturalist categories. This kind of identification connotatively and denotatively circulates and reifies the Muslim subject as a foreigner, despite the fact that the same study identified half of those subjects as German citizens.

The study fixes the Muslim being into a territorial essence that travels with them through time and space. Furthermore, it conflates different categories

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8   Ezra Özyürek's analysis of conversion in Germany is an extraordinary reading of the looming influence of Islamophobia in the lives of German converts to Islam, succinctly captured in the phrase "Converted Germans love Islam ... but they do not always find it easy to love born Muslims in Germany or elsewhere" (2015, 1).

such as "ethnicity", nationality, and citizenship. The measurement entails different symbolic patterns of inclusion and exclusion in the German nation. First, the study collapses the categories Muslims and foreigners, which obscures one of the results of the same study: the fact that half of the Muslims living in Germany are citizens. This collapsing is only possible on account of a previous step, which determines two forms of being Germans: on the one hand, "native" Germans and, on the other hand, persons with "migration background". The last category entailed the remnant of an essence external to Germany, and which marks German Muslim citizens as different from the natives. Thus, the study not only establishes essentialist identities for Muslims, but also for Germans since it anchors the ontologies of both in a birthplace.[9]

Second, the study illustrates the polyvalent mobility of racism as a discursive bricolage. The production of Muslims entailed the entanglement and conflation of diverse categories such as geography, names and surnames, "ethnicity", nationality, and cultural proximity in the making of the Muslim subject as Germany's Other, all this while having the Orientalist archive at hand. Thus, the MLG's racial characterization of Muslims also represents manifest changes in the Orientalist discourse.

Third, the MLG study illustrates the link between knowledge production and state power; the classification of the study produces and circulates strict social taxonomies about subjects living in the country and different paths of symbolic inclusion and exclusion. However, as briefly stated above, the MLG study did not restrict itself to quantifying Muslims, but it also inquired about several dimensions of the social and private existence of Muslims, which during the last decades have been held as problematic, such as gender inequality, "ethnic" self-segregation, unwillingness to integrate, stringent child rearing, the reasons for wearing a headscarf, marriage practices, high levels of religiosity linked with violence, and the representativeness of Islamic organizations. The MLG study scrutinized these among other dimensions producing an archive

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9   Legally, a shift occurred in the German naturalization policy. In 1999, the *ius-sanguinis* principle of national belonging was complemented with a restricted and optional *ius-solis* norm. From the first day of 2000, "a child of non-German parents with eight years of residency is automatically entitled to German citizenship at birth" (Göktürk, et al., 2007, 4), and after reaching his or her 18th birthday she or he can decide to keep the German passport or the nationality of the parents. She or he has five years maximum to make the choice. The legislation's change replaced racial belonging to the nation by a hermetic notion of cultural belonging transitioning from *ius-sanguinis* towards *ius-cultis* (Pautz, 2005). An essentialist conceptualization of culture, epitomized in the notion *Leitkultur*, emerged as the parameter to conditionally enfranchise those subjects who still were perceived to be outside the boundaries of the German Volk through processes of normalization, i.e., integration policies.

of knowledge about Muslim life and setting up the basis for management and regulation of a population defined exclusively by religion since, as I discuss in the next chapters, this knowledge serves as the foundation for practical recommendations and policies targeting Muslims.

Finally, the MLG study anchors in the current integration politics of the German state, with particular emphasis on Muslims. The imperative to integrate rehearses racial historicism, producing two different historical paths of development to Germans and Muslims. The latter, on account of their integration's deficit, still chase the integrated state of the former, and the DIK positions itself as the guide in this process. The MLG study provides the DIK with knowledge to implement the management, regulation, and integration of Muslims.

It is important to note, however, the sophistication of the MLG's portrayal of the Muslim population in Germany, at least in terms of its internal diversity, while keeping in mind as Talal Asad (1993, 17) argued, that hegemonic power not only homogenizes and totalizes, but also works the best through practices of classification and differentiation that although appearing to dissect the complexity and diversity of dominated groups, presuppose an identity.[10]

Therefore, the differentiation is directed at establishing a unity through showing the internal composition of the presumed identity. Thus, power both differentiates and homogenizes. This remark is relevant in the MLG study, which offers a depiction of the diversity of Muslim life in Germany, and yet at the same time such diversity serves to emphasize the unity of a pre-given identity, being Muslim.

One of the outcomes, not only of the MLG study but also of other DIK texts, entails the depiction of Muslim life in Germany as highly diverse. At first sight, this might appear to be a more critical and nuanced position about Muslims and Islam, pretending to distance itself from the common misrepresentation of Islam as an all-embracing monolithic culture in the line of Samuel Huntington's clash of civilization. This illustrates the reformist approach pointed out by Arun Kundnani (2014), in which the central issue is not about characterizing a one and single Islam, but distinguishing between the "good" from the "bad" Muslim (Mamdani, 2005).

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10   "While narrative history does not have to be teleological, it does presuppose an identity ('India', say) that is the subject of the narrative. Even when the identity is analyzed into its heterogeneous parts (class, gender, regional divisions, etc.) what is done, surely, is to reveal its constitution, not to dissolve its unity. The unity is maintained by those who speak in its name, and more generally by all who adjust their existence to its (sometimes shifting) requirements" (Asad, 1993, 17).

The MLG study presents a detailed portrait of Muslim diversity in Germany. It shows the different countries which they came from; the share of German Muslim citizens and Muslim foreigners; the age and gender composition of this sub-population; their distribution (informal segregation) across the nation, (e.g., 98 percent of Muslims live in the old states of Germany, West Germany before reunification), and the denomination of Islam to which they belong. And yet, regardless of the DIK's depiction of Muslim diversity, there is still the presupposition of an identity, being Muslim. Then, "what is done, surely, is to reveal its constitution, not to dissolve its unity. The unity is maintained by those who speak in its name" (Asad, 1993, 17). Those who speak in the name of Muslims—the editors of the MLG study—maintain Islam's unity; they are the ones who use the diversity of Muslims life to maintain its unity. They reveal the constitution, which does not dissolve whatsoever its unity. The following table presented by the MLG (DIK, 2009d, 91) study illustrates this point:

In the figure below (1.1), the MLG study presents a visual representation of Muslim diversity. Here, the results are about the different regions from which Muslims "originally" came from. Germany is not included, notwithstanding the fact that half of them are German citizens, that is to say, they "came from" Germany. Three continents and forty-nine countries, and yet the pie chart functions as a dispositif containing them all in a single unity and embracing identity. Despite the different socio-cultural and political histories of each country, the reasons and stories of migrations, the class or many other dimensions, this population while being diverse still can be defined as a group of Muslims.


0,4 Central Asia/CIS
1,5 other parts of Africa
1,7 Iran
4,6 South/Southeast Asia
6,9 North Africa
8,1 Middle East
13,6 Southeast Europe
63,2 Turkey

FIGURE 1.1   *Muslims according to region of origin* (%)
SOURCE: DIK (2009D, 91)

| 7,1 | Shiite |
12,7	Alevi
1,7	Ahmadi
0,1	Sufis/Mystics
0,3	Ibadis
4,0	Other
74,1	Sunni

FIGURE 1.2   *Muslims according to denomination* (%)
SOURCE: DIK (2009D, 92)

Above (Figure 1.2) the MLG (DIK, 2009d, 92) study presents a visual representation of the different denominations of Islam based on the interviewees' self-assessment and again, at first glance this might appear to show the diversity of Muslim life. The chart documents the existence of seven denominations of Islam in Germany, Sunni being the biggest one with 74 percent. However, at the end what remains is the unity in composition. Beyond the different denominations, interpretations of Islam, forms of religiosity, or even the fact that some of those subjects would not denominate themselves as Muslims (for instance some Alevis) they all can be labeled as Muslims. The central issue is that the creators of the charts are the subjects who through its conferred authority produced the unity; they are the architects of the diversity within the unity.

1.3   Can Anyone Wave a German Flag? Youth, Race, Gender, and Nationalism

Orientalism, according to Said (1978), can also be understood as a system of representation informed by authoritative knowledge, functioning "like a screen filtering our every perception of culture (Asad, 1980, 649). Orientalism therefore serves as a structural condition for representations of Islam rather than as an epithet for those representations" (Dornhof, 2013, 172).[11]

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11   "My whole point about this system is not that it is a misrepresentation of some Oriental essence—in which I do not for a moment believe—but that it operates as representations usually do, for a purpose, according to a tendency, in a specific historical, intellectual, and even economic setting. In other words, representations have purposes, they are effective much of the time, they accomplish one or many tasks" (Said, 1978, 273).

Paintings and visual forms of representation have been part and parcel of the system of representation called Orientalism. During the 18th and 19th century not only unaccountable portraits of Harems, Oriental landscapes, and biblical scenes were produced for, and consumed by Western audiences, but also these same images served to allegedly understand the Orient, its culture, traditions and its people, a form of knowledge termed by Johannes Fabian (2014, 106) *visualism* or in Said's terms radical realism.

Furthermore, and in the context of Imperialism images and photography served to arrange and classify the time of the Other as archaic, atavistic, and which could be consumed with a glance (McClintock, 1995). The anachronic Other through photography became, ever since, an spectacle to be consumed.

And images accompany almost every document of the DIK (2009b, 2009d, 2011b, 2011c, 2012a, 2013)—with the exception of the plenary sessions' reports. The pictures sometimes depict empty mosques, or Germans visiting the mosques. There are also representations of Muslims praying, interacting with German security authorities, with state representatives, or with regular citizens either in dialogue or in exchange. Likewise, there are images depicting artifacts that supposedly belong to or visually represent Islamic culture such as the Qur'an, prayer beads, cups of black tee, but also German national symbols, such as the nation's flag or pictures of the German constitution and laws.

In the documents, the images perform a central function. They fix, through visual representation and the use of symbols, as it were, the German and the Muslim identity, free-floating notions subjected to multiple interpretations, definitions, appropriations, and controversies. Thereby, the images anchor particular meanings and messages. Stuart Hall (1997, 228) pointed out that the meanings around any form of visual representation are always ambiguous. In other words, an image carries several messages, even in contradiction. And subjects represented as different tend to be exposed to a binary form of representation constructing them through contradictory and severe distinctions. Therefore, the stereotyped subject is represented concurrently as good and evil, innocent and barbaric, naïve and dangerous, sensual and repulsive (Hall, 1997, 229).

The work of representation entails the attempt to fix one particular meaning, to privilege one upon the other. This process occurs through the proliferation of dominant discourses, and intertextuality. The latter can be understood as a process in which the meanings of an image accumulate when read across other images and forms of representation (Hall 1997, 232).

Moreover, the images below depict persons and bodies, and as Frantz Fanon (2008, 92–95) argued, beneath the body-schema extends a historical-racial schema crafted by the racial knowledge, stereotypes, and representations of

the White gaze upon Black bodies. Thus, bodies are also read, along with gender, and sexual schemes through race. People codify differences in skin pigmentation and hair through a cluster of accumulated meanings attached to them. W.J.T Mitchell (2012, see also: Mitchell, 1984, 1994), following the steps of Du Bois and Fanon, defines race as "a *medium*, an intervening substance" as " something we see through like a frame, a window, a screen, or a lens, rather than something we *look at*" (Mitchell, 2012, xii [emphasis in the original]). In this sense, despite the dissemination of ideological utterances portraying post-racial societies or benign color-blindness, race continues to structure "the cognitive and conceptual filters through which forms of human otherness are mediated" (Mitchell, 2012, xii).

In the following, I use the DIK's flyer from 2011 as an example of how images carry messages and fix meanings concerning the people who constitute the Muslim and the German subject, and to further illustrate the looming presence of race as a medium whereby Muslims and Germans can be visually apprehended. I use images on account of the relevance the DIK imputes to them by producing and disseminating them, but also since they provide a rich source of tacit meanings about who is a German, who is a Muslim, and the different time zones they inhabit.

The front cover of the DIK's flyer (2011a) is a bricolage made of three juxtaposed pictures (Figure 1.3, 1.4, 1.5). In the first image (Figure 1.3), which serves as the background of the picture, some persons are sitting at a big square table. Connotatively, this image represents the DIK's plenary sessions, its central and most publicized events. At the thematic level, the ensemble of table, chairs, and persons in them also represents one of the central values embraced and promoted by the DIK, namely, dialogue. Denotatively and connotatively, the image carries the message of being a background, descriptively of the bricolage, but also as a representation of the DIK as a forum of dialogue to achieve the integration of Muslims. The DIK symbolizes the background in which dialogue and integration are upheld and performed. Although as Sarah Dornhof (2012, 384) argued, within the frame of governmentality, dialogue creates the representation of itself as a neutral exchange between equals, while in fact, it departs from specific problematizations (such as the conflict between cultures and religions), seeking to regulate, conduct, and normalize particular subjects. And in the current debate about Islam and Muslims, dialogue has been strategically used to govern the latter.

A second picture (Figure 1.4) overlaps the image of the table—the second one is the most prominent of the frame regarding size and central position—in which six young people (four women and two men) smile from an open window. Two of them, a woman and a man hold the German flag, which hangs from the window and waves with the wind.

The connotative meaning of this image represents the topic of integration, the central aim of the DIK and Germany's migration politics. The frame gathers the six young people—they are part of the picture, integrated within the framework. All of them are connected, touching each other with their arms interlocked, and together they hold the national flag (a token for the German nation). This action symbolizes integration, affiliation, and loyalty to the nation. The image denotes a staged integration with six models representing different archetypical subject formations: the White German woman, the moderate Muslim man, the Muslim woman with headscarf, and the German-Muslim woman without headscarf. Furthermore, this image presumes that the viewer possesses a cognitive frame by means of which these young people can be seen as different from each other, where race and gender enable the differentiation, and thereby enable the viewer to see through them and see them as either Muslims or Germans.

The picture also stands for the compliance and Muslims' pledge of loyalty to the Basic Law and the German social values, topics that, as I discuss in the next chapters, constitute a fundamental condition set by the DIK to accept the presence of Muslims in Germany.

Likewise, the body language of the young people suggests harmony, conviviality, respect, fellowship, social cohesion, and even respect, and gender equality. All these represent concepts of the lexicon promoted by the DIK and values to be taught to the German-Muslim subject to come. Additionally, it suggests a feeling of belongingness to the country, one that is lacking among Muslims—as has been stated several times by the DIK (2008c, 2009d)—and therefore needing development. The DIK emerges as the institution that can guide this process.

Altogether, these can be interpreted as the meanings that the DIK tries to fix upon the image, the representation of integrated Muslims in peaceful coexistence with their German peers. However, in the bricolage, the bodies of the youth carry another set of meanings in relation to the construction of racial, national, and gender differences between Germans and Muslims.

By shifting the focusing onto the bodies of these young people, it is possible to delineate the DIK's biopolitical technique and its caesura-making. One that is not only reduced to divide the races (Foucault, 1997), but also generations, gender, and Manichean constructions about "good" and "bad" subjects, trustful citizens and "enemies within", as well as real and fictive Germans.

This particular picture creates a caesura through visual techniques of representation. First, it constitutes a continuum, youth in common as a micro-sub-population of the German social body. Subsequently, it splits these young people according to what Fanon (2008) termed the epidermal racial schema in which racial marks fixed the meanings around the physical appearance,

FIGURE 1.3   *German Islam Conference* (*image taken from flyer*)
             SOURCE: DIK (2011a)
             ILLUSTRATION REPRODUCTION COURTESY OF KATY OTTO

i.e., there is a racial knowledge whereby bodies and meanings around them are assign in accordance with pigmentation of skin color and hair texture, in the picture, overdetermined by the hegemonic discourse of the German subject as White (Eggers, Kilomba, Piesche, & Arndt, 2005; Ha, 1999, 2007; Sow, 2009).

The two young White women with blonde hair represent the German identity and stand for a definition of Germanness as Whiteness. This fixation is possible through the contrapuntal position vis-à-vis the four remaining subjects in the picture, all of them with brown skin, three of them with dark hair,

FIGURE 1.4   *German Islam Conference* (*image taken from flyer*)
SOURCE: DIK (2011a)
ILLUSTRATION REPRODUCTION COURTESY OF KATY OTTO

and one wearing a headscarf, which in the picture is constructed as a the ulti-
mate signifier for Islam and Muslims. As exposed, even the official definition
of who is a Muslim produced by the DIK reproduces the idea that an "ethnic"
(White) German converted to Islam cannot be counted as a Muslim on ac-
count of her or his national origin.

The image uses hair, skin color, and cultural artifacts as symbols of national,
gender, and racial differences to discern visually the Germans from the Mus-
lims. Skin color, hair, and fabric are completely necessary to carry the silent
message of the existing differences among these models. Without the preex-
isting racial knowledge, as a medium to see through, it would be impossible
to differentiate what is unstated: Muslims and Germans are phenotypically

FIGURE 1.5   *German Islam Conference* (*image taken from flyer*)
SOURCE: DIK (2011a)
ILLUSTRATION REPRODUCTION COURTESY OF DIRK ENTERS

different. Even the selection of the two White blonde women has the effect of accentuating the contrast and reasserting the meanings of difference. In the picture, the DIK's promotion of difference serves as the condition whereby the representation of German-White homogeneity is reified. This procedure matches Goldberg's (2002) idea of homogeneity's promotion, requiring the production of heterogeneity. Thus, Germanness as Whiteness demands the production of the Other as non-White.

The two young males with dark hair embody the DIK's encouraged version of masculine Islamic religiosity: moderate, tolerant, gender equal, and with a piety performed in the private sphere. The stereotypical image foreshadowing the presence of the two young males refers to the "Muslim extremist"—the enraged and pious subject who wears loose clothes, and a long and dense beard. An image charged with symbols carrying fears and anxieties, and one of the most circulated representations within the overall construction of the moral panic around Muslims as the ultimate enemies of the nation (Schiffer & Wagner, 2009). In contrast, the body language of the two young men expresses friendliness, and cordiality, and one of them even shyness.

The depiction of these young males involves a role-model representation, one that other young male Muslims should aspire to be: the moderate Muslim as opposed to the hyper-masculine, violent and protector of honor. In this regard, the depiction also recruits idealized and normative conceptions of "proper" masculinity. Additionally, the DIK portrays young male Muslims as potentially the most dangerous subjects inhabiting the country (DIK, 2011e, 2012d). German authorities have emphasized the high risk among young Muslim males to be caught up in extremism, radicalization, "Islamism", anti-Semitism, and patriarchal ideologies. Likewise, young Muslim men have been depicted as the perpetrators of domestic violence, "honor killings", hate sermons, and terrorist attacks.

In contemporary Germany, as Katherine P. Ewing (2008) argued, the stigmatization of Muslim men depicts them as violent, aggressive, and oppressive subjects, through the denigration of their masculinity, and the parallel assertion of the White German men as the opposite, obscuring the prevalent gender inequalities crossing all of German society and not just among some Muslims.

In the picture, another two young women appear; they represent Muslim women. One of them wears a headscarf; she has brown skin and smiles at the camera. The presence of this woman has the effect of accentuating the cultural and visual difference between Muslim and German women and asserts the tolerant approach of the DIK, the discourse that claims that the headscarf can, up to a point, be tolerated. The headscarf represents another of those powerful and charged signifiers in contemporary discussions about Islam, Muslims, and integration not only in Germany but also in some other countries such as France, England, Austria, and Turkey to name just a few.

In Germany, probably the most renowned controversy about the wearing of the headscarf is the legal dispute interposed by Fereshta Ludin, a Muslim woman who was denied the right to be a teacher in Stuttgart, based on allegations about the incompatibility of the headscarf with the "neutral" nature of public schools.

In 2003, after a five year process, the court of Baden-Württemberg, the federal state in which her position as a teacher was refused, ruled that the school could not deny Ludin the right to teach in schools. However, "the Court still expressed fear that the headscarf as a religious symbol would, in and of itself, threaten the national education mission" (Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2014, 137). This prompted the federal states of Baden-Württemberg, Bayern, Bremen, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen and Saarland to enact laws against the use of headscarf in public schools, and Hessen and Berlin passed laws for all public servants. The federal states of Hamburg, Rheinland-Pfalz, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt,

Schleswig-Holstein, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Thüringen did not implemented special laws to regulate the use of headscarves.[12]

In January 2015, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (BVerfG) (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*), located in the city of Karlsruhe overturned the previous ban on teachers wearing headscarves—enacted in several federal states—as incompatible with the religious freedom guaranteed by the German Basic Law, and designating the ban as an intrusion into the self-identity of the teacher (BVerfG, 2015). This decision will now allow Muslim women who wear headscarves, if they decide it, to become teachers in public schools, although it does not rule out a prohibition in the case of a conflict of interests, since "the Constitutional Court decided to give schools the primary power to decide whether to accept teachers with headscarves or not, if schools deem the person and the headscarf not to be a 'direct threat' (*konkrete Gefahr*) to the school or to the neutrality of the institution" (Younes, 2015, 191).

The remaining person in the picture, positioned at the center of the image, is a brown skin woman with dark hair who remarkably wears no headscarf. Although racially fixed as non-White, her presence suggests the completion of the linear process of becoming German-Muslim; thus she embodies past, present, and future. Her "unveiled" body echoes the archetypical figure of the secular Muslim, the role model for a Muslim woman embodied in the publicized figure of Necla Kelek, an emancipated woman both religious and critical of Islam, and who does not need to wear a headscarf, symbolizing a religiosity that is performed also in the realm of the private sphere.

This biopolitical image creates a unity—a micro-population of youth—and subsequently splits it through bodily and cultural signs. It incorporates those subjects represented as Muslims in Germany, while it emphasizes and marks them as different. The image also suggests a set of preconditions (integration, respect, moderation, tolerance, gender equality) that need to be fulfilled by Muslims in order to be recognized as German subjects. This process illustrates what Damani Partridge (2012) termed as exclusionary incorporation, a conditional enfranchisement in which certain subjects, while being incorporated

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12   After the decision of the court, in the media began a campaign demonizing Ludin and the headscarf, following the usual racial script, picturing this piece of fabric as a symbol of oppression, backwardness, "Islamism", violence and gender inequality. This campaign was led by the German feminist Alice Schwarzer through the magazine *Emma* (Partridge, 2012; Schiffauer, 2006) in which different arguments tried to discredit Ludin, putting into question her German citizenship, her faith, and claiming that Ludin was an "Islamist" political operator (for a wider discussion see: Amir-Moazami, 2007; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2014; Shooman, 2014).

into the nation state, remain socially and symbolically excluded from the imagined community due to being perceived as the Other. The picture acknowledges all of the subjects as Germans; yet, it also establishes a subtler subcategorization, the White women standing as "real" German and the "rest" as fictive, or to-be-fabricated ones.

Moreover, the holding and waving of the flag by the youth denotes a rehearsal and articulation of nationalism. The first time I saw the picture, I wondered why there were no representations of White German young males; especially, why they were absent if the intention of the picture is to represent youth in Germany. What would it mean if instead of the German young women, there were young White men waving the flag? This absence can be understood against the background of the existence of extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi individuals and organization often depicted as young White Germans, precisely waving flags, an image that the DIK most likely does not wish to publicize.

As Floya Anthias & Nira Yuval-Davis (1993, 115) argued, women play a specific and central role in the reproduction of nationalism. In the picture, the young White German women are epitomized as representatives of the nation and the bearers of the German culture. They also signify a different body schemata vis-à-vis the rest of the young people; they carry the racial signifier of being White, German, and liberated (see below). Thus, the picture illustrates the interconnection between racism, gender, and nationalism.[13]

The presence of German women allows a rehearsal and representation of a soft nationalism, neither virulent nor racist, rather integrative. These two women are represented as ambassadors of the German culture that need to be inculcated or conveyed to Muslims. As I argue later, in the DIK there is a discursive strand in the DIK that constructs Muslims as being torn between two cultures, that of their country of origin and German culture. The DIK's representatives see this as a problem creating a lack of loyalty towards the German nation. This is a discourse that is also present in the political and media debates about double passports, naturalization, and nationality. In the image,

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13   Nationalisms have been played out to draw on, circulate, and reify symbolic boundaries and distinctions between men and women. According to Anthias & Yuval-Davis (1993, 115) the implications of women in the gendered reproduction of the nation and its relation with state practices can be analytically distinguished in five categories: first, as the subjects reproducing—in biological terms—the "ethnic" group; second, as the subjects that delimit the "ethnic" boundaries (see also: Stoler, 1995); third as active conveyors of national culture; fourth, at a symbolic level as vehicles for the reproduction of national identities, and finally, "as participants in national, economic, political and military struggle" (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1993, 115).

the flag represents the call for an absolute loyalty, one that cannot be shared between countries.

The image furthermore expresses the bifurcated gender representation of Muslims. Connotatively, it establishes two supplementary images, the moderate male Muslim, and the to-be-emancipated Muslim woman. Both are the positive counterparts of the archetypical Orientalist gender roles: the violent and oppressive Muslim man, and the oppressed and passive—though also dangerous—Muslim woman (Shooman, 2014).

Last but not least, the third image, (Figure 1.5), of the bricolage (DIK, 2011a), positioned on top of the other two, shows Hans-Peter Friedrich sitting at the table and talking in front of a microphone. Other persons appeared in the frame; however, their image is blurred, including a person wearing a headscarf next to Friedrich. In the frame, he stands as a representative of the German state, and as the DIK's highest authority, the one who convenes and guides it and ultimately sets the agenda of the yearly plenary sessions. His image is directly on top of the representation of the dialogue and the youth, suggesting a hierarchy between the images and the subjects represented in them—Friedrich above Muslims and the DIK. Moreover, his image denotes a token about guidance; he represents the embodiment of the DIK, the guide of Muslims who are, in this frame, chiefly, young Muslims.

Muslim youth represent one of the central groups addressed by the Conference; they are openly labeled as a target group. Several projects and techniques aim exclusively to enhance their integration, and with that, to reshape their subjectivities, exemplifying another dimension of the different caesuras within the Muslim subpopulation enacted by the DIK. In fact, a "little sister" (DIK, 2011d) of the DIK was established in 2011, the Youth Islam Conference (JIK) as a DIK replica with the aim to emphasize the necessity of working with young Muslims.[14]

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14   The Youth Islam Conference is an initiative of the Mercator foundation in cooperation with the Humboldt-University of Berlin and the DIK. One of the reasons behind the establishment of the JIK was to disseminate knowledge and awareness among youth about the existing platforms of dialogue—such as the DIK—its objectives and aims (JIK, n.d.). Moreover, the JIK has been described as a safe-space to critically engage with the role of Islam and Muslims in Germany, as well as to discuss the negative portrayals about Islam and Muslims disseminated in the media and public debate (JIK, n.d.). In 2011, and after recreating the structure and work of the DIK, a representative of the JIK handed to the former Minister of the Interior Friedrich a series of recommendations (DIK, 2011d). Since then the JIK has been engaged and promoted different event and campaigns. As the DIK's "little sister", the JIK replicates and iterates some of the DIK's lexicon, dialogue as the underpinning rationale for achieving particular aims, such as understanding and improving

Regarding the importance of youth within the DIK, it is possible to identify several assumptions and ideas underlying this project. First, the sense that their subjectivities are still not completely formed, somehow left unfinished. Thus, there is enough room for action, especially, in comparison to their parents and grandparents. Second, as the knowledge produced by the DIK showed (2009d, 97–101), statistically speaking, Muslims in Germany are a younger population vis-à-vis the non-Muslim population of the country; thus the relevance of addressing young Muslims in the present. Third, there is the postulation about the sequence radicalization-extremism-terrorism beginning at this age, in which subjects are still malleable. Hence, prevention work should also start at this vulnerable time. Finally, the DIK also circulates statements about the lack of integration in the labor market of this numerous segment of the population (DIK, 2009d). Thus, boosting their productivity will help to create the conditions for a peaceful and productive society of the future. Muslim youth is crucial in the wider objective of reshaping Muslim subjectivities; they are the future embodiment of the German-Muslim.

The meanings around the bricolage unfold and stabilize at two levels. First, there is the intentional objective to locate this image as a symbol of the integration of Muslims into German society and its beneficial outcomes, conviviality, tolerance, peaceful coexistence, togetherness, and belongingness. The second, entails a subtler subtheme unfolding from the first one: the representations of cultural, racial, gender, and national differences, serving as the legitimation and the basis for the first meaning, that of integration. Logically, someone cannot be integrated into something if one already belongs to it, if one is already part of the totality. In order to establish the imperative of integration, differences and disunity have to be created first, thereby producing the Other as lacking integration, and then calling precisely for it.

The DIK works within the moral panic that takes for granted the disintegration of the German social fabric, initiated by the troublesome presence of Muslims. The discourses emanating from the DIK discursively produce a priori

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the social coexistence in a plural society, while seeking possible solutions to conflicts (JIK, n.d.). The similarities between the JIK and DIK, however, should not be read as mediums to achieve the same goals, for the subjects who speak are differently positioned in the political arena and net of power relations. Moreover, although currently being a hegemonic governmental tool for regulating Muslim subjectivities, dialogue, in effect, can be used for other purposes and political agendas. Given the scope of my research I could not delved into the projects and structure of the JIK, and future inquires would need to consider its appearance and work precisely against the existence of the DIK, and also vis-à-vis the hegemonic discourses positioning Muslims and Islam as problems for German society. Thus the story of the JIK, its impact, and development remains a story to be told.

Muslims as non-integrated, obscuring different experiences of adaptation and the structural processes of exclusion blocking the enfranchisement and inclusion of Muslims in the nation. Based on this, it is possible to delineate the first dimensions of the DIK's representations of Muslims and the first elements of the atavistic Muslim subjects. They are phenotypically different and younger than the Germans; they are malleable and unfinished subjects. Moreover, there are particular gender roles within Islamic culture; thus Muslim men and women require different strategies to be integrated. And overall, Muslims are non-integrated—detached, as it were, from German society.

Furthermore, one can ask, as does W.J.T. Mitchell (1996): "what do these pictures really want?" What implicit and explicit desires do the images articulate? What power do these images hold? One of the images Mitchell examines is the now iconic recruiting poster of the US army "Uncle Sam", which explicitly formulates desire in the heading "I want you"—an overt sign seeking to mobilize the male of proper age to enroll in the military service, and send him "ultimately overseas to fight and possibly die for his country" (Mitchell, 1996, 77). But Mitchell does not stop there and asks the image what it wants in terms of what it lacks. Uncle Sam lacks the age and vigor for combat, but moreover he lacks "the direct blood connection that a figure of the fatherland would evoke. He asks young men to go fight and die in a war in which neither he nor his sons will participate. There are no 'sons' of Uncle Sam, only 'real live nephews'" (Mitchell, 1996, 77).

Asked about discrimination against Muslims by a female Muslim reporter from Hamburg, Thilo Sarrazin appropriated and rephrased Uncle Sam's desires, "I want you to integrate" he promptly responded (Sarrazin quoted in: Volkery, 2011). And this is one of the desires articulated in the DIK's image; integration is the overt desire of the picture. But what does this image want in terms of what it lacks? In a first analysis it lacks masculine nationalism, which is delegated to the young White women—they become the agents of integration, they have to teach the love to the nation. Through the use of the young White women, the images predicate nationalism, a nationalism that no state representative would dare to show. Young White women as impersonators of the nation are key for conveying a message, to articulate the desire of a society governed by peace despite constructed racial hierarchies, dissimilar access to rights, and virulent discrimination. Is this a portrayal insinuating peace among racially constructed hierarchies, desiring that Muslim youth avow to a nationalist fervor; that they, if needed, will die for the country and not for "jihad"?

In the brochure, three more pictures accompany the text describing the DIK. Figure 1.6 features two of the young women from the previous image,

the White woman who was at the center, and the young woman wearing a headscarf, here, both are laughing (DIK, 2011a). The White woman is slightly bent over the other and embraces her while in a supportive manner resting her hand on the shoulder of the woman wearing a headscarf. The intended meanings fixed by the DIK denote friendship, respect, tolerance, conviviality, and intercultural and interreligious openness—concepts proliferated by the DIK. However, as a subtext, the image can be seen as an exhortation by the White woman to the one with headscarf to emancipate, suggesting the lack of agency, freedom, and emancipation of the represented Muslim woman.

The brochure states that one of the DIK's three pillars concerns gender justice. The notion of gender oppression within Muslim communities is one of the most prominent and proliferated discourses about Muslims, based on a long Orientalist tradition, depicting Muslim women as passive, timid, and overall oppressed subjects, but also as potentially threatening (Fanon, 1965; Shooman, 2014). The source of oppression, the argument goes, is Islam as a patriarchal-based religion, structuring an embracing system of practices and beliefs producing the regular oppression of Muslim women, and the headscarf symbolizes the "everyday visual proof" of it, but this visual proof is only possible insofar as racial lens mediates the apprehension of the headscarf, paraphrasing Du Bois, (2005) race emerges as a veil whereby we see through the veil.

Reading the picture against this discursive background, it becomes possible to interpret it as an invitation to emancipation. The hand of the White woman on the shoulder of the one who represents the Muslim stands as a symbol of support and help. Moreover, the White woman embodies a symbol of Germanness carrying the meaning that the German state, the DIK, and the emancipated German women support the liberation of Muslim women.

The position of the two women in the picture furthermore suggests an imbalance between them. The representation of the White woman as liberated at the top, while the oppressed, the woman with headscarf at the bottom. The subtleness of the difference in positions has the effect of creating a harmonious and benign atmosphere. The reading would be different if the White woman were standing and the woman wearing the headscarf were sitting or lying down.

The picture conveys again the message of racial difference. The selection of these two women makes this interpretation possible, otherwise the image would be unnecessary or it would lose the meanings it carries. For instance, if the two women were White, there would be no room for filtering the meanings around gender inequality and oppression, or if one of the male models were substituted for the White woman the meanings would be different.

Here, the interconnection between race, gender, and nation appears again. The White woman becomes the bearer of German culture as the guide for the non-White oppressed Muslim woman in need of help or paraphrasing Gayatri C. Spivak (1994), the German woman saving the Muslim woman from the Muslim man.

In comparison with the media or some civil associations, the DIK's representation of Muslim gender roles tends to be subtler. The denoted meanings usually are coupled with sets of values that can be seen as benign, such as friendliness, support, and conviviality surrounded the emancipatory meaning in the picture. A point of comparison illustrating the system of dispersion of the discourse about the headscarf as a symbol of oppression is offered by the "other" Islam Conference—the Critical one.

The Critical Islam Conference (KIK) emerged in 2008 as a reaction against the DIK's soft tolerant approach. Organized by the Central Council of ex-Muslims and the Giordano Bruno Foundation. The KIK focuses on issues such as the emancipation of Muslim women, the disbanding of "parallel societies", and opposed the construction of the central mosque in Cologne (KIK, 2011).[15]

The logo of the KIK blatantly presents emancipation. It does not unfold as a subtext of a primary meaning, nor is it joined with "nice" values. The image depicts a woman dressed in black, holding in her arms and above her head a piece of black fabric. She seems extremely happy and enthusiastic, her brown hair moves freely. The other part of the KIK's logo appears above the woman's image, a crescent moon amplified by a magnifying glass that reveals a crack from which a red liquid substance drips.

The explicit meaning being fixed is the celebration of Muslim women's emancipation through the unveiling as a liberating, emancipatory, and empowering act. The headscarf represents a symbol of oppression, which needs to be suppressed. Likewise, the dark clothes denote a counter image of light and enlightenment. As a former Muslim, the woman in the picture is represented as inhabiting the obscure world of Islam, and through her unveiling she is making a first step towards liberation, enlightenment, and integration. The heading of the image anchors this message clearly—Enlightenment instead of veiling/covering!—exposing a blatant dichotomy: Islam as oppressive and benighted versus enlightenment as civilization, which without further reference is imputed to Germany.

The message of the KIK's logo is also direct. The crescent moon supposedly representing Islam and Muslims is revealed as flawed through the magnifying

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15   See the logo of the KIK: http://kritische-islamkonferenz.de.

glass, as having internal bloody fissures denoting the violence against Muslim women perpetrated by Muslim men and terrorist viciousness. The dripping blood symbolizes the innate violence and terrorism that Islam propagates.

The KIK emerged precisely as a reaction to the "soft" and excessively "tolerant" measures implemented by the DIK regarding Muslims, and the reading of both images simultaneously confirms this. Whereas for the DIK, women's emancipation is central, this agency can, at least in the image, tolerate the woman wearing the headscarf insofar as the woman is integrated and loyal to the German nation and does not decide to become a public servant. For the KIK, headscarves are unbearable; integration and loyalty are incompatible with this oppressive symbol, which cannot be tolerated.

However, there are differences between the representations about the path to achieve emancipation. While for the DIK, Muslim women need to be guided and supported, for the KIK, emancipation is the outcome of human agency. Nevertheless, both images—through different paths—concur in problematizing the representations about the religiosity and gender values of Muslim women. Both images use the headscarf as a symbol of oppression, and work as guidelines about liberation, positing a hierarchy in which Islam and Muslims are below the German culture, which is enlightened and emancipated.

Though, emancipation is a far more complex process than the act of removing a piece of fabric. As Judith Butler (1990) and Nikita Dhawan & Maria do Mar Castro Varela (2009) argued, emancipation is a normative discourse producing the subjects who it pretends to liberate, establishing particular criteria, and archetypical figures of the emancipated and the non-emancipated women. The latter is often represented by the Muslim migrant and the headscarf symbolizing the antithesis of the emancipated White German women, as the images above reproduced and reified. In addition, emancipation also entails politics of representation (Spivak, 1994), i.e., the question about who can speak for whom, and who will emancipate whom, establishing hierarchies about linear imaginaries of progressive liberation.

Furthermore, as exposed by Lila Abu-Lughod (2013), current portraits of Muslim women in need of saving reproduce stereotypical representations, involve homogenizing and culturalist interpretations of politics and equality, and establish legitimacy for military interventions and cultural crusades to save Muslim women from their men and culture.

Moreover, several scholars have questioned the idea of the headscarf as incompatible with the fight against gender oppression (Mahmood, 2011; Amir-Moazami, 2007; Nökel, 2002, 2005; Abu-Lughod, 2013; Ahmed, 1982). Sigrid Nökel (2005, 2002) showed how Islamic religiosity among a group of Muslim

women wearing headscarves in Germany plays a significant role in processes of self-determination and challenging patriarchal structures, inside and outside Muslim communities.

The DIK's image also provides hints about the tensions within global feminism and the (im)possibility of international women's alliances. In the last decades, different voices have challenged and exposed the limitations of White Western feminism for its homogenizing impetus and for neglect the way differences of class, race, religion, nationality, sexuality have differently influenced women's oppression experiences (Mohanty, 1984; Abu-Lughod, 2013; Brown, 2008; Spivak, 1994, 1999).

In her seminal essay "Under Western Eyes", Chandra T. Mohanty (1984) criticized the lacuna within Western feminist theory and interventions concerning racism and colonialism. Mohanty (1984) deconstructed the homogenizing category "third world victim women" and uncovered the embedded hierarchies it supposed and the reproduction of colonial moves. Following Mohanty, this epistemic approach blocks the prospects of transnational alliances and solidarities between women.

Moreover, Spivak (1994, 1999) forcefully criticized the Western feminist's universal claim to represent and talk on behalf of women and emphasized the centrality of different categories such as class, race, and citizenship in the women's oppression. The paternalist attempt to represent universally women's voice, following Spivak (1994), constitutes a complicity of Western feminism with the Imperialist logic.

The two representations discussed above—the DIK's and the KIK's—reproduce universalist narratives about liberating and emancipating Muslim women, projects initiated by an institution of the state and a civil society association that by producing Muslim women as oppressed emerged in a higher position—as already liberated and emancipated. This representational system produces at least two subject positions in asymmetrical power relations: the oppressed Muslim woman, and her savior. Moreover, this narrative serves as the basis for talking of and about Muslim women, while legitimizing intervention and silencing the voices of Muslim women.

Furthermore, as Spielhaus (2012, 98) argued, these types of narratives obscure the ongoing inequality between men and women permeating all of the German society. By focusing on the inequality of the Other, "[t]he issue of gender inequality within German society has been largely abandoned in public debates while discrepancies between men and women within the dominant society are proclaimed minor discrepancies in relation to the main difference of culture", by means of this, the German—White—woman appears as an already emancipated figure "and therefore able and obligated to rescue the Muslim woman from oppression" (Spielhaus, 2012, 98). In the next chapters,

FIGURE 1.6   *German Islam Conference* (*image taken from flyer*)
SOURCE: DIK (2011a)
ILLUSTRATION REPRODUCTION COURTESY OF KATY OTTO

I return to the topic of the headscarf, the point to highlight here is its use to define Muslim women as oppressed and in need of emancipation.

I do not go into detail about the third image of the flyer because it is an iteration of the image of the table as a symbol of dialogue. The fourth and remaining picture on the brochure (Figure 1.7) is an open book held by someone (DIK, 2011a). The book is written in Arabic. Denotatively, the image appears as a simple one, yet, connotatively, it is full of charged symbols. The image of the book is a representation of the Qur'an, although no further reference is to be found in the brochure, something that is by itself remarkable because this book as a token of the Qur'an is self-explanatory. The discourses and meanings around the Qur'an are so proliferated that no additional reference is needed to fix the image of the book as an exemplar of the Qur'an.

It can be inferred that every image in the brochure matches one of the three working areas of the DIK during its second phase. The Figures 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 are visual representations of integration (subject area 1) and of the DIK; the second image, Figure 1.6, is a representation of DIK's gender justice (subject area 2). The remaining area (3), "Preventing extremism, radicalization and polarization of society", is linked to the representation of the Qur'an (Figure 1.7), subtly suggesting a relation between the book and its readers and acts of extremism and radicalization.

The Qur'an represents a signifier of Islam, Muslims, and the recurrent conflation of religion and identity. This is another overdetermined and Orientalist reading, one that postulates that the whole life of Muslims is guided by the Qur'an, which by analogy can explain every aspect of Muslim behavior as emanating from compliance with this text. Said (1978, 93) termed this reading of the Qur'an as the textual attitude of Orientalism, understood as "the fallacy to assume that the swarming, unpredictable and problematic mess in which human beings live can be understood on the basis of what the books—texts—say".

Moreover, Asad (2003, 10–11) argued that contemporary discussions about "Islamic" terrorism as based on the Qur'an carry two "intriguing assumptions: (a) that the Qur'anic text will force Muslims to be guided by it; and (b) that Christians and Jews are free to interpret the Bible as they please". According to Asad, these assumptions presuppose contradictory conceptualizations about the reader and the text for Muslims as for Christians and Jews. Whereas the Muslim is constructed as a passive reader, whose actions are determined by an active text, the Qur'an, Christians and Jews are presumed to be active readers, who can freely interpret a passive text.

Another set of meaning circulates around the image, namely, the project of trying to fix the appropriate reading of the Qur'an by the DIK. As an open book,

this Qur'an suggests that it is exposed to re-readings and reinterpretations, yet authorized ones. Though, the German Basic Law imposes restrictions on the state regarding religious content, that is to say, neither state institutions nor its representatives can interfere, determine or influenced religious content. Regarding the Qur'an, the state cannot regulate which interpretations are right or wrong. However, within the DIK, one strategy unfolds in which appropriate readings of the Qur'an emerged, i.e., the interpretations made by Muslims themselves and disseminated by the DIK. For instance, as I discuss in the last chapter, the DIK provided an institutional niche for Necla Kelek to disseminate her idea about the headscarf as a misinterpretation of the Qur'an (Kelek & Donner-Üretmek, 2009). Furthermore, in the DIK's guidelines about gender roles (DIK, 2013, D.1–D.30), a section of the report delves into the gender roles stipulated by the Qur'an. What occurred in those two cases is a tacit authorization of the readings by means of their location within the German institutional framework.[16]

If the DIK's image is read against contemporary discourses about Muslims and Islam in Germany, it becomes clear that the Qur'an is a recurrent source of fear and anxiety, the source of gender oppression, and a token for Islam and Muslims. Here, the media performs the function of fixing the meanings about the Qur'an as a powerful and threatening symbol.

In 2012, a campaign to distribute Qur'ans in Germany by the Salafist organization Millatu Ibrahim attracted the attention of the media and the German authorities. The campaign was interpreted as an Islamic call for a holy war and the nurturing of "Islamism" and a violent "jihad". The distribution of the books was used to criticize the incapacity of the authorities and their soft-tolerant approach in dealing with this dangerous section of the population and this

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16   Elsewhere Zubair Ahmad and I (2016) have discussed in-depth the political operations around the Qur'an orchestrated by the DIK. Publicly imagined as "the most powerful book of the world" (Spiegel, 2007), and as the ultimate decider of war or peace (Bednarz & Steinvorth, 2007), the Qur'an has been imbued with a life of its own, a life and subjectivity, allegedly, imposing itself onto the deficient Muslim reader. Moreover, the Qur'an has been approached as the most important key to unlock "Islamic reformation" whereby a European Islam can finally appeared in the secular European scene. Ahmad and I have discussed how the representation of Muslims as passive and textual readers has served to what we called "policing the Qur'an", the political operations seeking to govern and discipline readings by means of legitimizing and delegitimizing approaches to the Qur'anic text. This, furthermore, is one of the not yet discussed technologies of governmental and disciplinary power embedded in the larger undertaking to craft an *Islam of Germany* as well as an ideal *German-Muslim subject and citizen.*

threatening action. From an article that appeared in *Der Spiegel*, the authors describe the actions of the Salafists behind the distribution as follows:

> They use words as weapons, and they take advantage of the leeway afforded by freedom of expression in a society that treats religious freedom as an important value. They stretch the constitutional state to its absolute limit, and sometimes beyond, with their acts of provocation and agitation ... even Friedrich lacks a strategy for dealing with bearded young men wearing long robes, and holding German passports, who have been distributing the Koran in Germany for several weeks now.
>
> GUDE, MEKHENNET, & SCHEUERMANN, 2012

Later that year on the 12th of June, Friedrich, in fact, took measures regarding Salafism in Germany, banning the association Millatu Ibrahim and implementing search and seizure warrants against them. In a press release of the Minister of the Interior, the following statements justified his actions:

> The ban and the dissolution of "Millatu Ibrahim" are based on the fact that the association is directed against the constitutional order and the concept of international understanding. For this reason, the Federal Minister of the Interior as the competent authority for imposing the ban decreed the dissolution of the association today. The association's assets will be seized and confiscated.
>
> BMI, 2012b

Nevertheless, the fear and anxieties channeled into the Qur'an are not new. Already in 2007, *Der Spiegel* devoted a whole issue to discuss the topic. The front cover of the issue (Figure 1.8) is illustrative of how the book is framed as a powerful and threatening symbol (Spiegel, 2007):

The heading and subheading fix the meanings about the book; the Qur'an is not an ordinary book but the most powerful of the world. The text is assumed as an active source of power (Asad, 2003), while the reader is depicted as a passive subject, who in the picture is a person wearing a headscarf, and thus she supposedly stands for a Muslim woman, matching the stereotypical assumption of Muslim women as passive and oppressed. She appears to be enmeshed in a double cover, by her headscarf and by the shadows and obscurity surrounding her. She is trapped in a Manichean struggle: light versus darkness, benighted Islam versus enlightened Germany. Islam represents religiosity, backwardness, oppression and obscurity, while Germany stands for freedom, emancipation, transparency, and civilization.

FIGURE 1.8   *The Qur'an. The most powerful book in the world*
SOURCE: SPIEGEL (2007)
ILLUSTRATION REPRODUCTION COURTESY OF DER SPIEGEL

The fear and suspicion about the Qur'an are part and parcel of the moral panic in relation to the presence of Muslims; the mere existence and distribution of the book are interpreted as an index of social crisis and the endangerment in which Germans and German society are situated. The messages and meanings around the Qur'an also serve as the basis for the implementation of security measures, banning, and issuing and carrying out search warrants. Thus, the Qur'an as a signifier articulates the racial stereotyping of Muslims in general with the reaction of the public and the means of control and regulation of state agencies.

Regarding the Qur'an, it is possible to identify differences in emphasis and approaches between the media and the DIK. The former making use of fear and suspicion to problematize Islam and Muslims, while the latter engages in the productive side of power and positions the Qur'an as a means to reform Islam and Muslims through the creation of "rightful interpretations" of the book. Both converge by giving the book central importance and utility.

To summarize this section and to delineate the overall representation of Muslims, these subjects in the flyer are depicted as phenotypically different young and malleable subjects. The gender roles prevailing in Muslim milieus are unequal and Muslim women in particular are in need of emancipation, while Muslim men are the enactors of violence. Muslims are passive religious subjects guided by the Qur'an, the influence of the book in their lives is central, mysterious, and powerful. Altogether, these dimensions create the Muslim subject as Germany's Other.

Becoming a Problem

2.1   Problematic Ontologies

> To achieve this [a better society], everyday problems must be solved,
> joint action must be taken to combat Islamist terrorism and unemploy-
> ment and educational disadvantages must also be reduced. We want
> there [DIK] to be an ongoing dialogue as stated in the coalition treaty, for
> Muslims are no longer a foreign population group in Germany but have
> become an integral part of our society.
>
> WOLFGANG SCHÄUBLE, *Background: from an initiative to a common goal,* 2009

Muslims are part of the country. They were foreigners, now they are part of the
national imagined community, yet they are still problematic and these issues
need a solution. The Muslim subject is incorporated into the German nation,
while remaining problematic. Terrorism, deficits of education, and unemploy-
ment constitute some of the problems that surround Muslims. In addition to
these, Schäuble adds the following:

> Religious education in Koran schools and state schools, the headscarf is-
> sue, the training of imams, the role of women and girls, halal butchery—
> there are plenty of issues with which the members of the German Islam
> Conference want to and must engage. We do not intend this to be simply
> a harmonious forum concentrating only on achieving consensus.
>
> SCHÄUBLE in: DIK, 2009a

Iteration is a frequent discursive strategy used by the DIK, the problems are
listed again and again until the simple association of Muslims with trouble has
been stabilized and secured. With the exception of halal butchery practices, all
of the issues listed by Schäuble became focal points in the DIK's work. But how
does one become a problem to be solved?

At the beginning of the last century, W.E.B. Du Bois' powerful critique
"How does it feel to be a problem?" (Du Bois, 2005, 5 [1903]) exposed how the
entanglement of race, economic exploitation, and gender produced the racial-
ized Black subject as a problematic ontology, crafting a double consciousness
in her or his soul. The Black subject, then, strived to reconcile two distorted
identities and cultures shaped by racial relations of domination and exclusion.

How does it feel to be a problem captured the effects of the capitalist-racist-sexist systems in the souls of the Black subjects. The process of racial characterization through its complex entanglement and collapsing of categories has as one of its key effects the production of subjects as problems. And "the articulation of the problem becomes a site for various interventions directed to its resolution" (Sayyid, 2010, 3).

A couple of years after the publication of Du Bois' *The Souls of the Black Folk* (2005 [1903]) in Germany, Berlin's national Colonial Congress of 1905 "addressed the topic 'Islam as a problem'" (Habermas, 2012, 125). This moment represented the beginning of German Islam politics as a geostrategic series of calculations about disputing colonies, regulation, and control of the colonial population (Schwanitz, 2008; Tezcan, 2012) marking a shift from the imaginative German Orientalism (Said 1978, 19) towards concrete administration and war tactics.

At the National Colonial Congress of 1905, the debates centered on the threat that Islam represented for the German colonies as this religion was "spreading" there and possessed an inherent sense of violence (Habermas, 2012). Briefly put, Islam and Muslims became a problem to be considered, evaluated, and to which different solutions were offered. Thus, one can argue that the problematization of Islam and Muslims had long, complex, mutable, and lasting historical effects at least in German territory.

Du Bois' critique focused on the effects of a hierarchically racialized system upon Black subjectivities. Following this line of inquiry, I examine not the effects of racism in Muslim subjectivities (Hernández Aguilar, 2018). Rather I take a preliminary step by surveying the conditions and the articulation of making subjects a problem. In other words, I ask how Muslims became a problem of government in the context of the DIK.

2.2   The Narration of a Problem

After analyzing the DIK's documents and the press articles about it, the alleged problems that Muslims represent for Germany mostly fall into the category of violence in its broader sense. First, there is gender violence bifurcating into two registers. On the one hand, signaling those behaviors that are against the law and prosecutable: forced marriages, domestic violence, and "honor killings" (Böhmer, 2010; DIK, 2012c; Maizière de, 2010). On the other hand, there are attitudes that deviate from normality, but not necessarily against the law, such as the alleged refusal of Muslim parents to let their children take sport and swimming lessons, attend sex education classes, go on school trips, and

the dissimilar rates of employment between Muslim men and women (DIK, 2009c, 2009d, 2013).[1]

Second, Muslim violence also refers to the terrorist threat, which again from a legal perspective takes distinct forms. For instance, radicalization is not directly prosecutable—but preventable—since it constitutes a preliminary step in the formation of a terrorist subject (DIK, 2010a). The same applies to those legalist "Islamist" organizations, which, while shunning violence and pledging loyalty to the German constitution, still pursue by legal means the displacement of the democratic order with an Islamic one (DIK, 2011e). The fact that these issues are not prosecutable does not imply that the security apparatuses leave them unchecked; different surveillance and preventive methods are already at work against these phenomena (see Chapter 4). A third form of violence refers to "Muslim anti-Semitism" (DIK, 2011e, 2012d). These acts as well as extremist and terrorist actions represent violations of the law.

However, Muslims also represent problems outside the category of violence, mostly referring to cultural and symbolic incompatibilities. Although the right of religious freedom protects the construction of mosques, the issue has sparked heated polemics and critical voices (DIK, 2008c, 2014a). Other types of symbolic cultural conflicts refer to halal butchery practices, Islamic funerals (DIK, 2008c), and male circumcision, a topic never mentioned within the DIK despite its prominence in the media and political debate. Troubles have also emerged in regard to the incompatibility of religious practices in the work place, e.g., regarding the handling of alcohol (DIK, 2012a), but most prominently about the wearing of headscarves for schoolteachers and public servants (DIK, 2014b).

Here it is important to add a caveat. The contemporary debate about Muslims and integration tends to be overdetermined. This situation has several political consequences. First, it circulates racism through stereotyping, and second,

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1 Several scholars have documented how the strategic use of single cases of gender violence perpetrated by Muslim men have served wider political agendas that racialize migrants, while imposing restrictions on immigration and family reunion (Attia, 2009; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2009, 2014; Shooman, 2014; Spielhaus, 2012; Yurdakul & Korteweg, 2013). The new law against forced marriages in Germany implemented in 2011 (Mirbach, Schaak, & Triebl, 2011) is a case in point: "the parliament also increased the period of time a foreigner wedded to a German citizen has to live with his partner in Germany before obtaining an independent residence from two to three years ... this measure could reinforce the reluctance among victims of domestic violence to oppose their situation. Furthermore, foreigners may now get an unlimited residence permit only when they have successfully completed an integration course, which includes language instruction and a proficiency exam. This too is presented as a measure in favor of for women's liberation" (Spielhaus, 2012, 100).

it depicts the German society as exempt from these issues. The convergence of both outcomes depoliticizes social conflict, creating a veil upon problems crossing all of the society. In other words, the problem refers to the framework that problematizes Muslims *a priori* and obscures conflicts crisscrossing all of the society.

An example of this relates to the DIK's approach to "Muslim anti-Semitism" (see Chapter 5). The DIK has persistently stated that anti-Semitism constitutes a salient problem among young Muslims (DIK, 2009c, 2011e, 2012d; Friedrich, 2011; Maizière de, 2010). The DIK established a working group to thwart this issue (DIK, 2011e, 2012d), and Wolfgang Schäuble commissioned a study (UEA, 2011) to examine the spread of this violence, which showed in regard to attacks on Jews that the only anti-Semitism growing and spreading is mostly carried out by extreme right-wing groups in Germany, and up to now, it is impossible to state, based on statistical data, the increase of anti-Semitism among Muslims. In this sense, the focus on one group tends to deflect and obscure the anti-Semitism of other sections of the population.

Without denying or minimizing anti-Semitism, I want to stress the limits of the DIK's strategy on this issue and make an argument for an approach that instead of seeking explanations in religion—by itself a complex category—and blaming groups a priori, addresses anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim racism regardless of nationality, religion, gender or age, and tackles them as political problems, and not as cultural ones. For doing so, the issues have to be reframed without predetermining subjects as problematic per se based on religious categorizations, which in turn cover racial categories. Following Nikita Dhawan (2013) what is necessary is a multidirectional critique rid of racial, heteronormative, and culturalist constraints, able to address social conflict without depoliticizing it and establishing guilty subjects in advance.

The DIK's first two phases, furthermore, provide hints about the areas in which Muslims allegedly cause problems. Three working groups and a round table constituted the DIK's first phase. The first working group, entitled "The German social system and value consensus" (DIK, 2008c, 1) delved into the prerequisites to integrate Muslims in Germany, i.e., it focused on the deficits and challenges that Muslims present to the German state. A central topic discussed in this working group referred to the loyalty of Muslims to the liberal democratic order and value consensus in Germany.

The second working group, focusing on the compatibility of Islamic religion and the German constitution, discussed the problems arising from mismatches or frictions between Islamic religious practices and German society, such as the wearing of the headscarf, the construction of mosques, halal butchery practices, and Islamic funerals, as well as with the introduction of

Islamic courses in public schools, and the legal requirements to initiate that project (DIK, 2008c, 7). In this group, the discussion thus focused on the problems that Islamic religiosity represents to the German socio-cultural and legal system.

The third working group analyzed the media and private sector as bridge builders (DIK, 2008c, 10). The emphasis was placed on the biased reporting about Muslims but also involved discussing the role of the private sector in fostering Muslim parents' knowledge about the German educational system, since the transition of Muslim youths from the school towards the labor market has been problematic and the Muslim youths' rates of employment tend to be lower in comparison to other groups.

The round table *Security and Islamism* centered on the threat of terrorism emerging from Muslim communities, the role of "Islamist" education, and its potential influence in processes of radicalization (DIK, 2008c, 12–17). Therefore, the problems were discussed in relation to "Islamic" violence in its extreme form.

The DIK's second phase changed its structure; new working groups were formed focusing on three main subjects. The first subject area dealt with the promotion of integration (DIK, 2010a). Here, the main issue concerned the institutional incorporation of Islam, the training of imams, the establishment of Islamic theology chairs in German universities, and the introduction of Islamic courses in public schools. The problems addressed by the DIK pertained to Islamic organizations' lack of centralized structures of representation, the issues concerning "imported" or foreign imams and their loyalty, and gaining of control of Islamic education, which tended to be unchecked being taught in "backyard" Mosques (DIK, 2010a, 3–7).

The second subject area delved into "living out gender equality as a shared value" (DIK, 2010a, 7); thereby, it focused on the promotion of gender equality for Muslim girls and women in the labor market and inside Muslim communities. Hence, the problems addressed related to Muslim women's dissimilar rates of education and employment, and the different forms of violence they suffered.

The third subject area focused on the prevention of extremism, radicalization, and social polarization (DIK, 2010a, 8–11). This area represents a continuation and expansion of the round table, Security and Islamism, by including the analysis of "Muslim anti-Semitism" and the "hostility against Muslims" in addition to the topic of "Islamist" violence in its extreme form.

As this brief description shows, the DIK's changing structure and work has responded to different aspects of the Muslim presence in Germany deemed problematic. The DIK's design and functioning has involved the segmenting

and addressing of problems separately. Hence, tailored strategies have been
developed to each one of the problems.

The DIK marks a shift not only in the way state agencies address Muslims,
but also with regard to the explanation of the source of the troubles. Accord-
ing to the DIK, Islam per se does not generate difficulties in integration or
produce socio-cultural conflicts. Rather, these issues relate to the countries
of origin of Muslims, the revisited Orient or in the DIK's terms the "Muslim
countries":

> Immigrants who come from countries where the structures of state and
> religion are different tend to have difficulty acknowledging the German
> social system which is marked by the separation of state and religion and
> find it hard to see this as beneficial. Yet there is no alternative to the un-
> reserved acceptance of this reciprocal limitation from the perspective of
> the German state. States governed by the rule of law require followers of
> all religions to fully acknowledge the legal system.
>
> DIK, 2008C, 5

The text presents several problematic assumptions. First, it presupposes a
normative construction of secularism, and the lack thereof as different, devi-
ant, or abnormal. As mentioned, the countries from which Muslims "came"
are defined as "predominantly Muslim" and all of them are grouped under a
single category. This reductionism obscures the complex and interconnect-
ed relation between the secular and the religious, and the different ways in
which this complex relation has happened, changed, and continues to be
reworked in those "predominantly Muslims countries", as well as in Germany.
Just to homogenize the relation between religion and the state in countries
like Turkey, the former states of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Indonesia, India,
and Russia to name only some of the 49 identified countries, constitutes
a generalization only possible through the latent authority of Orientalist
discourse, which foresees a linear path of historical development in which
nation-states and societies eventually will catch up with modernity through
a secular ethos.

These kind of statements about secularism and concerning "Muslim" soci-
eties and states' lack thereof, furthermore, circumvent the particular rise of
secularism and its effects in crafting religion as a category. In other words,
secularism has never been only an exercise of the separation between reli-
gion and politics, but also secularism "stipulates what religion is and ought to
be" (Brown, Butler, & Mahmood, 2013, ix), thus "the religious and the secular
are co-constitutive, indelibly intertwined, each structuring and suffusing the

sphere of the other" (Brown et al., 2013, x). Secularism, in short, is a pattern of political rule defining what religion is, and where it belongs (Asad, 1993, 2003).[2]

Second, the emphasis on Germany's achieved secularism creates a veil obscuring how several aspects of German political, cultural, and social life are intertwined with religious contents, including the DIK. In Schäuble's speeches more often than not Germany and its values and norms were described or aligned with a Christian ethos. Similarly, in the context of the DIK, the Minister of the Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich defined Germany's tradition as Judeo-Christian (Reuters 2011), while denying that Islam belongs to Germany (Hernández Aguilar, 2014).[3]

A third assumption relates to the idea that immigrants face difficulties understanding secularism and its benefits, a point that is not further explained but merely assumed; Muslims lack an understanding of secularism. Muslims as pre-modern subjects through integration, the argument goes, will understand and interiorize the secular historical development of Germany. Although not been explicitly mentioned, the benefits of secularism, as Salman Sayyid (2014b, 33–34) documents, revolve around three core ideas: firstly, secularism as the one and only guarantor of scientific development and progress; secondly, secularism as enhancer of civic peace, by restricting religious passions to private domains; and finally, secularism as *the* indispensable requirement for democratic rule. As Sayyid explains, the problem with these claims resides in their insertion into a universal narrative, which presents secularism as the materialization of history itself, "a necessary state that all cultural formations have to achieve if they are to progress towards modernity" (Sayyid, 2014b, 35).

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2 Talal Asad (2003) challenged the linear narrative embedded in secularism as a political doctrine. Accordingly, the represented development from religious to the secular "is no longer acceptable" (Asad, 2003, 1), not only because historically the separation between religion from institutions of government can be found in different examples of medieval Christianity and Islamic empires, but also because secularism "presupposes new concepts of religions, ethics and politics, and new imperatives associated with them" (Asad, 2003, 2).

3 But one might argue, following Gil Anidjar's (2008, 44–45) critique that the rendering of secularism as Christian rather than being a paradox reveals the historical and genealogical foundations both of secularism and Christianity, since "one particular 'religion' is the one whose self-identification with, whose understanding and enforced institutionalization of [religion] shaped the current, hegemonic use and dissemination of that very same word and its ensuing division of the real … This one, but complex and, of course, divided, entity has turned against itself, as it were, emancipating itself as if by fiat, by renaming itself 'religion' rather than preserving the name it had long given itself as *vera religio*: Christianity … judged and named itself, reincarnated itself, as 'secular'".

While each one of the benefits responds to particular conflicts between some European states and Christianity.[4]

Fourth, through the statements the proactive side of the discourse of tolerance emerges and postulates that secularism has to be accepted and deviations from this rule cannot be tolerated. That segment of the paragraph is implicitly directed at those legalist "Islamists" who are allegedly trying to implement Shari'ah in Germany (see Chapter 5).

Finally, it suggests that immigrants (Muslims) somehow do not fully acknowledge the German legal system only because they come from a country with a presumed different structural relation between religion and the state, again a general proposition only possible through the DIK's authority. All in all, the paragraph is constructed around the conflation of Muslim with foreigner and the Muslim subject's lack of knowledge about the modern and secular organization of the German state.

The statements depict the non-modern character and attitudes of Muslims, obscuring the fact that Muslims have been living in Germany for decades, and that half of them are German citizens. A high percentage of them were born, educated, and raised in the country. Some of them most likely have not even visited their imputed countries of origin, yet a strong generalization about how something in the past (the alleged lack of secularism in the countries of origin) still influences their present was made.

This version of secularism aims, as pointed out by Saba Mahmood (2006), at legitimizing the exercise of state control upon certain kinds of religiosity, to seek their reformation by creating subjects compatible with an enunciatively liberal order. This is the secular normativity identified by Mahmood (2006, 328), whose main purposes are to reform Islam and discipline its adherents. Muslims are defined then also through their lack of secularism, establishing a distinction between modern and pre-modern subjects. I return to these topics—secularism, and the limits of German tolerance—in the following chapters. The aim here is to present how these narratives produce Muslims as problematic.

The DIK has been defined by its representatives as a nationwide reaction—articulating different levels of government and Islamic organizations—to the growing problems emanating from the coexistence of different cultures, German and Islamic. The existence and work of this state agency depart from the

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4   Then, for example, Sayyid (2014b, 35) argues that the idealized benefit of secularism for scientific progress "rests upon a [particular] conflict between science and church … symbolized by the trials of Galileo", and the absence of a hierarchical organized church in Islamic societies made such a case and comparison untenable at best, or a violent imposition at worst.

widely circulated and accepted idea that the presence of Muslims has been creating conflicts. In the following statements from the interim report of 2008, the narration describes the rising reports of troubles, and the need to increase efforts towards the integration of Muslims:

> There is unquestionably a need to increase efforts to foster integration on the basis of our understanding of integration which both sides have made allowances for. Following many years of immigration from countries that have a Muslim majority, the fact that there has recently been *an increase* in media reports *on difficulties relating to the coexistence of people from different cultures* indicates that we are certainly experiencing problems with integration. As in other European countries, it has also been observed in Germany that integration is developing asymmetrically in some respects. Favored by state-of-the-art means of communication and transport, immigrants frequently feel they belong to several cultures. This means they may feel torn between their former homeland and that of their parents or grandparents and their new homeland Germany. This tendency can be intensified if they experience rejection and discrimination. It must also be borne in mind that the process of developing an identity and sense of belonging is indeed a complex process that may involve many difficulties with much fragmentation and reversal possibilities.
>
>   DIK, 2008c, 4 [emphasis added]

The paragraph departs from a we-they framework, in which "we" represents Germans, while "they" denotes Muslims. Thus, for the DIK, Germany is comprised of two separate entities—both sides. Moreover, it expresses the urgency to increase the efforts to achieve integration. In the statements, media reports are used as evidence of the growing problems shaped by the coexistence of people belonging to different cultures, particularly migrants from Muslim countries.

  The paragraph does not clarify what the particular problems are or to what figures they are referring to note an increase in the number of incidents because the call for deepening integration finds its legitimacy in the rising difficulties between self-enclosed cultures. Media reports are taken as indexes of a "truth" that does not need to be verified or supported by evidence, and here they are used as the evidence to legitimize a governmental plan. The discursive problematization of Muslims in the last decade has been so proliferated that no further information is required to disseminate the message that the presence of Muslims generates conflicts and that Muslims are problematic subjects. The association of the words Muslims and problems evokes the widely

circulated stereotypical images of the "Islamist" terrorist and the oppressed Muslim woman. This is a recurrent strategy within the DIK, the radical realism noticed by Said (1978), an attitude presupposing that the mere act of naming builds ontological stability into the phenomenon being named. The iterative association of the words Muslims and problems stabilizes this assumption.

Furthermore, integration in the statements relates to the biopolitical defense of German society, to its right to protect itself from the growing difficulties emerging from the coexistence between cultures. Furthermore, the idea of non-asymmetrical integration suggests that integration is a totalizing process, i.e., it cannot be restricted to particular dimensions, such as language competency or loyalty to the nation; each and every one of the prerequisites of integration need to be fulfilled in order to be symmetrical.

Moreover, it also states that Germany is not alone in facing the problems originated by the encounters of different cultures. Some other European countries are also experiencing "asymmetrical" processes of integration. A troublesome transnational Islamic community is imagined, establishing and rehearsing the discourse of the West and the Islamic rest, building up a contraposition between the European identity versus the Islamic one.

The statements are also framed in the normative conception of dialogue and consensus. Integration is depicted as a concept-strategy stemming from the dialogue of "both sides", which certainly is not the case. Since 1982, the German state has defined integration and its parameters, and more recently, it has been materialized in a national encompassing strategy iterated, not just in the DIK, but also at the Integration summit and the National Integration Plan. Moreover, within the DIK there is not a single reference to how Islamic organizations and individual representatives have defined the topic or influenced the discussion. In the next chapters, which delve into integration, it will become clearer that integration is not based on consensus but on top-down decision-making. This is in stark contrast to the view exposed in the paragraph, where the DIK outlines integration as consensus-oriented, an utterance that makes this tactic appear legitimate, benign, and desirable. If Muslims have also defined integration, then, it could be inferred that they want to be integrated. Yet, the DIK is an agency created by the state, to fulfill the state's purposes and Islamic organizations and individuals were invited to participate in it.

Another frequent supposition in the DIK's documents and in the above quote refers to migrants and Muslims as suffering from some sort of alienation caused by the assumption that they live between two worlds and cultures, a situation exacerbated by new technologies and means of transport. The above statements do not explain how this feeling is negative or even on which evidence this claim is supported. In fact, using the tools of the same Conference,

another conclusion can be reached, but this knowledge generated by the DIK itself is somehow overlooked. The MLG study designed a set of questions to measure the self-assessment of Muslims regarding their attachment to Germany, nearly 70 percent stated their feeling as very strong attachment or a strong attachment to the country, 27 percent and 42 percent respectively, and 20 percent declared "so-so". Almost all of the Muslims asked about their attachment to Germany responded positively (DIK, 2009d, 289).

Another remark from the paragraph implies a depoliticized concept of conflict, insofar as it is the outcome of the plain contact between cultures and not of relations of domination, social inequalities, exclusion, racism, and sexism. Although the statements acknowledge that Muslims face discrimination, this is not in relation to the irruption of cultural conflicts but to their fragmented identity; discrimination against Muslims plays no role in cultural conflict. Hence, the DIK deploys culture to cover up important sources of conflict and locate them in the clash between two cultural essences.

Likewise, the statements rehearse national imaginaries about historical development, from which can be inferred the existence of three different stages of the German nation. The first is based on a narrative about the past that depicts Germany before immigration as a country in which cultural conflicts did not exist, since the existence of a homogenous and more cohesive socio-cultural body is assumed. The second period refers to a distorted and dislocated image of the present, from which the existence of a bi-cultural society, German culture, and immigrant culture from Muslim countries can be deduced. Here Germany is depicted as a new homeland, suggesting the short time span of Muslim presence in the country. Finally, the third temporality depicts the German society to come in which cultural conflicts will be solved after immigrants have been integrated into Germany. Such a temporality presupposes that Germany did not face troubles before the arrival of migrants. The German social fabric and cohesion was satisfactory and somehow homogenous. Thus, the problems arrived with non-Germans arising in the problematic present, therefore calling for solutions, not to return to the previous stage, but to create an improved society in which German culture has been passed onto Muslim migrants.

The DIK uses historical discourse as a tactic to rehearse a narrative about a pure and homogenous German nation corrupted (polluted) by the intromission of an-Other culture. Then, the meanings of culture bifurcate. On the one hand, culture becomes the conceptual tool to understand the emergence of troubles. On the other hand, (German) culture irrupts as the solution to these problems. If Muslims immigrants can be acculturated following the parameters of the German culture, the problems will gradually disappear.

The fate of the German society rests upon the reproduction, (trans)mission, and maintenance of the German culture, which never change throughout the temporalities, it is represented as a homogenous set of values, norms, and ideas not trapped in but marking time. Therefore, another dimension of the representation of Muslims positions them as alienated subjects between cultures.

During the DIK's first phase, the working group 3 focused on the media and private sector as bridge-builders. Particularly the media was conceptualized as a tool "to foster understanding between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens in Germany" (DIK, 2008c, 10). These topics were dropped in the second phase, in which national security issues gained more relevance in the DIK's agenda and practices.

In this phase, the DIK distanced itself from the problematization of Muslims by locating the problem in how the media reports about them in the country. While some of the DIK's documents used media coverage as valid knowledge to indicate the problems engendered by Muslims, the DIK also blamed the media for focusing primarily on such issues: "The participants criticized the fact that to date the media in Germany paint an incomplete picture of the Muslims living in Germany and their role in the economy, society and culture of our country. Rather, most reports about Muslims dealt with problems and difficulties" (DIK, 2009c, 26).

This is one of the recurrent strategies deployed by the DIK, schizophrenically working within contradictions. On the one hand, it addresses the fact that the media represents Muslims mostly as problems; then, it states that this locus is biased, positioning itself against it. On the other hand, it actively defines and promotes the solution for the troubles Muslims represent and even draws on the media to argue about the rising cultural conflicts between Germans and Muslims as argued above. Here, by admitting that the media focus excessively on the problems the Muslim subject represents, the DIK emerges as free of these kinds of argumentations—it locates the problems outside the institution. The DIK's critique of the media has also been directed at the emphasis on violence in its reporting (DIK, 2009b, 64). Out of this, the DIK emerges as a non-bias institution, promoting a more objective media reporting of Muslim life in Germany. Thus, criticizing the media's problematization of Muslims confers to the DIK an impartial character. Though, as I have been arguing, the DIK found its existence in problematizing different aspects of Muslim life in Germany and openly expresses it.

One of the working group's recommendation for improving the media reporting suggested "that the number of qualified staff with a migration background hired as radio and TV editors and in the print media be greatly increased

in order to leverage their know-how and intercultural understanding" (DIK, 2008c, 11). The proposal presupposes that persons with "migration background" would provide a more objective reporting about Muslims, simply because they have a "migration background". This again imagines the totality of persons with "migration background" as a homogeneous and constant group with similar political views. Certainly, having a "migration background" is neither a direct cause of partial reporting nor of intercultural understanding. Moreover, the issue is depoliticized since the biased reporting in the media about Muslims only responds to a birthplace or to the stubborn remnant of an alleged migratory experience and not to national anxieties, political imaginaries about who can and can't belong to the nation, and racism.

The words and sentences used to legitimize the foundation of the Islam Conference were words positing the idea that Muslim presence in Germany has engendered, and posed a set of interconnected problems. Interconnected by the words Islam and Muslims, and underpinned by racial imaginaries. Wolfgang Schäuble, at the 54th meeting of the German Bundestag, stated the following concerning the DIK's foundation:

> To create prospects for our common future, we must try to solve the problems besetting the coexistence with Muslims in our country: religious education in Koranic schools and in public schools, headscarf, imam training, the role of women and girls, the slaughters—to name just a few keywords. Not only the federal government is concerned about the high unemployment, especially of the second and third generation Muslims, often as a result of a low skill levels. In addition to such everyday problems, Islamist terror and suspicion leads to fears in the population. Many Muslims find themselves wrongly placed under general suspicion, marginalized and not taken fully into German society.
>
> SCHÄUBLE, 2006a

At a basic level, what Schäuble implies refers to the alleged problematic coexistence between Germans and Muslims. Although the discourse acknowledges that Muslims also face difficulties such as suspicion, this goes hand in hand with a wider understanding and production of the predicaments that the Muslim presence represent since suspicion is the outcome of "Islamist" terror.

In Schäuble's speech in particular and the DIK at large, the production of the Muslim subject as a problem relies on a flexible racialization anchored—but not limited—to a cultural line dividing Muslims from Germans. This cultural line, however, when dissected reveals its gendered, racial, and sexual content. The cultural facade merely responds to the camouflage of racial ontologies.

Racism has welcomed culture, religion, sexuality, and gender in its wider and fluctuating spectrum ever since its different points of inception. As Du Bois (2005) argued, the color line is entangled with exclusions around gender, and economic exploitation, and the current racial characterization of Muslims with culture, nationalism, gender, and sexual regimes.

At the global level, the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent events discursively linking Islam and terrorism marked a threshold in the way Muslims as a problem were and are perceived and racialized. 9/11 set up the basis for new waves of violence, racial discrimination, and processes of exclusion and state intervention, focusing directly on those perceived as Muslims. And to be clear, this is not to say that racism against Muslim only appeared after 9/11, but rather, it highlights a manifest shift in intensity followed by a widespread proliferation and circulation of discourses portraying Muslims as the enemy outside and inside the nation, thereby creating the possibilities for state intervention.

Mahmood Mamdani (2005, 11) termed this particular instrumentalization of culture as *culture talk*, namely, the cultural interpretation of politics, and the assumption that "every culture has a tangible essence that defines it, and it then explains politics as a consequence of that essence" (Mamdani, 2005, 17). Culture talk has the effect of dividing subjects, populations, nations, and continents between modern and civilized, and pre-modern, traditional, and uncivilized. The former are active creators and producers of culture while the latter are subjected to it.

The problematization of Muslims in Germany follows the script of culture talk. It departs from the assumption that Islam can be conceptualized as a culture, and even when the diversity of Muslim life is acknowledged, a cultural identity can still be presupposed. Moreover, culture is also believed to be a territorial issue; hence, the idea of "Muslim countries" entails the supposition that Muslim culture is rooted in particular geographies and then inextricably attached to subjects.

The DIK's usage of culture is often subtle. It appears on repeated occasions, but mostly relates to other arguments, such as the construction of a better future and society, the prevention of tangible threats, or the resolution of conflicts. Frequently, the DIK associates culture talk with the right to difference, and the internal diversity of Muslim communities in Germany, stating the constitution of Muslims communities as heterogeneous. What homogenizes them are the problems they represent, problems originated by culture. In the interim report of 2008, the round table on *Security and Islamism* (DIK, 2008c, 12) examined the Netherlands in regard to the security measures implemented there to prevent the threat that Muslims pose:

It is true that the Muslim population in the Netherlands differs greatly from the Muslim population in Germany in terms of ethnicity, structure and share of the total population. Yet there are similarities between the two countries' Muslim populations in relation to the lack of integration and education deficits among Muslim immigrants. The security situation and the current threat posed by growing Islamist radicalization in both countries are also similar. In both countries, there is a lack of knowledge and mutual understanding among Muslims and non-Muslims.

DIK, 2008c, 15

Despite differences of "ethnicity", percentage, and structure, Muslims as a group and as a trouble can be internationally arranged in terms of their deficits—integration and education—the tangible threat that they represent, and the lack of mutual understanding between the host societies and Muslims. A Muslim cultural essence is reified insofar as some problems are identified, emerging from some common cultural practices—which in this text are not explicit—blocking the integration of Muslims. The paragraph also falls back on a binary understanding of social reality, arranging two transnational blocks in conflict, or without mutual understating: European countries, the Netherlands and Germany versus the transnational Muslim immigrants. To conclude this chapter, I flesh out the problems of one concrete problem that Muslims allegedly represent, namely, the participation of Muslim girls and young women in co-ed swimming lessons.

2.3   Gender Justice in the Swimming Pool

Along with integration and the prevention of extremism and social polarization, gender justice constituted one of the DIK's three pillars of work in its second phase. The topics addressed by the Conference matched with the themes circulated in the media about the inequality of gender roles among Muslims: forced marriages, domestic violence, "honor killings" (DIK, 2012c), traditional role models (DIK, 2010a, 2013), the lack of participation of women in the society and the labor market, and the headscarf, all of them elements symbolizing the inequality of Muslim women (DIK, 2010a, 7). The DIK locates the source of gender inequality prevailing in Muslim milieus in patriarchal structures and not in Islam (DIK, 2010a, 7). In the interim report of 2010, while discussing the promotion of gender justice as a shared value, the DIK reached the following conclusions:

> [It] will also mean addressing the stereotypes and preconceived expec-
> tations that in many cases are not marked specifically by Islamic struc-
> tures but by patriarchal structures which are explained and justified by
> religious or alleged Islamic traditions. These stereotypes are capable of
> hampering gender equality. The foundations for gender typical patterns
> of behavior and expectations are laid in families and girls and boys tend
> to be raised according to different educational ideals.
>
>   DIK, 2010a, 7

The statements illustrate the DIK's reformist approach. The central argument
positions a problem about the stereotypical expectations of Muslim parents
regarding the gender roles of their children—this is taken for granted. How-
ever, it is not because they are believers of Islam. Instead the preconditions of
these rigid roles have their origins in patriarchal structures. The report does
not mention where the patriarchal structures came from; they are neither Is-
lamic nor German since another report of the DIK argued that gender equal-
ity prevails in Germany (DIK, 2013). The only possible explanation left is the
countries of origin, the Orient, which historically has been constructed as a
site of women's oppression and patriarchy, but the DIK does not allude to this
imagined geography, therefore there is silence about the source of the prob-
lem. The media, and one of the non-organized Muslims represented in the
DIK will fix Islam as the source of patriarchy and the oppression of Muslim
women. I delve into this topic in Chapter 6 on account of its relevance. Here, I
focus on one dimension of the problems surrounding Muslim gender roles in
German—mixed swimming lessons—as an example of how gender inequality
is imprinted on the DIK's definition of the Muslim subject and tallies on the
racial problematization of Muslims.

However, following Gökçe Yurdakul & Anna C. Korteweg (2013, 205), my crit-
icism of the DIK's approach towards gender inequality concerning Muslims is
neither apologetic nor denies the existence of gendered violence. Rather, I am
arguing about the strategic use of claims of gender inequality to racially repre-
sent the Muslim subject in a pre-modern, archaic state, while rendering Ger-
many as if it has already achieved gender equality. Furthermore, as Yurdakul
& Korteweg (2013, 205) argued, in Germany, analysis about gendered violence
"are not addressing questions of racialization at all". The problem in the DIK's
approach resides in a predefined construction of the Muslim subject as onto-
logically gender unequal, generalizing single cases to depict a population with
constant and immutable characteristics.

According to the DIK, parent's expectations obstructing gender justice and
equality are particularly salient in the school system, specifically around the

topics of mixed-sports and swimming lessons, sex education, and school trips (DIK, 2009d, 17). The DIK acknowledges the relevance of these topics in the public debate as problems emerging from Muslim communities restricting the freedom of Muslim girls and children (DIK, 2009d, 173). The refusal to engage with and negotiations about the four issues not only represent deviations of the normal educational practices in Germany, but also refer to patriarchal understandings about gender and sexuality.

The overall results of the MLG study contradict the idea that Muslims are "not integrated" in these aspects or that there is an unequal gender treatment of Muslim girls. In every dimension of integration regarding mixed-sports and swimming lesson, sex education and school trips, the data showed—in a paternalistic air—that they are doing well, and still at the conclusion of each section shortcomings were highlighted and recommendation were suggested to improve the situation.

One of the recurrent topics in the media about Islam and Muslims revolves around the refusal of some Muslims parents to allow their children to take mixed swimming lessons at school. I use this case as an example, but the figures about swimming lessons are similar to the other topics. For instance, the participation of Muslims in gender mixed sports lessons was 84.2 percent for male and 88.7 percent for female pupils, the total of schools who do not offer the lessons was 6.8 percent, and 5.7 percent of the schools offered only single-sex sports lessons, the figure of those who do not attend such lessons on religious beliefs was 0.1 percent for both male and female pupils (DIK, 2009d, 175). Regarding sex education, 52.1 percent male and 58.1 percent female students attended the lessons, in 42,9 percent of the schools such lessons are not available, and 0.7 percent male and 0.8 percent female pupils do not attend for religious reasons (DIK, 2009d, 177). The issue of school trips shows a similar tendency, 70.9 percent male and 68.1 percent female students participate in school trips with at least one overnight stay, 25 percent of the schools do not offer the trips, and 0.3 percent male and 0.8 percent female pupils did not make the trip for religious reasons (DIK, 2009d, 180).

The results after the poll showed that Muslim parents prohibiting their children to attend mixed swimming lessons is barely an issue. According to the MLG study, more than a half of the interviewed, 53 percent, (53.7 percent male and 52.8 percent female pupils) reported that their children attend mixed swimming lessons, and for the ones who do not attend such lessons, the reason is that swimming is not offered in the school (42 percent), or that the school offers only single sex lesson (1.9 percent), that the school offers only this kind of lesson is not seen as a problem, despite that this is the problem attached to Muslims. Only one percent responded that their children do not attend mixed

swimming lessons based on religious beliefs, (0.1 percent males; 1.9 percent females). Furthermore, in comparison to other religious groups in Germany the attendance of Muslims to swimming lessons is slightly lower, 53 percent in comparison to 56 percent (DIK, 2009d, 177).

Despite the figures collected and quoted in the study, this evidence was insufficient to prove the points that MLG study pretended to make, i.e. the existence of *differences* between Muslims and Germans when it comes to cultural and religious gender practices, how these are obstacles for achieving gender equality, and how these are a special obstruction for Muslim young girls and children. Accordingly, the next step followed by MLG study was to focus on that one percent that do not attend swimming lessons based on religious beliefs, the "genuine objectors" (DIK, 2009d, 182) as they are labeled:

> The results further show that only a small fraction of the pupils living in the surveyed households explicitly refuse to participate in co-educated sports and swimming classes, sex education and multi-day school trips ... *The finding that the stated school lessons were not available to many pupils also allows another interpretation, however.* It may be that many schools whose pupils include a high proportion of children and young people from migrant backgrounds avoid offering certain types of classes from the outset or offer classes which are more likely to be readily accepted by parents, such as single-sex sports and swimming classes or single-day school trips without overnight stays—either on the basis of experience or for fear that a substantial proportion of their pupils will reject certain forms of teaching.
>
>   DIK, 2009d, 181 [emphasis added]

Here, the structural conditions, the fact that 42 percent of the schools do not offer mixed swimming lessons, are undermined. The study posits the idea that on account of the schools' fear that pupils will not attend such lessons, they decided to not offer them. The schools might have this fear when a high proportion of pupils carry the burden of "migration background"; yet, having a "migration background" is not equal to being Muslim. Thus, the interpretation of the MLG study filters the idea that groups with "migration background" might influence the curricula of 42 percent of the schools in which the Muslims surveyed send their children. But as mentioned, only 1.0 percent of the pupils do not participate in gender mixed sport lessons, 0.7 percent in sex education, and 0.5 percent in school trips based on religious reasons according to the same study.

The MLG study does not offer any kind of evidence to sustain the interpretation about the schools changing their curricula based on fear of rejection since neither a school director, administrator nor pertinent person around the subject were asked about, nor study sustaining this claim was presented. What the study created was a suspicion embedded in statistical knowledge that is presented as a scientific truth, having the effect of creating an aura of validity around this unfounded interpretation. Moreover, it asserts the moral panic about the disintegration of Germany, and the country losing control of key issues such as education—similarly as Werner Schiffauer (2006) analyzed the circulation of moral panic regarding naturalizations depicting Germany as no longer having control of central arenas. The MLG study subtly insinuates that Muslims with "migration background" might be able to change the educational practices of a significant number of schools, especially those attended by a high number of pupils with a "migration background". The argument about the genuine objectors continues:

> In order to obtain a rounded picture and to emphasize the proportion of *"genuine objectors",* figure 47 considers only those pupils to whom the corresponding classes and activities were available and who either participated in these or declined to do so for religious or other reasons. Considering only the group of pupils concerned, it emerges that the overwhelming majority of both Muslims and non-Muslims with a corresponding migrant background do participate in the stated classes and activities. Swimming classes and school trips are revealed as problematic issues for Muslim girls, with a share of *7 and 10 per cent respectively* failing to participate in these activities. The lower level of participation among Muslim girls in comparison to boys is statistically significant, *indicating gender-specific unequal treatment* of Muslim girls with regard to these two types of school activities.
>
> DIK, 2009d, 182 [emphasis added]

In the paragraph above, it is clear that the MLG study explicitly searched for those archetypal parents who would forcefully limit the freedom of choice of their daughters based on religious beliefs. And although the "overwhelming majority" of Muslims attend them, swimming lessons are still a "problematic issue for Muslim girls"; the previous 1 percent of the overall Muslim population is turned into a 7 percent, a higher figure that emphasizes that this is *in fact* a trouble. Moreover the non-attendance of the lessons is labeled a *failure* and further indicates that gender inequality is affecting Muslim girls.

In this section there is an emphasis on finding the gender-specific unequal treatment of Muslim girls since the study did not delve into, and proposed interpretations for those percentages in which the participation of male Muslim pupils was lower than those of female Muslim pupils, e.g., only 52 percent of male pupils attended sex education lessons in comparison with 58 percent of females; and this is not to say that there is gender-specific unequal treatment of Muslim boys, given that there was no research about the reasons for the discrepancy. The point here is that in this section the MLG study used percentages for a strategic reading.

In order to back up the conclusions about the gender-specific unequal treatment of Muslim girls with regard to swimming lessons, in a footnote the study quoted a qualitative study, which argued that Muslim girls in Germany tend to strategically choose a sports activity that complies with the religious principle of covering the body such as karate. To illustrate this point, the case of *a single* young Muslim woman is described as a "successful competitive swimmer" that at the age of 15 "deliberately switched to karate after her father banned her from continuing to swim, as long clothes are worn in karate" (DIK, 2009d, 182). The presentation of this single case guides the reader to imagine that this could be the reason why the figures are so low, i.e., Muslims have found a way to not comply with the requirements imposed on them, and certainly if the father banned this young Muslim woman from taking part in swimming lessons this represents a restriction to gender equality. The problem is the instrumentalization of this single case to suggest a wider tendency in a study that claims to investigate Muslim life in Germany, which in turn, is embedded in a discursive field producing and circulating the image of Muslims as problematic.

The category of genuine objectors also suggests that there are non-genuine ones, those parents that do not need to make a choice because swimming lessons are not offered at the school where their children attend lessons. The category insinuates that the proportion of Muslim parents' restriction could be higher than the data showed. And the voice of the successful competitive swimmer is lost in between her father and the institution, her different motives are imputed and she is being represented by the study (*vertreten*) as a symbol (*darstellen*) of gender oppression (Spivak, 1994).

This line of argumentation judges the decision of Muslim young women. It conveys the message that they have no freedom of choice, and even if they decide "genuinely", for instance, to take karate lessons, their decision can be judged as influenced by or in compliance with patriarchal structures, a judgment to which a White German woman most likely would not subjected. The study in fact did not ask whether the Muslim pupils wanted to take swimming lessons or not.

The inflated 7 percent found to be the genuine objectors made its way into an article of the magazine, *Der Spiegel* (Bartsch, Hipp, & Popp, 2013). In it, this figure is coupled with a legal dispute in Frankfurt involving the Muslim parents of a young girl who did not want their daughter to attend swimming lessons at school. The student is depicted as "an ideal student in the eyes of German politicians who advocate the integration of people from other culture" (Bartsch et al. 2013). The discourse is iterated and travels from one setting to another; again a single case is highlighted to insinuate a wider trend in which Muslim parents are damaging gender equality for Muslim girls:

> Conflicts repeatedly arise between families and schools when boys and girls are to attend co-ed swimming classes. According to a survey conducted on behalf of the German Islam Conference, a forum of dialogue between Muslim groups and the government, seven percent of Muslim girls don't attend co-ed swimming lessons, and roughly half of their families give religious reasons for this absenteeism. What's more, 10 percent of the girls don't take part in class trips where children spend nights away from home.
>
> BARTSCH ET AL., 2013

The article does not clarify that this 7 percent only applies to those Muslims in which the school offered swimming lessons, that is to say, only 53 percent, but rather is presented as covering the entire population, depicting wider tendencies. The same applies to school trips, where figures are even lower, only 0.5 percent for both male and female, 0.3 percent and 0.8 percent respectively—this was then inflated to 10 percent. The article first appeared in a magazine with nationwide distribution surpassing one million, subsequently was translated into English and published in the international version of the magazine on the Internet. This is precisely how the signification spiral of moral panics functions (Hall et al. 1978), i.e., statistics are strategically read to suggest increasing trends while targeting a particular group. Thus, Muslims in general are problematized. Returning to the MLG study, the study concludes,

> Overall, it is apparent that the rejection of school classes and activities is no 'mass phenomenon'. There is nevertheless a continuing need to win over parents with a migrant background in this area, so as to ensure that no child remains excluded from these activities which are important to their personal development and to counteract the unequal participation of Muslim girls and boys in some school subjects and activities.
>
> DIK, 2009d, 183

At work here is the soft and productive power approach of the DIK, the polemic around swimming lessons is addressed without anxiety, and this state agency also pushes for winning over parents with a "migration background", to win their minds and souls, so that in the future they have already internalized the acceptance of these lessons. What is important for the DIK is to set up the basis for consent about "normal" educational practices, to set the conditions for a better future.

In the comments section of the translated version of *Der Spiegel*'s article, one of the first entries entitled "Why are Muslims always special?" states the following:

> Can you imagine a German moving to Saudi Arabia and demanding that special accommodations should be made for him because he is a Christian? If someone moves to a new country they need to assimilate with the local population and it's culture. Otherwise they are free to move to another country that has a culture acceptable to them. Are Germans willing to change their culture and laws to accommodate every ethnic group that wishes to live in Germany? If this happened Germany would no longer remain German.
>
> comments in: BARTSCH ET AL. 2013

Again this exemplifies the signification spiral of moral panic, a strategic reading of statistics triggers the meta-discourse of integration/assimilation, the Christian, and masculine nature of Germany, and the fear about the future of the nation.

Reconfiguring the Present—Integration as the Answer

∵

Introduction to Part 2

Nowadays, integration operates in a variety of spheres and across a wide range of registers. It can be simultaneously used to praise the national soccer team as an emblem of successful integration and to condemn the lack of engagement with German culture of migrants and Muslims. There are novels, movies, and TV series, in which integration performs as the meta-narrative of the story. In politics, integration has transformed into a national and encompassing policy for several institutions, including the DIK. The notion has also been the subject of academic debates and highly elaborated conceptualizations. Integration can denote, inter alia, learning the German language, pledging to abide by the German Basic Law, marrying an "ethnic" German, and cultivating friendships with "native" Germans. Integration, then, fluctuates and operates dispersedly, appearing diffuse and yet concrete. In other words, the concept's ambiguity still can evoke common sense references since in contemporary Germany everyone has heard and known about integration, and whom it targets without further references.

Integration, with relatively few exceptions, is accepted as the solution to a set of "troubles" that for some decades has been affecting Germany. These problems are circumscribed and attached to those perceived and constructed as non-Germans, foreigners, refugees, migrants, Muslims and German citizens of Islamic faith, whose contact—or lack thereof—with German culture causes the conflicts tearing apart the German social fabric.

Integration circulates in every document of the DIK, and although its meanings constantly change and elaborated and multidimensional conceptualizations of the notion have been developed, some ideas are common to all of them: the assumption that Muslims are still not integrated; integration as a positive strategy to solve the problems emerging from the coexistence between cultures; the supposition of integration as beneficial for Muslims, and underlying this, the belief in the improvement of Muslims through integration. In addition to the nonexistence of references in the DIK's documents that challenged the necessity of integration, which is consistent with the fact that the discourse on integration not only provides legitimacy and consent, but also constitutes the Conference itself. The DIK represents the discourse on integration, it talks through it, it encourages people to speak about it, to measure it, and judge it. And through the proliferation of integration, it establishes an invisible normalcy: being German constitutes the parameter to judge the Muslim being.

Although dispersed and free-floating, the discourse on integration performs concrete tasks. It establishes a normative system of regulation to judge and measure the attitudes of Muslims with reference to the scales integrated/non-integrated and failure/success, resulting in contradictory but supplementary subject formations, namely, the willing and the unwilling to integrate Muslim. Integration requires for its functioning both, the former as an exemplary role model, and the latter as a signifier for the necessity of integration politics.

Integration politics became the paradigm of the German state to "deal" with foreigners and migrants during the beginning of Helmut Kohl's administration, which lasted from 1982–1998. From this moment onwards, integration has grown into the imperative of the German migration regime (Bojadžijev, 2006) to the point that nowadays Germany has been defined as an integrationland (Schäuble in: DIK, 2009b, 340).

In one of his speeches regarding the DIK, Schäuble stated, "Germany is an integration country" (*Deutschland ist Integrationsland*). This statement can be seen as a belated response to the former Chancellor Kohl's (1991) infamous statement "The Federal Republic of Germany is not an immigration country". Schäuble's words mark ruptures and continuities with Kohl's position. In contrast to Kohl, Schäuble acknowledges migration and migrants as part of Germany's reality, and similarly to Kohl, Schäuble proposes integration for migrants and Muslims as the prerequisite to be included into the nation. Both positions depart from an innate distinction between Germans and migrants and Muslims.

Furthermore, the statement that Germany is an integration country posits integration as a national responsibility. It depicts the German territory and its political system as a geography with particular characteristics, inclusive but under the premise of acculturation, assimilation, and "adjustment". Thus, integration delineates paths of national belonging and exclusion, and moreover, integration introduces a border and therefore a distinction between integrated Germans and to-be integrated Others. Since the only ones who need to integrate are those subjects perceived and constructed as non-German, namely, migrants, refugees, and Muslims—including German Muslim citizens with "migration background"—integration becomes a norm to be fulfilled, and something that migrants and Muslims have to take as their duty.

In the time of Angela Merkel's administration—starting in 2005—the German state has designed and deployed two major institutional strategies to promote migrants' integration through the National Integration Plan and Summit, and more particularly, the integration of Muslims via the DIK.

The history of integration as a modality of power looms large in European colonial history. David T. Goldberg (2002), for one, has documented the relation

between the rise of modern and racial states and integrationist/assimilationist projects. These concepts-projects have been strategies of racial historicism, demanding the undoing of racially constructed subjects deemed inferior due to their historical underdevelopment. Racial historicism and its integrationist and assimilationist policies presupposed the project of racial uplifting by means of the methodical undoing of racialized Others, and their refashioning according to specific racial standards and moral frames.

Furthermore, integration/assimilation politics were central strategies in different colonial projects and the crafting of modern-racial states. Without being a general rule and expressing itself in different forms, some imperial powers sought to transform the colonized lives and subjectivities as a means to achieve their racial uplifting and thereby to secure administration, control, and hegemony. The paradigm of integration/assimilation and their implications allowed the reaffirmation of a homogenous racial-national identity for one part and the marking of particular subjects in a pre-modern state on the other. This constitutes one of my central contentions: integration is a screen for a racial discourse marking Muslims as underdeveloped-unfinished racialized Others, and based on that premise, the DIK conditions their enfranchisement by circulating symbolic definitions about true-real Germans and fictive ones, thus revealing the biopolitical functioning of the German state through the DIK, splitting the German population into integrated-real-Germans and non-integrated-yet-Muslims.

Integration is a narrative of the present mounted on the premise and promise of attuning, aligning, and assimilating anachronic and atavistic subjects—subjects out of place and time in modern Germany. Integration moreover depoliticizes social and political conflict while obscuring different forms of exclusion and discrimination by putting on the shoulders of the non-German subject the burden not only of his or her acculturation but also any problems she or he may face, because these problems are ultimately due to the fact that she or he is not integrated.

In the chapters comprising this part, I map the uses of integration and its political effects in the context of the Conference. Chapter 3 traces the variegated ways in which the DIK defines integration, paying particular attention to the academic discourse on the term and its application for assessing the degree of Muslim integration. Chapter 4 examines the entanglement of integration, national security, and prevention; it fleshes out the positioning of national security concerns in the structure of the Islam Conference and the derivate projects. Finally, Chapter 5 delves into the lexicon of the present, the political definition of those notions disintegrating and fracturing the German national body, and which can be solve by integrative means.

Integration

3.1   Integration as Assimilation

The study *Muslim Life in Germany* (DIK, 2009d) constitutes one of the most ambitious projects launched by the DIK. Hitherto, it has been established as authoritative knowledge about Muslim life in Germany. Previously, I analyzed the study's definition of the Muslim subject. Now, I turn the attention to the study's definition of integration, without the former the latter cannot operate and vice versa.

The MLG study had as its aims the imperative of dissecting almost every aspect of Muslim life in Germany and assessing the integration level of Muslims (DIK, 2009d, 198). From this objective, it can be inferred that integration works within a measurable and temporal frame, i.e., it can be quantified by implying the existence of different degrees and moments in a scale. Thus, Muslims can be classified and ranked accordingly. Measuring integration entails an underlying hierarchy; the more integrated the better. It also necessitates a subject, the Muslim, and an object of knowledge, the attitudes to be measured. In this sense, integration also aligns itself with a linear notion of time—the road described by Schäuble (2006a)—a pathway that Muslims need to embark, from tradition to modernity, from sacred-eschatological time to secular one.

The concept of integration used by the MLG study follows Hartmut Esser's theory (DIK, 2009d, 198), yet it is stated that instead of integration Esser employs the term assimilation. Then, it is briefly mentioned that assimilation has negative connotations in Germany, but in other national and academic contexts it has been normally used to measure and evaluate the level of migrants' assimilation to host countries, thus it can be inferred that the process of assimilation is both transhistorical and transnational, alas, somehow universal and aligned with the marching step of progress. In order to use the concept without naming it, the editors of the MLG study interchanged the terms, applying the same strategy used by Friedrich Heckmann. Integration, then, is a screen for assimilation, integration functioning as a metonym for assimilation:

> Integration is evaluated here according to a concept based on Esser's theoretical approach (2001: 22ff). Esser employs the term "assimilation", which is commonly used in classical and more recent American migration research … For the purposes of this study, however, the term "integration"

> is used in accordance with Heckmann's line of argument (2001: 343), as
> the term "assimilation" has negative connotations in German.
>
> DIK, 2009d, 198

The study does not offer any clarification about the negative connotations of
assimilation in Germany, presupposing the reader's awareness of the term's
bad reputation, and yet it still can be used. Heckmann (2001) for his part argued
that his concept of integration leans towards assimilation, but, "For pragmatic
reasons we do not use the term 'assimilation', because it almost immediately
evokes emotional reactions and connotations of cultural suppression. Assim-
ilation, indeed, has had this meaning during the high times of nationalism"
(Heckmann, 2001, 60–61). Then, what are those negative connotations of the
concept assimilation particular to Germany and not been made explicit? Are
those referring to the anti-Semitic discourses around the "Jewish question" and
its devastating developments, in which through a series of racial stereotypes
Jews were forcefully called to *assimilate* to German society by disavowing their
Jewish selves? Moreover, if the history of assimilation has had, and still has,
negative connotations, and one needs to add racial and political tones and
uses, why keep using it and rehearsing its vocabulary and policies upon a reli-
gious minority?

Furthermore, Esser's theory follows the assimilation's paradigm, mostly de-
veloped in the US at the beginning of the last century by Robert E. Park (1939)
and the Chicago school exploring race relations and cycles of assimilation.
Since Park, different developments in the assimilation approach have been
made; Ramón Grosfoguel (2004, 315–316) identified three: the assimilation, the
cultural pluralist, and the context of reception/segmented schools.

The different approaches to assimilation theory share some common pre-
sumptions. First, assimilation involves a process of several temporal stages
whereby immigrants slowly but steadily acculturate themselves to the host
society's values and culture. The process can take two or three generations
and implies that the longer the time immigrants live in the host society, the
more assimilated they will be. Second, once assimilation has occurred, the
remnants of the immigrants' culture of origin disappear, but also the host so-
ciety's discrimination against them, or so the story goes. The cultural pluralist
school proposes a variation; assimilation prompts the development of novel
hyphenated "ethnic" identities. Immigrants have lost their language and cus-
toms but their "ethnicity" is newly recreated in relation to the identity of the
host society (Grosfoguel, 2004, 315–317). The DIK's approach mirrors the cul-
turalist pluralist scheme as it pursues to form a new hyphenated identity—the
German-Muslim.

The different approaches of assimilation theories shared some common problems: the approaches are state-centric, i.e., they neglect global and transnational dimensions as well as socio-historical processes, influencing the expected assimilation of migrants. Moreover, assimilation theories conceptualize immigrants as "static and unilinear" (Grosfoguel, 2004, 317), and disregard the different ways in which "migrants" are racially constructed. Assimilation, furthermore, can be seen as a conceptual derivation of "evolutionary time", and its classificatory scheme, in which "all living societies were irrevocably placed on a temporal slope, a stream of Time—some upstream, others downstream" (Fabian, 2014, 17). Within the scope of assimilation thus not only immigrants, and Muslims are though of as unilinear, but also the time they inhabit. Assimilation/integration then is offered as the vehicle to transit from downstream to upstream.

In addition, the distinct assimilation lines tend to erase the different forms of racial discrimination against immigrants by promising their disappearance once assimilation has been completed. Moreover, the theories present assimilation as an inevitable phenomenon, confirming the structures of domination that demand the transformation of migrants. Likewise, assimilation theories neither consider different forms of belonging nor the host society's structural racism effects on some migrants rather than others.

Briefly put, assimilation theories presuppose a universal *homo-migrans*, a subject that migrates and assimilates her- or himself following the same patterns regardless of racial constructions, class, gender, sexuality, or the historical context and the different dynamics across borders influencing these issues. Moreover, the host countries tend to be constructed as self-enclosed entities, with a homogeneous set of cultural values, which the migrants learn and internalize over progressive and homogenous time.

Nevertheless, the DIK has also tried to distance itself from assimilation, charging the concept with negative connotations such as its homogenizing impetus. In other texts, the DIK presents integration as a better solution to the problems that Muslims represent, as a more benign strategy that recognizes the richness of diversity. In his speech at the DIK's plenary session in 2010, Thomas de Maizière explained his and the DIK's position regarding assimilation, "To promote the social coexistence in Germany does not mean, in any way, making everyone similar, or to level every difference. The aim of the German Conference on Islam is not assimilation. Our aim is to avoid the problems that come with alterity/otherness [*Andersartigkeit*]" (Maizière de, 2010, 3 [author's translation]).

Here, de Maizière emphasizes the DIK's negative stance towards assimilation since the concept refers to a homogenizing drive. On the contrary, social cohesion (as integration) acknowledges differences, and moreover, it seeks to

solve the problems emerging from theses differences. If the MLG study and de Maizière's concepts of integration are read intertextually, it appears that even within the DIK the meanings of the notion change in relation to the site of enunciation and the context in which they are stated. This reveals the discursive dispersion of integration, at moments it can be assimilation, and at other times it can be the "opposite". However, whether it is named integration or assimilation both target Muslims and call for their adjustment.[1]

Returning to the MLG study, after cloaking assimilation in integration, the editors following Esser broke it down into four dimension and indicators: (1) Structural, measured through school qualifications and employment rates. (2) Social, evaluated around the quality and quantity of "interethnic" and interreligious relations and partnerships. (3) Cognitive/cultural, linked to the proficiency and competences in the German language. (4) Identificational/emotional, judged by the feelings of attachment to the country of origin and to Germany (DIK, 2009d, 199–200). The dissection of integration performs concrete tasks: it allows measuring and determining which attitudes of Muslims require more attention thereby enabling the development of tailored strategies.

3.2   Structural and Cognitive Integration

In the MLG study, the structural integration of Muslims refers to their educational levels and employment rates. The MLG study states that previous measurements regarding education have shown that persons with "migration background" tend to exhibit "a poorer situation with regard to educational level" (DIK, 2009d, 200) in comparison with those without migration background, i.e., Germans, and that Turkish migrants have even worse educational levels in comparison with other groups of migrants. The statements mix and collapse different categories, Muslims with Turks and persons with "migration background". Moreover, the study points out that Muslims have a "significantly lower educational level than members of other religious communities across the entire range of countries of origin covered by this study" (DIK, 2009d, 201). As I mentioned before, on account of the MLG's flawed method for defining Muslims, the study surveyed also non-Muslims coming from "predominantly Muslim countries", which throughout the study function as a control group vis-à-vis Muslims.

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1   The dispersion of a discourse, following Michel Foucault (2010), refers to the discontinuity and the spread of a variety of statements—which can contradict, supplement or reaffirm each other—forming concepts, objects of knowledge, subjects, social relations, and institutions.

However, after breaking down the data into the different countries of origin, a more complex picture emerged and great differences came to light, for instance, between Muslims from Turkey, who had the lowest level of education, and those from Iran with a good educational level (DIK, 2009d, 210). Therefore, the study was unable to determine whether the adherence to Islam influences the level of education—by itself a problematic assumption since this assumes that only being a Muslim can have a detrimental effect on education. Then, the MLG study explains the divergence within Muslims as an effect of social class:

> The differences with regard to standards of education among the religions and denominations are attributable above all to historical reasons relating to the recruitment of labor migrants from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, Morocco and Tunisia. These labor migrants and their dependents originated for the most part from poorly educated social strata.
>
> DIK, 2009d, 212

Here, the distinction between Muslims and Germans rests on the entanglement between religion and social class, obscuring the factual reality of the class stratification of German society. One problem of the MLG's assessment of educational level as indicator of structural integration is that the "poor performance" of Muslims in education is solely attributed to the former migrants' social class, while the role that the German educational system plays goes completely unnoticed.

Since the pioneering work of Basil Bernstein (1971, 2004) and Pierre Bourdieu & Jean-Claude Passeron (1990), the educational system has been conceptualized as reproducer of social class and inequalities. In Germany, several scholars (Auernheimer, 2006, 2010; Broden & Mecheril, 2010; Castro Varela & Mecheril, 2010; Radtke, 1995) have analyzed how the highly selective German educational system reproduces class asymmetries through national-ethnic-cultural belongings (Mecheril, Castro Varela, Kalpaka, Dirim, & Claus, 2010), thereby reifying the construction of the foreigner and the migrant versus the German (Castro Varela & Mecheril, 2010, 23), or that even the German educational system is not designed for a society of migration having as an outcome the reproduction of inequalities (Auernheimer, 2006). Thus, the "poor" performance of Muslims in schools relates not only to the social class of their parents and grandparents but also to how the educational system reproduces that difference along with those concerning nationality, "ethnicity", and race. And yet, in the MLG study, Muslims are the only ones responsible of their low educational levels.

The Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency (FADA) has documented evidence of discrimination against Muslim pupils and their parents in the German school system (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes, 2013, 16). Where the more or less 70,000 Muslim pupils in German schools routinely encounter discriminatory blockages in practicing their religion. The situation is even more pronounced for Muslim girls donning headscarves who regularly experience insults and derogatory remarks, not just from fellow students and teachers, but also from parents of non-Muslim children (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes, 2013, 16). A different study from the FADA also reported that 36 percent of the Muslims interviewed reported experiences of discrimination in educational settings (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes, 2012, 19).

The educational system is one of those crucial institutional settings where Muslims encounter and experience day-to-day discrimination, and Muslim girls wearing headscarves are extremely vulnerable to discriminatory practices and insults (Yegane Arani, 2015, 22). In this regard, the dominant narrative positing Muslims as non-integrated into German society has had discriminatory consequences for Muslim pupils in schools, where insults, forms of exclusion and obstruction to their careers have become a constant reality (Yegane Arani, 2015, 22).

Regarding the rates of employment of Muslims, more "positive" results transpire: 72 percent of the interviewees had gainful employment (DIK, 2009d, 214). Though, the group from Iran—along with those from the Middle East and Central Asia—was the one with the highest unemployment rate. Interestingly, just with reference to persons from Iran, a higher educational level does not directly lead to gainful employment, contradicting one of the study's assumptions: higher education rates lead to higher percentages of employment (DIK, 2009d, 230). But again, the rates of employment of Muslims depend exclusively upon their educational levels, and racial discrimination blocking the access to the labor market completely disappears.

In general, structural integration turned out to be the dimension in which Muslims are not doing well. Accordingly, the editors recommended concentrating future efforts on this dimension.[2] Hence, even after showing the complexity of the issue such as the different educational levels and employment rates and having reached the conclusion that it is impossible to determine whether Islam plays a role in the structural integration of Muslims, at the end,

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2 "Integration deficits are manifested first and foremost in the areas of education and integration in the labor market. Muslims reveal a significantly lower standard of education than the members of other religious communities across the entire range of countries of origin covered" (DIK, 2009d, 247).

all these nuances collapse and again the study addresses Muslims as a coherent population lacking structural integration. Furthermore, as with education rates, there are no references in the MLG study about the structural conditions of the labor market, nor to the structural discrimination blocking access to labor to Muslims, in particular to Muslim women (Ast & Spielhaus, 2012).

In this regard, research commissioned by the FADA brought to light that Muslims, and perceived ones, encounter different discriminatory experiences in the labor market and workplace (Peucker 2010). Another study from this office exposed that 38,2 percent of the Muslims interviewed reported experiences of discrimination in the workplace (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes, 2012, 19). In the labor market, e.g., employers tend to not employ Muslims based on the prejudice that customers may react negatively towards Muslims (Peucker, 2010; Scheer, 2013; Soliman, 2016). This situation is more pronounced for Muslim women, where the donning of a headscarf stands as a major obstacle for accessing a job. Moreover, the state's ban on headscarves, running from 2003 until 2015, created important barriers for women seeking access to public service, and significantly expanded outside it (Ast & Spielhaus, 2012; Soliman, 2016; Senatsverwaltung Berlin, 2008).

In effect, the access of Muslim women to the labor market represents one of the most critical materializations and deployments of racism and its entanglement with gender inequality. Not only women in general face more discrimination than men in the arena of labor, but also "women with a migrant background are more discriminated against than women without a migrant background" (Soliman, 2016, 40). Therefore, being Muslim and donning a headscarf has created an extra burden, a "threefold discrimination" (Nesrin Odabasi quoted in: Soliman, 2016, 40). Moreover, women have been fired after beginning to wear a headscarf (Peucker, 2010, 46–48; Soliman, 2016, 45), and "women with Turkish-sounding names who have equal qualifications and education are disadvantaged in comparison to women with German names" (Soliman, 2016, 41; see also: Kaas & Manger, 2010).

Integration then simultaneously becomes a vehicle to enhance the productivity of Muslims in the labor market and to veil structural racism in accessing jobs and in the workplace. Muslim productivity has also been topic of the Conference. In 2012, the DIK (2012a) published a report aimed at providing a series of recommendations and practical solutions about potential conflicts between Muslims and Germans in the workplace, and to enhance the integration of Muslims in this area; thus, integration also involves interventions at the level of productivity.

The report *Better Integration of Muslims in the Labor Market* (DIK, 2012a [BI]), is the outcome of this interest. The report comprises three sections. The

first explores the relations between Muslims and the labor market. It surveys questions about the integration of Muslims in this sphere and the limits between religious and work duties (DIK, 2012a, 14–35). The second explores cultural openness as a competitive advantage, by analyzing the public and private sector and the position of a trade union about diversity in the workplace (DIK, 2012a, 37–60). The final section is an annex iterating the results of the MLG study (DIK, 2012a, 62–86).

Briefly, the report disproves the idea that Islam causes problems in the workplace through the statements of some companies in Germany which have learned to use "the migration background" of their employees to enhance productivity or even to open new markets. Furthermore, the report provides different solutions to some "issues" in the workplace involving Muslims. For instance, "We use the differences" (DIK, 2012a, 52), is the title of one entry in the section about intercultural openness. The slogan captures the approach of the report BI, and highlights the link between tolerance and productivity. In a political debate in which the depiction of "migration background" and Islamic religiosity is heavily linked with a set of problems, the position of the report can be praised as showing the contrary, the utility of difference. Though, that is precisely the problem with the report's approach. It positively carries notions of difference, which although useful for a wide set of purposes, still needs to be tolerated, and the difference anchors in the problematic category of "migration background"; difference becomes an advantageous ontology for the making of profits and the expansion of markets.[3]

Concerning the cognitive dimension of integration, the MLG study states that migrants' successful integration rests on mastering the language of the host society (DIK, 2009d, 230). Thus, the acquisition of the German language is one of the keys to unlocking the door to integration, insofar as "language proficiency affects performance at school and, in turn, the attained standards of education, ultimately impacting on the structural integration of migrants in the labor market and playing a crucial role in determining migrants' success in the labor market" (DIK, 2009d, 230).

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3   Another problem of the report is the erasure of discrimination in the labor market against Muslims. The report is the outcome of the recommendations of the MLG study, which underlined that the major efforts of integration politics should be directed at the integration of Muslims in the labor market and to elevate the rate of education of Muslims. Previously, I pointed out how the MLG study only considered Muslims' willingness or lack thereof to integrate, and by means of this, it provided "valid" data that corroborates the unwilling character of Muslims. In addition to this, the report did not consider the role of the German government in blocking the access to Muslim women as teachers and public servants for more than a decade in several federal states.

The MLG study surveyed the participation of Muslims in integration courses and completion of the final examination *Zertifikat Deutsch*. Since 2005, the BAMF has compelled migrants from third countries who plan to stay in Germany to take the integration course. EU citizens and Germans with a "migration background" are entitled to but not obliged by the law to take it. The integration course consists of two modules, one regarding the German language, and one "to provide, a knowledge of Germany's legal system, history and culture" (DIK, 2009d, 239).

Kien N. Ha (2007, 115) argued that integration courses constitute a selective imperative linked with the *Leitkultur* aimed at re-socialize migrants in accordance to such a normative concept as a "kind of political control, a cultural examination, and a legal certification" (Ha, 2007, 115 [author's translation]), articulated with a selective regime of migrant's inclusion and exclusion. The rationality of the integration course seeks the cultural homogenization of migrants as a means to revitalize the allegedly homogenous cultural codes and values of Germany.

The MLG study considered Muslim attendance and completion of the integration course as a positive aspect of cognitive integration. The percentage of Muslim new entrants who completed the course is high, 66 percent (DIK, 2009d, 240). Though, the Muslim population overall percentage is significant lower 39 percent, when compared with persons from other faiths 66 percent (DIK, 2009d, 240). Despite the elevated figures, the editors stated in their conclusion that additional efforts should be implemented in this regard:

> To date not all Muslim participants have completed the course by taking the final examination. *This will change in the future*, following the introduction of the new *obligation* to sit the final examination. Here, the additional and specific promotional measures as already offered with the reformed structures of the integration course must take hold to ensure that no one is left behind. Such measures must consider the different requirements for using the German language, i.e. colloquial use to get by in everyday life and also the written skills that are crucial to succe[ed] at school and work.
>
> DIK, 2009d, 332–333 [emphasis added]

The paragraph delineates the expansion of integration's grip regarding integration courses and their certification. It is not only compulsory to take the course, but also to pass the final examination. The "problem" is that not all Muslims have taken the final examination, but out all of those Muslims, 89 percent already have a good command of German, yet the integration course does not only entail the acquisition of the German language but also knowledge about German culture, history and law.

3.3   Emotional Integration

Regarding emotional integration, the MLG study measured Muslims' satisfaction and attachment to her or his residential neighborhood, to Germany, and to their countries of origin (DIK, 2009d, 285–290). Concerning the former, the editors asked "whether they had any preferences regarding the ethnic composition of their residential neighborhood" (DIK, 2009d, 285). The results show a widespread indifference about it, which, "may indicate that a residential environment inhabited predominantly by foreigners is not necessarily seen as lowering the quality of home life" (DIK, 2009d, 285). The phrasing again collapses different categories; foreigner, "ethnic groups", and Muslims are used interchangeably to denote the composition of spatial locations. Here, it is unclear who constitutes an "ethnic" group, Muslims, migrants or foreigners, all which in reality are simply *not* "ethnic" groups.

This question implicitly aims at surveying one of the presumptions of the MLG study, namely, that migrants tend to self-segregate (see: Esser, 2001, 20–21). This presupposition erases the relational aspect of housing to the extent that it considers only a migrant's decision to self-segregate or to self-integrate, obscuring one of the most common features of racial discrimination, i.e., its segregating effects in housing in particular, and the organization of space at large.

Integration as a modality of governmentality and biopower provides the framework for understanding and judging every aspect of Muslim behavior in both positive and negative terms. Integration represents the general and normative measure whereby Muslim conducts can be assessed, e.g., for a Muslim living in a neighborhood, "in which migrant residents predominate has negative effects on the frequency of contact with Germans" (DIK, 2009d, 263). The phrasing illustrates the Manichean game concealed in the notions positive and negative and establishes parameters to judge Muslim behavior. Then, having few contacts with "real" Germans is negative since it does not contribute to the overall integration of Muslims,

> It is nevertheless to be assumed that the higher the proportion of Germans in the residential environment, the more opportunity immigrants will have to establish and foster contact with natives. A lower proportion of foreigners in the residential area is thus interpreted as an indicator of greater opportunities for integration.
>   DIK, 2009d, 280

The wording exemplifies the DIK's governmental approach; it is a matter of arranging options and desires so that the subject conducts its conduct in a

particular way. The statements posit contact with "natives"—White Germans—as opportunities for integration, thus the lower the rates of foreigners the greater the opportunities to integrate through contact with "natives". Muslims should seek to live in residential areas with German "natives"; through them their integration index will develop.

The study does not state directly that Muslims need to move to German residential areas. Instead, the idea is framed as a positive decision full of opportunities, as a guide that *can* be followed. At work are normative values about the categories foreigners and "natives". The study imputes a detrimental worth to the former as her or his presence obstructs integration, while the latter, by her or his birthright possesses essential positive qualities. For a Muslim, the mere contact with German "natives" will enhance integration, yet the MLG study does not clarify how this process unfolds.

Furthermore, at this point biopolitics intersects governmentality. The former splits the population through an alleged origin and an unnamed essence, postulating two kinds of being: "native" and foreigner. These subjects give residential areas different characteristics, and according to the place Muslims inhabit, the areas will impact their integration differently. The normative frame behind these sorts of questions denotes the superiority of one form of dwelling upon the other, and thus establishes a racially determined parameter to be followed. The work is subtle but firm, living in a foreign quarter is not advisable for Muslims who want to integrate, and if they want to integrate, they should better move to a native residential area.

Subsequently, the study contrasted Muslim preferences about the "ethnic" composition of their residential neighborhood with their actual distribution in residential areas with low and high proportion of foreigners. The results were not so "positive":

> In the context of the hypothesis presented at the beginning of this chapter that the residential environment provides a structure offering opportunities for contact with Germans, it is significant that almost 40 per cent of the interviewed Muslims live in an environment in which foreigners make up the majority of the population. This means that these people have less opportunity to enter into contact with Germans in their residential environment.
>
> DIK, 2009d, 284–285

The DIK's interest in where Muslims reside relates to the trope of the "parallel society" and the "foreign ghetto". These notions do not only describe spatial locations but also unruly—often "dangerous"—places constructed through

racial stigmatization. Moreover, the discursive construction of these locations has been coupled to the discourse on integration, the latter precisely as a method to govern those unmanageable places (Ronneberger & Tsianos, 2009).

A recent study of the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (Schneider, Yemane, & Weinmann, 2014) found out that housing is one of the core issues of discrimination against persons with migration background in Germany, especially in the competitive market of big German cities. It affects in particular women of Turkish background and is even more pronounced against women wearing headscarves (Schneider et al., 2014, 15). The report is backed up by research exploring ethnic discrimination in the German housing market (Auspurg, Hinz, & Schmid, 2011), which also revealed that Muslim and Arab men face the highest discrimination rates in this regard.

Against this background, housing not only involves individual decisions, but also relates to the structural conditions of the housing market and to racism. However, the impetus of the MLG study to determine whether Muslims self-segregate obscures these issues and erases the relational aspects of the pretended integration of Muslims. Moreover, in the study, dwelling emerges as a category to differentiate and rank essentialized identities and to judge places of residence.

Another blind spot in the measurement of the housing preferences of Muslims relates to the existence of "nationally liberated zones" (*National befreite Zonen*). Spatial locations in the German landscape, "where it is difficult for people of color to move ... without risking getting beaten up" (Partridge, 2012, 55). These places, as Damani Partridge details, constitute spaces claimed by right-wing extremist and neo-Nazis wherein "foreign" bodies are not welcomed, and if they dare to enter, the promise of violence is latent. Therefore, the mobility and freedom of choice of Muslims regarding housing is not as free as the measurements of the MLG study implied.

Feelings of attachment to Germany and to their country of origin is another dimension of cognitive integration. The rationality behind asking Muslims about their attachment to Germany, "is of importance in the light of the assumption that the stability of a democratic political system is crucially dependent on concordance between a nation's political culture and the prevailing political structure" (DIK, 2009d, 287), and "in the case of migrants it is also assumed that their support for the host society's system represents an important landmark for their identificational integration" (DIK, 2009d, 287).

This assumption presents a condition only required of Muslims (and migrants). No "native" or "ethnic" German is required to feel attached to Germany; in fact, she or he has the possibility of not feeling any kind of attachment and her or his loyalty and citizenship would not be jeopardized. One wonders

how the feeling of attachment of a Muslim living, working, and paying taxes in Germany to an X country would destabilize the democratic political system. Moreover, this questioning left unaddressed different experiences of hostility, discrimination, and racism that might influence how Muslims feel towards Germany, and how the recurrent depictions of Muslims as a trouble might affect those feelings.[4]

The study measured and compared Muslim attachment to Germany with that to the country of origin. The results show that Muslims have a higher "strong" or "very strong" attachment to Germany, 69 percent, in comparison to their countries of origin, 52 percent (DIK, 2009d, 288). Subsequently, when asking which feeling is stronger, the one towards Germany or the one towards the country of origin, the results exhibit a similar tendency, with 44 percent of the interviewees having a stronger attachment to Germany, 23 percent towards the origin country, and 36 percent having a similar feeling to both countries (DIK, 2009d, 289). However, these "positive" results should be approached with caution, especially because of the third category, "It is thus possible that this halfway category includes both persons who feel a pronounced attachment to both their country of origin and Germany and interviewees who do not feel any attachment to either country" (DIK, 2009d, 292).

In general, the three dimensions mentioned above tend to portray ambiguous results, and in some aspects Muslims "do better than in others". The measurements also reveal some of the MLG's working assumptions and their consequences. First, integration rehearses a we-they dichotomy, producing representations of hermetic cultural groups. Second, the measurements operate through a Manichean-normative scale whereby every Muslim behavior can be judged as positive or negative with reference to its influence in the overall integration. Thus, implicitly establishing frames of guidance for Muslims. Third, the measurement of these aspects is uni-dimensional, as it only considers Muslim willingness or lack thereof, but neither the labor market, housing nor the feeling of attachment are processes only dictated by individual decisions. Thus, the study obscures the relational aspects and the different forms of exclusion and discrimination that Muslims face in these arenas. These aspects become more critical and pressing during the assessment of social integration performed by the MLG study.

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4   "With some small degree of empathy it is not difficult to imagine that a Muslim might be made uncomfortable by the relentless insistence—even if it is put in terms of a debate— that her or his faith, culture, and people are seen as a source of threat, and that she or he has been deterministically associated with terrorism, violence, and 'fundamentalism'" (Said, 1997, xx–xxi).

3.4   Social Integration or How to Re-socialize Muslims

The measurement of social integration relates to a wide set of contacts of Muslims within their corresponding "ethnic" group but mostly to their interactions with "native Germans", the category used by the MLG study to denote Germans without "migration background", to metonymically signify racially characterized "real" Germans. The topics addressed were the membership of Muslims in "ethnic" organization or associations, affiliations in German clubs and organizations, the frequency of "interethnic" contacts in the family, among friends, at the workplace, and in the neighborhood (DIK, 2009d, 257–262).

Likewise, the MLG study measured social integration through the frequency of "inter-ethnic" and inter-religious partnerships, and the openness to such kinds of relations. For this, the study asked Muslims if they could envision, as it were, being engaged in these kinds of relationships, and also their stance on the same topic concerning their children. If they did not have children, they were asked to imagine the situation and then answer the question (DIK, 2009d, 268).

Moreover, the MLG study followed Esser in his breaking down of social integration into four possible outcomes: "Assimilation (inclusion in the host society), ethnic segmentation (inclusion in the ethnic group), multiple inclusion (inclusion in the ethnic group and the host society) and marginality (no inclusion)" (DIK, 2009d, 245). The logic behind the classification and the expected outcome pursued by the DIK is puzzling. Accordingly, assimilation represents the desired outcome; yet this only involves inclusion in German society. Does this demand that Muslims should exclude themselves from their "ethnic" group? Some arguments from the study insinuate an affirmative answer to that question, i.e., that living in an "ethnic" segmented neighborhood, that is to say, with "more foreigners" obstructs social integration, as well as to having few German friends, marrying a Muslim or not participating in German clubs and associations.

Contrary to Esser (2001, 21), who considers multiple inclusions as empirically rare and detrimental to assimilation, the study stipulates that "multiple integration does not have a particularly positive effect, neither does it have any negative impact on inclusion in the host society" (DIK, 2009d, 245). Thus, while the study allegedly takes a neutral stance about Muslims interacting with other "ethnic" groups the wording of the questions posed to them suggest the opposite.

Previously, I briefly pointed out how the language of "ethnicity" constantly appears in the measurements of the MLG study. However, for what precisely does the "ethnic" dimension stand? Basically, the DIK deals with Islamic religious communities and individuals that "came" from at least three different

continents and 49 countries. Thus, what does "ethnicity" have to do with it if it is not the conflation of religion with race, and the metonymical vehicle to talk about race?

Throughout the whole assessment of social integration in the MLG study, "ethnicity" consistently slips in to evaluate the quantity of contacts between Germans and Muslims, and the quality: being open or not. Metonymically, in the MLG study, "ethnicity" became the vehicle to talk about race relations in Germany.[5] If not, why should a friendship between a White German and a German citizen with Islamic faith be approached and conceptualized as an "interethnic" relation when both are German citizens? When did being a Muslim become an "ethnicity"? Is not an important outcome of the MLG study that it demonstrates the diversity of Muslim life in Germany? Does this diversity collapse under a single "ethnic" group wherein the determining factor to characterize them is not "ethnicity" but religion, which the same study portrays as being highly diverse?

According to Stuart Hall (1996) and due to the historical and contextual characteristics of racism, nature stopped to be racism's frame of reference—although it never left—and "ethnicity" replaced it as a strategy to ground difference. "Ethnicity" also came to be instrumentalized as a form to disavow racism and to represent a "particularly closed, exclusive and regressive form of national identity" (Hall, 1996, 447). In this regard, David Tyrer & Salman Sayyid (2012, 355) argued that:

> [A]lthough there is a simplifying tendency to draw a hard division between race and ethnicity, "the more 'ethnicity' matters, the more its characteristics are represented as relatively fixed, inherent within a group, transmitted from generation to generation, not just by culture and education, but by biological inheritance" [Hall, 2000, 233], because race and ethnicity both establish equivalences between the cultural and biological. Thus, the "ethnicization" of Islam ... is actually part of a wider process through which boundaries and subject positions are ascribed and contested within the context of a racial politics that circumscribes appeals to both biological and cultural (ethnic) registers for expressing difference.

Likewise, by analyzing the scientific and political use of the concept, Miles (1989) showed how "ethnicity" tends to be used as a "politically correct code word for race" (1989, 93) insofar as it represents an "ethnic group" "according

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5 Assimilation theory, the one used in the MLG study, since its inception sought to analyze race relations in the US.

to common-sense phenotypical indicators" (1989, 3). And the DIK's representation of Muslims—not only in the MLG study—entails their "ethnicizing" (racializing) through cultural and religious coding, fixing an "ethnic" ontology codified by culture and applied to Muslims and Germans alike. Thus, the measurement of social integration involves a complex governmental and biopolitical process whereby the DIK monitors, judges, and suggests patterns of behaviors to Muslims in realms of life such as sexuality and friendship.

For the assessment of Muslim social integration, the MLG study designed a set of questions to measure and evaluate the frequency and quality of "interethnic" partnerships. This was guided by the idea that these partnerships provide hints about "interethnic" contacts within the family (DIK, 2009d, 258), and thus it enables the measurement of the degree of Muslim social integration.

At first glance, the results tend to be "positive", showing that a high percentage of the interviewees (44 percent) have a partner with German nationality (DIK, 2009d, 258), yet these are Germans of a different kind, they have a different "ethnicity" than the "native" Germans—they have the burden of migration. Therefore, the results need to be contextualized and attenuated:

> This high proportion is placed into context when the partners' migrant background is considered, however. Only 4 per cent of all Muslim interviewees, 24 per cent of those belonging to other religious communities and 18 per cent of those who do not adhere to any religion have a partner without a migrant background. In the overwhelming majority of cases the partner has the same migrant background as the interviewee, i.e. the choice of partner is based on ethnic and religious criteria.
>
> DIK, 2009d, 258

The section again rehearses a discursive distinction between real and fictive, modern and pre-modern Germans, performed by race and sexuality but disguised in "ethnicity". This argument is consistent throughout the study. Continuously, when the results portray a "positive" view of integration, bringing in the notion of "migration background" attenuates the results. The study then reduces the 44 percent to 4 percent, indicating the ambivalent results of social integration. "Migration background", "ethnicity", and religion, instead of love turned out to be the decisive parameters for choosing a partner, and moreover, "ethnicity"—via migration background—marks German citizens of Islamic faith as different from White Germans. The paragraph plainly expresses that a "native" German and a German citizen of Islamic faith with "migration background" are two different kinds of subjects thus they should be counted separately.

Thus, a Muslim marrying a German citizen with "migration background" and Islamic faith does not count as an "interethnic" marriage, but as ethnocentrism (see below), on account of their different "ethnicities". Only if a Muslim marries a "native" German, does this count as an "interethnic" partnership, and thus it adds points to the integration's index. This usage of "ethnicity" is extremely close—if not equal—to race since it constitutes ontologies beyond the legal frame of citizenship, positioning being German as more than the acquisition of the German passport and citizenship. Being German thus denotes a symbolic essence; race stresses the difference between White Germans and Germans with Islamic faith and "migration background".

Moreover, the paragraph's last sentence suggests a different way Muslims engage in intimate relations. Love, affection, passion, care or many other dimensions—including the rejection of the host society—do not determine how a Muslim chooses her or his partner. Instead, this decision, based on "ethnicity" and religion, is incompatible with the idea of freedom of choice. The statement insinuates that Muslims are not as free as Germans when selecting a partner, implying that Muslims apply distinct criteria such as "ethnicity" rather than freedom. The MLG study colors political calculations about integration with the concepts of love and intimacy. Partnership, an intimate sphere of life is turned into an index of a heavily politicized concept.[6]

However, the MLG study did not consider these results as a sufficient proof of Muslim restrictions concerning partnerships. The MLG study further inquired if Muslim subjects, despite being married or not, would hypothetically engage in marriage with someone of another faith. According to the MLG study, this question helped to determine the level of ethnocentrism among Muslims:

> For the purpose of determining social distance between groups (ethnocentrism), the question as to whether persons can envisage marrying a person who belongs to another social group has proven effective in social research. In order to establish whether certain religious groups isolate themselves from those belonging to other faiths, the interviewees were thus asked whether they could imagine marrying a person of another faith.
> DIK, 2009d, 268

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6 Furthermore, the MLG only asked about the country of origin (item H145) and nationality (item H146) of the partner, and not about the criteria to select the partner, which are completely different issues. Yet the MLG's analysis and conclusions stressed that the selection of Muslims is based on religious and "ethnic" principles, and again there was no question about the partner's "ethnicity" because nationality is not equal to "ethnicity" if race is not in the equation.

Striking in the statements is that if a Muslim marries another Muslim this can be labeled as ethnocentrism, which conceptually denotes more than just the social distance between groups as the MLG study defines it. Any dictionary's definition will explain ethnocentrism as the attitude about one's group as superior than others, and here just marrying someone of the same religion—conflated with race and "ethnicity"—regardless of the reason for such action constitutes an ethnocentric choice; the affirmation of Muslim superiority upon Germans. Even more striking is that if a "native" German married another "native" German, this will not be seen, conceptualized or approached as an ethnocentric move but as a "natural" one. The underlying assumption is that a Muslim marrying a German represents a positive action that will help them to shed her or his ethnocentric values. In addition, this question illustrates the "ethnicizing" of religions, since it plainly equates religion with "ethnicity". The results of these imaginary-involuntary marriages—since the study pushed Muslims to envision them—were the following:

> The interviewees were first asked whether they could imagine marrying a person belonging to another religion. This question was put to both single and married persons. Around two thirds of the interviewed singles (69 per cent) were able to imagine marrying a person belonging to another faith. 65 per cent of the married interviewees also answered this question in the affirmative.
>
>   DIK, 2009d, 268

Subsequently, the MLG study found a discrepancy since a high percentage of Muslims would accept a hypothetical marriage with non-Muslims but their actions say otherwise. As the study stated, the overwhelming majority of Muslims marry "ethnic Muslims", then the editors explained the reasons:

> There are various possible reasons for this discrepancy between the interviewees' responses and their actual behavior. As many interviewees chose their partner prior to migrating, there was no *opportunity* for or possibility of an interethnic or interreligious partnership at the time of their marriage. Against this background it may be possible to explain this discrepancy by concluding that while broad interreligious openness does exist within the group of interviewees, this has yet to be manifested in actual behavior due to a *lack of opportunity* and on account of social norms within the ethnic groups concerned ... it is to be presumed that the high barriers to interreligious marriages will diminish over time, in view of

which an increase in interreligious partnerships is to be expected for the next generation.

<div align="right">DIK, 2009d, 270 [emphasis added]</div>

The study frames marrying a non-Muslim (German) as an opportunity, something positive that a Muslim is subtly encouraged to do. The notion of high ethnic barriers also emerges from the statements fueling the underlying ghost of the "parallel society" and the lack of freedom regarding the selection of partners. Moreover, a growth in interreligious marriages is expected from the next generation of Muslims (the fourth one?) since they will be living and growing up on German soil they will have *the opportunity* to marry a non-Muslim, a White German.

In this discussion about interreligious and "interethnic" marriages, and sexual practices of Muslims, it is important to remember Ann L. Stoler (1995) and Michel Foucault's (1990, 1997) arguments about the proliferation of discourses on sexuality and its work within the biopolitical frame. Sexuality represents the link between individual bodies and the life of the species, coupling disciplinary power with biopolitics, and creating the conditions for the management of life. The proliferation of the discourse on sexuality has been central in facilitating the penetration of power regimes in one of the most intimate spaces of human life. The case of the MLG study with regard to the aforementioned questions exemplifies the intervention of the state's gaze into Muslim sexuality, love, and care, departing from the assumption of a deviation from the norm, the non-acceptance of interreligious and "interethnic" relations and an alleged ethnocentrism.

Likewise, the discursive incitements on sexual discourses produced a set of distinctions about the bourgeois European identity as the norm, and the deviations of it as threatening the nation's health (Foucault, 1990; Stoler, 1995). Racialized sexuality thus was linked with the bourgeois identity, the struggles about national identities, and the ongoing defense of the society by itself. In the MLG study the categories "interethnic" and interreligious marriages serve as parameters of distinction between Muslims and Germans, the former as a deviation from the norm imputed to the latter. It would have been logical to also survey "native" German attitudes on this issue. However, not a single one was asked if they will enter into one of these partnerships—and it is probable that some Germans would not marry a Muslim for different reasons—and yet, White German sexual regimes are constructed as homogenous in regard to acceptance, tolerance, and openness, constituting indexes of normal and national sexual identity.

National, sexual, and racial distinctions designate certain cultural and sexual habits and practices about what it means to be a true European, or here, a true

German, vis-à-vis fictive ones. Openness and freedom are constructed as German cultural and sexual habits, defining what it means to be truly German. In contraposition, Muslims as fictive Germans still lack those attributes which marks them as different. For the study, what is more worrying is that such cultural and sexual practices are blocking the acculturation and temporal adjustment of the second and third generation of Muslims, placing the fate of the nation in jeopardy. If Muslims continue to marry among themselves then the "parallel society" would continue its reproduction and the German social body's disintegration would linger. The intertwinement of race, nation, and sexuality are at work as producers of the distinction between real Germans and those assimilated or with a fabricated status, establishing different classes of being German and allowing the access of the German state in intimate spheres of Muslim life.

The DIK's approach to "interethnic" and interreligious marriages also reveals the imprinted racial historicism in the mechanisms of the Conference. Goldberg (2002, 85–86) pointed out that racial historicism presupposes the promise to racialized subjects of development and racial uplifting through their methodical transformation. This supposition had consequences in the restrictions and incitements to sexuality. Whereas racial naturalism established strict rules against miscegenation based on degeneracy fears, the integrationist policies of racial historicism leave this possibility open and subtly encourage mixed-race partnerships. The MLG study quietly but firmly incites the "mixing" through marriage between Germans and Muslims since the study considered a marriage between a Muslim and a "native" German as "positive" to the extent that it represents a step forward to social integration, and, alas, modernity.

Moreover, the MLG study implicitly imparts and circulates the idea of the heterosexual partnership and the nuclear family as the norm and building block of the German society. Integration debates and its entanglements with migration studies tend to position migrants exclusively within heterosexual family structures (Dhawan & Castro Varela, 2009; Kosnick, 2011). The MLG study locates Muslims and White Germans within this frame. The study represents both "groups" as heterosexuals and reproducers of nuclear families. However, the sexual practices of the latter framed in "universal values", whereas Muslim ones are coded with culture, tradition, and bondage. Thus, the MLG study embeds Muslim sexual practices in universal thinking, aligning German gender and sexual regimes with the values of freedom and equality as universals, but also with heteronormative partnerships and the nuclear family, all principles which have been advanced as the norms to be followed.

The discussion of Muslim sexual practices in the MLG study also establish them as unsuitable participants of the body politic. Their stigmatization is coded as necessary in the pursuing of the social body's health and reproduction.

Muslims represent a problem for that purpose as they are marrying exclusively among themselves. Sex is at the heart of the DIK's biopolitics; the MLG study uses sexual practices as a condition for the symbolic enfranchisement of Muslims. Sexuality thus is constitutive of citizenship and processes of inclusion in and exclusion from the nation. In this section of the MLG study, sex is put into discourse both as an object of analysis and as a target of intervention.

The MLG study designed two types of indicators regarding the social integration of Muslims through partnerships. The first one, the "interethnic" marriage discussed above, is marked by the conflation of religion with a racialized ethnicity; while the second one, interreligious marriage, is marked by the racialization of Islam.[7]

Regarding interreligious marriages among Muslims, the study found out that "It is also to be observed that interreligious partnerships are a rare occurrence" (DIK, 2009d, 275), because a significantly high percentage (81 percent) of Muslims marry Muslims, representing "higher barriers to interreligious partnerships" (DIK 2009d, 276). Moreover, the barriers to these kinds of partnerships are stronger for Muslim women, i.e., the percentage of Muslim women marrying persons from a different religion than Islam are lower in comparison to Muslim men.[8] Later, the study pointed out some reasons for the gender specificity of interreligious marriage and turned women into tradable resources:

> In statistical terms, there is an *undersupply* of potential female Muslim spouses in Germany, as the number of male immigrants in Germany from many major countries of origin exceeds the number of women— and markedly so in some instances (Chapter 2.2.3). This predominance of male immigrants was particularly pronounced in the initial phase of the recruitment of labor migrants, leading to a high rate of binational marriages among other groups of origin, above all Italians and Spanish. Apart from this "marriage bottleneck" phenomenon, the divergent behaviour of Muslim men and women respectively with regard to marriage may also be assumed to reflect Islamic religious rules, according to which marrying members of other book religions is permissible for men, but not for women. To this extent, the *marriage patterns thus reflect ethno-religious rules*.
>
>   DIK, 2009d, 277–278 [emphasis added]

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7   I return to the topic of "interethnic" and interdenominational partnerships, but focusing on the pedagogies to incite them (Chapter 6).

8   "In relative terms, the number of Muslim men marrying a woman who did not belong to their own religious community was almost twice that of Muslim women marrying a man of another or no faith" (DIK, 2009d, 276).

The paragraph provides two striking conclusions for understanding the gender unfairness concerning interreligious marriages. The first refers to an issue of numbers. Since there were more migrant men than women during the "guest worker" program, male immigrants married women from other nationalities (however, this section was about marrying persons from other religions thus conflating nationality with religion) due to the "undersupply" of Muslim women. Here, it is important to note the study's gender biased phrasing, the labeling of Muslim and implicitly Italian, and Spanish women as supplies, as resources to be consumed; in short, dehumanized for the consumption of the migrant—perhaps Muslim—worker. The phrasing is even more striking coming from an institution claiming to promote gender equality among Muslims, and by inference imputing to itself the putative achievement of gender equality.

The second conclusion rests on a culturalist line of reasoning, entailing Muslim obedience to immutable and anachronistic Islamic rules. Allegedly, what the Qur'an established centuries ago still dictates the behavior of Muslims regarding the selection of a partner today, as it were, Muslims have been living the same rules dictated to them many centuries ago, therefore living, ever since, out of time. Thus, the editors conclude that, "In the light of these findings, the study provides evidence of the importance of ethnic, religious and denominational affiliation to the choice of partner" (DIK, 2009d, 280).

Here the editors of the MLG study posit the assumption of Islamic rules as a factor influencing the unequal percentage of Muslim women marrying men from other religions. Such an assumption is only possible through a previous step in which Islamic rules are thought of as a singular, anachronic, and self-enclosed package of religious laws guiding uniformly the conduct of—at least in Germany—almost 4 million subjects.

The study also pointed out that Muslims somehow act differently than how they think. Similar to the issue of "interethnic" marriages, some items were developed to question whether the interviewees could hypothetically envision an interreligious marriage. The affirmative responses were high 65 percent (DIK, 2009d, 327), but then the previous conclusions, i.e., the actual patterns of Muslim marriages were used to attenuate the results, emphasizing that the willingness of marrying a non-Muslim in practice, is seldom fulfilled:

> Most Muslims are also open-minded when it comes to interreligious matters. 65 per cent of single Muslims can envision a relationship with a person of another faith, as can 58 per cent of married Muslims. However, this

> is not yet realized in practice: Despite the essential willingness expressed
> to enter into an interreligious relationship, just 8 per cent of Muslims and
> non-Muslims interviewed actually marry a partner with a religion differ-
> ent to their own.
>
> DIK, 2009d, 327

The statements portray Muslims as contradictory subjects since they say
something but act otherwise. The argument posits the existence of limitations
on their decisions, and without these restrictions, they would probably act
differently and engage in freer decision-making. Then, culture and religion are
tacitly filtered as constraints for partnerships.

The study also designed a question aimed at determining the precondi-
tioned level of Muslim parents' expectations regarding their children. The
study asked the interviewees whether they would accept that their sons and
daughters would enter into an "interreligious marriage". In cases where the
interviewed did not have any children, the study asked her or him to imag-
ine the hypothetical situation and then answer the question (DIK, 2009d,
271–272).

These questions are implicitly derived from a couple of assumptions. First,
that Germans will be open to these kinds of marriages, establishing them *a
priori* as tolerant and open, but simultaneously suggesting that in the pre-
vailing gender norms of Muslims there is a tendency to not engage sexually
with Germans. Although religion supplies the framing for the question, the
study conflates "ethnicity" with religion. Therefore, the questions sought to
know about hypothetical marriages between "foreigners" and "Germans". The
sexual practices of Muslims are thus brought into question as deviating from
the norm, freedom of choice, establishing the refashioning of their sexuality
as a Conference's task, and allowing the symbolic redefinition of the German
sexual identity.

The results exhibit that in general persons without children are more "open"
to interreligious marriage than those who, in fact, have children (DIK, 2009d,
272). Moreover, a further outcome is that both groups will be more "open" to
accept that their sons will marry a person from another religion in comparison
to their daughters. The study uses this discrepancy in percentage to highlight
the prevailing unjust gender relations within Muslim communities regarding
real and imagined sons and daughters.

All in all, the figures show a high percentage of acceptance of interreligious
marriages regarding both imagined and real children. Though, the report's re-
sults emphasize that the parents' gender expectation are harder on Muslim
women, which is taken as a sign of the unequal gender treatment:

> Persons belonging to the Muslim faith are somewhat less open, particular insofar as the partner for their daughter is concerned, although the fact must not be overlooked that two thirds of the interviewed Muslims would nevertheless consent to their daughters entering into an interreligious marriage.
>
> DIK, 2009d, 274

The statements silently and stubbornly insist in depicting the White German population as more open and tolerant than the Muslim one, and establishing them as the norm to be followed, even without having any kind of data sustaining this claim. This introduces a distinction between normal sexual practices framed in freedom, and deviant ones repressed by family and religion. One wonders if the same question were posed to "native" German parents, i.e., if they would allow their daughter to marry a Muslim, and if their answer were negative, whether this could be interpreted as a sign of gender inequality in the German community, i.e. the German nation?

Besides the biopolitical and racial historicist imprints in these questions, there is also a dimension of symbolic violence in them, insofar as they represent institutional intromissions in intimate spheres of life. For instance, calling a Muslim on the phone and asking her or him if she or he would marry someone from another religion and "ethnic group", and then asking her or him if she or he would allow to their children—real or imaginary—to marry someone outside the religious and "ethnic" group does not take into account that those questions might hurt sensibilities or make the interviewee feel uncomfortable on account of several reasons, e.g., perhaps having children is simply neither an alternative nor a possibility. Moreover, this institutional gaze upon intimacy targets only one section of the population discursively produced as foreign to the nation—this kind of questioning and judgment is not directed to those "ethnic" Germans. The questions can have their own effects, which are not taken into account.

Integration in the MLG study persistently reifies and circulates a homogenous representation of German identity. There is slippage between two categories in the assessment of the integration of Muslims, namely, the categories *native Germans* and those with *German origins*. The study uses the two notions to elaborate a distinction between real Germans and fictive ones. Native and origin refer to essences that cannot be transmitted, learned or acquired with citizenship. At play are the sediments of the intertwinement between the symbolic definition of Germans as White and the now reformed citizenship law formerly based only on blood; native and origin represent the sediments—the not giving up the racial membership to the German nation.

The MLG study's evaluation of the "interethnic" friendships of Muslims exemplifies this slippage:

> In general, the overwhelming majority of interviewees have frequent contact with *native German friends*. The proportion of those who have no contact with persons *of German origin* is particularly high among Muslims from Turkey, Iran and other parts of Africa (15 per cent, 19 per cent and 16 per cent respectively).
>
> DIK, 2009d, 265 [emphasis added]

Accordingly, these results contradict previous measurements regarding friendships among Turkish (another example of slippage, collapsing Muslims and Turks into one category) "that showed that 62 percent of Turkish interviewees had no Germans among their three best friends" (DIK, 2009d, 265).

In order to calculate the friendship rate, the study built essentialized categories for Muslims and Germans alike. The "native" German and the person of German origin are subjects represented as having no "migration background", creating a sharp distinction between those who have it and those who do not, and by means of this reifying the distinction between real and fictive Germans; to reaffirm homogeneity, heterogeneity needs to be produced. The assessment of "interethnic friendships" became a vehicle to assert German homogeneity, to talk about racial mixing, and to construct self-enclosed groups, which under the DIK's normative guidance, should interact eventually. The language about "interethnic" friendships and partnership is not neutral—despite its statistical presentation—because it judges these social relations on a positive-negative scale contributing to overall Muslim integration. The normative statement being tacitly produced denotes that if you want to be integrated you should have "native" German friends.

Although the general outcomes of the measurement about "interethnic" friendships tend to be "positive", i.e., contact between Muslims and "native" Germans is high (DIK, 2009d, 325), at the end of the study these results were weighted by comparing them with the control group, foreigners who came from "Muslim countries" but profess other religions: "Muslims have less frequent contact with persons of German origin within the family, at the workplace, in the neighborhood and among friends than members of other religions" (DIK, 2009d, 326). As usual, the study attenuates the "positive results" since Muslims have a lower proportion of "interethnic" contacts vis-à-vis the control group. This comparison suggests that Islam plays a detrimental role in the percentage of this kind of contacts.

All the aspects of integration presuppose a normative frame whereby the different indicators are measured against, comprising moral guidelines about the proper way to integrate, e.g., having an "interethnic" partnership is positive and its corollary: the selection of a partner with the same "ethnic" background will thwart integration, reproduce "ethnocentrism", and overall will be an obstacle to the DIK's goals. Altogether the dimensions of integration work similarly, having a German friendship is more positive; living in a predominantly German residential area is better than inhabiting an "ethnic" segregated enclave. All in all, the study uses integration as a normative frame of reference. The knowledge produced by the study serves as the basis for an embracing set of parameters that are expected to guide Muslim behavior and attitudes. Here, the study's biopolitical rationality intersects with governmentality to the extent that the integration's measurements involve a set of guidelines about the proper way to become a German-Muslim.

Thus, assimilation, according to the MLG study, requires that a Muslim holds high-school graduation qualifications and employment; and masters writing, speaking, reading, and listening in the German language. She or he has participated in the national integration courses and passed the *Zertifikat Deutsch*. A well-assimilated Muslim belongs to German organizations and sports clubs. She or he has "interethnic" contacts at the workplace, place of residence, and among friends. Desirable too, is that she or he has a German partner without "migration background" and that she or he will be open about her or his children's partner—advisedly, this would be a "native" German. She or he lives in an area where the majority of residents are "native" Germans, and has developed a strong feeling of attachment to Germany, to her or his residence, and job.

As I argue, the DIK's project of making the German-Muslim requires the preceding production of the Muslim subject as inherently problematic. The MLG study's measurement of integration thus allows both processes to be considered simultaneously. The problematic Muslim subject only marries another Muslim; on the contrary, the integrated German-Muslim will marry a non-Muslim. Therefore, the "positive" side of the dimensions precisely constitutes the profile of the German-Muslim subject outlined by the MLG study. A hyphenated identity reshaped by the normative guidance of the German state via the DIK.

All the dimensions presupposed that if Muslims decide to—and they should—they could fulfill all the aspects of integration. Integration presents itself as a voluntary task, and magically transforms the incitements to integrate into choices. This conjecture vanishes the relational aspect of the requirements:

the discourses that implicitly and explicitly demand that Muslims be integrated, and the different experiences of racism blocking the fulfillment of the preconditions for integration.

Those aspects constructed around integration, e.g., friendships, memberships in associations, and sexual desire are fashioned as neutral sites where the Germans openly wait for the Muslims, suggesting the unwillingness of Muslims as the factor blocking their integration. As Ha (2007) pointed out, integration constructs a difference between those migrants (Muslims included) who are willing and unwilling to integrate.

Through integration, the DIK delineates different parameters of inclusion and exclusion. For those racially constructed as non-Germans—despite the fact they are German citizens—the DIK establishes a whole set of prerequisites unthinkable to ask of those constructed as legitimate-native German citizens, who are given no incitements to have partnerships with Muslims.

Integration represents a modality of governmentality intertwined with biopolitics, disciplinary processes, and exclusionary incorporation, based on a set of rational calculations about how to guide the conduct of Muslims, establishing a normative frame of reference, which expects that Muslims integrate themselves accordingly. Integration is also a discourse embedded in a linear and progressive conceptualization of time; integration appears as the driving force bringing Muslims into modern times. In doing so, it establishes a racial-temporal hierarchy allowing the intromission of the state into the most intimate spheres of life, seeking their regulation and attuning.

Integration, Security, and Prevention

4.1   Defending German Society

Already around the 1980s the figure of the "Islamic" fundamentalist appeared in the documents of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). Categorized as an external threat, the "Islamic" fundamentalist's motivations escaped the classic dichotomy left-right, and the Cold War's spies and revolutionaries overshadowed the prominence of this figure in public debate and governments' agendas (Rodatz & Scheuring, 2011).

The 9/11 attacks, the ensuing "War on Terror" and its applications in different national contexts catapulted Islam and Muslims into public consciousness particularly in relation to national security concerns. The 9/11 attacks also altered Germany's sociopolitical reality. After it was discovered that the attacks were planned in Hamburg, German authorities fully reacted to the threat (Fekete, 2004; Partridge, 2012).

Immediately after 9/11 the German government implemented the anti-terror law and the security packages I and II, and prepared amendments to the Association Act. These legislations, in short, granted more powers to the security authorities, tightened the migration regime and allowed the use of new technologies, e.g., biometrics in passports and identity cards in order to defuse the "Islamist" threat (see: BMI, 2004).

Moreover, the former Minister of the Interior Otto Schily banned some Islamic organizations such as the Caliphate State, Al Aqsa, and Hizb ut-Tahrir (Schily in: BMI, 2004). Furthermore, security authorities carried out raids on Mosques and offices of Islamic organizations, and overall the surveillance of them increased. Additionally, the government implemented a system of religious profiling of "foreign nationals" whose country of origin was "Islamic", the Orient (Fekete, 2004; Tyrer & Sayyid, 2012).

The implementation of these measures hints at the inscription of racism in the mechanisms of the state. Measures put into effect using special surveillance and monitoring policies targeting, in particular, Muslim individuals and Islamic organizations as Werner Schiffauer (2008) has documented.

The DIK's existence and work mark significant ruptures and continuities with previous strategies of German migration, integration, and security politics. Arun Kundnani (2014) distinguishes two phases and ideologies within the

"global War on Terror" whereby Western governments seek to understand what drives Islamic terrorism and to make sense of the "Muslim question".

On the one hand, the culturalist approach conceptualizes Muslim communities in Western countries "as failing to adapt to modernity as a result of their Islamic culture. Islam, they say, fails to separate religion from the state" (Kundnani, 2014, 55). The central argument posits a perpetual cultural essence of Islam and Muslims wherein "culture here plays the same role as race: a hidden force that underlies a whole people's behavior; a single rule that can be applied everywhere to explain everything that Muslims do" (Kundnani, 2014, 58). The culturalist approach racializes and fuels the idea about Islamic culture as static, anchored in its origins, and therefore, being Muslim becomes an ontology fixed in pre-modern time.

The reformist approach, on the other hand, conceptualizes Islamic violence as a misinterpretation of Islam. The point of departure to explain the "Muslim question" is not the Orientalist idea of Islam and Muslims as inherently violent, but rather as "the result of twentieth-century ideologues who transformed Islam's essentially benign teachings into an anti-modern, totalitarian, political ideology" (Kundnani, 2014, 55). This approach seeks to change the stereotyping of the early "War on Terror" in which every Muslim was equivalent to a terrorist. Reformism works within a Manichean scheme and pursues to distinguish the "good" from the "bad" Muslim in Mahmood Mamdani's terms (2005). The arguments in this approach propose that Islam is in fact compatible with Western society and values. Islamic extremism is the result of the highjacking of Islam by some and the religion turning into a political ideology. The labeling of this approach as reformist is due to its double aim, firstly, by reforming the culturalist approach, that is to say, changing the fixed linkage between Islamic culture and terrorism, and secondly because it seeks to reform Islam itself by creating the conditions of its depoliticization (Kundnani, 2014, 56).

The culturalist approach was the main reaction after the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing "War on Terror". However, this approach was called into question around 2006, caused by the opposition to the war in Iraq and the denouncement of the atrocities in Guantánamo Bay and Abu-Ghraib.[1] Afterwards, the reformist approach became more prominent (Kundnani, 2014, 65–68). This also led to a shift from international policies towards domestic security in which the main objective became the reformation of Muslims within the Western nations, mostly by pursuing their depoliticization and the co-opting of leaders of Muslim communities and associations. Both approaches often interact, and "For both, Muslim culture is reified and singled out as an object

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1   For a poignant analysis see: (Butler, 2008, 2010; McClintock, 2009).

of wide-ranging state intervention—whether through hard or soft power ... these two modes of thinking, in effect, collude to sustain a shared discourse that defines Muslims as a problem" (Kundnani, 2014, 88).

The DIK can be seen as a reformist agency, which draws on culturalism. As a reformist agency, the DIK has claimed that, although the threat emerges from the Muslim community (DIK, 2008c; Friedrich, 2011), not every Muslim represents a threat (Schäuble, 2006a). The DIK has also stressed the diversity of Muslim life in Germany, i.e., it moves away from the idea of one monolithic Islam, and yet still addresses Muslims as a single population with constant characteristics.

However, the DIK has often relied on culturalist and Orientalist tropes, such as the lack of secularism in the "predominantly Muslim countries", which allegedly causes migrants to have difficulty understanding and complying with the separation between politics and religion in Germany. This position is anchored in a linear and progressive conceptualization of historical time, where secularism serves as a signifier for modern and enlightened societies, whereas the lack thereof is located in an anachronistic space (McClintock, 1995) or in the waiting room of history (Chakrabarty, 2007), as a sign of tradition and the uncivilized.

The DIK has used the reformist approach to call for Muslims themselves, the "good" ones, to support the fight against the "bad" ones, the "Islamist" extremists. Yet, as I argue, the overall programs and tactics of the institution are not only directed at those "bad" Muslims, but to all of Muslims in general and even to non-Muslims whose country of origin is "predominantly Muslim".

Here it is important to clarify that I am not arguing that violence cannot be waged in the name of Islam. But rather that to think that Islam constitutes the source and explanation of violence can be misleading and it obscures the complex sociopolitical and historical processes influencing and producing violence (Mamdani, 2005; Sayyid, 2013; Asad, 2007; Kundnani, 2014; Fanon, 2004). Moreover, the overdetermined political debate about "Islamist" violence, conducted by particular—often isolated—subjects, allows addressing a whole community of believers and non-believers alike (those perceived as Muslims regardless of not being so), nationally and internationally through evocations of fear, suspicion, threat, and danger. Furthermore, this kind of addressing recodifies, circulates, and reifies a racial representation of Muslims.

Several scholars have contended that historically violence waged in the name of Islam can be better understood in relation to global politics such as the cold war (Mamdani, 2005), colonial and postcolonial wars (Sayyid, 2013; Fanon, 2004; Silverstein, 2008), processes of resistance, guerilla, and militant actions (Asad 2007), and imperial and colonial tactical warfare (Schwanitz, 2008).

In other words, violence waged in the name of Islam is the outcome of the entanglement of complex political and historical issues—including Muslims and non-Muslims alike—and not the product of a culture or religion. Thus, the problem resides in the codification of violence in cultural terms, and the erasure of the role of Western powers in the process. In addition to this, violence is dissimilar evaluated when Muslims are involved, more often than not culture or theology are presented as the cause and explanation of violence perpetrated by Muslims, erasing political motivations, and revealing divergent normative and moral frames whereby violence is codified.[2]

In this chapter, I trace the intersection of integration and security discourses, contending that the DIK is part and parcel of the security strategies pertaining to Muslims in Germany. The functions of the DIK as a governmental security apparatus differ from that of the police or the BfV, for its main purpose unfolds in different and related projects. Firstly, the DIK operates as a lynchpin between different levels of government, institutions and organizations of the civil society, providing "solutions" to a series of "problems" discursively linked to Islam and Muslims. Secondly, one of the DIK's key strategies refers to its constant calls for Muslims to engage in the surveillance and policing of their own communities. Thirdly, the DIK also invests in defining and disseminating a lexicon to understand processes relating Muslims and violence. Finally, the overall rationale of transforming Muslims and Islam into German-Muslims and German Islam is also informed by an understanding of this process as a means to alleviate potential violence to come. I contend at the end of the chapter that

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2   There seems to be a tendency in the media and in some Western governments to focus on, and report cases of terrorism in which Muslims are involved. Talal Asad (2013, 52) while discussing the "Danish cartoon affair" noted that the first European Police Office's (Europol) report on terrorism—published in 2007—documented that from 498 acts of terrorism committed during 2006 in the European Union only one was attributed to "Islamists", "The largest number was carried out by Basque separatist, and only one of these Basque attacks resulted in the loss of life. Yet more than half of those arrested on suspicion of terrorism were Muslims. Almost all the media in Europe have ignored these figures while playing up 'the threat of Islam'. What, one wonders, accounts for this curious voluble silence?" (Asad, 2013, 52). The report of the Europol regarding 2013 (2014) presents similar figures, in that year there was not a single case reported of religiously motivated terrorism, "A total of 152 terrorist attacks occurred in five EU Member States. The majority took place in France (63), Spain (33) and the UK (35). After an increase in 2012, the number of terrorist attacks in 2013 fell below the number recorded in 2011. As in previous years, the majority of the attacks can be attributed to separatist terrorism. The number of attacks related to left-wing and anarchist terrorism rose in 2013 … EU Member States did not report any terrorist attacks specifically classified as right-wing or religiously inspired terrorism for the period 2013" (EUROPOL, 2014, 11).

the Conference's relentless call for Muslim cooperation in national security concerns becomes one of the conditions for the granting of the Corporation of Public Law status to Islamic organizations, creating a suffered paradox (Brown, 2000), in which the rights associated with this legal status *cannot not be wanted* (Spivak, 2004) by the organizations, despite the underlying racial characterization of Muslims as threats to the nation (Hernández Aguilar, 2017b).[3]

Over the course of its existence, the DIK has developed different and related strategies to defend German society from the threat posed by the discursive association linking Islam and Muslims to violence. As a governmental technology, encompassing biopower, discipline, and pastoral power, the DIK has as a general framework, prevention through integration—the governing of Muslim conducts at the level of the individual, the community, the Islamic organizations and the Muslim population.

Moreover, prevention through integration attempts to guide Muslim conducts in compliance with a particular set of values—transparency, trust, and responsibility—as moral codes whereby Germany's security can be enhanced.

This rationale has prompted the articulation among different levels of government and with Islamic organization fostering the appearance of new institutional arrangements. As outcomes of DIK projects and discussions, the German government founded several organizations: the Prevention and Cooperation Clearing Point (CLS *Clearingstelle Präventionskooperation*), the security-initiative Together Against Extremism—Together for Security, and the Counseling Center for Radicalization.

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3 Germany is a secular state including religions in the public arena through the legal figure of the Corporation of Public Law. Thus, the state officially recognizes religions and grants them the status of corporate bodies, allowing them several benefits. Including the possibility to collect taxes from those ascribed to the religious corporate body, and to employed civil servants (Robbers, 2001, 651). Moreover, the organizations can have the prospect to offer religious courses in public educations and to determine its content (Rohe, 2008). Thus, the German state is secular and differentiates itself from the laic state in which religion is excluded from the public sphere. Legally, the Muslim organizations in Germany have the possibility to be recognized as Corporations of Public Law thereby to be able to exercise the right of religion in the private and public sphere. In 2013, for the first time a Muslim organization, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat (AMJ), acquired the status of Corporation of Public Law in Hessen (DIK & Wagishauser, 2013). This organization has now the same legal status as the Christian and the Jewish organizations. Hessen has also recognized the DITIB as a religious community—not corporate body—and currently the organization collaborates with the state regarding the introduction of Islamic education in public schools, and similar agreements with the DITIB have taken place in Hamburg and Bremen (Rohe, 2014, 110–111).

Following Schiffauer (2008), Mathias Rodatz & Jana Scheuring (2011, 178) argued that the strategy of prevention through integration portrays the Muslim community and its representatives in a bifurcated-yet-complementary form. Muslims, on the one hand, constitute the security agencies' objects under scrutiny, and on the other hand, they represent the subjects in dialogue, by bringing Johannes Fabian (2014) into the conversation, this dialogue between subjects and objects also involves different temporalities ascribed to Germans and Muslims. The DIK exemplifies the materialization of such dialogue, objectification, and temporal distancing. The Conference produces the Muslim community as a site of government and addresses it as a single, atavistic, and homogenous entity in which the threat posed by "Islamism", extremism, and radicalization arises. Simultaneously, the DIK represents itself as a platform of dialogue with the "objects" of security concerns, namely, Muslim representatives, which are also rendered as lacking modernity and the values and norms of the Enlightenment. Biopower supplements the DIK's rationality by constructing the Muslim community as a subpopulation different from but part of the German society.

Schiffauer (2008) argued that prevention strategies in Germany aim not at criminals but rather at extremists "assumed to be capable of becoming potential criminals" (Schiffauer, 2008, 55). Hence, prevention works on "abstract dangers", assessed situations that have not happened yet. In this regard, the governmental frame of integration through prevention is underpinned by a "paranoid temporality" (Puar, 2007), which anticipatory drive rests upon the racial representation of Muslims as potential dangerous problems. Following David Tyrer & Salman Sayyid (2012), the assessment of "potential" has important consequences to the extent that "a suspected criminal can always be innocent, whereas a potential criminal can always be assumed likely to pose a threat" (Tyrer & Sayyid, 2012, 362). The radicalization process emerges as the key point to spot the potentiality of a subject to become a terrorist, and provides an analytical framework to stop the process before it unfolds. It thus anticipates a dangerous future, which has not happened yet.

Furthermore, Rodatz & Scheuring (2011, 180) argued that the DIK's policy integration as prevention creates complementary representations about different historical developments of German and Muslims. The representation of Germany denotes a homogeneous and harmonic society in which foreigners (Muslims) need to adapt and be civilized due to their underdevelopment. Throughout this book, I have argued, how racial historicism informs the notion of integration in the DIK's discourse about Muslims. The portrayals of the figures of the "Islamist", the radical, and the extremist as undemocratic and uncivilized rehearses and reifies this discourse by creating a sharp distinction

between German civilization versus "Islamist" barbarism, which within the framework of integration as prevention legitimizes interventions aimed at the Muslim population in general.

Briefly, the strategy of integration as prevention works through and reifies two logics: First, it standardizes Muslims as a homogenous group in which extremism and radicalization takes place. This is followed by the implementation of preventive strategies via the exclusion of extremist tendencies in the imagined homogenous group (Rodatz & Scheuring, 2011, 180). Thus, the DIK constructs a self-enclosed group based on the conflation of religion and identity, drawing a borderline between normal and dangerous subjects, between civilized and uncivilized ones.

4.2   Trust and Transparency

> What does transparency keep obscure?
> JUDITH BUTLER, *Gender Trouble,* xix

The DIK (2008c, 2009b, 2009c) has consistently deployed the value-strategy trust within the framework of security and prevention. The notion refers to the project of building trustable relations between Muslims and security agencies. Moreover, the DIK (2008c, 12–14) often couples trust with cooperation, the former being a steppingstone for achieving the latter. The round table *Security and Islamism* advised the enhancement of "the cooperation between the police and mosques as well as the development of the concept 'trust-building measures'" (DIK, 2008c, 12).

This concept-strategy aims at building trust between Muslims and German security authorities, suggesting the absence of it or the existence of distrust between Germans and Muslims. The development of this concept harks back to 2005 as the result of the cooperation between different levels of government and some Islamic organizations in Germany (DIK, 2009b, 66).

The concept not only seeks to build up trust between the actors involved, but also to strengthen the cooperation between government security authorities and Islamic associations. According to the DIK, trust-building measures have a direct relation to the fight against radicalization, since "the better the mutual trust is between security authorities and Muslims, the greater the willingness of Muslims to counteract Islamist tendencies" (DIK, 2009c, 13). In other words, improving the trust between Muslims (in general) and the security authorities will be useful for the latter to the extent that the same Muslims will counteract "Islamist" tendencies. The more trust, the more Muslims will work

within the objectives set up by the security authorities. Trust then works as a modality of governmentality, that is to say, the DIK deploys trust as a rationale for guiding Muslims in being willing to cooperate and trust the German security authorities.[4]

Thus, trust operates in a normative frame, being implicitly conceptualized as positive insofar as it aids in the prevention of extremism while distrust is negative in that it obstructs the cooperation between Muslims and security authorities. Furthermore, trust also functions as pastoral power to the extent that it is linked with the establishment of a truth telling power relation between the state and Muslim communities. Trust constitutes the basis for the development of a confessional relation in which ideally, Muslims would be willing to cooperate by spotting Muslim radicals, extremists, and "Islamists" within their communities. Therefore, like responsibility, trust became a dimension of what I term the native informant security agent. This subject position should be responsible for the danger Islam represents thereby she or he should develop trust towards the authorities whereby the authorities should also trust her or him. The way to prove one's trustworthiness is to cooperate by providing information from within about potential dangers.

Later, the round table recommended some measures to establish successful cooperation between Muslims and security authorities. These included codifying nation-wide contacts, i.e., the institution of cooperation and the involvement of all those concerned with the topic, including "youth welfare administrations, schools, clubs with Muslim members, recognized Muslim figures" (DIK, 2008c, 13). Hence, the line of addressing Muslims as a homogenous group that should fight "Islamism" within their organizations continues. Likewise, the group recommended the assessment of how each one of the stakeholders can contribute to the project so that "All stakeholders must measure up to predefined goals" (DIK, 2008c, 13). In other words, every subject involved in prevention must set concrete aims for her- or himself, and these have to be rationally calculated and monitored. Finally, the managers of each institution should commit themselves to engaging with other managers over the long

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4   The relative new interest in Islamic organizations by the German state marks a shift in which the organization were mostly non-recognized towards a period in which they started to receive public and political attention as spokespersons of Muslim communities (Brunn, 2012; Buijs & Rath, 2001; Tietze, 2008). Then, Islamic organizations began to be conceptualized as vehicles for state's integration politics (Brunn, 2012, 17). Different global and national events such as the 9/11, and the changes in the migration regime, including the naturalization and security laws in Germany, prompted this shift from relative invisibility towards being conceived of as key actors in integration politics (Rosenow-Williams, 2012; Tezcan, 2008), and as I show with regard to national security concerns.

term, followed up by concrete measures such as: "jointly developing information material on Islam and radicalization" and "fostering coordination among state players in order to ensure the various institutions (e.g. local administrations, police authorities) can together provide a parallel impetus to the Muslim community" (DIK, 2008c, 13–14).

The first salient feature of the section is its administrative and managerial language. From the previous section to this one, the style and tone shifted and gives the impression of the DIK as a company and prevention as its product. Furthermore, the DIK's working group delineates a wide range of interventions in the settings of the state and civil society such as schools, clubs, organizations, the police, and local administrations. Actually, the recommendation aimed to give an impetus for "state players" to push forward different projects of cooperation and coordination that can also influence the Muslim community. The premise behind the recommendations and concrete practices entails the guidance of Muslims in being willing to cooperate with security authorities.

The CLS, the nationwide agency coordinating the different security projects between Muslims and the German authorities constitutes the product of the recommendations emerging from the trust building measures; thus, it represents the discursive materialization of trust and cooperation, condensed into a nationwide institutional agency.

Institutionally, the CLS is located in the BAMF even though it was instituted as a result of the DIK's recommendation in 2007. The office exemplifies the articulation of different levels of government and institutions when it comes to the trouble that Muslim extremism, radicalization, and "Islamism" represent.[5]

Even though the office's aim is to coordinate the projects between Muslims and security authorities, the CLS is embedded in the BAMF, whose sphere of action is wider than the DIK as it is also in charge of migrants and refuges. This represents an expansion of the state's reach fueled by the concrete problematization of Muslims. Instead of addressing only Muslims as objects of security, the location of the CLS allows the intervention on other sub-population that similarly to Muslims are represented as problematic and still not integrated. Originally conceived as an institution for national security issues, the CLS has expanded its reach and nowadays also addresses and monitors forced marriages, "honor killings", Islamic community life, and even analyzes the DIK's work (BAMF, 2012a; CLS, 2011).

The name of the institution already highlights its purpose, the coordination between Muslims and security agencies to prevent "Islamist" radicalization

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5   An overview of the different projects of the CLS can be found at: (CLS, 2011).

and extremism. The BAMF's description of the CLS further emphasizes the need for trust and knowledge about each other, Germans and Muslims; thus, as with every DIK's document it moves within and reifies a we-they dichotomy:

> Our leitmotif is that the basis for a good working relationship between security agencies and Muslim organizations is reciprocal trust and knowledge. Based on this idea, the Prevention and Cooperation Clearing Point promotes the nationwide dialogue and exchange between these two groups.
>
> <div align="right">BAMF, 2012a [author's translation]</div>

The notion of "clearing" suggests some opacity, misunderstanding or ambiguity in the current relations between Muslim and security authorities. One value to teach to Muslims is transparency, and the lack thereof has been used to describe not only the construction and finances of mosques, but also to stress the opacity of some sermons, Islamic education, the training of imams, and the functioning of some Islamic organizations.[6] As such, it resorts to a line of argumentation that I have already exposed: light versus darkness, transparency versus opacity. The first part of these oppositional pairs is depicted as positive and benign while the other side is painted as negative and threatening. In this sense, "clearing" in the title of this agency implicitly foregrounds transparency as an aim to strive for in contacts between Germans and Muslims.

The DIK's report of 2008 delineates the CLS's aims as seeking, "to gain an overview of all cooperation projects, to broker contacts, to arrange for speakers etc. and to assist with the development and distribution of information material" (DIK, 2008c, 14).

The CLS works as a federal panopticon in order to establish a continual gaze upon the cooperation between Muslims and security agencies and upon the radicalization of Muslims. Transparency suggests the ability to see through; ideally, the transparency would allow the CLS to see through the opacity of Muslim communities. Likewise, the CLS would work as a guiding institution

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6   However, the state's approach towards Islamic organization has been marked by general suspicion towards them framed within the threat of terrorism in the post 9/11 era. Schiffeaur (2012), for instance, documented how after 9/11, membership to an Islamic organization under the radar of the BfV started to play a detrimental role in naturalization processes for Muslim subjects, an issue that can influence the official membership to Muslim organizations, which in turn, is an expectation of the DIK as a proof of representativeness. Thus, suspicion, lack of organization and representativeness are the arguments blocking the acquisition of the corporate status for Islamic organizations.

managing social relations, gathering and providing information about "Is-lamist" threats.

One of the impetuses behind the establishment of the CLS can be traced back to the ambition to create a coordinated nationwide system that can monitor the conduct of Muslims vis-à-vis security authorities and Muslim communities themselves. Emphasis is also placed on the production and distribution of knowledge that is useful for obstructing radicalization and extremism among Muslims. For this reason, the CLS gathered a group of experts, including Islamic studies scholars, police officers, constitutional lawyers, journalists, writers and Muslims in order to assist the institution in the production of such knowledge (BAMF, 2011).

Thus, four governmental strategies interact and complement each other in the CLS: (1) the rationality of guiding Muslims to become willing to cooperate, guiding them to produce a cooperative subject or the native informant security agent; (2) linked with making Muslims accountable in matters of national security, guiding them in a way that Muslims become subjects responsible for the security within their community and consequently for the security of Germany; (3) resulting in positioning the Muslim community as a site of government; (4) finally, establishing a relation of truth telling between Muslims and security authorities that is able to produce knowledge. All in all, the CLS works within the parameters of integration as a prevention strategy against radicalization, extremism, and "Islamism".

4.3 Responsibility and Togetherness

A topic permeating and informing the strategy of prevention through integration concerns the issue of shared responsibility. In the discourse that explains, plans, or seeks to implement integration as a tactic against "Islamist" extremism, the shared responsibility of German authorities and Muslims always appears. Responsibility thus allows the call for the active cooperation and involvement of Muslims in the fight against these phenomena. Already during the DIK's first phase, this was made explicit:

> It is the shared responsibility of the state and its citizens to promote democratic coexistence on the basis of the German legal system and value system enshrined in the Constitution, to protect the rights of all citizens and to jointly counteract any subversive activities aimed at harming our liberal democracy—for they threaten the freedom and security of everyone in Germany.
>
> DIK, 2008C, 6

Thus, the threat represented by "Islamism" can only be counteracted by the engagement of everyone and through collaboration of Muslims with security authorities, dialogue, and integration politics. These statements illustrate Rodatz & Scheuring's (2011) argument about the strategy of prevention through integration as a political intervention imputing responsibility to Muslims as subjects in dialogue and as potential risks. Hence, the call for shared responsibility attempts to conduct the conducts of Muslim as subjects responsible for the risk their faith represents for the German liberal democracy and national security. Since "Islamist" extremism constitutes a common problem for Germans and Muslims alike, the DIK compels Muslims to cooperate in spotting, detecting, providing information, and standing up against extremism.

Nevertheless, if "Islamic" extremism represents a problem for everyone in Germany, why do the authorities only call for the cooperation of Muslims? In the previous section, I argued that the DIK disseminates the ideas that this phenomenon occurs outside of security authorities' reach, i.e. within Muslim communities. Responsibility and cooperation aim at piercing Muslim communities and establishing them as sites of governance. One of the underlying assumptions in the trope of the "parallel society" refers to these spatial locations as unruly—out of the sovereign reach of the German state. The DIK's call for cooperation and Muslim responsibility constitutes the German state's attempt to recover the self-imputed loss of power in these alleged self-enclosed ethnic-religious enclaves.

In his opening speech at the DIK's plenary session of 2011, the former Minister of the Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich extended an invitation to Muslims attending the Conference and to the entire Muslim population living in Germany to initiate a new project to enhance national security, and to prevent "Islamism" and extremism: the plan "Together Against Extremism—Together For Security" (Friedrich, 2011, 2).

Furthermore, Friedrich stated that the DIK's scope of action is not limited to security issues. Rather the institution represented an open dialogue between Muslims and state representatives addressing a wide range of topics. However, he subsequently emphasized that "self-evidently" security topics have always been on the agenda of the Conference and they will stay in on (Friedrich, 2011, 2). His position implies that discussions about Muslims are essentially also debates about security. But the linkage between Muslims and security is only self-evident insofar as Muslims have been previously coupled with problems and extremism, addressed as a homogenous group, and Islam and Muslim communities have been conceptualized as the fields in which extremism, radicalization, and terrorism irrupt.

As the background for launching his new initiative, Friedrich mentioned the killing of two American soldiers and the wounding of two more by a terrorist at Frankfurt Airport in 2011, using this single event to launch a nationwide security project:[7]

> I am however of the opinion that in the future we should come together and think more closely about new ways to combat radicalization. The bloody attack on March 2nd at Frankfurt Airport, which resulted in the deaths of two US soldiers and two other soldiers being seriously wounded, has sadly confirmed how dangerous so-called "homegrown" terrorist are, who are "silently"—unnoticed by the security authorities—radicalized in our country … This partnership is really important for me because signs of radicalization are for the most part apparent in the immediate environment and cannot be readily detected by the security authorities. In associations, at sermons, during discourses about individual's personal understanding of Islam, it will be possible to detect radical positions at an early stage, and then a critical debate on radical positions can take place.
>
> FRIEDRICH, 2011, 2–3 [author's translation]

A problem exists, i.e. the radicalization of Muslims, and problems emerge around the solution of it since this process occurs in the immediate environment of Muslims (Muslim communities, a mosque, a parallel society?): an environment that the security authorities cannot monitor regularly. Then, Friedrich emphasizes the need for a partnership between Muslims and German security authorities, suggesting that Muslims should keep an eye on themselves. Friedrich's call for the cooperation of Muslims suggests the establishment of an Islamic panopticon in daily life, in which every Muslim would be subjected to the gaze of other Muslims.

The concept of radicalization allows Friedrich to make the leap from addressing concrete cases in which a single Muslim radicalized towards addressing the totality of Muslim living in Germany. Muslims have to monitor their "own" communities and function as sub-contractors (without being paid) for the security authorities. Friedrich then insinuates that Muslims should implement the early detection system in associations, sermons, and interpretations of Islam. These should be carefully monitored by Muslims, keeping a sharp eye on

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7   In 2012, Europol stated that the killings, according to German legal code, were not terrorist attacks but rather a religious inspired murder committed by a lone actor (EUROPOL, 2012, 15), yet for Friedrich it was a terrorist act.

these fields, and when they encounter something resembling radicalization—which in the framework of the DIK was barely defined—a discussion should take place. Friedrich does not clarify whether Muslims themselves should discuss with people they believe to be in the early stages of radicalization or if they should inform the competent security authorities about them.[8]

Friedrich's call for cooperation works within the parameters of what Nikolas Rose (1996) termed "governing through communities" (1996, 332), a current governmental strategy deployed by states in which the community is conceptualized as a new territory of government. The community can be "mobilized, enrolled, and deployed in novel programs and techniques which operated through the instrumentalization of strategic alliances and active responsibilities" (Rose, 1996, 332).

Accordingly, the community's reconfiguration as a site of governance poses an ethical change to the individual's conceptualization. A transition from a subject's personal responsibility regarding her or his conduct towards a subject "addressed as a moral individual with bonds of obligations and responsibilities for conduct" (Rose, 1996, 334) built and situated within a determined community. Thus, "Government through community involves a variety of strategies for inventing and instrumentalizing these dimensions of allegiance between individuals and communities in the services of projects of regulation, reform or mobilization" (Rose, 1996, 334). Furthermore, Rose (1996) pointed out that one of the deployments of governing through community concerns matters of security by using "similar images of the subject as an active and responsible agent in the securing of security for themselves and those to whom they are or should be affiliated" (Rose, 1996, 335).

Friedrich's statements regarding the partnership between Muslims and security authorities involve, first of all, the conceptualization of Muslims as an homogenous community in which individuals belonging to it are given the responsibility to detect extremism among them, to spot extremists, and even to have a critical dialogue with them. Hence, the Muslim individual within her or his community is responsible, paraphrasing Rose, not only for securing the security of the Muslim community but also for securing the security

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8 Joan W. Scott (2007, 3), poignantly argues that the declaration of Muslims as a threat to the national integrity of Western nations relies on the interpretation and exponentiation of a few individual actions in which, "the radical acts of a few politically inspired Islamists have become a declaration of the intent of the many; the religious practices of minorities have been taken to stand for the 'culture' of the whole; and the notion of a fixed Muslim 'culture' obscures the mixed sociological realities of adaptation and discrimination experienced by theses immigrants to the West".

of the German nation, at least by filling the space in which the reach of the security authorities wanes, namely, "the immediate environment", the Muslim community.

Likewise, governing through communities presupposes that the subject would guide her- or himself, and possibly guide others in reference to a particular course of action stipulated by the state. The guidance aims at forming a moderate subject, in contraposition to the extreme. Thus, religious Islamic conduct should follow a moderate pattern.

At this point, governmentality intersects with biopolitics. First, at work in the call for Muslim cooperation a discursive split divides the German from the Muslim population. Thereafter, the Muslim subpopulation is addressed in its totality and Muslims are called to build a further division as they should distinguish the "good" from the "bad" Muslim. Moreover, radicalization along with extremism, and social polarization are phenomena disintegrating the German social fabric, and this is the discursive position from which the call for defending Germany from its internal Muslim enemies emerges. However, the defense of German society involves the recruitment of Muslims; they have to participate in the protection by spotting those subjects representing the internal threat within their communities and the nation.

Governmentality provides the frame for the defensive process; the conduct of Muslims should be carefully guided in different ways. Firstly, they have to behave in a moderate manner. Secondly, they have to conduct their conducts in a way able to identify those Muslim conducts which lay outside of the moderate center, and as suggested by Friedrich, they even have to attempt to guide the conducts of those potential radicals through dialogue.

Furthermore, Leerom Medovoi (2012) and Levent Tezcan (2008) argued about the utility of Michel Foucault's (2007) notion of pastoral power to understand the current work on security concerning Islam and violence. Medovoi (2012) highlighted that pastoral power as the precursor of governmentality referred not only to the guidance of the flock but also to its protection from enemies. The shepherd has to be constantly vigilant and care for the flock. Through secularization, the enemy of the flock, i.e., the infidel, has been translated into the disloyal civic subject, who became the enemy of the new flock, the nation state's population. Tezcan (2008) argued that pastoral power installs a relation of power between the pastor and his followers, a relation of truth telling whereby the pastor makes the flock and the individual simultaneously accountable.

Friedrich's call for Muslim cooperation resembles pastoral power strategies. First, Friedrich's speech moves between the distinction of friends and foes. Muslims can be friends if they are loyal to the nation and conduct their

conducts loyally. Moreover, Friedrich also pursues to install a relation of truth telling between Muslims and security authorities establishing the latter as a secular shepherd. Muslims should tell the truth when they spot radical tendencies within their communities. This rationality informs the DIK's projects launched in regard to prevention work: the CLS, the initiative Together Against Extremism, and the Missing Person Campaign (see below).

Through extremism and radicalization different power technologies intertwine in a quest to defend the German social body from its internal enemies. Biopolitics splits the population. Governmentality provides the guide of conducts. Governing through communities imputes responsibility to Muslims and positions the community as a site of government. Finally, pastoral power establishes a confessional relation of truth telling between Muslims and the security authorities. Furthermore, the rationality of governing through communities has been central in the projects implemented by the DIK regarding security issues and thus to the forging of strategic alliances initiated by the DIK with leaders of Muslim associations.

The "immediate environment" mentioned by Friedrich, the breeding ground, and the "Islamist parallel society" allegedly denote unruly Muslim territories within Germany. Places in which the state's reach is narrow, an argumentation legitimizing the call for Muslim cooperation. The discourse presents the loss of German sovereignty in these locations, from which emerges the need of cooperation to gain them back, and with that to secure the nation.

This is a consistent argument in Friedrich's speech and in the DIK regarding security, which portrays security authorities as helpless to access the immediate environment of Muslims, their community, which discursively legitimizes the call for Muslims to cooperate with German authorities and the attempt to form a native informant security agent.

As the media articles analyzed often do, Friedrich also instrumentalizes a single case to suggest general tendencies, fueling the moral panic about the disintegration of Germany and the threat posed by Muslims. The hegemonic discourse on Islam as a menace allows Friedrich to move with ease from a single case towards addressing the totality of a subpopulation defined by an imagined homogenous religiosity. Friedrich did not explain how this particular attack relates to Islam and Muslims, what the relation of religion to acts of violence is, or whether the subject justified his actions with his Islamic faith. Friedrich just uses the case as the background to launch a stronger initiative involving Muslims to combat extremism:

> The prevention of these kinds of bloody deeds that are trust in to our
> peaceful way of life should not longer just be the task of the security

> authorities. We all are now called upon to take action as a community.
> I am convinced that the only way to accomplish this is to forge a part-
> nership between Muslims and the security authorities. I would therefore
> like to announce an initiative, which I would like to realize together with
> Muslims completely independent of the Islam Conference: a security
> partnership, "Together Against Extremism—Together For Security".
>   FRIEDRICH, 2011, 3 [author's translation]

Everyone in Germany is compelled to actively counteract extremism, yet above
all, the participation of Muslims is required. Here, Friedrich switches from the
singular case (the Frankfurt Airport attack) to the plural, bloody deeds (*Blut-
taten*), discursively linking this concrete act of violence with previous and fu-
ture actions, implicitly reifying Islam as a source of violence in the past, the
present, and the future to come.

In accordance with the strategy of integration as prevention, Friedrich calls
for Muslims cooperation to prevent these acts. Here one might wonder what
exactly a regular Muslim can do against an actual terrorist without putting
her- or himself in danger. How can she or he become active in fighting these
kinds of acts? Does this imply that becoming a German-Muslim does not only
require integration but also means keeping a vigilant eye upon the communi-
ties in which they live? Being a native informant security agent? The Frankfurt
Airport attack thus becomes the basis for launching a new project completely
independent of the DIK, a security-partnership between Muslims and security
authorities, which in fact already existed—the CLS.

The concept of "together" constitutes the focal point of Friedrich's initiative,
German authorities and Muslim communities and organization should form
a strategic alliance to combat and prevent radicalization tendencies that lead
to terrorism. Cooperation-cooptation of Muslims in the fight and prevention
against terrorism are strategies of governing through community, aligned with
the dominant approach in Western countries to fight and prevent "Islamic"
terrorism (Kundnani, 2014). Analytically, the DIK pursues to guide Muslims as
infiltrated security agents able to pinpoint those subjects in risk of radicaliza-
tion and also as guides inside the communities, guiding fellow Muslims away
from these tendencies. Like the DIK, Friedrich's speech left unaddressed the
complex sociopolitical context generating what is commonly deemed as the
radicalization of Muslims.

On Friedrich's initiative, a new institutional summit was establish—along-
side the DIK, the Integration Summit, the Youth Islam Conference, and the
Youth integration Summit—focusing on the prevention of extremism, radical-
ization, and "Islamism" (BMI, 2011a, 2011b). Friedrich's invitation to Muslims

became the first Prevention Summit (*Präventionsgipfel*) (BMI 2011b), and later it was established as the "Initiative Security Partnership—Together with Muslims for Security", which aims at counteracting the "Islamist" radicalization of youth in cooperation with Muslim organizations (BMI, 2012e).

One of the first strategies deployed by this initiative was the instituting of the Counseling Center for Radicalization (*Beratungsstelle Radikalisierung*). According to the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), the Center's foundation responds to the counseling needs of relatives and friends of radical young Muslims. In order to promote the Counseling Center, the BMI designed a publicity plan with special focus on the Muslim population; the outcome—the Missing Person Campaign—was a series of black and white posters and postcards to be distributed all over Germany in three different languages: German, Turkish, and Arabic.

The campaign borrows the idea of missing person posters, yet the missing persons in the posters did not disappear or got kidnapped but rather got involved in "Islamist" radicalization processes. Following Sara Dornhof (2016, 131), the "missing" motive of the campaign precisely plays out with forms of visibility and invisibility, contrary to the typical images of missing persons, where the subject has disappeared, the models of the Counseling's campaign are present and visible, what remains uncovered and therefore "missing" are the radical ideas espoused by them, an the appeal of the campaign rests upon making those invisible ideas visible. This form of seeing difference (Dornhof, 2013) furthermore can be seen as an attack against the public visibility of Muslims, framed in the post 9/11 state initiatives focusing on national security and constructing Muslims as *the* threat to the European identity (Dornhof, 2013, 132). Whereas the images of the DIK's flyer analyzed before can be seen as graphic representations of the integration politics of the German state, the images of the Missing Person Campaign are completely aligned with the discourse of defending the society, whereby Muslims are seen through the lens of national security with a racial filter. However, both set of images represent the range of the state's view upon Muslims.

The posters of the Missing Person Campaign contain the pictures of four youngsters, three males, and one female. Ahmad, who stares directly to the camera, is a young man with dark hair, an incipient beard, and kind and confident appearance. His image is set against the background of the countryside. Fatima is a young woman wearing a white headscarf, which also covers her neck. She posed for the shoot with an open and friendly smile. Tim is also a young man smiling, he wears a hoody, and his hair is not dark. Finally, Hassan seems the older of the four, he has dark hair, a black t-shirts and also smiles at the camera. The images are accompanied by the contact information of the

Counseling Center, and the following text (the names and relations with the radical Muslim varying in accordance with the family member or friend who supposedly made the poster):

> This is my friend/son/brother (name). I/We miss her/him, because I/We do not recognize her/him anymore. She/he withdraws more and more and every day she/he gets more radical. I/We are afraid of totally losing her/him to religious fanatics and terror groups. If this happens to you like it happened to me/us turn to the Counseling Center for Radicalization.[9]
>
> BMI, 2012d [author's translation]

According to the BMI (2012c), the campaign's theme seeks to emphasize the human side of losing a radicalized or terrorist relative. Thus, the models in the pictures represent either radicals or terrorists, particularly those influenced by Salafism (BMI, 2012c).

In order to show that radicalization is not exclusive to persons with "migration background", a picture of a subject without this background was included, Tim (BMI, 2012c). Although recognizing that radicalization does not only affect persons with "migration background", the BMI is reticent to state that Tim is German. Since he is involved with radicals, Tim cannot be interpellated as a German precisely because of his beliefs, instead Tim is someone without "migration background".

The campaign resorts to images in order to racially fix Muslims, it uses skin color, hair, fabric, and "typical Muslim" names to establish the profiles of Muslim

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9   While preparing this manuscript I needed to ask for permission in order to use the images of the posters for the publication. First, I contacted the Ministry of the Interior, and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees without receiving an answer. Afterwards, I wrote an email to the address in the posters, i.e., to the Counseling Center, and this time I got a reply not from the Center, but rather from the Counter-Terrorism Task Force of the Ministry of the Interior. In their response, the Counter-Terrorism Task Force prohibited me to use the images, even for strictly academic purposes, based on the argument that the Ministry stopped the campaign around the end of 2012. However, the images remained on the web page of the BMI until March 2017. Then, I insisted and wrote back to the Ministry, explaining once again the arguments I am making, and the importance to discuss this campaign against the background of the dialogue initiated by the BMI with Islamic organizations. Unsurprisingly, the answer was negative again, but I noticed that the posters were finally removed from the BMI's web page. The posters can still be found in the archive of one of the designers of the Campaign, in the ZDF's portal, and in different German newspapers and magazines which reported on the Campaign: https://umlauttext.wordpress.com/portfolio/kampagnen/.
https://www.zdf.de/kultur/forum-am-freitag/eine-plakataktion-mit-folgen-100.html.

radicals, it produces Orientalized bodies, with Tim as an exception. The inclusion of Tim as explicitly someone without "migration background" and White, while Ahmad, Hassan, and Fatima as people of color further reifies the racial representation of Muslims and Germans. Following the same line previously analyzed, it draws a color-line between Germans and Muslims. Although the aim of the strategy is to underline the human dimension of the loss, the Muslims represented in the posters are racially objectified. Moreover, all the models portrayed in the pictures represent "regular" folk; they look happy and friendly. These images are set against those widely circulated in the media about terrorist and extremist, usually male, bearded subjects enraged and aggressive.

The "regularity" of the missing Muslims has the effect of suggesting that anyone can turn into or be a radical terrorist. The inclusion of Fatima, for instance, implies that radicalization and terrorism are not male-exclusive domains, as the BfV (2011) has also suggested. Frantz Fanon (1965), wrote decades ago wrote about the depiction of Muslim women and the headscarf as threatening as it can help to hide weapons, and Yasemin Shooman (2014) has pointed out how the representation of Muslim women in the German media anchors them in the tension between submissive and potentially dangerous. The campaign sends a clear message about how radicals and terrorists look like—and they look like regular Muslims. These models, as potential terrorists, reproduce the stereotype of the terrorist discussed by W.J.T. Mitchell (2012, 30), an anonymous and facelessness subject, "'Friendly' native[s] who turn out to be carrying a suicide bomb under his or her clothing". Ahmad, Fatima, Tim, and Hassan then appear trough the lens of race and security, as "the anonymous enemy who could be anyone and anywhere" from which it is articulated "the continual expansion of the national security state and its appropriation of increasing emergency powers" (Mitchell, 2012, 31).

The campaign also instrumentalizes an emotional language to emphasize the human dimension of the loss of a relative. As a missing person campaign, it implies that those radical-Muslim subjects can be found. However, these images are staged representations of radicalization and the missing persons are models. And yet the staging seeks to carry a message of truth through the entanglement of racial profiling and emotional blackmailing.

The billboard campaign also seeks to establish a relation of truth between the BMI as a government agency and Muslim communities. It seeks to pierce into their feelings and emotions and through that to spot young Muslims radicals. Although the campaign explicitly aims at helping and counseling relatives, there is no information about what would happen with the information or with the young Muslim radicals. Thus, this tactic uses affect to detect potentially threatening Muslim subjects and gather information about them.

Although the Counseling Center has the potential to be a valuable tool for those relatives who in fact have seen a friend or family member radicalized, the Missing Person Campaign circulates a clear-cut profile about how a religious fanatic and a member of a terrorist group look, and they look like ordinary Muslims, with the exception of Tim who is racially fixed as German. This racial profiling can generate different outcomes as it has the potential to further fuel the fear, suspicion, and racism against Muslims insofar as it carries a clear message associating danger with Muslim bodies. The images further intensify the moral panic about the Muslim subject as the enemy within the nation. Additionally, I consider that these images propagate symbolic violence against Muslims; they can further disseminate suspicion, rejection, racial profiling, and exclusion in a context in which those issues are already well cemented.

And again, one can wonder what do these images want? And what desires in terms of what they lack do the images articulate? (Mitchell, 1996). In a first moment the images want to attract the viewer through an affective appeal, as posters they seek to visually and emotionally engage everyday passersby, and as postcards those to which they were sent. This attraction, or "Medusa effect" (Mitchell, 1996, 76) fleetingly freezes and turns the viewer into an image for the gaze of Ahmad, Fatima, Hassan, and Tim. They then return the gaze and engage you in a fabricated story of fanaticism and radicalization. By this addressing, the images transit to deliver the message and expect to mobilize you, to touch either your empathy, fear and distrust or all of them and thereby engage you in helping finding the missing persons, the radical models.

Furthermore, what these images lack is an explanation, a narrative about why, in the first place they get caught in the net of "religious fanatics and terrorist groups", which is consistent with the hegemonic discourses about "Islamism" and radicalization where Islam is simultaneously cause and effect, description and explanation. In this sense, as Mitchell (1996, 75) argues following Fanon, "the ocular violence of racism splits its object in two, rending and rendering it simultaneously hypervisible and invisible", because the viewer can see Ahmad, Fatima, Hassan, and Tim, without really seeing them. The radical models are thus seeing exclusively as terrorists.

In terms of lack moreover the images fabricate a direct relation to the potential and targeted audience. Skin color, names, a headscarf, and an unnamed religion craft an alleged resemblance to the Muslim community and thereby they address Muslims. In this sense, "radical Muslims" call for the help of fellow Muslims, and by means of this representation the authority, planning, and design of the BMI, the DIK, and the Counseling Center disappears completely. During the time of the campaign the addressing of Muslims and migrants was, in effect, explicitly revealed by the locations were the posters hung.

The journalist Stefan Wehrmeyer requested to the BMI knowledge about the locations were the posters were exhibited, as it turns out, the vast majority of the posters targeted specifically those neighborhoods with a high proportion of "immigrants" and Muslims (Hörz 2012). From the total of 200 posters, 140 alone were allocated to Berlin and hung on the streets of Kreuzberg, Neukölln and Wedding, (in)famous in the German media outlets as "parallel societies", unruly neighborhoods. Thus, the images also reveal a lack in terms of state's strategically relations with Muslim communities, as it has been voiced explicitly in the DIK's protocols. The images, finally, also reveal an anxious desire to control the future, its possible apocalyptic outcomes potentially engender by "young radicals" of Islamic faith.

The campaign was criticized by the Islamic organizations working in the initiative, and for this reason they decided to end their participation. In August 2012, the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD), the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB), The Union of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKS), and the Islamic Community of Bosnians in Germany (IGBD) sent a letter to the Minister of the Interior withdrawing their participation from the initiative and stating their reasons,

> The Honorable Minister of the Interior:
> Democratic principles are the foundation for a peaceful and stable social structure, in which individuals and society are both protected from any pressure, undue influence, and manipulation. These values are rooted in the universal principles of human rights and the rule of law. These values are likewise the basis of our statements, our beliefs and practice, which we always try our best to embody in our words and deeds. As a consequence, we find it unacceptable to legitimize the instrumentalization of religions and their teachings, which are intended to bring peace to persons and society, for social and political objectives, ideologies, or the legitimation of violence. Working off of these basic principles and theses expectations, we are forced to terminate our participation as cooperation partners in the context of the "Initiative Security Partnership" ... Ending the unspeakable "Wanted Person Campaign" is the conclusion reasonable that one can come to when the expected social collateral damage is taken into account. We already pointed this out on several different occasions and, with your indulgence, we would like repeat it again here in this letter.
> DITIB, IGBD, VIKS & ZMD, 2012 [author's translation]

The letter represents another example of the Islamic organizations' dissent regarding a particular project of the government and its security apparatuses,

and by relabeling the campaign as a "Wanted Person" billboard; the organizations succinctly exposed the foreseeable outcomes of the initiative. The Islamic organizations expressed their criticism by appealing to principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, but the Minister of the Interior dismissed their concerns. Afterwards, Friedrich lamented the position of the organizations, and reaffirmed, paradoxically, the continuation of the *partnership* in order to fight against terrorism (Friedrich in: BMI, 2012a). Eventually, the posters were removed from the German landscape, yet they still could be found on the web page of the Minister of the Interior for five more years.

Friedrich dismissed the claims and concerns of Islamic organizations. He called for the continuation of the initiative and wished that the organizations would reconsider their position on account of the relevance for the fight against terrorism, despite the fact that the campaign was aimed at radicalization not terrorism itself. The critique of the Islamic organizations' stance was further explained on the web page of the BMI:

> The reasons that the four Muslim associations gave for canceling their cooperation do not convince the Minister of the Interior. The advertisement campaign is not a "wanted persons" campaign. It clearly addresses terrorist recruiting efforts. It tackles the concerns of families about a possible radicalization of *their* children.
>
> BMI, 2012a [emphasis added, author's translation]

Thus, the BMI imputes and circumscribes radicalization to Muslims, and it makes Muslim parents responsible for their children's radicalization. Although this dispute occurred outside the DIK, the actors involved are part of it and Friedrich's initiative was launched in the DIK. The reluctance of Friedrich to consider the concerns of the organizations exhibits the limits of a "dialogue" whose aims have already been implicitly pre-defined.

4.4   Suffering Incorporation

Against the background of the DIK's relentless call for cooperation to the Islamic organizations and given that these organizations saw the Conference as a tool to acquire the Public Law Corporation status, I propose to read this conundrum as a "suffered paradox" (Brown, 2000; Hernández Aguilar, 2017b).

The DIK has offered rights to Islamic organizations, particularly the acquisition of the Public Law Corporation status, which brings with it a series of rights

such as the introduction of Islamic religion courses in public schools.[10] However, the acquisition of such rights is contingent on compliance with a range of prescriptive requirements. First, Islamic organizations need to develop centralized and representative structures.[11] Second, they have to take as their duty to help the German government with the integration of Muslims. Third, the organizations have to cooperate with security authorities against extremism, radicalization, and 'Islamism'. In addition to these, as I have been contending, integration can be seen as a form of racial historicism positing two different kinds of historical development for Germans and Muslims.

The suffered paradox for the Islamic organizations resides in the acquisition of rights as what they *cannot not want*, paraphrasing Gayatri Spivak (2004), in spite of racialization and the acceptance of the conditions of integration and cooperation in national security issues that goes along with these rights. In other words, Muslims are incorporated into the nation and promised rights under preconditions while being discursively racialized as in the Missing Person Campaign. Their acceptance into the nation and the granting of rights reproduce power asymmetries and domination and create possibilities of state's techniques of surveillance, control, and regulation targeting Muslims.

This granting of rights is depending on the fulfillment of two prerequisites. The first entails the imperative to integrate. The Minister of the Interior Thomas de Maizière (2010) exemplifies this position through his statements positing the social integration of Muslims as the precondition to the structural integration of Islam, i.e. the legal incorporation. On the one hand, social integration addresses, for instance, the development of "interethnic" friendships and

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10   The German state has established several prerequisites to obtain legal status, although the application for the status is a competence of each one of the federal states. A religious organization must avow the law, and pledge its alliance to the core values and principles of the constitution. Moreover, the organization should not jeopardize the safety of third persons, and not overstep the law concerning religion. Finally, a representative is needed with whom the state can discuss and negotiate, for instance, the introduction of religious courses in public schools (Robbers, 2001, 650).

11   Due to its historical decentralization and the existence of several denominations, organizations, and interpretations of Islam not a single organization can serve as a single representative of the Muslim community. The issue becomes more problematic regarding the introduction of Islamic courses in public schools. On account of the state's neutrality a representative is needed to develop the content of the instruction. However, according to Mathias Rohe (2008, 60) the law does not require the unification of the different Muslim organizations under a single and unified body, in fact, every organization can, if it so decides, put an application for religious courses, if the number of students determined by the law is fulfilled.

partnerships. On the other hand, structural integration involves the Islamic organizations in relation to Islam as a religion, and the granting of the corporate status. Thus, for instance, why should the rates of "interethnic" marriages be a precondition for a bureaucratic procedure such as the granting of corporate status? This is precisely the utility of the DIK's ambiguous representational politics (Tezcan, 2012). It allows the institution to move with ease through different registers of representation and to condition the granting of rights to the organizations. In addition to this, as I have argued, the integration of Muslims depends on their construction as racialized-problematic subjects required to reshape their subjectivities. Therefore, the first condition for the legal incorporation entails the imperative to integrate and the tacit acceptance of the racialization.

The second tacit condition that has to be met for incorporation presupposes cooperation in national security. The discourse on security constructs Muslims as the internal enemies of the nation and imputes to them the task of monitoring and defending their communities from 'Islamist' and radical guises. In addition, the security authorities' gaze upon the Islamic organizations locates them under constant suspicion of not being loyal to the nation. Therefore, the second discourse organizing incorporation assumes the acceptance of the threat that Muslims represent and the need for their cooperation to fight against "Islamist" threats.

Together, these discourse position the granting of rights as a suffered paradox. Rights, in this case, rather than challenging the unequal legal status of Islamic organizations vis-à-vis the other religious organizations in Germany, are established as conditions to regulate these same organizations. If Islamic organizations want to acquire legal status, they have to fulfill the legal requirements in addition to integrating themselves, helping to integrate the wider Muslim community, and working as security subcontractors. Therefore, the DIK strategically uses religious rights as a condition for the legal incorporation of Islamic organizations and to pursue the DIK's political aims to integrate Muslims and to enhance the mechanisms of control and regulation.

Hitherto, the biggest Islamic organizations still pursue their incorporation as Corporations of Public Law, which, following Tezcan (2012), constituted one of the central reasons for the organizations to participate in the DIK. Aleksandra Lewicki raised a similar argument, while the organizations saw the DIK as an opportunity to pursue their recognition; the state's representatives conceptualized the DIK, "as an opportunity to specify the conditionality of the legal recognition" (Lewicki, 2014, 78). In other words, the DIK was established not only to integrate Islam, but also to determine how such a process would take place. Likewise, the lack of concrete efforts to grant the legal recognition

influenced the ZMD's withdrawal as participant of the DIK, in addition to the DIK's reluctance to tackle racism against Muslims, proposed in particular by the ZMD (Köhler, 2010), and the emphasis on security that dominated the DIK's second phase.

The Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat (AMJ) acquired such a status, and it did so outside the DIK's framework. In an interview, the AMJ's chairman, Abdullah Uwe Wagishauser explained the process for the acquisition of the status, "This recognition is purely an administrative act. Under German law, the public is not asked its opinion. There was no opposition from that side. There were some legal inquiries. The process was quite speedy and we were pleased to see how quickly it led to recognition" (Wagishauser & Krämer, 2013). Thus, the recognition as a Corporation of Public Law is available for those organizations that want the status; it is a legal and administrative procedure that does not require the existence of a centralized council such as the DIK, which invited the AMJ in 2013 for the DIK's new and third phase.

In a similar vein, the Islamic Federation of Berlin (IFB) since 1980 and on several occasions applied to the School Senate for the right to introduce Islamic courses in public schools in Berlin. In 2000, the IFB was granted the status of a religious community, and then the School Senate authorized the introduction of Islamic courses offered by the IFB. This dispute occurred before the existence of the DIK, and the granting of recognition and the rights associated with it were the product of the IFB's actions.

These two cases exemplify that at least as far as being legally recognized either as a corporate body or as a religious community, the DIK is not strictly needed since any organization can apply independently—if they want—for theses statuses.

The Glossary of the Conflictive Present

5.1 The Social Polarization of Germany

The act of defining is a political process enmeshed in delimiting analytical borders about what is to be included and excluded. In the DIK's second phase, the notion of social polarization gained weight supplanting *Security and Islamism* (DIK, 2010a). Social polarization became an umbrella term encompassing three, allegedly, interrelated phenomena: "Muslim anti-Semitism", "hostility against Muslims", and "Islamism". In 2011 the Minister of the Interior Thomas de Maizière proposed the creation of a glossary of these phenomena currently polarizing and fracturing German society. As the first step to prevent these issues, the Conference's working group *Prevention Work with Youth* drafted the glossary in 2011 (DIK, 2011e). Once this lexicon was completed, the second step involved the development and implementation of concrete preventive strategies to promote tolerance among youth.

Although problematic in some aspects that I discuss, the DIK's report of 2011 constitutes an important step towards acknowledging—in the DIK's terms—the contemporary "hostility against Muslims" in Germany. The Islamic organizations, in particular the ZMD, represented in the DIK pushed for inclusion of this topic during the first phase, yet this issue was mentioned but never fully addressed until 2011. The DIK's refusal to deal with the issue as a form of racism even prompted the ZMD's withdrawal from the Conference.

The sudden inclusion of the topic of "hostility against Muslims" in the minutes of the Conference can be seen as a much needed response of the government to two events that brought the issue to the fore: the so-called Sarrazin debate and the systematic killings of migrants and Muslims perpetrated by the National Socialist Underground (NSU).

The so-called Sarrazin debate refers to the publication and ensuing public reaction to *Deutschland schafft sich ab* in 2010, roughly translated as *Germany Undoing/Abolishing Itself*. Berlin's former senator for finance Thilo Sarrazin wrote the book, which in short, calls for stricter immigration policies and the reduction of welfare benefits. The arguments supporting these proposals are based on Sarrazin's racist ideas that Muslims and immigrants as a group take advantages of the German welfare system. He also posits the inherent violence of Islam and Muslims, linking them with criminality, and terrorism. Sarrazin, likewise, predicts that through the higher birthrates of Muslim women,

in comparison with German women, Germany, as we know it, eventually, will disappear. In this sense, Sarrazin's arguments align with a paranoid future rendered apocalyptical.[1]

Sarrazin's book conspicuously related statistics to eugenics and became Germany's best-selling book in 2011. The publication of the book ignited a heated debate between defenders and detractors of his ideas. Moreover, it prompted discussion about political correctness in Germany, namely, the alleged inability of Germans to freely criticize religions and religious subjects without being reminded of the anti-Semitism of the past. The Sarrazin-debate, then, is a code for the expansion and continued public irruptions of racism against Muslims, Jews, and migrants. In this sense, Sarrazin's discourses and the ensuing public debate revealed that racism—often deemed as marginal at best, or inexistent at worst—has been, in effect, well cemented and widespread throughout German society.[2]

From 2000 until the arrest of one of its members, the National Socialist Underground (NSU), an undercover neo-Nazi organization, terrorized migrants and Muslims, killing eight Turks, one Greek, and a police officer. They robbed several banks and detonated two pipe bombs in the city of Cologne, one of them on the *Keupstraße*, which is well known as one of the centers of Turkish life in the city. The *Keupstraße* was also the target of the BMI's publicity campaign "Missing Persons". Besides murderous racial violence, this case involved other forms of structural racism. The case of the NSU is paradigmatic of the deep influence of racism in the application of justice. During the first years of the killings, the police created the "Crescent" special commission (*Sonderkommission "Halbmond"*) to investigate the serial killer, the commission was re-labeled afterwards as the special commission "Bosporus" (*Sonderkommision "Bosporous"*). Whereas the first name clung to the idea that somehow Islam and Muslims were involved, the second is related to the racial stereotype of the criminality and mafia links to the "foreigner", here the Turkish one. It was not until the capture of one of the NSU members that the police realized that the killings were not related *at all* to alleged links with Turkish mafia and drugs or to the families and relatives of the deceased, which were during the investigation treated as suspects, and that the perpetrator was not someone with

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1   "I don't want the country of my grandchildren and great grandchildren to be largely Muslim, or that Turkish or Arabic will be spoken in large areas, that women will wear headscarves and the daily rhythm is set by the call of the muezzin. If I want to experience that, I can just take a vacation in the Orient" (Sarrazin quoted in: CGH, 2010).

2   For a critical and detailed account of Sarrazin's racial discourse see: (Butterwegge, 2014; Foroutan, 2010; Hentges, 2014; Link, 2011; Räthzel, 2011; Shooman, 2014; Stanicic, 2011).

"migration background" as they suspected throughout all the years as can be seen from composite images of the perpetrators that investigators distributed (str/AFP/AP, 2006). Later, the media labeled the case as the "Döner murders" ("*Döner-Mörder*"). This kind of labeling is probably the rationale that Frantz Fanon (2004, 2008) had in mind when he proposed the idea of racializing as the opposite process of humanizing, in this case equating the lives of humans and the tragedy surrounding the families and communities with the most popular sandwich in Germany.[3]

Thus, these political and racial events influenced the positioning of the issue in the DIK's agenda. This is clearly the case as Islamic organizations represented in the DIK pushed for the inclusion of the topic since 2007, and it was not until 2011 that the issue was addressed.

In this chapter I attend to the conceptual tensions and the political consequences of the DIK's lexicon, contending that although "Muslim anti Semitism", "Islamism", and "hostility against Muslims" were presented as issues concurrently polarizing German society, the DIK prioritized solving the first two, while handing back to Muslims the responsibility of the hostility they suffered since it is deemed a reaction to Muslim problems, i.e., Muslim violence fuels the hostility of the German society towards Muslims. Furthermore, I also argue about the ideological effects of locating anti-Semitism primarily on Muslim subjects.

5.2   A Polarized Society: "Muslim anti-Semitism", "Islamism", and "Hostility against Muslims"

Social polarization grammatically overlaps with the discourse on integration and thus with the biopolitical rationality of defending the society by preventive means. Polarization, as a physics metaphor, translates into the realm of the social to highlight a division between two contrasting socio-cultural groups. Metaphorically, polarization emphasizes the existence of two poles distancing themselves from each other through stark opposition. Translated into the DIK's discursive field, the two poles represent, on the one hand, Germany and Germans, and on the other hand, Islam and Muslims.

Germany's social polarization thus refers to the German social field experiencing a process in which these two poles diverge from each other, breaking apart the German social fabric. However, the topic "hostility against Muslims"

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3 For an account of the process and the NSU, see: (Gensing, 2012; Röpke & Speit, 2013; Schmincke & Siri, 2013).

disrupts the metaphor because it introduces another pole in the social field whereby Germany and Germans are relocated from one extreme pole to the moderate center, setting up new poles: on the one hand, anti-Semitic and "Islamist" Muslims; on the other hand, those hostile to Muslims, German society, and the DIK occupying the middle group.

Additionally, social polarization conceptually includes its remedy, namely, bringing the opposite poles together towards the moderate center. Integration works as the vehicle whereby the Muslim pole can move to the moderate center by adding German qualities to the Muslim subject. Thus, it is through "acculturation" and adjustment that the Muslim subject can leave the extreme pole. Integration implies that one of the poles needs to resemble the center; it needs to mimic its habits, mindsets, and practices. In contrast, a lacuna surrounds the other pole, those hostile to Muslims. Neither a concrete subject nor a solution to bring back the pole to the center appears, and the DIK's integration focuses solely on Muslims.

The grouping of the three phenomena under social polarization suggests a relation between them since they represent problems that create a meta-problem. As I discuss, on the one hand, the DIK explains the "hostility against Muslims" as caused by the majority societal rejection towards Muslims, i.e., Muslims are not recognized as part of German society (DIK 2011e, 2). On the other hand, the DIK describes "Muslim anti-Semitism" as the outcome of Muslim frustration caused by the lack of recognition and self-victimization leading to aggression re-directed at Jews. This argumentation suggests that the solution to one pole's problem can influence the other. Yet, the causality is unclear or might lead to a vicious circle. The recognition of Muslims would diminish their aggression thus detrimentally influencing their anti-Semitism; however, "Muslim anti-Semitism" and "Islamism" fuel the idea of the Muslim enemy hence obstructing the recognition of Muslims. Moreover, the discursive strategy of grouping together the different phenomena produces an additive effect, in which each phenomenon by itself but even more so in combination threaten to destroy the German nation from within.

The first concept discussed in the report was *Muslimfeindlichkeit*, which can be loosely translated as "hostility against Muslims". The discussion of this notion acknowledges that people in Germany feel rejected due to their real—or sometimes imputed—belonging to Islam, ranging from verbal discrimination to assaults, which mostly occur at schools and the working place (DIK, 2011e, 2).

Subsequently, the working group highlighted the necessity to find a meta-concept able to capture the phenomenon's range and intensity, thereby allowing the state's intervention. The group presented, evaluated, and finally

selected one concept "hostility against Muslims" from the different options considered: Islamophobia, hostility against Islam (*Islamfeindlichkeit*), racism against Muslims (*anti-muslimischen Rassismus*), resentment against Muslims (*anti-muslimischen Ressentiment*), and hate against Muslims (*anti-muslimischer Hass*) (DIK, 2011e, 3–5).

The working group agreed that "hostility against Muslims" was an appropriate choice for several reasons. First, it does not allude to the interpretation of religion such as the concepts Islamophobia and *Islamfeindlichkeit*, in which the German secular state has no legal influence (DIK, 2011e, 3), that is to say, the German state cannot interfere with assessments about what visions of Islam are true and which are not. In other words, one can be hostile towards a religion but not against its followers.[4] Removed from the conceptual level, the distinction between Islam and Muslims often collapses because the hostility can target religion, followers, and perceived followers alike, and disparaging Islam can be intentionally used as a way to attack Muslims (Asad, 2013; Said, 1997; Sayyid, 2010; Vakil, 2010).

Second, the suitability of the concept "hostility against Muslims" also refers to its intensity. Racism and hate are too strong and inflammatory, whereas resentment is too weak. Thus, *Muslimfeidlichkeit* turned out to be the appropriate concept since it positions people and not religion as the object of hostility, and because it allows the intervention of the secular rule of the law and the state, which is compelled to fight these attitudes (DIK, 2011e, 3–4).

The working group further elaborated why "hostility against Muslims" constitutes a better concept than racism. They recognized the analytical advantages of racism in particular because it refers to social relations between humans and not to religion, but also because it is situated within the genuine tasks of the secular state—its obligation to prevent every form of racism (DIK, 2011e, 3). However, the concept also has disadvantages, racism is too incendiary and its usage would "result in hopelessly polarizing the public debate" (DIK, 2011e, 4).

Furthermore, since racism might be subjected to criminal penalties, the notion should be used carefully, "Racist stigmatization must not be encouraged but must be rejected (and in extreme cases, if necessary, be subject to criminal penalties). Precisely for this reason therefore, the term 'racism' must not be used in an excessive manner under any circumstances" (DIK, 2011e, 5). Moreover, the use of racism would leave unaddressed the degree of the phenomenon and can hurt sensibilities; thus, the use of racism "would also be

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4 "[T]he working group agreed that criticism of Islam, as of any religion, i.e., a criticism of the religion itself, is acceptable in a free society and if necessary should be understood as a call for discussion" (DIK, 2011e, 5).

inappropriate in this case. Many people, who perhaps feel a vague uneasiness about Muslims, would surely consider it unjust if they were considered to be almost racist from the outset" (DIK, 2011e, 4). In other words, the DIK refrains from using the term racism due to the expected reactions of an imagined audience. Hence, the issue does not only involve social justice but also the sensibilities not of those touched by racism, but of the majority society who feel uneasy towards Muslims.

One might ask first about the concern that such language would lead to the "hopeless polarization of the public debate", but why should that be a worry of the working group when the alleged aim is to thwart the "hostility against Muslims"? Why should the public debate (which is not polarized but tends to be hegemonic about representing Muslims as problems) cause distress when Muslims and those perceived as such not only face symbolic and physical violence, but also concrete exclusionary practices? (Hernández Aguilar, 2017b).

Second, concerning the vague uneasiness about Muslims, the statement implies that such a feeling, although vague, is against Muslims simply because they are Muslims or deemed as Muslims. Therefore, a negative feeling about an imputed essence—being Muslim—exists. The working group admitted that people's feeling of being rejected by the majority society is caused by "their (actual or *sometimes merely assumed*) affiliation with the Muslim religion" (DIK, 2011e, 2 [emphasis added]). Thus, the rejection can be caused either by being Muslim or by being perceive as such. However, does not being perceived as Muslims—despite not being one—involve the reading of those subjects and their bodies in a particular way? Are not those bodies read through bodily and cultural racial stereotypes that allow the hostile subject to spot them, or put more precisely, to construct them in her or his imaginary as Muslims? Are not those readings anchored in negative perceptions about Muslims that prompt their rejection? Moreover, racism refers not only to the intensity of the rejection, but also to the rejection itself. Moreover, as with the working group's concern about the public debate, the group's wording suggests that not hurting the sensibilities of the people who feel unease about Muslims is as important as the sensibilities of those affected by the "uneasiness".

Another problem with the working group's discussion concerns the language to describe the phenomenon, which tends to diminish the issue. The first paragraph states, "People in Germany sometimes feel rejected by the majority society" (DIK, 2011e, 2). First, the hostility refers to occasional feelings, the adverb "sometimes" working as attenuation, and second, rejection is described as a feeling, a perceived emotional state, experienced from time to time.

Moreover, further aspects can be criticized. Firstly, the disregard of two concepts widely discussed and well established in academic and political contexts,

i.e., Islamophobia and racism. The concepts provide a prolific and wide frame whereby it is possible to understand not just the current stereotyping, discrimination, and violence against Muslims, but also their historical development, the different sources that inform them and the intensity, which was a concern of the working group. Furthermore, Islamophobia does not attempt to establish which vision of Islam is right or wrong as the group suggested.

Following Ann L. Stoler's (2011) notion of colonial aphasia, the DIK's reluctance to term the hostility as racism can be seen as a racial aphasia, namely, as the linkage between the unwillingness to talk about and recognize racism, a lack of vocabulary to discuss the issue, and the impossibility of linking historical forms of racism with the present. The prevailing racial aphasia in Germany was also central in reconfiguring the German imagined community as open, democratic, liberal, and somehow free from racism. The mythical denazification process and the zero hour as events worked as historical dispositifs whereby German society could reimagine itself exempt from the racial anti-Semitic terror of the past (Gimbel, 1960; Räthzel, 2006; Räthzel, 1991).

Annita Kalpaka & Nora Räthzel (1986) already at the end of the 1980's made a strong case against the notion of "hostility against foreigners" (*Ausländerfeindlichkeit*) as a euphemism for not addressing racism insofar as the latter was incompatible with the definition of the German state, a process that ideologically created a veil upon everyday and structural racism in the German society. Kalpaka & Räthzel argued that *Ausländerfeindlichkeit* rehearsed ethnocentrism and reproduced racism. Interestingly, the DIK also considered the adequacy of the notion "hostility against Muslims" due to its resemblance with *Ausländerfeindlichkeit* (DIK, 2011e, 4). Thus, the DIK's concept "hostility against Muslims" works in a similar fashion, it acknowledges while at the same time diminishing the issue by locating it exclusively in the sphere of feelings and by depicting it as occasional, allowing simultaneously a rehearsal of ethnocentrism. However, racism is first and foremost a political issue, involving the state and the relations it establishes with subjects, which also has emotional consequences.

In this sense, the second problem with "hostility against Muslims" as a concept is that it renders invisible the effects of the DIK and the state in the reproduction of the phenomena, by positioning the secular state as the agent that can prevent and intervene in overcoming the hostility. This issue obscures the state's role in the reproduction of the hostility by circulating and reifying the construal of Muslims as problematic subjects, and by constantly iterating the alleged problems and threats that they represent. This is in addition to the specific methods of surveillance targeting Muslims, and laws such as the banning of headscarves in some federal states that affect Muslim women in particular.

Considering only the DIK, the mere existence of this institution is based on the problematization of Muslims and Islam, which resorts, circulates, and reifies racial, sexual, and Orientalist tropes having as an effect the circulation of the moral panic about the inherently conflictive nature of Muslims and the troublesome contact between cultures. Moreover, the DIK has been central in the circulation of the links between Islam, danger, Muslims and the terrorist threat, and as Leerom Medovoi (2012) pointed out the iteration linking Islam with terrorism circulates the image of the Muslim subject as the nation's enemy.

Additionally, the DIK's commitment condemning the "hostility against Muslims" can be seen as a nonperformative speech act (Ahmed, 2006, 2012), which refers to statements made by institutions either about or on their behalf, and through which the institution presents itself, its character, its values, and courses of action (Ahmed, 2006, 104). However, this does not mean that the speech act does what it says, although it is often read in such a way. An utterance's nonperformativity is not equal to its failure; in fact, the act succeeds when it does not do what it says.[5]

Among the effects of institutional nonperformative speech acts are the creation of institutional fictive images, and the reading of those utterances as performative. For example, claiming that one is engaging in an anti-racist practice does not mean that anti-racist practices will ensue immediately, but reading the statement as if these anti-racist practices have begun can create a veil covering factual racist practices.

The DIK's commitment denouncing hostility against Muslims can be seen as a nonperformative, especially in comparison with the other two commitments from this institution against social polarization, "Muslim anti-Semitism", and "Islamism". Regarding the subject of the action, there is a clear distinction between the two cases. Whereas for "Muslim anti-Semitism" and "Islamism" the DIK openly delineates the perpetrator of these acts, namely, Muslim male youths, for the "hostility against Muslims" the subject is ambiguously defined: the majority society.

The DIK locates the "occasional" feeling of rejection experienced by Muslims as caused by the majority society, i.e., Germans "sometimes" reject Muslims and perceived ones. The logical extension of this is the admission that German society rejects Muslims. The first effect of this admission is to imply that the DIK by recognizing the rejection of the German society positions itself and the

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5   "Such speech acts do not do what they say: they do not, as it were, commit a person, organization, or state to an action. Instead, they are nonperformatives. They are speech acts that read as if they are performatives, and this 'reading' generates its own effects" (Ahmed, 2006, 104).

German state as free from these actions and as active workers against it. The DIK places the responsibility for the phenomenon on society while absolving themselves, the agency in charge of Muslims in Germany, of any responsibility. Thus, it erases how the uneasiness (racism) has been central in the DIK's crafting and the discourses it circulates about Muslims, if this is not the case, one wonders, why was the DIK institutionalized in the first place, "the speech act, in its performance, is taken up as having shown that the institution has overcome what it is that the speech act admits to" (Ahmed, 2006, 108). Then, the institution can be praised for showing its willingness to combat the rejection, but because of the absence of a concrete subject and the addressing of German society in general, a strategy is neither planned nor deployed.

The nonperformativity of this commitment also refers to the plan of action drawn up to tackle the phenomena of social polarization. In the report about the three issues, the working group developed a concrete strategy to prevent "Muslim anti-Semitism" (see below) and the plan for "Islamism" had already been drafted, while the working group failed to come up with a plan for the issue of "hostility against Muslims".[6]

One more problem about how the DIK addressed hostility against Muslims concerns its position under the umbrella of social polarization. "Hostility against Muslims" constitutes one issue within the tridimensional notion, and the work of the DIK aims at preventing these phenomena from causing the disintegration of German society. The grouping, I suggest, functions as a "conditional acceptance", to borrow again Frank Peter's (2010) phrase. It acknowledges—while minimizing—the "hostility against Muslims" thus simultaneously implying the solution of the other issues, and here I am not saying that the other two topics should not be addressed, but that the grouping suggests a condition. This conditioning has been explicitly formulated at the DIK's plenum. De Maizière stated the following in regard to how the acceptance of Muslims by the majority society can be achieved:

> By rejecting Islamists distorted images, Muslims have a special power of persuasion in their personal environment as well as in the public discussion. Because of the special position they are in, they also have an obligation to get involved. It is fair for society to expect this and also right that we to expect this of society, and I demand this kind of engagement. ... Such open, visible and engaged debate and a clear marginalization of

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6   Though, in 2012 the DIK organized a conference bringing together different scholars focusing of the topic of "hostility against Muslims". The results were published by the DIK in 2012 (DIK, 2012b).

> Islamism is, in my view, the necessary basis for a better acceptance of Islam in society at large. To take responsibility for our system of values is the best contribution we can make to integration.
>
> MAIZIÈRE DE, 2010, 4 [author's translation]

Here, De Maizière links the acceptance of Islam in Germany to the exclusion of "Islamist" extremist tendencies. Accordingly, Muslim responsibility to Germany's system of values represents the best contribution to integration. Thus, de Maizière conditions the acceptance of Islam on the requirement that Muslims accept the responsibility to exclude "Islamist" tendencies from their communities. "Hostility against Muslims" is caused by feelings of rejection and the majority society's uneasiness towards them. Being accepted involves no longer feeling rejected, yet it also requires the fulfillment of some conditions: Muslims defending the system of values, Muslims taking responsibility, and the exclusion of "Islamist" tendencies. It follows that if Muslims fight against "Islamism"—one dimension of social polarization—they will be accepted by the majority society; consequently, Muslim engagement against "Islamism" is a first step towards being recognized. De Maiziére posits a condition for the acceptance of Islam, and this acceptance, following the working group, would diminish—the already diminished—feeling of rejection that Muslims occasionally perceive.[7]

Whereas in the section about "hostility against Muslims" the main purpose was the search for a definition, in the section about anti-Semitism the emphasis was on explaining the factors that produce this phenomenon among Muslims. The working group stated that anti-Semitism and hatred of Israel are not problems restricted to Muslims since they are also present in the majority society and non-Muslim migrant groups, yet anti-Semitic attitudes "are currently to be found amongst Muslim youth and young adults comparatively more often than in the overall population in Germany" (DIK, 2011e, 5). Thus, in a first step, the study conflates anti-Semitism with the hatred of Israel, and highlights its prominence among Muslims.

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7 Likewise, Maria Böhmer conditioned the fight against "hostility against Muslims"—Islamophobia in her speech—on the fight against forced marriages, "Forced marriages are a tragedy not only for the victims, likewise they promote the Islamophobia that is, even today, a continual source of discussion" (Böhmer, 2010, 1). Following her reasoning, forced marriages fuel Islamophobia, and the solution of the former would alleviate the latter. As the notion of social polarization implies, by grouping Islamophobia or "hostility against Muslims" with other phenomena such as forced marriages, "Islamist" terrorism, and Muslim anti-Semitism, the DIK conditions solving the problem by emphasizing the problems that Muslims themselves represent.

Following Iman Attia (2007, 15), over the last years Muslims have been blamed as the anti-Semitic subjects *par excellence* in Germany, and according to Matti Bunzl (2007) all over Europe. Furthermore, Attia (2007, 14–15) pointed out that the imputation of anti-Semitism to Muslims works in three directions. Firstly, it allows the self-definition and presentation of Germany and Germans as enlightened as they are not anti-Semitic, which, secondly, blocks the possibilities of critiquing anti-Semitic attitudes in the German population, and finally, it posits Germans as the protectors of Jews against "Muslim anti-Semitism".

The DIK's report briefly breaks with the first and second consequences pointed out by Attia (2007), as it acknowledges that anti-Semitism is not an exclusive attitude of Muslims. Yet, in a subsequent discursive step, the report relocates anti-Semitism within Muslims and partially cleans anti-Semitism from German society by highlight the lower relative frequency of anti-Semitism in the German population when compared to the level among Muslims, which according to the working group, is more frequent. The working group did not provide sources or figures to support this claim.

Bunzl (2007) argued that it is possible to distinguish between an "old" and "new" anti-Semitism by situating these ideologies of exclusion within the different projects in which they have been framed. While the old anti-Semitism—from the 19th and 20th century—aimed at the exclusion of Jews from the European national bodies, the new one, which refers to anti-Semitic incidents perpetrated by Muslims, does not seek the creation of a racially pure nation through the expulsion or death of Jews.[8] The difference between the

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8   The debate about "new" and "old" manifestations of anti-Semitism is itself a complex and highly debated issue that goes beyond the limits of the present study. In the following pages, I am only addressing how the imputation of anti-Semitism is used to position Muslims as the anti-Semitic subjects in Germany. In other words, I cannot delve historically, politically, and conceptually into the question if an attack against a Jew by a Muslim is by itself an expression of old or new anti-Semitism, or merely anti-Semitism; although I am inclined to accept the latter. However, I consider anti-Semitism to be a form of racism that is neither homogeneous nor strictly immutable. I understand racism as a polyvalent and flexible bricolage, susceptible to changes, transmutations, continuities, and constant re-articulations, and anti-Semitism can be approached as such. For instance, regarding the case of anti-Semitism and Islamphobia in France, Paul Silverstein (2010) traces the complex contexts, tensions, and ambivalences in contemporary attacks on Jews, taking into account the differential French colonial legislation upon Jews, Muslims, and Beurs; the war of independence of Algeria and the French reactions to it; urban segregation; and the widespread occurrence of violence against immigrants and Muslims; as well as processes of resistance and the emergence of different organizations. In short, there are several dimensions, historical processes, and

"old" and "new" anti-Semitism is that "while the former sought to exclude Jews from the nation-states of Europe, the latter targets Jews precisely because of their Europeanness" (Bunzl, 2007, 27).

Although, I agree with Brian Klug's (in: Bunzl, 2007, 59) argument to Bunzl, "I suspect that the story that need to be told about the perception of 'young Muslims' who target 'Jews' is more complex. It needs to be adjusted according to national—even local—context", and I argue that analyzing racisms as polyvalent and flexible discourses can help to unlock the impasse about newness and oldness, I use Bunzl's distinction between "new" and "old" anti-Semitism only because the DIK approaches anti-Semitism as a homogenous and historically constant phenomenon, while imputing "old" anti-Semitism to Muslims.

In the 2011 report, the working group stated that one of the defining features of anti-Semitism is its anti-modernism, a recurrent theme of the 19th and 20th century anti-Semitism, and that contemporary Muslims reproduce this ideology,

> [A]nti-modernism and its function as an ideology of community belong to the major and universal elements of anti-Semitism in its modern forms. These variants arose in Europe almost contemporaneously with the rise of nation states in the 19th century ... Anti-modern positions and the idea of a society to which Jews are apparently opposed are also the core motives of anti-Semitic attitudes amongst Muslims.
>
> DIK, 2011e, 5

The working group's definition of anti-modernism and ideology of community as universal dimensions of anti-Semitism refers to the crafting of European nation states, in which racism against Jews was posited as the key for the creation

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entangled stories attuned to national narratives influencing anti-Semitism. For an argument about the new anti-Semitism and its link with Islamophobia see (Bunzl, 2007), and for a discussion against the "new" anti-Semitism thesis in the German context see (Brumlik, 2011; Globisch, 2008), and the excellent essay of Brian Klug (2012). Michel Wieviorka et al. (2007) and Étienne Balibar (1991) also discussed the idea of "newness" and continuities in contemporary anti-Semitism. The edited volume by Wolfram Stender et al. (2010) provides a comprehensive overview of anti-Semitism in Germany, as well as the UEA (2011), and Wolfgang Benz (2008). Juliane Wetzel (2014) recently published a study about anti-Semitism among Muslims in Germany. For an extraordinary deconstructive reading of the figure of the Jew and the Muslim as Europe's enemies, see: (Anidjar, 2003, 2008; Massad, 2015). For an account of the role of anti-Semitism and its interplay with other ideologies in setting the basis for the irruption of the Nazi regime see (Mosse, 1981, 2000), and for a wider analysis of anti-Semitism and racism see, for instance: (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sandford, 1950; Bauman, 2000).

of a racially pure national imagined community. This anti-Semitism is imputed to contemporary Muslims. However, as Bunzl argued, this is probably not the rationality behind the attacks targeting Jews by Muslims in contemporary Europe. The present research cannot offer an explanation about what drives these kinds of attacks. Yet, the point to highlight concerns the improbability that these attacks are driven by the attempt to form a closed racial Muslim nation state in Germany, or are motivated by a desire to strike out against modernity. In this sense, the accusation of "Muslim anti-Semitism" also works within the parameters of the DIK's racial time politics insofar as it clings to, and reproduces the construal characterizing Muslims as archaic and pre-modern subjects possessing an innate sense of violence.

The next paragraph in the report states that Islam is not the direct source of anti-Semitism among Muslims of Arabic or Turkish background (although it can be used to legitimize anti-Semitic positions). Rather, the Middle East conflict and the foreign media play an important role in the dissemination and reproduction of anti-Semitic stereotypes and anti-Israel positions among Muslim youth, even when these young people do not have any direct contact with the Middle East conflict, a point which has been revealed as flawed since young Muslims tend to consume German media primarily (Özyürek, 2016).[9]

Afterwards, the working group explained the psychological and social factors producing anti-Semitic feelings and attitudes among Muslims. The lack of recognition by the society plays a key role among youth and adults who themselves feel weak and thus seek to feel stronger by denouncing Jews. Accordingly, Muslims self-positioning as victims provides the basis for the development of anti-Semitic and anti-Israel feelings:

> Young adults and youth who perceive themselves as being weak in their everyday lives feel stronger by denouncing and putting down other people (in this case the Jews). In the final analysis, sometimes a self-biased victim perspective explains and excuses one's own situation and absolves one from one's own responsibility. "The Jews" can then always fulfill the role of scapegoat if there is already a tradition of latent and openly anti-Semitic stereotypes.
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> DIK, 2011e, 6

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9 "In mobilizing and reproducing generalized anti-Israel positions (in contrast to legitimate criticism of Israel) that also provide connecting points for anti-Semitic stereotypes, the Middle East conflict plays an important role amongst Muslims much more often. Foreign media are important multipliers in this regard. Anger against and hatred of 'the Jews' or the state of Israel also exists amongst Muslim youth who have little direct involvement with the conflict in the Middle East" (DIK, 2011e, 6).

The explanation of anti-Semitism thus refers to a sort of retaliation on the part of Muslims related to their own biased perception of weakness, and anti-Semitism emerges as a vehicle for Muslims to feel stronger. This explanation is itself weak, not only because it does not provide sources about how this conclusion was reached, but mostly because from the very beginning it minimizes anti-Semitism by explaining it as a revenge attitude embedded in feelings of frustration and not as a political and historical racial program. The move is surprising, especially because the working group's discussion began by linking anti-Semitism with the rise of the European nation states and claimed the Middle East conflict plays a role in the circulation of anti-Semitism thus linking political dimensions to the issue. However, when it refers to the particularities of "Muslim anti-Semitism", this contextualization vanishes and then a psychological explanation, resembling displacement (Freud, 1991) and mortido (Federn, 1952) replaces the more complex account.

Muslim frustration as the source of anti-Semitism is also problematic. Not only does it establish a simple causal relation between self-victimization and aggression, thereby erasing socio-political and historical causes and wider international conflicts, but it also resorts to the Orientalist trope of the sexually repressed violent "oriental" who displaces his sexual frustration in the form of violence (Ewing, 2008; Massad, 2008). Nevertheless, in an interesting and unexpected shift after explaining the dimensions and causes of "Muslim anti-Semitism", the study stated that, "according to scientific evidence, having a steadfast anti-Semitic world view is somewhat rare among Muslim youth" (DIK, 2011e, 6).[10]

Previously, the report stated that anti-Semitism appears more often among Muslim adults and youths in comparison to the German population and here the report argues that anti-Semitism among Muslim youth is rare. Following this to its logical conclusion, anti-Semitism within the German population would be less than rare, i.e., marginal or almost nonexistent. According to the MLG study (2009d), Muslims represent 5 percent of the German population, in this 5 percent, anti-Semitism is more frequent in comparison with the remaining 95 percent; yet in the Muslim 5 percent anti-Semitism is rare. Thus, anti-Semitism, following this argument, will be almost nonexistent in the other 95 percent of the German society. Despite the report's statement about "Muslim

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10   In the following year, 2012, the working group arrived at the same conclusion, "In addition, 'Anti-Semitism in Germany', a report which was published in November 2011 by the Independent Expert Group on Anti-Semitism confirmed that to date there was no reliable scientific evidence for the actual dissemination of anti-Semitic stereotypes amongst Muslims" (DIK, 2012d, 6).

anti-Semitism" being rare and not widespread, the group proposed a series of interventions to prevent it.

> [S]upporting media literacy; analysis of the Middle East conflict from various angles; a critical and general analysis of community ideologies i.e. thinking in terms of "us" and "them"; addressing Muslim youth in a religious manner. Religion can also help to dismantle concepts of the enemy and to open doors to a tolerant concept of the world and its people; creating a balance in the pedagogical encounter between the necessary recognition of young people and clear boundaries/confrontation to anti-Semitic and other positions that disparage people; the corresponding continuing and further education of teachers and youth leaders.
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> DIK, 2011e, 6

In the previous section about "hostility against Muslims", I pointed out the nonperformative character of this commitment in relation to the lack of a plan of action to thwart the phenomena. I also highlighted that the other dimensions of social polarization, here anti-Semitism, were addressed with a concrete set of measures and interventions to tackle the problem—recognized by the working group as rare—in a specific group. Whereas for fighting anti-Semitism, the DIK developed a plan and identified a group to work with, for the "hostility against Muslims" neither a plan nor a concrete subject appeared.

Moreover, the prevention strategies aimed to curb "Muslim anti-Semitism" illuminate the DIK's governmental approach. The institution emerges as the guide helping Muslims to overcome the rare anti-Semitism by addressing the Muslim youth as a single and homogenous sub-population. The recommendations rely on a pedagogical approach involving the transfer of knowledge to Muslims, e.g., addressing community ideology through the reflection of the terms "us" and "them", which also informs the DIK and its procedures.

The working group also turns Islamic religion into a productive asset whereby pedagogues can address Muslim youth's anti-Semitism. Hence, religion becomes a vehicle to guide the conducts of Muslims in a tolerant manner and away from enemy's conceptualizations. Yet, through its emphasis on security, terrorism, and "Muslim anti-Semitism", the DIK circulates conceptualizations of the Muslim enemy.

Furthermore, since the lack of recognition leads to frustration, and self-victimization in Muslims, which afterwards is channeled into anti-Semitism, the working group advocates balancing recognition by setting up clear boundaries that exclude anti-Semitic expressions and attitudes. In addition, the working group recommends educating teachers and youth leaders, guided by the idea that both positions can help Muslims in this regard.

Finally, the working group discussed the proper term to denote the phenomena, and here there was not deliberation about what sensibilities might get hurt. The group simply presented the options: "Muslim anti-Semitism" (*muslimischer Antisemitismus*), "Islamized anti-Semitism" (*islamisierter Antisemitismus*)*,* and, "anti-Semitism in the migration society" (*Antisemitismus in der Migrationsgesellschaft*) all of them deflecting anti-Semitism from German society into Muslims and migrants. Then the group decided to work with the concept "anti-Semitism among Muslim youth" (*Antisemitismus unter muslimischen Jugendlichen*), since the "German Islam Conference is looking at the topic of anti-Semitism with the aim of launching projects and initiatives that take specific causes into account to prevent anti-Semitism amongst Muslim youth" (DIK, 2011e, 7).

When addressing two of three phenomena falling into social polarization, the DIK deploys two different strategies. Whereas in discussing "hostility against Muslims" they exercise great caution to not polarize the public debate and hurt the sensibilities of people who are uneasy towards Muslims, the deliberations on how to address "Muslim anti-Semitism" omit these concerns and directly state the subject of intervention without taking any sensibilities that the people being addressed may have into account even after acknowledging the rareness of the phenomenon.

Underlying the imputation of anti-Semitism to Muslims runs the presupposition that this form of racism constitutes a component of the Other's identity, the Muslim. As Attia (2007, 15) and Bunzl (2007) pointed out, criticizing the accusation is not tantamount with the negation or disavowal of anti-Semitic tendencies, attitudes, and actions among some Muslims. Rather, the problem lies in the interpretation and explanation of the phenomenon and its political effects. Firstly, the imputation of anti-Semitism to Muslims reifies a racial representation of them as a homogenous group of frustrated individuals, in which the anti-Semitic expressions of a few stand for the views of the whole, legitimizing the DIK's wide pedagogical intervention. Although stating that Islam is not a factor, the addressing of Muslims as anti-Semitic implicitly promotes the idea of the anti-Semitic Muslim as the enemy of Jew (see: Anidjar, 2003).

Secondly, and in relation to the previous point, the positive self-representation of Germany as less anti-Semitic in comparison with Muslims emerges, and partially washes away anti-Semitism in German society. As I discuss below, the figures provided by the study of the Independent Group of Experts on Anti-Semitism (*Unabhängigen-Expertenkreises-Antisemitismus*) (UEA, 2011), commissioned by the Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble, contradict these

claims. They argue that the only place anti-Semitism is rising and spreading in Germany is in the extreme right-wing scene. Therefore, as Attia (2007, 18) argued, the denunciation of "Muslim anti-Semitism" serves to discredit Muslims, while obscuring anti-Semitic attitudes spreading throughout the society at the same time positioning Germans and the German state as the protectors of Jews against Muslims.

The study of the UEA provides a more nuanced approach to the topic of anti-Semitism among Muslims. The UEA acknowledged that before 2001 the concept "Muslim" was not commonly used in public debates. Instead, "ethnic" or national terms such as the Arab or the Turk circulated to describe the "foreigner". After that year the collective tag "Muslim" began to be used to suggest the unity and uniformity of Islam and Muslims, conflating different categories and promoting processes of cultural stereotyping (UEA, 2011, 79). The research group stressed that the common usage of the notion tends to erase a series of internal difference collapsing in this diverse population into a homogenous group, a line of reasoning that—as I have argued—is present in the DIK.

The authors suggested that the beginning of the second Intifada in 2000, and the escalation of the Middle East conflict were mobilizing factors in the renewal of anti-Semitic attitudes (UEA, 2011, 79), which also influenced Muslims living in Europe, yet, anti-Semitism in the Middle East results from the complex historical entanglement of European history and its contact with that region. Moreover, the situation concerning anti-Semitism worsened after the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing "War on Terror" due to the fact that some discussions tried to explain "Islamic" terrorism as caused by the Israeli occupation and the pro-Israel stance of the US. This background provided the basis for the entanglement of anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism whereby a valid critique of the state of Israel was used to legitimize anti-Semitic dispositions.

Before addressing "Muslim anti-Semitism", the authors went through an exhaustive exposition to contextualize the sociopolitical dimensions that can help to explain this particular brand of anti-Semitism and to illustrate its complexity by highlighting the problems around the category Muslim, and the sociopolitical and historical context in which these acts unfold. Then, the authors stated that at present there are no reliable scientific data about the spread of anti-Semitism stereotypes in Muslims and persons with "migration background" (UEA, 2011, 79–80).

Finally, they analyzed the only data available concerning anti-Semitic attacks recorded by the Federal Office of Criminality (*Landeskriminalämter*), which also documented the perpetrator's political motivation: left, right, foreigner, and other. Thus, being a foreigner is considered by itself as a political

motive, regardless of the "foreigner's" political views. The data showed that right-wing extremists mostly commit anti-Semitic attacks in Germany. Some assaults were indeed perpetrated by foreigners, but the fuzziness of this last category makes it impossible to draw any conclusion about "Muslim anti-Semitism". However, the increase in the frequency of attacks can be neatly correlated with the different moments of escalation in the Middle East conflict (UEA, 2011, 80),

I pointed out the different interpretations of the DIK's working group and the UEA. On the one hand, the DIK's group stated that anti-Semitism is rare and not widespread among Muslims. On the other hand, the study argued about the lack of data that can prove the spread of anti-Semitism among Muslims. Between the two statements resides an important difference. Although one diminishes the phenomenon, it still claims its existence, while the other, based on the study's analysis, states the insufficiency of information to back up such a claim. One position allows intervention, the other does not deny it but calls for more analysis and research.

I argued before about the DIK's problem in the framing of the problems allegedly represented by Muslims based on cultural generalizations. This produces several effects: Firstly, it produces the racial characterization of Muslims as the DIK's report portrays them as the enemies or the potential enemies of Jews, simultaneously, creating social polarization in Germany. Secondly, it establishes power relations and sites of intervention; here, the DIK emerges as the guide of Muslims in the impeding of their frustration. Thirdly, the DIK's focus on Muslims tends to create a veil that obscures phenomenon crisscrossing all of society, and the figures of the UEA are a case and point in this regard. The most salient anti-Semitism in Germany is not perpetrated by Muslims but by the right-wing scene, yet the insistence of focusing on Muslims blocks the possibility of addressing anti-Semitism regardless of faith, nationality, age, or political orientation. The same DIK report stated that anti-Semitism is to be found in adults and young Muslims; however, the prevention's strategies are aimed exclusively at Muslim youth.

The final concept in the cluster of social polarization refers to "Islamism" or religious grounded extremism among Muslims. While the working group acknowledged that this phenomenon is not circumscribed to a particular religion, they only focused on "Islamic" grounded extremism stating the need for a concept able to identify practices attempting to disrupt the constitutional order (DIK, 2011e, 7). Additionally, the group indicated the relevance of drawing a line between Islam as a religion and its usage as a political-extreme ideology, "whose aim it is to replace the whole national and social system with a

totalitarian system based on this special understanding of Islam" (DIK, 2011e, 7). Subsequently, the group defined "Islamist" ideology as:

> [T]he absolute, religiously legitimized claim to power made by its fol-
> lowers. According to their understanding of unity between the religious
> and political sphere (*"al islam din wa daula"*), the teachings of Islam offer
> answers to all the questions posed by private and public life and should
> therefore also determine the whole social and state order. Islamic law
> (sharia) is seen as the central source of legislation.
>
> DIK, 2011e, 7

Then, the working group considered the compatibility of some components of Shari'ah with the German constitutional system, in particular the right guaranteed by the Basic Law concerning religious freedom. Yet, some interpretations of Shari'ah are completely incompatible with the constitution, so the task of the working group was to examine which interpretations are compatible and which are not. As an ideology, the working group further argued "Islamism" does not always incite violence, but a strand of it, the "legalist" school, may in the long term pursue the substitution of the social and legal order of Germany with a totalitarian regime through legal means (DIK, 2011e, 8). Hence, at least two different kinds of "Islamist" ideology exist: one seeking to supplant the German order via violence, and the other by means of legal procedures in a long process of overturning power relations.

Following Werner Schiffauer (2006, 98–99), the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) conceptualizes "Islamism" using three subcategories. The first, subcategory A, refers to groups who threaten the global order by means of terrorist attacks, and embrace a holy-jihadist-war. Subcategory B concerns groups seeking to change their countries of origin by violent means and who came to Germany as political refugees. Subcategory C denotes organizations in Germany, "'which fight for Islamist positions in the context of the social life of the Federal Republic or at least try to establish spaces for organized Islamist engagement'" (Schiffauer, 2006, 98). Subcategory C is problematic in terms of the classification insofar as the organizations grouped in it have pledged loyalty to the German nation and have rejected violence as a vehicle to pursue their aims. However, the BfV's representatives suggest that these organizations "resort to 'subtle means' in order to pursue their basic aim, that is to establish a state in which Islam is the dominant religion and where freedom of religion and freedom of expression are abolished" (Schiffauer, 2006, 98). In other words, these organizations work undercover and through legal means

aim to establish an "Islamist" state. Subcategory C and the DIK's description of legalist "Islamist" resemble some of the tropes of anti-Semitism, which aligns with Said's (1978, 285–286) idea about the transfer of racial stereotypes from Jews towards Muslims after the end of the Second World War.[11]

Previously, I mentioned Medovoi's (2012) notion of dogma-line racism as the historical process of making races out of religions. One of the characteristics of this racism refers to the idea that the racial Other can pass undetected; she or he is able to conceal herself or himself and the racial distinction is anchored in a mental state (Medovoi, 2012, 45–46). This rationale was central to the Nazi propaganda against the Jews. What made the Jew threatening was that albeit detectable due to some phenotypes, she or he could also disguise, "becoming the perfectly camouflaged enemy within" (Medovoi, 2012, 47), infiltrating into different spheres of life and once there pushed towards domination. As Medovoi (2012) argued, this kind of reasoning has been consistent in the racialization of religions. Due to this, dogma-line racism tends to move within the political categories of the friend and the enemy (see also: Anidjar, 2003).

Conspiracy theories about Islamic domination have seen a rise after the 9/11, chiefly through the trope of the silent Islamization (Shooman & Spielhaus, 2010, 206) or via the so-called project Eurabia, a term coined by Bat Ye'Or, which supposedly refers to a plan between European and Arabic governments to Islamize Europe. As several scholars have argued (Bangstad, 2013; Carr, 2006; Fekete, 2011), these racist narratives have spread widely and influenced extreme far right movements, individuals, and political parties.

In Germany, the plot for Muslim domination found its way in Sarrazin's nightmares of Muslim domination through higher birthrates, but it also carved out a prolific niche on the Internet. Yasemin Shooman & Riem Spielhaus (2010) analyzed one of the most successful (in terms of visitors and reach) anti-Muslim websites, *Political Incorrect*, which precisely disseminates conspiracy theories about Muslim domination of Germany through the alleged Muslim control of the media, or via the infiltration of Muslims in public offices and the government. Shooman & Spielhaus (2010) also noted the resemblance of these argumentations with anti-Semitic tropes: the aim of global

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11   Writing about the discursive genealogy of the figure of the Semite, and the political-theological transitions in which the Semite was both Jew and Muslim, to later be decoupled, Edward W. Said (1978, 278) argued that the aftermath of the Second World War witnessed a smoothly "transference of a popular anti-Semitic animus from a Jewish to an Arab target … since the figure was exactly the same", that is to say, the Semite (see also: Anidjar 2003, 2008).

domination, infiltration in politics, the control of the media, and the issue of concealment.[12]

Against this background, the legalist "Islamist" groups mentioned by the DIK's report resemble the prototypical conspiratorial Muslim groups intending to infiltrate and use the German legal system to slowly impose their worldview. A significant difference exists between anti-Muslim websites and the DIK, yet there is a common point concerning the assumption and circulation of the deceitful "Islamist" enemy threatening the German nation. And as Schiffauer (2006) argued, this conceptualization works as a moral panic and has direct consequences in institutions such as the BfV and the naturalization of Muslims. Furthermore, it fuels and circulates the idea of the Muslim enemy coded in self-enclosed categorizations of "we" versus "they".

Returning to the DIK's report, after distinguishing between the different ways in which "Islamists" work, i.e., by violent or legal means, the working group sought to apply this distinction to the analysis of some examples of "Islamist" ideology in Germany, particularly Salafism and traditionalism (DIK, 2011e, 8).

Salafism represents an example of "Islamist" fundamentalism working throughout the distinction between violent and legal means, "Salafist can be found in both non-political and political guises, and recently in terrorist guises, too" (DIK, 2011e, 8), and its "followers strive with an activist approach to penetrate society and it is organized against a free democratic system" (DIK, 2011e, 8). Penetration refers to the trope of Muslim infiltration and concealment from society, and once within, Salafists would seek to overturn the German social order by implanting "Islamist" rule.[13]

In contrast to Salafism, traditionalism does not represent an "Islamist" ideology because traditionalists do not attempt to replace the state or claim its power, and they respect the German constitution. Traditionalists are those Muslims "that adhere to an interpretation of Islamic standards established for centuries" (DIK, 2011e, 8). In other words, these Muslims have been living

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12   "The conspiracy fantasy of silent Islamization, meaning the secretly conducted subversion of Western societies by Muslims, bears a structural resemblance to anti-Semitic motifs" (Shooman & Spielhaus, 2010, 220).

13   Europol defined Salafism as a religious movement with several varieties, i.e., there is not only one form of Salafism, thus "Salafism is first and foremost a religious movement Salafist communities may have certain theological preferences in common, but they can have widely different, often diametrically opposing, political agendas, ranging from quietist religious propagation to participation in armed struggle. The strand of salafism that legitimizes violent action under the concept of 'jihad' is sometimes called salafiyya jihadiyya" (EUROPOL, 2014, 21).

the same religiosity for centuries. At work in this section is the Manichean game pointed out by Mamdani (2005) distinguishing between the "good" and "bad" Muslims. The loyalty to the state establishes the parameter performing the distinction, and yet both descriptions entail a negative representation of Muslims: on the one hand, Salafists as violent tricksters; on the other hand, traditionalists as prisoners of archaic time.

Finally, the working group discussed the term to denote the phenomenon, stating that from the state's point of view "Islamism" constitutes the norm to describe this ideology. The notion is helpful because it makes a distinction between Islam as a religion and "Islamism" as an ideology. The working group suggested that Muslims should adopt this distinction, "This could also be advantageous to Muslims themselves if used [these terms] differently" (DIK, 2011e, 9). However, the group remarked that the term "Islamism" "is particularly controversial amongst Muslims and is fiercely rejected by some of them" (DIK, 2011e, 9) because the distinction between "Islamism" and Islam, the one praised by the group, is often ignored in public discourse. Moreover, some Muslim representatives in the DIK argued that "the term connects the term 'Islam'—contrary to their own understanding of religion—with extremism and violence" (DIK, 2011e, 9). Hence, the Islamic organizations rejected the notion "Islamism" and instead proposed the term "religious extremism among Muslims".

However, as the title of the report's section perfectly illustrates—Islamism/religious extremism amongst Muslims—the DIK only partially addressed the concerns of the Islamic organizations. The term proposed by them was added to the one useful from the state's point of view. However, the problems with the notion "Islamism" raised by Islamic organizations were ignored because the DIK still employed "Islamism" in this and other documents of the conference (DIK, 2008c, 2009b, 2009c, 2012d). Schiffauer (2006, 99) referring to the case of the BfV, also criticized this approach to "Islamism", accordingly:

> The distinction between real Islam ("religion") and "Islamism" ("ideology") is drawn primarily by German politics and the Verfassungsschutz. Muslim authorities are hardly referred to when making this distinction … The self-confidence with which German politicians and intellectuals judge what is or is not Islamic is one of the debate's most striking features.

From the DIK's partial addressing of the Islamic organization's concerns emerges the nonperformativity of the DIK's commitment to fight the hostility against Muslims. I argued about how the group decided not to use the notion of racism because it was too inflammatory and it might hurt the sensibilities of those who feel unease towards Muslims. But those fragile sensibilities were

imagined; it was a supposition of the working group, but one strong enough to demand the search for another term. On the topic of "Islamism", the real concerns of Islamic organizations were not taken completely into account: the group added the term proposed by the organizations, but at the same time it did not abandon the term reflecting the state's point of view, which the Islamic organizations considered inappropriate since it links Islam with violence. This is one of those few moments of dissent documented in the DIK's publications, in which the Muslims represented in this agency advanced a criticism about a concept, which in their view was problematic for the reasons mentioned above, and the DIK still kept using the term.

Regarding the nonperformativity of the DIK's commitment to fight the "hostility against Muslims", I mentioned the inexistent of a concrete hostile subject whereas in "Muslim anti-Semitism" and "Islamism" the subject emerges clearly. In addition, while there was no plan of action in the report regarding "hostility against Muslims", the group developed one to prevent "Muslim anti-Semitism".

The DIK had already advanced the plan of action against "Islamism" during its first phase, pushing for the enhancement of transparency in Islamic organizations and mosques, the development of trust and cooperation, the training of imams, and the institutionalization of the CLS (DIK, 2008b, 2008c, 2009c). Thus, the DIK addresses differently the three phenomena conforming social polarization, prioritizing "anti-Semitism among Muslims" and "Islamism" through a concrete plan of action and identified subjects of intervention.

In the chapters comprising this part, I exposed integration as the DIK's central strategy to reform Muslims and Islam in Germany. Integration represents the axis of different power technologies and political projects: first, it is a strategy to transform the social, emotional, and private existence of Muslims; second, it is a way to regulate and control the politicization of Islamic organizations, Muslims and Islam; third, it seeks to solve the alleged cultural problems caused by Muslims; fourth, it enables to condition certain rights to Muslims, and their legal and symbolic incorporation into the national imagined community; and finally, it allows the reification and circulation of hermetic ideas concerning national identity, and their corollary; that is, the production of foreign subjects and their exclusion. These are the DIK's politics of the present, what is needed to do now in order to change the past and secure the future.

PART 3

Projecting Germanness into the Future—Tolerance and Imams

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Introduction to Part 3

The discourse of tolerance carries and establishes asymmetrical power relations between the one who tolerates and the one that is tolerated, and tolerance has occupied a central position in the structure and values of the DIK, serving not only as a normative frame for key political objectives such as those of integration and dialogue but also as a major tool for building a better future. Tolerance has been conceptualized as the engine for harmony and social conviviality in Germany among different cultures and religions and as an instrument to prevent social polarization and the radicalization of Muslims. Likewise, tolerance has been deployed by the DIK to mark the limits of accepted behaviors, particularly violence against Muslim women, and as a value inscribed in the DIK and the German identity. Thus, at least two complementary sides of tolerance appear in the context of the DIK.

The first refers to a passive or soft version of tolerance, in which its meanings refer to a benign strategy—personal and institutional—to enhance social life in Germany. Here, tolerance and integration are intertwined, integration being a formula to inculcate a sense of tolerance in Muslims or tolerance being the first step towards integration. Then, tolerance should be rehearsed and practiced in the private and public life of citizens.

The second dimension concerns the tolerance's threshold. Here, its usage is against the undesirable, something that threatens the social body, something that Germans or Germany cannot accept under any circumstances, and therefore, the state but also individuals should fight (by any means available) against it. Tolerance erupts as a cry for restricting or banning particular cultural, religious or social practices dissonant or incompatible with the German social order, ranging from "Islamic" fundamentalism to domestic violence in the Muslim household.

According to Wendy Brown (2008, 2), the 1980s represented the historical period in which tolerance talk became prominent in the context of migration from the Global South to Western countries and the conceptualization of liberal societies as multicultural. Against this background, tolerance appeared as a norm coupled with integration politics, simultaneously conceptualized as a strategy to cope with and regulate the multiplicity of cultures, religions, sexualities, and races in one national frame, and as the adequate measure to solve the problems irrupting from multiculturalism.

In Germany, the proliferation of tolerance talk also emerged powerfully around the decade of the 1980s linked with the imperative of integration, in particular after the end of recruitment of "guest workers" in 1973 and the rise

of Helmut Kohl (CDU) as chancellor in 1982, who initiated a program to encourage migrants to leave the country, to restrict family reunification and the right to asylum, and for those who stay made it imperative that they integrate into German society. Kohl also made an appeal to German society to tolerate the migrants who decided to settle in the country. In his renewal politics speech in 1982, Kohl declared the following, "A large number of people having another mentality, culture, and religion living together with the Germans represent a major challenge for us all, state and society, foreigners and Germans. It requires patience, tolerance, realism, as well as humanity" (Kohl, 1982, 15).

Thus, the birth of integration as a political program of the German state was joined with the promulgation of tolerance talk. From this point onwards, both tolerance and integration will function as discourses carrying a conceptualization of Germany as a homogenous social body, while ontologically asserting and fixing the difference of those subjects constructed as non-German, and to be tolerated in the meantime until their eventual integration.

Another point noted by Brown (2008) refers to the use of secularism in tolerance talk to mark subjects and groups defined in religious or cultural terms. This discursive tactic works in two directions. Firstly, by fusing either religion or culture with identity, it positions subjects as essentially intolerant and subscribes them for tolerance training, as pursued by the DIK, a strategy that is attached to the representation of secular normativity as the preeminent site of tolerance. Secondly, it imputes secularism and tolerance to the dominant identity, which is, in contrast never defined by culture or religion. However, in the case of Germany, there is a twist in this discursive strand, linking German identity and tradition with Christianity and Judaism; though, these religions are quickly associated with enlightenment, secularism, liberal democracy, and tolerance.

Since its very foundation, representatives of the DIK inscribed tolerance in the institution and the German self, drawing an uninterrupted historical line spanning from the Prussian dynasty until today. The DIK's inaugural meeting took place at the Orangerie of the Charlottenburg palace in Berlin. This location served precisely to highlight the great tolerance of the Prussian dynasty while voicing the concerns of the German government regarding the problematic coexistence between Muslims and Germans:

> We should take seriously all these concerns [the headscarf, the training of imams, the terrorist threat, etc.] and we take them seriously ... Therefore, I opened yesterday in the Orangerie of the Charlottenburg palace the German Islam Conference as the first institutional dialogue between the German state and the Muslims living in Germany. The Charlottenburg

> palace—that also should be said—built at the end of the 17th century reminds of the great tolerance of the Prussian dynasty [Interruption by Steffen Reiche: and the citizens!] yes, the citizens, but also the dynasty, and it was a good place to open this dialogue.
>
> SCHÄUBLE IN: DIK, 2009b, 12–13 [author's translation]

Wolfgang Schäuble appropriates the assumed modern tolerance of the Prussian dynasty to frame the DIK as a tolerant institution and to insinuate tolerance as a German character. In other words, Schäuble's discourse subtly and simultaneously inscribes tolerance in Germany's history and within the DIK. Though, Schäuble acknowledges only one side of the toleration politics of the Prussian dynasty concealing how tolerance served to support the status quo of the Protestants and the exclusion of Jews (Forst, 2013).

The nostalgia about the tolerant Prussian monarchy has the effect of suggesting a long trajectory of German tolerant politics, a historical narrative of toleration progress. These historical linkages and usages represent strategically selective readings insofar as they highlight only the "positive" outcomes of tolerance and obscure "intolerant politics", not only concerning the National Socialist era, but also of the Prussian dynasty and current politics.

The longing for Prussia's tolerance likewise portrays a better past and positions the preceding Prussian times as an exemplary epoch to be reproduced in the present in order to build the future to come. Despite being conceived of as an outcome of the German past, tolerance does not carry any negative meanings, in effect, it serves to underscore the superior values of the German past and the need to keep enhancing it in the present. Contrary to the Muslim past, deemed as problematic and atavistic, the German past symbolized in tolerance was already modern and enlightened, by means of this, the German past is rendered contemporary and crucial to avoid a catastrophic future of intolerance between cultures. In this sense, the DIK's discourse of tolerance exemplifies an operation of racial discourses pointed out by Ann L. Stoler (2016, 256), namely, racism's capacity to "recuperate and invent past legacies that provided utopian visions of the future ... in the spirit and language of a new and improved social order".

Thus, the DIK's foundation inscribes tolerance as a value of the institution by drawing selective examples from a past whereby tolerance allowed the coexistence of people with different religions. One might argue about other parallels between the Prussian dynasty's tolerant politics and the DIK. Both concealed the work of power and the underlying hierarchies between tolerant and to-be-tolerated subjects. In different ways, both deployments aimed at the regulation of a sector of the population, defined exclusively by religiosity,

and carried a deep sense of difference. Yet, these remembrances are more than just nostalgias. In a governmental institution designed to deal with Muslims, they became historicist artifacts—national myths—crafting dislocated narratives of the past, present, and future of Germany. The inscription of tolerance in a temporally distant monarchy and its iteration allows the re-imagining of the German self, erasing intolerant politics and projecting intolerance onto the Other. Thus, prefiguring the future necessitates the remembering of the past, albeit, a sanitized version of the past.

The Tolerant Future

> There is no validity to the notion that progress for women can be achieved only by abandoning the ways of a native androcentric culture in favor of those of another culture. It was never argued, for instance, even by the most ardent nineteenth century feminists, that European women could liberate themselves from the oppressiveness of Victorian dress (designed to compel the female figure to the ideal of frailty and helplessness by means of suffocating, rib-cracking stays, it must surely rank among the most constrictive fashions of relatively recent times) only by adopting the dress of some other culture. Nor has it even been argued, whether in Mary Wollstonecraft's day, when European women had no rights, or in our own day and even by the most radical feminists, that because male domination and injustice to women have existed throughout the West's recorded history, the only recourse for Western women is to abandon Western cultures and find themselves some other culture. *The idea seems absurd*, and yet this is *routinely* how the matter of improving the status of women is posed with respect to women in Arab and other non-Western societies.
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> LEILA AHMED, Women and Gender in Islam, 244 (emphasis added)

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6.1   The Tolerant Germans

As exposed by Wendy Brown (2008), tolerance represents a modality of governmentality seeking the regulation of "ethnic", sexual, and racial relations at the domestic level, while being supplemented by a discourse at a supranational level in which the West is conceptualized as the beacon of civilization and tolerance, "marking nonliberal societies and practices as candidates for an intolerable barbarism" (Brown, 2008, 6). The West discursively epitomizes tolerance and freedom, while the rest—borrowing Stuart Hall's (1992) phrase—represents the exact opposite, an imagined geography marked by intolerant regimes, cultures, religions, and individuals. Additionally, after the 9/11 attacks and the following "War on Terror", radical Islam became the quintessence of intolerance and the uncivilized in general.

As a modality of governmentality, tolerance positions racially character-ized subjects, cultures, religions, and sexual orientations as innately tolerant if they are identified with hegemonic positions, as to be tolerated, when they are deemed as "deviant" or "abnormal", or as intolerant per se if their culture or religion ontologically fixes intolerant behaviors in subjects. Thus, the discourse on tolerance continually produces subject formations, e.g., the tolerant, and reproduces the Other in a bifurcated manner as the object of tolerance and as the intolerant subject.

Following Michel Foucault, Brown (2008) argued that tolerance as a gov-ernmental technique relies more on tactics than laws, or uses the laws as tac-tics. One of its features entails arranging guidelines of conduct, institutions, and social relations based on extralegal commitments to achieve that subjects govern themselves and govern others in reference to a norm. The discourse of tolerance represents a pristine example of governmentality's functioning since it is not anchored in a particular law or constitution. Thus tolerance cannot be implemented by an appeal to the law. Yet, tolerance operates within a frame-work of norms in which the notion is surrounded by meanings that through mirroring games attach positive values to the concept and negative ones to its opposite, intolerance. Hence, tolerance arranges itself discursively as a guid-ing norm orienting the self-government of conducts and the government of others.

As a political discourse that produces subject formations marked by power, that is, subject positions in asymmetrical hierarchies (Derrida, 2003), tolerance borrows, circulates, deploys, and reifies racial historicist distinctions whereby the anchoring of these subject formations takes place. An enlightened, civi-lized, tolerant, racially superior subject emerges in contraposition to its nega-tive double, a benighted, uncivilized, intolerant, and racially inferior Other.[1]

However, as a racially informed governmentality, tolerance implies the pos-sibility of racial uplifting for those intolerant Others. The DIK positions itself within the spectrum opened by this possibility. On the one hand, the DIK as a tolerant institution aims at teaching tolerance to Muslims through integra-tion. On the other hand, the work of tolerance within the DIK consists of marking Muslims as potentially intolerant and then subjecting them to state

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1   "Tolerance is first of all a form of charity. A Christian charity, therefore, even if Jews and Mus-lims might seem to appropriate this language as well. Tolerance is always on the side of the 'reason of the strongest', where 'might is right'; it is a supplementary mark of sovereignty, the good face of sovereignty, which says to the other from its elevated position, I am letting you be, you are not insufferable, I am leaving you a place in my home, but do not forget that this is my home" (Derrida 2003, 127).

intervention, discipline, and surveillance. Both strategies complement each other, racializing Muslims and conditioning their enfranchisement in the nation, while creating legitimacy for the work of DIK.[2]

In the context of the DIK every summoning of tolerance carries a profound sense of difference. Thus, tolerance became a central dimension in redefining the German social body as homogenous; insofar tolerance designates a common ground as a shared value. Therefore, tolerance became a value shared by Germans regardless of political affiliations, their views on Islam, social class, or age, and this is one of the first depoliticizing effects of the notion. It discursively erases internal differences to redefine and imagine a self-enclosed national community while emphasizing its positive values.

Tolerance, then, functions as a marker of identity reaffirming what is truly German and what is not. The soft side of tolerance works within the productive side of power, manufacturing positive definitions of the national identity and the German self, and marking subjects out of those parameters as selectable for tolerance training.

6.2   Ten Muslims Teaching Tolerance to the Muslim Community

The discourse of tolerance deeply entangles with the narrative about gender injustice and inequality in Muslim milieus. Following Schirin Amir-Moazami (2011a), contemporary depictions of Muslim gender roles represent them as deviant from normality, but not necessarily against the law, and are strongly linked with the discourse on tolerance as a dispositive of normalization and discipline. Thus, tolerance can be deployed to align conducts with the norm without requiring laws to be enforced. Yet, three exceptions of alleged gendered

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2 Frank Peter (2010) analyzed the appearance of the DIK as a modality of tolerant governmentality whereby the German government recognizes the presence of Muslims in the country, while emphasizing their difference and conditioning their acceptance—by means of normalization and disciplining—into German society. In other words, tolerance "designates the conditional acceptance of Muslims by the dominant majority" (Peter, 2010, 119), by the confluences of two processes: first the official recognition of Islam as a part of the country, and second via the undertaking of reshaping the subjectivities of those constructed as Muslims, by addressing "Muslims as not-yet-perfected Germans and situates them in a specifically German moral landscape" (Peter, 2010, 134). Peter however did not explore what rationale underpins and legitimizes the call for reshaping Muslim subjectivities, which in my analysis is racism and its polyvalent intertwining with time, gender, and history. It is by means of the complex racial representation and characterization of Muslims that they can be deemed, and addressed as not-yet-perfected Germans.

Muslim conducts require the intervention of the law: "honor killings", domestic violence, and forced marriages.

The problems around Muslim gender roles, so the argument goes, fall into two categories: (a) those attitudes and behaviors deviating from the norm, but are not prosecutable under the law, such as the restriction of Muslim parents allegedly place on their daughters by not allowing them to take part in mixed swimming lessons and school trips, or the dissimilar rates of employment between Muslim men and women wearing headscarves; and (b) forced marriages, "honor killings", and domestic violence constitute criminal offenses and thus, as the DIK stated (DIK, 2012c), these should not be tolerated.[3]

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3 According to Saba Mahmood (2008, 96), "'Honor Killing' is generally understood to be an 'Islamic practice' in which women suspected of engaging in illicit sexual behavior are murdered by male family members. This practice might be compared to acts of man-on-woman homicide common to many Western societies". Mahmood, for instance, analyzed the statistics about both kind of homicides in Pakistan and the US to argue, "…despite the parallel statistics, discussions of 'honor killings' are seldom analyzed within a comparative context. Instead, most discussion construct 'honor killing' as symptomatic of 'Islamic culture' … while acts of man-on-woman homicide in the United States are presented as acts either of individualized pathology or excessive passion. In this logic American men are represented as acting out of jealousy (a 'natural' emotion) against their sexual rivals (albeit swept away by its force), while Muslims men are understood to be compelled by 'their culture' irrationally and blindly acting out its misogynist customs and traditions. An individualized account of domestic violence in the West is secured, in other words, against a tautological account of Islamic culture" (Mahmood 2008, 96.). A study published in 2011 by the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law (Oberwittler & Kasselt, 2011) about "honor killings" in Germany illustrates the point raised by Mahmood for the German case and the trouble to impute cultural motives to an issue that should be politically and legally addressed. The study analyzed all cases of "honor killings" in Germany from 1995 to 2006 (interestingly, it seems there were no "honor killings" before this date). The authors acknowledge the problems about the definition of "honor killings", including that these can be seen as homicides involving the partner; still they presented two different forms of killing. On the one hand, "homicides bordering on partner killings … when the wife or partner's desire for independence, separation, or sexual infidelity (actual or suspected) results in a violent reaction of the (ex-) husband or partner" (Oberwittler & Kasselt, 2011, 2). In the study this homicide is termed—albeit with quotation marks—as the "normal", alas, the normal homicide (Oberwittler & Kasselt, 2011, 3–4). On the other hand, "honor killings" are defined as "the killing of a girl or young woman by their blood relatives to restore collective family honor" (Oberwittler & Kasselt, 2011, 1), then the authors elaborate the causes of "honor killings", "On the basis of anthropological and sociological research, honor killings can be understood as an extreme result of the combination of patriarchal dominance over women and their sexuality, rigid behavioral norms, and the importance of honor for social relations in economically and *socially backward*, agrarian *tribal societies*. The causes of honor killings can be best seen in the

Regarding gender inequality in Muslim communities, the DIK in its second phase produced two texts particularly addressing the issue. In the interim reports of the first phase, gender inequality was only mentioned as one of the problems that the DIK in cooperation with the Muslim side will address. Therefore, during the first years of the DIK's existence, the narrative on gender was merely a nonperformative speech act (Ahmed, 2012), an institutional commitment whereby the DIK presented itself—and Germany—as embodying these values, but not resulting in concrete plans or actions to solve the issue. Yet, the DIK's commitment to gender equality did perform in two directions. First, it was read as if the DIK was addressing the issue, based on the presumption that gender equality in German society has been achieved and that eventually, with the guidance of the DIK, Muslim communities will catch up and aligned their gender regimes with those of the German society. This narrative appeared explicitly in the DIK's report from 2013 (see below). Positioning gender equality and justice as already achieved in German society has its own effects, not only for Muslim women, but also for all women in general, for if it has already been achieved then "German society … does not intend to engage any longer in substantial discussions about gender inequality within dominant structures" (Spielhaus, 2012, 101).

The second nonperformative performance resulting from the mentioning but not addressing of gender inequality refers to its functioning as a means to stigmatize Muslim communities as gender unequal, and as different from

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combination of structural conditions that are found in the most affected societies of the Near and Middle East. Honor killings in Germany occur in immigrant families who *have brought with them* these tenacious patriarchal and collective norms of conduct. Without the specific cultural background, these homicides are simply inexplicable. Challenges and deprivations that relate to migration can at most be considered an aggravating factor in the genesis of honor killings" (Oberwittler & Kasselt, 2011, 2 [emphasis added]). At the end, the study found out that its classification was not as clear-cut as the initial categories suggested, "The paramount motives in partner conflicts are separation or the (alleged) sexual infidelity of the victim or indirect victim, in accordance with the main motives of 'normal' partner homicides. With regard to psychological problems and the violent tendencies of the perpetrator, partner conflicts show similarities with 'normal' partner homicide; at the same time, they display little evidence of a lack of cultural assimilation. This confirms our assumption that there is a blurred transition zone between honor killings and 'normal' partner homicide" (Oberwittler & Kasselt, 2011, 3). I cannot delve at length into the categorical problems of the report because it escapes the scope of this research, yet the point to underscore is that violence against women is particularly codified in cultural (Orientalist) terms, and this has its own effects, as Mahmood argued, it renders "normal" the violence perpetrated by the male Western subject, and it blocks the possibility to address these issue beyond culturalist explanations that racially characterizes particular Muslim subjects.

those who have already achieved equality between men and women, that is, German society. The interplay between these two dimensions stabilizes the representation of two sealed-off groups with two different gender regimes, one more just and equal than the other.

From the DIK's foundation until the appearance of the first text addressing gender inequality, six years past. The first text, issued in 2012, was the declaration *No Tolerance of Domestic Violence and Forced Marriages* (DIK, 2012c [hereafter NT]). The second was published the next year, the guidelines entitled *Gender Roles between Tradition and Modernity* (DIK, 2013 [hereafter GzTM]). The two texts inextricably link gender equality with tolerance in a bifurcated yet complementary form. The declaration anchors in the threshold of tolerance in its proactive side expressing the limits of tolerated behaviors pertaining to gender issues, while the report GzTM reproduces the soft side of tolerance, as a benign strategy to be taught to Muslims enabling a peaceful coexistence. Thus, as Brown (2008) argued, the discourse on tolerance emerges as a means to regulate the Other instead of addressing problems permeating all of society, and in this case, tolerance talk further introduces a distinction marked by power and Orientalist representations between those who teach tolerance and those who have to learn and interiorize it.

The declaration NT was the outcome of the plenary meeting of 2012, whose central topic was gender equality. However, in that meeting the topic of Salafism in Germany surfaced prominently for two reasons. First, the campaign to distribute exemplars of the Qur'an by some Salafist groups occurred just previous to the meeting and captured the attention of the media, politicians, and the DIK. Second, in this phase, an emphasis on national security and prevention work tended to dictate the agenda of the DIK overshadowing other topics such as gender inequality.

In the plenary session that led to the declaration, the Integration Minister of Lower Saxony, Aygül Özkan, gave a talk on the topic. She clarified that her address on the issue was as a legal expert and minister and had the goal to advance two interpretations of the Qur'an. First, "According to mainstream interpretation it can be noticed that God does not apply directly to the woman, but [speaks] always through the man—as a kind of mediator—to the woman", and second, "But this is nothing unusual for a religious text, which addressed a society of late antiquity—as was the Arabian peninsula in the 6th century" (Özkan, 2012 [author's translation]).

Özkan explains that the Qur'an as a sacred text is unchangeable, yet this does not preclude misinterpretations by those who read it. Then, the alleged solution to Islamic troubles is to engage Muslims as active readers while rendering

the Qur'an a passive text (Asad, 1993). For Özkan thus the key is how to read the Qur'an in order to enhance a peaceful coexistence. Özkan's statements also shed light on the DIK's reformist approach: she suggests that although the Qur'an is imprinted with unequal roles for men and women, this is related to the time in which the book was written, and that the problem resides in how the book is interpreted. Nevertheless, as Arun Kundani (2014) argued, the only difference between the reformist and the culturalist approaches resides in the explanation. The central premise remains untouched, that is to say, the source of the troubles is still the Muslim community, thus it follows that the call for intervention on how Muslims read and interpret the Qur'an. Intervening in their subjectivities surfaces as the key to solve, in this case, the problems about gender inequality.

Özkan's position furthermore illustrates the textual attitude of Orientalism analyzed by Edward W. Said (1978, 93), as the assumption positing that everything Muslims do and think can be understood with reference to what the Qur'an established. In doing so, Özkan's argument also presupposes a reader trapped in time, reproducing the same practices and ideas that were common to a society of late antiquity. And this is precisely one of the effects of the orientalist discourses, it reduces the complexity of human life—for instance, disregarding more than a millennium of Islamic theological discussions, schools of interpretation, different Islamic denominations, national traditions and so on—to a easily consumable representation, in which Muslims and Islam appear as constant and unchangeable in time and history.[4]

Later in her speech, Özkan calls for the support of the Islamic organizations represented in the DIK concerning two topics: "1. To delegitimize violence, 2. and to explain to the population that these kinds of crimes cannot be legitimized with the Holy scripture, instead they are outlawed by Muslims" (Özkan, 2012 [author's translation]).

Özkan's talk provided the context for the text NT, in which the DIK did not point out Islam as the source of gender inequality. Against the background of Özcan's speech, it can be inferred that the NT was the outcome of an initiative put on the table by the representatives of the government and endorsed by the Islamic organizations. The declaration NT delves specifically into forced marriages and domestic violence, which are defined as violations of fundamental rights:

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4 "A verse from the Koran would be considered the best evidence of an ineradicable Muslim sensuality. Orientalism assumed and unchanging Orient, absolutely different (the reasons change from epoch to epoch) from the West" (Said, 1978, 96).

> Every individual regardless of sex, religion, ideology, age, disability or eth-
> nic origin is entitled to physical and mental integrity and has the right
> to decide freely and within the framework of applicable law whether to
> marry or not. Unfortunately, even today these universal human rights are
> often ignored. There are still cases of women and men forced into mar-
> riage or affected by violence or threats in their families—also in Germany,
> where forced marriage and bodily injury constitute criminal offences.
>
> DIK, 2012C, 1

The declaration NT also states that forced marriages and domestic violence are
not the outcome of any religion, but rather caused by patriarchal structures,
since the declaration is very brief (one page) there is neither an explanation
about what creates them, what their origins are, nor who upholds these patri-
archal structures. Like Özkan's speech, the DIK's approach to forced marriages
and domestic violence remains within a reformist interpretation. The declara-
tion clearly expresses that religion—Islam—is not the source of these acts,
which also leads to an absence, i.e. the subject who commits these acts disap-
peared from the declaration. In this sense, Özkan's speech as the background
and context of the declaration filters forced marriages and domestic violence
as problems of the Muslim community, not because these are established by
Islam but rather on account of how Islam is interpreted. For these reasons, the
assistance of the organizations is required since they will be able to convey the
message that Islam does not provide the basis for violence. The organizations
can help to reform the misconception within a population that commits these
acts. Therefore, the DIK addresses the organizations as key vehicles whereby
governmental and biopolitical aims can be pursued—here the organizations
are approached as central actors in the fight against forced marriages and do-
mestic violence within Muslim communities.

Afterwards, the declaration states that the Muslims represented in the DIK
affirmed that Islam opposes any kind of violence including these two dimen-
sions (DIK, 2012C, 1). Once the position of the Muslim side was made, the DIK
called for these phenomena to not be tolerated, "beyond the already existing
punishability of the offence and to condemn violence". This should involve ac-
tors in civil society, who can assist in two directions: firstly, they can "help pre-
vent such acts through awareness-raising and other appropriate measures, also
with public support" (DIK, 2012C, 1), and secondly, through support networks:

> [S]trengthen those concerned—mainly by informing them about their
> rights and possibilities of support and intervention, by jointly developing
> strategies to cope with this problem and by motivating and strengthening

> the victims' initiative and their capacity to help themselves and take ac-
> tion against forced marriage and/or domestic violence.
>
> DIK, 2012C, 1

The declaration was seen as an important step for the Islamic organizations and as a significant outcome of the DIK. In the press conference after the plenary meeting, the Minister of the Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich praised the declaration as a important message in which Muslims from different backgrounds for the first time and together with state representatives took a stance against "forced marriages" and domestic violence (Friedrich in: BAMF, 2012b).

Friedrich's praise for the declaration can be seen as a nonperformative speech act, that is to say, the declaration does not do what it says but rather performs in other directions. Thus, the NT is praised and read as if the fight against these issues will follow despite the fact that no concrete plan, guidelines, or solutions were offered to thwart these issues. Instead the document is merely a call for civil society actors to raise awareness and disseminate knowledge. In contrast, as I argued, previously and that same year, the DIK elaborated a detailed plan, launched a new national summit, created a nationwide campaign, and crafted two new institutions to fight against social polarization, extremism, and radicalization. In addition to this, the NT did perform by designating the Muslim community as the site in which these phenomena occur.

Gökçe Yurdakul & Anna C. Korteweg (2014, 210) argued that Friedrich's position on the issues is symptomatic of the German government approach towards gender equality for Muslims. First, highlighting a lack of definition about what gender equality consists of. Second, by fusing violence and gender inequality, Friedrich used gender equality to stigmatize Muslims, and finally, this declaration and the ensuing discussion barely provide a basis to address the issue pragmatically.[5]

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5 The Federal Ministry for Family affairs, Senior citizens, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ) published in 2004 a report about violence against women in Germany entitled, *Health, Well-Being and Personal Safety of Women in Germany* (BMFSFJ, 2004). The survey highlighted that 37 percent of the women living in the country have experience at least one form of attack or physical violence, 40 percent "have experienced either physical or sexual abuse or both", 58 percent have suffered from some form of sexual harassment, and 42 percent have suffered psychological violence (BMFSFJ, 2004, 9). That is to say, "approximately every second or third woman in Germany has experienced physical violence and approximately every seventh woman sexual violence, at the hands of persons known or unknown" (BMFSFJ, 2004, 10). The study measured separately violence against women from Turkey and East-Europe finding that the rates of violence against them are higher, whereas for the entire population the percentage of women who suffered physical and sexual value was 40 percent, for Turkish

In 2013, the DIK published a report concerning gender roles and expectations in Muslim communities, the GzTM. In it, tolerance appears prominently as a metanarrative to foster the equality between Muslim men and women. The issues of forced marriages and domestic violence are concealed throughout the report, in other words, these topics are not directly mentioned. Instead, the DIK highlighted the opposite: arrangements in Muslim couples in which freedom and emancipation are the central themes. Accordingly, the GzTM aims to promote tolerance for a variety of gender roles:

> With this manual, the members of the German Islam Conference want to encourage Muslim men and women to debate different role models— be they externally prescribed role model which Muslims have chosen to adopt and/or ones they have chosen themselves. The aim is to promote tolerance for diversity, and when needed to encourage Muslims to change their own behavior; to align with different gender role models.
>
> DIK, 2013, 9 [author's translation]

These gender role models represent different biographical extracts of Muslim men and women. The report presents them as a way to teach tolerance to Muslims, departing from the assumption of a lack or weak tolerance in the Muslim-self regarding "different" gender roles, thereby softly imputing to Muslims a degree of intolerance regarding different arrangements between men and women.

The GzTM is divided into four sections. The first refers to the constitutional frame whereby men and women can relate in German society, representing the use of the law as the frame of guidance for Muslim conducts (DIK, 2013, A.1–A.4). The second section concerns ten biographical portraits of Muslim men and

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women the figure was 49 percent and for Eastern European women 44 percent (BMFSFJ, 2004, 27). Furthermore, the percentage of Turkish women suffering from psychological violence by unknown persons and derived from xenophobia or racism was the highest in comparison with other groups, "Thus, 61 percent of immigrants from Turkey, 54 percent East-European immigrants, but far fewer women from the predominantly German population of the main representative study, only 26 percent, reported violent acts by little-known or unknown persons in public areas. 54 percent Turkish, 46 percent East European, and only 26 percent German interviewees gave replies mentioning prejudicial or negative treatment due to gender, age or country of origin" (BMFSFJ, 2004, 28). The point to highlight about this figures is that violence against women is a problem permeating German society, and that as Yurdakul & Korteweg (2013, 205) argued, an intersectional approach that takes into account the interplay of gender violence with other categories of exclusion such as racism against Muslims can be a more useful approach that might enable alliances instead of blocking them by producing two different groups with two different forms of violence.

women, touching on the personal and intimate life of Muslims: partnership, children's upbringing, division of labor between men and women inside and outside the household, marriage, divorce, etc. (DIK, 2013, B.1–B.35). This section represents the DIK's pedagogical approach, teaching through role models. The third section offers different suggestions regarding potential conflicts within Muslim milieus involving gender roles, problems in schools, and child rearing (DIK, 2013, C.1–C.54). Here again, a governmental guide about the best way to reshape Muslim attitudes and behaviors is presented. The last section explores what can be established from reading the Qur'an regarding Muslim gender roles (DIK, 2013, D.1–D.19). This last section was compiled with the aid of Islamic organizations' representatives. The input of the organizations is crucial because the neutrality of the state prohibits any kind of interference regarding religious interpretations. Briefly, the DIK implements exemplary education, role modeling, and lecturing as pedagogical tactics to reform and reshape the dimensions of the Muslim-self deemed as gender unjust.

The title and cover of the report "Gender Roles, between Tradition and Modernity" (Figure 6.1) is symptomatic of its whole approach, positing the idea that Muslims, in particular the young ones, are torn between two different historical gendered expectations. One represented by tradition—and atavism—embodied in their parents' and grandparents' culture, and the other symbolized by modernity, tacitly denoting the German gender order. The GzTM weighs both sides of the balance—tradition versus modernity. As it can be expected, it aims at guiding Muslims to select the modern set of gender roles, and the rationality of the guidance presupposes that they have to choose them and govern themselves accordingly. The cover furthermore connotatively illustrates the transition from tradition towards modernity in each one of the genders; the degrees of shadings becoming stronger, for instance, from the woman donning a hijab to one "unveiled".

Racial historicism provides the rationality for the DIK's discursive distinction between tradition and modernity and their imputation to archetypical subject formations, the Muslim and the German accordingly. Departing from the idea that the racialized Other lacks historical development, racial historicism entails the possibility of reshaping whereby the racial Other can catch up. The study GzTM aims at guiding Muslims in their quest for modernity and helps them to abandon tradition. Then again, and in line with the DIK's rationale, the GzTM appears as a discursive device whereby two different and hierarchically arranged temporalities are produced. Temporalities producing Muslims as subjects of the past vis-à-vis modern Germans, and here the interlocking of gender with time and race underpins the distinction.

In this sense, racism overlaps with time and then both are folded into a set of guidelines to reform Muslim subjectivities in relation to gender inequality.

FIGURE 6.1   *Gender roles, between tradition and modernity*
                SOURCE: DIK (2013)

By iterating the temporal distinction between tradition and modernity the
GzTM not only distance itself, and Germany, from Muslims, which are allo-
cated in a different temporal zone ruled by tradition, but also leaves the door
open for Muslims to march along the step of integration towards modern and
gender equal time. Schizogenically, then, the historical trajectories of Germans
and Muslims diverged, and the sharing of present time once again is denied.

The GzTM states that within societies there are different expectations about
the role of men and women. These can either be meaningful for the coexis-
tence between men and women or they can engender conflicts in society and
inside families (DIK, 2013, 7).

Furthermore, the report indicates that men and women also confront dif-
ferent concepts of life and gender roles when they inhabit social fields *different*

from the ones of their parents and grandparents. The case of Muslims with "migration background" exemplifies this situation in Germany. Accordingly, for them to find their own way is not always easy, because they are confronted with the role expectations of the society and their families (DIK, 2013, 8). This description suggests a conflict or irreconcilability between expectations held by Muslims and those of German society, and by inference depicting them as different from each other. In other words, two self-enclosed packages of gender roles are available to young Muslims. The editors introduce the notion of "migration background" to suggest precisely an in-between situation and to emphasize the difference between the host society's values and those of Muslims. Afterwards, the report explains the gender role expectations in some Muslim families:

> Today in Muslim families traditional roles are becoming increasingly obsolete. There are, however, still Muslim families in which, even today, gender roles and expectations are based on traditional and patriarchal structures where gender and age are the determining factors for establishing specific roles within the family. Following this model, the father is generally the head of the family. He fulfills the role of breadwinner of the family, and at the same time he is the representative of the family to the outside world. In contrast, the woman is in charge of the household, raising the children, and is responsible for passing on traditions.
>
>   DIK, 2013, 8 [author's translation]

Allegorically, the report draws a time distinction between today and yesterday; a progressively outmoded tradition is in the past, but it has traveled to Germany with Muslim families until today. This tradition, however, is patriarchal and hierarchical, and as the report stated at the beginning, the (German) gender roles have changed and evolved during the last decades leading to equality, a process inscribed in a historical development that some Muslim families, even today, lack.

Furthermore, the study's script of the traditional-patriarchal Muslim family, namely, the father as breadwinner and the mother as housewife and transmitter of culture, is not exclusive to Muslims. This particular arrangement also can be found in German families. Here, it is the subject of difference, the Muslim, which anchors the distinction and the role as patriarchal and atavistic.

This paragraph reinforces the representation of Germany as a modern nation with modern-equal-gender citizens by drawing a sharp contrast with some patriarchal-traditional Muslim families. Here, a political move to depoliticize gender equality in all of the German society takes place. The construction of Germany as a homogenous already-gender-equal society obscures the

existing gender inequality in all of society; it blocks the possibilities of critique by appealing to something already achieved by circumscribing patriarchal structures to a religiously defined group.

This contrast is possible by discursively delineating a severe division between modernity and tradition. Patriarchal thinking as an inherently Islamic structure has been a recurrent trope of the Orientalist system of representation. Thus, the study concedes that within the Muslim subpopulation it is possible to find either traditional or modern gender role expectations. However, the modern ones are those Muslim couples that break with the traditional-patriarchal gender role expectations (DIK, 2013, 9). In other words, modern Muslims exist; the ones who have confronted and diverged from the expectations imposed onto them. The dichotomy traditional-Muslims versus modern-Germans is still at work, what the study introduces is the possibility of progress through deviation from tradition and alignment with modernity, a self-refashioning in accordance with the frame of modern gender equality.

Afterwards, the editors explain the aims of the project, the teaching of tolerance to Muslims regarding diverse gender role expectations. It is noteworthy that the GzTM never addresses patriarchy as being against the law but only as a deviant behavior in the context of gender equality established by modernity. Hence, the governmental approach continues, not to force behaviors in accordance to the law, but rather to arrange attitudes and social relations with the purpose that Muslims govern themselves by turning their back on tradition and guiding themselves towards modernity. Then, tolerance becomes a vehicle to help the transition from tradition towards modernity and to reify an Orientalist representation of Muslims living in Germany.

After stating the report's objectives, the study points out the subjects at whom the recommendations are aimed. The report establishes extracurricular guidelines to be used by educators who work with Muslim children and youth, the German-Muslims of the future, but it can also be used to work with Muslim adults in advising them in questions regarding gender role expectations (DIK, 2013, 10). The emphasis of the study is placed on teaching tolerance for different gender roles to Muslim youth, and implicitly to present them with "other forms of life" when it comes to gender expectations, so that they can lean towards modernity. The work of the report aligns with the DIK's general approach, refashioning Muslim subjectivities by focusing on youth and gender role expectations. Gender equality thus should be part of the dimensions of the German-Muslim subject formation.

In an interesting footnote about the report's readability, the editorial team of the DIK note that for that purpose, they will use throughout the text the masculine form, asserting that this includes the feminine. But if the linguistic

and discursive turns, and decades of feminist thought emphasized something, it is that words structure the perception, power structures, and inequalities and ironically, the masculine form is given primacy over the feminine in this report on gender equality (DIK, 2013, 11).[6]

The report's second section offers different Muslim gender roles in Germany by presenting ten short biographies of modern Muslim men and women who epitomize exemplary role models that can guide the patterns of behavior of other Muslims. The discourse of tolerance permeates all of the biographies; it establishes that Muslims should tolerate all of them as legitimate and valuable choices. According to the GzTM, Germany's Basic Law does not stipulate particular lifestyles for men and women, that is to say, the law protects the right of self-determination (DIK, 2013, A.2). In this sense, as Brown (2008) pointed out, one of the depoliticizing effects of tolerance refers to the call for tolerance, when strictly speaking, if these are rights, why they should be tolerated? Since tolerance does not appeal to the law but to a norm, rights do not have to be tolerated but protected.

The section about the Muslim portraits states the existence of different role models within Muslim communities compatible both with the basic law and with Islam. These kinds of portraits are the ones that will be presented in the study (DIK, 2013, B.4). At this point, the study has already made a caesura between Muslim gender roles compatible and incompatible with the Basic Law.

The report then uses the law to draw the different options and parameters in which Muslim gender roles can unfold. Consequently, the ten role models presented are within the rule of law. They should serve as exemplary role models whereby Muslim women and men should find their way, in other words, the DIK delineates the parameters of accepted (heterosexual) gender behaviors by framing them inside the constitution and providing different options for self-guidance.

The role models, or Michel Foucault would say the subject formations are the following: the traditional couple with children (he is the breadwinner, while she is the housewife); the "reversed" traditional couple with children (she is the breadwinner, while he is the househusband); the professional couple, both employed with children; the professional couple, both work without children; the unemployed couple (she is the housewife); the single young Muslim woman, who lives in a shared flat; the divorced woman; the "interethnic" couple; and the interdenominational couple (DIK, 2013, B.5–B.34).

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6 Similar footnotes appear in the reports BI (DIK, 2012a, 8) and in IGD (Halm, Sauer, Schmidt, & Stichts, 2012, 201).

Several topics run throughout the biographies. First, all of them are heteronormative couples, each one of the options offered as exemplary role models in the study are couples formed by a man and a woman. Therefore, the report excludes the possibility of Muslim homosexual partnerships. Second, and in relation to the previous point, the study resorts to a normative conceptualization of family, made of a man, a woman, and a limited number of children. Thus, these role models exclude a variety of families arrangements, i.e. not based on blood ties, multigenerational, etc. The exceptions also conform to this narrow concept of the family: the single female Muslim student wishes to marry a man in the future, and the couple without children offers the possibility of a heteronormative couple focusing on their professional carriers.

The third point refers to labor. All the Muslims have gainful employment, in the couples either one of them or both have gainful employment. The exception, the unemployed couple, currently plans to start a business—a slaughterhouse—despite the fact that the wife can't stand the sight of blood; thus, the portrait also emphasizes a working attitude.

Fourth, the idea of freedom in different spheres of life runs throughout the biographies. In the selection of a partner, either she or he had no pressures choosing his or her beloved one "even" in the case of a different "ethnicity" or religious denomination. Likewise, freedom appears as a value in the upbringing of the children, in those cases of couples with kids, each one of them claims that they would give their sons and daughters the freedom to decide their own future.

Fifth, the topic of women's emancipation appears constantly and some of the Muslims portrayed explicitly refer to the concept. Sixth, descriptions about the countries of origin as archaic and traditional come up again and again in the biographies. These anti-modern characterizations also apply to Muslim families or to the societies of those countries. Instead of analyzing each biography, I use these topics to explore the governmental pedagogy at work and the biopolitical splitting of Muslims based on the temporal and historical dichotomy tradition versus modernity.

Contemporary German debates about migrants and Muslims tend to conceptualize them in a heteronormative frame. In particular, the German integration debate and the different government plans pursuing integration discursively restrict migrants to heterosexual couples. Furthermore, sexuality is only addressed when it pertains to the reproduction of the heterosexual family (Dhawan & Castro Varela, 2009, 107; see also: Kosnick, 2011). The DIK as a governmental institution is not an exception. Throughout all the documents produced by this institution there is not a single reference to homosexuality or transgender issues.

The study GzTM follows the same pattern; yet, the reproduction of the heteronormative imperative is framed within Germany's Basic Law. Although the study mentions that the constitution does not assign a particular role to any of the two sexes implicitly or explicitly, the legal figure of marriage certainly does. Although there have been several amendments to the law in Germany concerning the equality of homosexual couples and the legal construct of registered civil partnership exists since 2001, the later did not guaranteed the exact same rights as in a marriage. As Kosnick (2011) argued, although the German state provided a certain degree of recognition to same-sex couples, the legal figure of register partnership was symbolically and "carefully separated from—the heterosexual institution of marriage" (Kosnick, 2011, 124). This legal context finally changed in October 2017 after the Bundestag finally legalized same-sex marriage.

All the Muslims represented in the ten biographies are heterosexual. This is not explicitly mentioned, but each one of them had, has or wants to have a partner of the opposite sex. Without been stated and by means of this, the study GzTM establishes the heteronormative assumption as an invisible normalcy. Thus, the study restricts the topics unfolding from the biographies, freedom and emancipation, children's upbringing, and the distribution of the household chores to a limited set of heterosexual options. Since the report aims at inculcating tolerance in Muslims regarding different gender roles, the silence about homosexual couples is striking against the background of the current sociopolitical debate in which Muslims have been framed as homophobes (El-Tayeb, 2012; Haritaworn, Tauqir, & Erdem, 2007; Kuntsman, Haritaworn, & Petzen, 2010) and the "Orient" has been depicted as a threatening and dangerous place for homosexuals (Massad, 2008) stabilizing the idea of Europe and Germany as a safe haven for queer migrants (Dhawan & Castro Varela, 2009, 114).

The DIK and the study GzTM depart from and reify an epistemic framework in which heterosexuality constitutes the norm. As I argued before, the DIK touched upon the topic of sexuality in its incitements to "interethnic" marriages, but this again was restricted to a normative framework reproducing the heterosexual family and couple, and moreover to improve the integration index of Muslims. The DIK's silence about homosexuality can be explained on account of this heteronormative epistemology.

The report emphasizes freedom in several aspects and refers to the Basic Law to underscore that the constitution does not stipulate any particular role for men and women. Accordingly, the fixation of gender roles is against the law and affects not only those touched by it, but society in general by blocking the individuals' potential (DIK, 2013, B.1). Thus, freedom frames the different roles selected by the Muslims in the biographies.

A first usage of freedom refers to the lack of external coercions regarding the partner's selection. The ghost of forced marriage haunts this description of freedom. Handan, the single divorced woman expressed how and when she met her partner: "I met my husband during the summer holidays in Turkey. I was 18 and he was 24 years old. I felt in love with him … it was not like, that my family picked him for me; they were happy, though, there weren't any Germans who fancied me" (DIK, 2013, B.25 [author's translation]).

Handan reaffirms her free will when selecting a partner, however, she feels the need to explain her choice and emphasizes that her family did not influence her decision. Rather, her family was happy that she did not marry a German. The ellipsis after explaining her love followed by the justification about her family's reaction suggests a moment of doubt in Handan induced, perhaps, by the thought of providing to the interviewer information of her free choice, to stress that her family did not impose a husband on her. Therefore, Handan needed to assert her free will in relation to the widely circulated discourse of forced marriages among Muslims. The report uses her biography to signal that freedom is what matters in choosing a partner and not the influence of her family. Her statements also circulate some sort of animosity on the part of the Turkish family to the idea of her marrying a German. Thus, marking the family as still having preconditions towards partnerships. This brief remark about animosity with regard to marrying a German will be further addressed in the case of the "interethnic" couple. In the biography of Handan, another use of freedom emerges—her divorce:

> That's regrettably when the problems began. My husband was proud that I studied and that I was employed. After the birth of our daughter though, he had massive problems to accept that I did not want to stay at home. In the traditional Turkish society marriage is very important. Because of this, separating wasn't a step that I took lightly, and in the end I asked my husband to move out of our shared apartment. My parents weren't thrilled about this, but they respected my decision and stood by me.
> DIK, 2013, B.27 [author's translation]

In this biographical narrative, Handan needed to confront the expectations of the Turkish society and to a lesser degree also those of her family. She achieved her freedom by asserting her will against those traditional expectations. Freedom for Muslim women appeared as something they need to fight for against different obstacles informed by a traditional understanding of couples and marriages.

The biography of Handan already touched upon women's emancipation, depicting her as a subject who fought against numerous barriers (her family, her husband, the traditional Turkish society) to pursue the life that she wanted. Her biographical excerpt ends by highlighting Handan as having a good and prosperous life as a single mother, employed, and economically independent (DIK, 2013, B.27). The ending aims at illustrating the possibility of a good life after a divorce, and that neither her happiness nor her financial stability suffered. The subject formation of Handan serves as an exemplary role model to Muslim women wanting to divorce but being restrained by tradition.

The biography of Mohammad (from the professional couple without children) provides another example of women's emancipation, which he explicitly references, "I always wanted to have an emancipated partner like my wife" (DIK, 2013, B.13 [author's translation]). His wife is a professional Muslim woman with a doctoral degree in sociology. Because of her work, she travels to different parts of the world. Mohammad represents the antithesis of Handan's husband, who could not bear his wife being a professional Muslim woman. To the contrary, Mohammad feels proud of having an educated and emancipated woman. Thus, the figure of Mohammad serves as an exemplary role model for other Muslim men. He emerges as a modern Muslim man, who not only accepts gender equality concerning occupation, but who feels honored to be with a modern Muslim woman. He represents an example to be followed; interestingly, his name matches the one of the prophet.

Likewise, the story of Öznur, the single student woman depicts an emancipatory trajectory. She needed to discuss with her parents her wish to move to the city in which she studies, Frankfurt. Her parents were doubtful about it, but in the end she gets what she wants (DIK, 2013, B.22).

Furthermore, Öznur portrays her ideal partner as someone who would not control her, decide for her, or prevent her from accomplishing want she wants (DIK, 2013, 23). In short, she does not want a patriarchal partner, and rightly so. However, as with Handan, her account of herself seeks to oppose the stereotype of the Muslim woman oppressed by her male partner. And the biography is embedded in a report about guiding Muslims towards modern gender roles. Thus, the report manipulates Öznur's thoughts as a pedagogical guidance, and as a symbol of breaking with tradition while remaining Muslim. Furthermore, Öznur emerges as an emancipated role model able to pursue her own will.

The biography of Öznur aims to teach two subject positions. Firstly, it addresses Muslim parents, who should learn to respect the decision of their daughters and sons, especially in relation to education—a sign of integration.

Secondly, Öznur's biography also targets young Muslim women. Her portrait shows a woman who pursues a professional carrier, able to confront her parents, and who wishes to marry a modern-equal man.

Another side of freedom imprinted in the biographies refers to the upbringing of children. In the introduction to each section, the editors present what the Basic Law established in these regards, emphasizing that Muslims have to be reminded of it. Particularly, that the parents have the right and duty to take care of their children (DIK, 2013, A.4). However, the emphasis regarding children's upbringing in the portraits refers to giving children the freedom to choose their own way of life, i.e. parents should not intervene in the decision of their children or in their gender roles.

I already mentioned that Öznur's parents respected and supported the decision of her daughter to move to Frankfurt. Handan also explained that her parents did not choose a husband for her, and although reluctant about her divorce, they eventually supported her. Regarding the couples with children, all of them assert that they want a good life for their children, but they also believe it is important to be respectful and not interfere in the freedom of choice of their offspring. For instance, Muzaffer from the traditional couple, stated, "Our older one will soon begin to study; however, she is still indecisive about which profession she should choose. We leave the decision to her, and if it is necessary, then she can also move to another city" (DIK, 2013, B.7 [author's translation]).

Like Öznur, the issue of allowing children to move to another city to pursue their education appears in Muzaffer's story. Thus, the report stipulated guidance about Muslim children's upbringing implies that Muslim parents should not interfere in their children decisions, specifically in the context of education since it contributes to integration.

In the MLG study's assessment of Muslim integration, structural dimensions, particularly education rates, were the index in which more efforts were needed on account of the "poor" performance of Muslims. Furthermore, as mentioned before, Muslim gender inequality outside the law mostly refers to four problems in the school, sex education, co-ed sport classes and swimming lessons, and school trips. The alleged problem around these topics refers to Muslim parents' unwillingness to allow their children to attend and take part in these activities, supposedly, based on conflicts with Islamic norms. In the GzTM, although the children's choices do not relate to the aforementioned topics, the underlying assumption refers to the same issue. Muslim parents should learn to let their children decide on their own. Mirjana, from the "inverted" traditional couple, exemplifies another example of the use of freedom regarding Muslim children's decisions:

> We simply ask the children: What do you say about that? Which occu-
> pation our children want to do later is, of course, for them to decide by
> themselves. My son wants to become a pilot; he's known that since he
> was seven. He knows the names of all of the airlines. We're keeping our
> finger crossed for him. But we also make sure to tell our children you have
> to work hard in order to get the training you need for your dream job and
> later be able to earn a living with it.
>
> DIK, 2013, B.9–B.10 [author's translation]

Mirjana's statements reiterate the idea that even though their children's de-
cision is still unclear, it is *of course* their decision. Her story also emphasizes
the value ascribed to a strong work ethic running throughout the stories. Their
children are free to decide on whatever profession they desire, but they need
to work hard. These statements tackle the two alleged problems concerning
Muslim upbringing. On the one hand, freedom is the value guiding how par-
ents relate to their children. On the other hand, parents need of their children
to pursue formal education and work hard. Since Muslim youth have been de-
picted by the DIK as lagging in education and having low rates of employment
(DIK, 2009d, 200–214), the figure of Mirjana represents an ideal model for Mus-
lim upbringing.

Another recurrent topic in the biographies is the depiction of either the
countries of origin (Turkey) or their societies as traditional locations where
societies and families still cling to the old ways. I mentioned that Handan de-
scribed Turkey as a traditional society which holds marriage in high esteem.
Kardelen, the Muslim woman who married a man "without migration back-
ground", stated the following, "Actually, I thought that I would marry a Muslim
man from a Turkish family/lineage. I grew up in a traditional family and want-
ed to conform to their expectations. My parents come from a region in eastern
Turkey in which life is still very archaic" (DIK, 2013, B.29 [author's translation]).

Kardelen used to think that she would marry a Turkish Muslim man im-
plying that archaic rules—embodied by her parents—expected that decision
from her. However, she married someone without "migration background", i.e.
German. The phrasing illustrates a transfer from categories; her husband in-
stead of being labeled as German is mentioned as someone without the expe-
rience of migration. Her marriage also exemplifies emancipation and freedom
since she broke through the archaic expectations and freely chose to marry,
contrary to tradition, a modern man "without migration background".

Tolerance permeates all the biographies but is especially salient in the "in-
terethnic" and the interdenominational couple. The report presents these ex-
emplary cases as positive outcomes for a Muslim if she or he decides to marry a

non-Muslim man or a woman from another Islamic denomination. Moreover, the GzTM uses these couples to teach that Muslims should tolerate these marriages, and here one particular phantom haunts the teaching of tolerance: the honor killing.

The following extract is the report's presentation of the couple conformed by a Muslim woman and a man without "migration background": "both Kardelen and her man work and share the household's chores. That her man does not have a migration background is not a problem for her family" (DIK, 2013, B.29 [author's translation]). By asserting in the presentation of the couple that Kardelen's family does not have a problem with this topic, it is suggested that this could have been a potential source of conflict. Afterwards, Kardelen relates that she expected that this issue would be a problem because her family comes from a very conservative and archaic region:

> For my family it was a shock when they by chance found out that I had a German boyfriend. Because of my studies, I have moved to another city. Over and over again, I have tried to arrange a meeting where I could introduce my boyfriend to my family. I knew that they would be disappointed because he is not a Muslim, but also that they would like him. For a long time, my boyfriend was really afraid of meeting my parents. He was insecure on account of all the stories about honor killings that were circulating in the media in Germany.
>
>   DIK, 2013, B.29 [author's translation]

However, the fear vanished after they married. Now Kardelen's family respects and likes her husband. Thus, Kardelen story has a happy ending. Instead of violence, it was respect that came from her family. This particular biography aims at teaching Muslim parents and relatives to restrain from violence when they do not agree with the selection of a Muslim woman's partner. Thus, tolerance and freedom of choice filters throughout Kardelen account.

The interdenominational partnership refers to a couple in which he is Shia, and she is Sunni. The pair also had negative expectations about what the parents might say, which as in the case before were unfounded. The parents accepted and tolerated the marriage, Ahmed narrates:

> At the time when we announced to our families that we wanted to get married, I was told later that my mother-in-law afterwards asked, "a Shia, but he is then a normal Muslim?" My father-in-law, a high cultured man, answered to her: "Yes, he is a Muslim". And with that, it was no longer an issue.
>
>   DIK, 2013, B.32–B.33 [author's translation]

Here again, "traditional" Muslim parents are presumed to be intolerant, in particular, the mother in comparison with the educated father—another subtle sign of tradition and patriarchy. The distinction between Muslim generations runs throughout the report. Whereas Muslim youth are modern, the parents tend to be unfounded traditional. Kardelen and Ahmed feared or felt insecure about their families' reactions regarding their respective partners. These feelings address the existence of real fears and insecurities, namely, that Muslim parents and relatives might reject these kinds of partnerships. However, in both stories the fears were unfounded. The parents accepted and respected the decision. Hence, every Muslim included in the story breaks the traditional understanding of marriage and emerges as modern subject who respects freedom.

The report GzTM differs completely from any other document from the DIK. The pedagogical structure of the whole text is found nowhere else to in the DIK. The section about the ten biographies is preceded by one in which some articles of the Basic Law are presented and explained. The biographies of Muslims exemplify the articles of the law. Thus, the report first presents the legal obligations and subsequently how they can be put into practice through exemplary education.

The frame of law complements a normativity concerning historical development, women's emancipation, and the dichotomy tradition versus modernity. Therefore, in the narratives the law provides the frame, and the normativity supplements the law establishing patterns of normal behavior between gender roles. For instance, all the cases, with the exception of the divorced single mother, discuss the distribution of the household chores presenting different options. The male, the female or both perform the duties. Yet, whoever does the chores, it should be consensual, and both partners have to agree to that distribution of labor.

Without a doubt, the non-coercive distribution of tasks in the household constitutes an important issue for gender equality, but what is troubling is how the emphasis on the topic carries the assumption that somehow Muslims need to learn these patterns of behaviors since the report uses the biographies as role models while tacitly imputing the equal distribution of the household's task to the German identity. In addition to this, the DIK's position in the discourse emerges as the teacher in these regards, thereby establishing a normative hierarchy.

The same can be said regarding the other topics, such as respecting the freedom of choice of the children. However, through an intertextual reading and even direct references, the presentation of these patterns of behaviors alludes to stereotypical representation of Muslims, such as forced marriages,

and so-called honor-killings. Thus, the text implicitly reifies the stereotypes by presenting the very opposites to these phenomena. According to Brown (2008, 120), this represents one of the ironies of the teaching of tolerance, namely, in order to fight prejudices it relies on stereotypes to didactically refute them. In other words, the teaching of tolerance against stereotypes requires their reproduction and circulation.

In the biographies, different episodes emerged in which the subjects needed to give an account of their actions by refuting the common stereotypes. Mirjana explained that although they haven't heard any criticism about her family arrangements (she is the breadwinner, he takes care of the house and children), she is aware that these are not traditional, and some friends of her husband worry about him (DIK, 2013, B.8).

Handan needed to explain that her parents did not dictate her husband and accepted her divorce. Öznur was required to give an account of her parents' skepticism concerning her moving to another city to study: they were not worried about the fact that she was not married, but rather because they care about her. Kardelen gave elaborations about how her family accepted her German husband because her partner was afraid of the honor-killing stories that often appear in the media. All these examples were presented precisely against a trope of stereotypes regarding patterns of behavior of Muslims related to gender violence and inequality. Moving in the tensions between Muslim tradition and agency, the constraints of the Muslim family versus free will, the centrality about marriage and honor against the freedom to divorce, forced marriages and intolerance in contrast to "interethnic" and interdenominational love. The biographies work within a contradiction that rebuffed the stereotypes by asserting them. In other words, the exemplary cases reversed the stereotypes, yet, by being exemplary role models, they implicitly reaffirm the existence of these patterns of behavior within the Muslim majority.

The role models have a strong pedagogical impetus. They serve to illustrate that common Muslim patterns of behavior can be subverted through deliberate agency. The biographies aim at showing that Muslims are the architects of their lives and not tradition or religiosity. The latter are presented as compatible with a professional life, emancipation and gender equality, but only for a self-governing subject who has mastered religiosity.

The labeling of these biographies as exemplary role models also introduces a distinction: by being praiseworthy they operate as desirable models, representing the best of their kind, subtly suggesting their out of the ordinary character, differing from the alleged common patterns of Muslim behavior regarding gender roles and expectations.

Furthermore, the biographies are situated at the intersection of biopower and governmentality since they involve the regulation of life. The ten portraits have already been distinguished as a sub-population in Germany defined by their religiosity, and in a subsequent step, a caesura took effect between subjects with gender roles aligned with the law and the opposite. Afterwards, the report brought intimate spheres of life into the calculations and strategies of power: divorce, children's upbringing, and marriage represent topics to be regulated in a specific manner. At that point, governmentality operates by establishing a set of particular behaviors as the norms to guide the conduct of other Muslims—they have to self-govern accordingly.

The biographies present subjects able to conduct themselves without being restricted by tradition, honor, religiosity, community, or society. The report explicitly states that these self-managerial subjects should work as role models for other Muslims when guiding themselves (DIK, 2013, B.4). This project aligns with the overall DIK's approach, "Successful German Muslims should serve as role models to a greater extent" (DIK, 2009c, 10).

Moreover, tolerance as a modality of governmentality strongly anchors in the biographies. The discourse of tolerance situates itself in the metanarrative of the portraits. It provides the impetus for tolerating these different gender roles within Muslim communities and certainly implies that Muslims themselves should be tolerant when they were confronted with situations out of the "traditional" frame: a divorce, children moving away from home before being married, a non-Muslim partner. These actions are registered in a double fashion. Firstly, they show the tolerance of exemplary Muslims, and secondly, they function as a way to teach other Muslims to be tolerant in these regards: "The presented role models are in the view of the Muslim representatives in German Islam Conference independent from the question of religiosity. All of the represented models are also viable for religious Muslims" (DIK, 2013, B.4 [author's translation]).

The biographies work within the paradigm of integration, which does not appear explicitly in the narratives. The explanation of such absence relates to the idea that these Muslims are already integrated. They have fulfilled the prerequisites of integration. They guide their lives according to the law. They speak German, most of them have a higher education and are employed, and the ones who are not currently employed plan to start a business. They fulfill the DIK's requirements of gender equality among the spouses and with their children since they do not follow a pre-established set of gender expectations, and when they acknowledge the existence of such a-priori expectations, free will guides their decisions. All of them have already made the choice relating to the dichotomy presented in the study, tradition versus modernity, embracing

the latter. Briefly, tradition does not rule their lives, it does not interfere in the decisions of their children, and some of them are open to engaging in partnerships outside their religious denomination or in "interethnic" marriages—these Muslims are fully integrated in the German society.

Thus, the biographies represent archetypical German-Muslims. They are the embodiment of the project launched by the DIK, the reforming and re-shaping of Muslim subjectivities according to the particular normative frame of the German values. As such, they symbolize role models, a guiding light for Muslims that can be a template for the patterns of behavior of other Muslims. They constitute hyphenated Muslim subjects in which the quality of the German identity has already been added. The deployment of tolerance emerges then as a central ingredient in the (re)formation of subjects.

The different Muslim subjects in the biographies also relate to the DIK's time politics. Some of the parents, such as Handan's, embodied the Muslims of the past, still performing tradition in their everyday lives. The ten biographies represent how the future of Germany and Muslims would look like once integration has been achieved. Thus, they epitomize the German-Muslims of the future living in the present in order to guide other Muslims to reach the state that they have already achieved: modernity. Modernity, in turn, as deployed in the study, represents a temporal device to distinguish between dissimilar time developments, and as a guidance to align Muslim subjectivities in the present with the purpose of creating a better society and improved Muslims.

Secular Imams and Secular Muslims for a Secular Future

7.1 The Muslim Subjects of the Future

The DIK's project to produce the German-Muslim subject not only biopolitically addresses the Muslim population, but it also seeks to form particular subjects at the individual level. Both projects complement each other, in particular, through the figure of the imam. On the one hand, the DIK's project of making German-Muslims entails reforming the subjectivities of the Muslim population living in Germany. On the other hand, two subject formations—the imam and the secular Muslim—require the configuration of guides, and sources of legitimacy for the Muslim community and the existence of the DIK respectively.

Previously, I discussed the institutional incorporation of Islam and stressed one of its sub-projects as the (re)formation of imams. Accordingly, the recruitment of imams from foreign countries should stop giving space to homegrown imams, the German-Muslim imams of the future. The latter would be trained in German universities and receive their training in German and the social reality of Germany (DIK, 2011b). Ideally, the imam would be the Muslim subject making his community accountable. At the same time, he should work as the spokesperson and representative of the Muslim community in its articulation with the state (Tezcan, 2008). Moreover, as I argue, since the imam has been portrayed as the key figure inside the Muslim community guiding Muslim conducts in religious, cultural, and social spheres, an implicit political strategy expects that once trained, the imam should transfer to his community an authorized body of knowledge already passed to him through the training provided by the state. Hence, the DIK attempts to set in motion a governmental chain of guidance—guiding imams capable to guide the conducts of Muslims. For the DIK, the imam represents a strategic subject position in the project of reshaping Muslim subjectivities. He can, as the DIK argues, fill the gaps and multiply the integration process (DIK, 2011b).

Regarding gender justice as one of the DIK's (2010a) pillar of work, the conference issued invitations to secular Muslim (mostly women) to serve as advisors in these topics (Schäuble, 2006b). For the DIK, the secular Muslim works as an informant from within, able to transfer or confirm the knowledge about

the alleged gender inequality in Muslim communities. She also stands as an exemplary role model capable of harmoniously combining being a Muslim with gender equality. The linkage between the subject formations of the imam and the secular Muslim resides in the DIK's attempt to make them work as native informants (Said, 1978; Spivak, 1999), namely, as sources of legitimate information and knowledge due to their position from within, and as transmitters of authorized knowledge to Muslims.

However, the information retrieved from each subject has different purposes. On the one hand, the imam serves the purposes of integration and security enhancement. As a worker within the community, he can transfer information to Muslims and handover knowledge about the community to the authorities. Thus, he articulates the Muslim community with the state and civil society. On the other hand, the secular Muslim serves the purposes of creating legitimacy for state interventions regarding gender in Muslim communities. Due to her "real" voice, her speech—more often than not—is read as authentic and representative of Muslim life. Moreover, the DIK provides an institutional niche for the secular Muslim to disseminate her voice.

I propose to read the DIK's work on these subjects through the lens of the native informant and to link this power technique with the embracing strategy of governmentality. Previously, I analyzed the DIK's security project of cultivating native informant security agents—Muslim subjects that as a result of being Muslims can work within Muslim communities spotting radicals and passing knowledge about the community to the German state. In this section, by analyzing the project of reforming imams and the role the DIK gives to secular Muslims, I show how the native informant power technology is entangled with representational politics and racial formations.

Here it is important to acknowledge that the discourses about the imams' role in Germany is not only dictated by the DIK but also by the Islamic organizations and transnational interests in the context of the ties some institutions with other countries such as the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs' (DITIB) connection with the Turkish government (Rosenow-Williams, 2012). Thus, the imam has also been conceptualized as a figure who can assist and fulfill a wide set of different purposes that have changed during the last decades. In the present discussion, I am only focusing on the DIK's discourses concerning the imam as an agent of integration.

Firstly, I examine the project concerning imams by analyzing the discourse from which the necessity of remaking them appears, the position of the topic in the DIK, and the concrete plan of action developed by the institution. Secondly, I analyze the position of the secular Muslim within the DIK, her work regarding gender justice and the presumptions that inform her central position in the conference's structure.

7.2 Imams

As Levent Tezcan (2008; see also: Kamp, 2008, 2014; Peter, 2014) pointed out, the 9/11 attacks marked a threshold in the attention and importance given to the imam by Western media and governments. The imam emerged as the figure that can make the Muslim community transparent and accountable.

In current discussions about the integration of Muslims in Germany, the imam provokes ambivalent reactions. The DIK approaches the imam as the key figure to enhance the integration of Muslims, thus labeling him as a "multiplier" (DIK, 2011b). However, the media often depicts the imam as an obstacle to integration blaming him for maintaining a traditional Islamic culture, harboring radicalization and "Islamism", preaching loyalty to Islam and not to the German nation, and fomenting gender inequality and anti-Semitism (see for instance: Brandt & Popp, 2010).

Hence, the same Manichean line of reasoning highlighted by Mahmood Mamdani (2005) applies to imams: the existence of "good and bad Muslims"—here "good and bad" imams—and the need to identify them, in turn creating the need for the DIK to produce the "good ones". Whereas the "bad" imams serve the purpose of fashioning legitimacy for interventions aimed at solving the problems they represent, the "good" imams work as an exemplary role model characterizing the conduct that should be followed by other Muslims.

Following Tezcan (2008, 127) the relation between the imam as an agent of integration and as an enhancer of security relates to disputes about national identity; the approach to "Islamic" fundamentalism provides the linkage. Since the terrorist threat works transnationally, it is assumed that the establishment of a nationalized version of Islam would result in Muslims abandoning their "ethnic identities" and pledging loyalty to the German nation. Therefore, the development of an assimilated nationality would have as a side effect the prevention of transnational fundamentalism.

The public relevance of, and attention to the imam often rest upon his comparison to the Christian priest; however, the figure and role of the imam differ from the priest in several ways and for distinct reasons. Following Melanie Kamp (2008), in Germany the role of the imam shifted in accordance with the necessities of Muslim communities in the diaspora. Likewise, Tezcan (2008, 122) argued that the function of the imam in Germany changed with the emergence of a unique development in Islamic history, the mosque association, established also in the Muslim diaspora, and as I argue, the conceptualization of the imam also entails modifications in regard to state interventions; chiefly, the imputed task of serving the purposes of integration and his intended cooperation with security authorities.

Furthermore, as Tezcan (2008, 127) argued, current discussions about the imam are entangled with the institutionalization of Islam in Germany and with the dispositif of security. As a Muslim the imam is constructed as a trouble. The call to institutionalize imams' training aims at hindering the problems that emanate from his figure. Moreover, foreign imams working in Germany have been depicted as being unable to give the Muslim population what they need. Imams are portrayed as lacking the German language skills and having little knowledge about the reality of Germany and the Muslims living in the country. These are the two dimensions on the (re)formation of imams stipulated by the DIK:

> In particular, if they [imams] do not come from Germany, they often have little knowledge of the German language and the social environment of their parishioners. The advanced training in language, area and social studies for religious personnel and other actors of the Islamic community in Germany is of great significance for the promotion of integration and social cohesion. They contribute to the reduction of mutual reservations and act against polarized positions.
>
> DIK, 2011b, 12 [author's translation]

In 2010, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) invested 20 million euros to establish four centers of Islamic theology at German universities: Münster/Osnabrück; Tübingen; Frankfurt am Main/Giessen, and Nuremberg-Erlagen (BMBF, n.d.). The establishment of this programs "is part of a modern integration policy" (BMBF, n.d.), that is, the instituting of Islamic theology is not seen as a genuine task of knowledge production, or as meeting a demand for teachers and Islamic theologians but rather as a modern program to enhance the integration of Muslims in Germany.[1]

The reformation of imams in the DIK's second phase resulted in a concrete set of guidelines, published in 2011 with the title *Dialogue, Opening, Networking*

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1   Riem Spielhaus (2012, 101) argued that all the professors appointed to the chairs of Islamic studies in these universities are male, reinforcing the contemporary ideas about Islam in which women as figures of authority are blocked and not taken into account. Thus, it "ignores examples of female teachers and community leaders from Islamic history ... This is how we can understand why even though Catholic and Protestant faculties of theology went through the process of including (a few) female scholars before, the chance to come up with a new inclusive structure for Islamic Theology is wasted. As if it was necessary to make sure that the departments of Islamic studies were not, after all, more inclusive than departments of Christian Theology. Remember, according to the semantics of the 'actual', Islam does not even allow women to become imams, how could they teach them?"

(DIK, 2011b [hereafter DOV]). The plan to reform imams bifurcates into two modules. The first refers to the socio-reality of Germany, and the second deals with the acquisition of the German language. According to the DOV, the training of imams in social studies (*Gesellschaftskunde*) aims at familiarizing them with German society insofar as the environment in which the imam would work is marked by German culture. Thus, this education would enable imams to become competent and secure spokespersons for their community and for local actors as well (DIK, 2011b, 34). German universities would then take charge of the theological dimension of the training while the DIK in cooperation with municipalities, different institutions, and private actors would supervise the social and language dimensions of the training.

The DIK divides the social module into eight central thematic fields and three sub fields. The module has eight focal points: (1) the understanding of the relationship between religion and state, (2) the joint development of educational success, (3) learning about the religious life of Germany, i.e., the religious life of Christians and Jews, (4) the shaping of local interreligious dialogue, (5) Germany earlier-Germany today, the historic module, (6) basic knowledge of the constitution, (7) support for families, women, and youth, and finally (8) Health, acquiring basic knowledge of the health system in the country (DIK 2011b, 37–49). In addition there are three sub-topics: (a) developing imams' sensitivity to public relations, (b) collaboration in local politics, and (c) the management of teams and projects (DIK, 2011b, 50–53). A set of concrete guidelines accompanies each topic, comprising backgrounds, descriptions, objectives, tips, and suggested activities and further readings—including the DIK's publications.

In module 1, the DOV report explains the secular characteristics of Germany and the legal entity of the Corporation of Public Law, which allows religions to be active in the public sphere. Additionally, the report presents a discussion on the relation between the state and the historical development of religion. Accordingly, the need to discuss secularism relates to the "fact" that in the majority of "Muslim countries" the separation of church and state and the regulation of religion are the subject of conflict and debate:

> Secularization, the separation between the sacred and the secular and the regulation of their reciprocal relationships is also in most of the Muslim countries of origin cause for recurrent debates and conflicts. The relation between religion and state can and should be subject to a vigorous debate because this is the only arena where internal as well as external can come to the fore.
>
> DIK, 2011b, 37 [author's translation]

The lack of secularism is one of the most recurrent tropes in the Orientalist discourse and racism against Muslims (Attia, 2007; Sayyid, 2014b) and this is also a recurring theme in the DIK's simplistic argumentations about "Muslim countries" and Muslims being at odds with secularism. This presumption draws on the Orientalist archive, while reaffirming secular time as the inevitable consequence of historical development, thereby erasing different experiences of the secular in "Muslim countries of origin" by generalizing and reducing Islam and Muslims to religion and subjects lacking the historical separation between religion and the state. This presumption also requires the production of difference by homogenizing Muslims, thus the Orient (Said 1978), and IslamLand (Abu-Lughod 2013) as geographies of the Other appearing disguised as Muslim countries of origin.

The DIK's insistence on Germany's secularism and the achievement it represents not only homogenizes Muslims, but it also renders invisible the porous relation between the secular and the religious informing different aspects of German political and institutional life, including the DIK.

The discourse about Muslim lack of secularism rehearses and disseminates racial historicism. The DIK and the German nation appear in a more advanced state of historical development vis-à-vis Muslims due to the secular character they have achieved, while the separation of politics from religion in the Oriental countries is still a subject of conflicts and debates. This representation brings to light the need to teach imams about secularism and to promote debate about the topic to educate them about the limits of secularism. As Salman Sayyid (2014b, 35) argued, secularism is presented as the "necessary condition arising out of the unfolding of history itself", a history that has to be taught to Muslims.

Examining the modules to be taught to imams, the profile of the future German-Muslim imam emerges clearly. He has gained legal knowledge by studying the constitution and its limits. He complies with Germany's secular rule and has learned how religions interact in the public sphere. Thus, he is aware of and teaches the limits of religion in the social and political life in Germany. As a teacher, the imam has acquired pedagogical competences to impart Qur'anic lessons in the mosque.

He has studied the organization of the German school system as well, and he is conscious about the alleged problems that Muslims represent in the school system. Hence, with Muslim parents, he is a counselor in educational troubles. Moreover, he should have the proper answer to issues about Islamic customs in school, i.e. the headscarf and the compatibility of Islamic rituals, such as Ramadan, with educational duties.

The imam of the future has solid knowledge about the religious life in Germany, including the Muslim population. Likewise, the imam possesses the

competence to engage in dialogue with other religious communities, and his work should help to ameliorate the social polarization in Germany caused by the diversity of cultures and religions inhabiting the country.

From now on, the German-Muslim imam also represents his community and his mosque. His work of representation entails not only contact with other religions but also engagement with the municipality, social institutions, the police, hospitals, the media, foundations, and civil associations. The imam, thus, is a confident and responsible representative of Muslims in these locations. His studies of German history have made the imam able to understand the laws and norms structuring German society.

The imam has been trained to be a counselor for Muslims in several spheres of life. He can mediate marriage disputes, domestic violence, addictions, and Muslim youth encounters with extremism on the Internet. The imam also performs duties related to national security. He knows how to spot a radical within the Muslim community, detect extremist guises and work side by side with the local police, informing them about possible threats. And since the imam has acquired basic medical knowledge, he can help Muslims communicate with the available health services in the community and clarify the compatibility of Islamic norms with those of medical care.

The imam is competent and can work in public relations. He can function as a spokesperson with the media when problems and hate speech arise, and he can perform the duties of a manager for the mosque. He can draft projects, manage tasks and plans, raise funds, and manage the day-to-day business of the mosque.

The entire tasks should be primarily performed in German language. Yet since the imam also has other language competences either in Arabic or Turkish, he can also use these languages when the situation requires it. Therefore, he can perform as a cultural translator and broker (Jong de, 2016). Moreover, the imam has been familiarized with the work of the DIK—if necessary and desired he can work with it.

As this profile illustrates, the imam of the future represents a multifunctional subject formation. He acquired a wide range of specific knowledge to perform duties inside and outside the Muslim community. Altogether, the training aims at producing an agent of integration who serves the purposes of the DIK and the German state. He represents one of the key figures in the integration, regulation, and control of Muslims.

Furthermore, the imam's professionalization involves a series of tacit prerequisites. First, he should convey this information to the Muslim community; he should guide them following the parameters that previously guided him. He should transmit knowledge about secularism, tolerance, gender equality, but

he should also intervene in those problematic cultural features of Muslims. He should also guide Muslim parents in their alleged refusal to allow their children to take mixed swimming lesson or sexual education. He should stand up against domestic violence and mediate marital disputes.

Second, as an agent of integration he represents, in the both meanings of the word analyzed by Gayatri Spivak (1994), the Muslim community. On the one hand, he is, as a political proxy, the representative (*Vertreter*) of the community with other religions and cultures, with the state, with the security authorities, with the schools and hospitals, and with the media. On the other hand, he embodies (*darstellen*) the prototypical German-Muslim; thus, he is the exemplary image of the DIK's project, a tolerant, gender equal Muslim, versed in the German language, history, law, culture, and social norms. He is loyal to the nation and the constitution and successfully combines being German with being Muslim. His training has stitched these two identities together.

Furthermore, the project of reforming imams relates to the politicization of Islam as analyzed by Tezcan (2011, 115), that is, the governmental calculations seeking to politicize Islam in a particular form and direction with the purposes of regulating and controlling. The imam, as the linchpin that links the Muslim community with the state and civil society emerges as a political religious figure, as a political proxy. However, his politicization has been carefully managed by the DIK. The political content for which he stands has been authorized and is compatible with the law. From someone originally leading the Friday prayers, the DIK has turned him into an authorized political and multifunctional representative of the Muslim community.

The DIK's scheme to reform imams perfectly illustrates its governmental-pedagogical approach, a highly elaborated plan to solve the alleged problems that Muslims represent. The DIK through the DOV sets in motion a governmental chain of guidance. First, it arranges a set of institutions and the subjects inside them to guide the imams, language course facilities, churches, synagogues, and mosques, municipalities, universities, local police stations, hospitals, offices of social work, and counseling centers. Therefore, an initial governmental tactic entails arranging the infrastructure and conditions for the guidance; it includes guiding the guiders (Hernández Aguilar, 2016).

Second, these guiders—pedagogues, teachers, and university professors among others—would guide the conduct of imams using the syllabus in the report. Third, once trained, the imams would guide the conducts of more Muslims: children in public schools and in mosques; youth regarding violent behavior and educational performance; Muslim parents about the educational performance of their sons and daughters; couples with regards to gender equality and

marriage; mosque attendees through sermons addressing the socio-reality of Germany. The purpose of making German-Muslim imams can also be laid bare by looking at the notion of the native informant (Said, 1978; Spivak, 1999).

The German-Muslim imam project specifically refers to the purpose of creating a Muslim elite made of German educated imams, who will be central in the articulation of Muslims with the German government and its agencies. The native imam works on the agenda of integration politics, yet the imam as a native informant can serve other purposes as well. Due to his privileged position inside the Muslim community, he can acquire knowledge about it and then relay it to the relevant authorities. I use the concept native informant insofar as I consider that the notion includes a crucial dimension in the making of these subjects, namely, the category of race. The added value to the discourses of the native informant is based on the idea of a racial essence—being a native. The presupposition is that the identification as insiders is only possible if one possesses an essence that cannot be washed away entirely. Indeed, the informant can be refashioned, but racial sediments will linger and this essence can have useful purposes. The native informant possesses a torn between ontology: the mind habits of the ruler and the body of the ruled.

The DIK's stipulated training of imams also provides hints about the refinement and expansion of Foucault's (2007) governmentality, exposing how the tactic of conducting conduct can be articulated as a normative chain of guidance at different levels seeking to reshape conducts and subjectivities through methodic pedagogical interventions. Moreover, approaching the native informant as a modality of governmentality can help to relocate the concept outside Foucault's Eurocentric frame. For instance, Ann L. Stoler (1995) exposed the colonial experience (Foucault's silence) as a constitutive factor in the articulation of biopower and the inscription of race in the state. Stoler (1995, 13) argued that Foucault's "four strategic units" of the 18th century technologies of sex—the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the Malthusian couple, and the perverse adult—excluded the colonial servant as a site of sexual incitements and regulation and as a central counterpart in the development of the figures analyzed by Foucault, and the emergence of biopower.

A similar point can be raised about Foucault's conceptualization of governmentality. Foucault (2007, 88) located the emergence of this technology in Europe around the 16th century at the historical juncture of the reformation and the establishment of colonialism, though the last issue is just mentioned briefly. Afterwards, Foucault concentrated on the unblocking of this technology in the 18th century with the discovery and production of the population

as a social reality. According to him, governmentality focused on governing oneself, souls, conducts, and children (Foucault, 2007, 88).

The government of Europe's Others, the colonial subject and the native informant would also represent articulation points of governmental strategies, and therefore they should be added to the list. The figure of the native informant was central in the calculations of colonial empires as a technique of domination, control, regulation, and the crafting of a European identity. And, as I have argued, the case of contemporary native informants exhibits how this technology of power has suffered important mutations, changing their location from the colonies to the metropolises, moving transnationally, engaging in academic research, and modifying their functioning as translators of knowledge and religious guides—imams.

7.3   Secular Muslims

Within the DIK's first phase there was a plenum formed by 30 participants, 15 representatives of the German state and 15 Muslims. Of the latter group, 5 represent Islamic organizations in Germany and the remaining 10 non-organized Muslims individuals. Altogether, according to the DIK, the 15 representatives of the Muslim side were "giving a voice to the Muslim community" (DIK, 2011a). This structure has been depicted as the "heart of the German Islam Conference" (DIK, 2009b, 8 [author's translation]), and the selection and invitation of Muslim representatives have been portrayed as a way to represent the diversity of Muslim life in Germany (DIK, 2010b). Moreover, the balance in numbers between Muslim and government representatives camouflages the power imbalances in determining the agenda and the regulative impetus of the DIK, thereby lending the notions of equality and democracy to the character of this institution.

Although since the beginning of the Conference, this structure of representation had been praised by spokespersons of the DIK as open, democratic, inclusive, and sensible to diversity, different polemics have surrounded the invitation of particular Muslim representatives. The media highly criticized Schäuble's invitation of the Islamic organization Milli Görüş, leading to a suspension of its participation in the DIK enacted by de Maizière due to charges of fraud and support of international terrorism, which were later dismissed and the organization was cleared of all wrong doing.

Another polemic circulated in the media around the structures of representation of this state agency when Feridun Zaimoğlu (artist and co-founder

of the group Kanak Attak), who had been invited as a non-organized Muslim, withdrew as a participant of the Conference.[2] Zaimoğlu criticized the fact that not a single Muslim woman wearing a headscarf had been invited to the Conference and offered his seat in the DIK to a young self-confident Neo-Muslim woman arguing that if the participants of the Conference want to discuss Muslim women wearing headscarves, they should at least be present in the discussion (Cantzen, 2007; Zaimoğlu & Reimann, 2007). The issue became even more controversial due to the DIK's invitation to self-labeled secular-liberal Muslims such as Necla Kelek—called as an expert on Muslim women affairs—who is well known in the German public debate as a critic of Islam.

I bring this controversy up here to point out the complexity of the politics of representation surrounding the DIK, its linkage with racial and gender representations about Muslims, and the governmental functioning of the German state. The foundation of the DIK frames the political aim of setting representatives of Muslims in dialogue with the German government, and it claims to give a voice to Muslim communities. Yet, as the incident of not inviting Muslim women wearing headscarves exposes, this "giving a voice" also silences other positions.

Previously, I stressed Tezcan's (2011) criticism about the DIK's representational politics and the different registers about Islam as a religion, as a set of organizations in connection with the religion, and as the description of the whole population defined by a religious category. Tezcan (2011, 124) argued that the DIK's plenum structure responded to the DIK's representation of Muslims in the third sense, as a coherent population.

This constitutes one of the central, but productive, flaws of the Conference. Instead of exclusively engaging with Islamic organizations in the legitimate goal, protected by the law, to incorporate Islam as a Corporation of Public Law, the DIK addresses and thus politicizes the religious identity of a whole population. Yet, this structure of representation and addressing is useful insofar as it allows to the DIK access to spheres of life outside of the relation between a religious corporate body and the state. As mentioned above, projects against

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2 In Germany, in 1998 a group of scholars, artists, and political activists formed the group Kanak Attak. The first word, Kanak, refers to the derogatory word *Kanake*, which in Germany during the first years of the "guest worker" program was used to denote negatively "Southlanders", persons from Spain, Italy, and Greece. Afterwards, the term was mostly deployed as an insult against Turks, Kurds, Moroccans and all those perceived as "Middle Easterners". Kanak Attack emerged in the sociopolitical and cultural German context in 1998 in the midst of debates about multiculturalism and integration.

radicalization and extremism, integration in the labor market, guidelines for Muslim parents and couples about gender issues or strictly speaking even the training of imams do not constitute topics pertaining to the relation of the state with religious communities. Thus, the mere structure of representation embodied in the DIK's plenum becomes a political dispositif to expand state power with the aim of regulation and control.

The secular Muslim comes into the picture as a non-organized Muslim. Accordingly, in the DIK's structure she represents the section of the Muslim population that does not belong to an Islamic organization. This is by itself paradoxical since the non-organized Muslims are not a coherent group because "they" do not organize as such. However, the possibility of the grouping refers to a previous discursive moment in which "they" were biopolitically produced as a part of a subpopulation in Germany interpellated through its religiosity via the conflation of several categories: "ethnicity", country of origin, and religiosity.

Secular Muslims fulfill another crucial role for the DIK; they represent "authentic" voices of the Muslim community since they are also Muslims (Amir-Moazami, 2011a; Castro Varela & Dhawan, 2007; Shooman, 2014). In order to elucidate the DIK's political aim to reshape Muslim subjectivities regarding gender and sexuality, Schirin Amir-Moazami (2011a, 14) analyzed the invitation of secular-liberal Muslims by the DIK as representatives of Muslim women's affairs. In contemporary Germany, several voices problematize Muslims and Islam, however, what makes relevant the position of secular Muslims is the depiction of their critique as emerging from "within". In other words, the criticism is coming from Muslims themselves, and mainly focuses on the negative aspects of Islam for the lives of Muslim women, "secular Muslim feminists are considered 'authentic' representatives of a 'different culture' and at the same time its most credible critics" (Amir-Moazami, 2011a, 18).

The relevance of governmentality for understanding these procedures relates to the DIK's pedagogic approach, "which seeks not to sanction but normalize gender practices inside Muslims communities, through dialogue and education, and the attempt to smoothly but authoritatively transform Muslims into liberal democratic subjects" (Amir-Moazami, 2011a, 20). Accordingly, dialogue in the DIK illustrates Foucault's governmentality, as primarily drawing on strategies and instrumentalizing laws. Since the dialogue initiated by the DIK, "presumes Muslim gender norms and sexuality as somewhat disturbing, yet as not necessarily transgressing legality" (Amir-Moazami, 2011a, 20).

The function of secular Muslims appears as crucial for the objective of normalizing deviant pattern of Muslims' gender and sexual behavior. First, they are positioned as mediators between the German state and Muslim communities,

which "shows how the state has managed to produce normalizing agents 'from within'" (Amir-Moazami 2011a, 25). Second, they can produce knowledge due to their "internal" position, while still being Muslims. Finally, it can be added to Amir-Moazami's diagnose that they also serve as exemplary role models by fashioning themselves as integrated and normalized. They can be seen as the embodiment of the German-Muslim.

Motivated by Amir-Moazami's critique of the role of the secular-Muslim in the DIK, I want to pursue another direction by conceptualizing this figure as a native informant (Said, 1978; Spivak, 1999), thereby offering a nuance interpretation about the state as the only site of production of secular Muslims. For the German state is a crucial location due to the authority it imputes on this figure, the position it establishes for its statements, and how it disseminates its discourses, however, the subject also plays a role in its own constitution through processes of self-guidance, self-conduct and self-government. Refashioning and reforming under the scope of governmentality also presumes an active role of the subject in its own process of subjectification and constitution (Butler 1990). Besides, I want to pursue a line of argumentation in which the native informant is understood as a governmental procedure of subject formation, in which following Foucault, the emphasis is not on the individual, rather on the function a subject performs within a particular discursive formation. Therefore, secular Muslims perform the role of native informants, i.e., as producers of knowledge about Muslims due to their internal position for the purposes of governance.

Native informants stand in the middle of the Orientalist system of knowledge production and representation. As a discourse, Orientalism produces "a source of information (the Oriental), and a source of knowledge (the Orientalist)" (Said, 1978, 308). In this relation, the Oriental represents a passive object, she or he is to be studied and analyzed in accordance with what is already known about her or him. Instead of being passive objects of knowledge for the Orientalist, native informants represent a source of active knowledge. They can either produce knowledge by aligning their research or speech with the Orientalist cannon or give a stamp of authority to the assumptions of the Orientalist discourse on account of their internal position (Said, 1978, 308). The native informant is anOther Other, a subject of difference not entirely different.

It is possible to infer a second distinction in Said's thoughts regarding the native informant, namely, her or his alignment with the Orientalist canon. Particularly in contemporary academic production, "natives" of the Orient subscribe their research to the Orientalist dogmas, imbuing themselves in an aura of authenticity that emanates from their position as insiders, reifying the stereotypes about the Orient. Instead of being a source of active knowledge, the

native informant becomes a producer of knowledge. Both dimensions of the native informant presuppose a supplementary value in the knowledge and information retrieved or produced from this position. Both dimensions conflate religion or "ethnic"—racial—origin with identity and authenticity. And both contribute to the reproduction and circulation of Orientalist representations of Muslims (see also: Dabashi 2011).

Moreover, the colonial project of making native informants entailed the political rationality of forming a native elite, serving as the linchpin between the colonial rulers and the natives. In this role, the native informant also worked as a translator of cultural practices: this subject could transfer information to the ruler about the ruled by knowing the language, culture, habits and mindsets of the native. Thus, the native informant also served as a representative, in the political sense, of her group, silencing, by her representative claim, the multiple voices of the group allegedly represented (Dabashi, 2011; Jong de, 2016; Massad, 2008; Said, 1978; Spivak, 1999).

Within the DIK, the role of the secular Muslim as a native informant mostly focuses on the topic of gender inequality inside Muslim communities. As Yasemin Shooman (2014) exposes, the hegemonic representation of Muslim women in the German media is overdetermined by the Orientalist script, depicting and producing Muslim women in the middle of a tension between being submissive and potentially dangerous. Yet, this representation comes from "outside", and since the voice of the secular Muslim comes from "within", her speech is read as "authentic and legitimate".

As mentioned before, the notion of the native informant further illustrates the mark of race in the political calculations about the imam and the secular Muslim. The secular Muslim is represented as embracing the values discursively identified with the dominant society, and depicted as talking and behaving like the dominant subject formation; still her former identity cannot be entirely washed away. Something lingers, something that makes her position more relevant than a critic from the dominant society, and is precisely a racial sediment, which provides the source of authenticity. Discursively, the figure is constructed as displaced from itself, from its roots, though it is this displacement that makes the subject visible. The native informant remains, as Homi K. Bhabha (1994, 86) put it, "a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite".

The notion of the native informant is pertinent to understanding the role of secular Muslims in the contemporary project of reforming Muslims in Germany since these procedures seek "authenticity" and "representativeness" in the voices of postcolonial migrant elites, though, "between the 'authentic' white woman and the postcolonial 'mimic woman' the subaltern woman 'disappears'"

(Castro Varela & Dhawan, 2009, 330). These considerations can shed light on the role of secular Muslims within the DIK, and to question, for instance, how their authenticity and legitimacy to talk about and on behalf of Muslims rest upon the fixing and essentializing of their identities as native informants. Riem Spielhaus (2012) argued that the protagonists of the German debate about Islam tend to fall into two categories. On the one hand, secular Muslim women such as Necla Kelek, advancing a vociferous critique of Muslims and Islam. On the other hand, "male voices—favorably those who support the stereotype of the misogynist Islam—are quoted as opinion leaders and 'real' interpreters of Islam" (Spielhaus, 2012, 96). This has the effect of silencing "initiatives for reinterpretations of the Qur'an from a female perspective" (Spielhaus, 2012, 96). And the DIK is not the exception, at least during the first phase: only government representatives, the male leaders of the organizations, and secular Muslims like Kelek debated Islam and Muslims.

In an interview with Kelek about the headscarf, published on the DIK's web page, (Kelek & Donner-Üretmek, 2009), a short biographical note about her is presented, which states that Kelek was born in Istanbul and came to Germany when she was ten years old. This brief note, already locates Kelek in a particular position—as in-between—as an insider for talking about the Muslim headscarf, but also as an outsider due to her famous negative views on the topic and her alignment with the hegemonic discourse about the headscarf as a symbol of patriarchy. In the interview, Kelek was asked about her opinion regarding the use of headscarf as a message of self-determination:

> Your question is quite naturally based on the assumption that the headscarf is a religious symbol. It is however based not on the Koran, but only on tradition. According to the Koran, Mohammed wanted to protect his wives from harassment and advised them to cover their bosoms with a veil. The Islamic view is that people are unable to control their urges through reason, i.e. understanding, hence the recommendation that women veil themselves in front of men who cannot control themselves, so as not to sexually arouse them. So the headscarf has nothing to do with reverence for Allah, but with the Muslim culture of shame.
>
> KELEK & DONNER-ÜRETMEK, 2009

Here, Kelek locates the wearing of headscarves in tradition and the "Muslim culture of shame". These notions are highly problematic. Tradition has been a recurrent trope of Orientalist and racial historicism through which racialized subjects have been constructed as inferior due to their lack of modernity.

Tradition represents the opposite of modernity, both notions produce antago-
nistic subject formations: the traditional versus the modern. Tradition within
the Orientalist discourse establishes a series of deficits and problems ontologi-
cally fixed in the Muslim subject. It further constitutes the source of patriarchal
thinking, the deficiency of secularism, and a dimension influencing "Islamism"
and violence. In Kelek's speech, tradition links with a Muslim culture of shame,
which in turn ontologically anchors in a homogenous Muslim culture. As a
sign of tradition, the headscarf cannot be a symbol of self-determination.

The notion of shame is also part of the Orientalist discourse's repertoire,
particularly linked with the notion of Muslim honor and the anthropological
research on the Mediterranean around 1960 (for a critique see: Ewing, 2008).
Shame and honor are rehearsed as innate characteristics and values guid-
ing the lives of Muslims, structuring unequal gender relations among them,
giving primacy to men over women. Muslim men through honor embody a
non-modern (violent, patriarchal and repressive) masculinity, and shame in
women's bodies involves the internalization of the Muslim male-dominated
world-view. Shame represents a main ingredient in the subject formation of
the oppressed and submissive Muslim women, and opposes freedom and
emancipation. Likewise, Muslim honor and shame are sexually charged cat-
egories underlying traditional sexual practices in dissonance with freedom,
gender equality, and women's emancipation.

Furthermore, Kelek emerges in the discursive field as someone versed
in the Qur'an and having the rightful interpretation of it, implying that the
practice of wearing a headscarf is a misinterpretation of the Qur'an, in-
formed by shame. Kelek's argumentation renders silent the voice of those
Muslims wearing it and the different motives, reasons, and pressures to don
the headscarf. Paradoxically, Kelek's suggestion about the headscarf as a mis-
interpretation of the Qur'an implies that Muslim should follow the teach-
ings of the book literally, constituting one argument of the stereotyping of
Muslims and their inability to read actively and freely interpret the Qur'an
(Asad, 1993).

Furthermore, Kelek relies on and circulates a system of oppositions around
the simplistic notion of "the Islamic view" as unable to repress sexual de-
sire vis-à-vis the use of reason, updating the discursive colonial dichotomy
of the civilized versus the uncivilized, the traditional versus the modern, the
sexually repressed versus the sexually liberated. Moreover, she denies reason
to Muslim men, by claiming their incapability to control their sexual urges.
Thus, they emerge as hypersexual non-rational subjects unfit to repress their
sexual desires. This has been a common racial representation also applied
to Black male subjects (Collins, 1998; hooks, 2004; Partridge, 2012), in which

a wild sexuality ontologically fixes in an irrational-uncivilized male subject (Massad, 2008).[3]

In addition, different scholars have challenged the reductionist interpretation of imputing the wearing of a headscarf as a traditional and patriarchal imposition. Rather, they have analyzed the diverse motives, reasons, tensions, and structural conditions connected with donning a headscarf, as an expression of identity in the diaspora, as a reaction to the hostility coming from the majority society, as agency, or as a technique of the self, but also including the pressures to don it (Amir-Moazami, 2007; Nökel, 2002, 2005; Shooman, 2014). Actually, Kelek's next answer indirectly challenges the idea of wearing a headscarf as a sign of free will and agency:

> If Muslim women wear the headscarf of their own free will, however, then that is also their right. But they must be clear about the fact that, in doing so, they are sending out a quite specific message. They are saying, I am a respectable woman, my charms belong to my husband alone, I submit to him and have no wish to be bothered in any way. It is also a political message to German society. The headscarf has now become a political symbol, that of a Muslim identity which separates itself from the majority community out of religious, traditional, patriarchal motives. When I see the veiled young import brides walking behind their veiled

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3 In an interview with the German public-service television broadcaster, Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF) program *Forum on Friday*—a program that specifically targets at Muslims in Germany but probably has a wider audience—Kelek further argued about the consequences of the incapability of Muslim men to restrain their sexual urges on account of what the Qur'an allegedly stipulated. In the interview, she delved into her book *Himmelreise*, the national soccer team as an example of integration, Islam as an apartheid system, her own position as a Muslim, and also about the zoophilia of Muslim men, "The people [Muslims] do not have the ability to control their sexuality. This is particular true of men. In fact, a man is under constant pressure and must give in to his sexuality. He must empty himself, that's how it's called, and when he does not find a woman, then an animal will do, or any other possibility ... and this is well established in the population. There is consensus about this" (Kelek in: Safiarian & Kelek, 2010 [author's translation]). These kinds of statements, aside from their dehumanizing effects, are only possible to be uttered in a television program on account of a latent structure constantly circulating a racial image of Muslims. Said (1978, 301) while arguing about latent Orientalism pointed out that nowadays no one would dare risk to make the kind of statements that are uttered about Muslims with regard to other groups, and that is precisely one of the effects of Orientalism's cultural hegemony, i.e., how it is possible that someone can state that millions of Muslim men commit zoophilia due to their religion with such an authority on a national television program aimed to Muslims?

mothers-in-law in Berlin-Wedding, Cologne or Paderborn, I doubt that
they have chosen this veiled life of their own free will.

In Kelek's statements, an attempt to deny Muslim women's agency appears
again. This is accomplished by circumscribing their free will to a message
about submission to men and patriarchal structures and turning their choice
into a symbol of the unwillingness to integrate into German society. The idea
of unveiling Muslim women—here for the purposes of integration—is accord-
ing to Shooman (2014) align with the Orientalist discourse and the desire to
have access to Muslim women's bodies, and the headscarf stands as an obsta-
cle for the gaze that wants to see and approach them (Partridge 2012). Thus, the
headscarf represents an unwillingness to integrate, and therefore an obstacle
to integration politics and sexual desires. Kelek's speech collapses representa-
tion as a political proxy (*vertreten*), and as an image (*darstellen*). Kelek claims
to represent a regime of truth about the headscarf. She locates herself in a posi-
tion to talk both about and on behalf of Muslim women and provides an image
of them as oppressed subjects and unwilling to integrate.

Hence, Kelek's statements reproduce the wider structure of representation
initiated by the DIK, an agency talking for and about Muslim women with
headscarves but that does not include their voices and thus silences them. From
Kelek's speech, it becomes clear that the headscarf represents exclusively the
submission of Muslim women. Even though Muslim women decide of their
own free will, they only do so because they are determined to be submissive,
in other words, for a Muslim woman, truly free will can only be accomplished
without the headscarf. With it, she embodies an alienated subject aligning her
agency to the system that dominates and oppresses her. Then, the interviewer
asked Kelek about new fashion trends among young Muslim women, and in-
quired if this development can be seen as the search for identity:

A wide variety of options can be observed. There is the veil worn by fe-
male students as a political statement (Palestinian scarf) or, in contrast to
this, the Hermès turban combined for example with tight low-slung trou-
sers, presumably worn by the young woman wishing to be provocative,
an "Islam bitch". Hypothetically speaking, change is happening. People
are no longer asking "What should I believe?" but "How should I believe?".
As it is no longer certain what can be believed, since faith is less and less
consistent with experienced reality, outward signs of separateness and
identification become all the more important. Islam is becoming a style
statement. And in many respects: as strict separation from the western

world, as justification for the retreat into a counter-society on the one hand and, on the other, as an aggressive movement with the overriding aim of reinforcing the otherness and individual identity of young Muslims. These two elements of Islam-as-a-fad have one thing in common: the attempt to compensate with overly conservative or provocative dress, because there is no real sense of being sustained by religion. These young women stand out and like to be paraded as examples that the problem will solve itself. But what about those in the home, behind their mothers-in-law, their own mothers, hidden under headscarves, whose identity is not to exist in public—the fate of these women goes unheeded. But it should interest us. When we talk about the headscarf, they are precisely the ones we should talk about.

KELEK & DONNER-ÜRETMEK 2009

Kelek reduces the young Muslim women's different fashion trends (and motives behind them) as resulting from the disenchantment of the Islamic world—borrowing Max Weber's phrase—namely, the decline in the religious understanding of the world supplanted by the progressive and universal march of rationality. For Kelek, religion can no longer provide a reason for being; thus, young Muslim women react in a bifurcated manner. On the one hand, they retreat from Western society—Germany—adopting conservative fashion styles and self-segregating into counter-societies. On the other hand, they react aggressively, and "reinforce the otherness", i.e., by means of their self-segregation, Muslim women confirm their position as Germany's Other by emphasizing what makes them that way: their religiosity. These are the "Islam bitches" dressed à la mode and confident about their identity.

This is an unfortunate sexist phrasing, especially for an institutional advisor on topics of gender equality. In addition, the major problem with this argumentation resides in the reductionist portrait of confident Muslim women as aggressive subjects. The only way they can be agents, in Kelek's view, is without headscarves and integrated in German society. Thus, the depiction of young Muslim women links up with the widely circulated tension pointed out by Shooman (2014): Muslim women can either be submissive or threatening. Kelek adds to this representation an alienated agency. Young Muslim women's submission and aggression respond to their alienated will, as a reaction to the existential void that Islam cannot fulfill. Moreover, Kelek's reduces the religiosity of the young Muslim women to a temporary trend, and as such, one that will eventually disappear through integration in the future to come.

Afterwards, Kelek changes the discussion's focus towards the real victims: those women who do not assert their religiosity aggressively or conservatively.

The ones oppressed this time, not by the Muslim man, but by the Muslim woman, epitomized in the maternal figure. For these women, the headscarf does not symbolize an alienated option, but an imposition. Following Kelek's argumentation, these are the women who should be in the public debate, the ones who need to be rescued, or to twist Spivak's (1994) phrase slightly, saving the Muslim woman from the Muslim women.

In Kelek's speech, representation as an image and as a political proxy collapse. She offers a clear definition of the Islamic view as a culture of honor and shame and portrays three stereotypical forms of being a Muslim woman: the over-oppressed, the traditional, and the aggressive. This is in addition to her racialized depiction of Muslim men as unrestrained hypersexual subjects. Likewise, Kelek's statements position her as a political proxy since she talks for Muslim women when explaining their motives for wearing headscarves (alienation, disenchantment, oppression). She also speaks on behalf of Muslim in general when "clarifying" the Islamic view as a system of honor and tradition, and she even gives voice to Muslim men by deciphering the motives of their unrestrained sexuality. Hence, she also represents Muslims as a population, as following the same patterns of behavior since the time of the prophet but misreading his teachings. Then, again, racially characterizing Muslims as anachronistic subjects out of time.

It is important to underscore that the interview is located in the DIK's frame. The institution provides Kelek an institutional space to disseminate her ideas about Muslim women and headscarves, implying the DIK's tacit authorization of this vision. Kelek's positions align with the DIK's political project of integrating Muslims and dismantling their parallel societies. Her views about the headscarf match those of several federal states in which they are not tolerated in certain institutional settings. Kelek's authenticity emanates from her position as a native informant, as an authorized—in between—subject of difference, producing and circulating knowledge about Muslims for the purpose of regulation and control. Thus, Kelek has been also racialized, since an essence remains in her figure. Notwithstanding her embracing of so-called Western values, the aligning of her research to the Orientalist script, and even her racializing of Muslims, a remnant of being Muslim and having a "migration background" is still attached to her ontology, and it is the mere racialization of Kelek which provides the basis for the legitimacy of her speech.

The native informant subject formation provides hints about the entanglement of state power and the processes of self-subjectification, challenging the idea of the all-embracing power directed from the state, i.e., the state as the only agent producing subjects. The native informants involve an active role in their constitution via processes of self-guidance, self-conduct, and self-government,

and here, the state provides an institutional site of enunciation for the speech of this subject position, since the subject aligns with the state's purposes. Under this frame, the name Necla Kelek can be exchanged with someone else's name that fulfills the parameters of her subject position. The changing structure of the discourse reserves a position for the native informants. The DIK for its part imputes authority to these subjects, it establishes an institutional site for their statements and it disseminates their discourses.

I add one final theoretical note about the native informant, concerning Bhabha's celebration of the "mimic man" as a site of resistance and disruption of the colonial gaze.[4] Following Bhabha, on account of the ambivalence embodied in the mimic subject, its gaze can reverse the colonial gaze, "by now producing a partial vision of the colonizer's presence; a gaze of otherness" (Bhabha 1994, 88–89). In this line of reasoning, Kelek as a mimic woman would embody a gaze of otherness, thereby the possibility exists that her ambivalent presence can disrupt the hegemonic identity position. However, this celebration of ambivalence as resistance would exclude the regulatory effects of Kelek's speech, but moreover, it creates a veil upon how Kelek's speech silences the different voices of Muslims since they are reduced to submissive-yet-aggressive, alienated and hypersexual-yet-timid subjects. Moreover, especially the voice of young Muslim women disappears, their religiosity is diminished, and their agency depicted as a fad.

Thus, Kelek as a mimic woman, instead of being an agent of resistance or dissent, becomes a crucial subject in the legitimization of stereotyping and state political interventions. She iterates the imputed values of the hegemonic identity, but for the purpose of regulation, control, and consent upon them. Kelek has been portrayed as a freedom fighter in contemporary Germany who performs the "Germans' dirty job" (Kurbjuweit, 2010) i.e. the defense of their values against the intolerant Muslim. Thus, Kelek received the criticism for her arguments while the "Germans" can remain silent and avoid being called intolerant. The DIK delegates the criticism of the headscarf and its effects on women's oppression to Kelek. She can be bold about the topics, and the DIK only provides a site for the enunciation, authorizing the speech, but at the same time distancing itself from it because the utterance came from the Muslim "side". Since an authentic, though "liberal", Muslim depicts the problems of Muslims (in general), these are read as legitimate problems, setting up the basis for state interventions. At least in the case of Kelek and her position within the DIK, instead of resistance, her speech embodies stereotypes and regulative aims.

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4   Here I draw on Castro Varela & Dhawan's (2009) critique of Bhabha's (1994) mimicry.

Epilogue: The Time of Race, Racial Times

> In principle, as a process, integration changes both sides, both the majority society and immigrants. Integration demands a much greater level of adjustment on the part of immigrants, particularly in terms of attitudes of the receiving society that are based on German laws, German history and German culture. Acknowledging the German legal system and our value system and showing a willingness to learn and speak the German language pave the way for understanding and integration.
>
> DIK 2008, Interim résumé by the Working Groups and the round table, 1

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> A great deal still remains to be done before we accomplish the goals we have set ourselves, namely to integrate Muslims and their faith into German society so that Muslims living in Germany end up becoming German Muslims.
>
> WOLFGANG SCHÄUBLE 2008, Interim résumé by the Working Groups and the round table 4

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The above statements reveal the paradoxical nature of integration. The concept first divides the population, and in a second instant presents itself as the remedy for the division that the notion promulgated in first place. This paradox enables the existence and work of the DIK as the institution that would work upon the second part of the paradox, i.e. suturing the division and bringing the two poles together.

Integration, the argument goes, changes both sides, but the change should be greater from the side of the immigrants—Muslim citizens and noncitizens. Guided by the exclusionary and racially informed presumption of deficiencies in the immigrants' subjecthood, the DIK prescribed that they learn German, pledge loyalty to the German nation and, additionally, integration demands "a much greater level of adjustment", which should be attuned to the culture, history, and modern temporality of the German nation.

From this construal unfolds the project of remaking Muslims to transform them in such a way that they become German-Muslims. The racial strategy

to reform Muslims via integration implicitly reifies and circulates a fixed and homogenous conceptualization of culture. Muslims represent a collectivity that needs to be reformed due to some deviant cultural patterns of behavior and attitudes; the change should conform to the German guiding culture and the value consensus, discursively associated with the nation and the state. Culture, then, is constructed as a problem and as a solution. The Other's culture is troublesome and can be fixed through modern German culture.

The DIK's conceptualizations and deployments of culture are highly problematic. First, the DIK relies on a generalization concealing the enmeshed complexity of human life, which cannot be defined or understood by a single dimension. Second, culture depoliticizes social and political conflict by moving the source of trouble from social inequalities, process of exclusion and discrimination towards ambiguous cultural explanations. Third, this usage of culture has the effect of building two imagined, hermetic, and incompatible social bodies; inhabiting two hierarchically arranged distinct time zones. Fourth, this discourse presupposes that the single category of culture can explain everything about that Muslims do and think, from political attitudes to passions and historical developments, and that German culture can solve all the problems that Muslims represent, for instance, and in relation to "Islamist" violence, it naïvely presumes that violent messages cannot be conveyed or expressed through the German language. Finally, as I exposed, culture operates as a masquerade of race within the DIK.

The slogan of the DIK "Muslims in Germany–German Muslims" announces and captures the politics of time carried out by the Conference and analyzed in the preceding chapters. The first part, *Muslims in Germany* refers to the regime of representations analyzed in Part 1, namely the crafting of the racialized Muslim subject of the past, as a flawed, unfinished yet malleable figure, which until now has remained non-integrated.

A relevant form of producing the Muslim subject entails the crafting of its self and its culture as problems. The Muslim of the past is patriarchal, gender unequal, prone to violence and anti-Semitic, strict and coercive in the upbringing of children, and is ethnocentric because she or he only marries other Muslims. Furthermore, the Muslim community provides "the breeding ground" for the emergence of extremists, radicals, and "Islamists". Moreover, the loyalty of the Muslim of the past is unclear, as a subject torn between cultures, its attachment and belonging to Germany is compromised since it still longs for the country of origin. The Muslim of the past does not want to or has not been able to integrate.

The production of the Muslim of the past runs parallel to the discursive reproduction of Germany's homogeneity. The Muslim of the past represents

the heterogeneity threatening the national body. For this reason this subject needs to be remade, the German quality will be added to the Muslim self, and the DIK will suture the stitches healing the wound cause by these two formerly "antagonist identities".

At this point, the second part of the DIK's slogan enters, the hyphen "–", which symbolizes integration and stands for a vehicle driving from the past to the future. While the Muslim subject navigates the liner road delimited by the hyphen and aligned with the marching step of progress, it will unlearn the problems associated with her or his self and culture, as she or he learns the German language, law, culture, history, norms, and values. The hyphen thus symbolizes the transition from a state of being represented as pre-developed and unfinished towards a more "refined-superior" stage in which the qualities of being German have been added to the representation of the flawed Muslim being. Racial historicism codified the political project of becoming German Muslim, namely, the rationality of fixing the Other in a pre-historical condition vis-à-vis the historical development of Germany and the German identity.

Likewise, the hyphen highlights a different way of being German and to be included in the nation through the sewing together of two archetypical identities that were previously constructed as incompatible and antagonistic. In this book, I exposed how throughout the DIK's discourses run a we-they dichotomy. Yet, with the rise of the German Muslim, that moment will be buried in the past. The "German" versus the "Muslim" turns into a single identity that is neither "completely German" nor any longer "foreign Muslim". This is the novel, productive, and reformist approach of the DIK in comparison to previous politics of migration and integration. The work of the DIK is precisely to sew the stitches between these two identities by correcting an imagined self-enclosed form of existence—being Muslim—so that it resembles another imagined self-enclosed entity—being German. Yet, paraphrasing Homi K. Bhabha (1994, 86), the German-Muslim will be almost the same as the German, but not quite. Religion and "migration background" still mark it as a subject of difference; the German Muslim represents an approved Other that has been reformed and normalized.

Racial historicism presupposes the possibility of those racial Others to undergo historical development. The main objective of the DIK entails closing that gap to be the guide in the historical development of Muslims. The hyphen symbolizes the bridge, representing a sign of progress from an anachronistic time and space, in which Muslims are trapped due to their culture, towards modernity. Furthermore, the transition underlying the hyphen presupposes an additional actor, the guide that can help Muslims in their movement from tradition towards modernity, and the DIK in contemporary Germany fulfills that position.

Finally, the third part of the DIK's slogan pertains to the subject to come, *the German Muslim*, which as mentioned before required in the first place the production of the Muslim subject in which flaws, problems, and deficiencies were identified.

The German-Muslim of the future is a multifaceted subject. First, she or he is integrated into German society, which entails a command of the German language, culture, history and social conventions. This subject had learned secularism, and lives under the secular rule. As a part of the integration contract, she or he has pledged "full" loyalty to the constitution and the value consensus of Germany. He lives gender equality, she is emancipated, both have education credentials, gainful employment and do not interfere with the decisions of their children, which in turn take part in the sexual education, sport and swimming lessons and make school trips. These issues do not constitute a problem since all the German-Muslims including children have found the balance between religiosity and an integrated way of life. Regardless of age or gender, the German-Muslim will work side by side with the German security authorities. They regularly monitor their community in search of extremist and radical guises; they are the eyes on the ground for the security authorities.

The DIK situates itself and its projects in the time tension between past and present; as such its work is informed by a historicist racial regime attempting to close the temporary gap that divides the Germans from Muslim. The DIK's time is formative time, a time to unfold, as Wolfgang Schäuble argued, "We must give time to the Muslims" (Schäuble & Bahners, 2008 [author's translation]); the modern time of the Germans condescendingly offered to atavistic religious subjects. But this time, the time of the DIK, its past, present, and future are not categories chronologically ordered, successive and sequential in their progression. Rather, past, present, and future inhabit the discursive project of history-making and its political uses in the continual reconfiguration of the state and the relations it draws to its citizens and non-citizens.

In the preceding chapters, I presented an analysis of the regime of representation about Muslims produced by the DIK and a sample of print media whereby the Muslim subject is produced. The metanarratives of time and race mark this subject position in a pre-developed state, producing a series of troubles anchoring ontologically in the self of the Muslim and constituting it as a problem to be solved. This metanarrative has sustained the existence and legitimacy of an institution carefully designed to solve these alleged problems while attempting to craft a brand new Muslim-self. In this sense, my analysis of the DIK has underscored the need of approaching racism as an open, ongoing, and contested political discourse in constant remaking. A discourse that nowadays has at its disposition a wide range of imaginaries, emotions, and archives from which it draws on.

The complexity and plasticity of the DIK's discourses require to approach and think of racism beyond merely the instrumentalization of culture, or the optic operations of seeing racial difference. As Ann L. Stoler (2016, 239) argues, "racial essentialism may be constant but its content not". In the preceding pages, I unraveled the racial content operating through the DIK. The uses of time and history, claims of gender equality, nationalist fervors, accusations of anti-Semitism, and calls to defend German society have been folded into a polyvalent and dispersed discourse that represents Muslims and Islam as problems, and thereby legitimize manifold speech acts and practices of governmental intervention, exclusion, and discrimination.

The DIK as a power technology has also had wide articulating effects. It has prompted the creation of a linkage between different levels of government, universities, and Islamic organizations with the aim to train imams and teachers for Islamic education in public schools. In September 2011, the first generation of imams completed the social training specified by the DIK at the university of Osnabrück, and in October 2012, the same university opened the biggest—out of four institutes in Germany—Islamic theological center, offering bachelor, master, and doctoral degrees in Islamic theology, and a bachelor in Islamic religion designed for teachers of Islamic religion in public schools. Thus, now all the prerequisites have been established for the arrival of the imams and the teachers of the future who will take care of the next generation of Muslims. Thus, the DIK has been able to articulate the conditions to simultaneously avoid a catastrophic future, while setting the conditions to improve Muslim subjectivities, emotions, and desires.

Likewise, since 2008 the Prevention and Cooperation Clearing Point (CLS) has been operating nationwide, as one of the concrete materialization of the DIK's recommendations. The CLS articulates Muslim organizations with different security apparatuses, counseling and emergency pastoral centers of the police. As one result of the security partnership initiated by Hans-Peter Friedrich under the auspices of the DIK, nowadays a counseling center for friends and relatives of radicals and extremist functions throughout the country. In a similar vein, the DIK has prompted the reorganization of some Islamic organizations, leading to the formation of the KRM, an umbrella organization that represents 80 percent of the Mosques in Germany at the time of writing is still continuing to pursue the status of Corporation of Public Law.

These few examples illustrate the influence of the DIK on the rearranging of institutions, circuits of knowledge production, and the articulation of different agencies of the state. However, the DIK has also prompted a redefinition about the German nation and identity. By different means, the DIK has produced and reproduced a sealed-off conceptualization of what it means to be German, emphasizing a Christian, secular, tolerant, and gender equal character.

Germany as a country has also gained new meanings; recalling Schäuble's words "Germany is an integration land".

The discourse on integration continuously reshapes the character of the country, its policies, and different paths of inclusion and exclusion. Schäuble's statement succinctly epitomizes the DIK's approach because Germany, as an integrative geography, will turn "migrants" into Germans with "migration background", and for the case of Muslims, German Muslims with migration background—still anchored in a racially informed taxonomy organizing two types of being German, real and fictive.

The DIK claimed that integration is the key to the future; I claim that integration is the key to understand the work of racism informing the racial representation of Muslims in our present, the instituting of the DIK, and its variety of programs and projects insofar as integration comprises, articulates, and updates different technologies of power, a set of representations about Muslims and Germans, files from the Orientalist and racial historicist archives, new records delivered from the "War on Terror", and strategic and selective narratives about time, history, and gender equality. The discourses about Muslims, Islam, Germans, and Germany that produced the DIK and being reproduced by this agency reveal that the foundation of its architecture rested upon a racially informed we-they base, anchoring the unfolding of the DIK and being continually updated. Schäuble's statement "We want enlightened Muslims in our enlightened country" captures this assemblage. The perils attached to the promise of inclusion and enfranchisement under the fulfillment of the imperative of integration.

Another issue to highlight is the retrospective effects produced by the DIK. The initial structure of the DIK, 15 Muslims and 15 state representatives, was first embedded in rationalities about how to address the Muslim population in Germany, conflating and productively using the differences about the representations of Islam pointed out by Tezcan (2011). Second, this structure produced the retrospective effect of representing Muslims and Germans as two coherent and constant blocks in dialogue, in conflict, but also inhabiting two different temporalities. These representations have depoliticizing effects because neither the state nor the Muslims and the Islamic organizations are coherent groups with clear-cut boundaries. Common and different ideas, political views, life-styles, and many other dimensions permeate, contradict, and crisscross these artificially sealed-off groups in dialogue.

The non-integrated and pre-modern Muslim as a stereotypical subject formation is an ambivalent figure within the DIK and its discourses, causing friction with some of the Conference's ideas and procedures. The non-secular character of the Muslim subject ghostly haunts the DIK's representation of Germany as Christian; it is an uncanny figure that disrupts the DIK's narrative

of the imprinting of Christianity in the secular German state. Thus, the non-secular Muslim subject resembles the identity of Germany and Germans as Christian promulgated by the DIK in which nationality, identity, and religion collapse, yet it is the paradoxical resemblance of the non-secular Muslim what creates its repulsion as a pre-modern subject. The collapsing of religion and politics is a problem that the DIK ascribes to the Muslim subject of the past, disavowing the way the DIK defines itself, the state, and the German identity in a similar fashion.

The ambivalence of the Muslim subject also appears through the DIK's institutional silence about homosexuality and homophobia. As I showed, the DIK addressed each one of the problems that Muslims allegedly represent, strictly following line by line the discursive script proliferated in the public debate with one exception: Muslim homophobia. I exposed, following several authors that contemporary discussions about Muslims as a problem attributed them with an innate homophobic character, which in turn is made of the discourses about Muslims as intolerant, patriarchal, and pre-modern while the German identity is rendered as the exact opposite.

Despite the prominence of the discourse about Muslim homophobia in the public debate, and the attempt to inscribe this principle in state legislation via the naturalization or "Muslim" test in Baden-Württemberg as Nikita Dhawan & Maria do Mar Castro Varela (2009) documented, the DIK never addressed this topic, none of its representatives touched upon the issue, no minutes, programs, reports or studies were made. At least from its foundation until the mid of 2014, there is not a single reference to the topic. One of the effects of this silence entailed the erasure of the Muslim queer subject.

The DIK's silent reluctance to talk about homosexuality in general, and homophobia in particular, is even more striking on account of the publication of the report GZtM analyzed before, in which the DIK produced a set of guidelines to teach Muslims a tolerant attitude towards different gender roles and expectations, and different ways in which the relation between men and women should unfold. I stressed in that section that the DIK relied on, and by means of this reified an epistemological and ontological heteronormative framework strictly locating Muslims—but also Germans—in heterosexual categories. Moreover, the incitements to "inter-marriages" also provided hints about the DIK's heteronormative imaginary of the German society in general.

The silence about Muslim homophobia, despite its prominence in the public debate provides hints regarding the DIK's anxieties, which implicitly, via silence, decided not to address the issue. The stereotypical racial representation of the Muslim subject posed a challenge to the DIK, which was unable even to talk about one of the dimensions constituting this subject, because

that dimension also haunts the German state's institutional framework, which established differences between homosexual and heterosexual couples.

Another ambivalent figure haunting the DIK is the convert—the "native" German who decided to become Muslim. Throughout all the texts of the Conference there in not a single reference to them—despite the fact that Germans converted to Islam play a crucial role in some Islamic organizations and associations—with one exception: in the MLG study when defining and counting Muslims, the editors deliberately decided (and thus they needed to mention this group) to not include them in the analysis, although the MLG study's explicit aim of covering all of the Muslim life in Germany. I pointed out that this approach relied on defining Muslims as foreigners and not as practicioners or followers of a faith, being a Muslim was the product of an atavistic geography and not of a religion. The ambivalent presence of the convert disrupts some of the DIK's working assumptions. First and foremost, it silently challenges the ideas of culture and identity as sealed-off and static, and it introduces the flexibility and in-the-making nature of identities, their fluctuation over time, and the different points of identificational articulation.

Second, the ghostly figure of the convert defies the assumption that being Muslim and being German respond to geographical essences. The identificational fluidity in time of the convert posits the contention that being Muslim is not an essence, "something" that travelled from the Orient and inextricably attached to bodies. Thus, the figure of the convert also contests the DIK's definition of German as Christian. Third, the convert also poses a logical problem to the DIK's overall project, the plan to make German Muslims. The convert reveals the existence of German Muslims in the territory and exposes the DIK's racialized operative definition of the Muslims in which religion is not the determining factor, but rather a negative essence, being non-German, and by logical opposition by being German, one cannot be counted or considered as a Muslims—as the DIK did. The exclusion of the convert from an institution that claimed to engage with Muslims in Germany but which exclude them—and the topic of conversion—because of their nationality reveals the complex entanglement and collapsing of different categories in the making of a Muslim as a racialized subject.

Certainly, the issue of the conversion outside the framework of the DIK is a more complex issue shedding light on anxieties permeating national belonging, loyalty, and treason. But also because as Esra Özyürek (2010) exposed converts in Germany tend to move between the Islamophobia-Islamophilia tension, trying to distance themselves from "migrant" Muslims while asserting their love for Islam. What I am trying to argue instead is how the absence of converts in the DIK's procedures reveals some cracks in the argumentation

by means of ambivalence. The ambivalent figure of the convert introduces a disrupting aporia in one of the discursive anchors of the DIK, the imagined border, biopolitically created, between Germans and Muslims, and being Muslim as a racial and geographical issue.

Here, I tried to expose the discursive bridge linking the flexible formation of racism and the continual crafting of the state and its institutions. The DIK can be seen as the inscription of a particular face of racism, that against Muslims in the mechanisms of the state. However, this racial inscription is flexible and polyvalent. While it represents and targets Muslims as a violent threat within the borders of the German nation, it also addresses the "hostility against Muslims" although by diminishing the issue as merely uneasiness towards Muslims. Thus, on the one hand, the DIK represents the materialization of the discourse about the problematic presence of racialized subjects. On the other hand, as a state institution, it can through its different apparatuses detrimentally influence the structural and everyday racism against Muslims. The DIK can be a poison, a remedy, and simultaneously both for the current discourses racially characterizing Muslims in Germany.

In "Plato's Pharmacy", Jacques Derrida (1983) deconstructed the idea of pharmakon, and its set of polysemic characteristic, encompassing a cluster of meanings ranging from poison to cure. The pharmakon as a drug can function as a poison and as a cure (Derrida, 1983, 71–72). Following and reworking this idea, Gayatri C. Spivak (1999) argued that religion, culture, and nationalism as pharmakoi have been deployed both for secure domination and oppression and as points of articulation "by subordinate groups to consolidate dissent" (Spivak 1999, 91). These categories, including the state (Nikita Dhawan, 2013), can be deployed by different groups and for diverse purposes: securing domination, but also enabling dissent, being poisonous and curative.

Perhaps, the DIK can be seen as a pharmakon, this would entail thinking of and stressing the technologies of power deployed by the DIK as open struggles. For instance, although the introduction of Islamic education in public schools was framed by the DIK as an integration tool, and as immunization against "Islamist" education and its radicalizing effects (de Maizière in: DIK, 2011c, 14), the introduction of these courses can also be think of as the quest for rights, and as such, can have the effect of asserting the rights of those Muslims who want that their children attend these courses.

The DIK itself can be used to channel and subvert hegemonic power. This institution can be set in motion to problematize the problematization of Muslims itself and to signal both the different exclusions and discrimination that Muslims face in their everyday lives and the structural racism permeating German society. A first step was made in 2012, in which a conference organized

by the DIK was held concerning hostility against Muslims. Though, up to now the most prominent discourse about Muslims in Germany coming out of this institution continues to be based on the representation of them as "different", "problematic" and in need of guidance.

The German-Muslim subject can also be turned into a political category, one that can articulate different struggles, claims of enfranchisements and rights, and also it can challenge hermetic conceptualizations about what it means to be German, processes of discrimination, exclusion, racism, and violence, because the struggle for meanings and the relations of power are open fields.

In Germany, the hyphenated political identity of being Afro-German has been deployed by some groups, individuals, and organizations to challenge different forms of oppression against Black subjects, and as a point of maneuver through different projects of exclusion (Lorde, Rich & Stendhal, 1993). Certainly, every history of resistance is different in its own complexity. The point to highlight is that hyphenated identities can also work as a form of resistance, as a means to challenge hermetic conceptualizations of the state and the nation, and to push enfranchisement.

Accordingly, the racially informed project of refashioning the German-Muslim subject should be thought of as an unfinished and contested project, which entails its resistance, and perhaps more importantly its re-appropriation by those subjects targeted by state power. In other words, although the German-Muslim project reifies and circulates racial historicism this does not foreclose, first, that subjects can resist this process of subjection internally and externally, and second, that this process cannot be subverted or turned into a means to pursue different aims than those predicated by state power.

Although I stressed the formative side of the racial discourse in the project of fashioning a new subject formation, the previous remarks should not be forgotten, and future academic research should engage in the analysis of one of the many sides of the story, that of resistance, subversion, and appropriation. What should not be forgotten is that despite its effects on circulating racism and conditioning the enfranchisement of Muslims, the DIK is still a platform whereby Islamic organizations can claim rights, expose their concerns (although the DIK often did not listen to them) and channel their aims.

While I tried to analyze almost every project of the DIK, time, indeed time, posed some restrictions. Further academic research can inquire about the new phase of the DIK and its shift towards pastoral power, and the different articulations that will transpire under this new program.

Another point of departure could be the analysis of the complex assemblage and articulation prompted by the DIK involving universities, different levels of government, and Islamic organizations in the inscription of Islamic

theology in German universities as the basis for the training of imams and school teachers, and perhaps be approached as a re-articulation of German Islam politics in the attempt to produce an authorized version of Islam, but it could also explore the different challenges, tensions, and dissent about the project. In relation to this, future research might inquire about those imams being trained, about how they navigate and maneuver through the plan, and how these imams interact with their communities, and vice versa. In other words, what are the different effects of the creation of German-Muslim imams on the micro, meso, and macro levels?

Furthermore, as I pointed out before, the DIK represents the German case of a wider European trend to create centralized Islamic councils; as such, it represents a transnational phenomenon. Instead of addressing the transnational nature of the councils, I opted to examine one national case and provide a detailed portrait of this institution and its work. Aleksandra Lewicki (2014) and Christine Brunn (2012) already carried out transnational comparisons between Germany and Britain, and between Germany, Britain, and France respectively. The former focusing on social justice, citizenship, and integration, while the latter looked at the role of religion and religious organizations as vehicles for integration.

Another line of inquiry could emphasize the emergence of these councils as a soft method of the global "War on Terror". As mentioned, the discourse positing integration as a solution for "Islamic" global terrorism in Europe is currently circulating (e.g. Bassam Tibi's position). Moreover, considering only the DIK, I briefly exposed how integration as a preventive measure against extremism, radicalization and "Islamism" was the product of a bi-national experience in which the DIK evaluated and drew on the integrative measures of the Netherlands, revealing the transnational character not only of prevention and integration but also of the moral panic about Muslims in Europe. In addition, nowadays, Islamic councils also exist in Italy, Belgium, and Spain, cases that can provide points of comparison and dissimilarity with the DIK, and taking into account the role of the European Union as the meta-institutional frame in which the councils unfold. A further examination about the Islamic councils in Europe can explore the—perhaps—shared set of Orientalist and racial representations of Muslims, the way these discourse are attuned, changed, and modified in relation to particular national narratives, colonial histories, the Muslim presence within each country, and different historical events shaping the relation of governments with Muslim subjects.

Moreover, I could only focused on one of the many facets of the DIK's story: the reaction of the German state with regard to the Muslim presence in the

country. Thus, another point of departure for future research could analyze the reactions, maneuvers, challenges, dissent and consent of the Muslim organization participating in the DIK. The relation between the government and the organization was not always a "dialogue" as the official documents depicted. There were disputes about the use of terms, such as "Islamism", disagreements about the topics that should be included or excluded, e.g., the ZMD pushing the inclusion of the topic about racism against Muslims, while the DIK under Friedrich emphasizing national-security issues. Likewise, non-organized Muslims such as Zaimoğlu also criticized the DIK's approach. In addition to the open criticism and withdrawal of the ZMD, DITIB, and VIKS from the security partnership, proposed by Friedrich, after the dissemination of the racist Missing Person Campaign. I only had access to these moments of dissent through a contra-punctual reading inscribed in the documents produced by the DIK; thus, a further line of inquiry could engage with the voices of the Muslim organizations.

To conclude, I want to note two current political developments—June 2015—about Islam, Muslims, and Germany, one with a wider coverage than the other. On the one hand, PEGIDA emerged in the German sociopolitical landscape, and now has expanded its reach nationwide and transnationally, catalyzing a discourse about Muslims as the enemy of the nation, and the West. During PEGIDA Monday's demonstrations, the chant "We are the people" ("*Wir sind das Volk*") was uttered as a re-articulation of a racialized national belonging and practices of inclusion and exclusion. In a demonstration on the 1st of March 2015, some members of PEGIDA carried a banner, in which it could be read, "We—only we are the people—give the beat! The beginning of PEGIDA means your end!" (dpa/fp, 2015). Immediately after the demonstration, around 150 PEGIDA followers attacked the refugee camp in front of the *Semperoper*. PEGIDA represents just the most recent example of the articulation of a discourse moving with ease throughout Germany, carrying racism, intimidation, and promulgating fear and hate. The slogan and the ensuing actions point out towards the intensification of anti-Muslim, anti-migrant, anti-refugee, and anti-non-German climate, and one that can easily draw on and articulate global events such as the violence of the so-called Islamic State in the fueling of moral panic about the "violent" presence of Muslims in Germany.

On the other hand, as briefly mentioned, two German Muslim women, using institutional channels, successfully challenged the inscription of a gendered racism in the mechanisms of the state materialized as the ban on the headscarf for public servants. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has overruled the previous ban both as discordant with the religious freedom

and as an intrusion into the self-identity of the teacher (BVerfG, 2015). This case brought by two Muslim women is the best example to show how racial gendered structures can be challenged, subverted, and at least legally annulled. Both the existence of PEGIDA and Muslims fighting for their rights are part and parcel of the contemporary political horizon of the German nation, and the futures to unfold.

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