

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ISLAM

Series Editors: Hossein Askari and
Dariush Zahedi

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ISLAMICITY INDICES

The Seed for Change

Hossein Askari and
Hossein Mohammadkhan



Political Economy of Islam

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All Middle Eastern countries, with the exception of Israel and Lebanon, profess Islam, a rules-based system devoted to establishing just societies, as their religion. Islam's concept of justice is closely related to the degree of compliance with the rules prescribed in the Quran and implemented by the Prophet Mohammad (sawa). There are rules regarding justice in access to resources, production, exchange, distribution, and redistribution. Many verses of the Quran and the sayings and practices of the Messenger (sawa) make it clear that inequalities, whatever their source, must not be allowed to lead to extremes of wealth for the few and poverty for the many. Moreover, the governance structure envisaged in Islam requires full transparency and accountability by the state and full participation in societal affairs by all members of society. Yet Muslim countries today suffer from extreme inequality, high level of poverty, violence, and significant oppression. There is preliminary evidence to suggest that the main reason for this state of affairs in the Muslim world is the low level of compliance on the part of Muslim countries with the rules prescribed by the Quran and implemented by the Messenger (sawa).

The Palgrave series *Political Economy of Islam* will provide an accepted benchmark to demonstrate that the predicaments afflicting Muslim countries today are due to these states' deviations, in various degrees, from Islam's concept of justice. The series can also serve as an important contribution to building the foundation for fundamental reforms and just societies in the Middle East region.

Islamicity Indices: The Seed for Change (2016)

Hossein Askari and Hossein Mohammadxan

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Islamicity Indices: The Seed for Change



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and

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To all Muslims who are deprived of the opportunity to reach for their dreams

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Foreword

Islam is a rules-based system, with guidelines outlined in the Holy Quran and interpreted and practiced by the Prophet Mohammad. In this volume, the authors develop five Islamicity indices to measure rule compliance. These are Economic, Legal and Governance, Human and Political Rights, International Relations, and the Overall Islamicity Index, which is the combination of the four. These indices are designed to measure the features and attributes of a society that implements Quranic rules. The results indicate that seven northern European countries along with Australia, Canada and New Zealand are the best performing countries, with Muslim societies far behind. Islam provides a roadmap for a thriving society. The problems lie with Muslims, not with Islam.

The reasons for the collective failures of Muslim societies are many. Rulers, those required to be the most rule-compliant members of society, have used religion as a vehicle of control to serve their own interests. Individual Muslims have not taken charge of their religion and have allowed rulers and clerics to dictate what they must and must not do. Foreigners have supported autocratic rulers to serve their own personal and national interests.

These indices offer the seed for political, social and economic change. They summarize the features of a rule-compliant Muslim society. They are a benchmark for Muslims to hold their rulers and governments accountable. They afford a basis for Muslims to monitor progress. They offer hope for a peaceful turnaround in Muslim societies,

a better understanding of Islam in the non-Muslim world, and improved relations between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Hossein Askari and Dariush Zahedi

August 2015

Foreword

The contradiction between the wise, beautiful, serene, and rules-based message of the authentic voice of Islam enshrined in the Quran and the shameful, criminal behavior of those with the most vociferous claim to Islamicity has become glaring in our time. This despite the fact that the Quran, in no uncertain terms and in unambiguously terse language, condemns the behavior of those who profess Islamicity and act contrary to the prescribed rules of behavior. This contradiction is declared grossly repugnant to the Supreme Creator in Chapter 61, Verses 2–3 of the Quran:

61:2 O YOU who have attained to faith! Why do you say one thing and do another?

61:3 Most loathsome is it in the sight of Allah that you say what you do not do!

Many scholars have noted the inconsistency but it has only been since 2007 when Professor Askari and his associates began their attempt to get a quantitative handle on the degree and intensity of this contradiction that the shameful behavior of those who vociferously profess Islamicity has received widespread attention.

The result has been a major clarion call to Muslims and their collectivity. The present concise, yet comprehensive, book is a valiant effort to make a difficult subject accessible to the general public. It is a must-read for those who wish to preempt the Bernard Lewis-Samuel Huntington fantasy of “clash of civilizations” from becoming a reality.

Abbas Mirakhor

First holder of the INCEIF Chair in Islamic Finance

August 2015

Preface

In the aftermath of the tragic terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001, most commentators attributed terrorist attacks around the world to “Islamists.” Though unfortunate, such knee-jerk reactions were understandable in light of conditions in many Muslim countries—dictatorial and autocratic governance, little or no personal freedoms, subpar economic performance, social and cultural stagnation, a veil of injustice, and virulent anti-Western and anti-human-rights rhetoric of “Islamists.” Under these circumstances, while placing the responsibility of failed Muslim societies on Muslims may be understandable, its extension to Islam and Islamic teachings is a giant leap that has no basis in reality and poses long-term dangers for interfaith relations. Some extreme elements in the West go even further and imply, or even state, that the DNA of Islam is hatred, injustice, terror, violence, and backwardness. This is not the Islam that we have known or recognize. It was for this reason that we decided about a decade ago to look into Islamic teachings and assess their application in Muslim countries.

So we started to look into the political, social, and economic conditions of countries that profess Islam (countries that belong to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation [OIC]) and their adherence to the fountainhead of all Islamic teachings—the Quran. We wanted to know which Islamic teachings were practiced and prevalent in Muslim societies; in other words “how Islamic were Muslim countries.” We were not preoccupied with the percentage of a population of a country that

professes Islam and prays five times a day, but whether societies adhere to the principal political, social, and economic teachings of Islam, such as providing a scaffolding of justice and affording individuals freedom and equal opportunities to develop. So with this purpose in mind, we embarked on constructing Islamicity Indices. We delivered a paper on the topic in 2007, published two papers in 2010, and a third paper in 2013 on the topic.¹

To our surprise, this work has generated much interest around the world. These earlier papers have been downloaded thousands of times around the world and Muslims, especially young Muslims, have contacted us. The ideas have been discussed at Friday prayers, in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries. The prime minister of Malaysia adopted a Malaysian *Shariah*-based Islamicity Index beginning January 2015.² In 2014, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) sponsored two international conferences on “Shariah-based Multi-dimensional Development Indicators” in Saudi Arabia and in Indonesia, where about two dozen scholarly papers were presented.³ In May 2015, at the opening of an International Conference in Tehran, the president of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, voiced the opinion that Muslim countries should use Islamicity indices to monitor their progress toward achieving societies envisaged in the Quran. Our findings have been reported on the BBC, ARD (the German Public Broadcasting System), Irish Public Radio, and numerous other major commercial radio stations and on the pages of many major newspapers around the world. In February 2015, we were invited by ARD to give a forty-minute public lecture on Islamicity Indices and how they could be the seed for positive change, in the Muslim world and in relations between the Muslim and non-Muslim countries.⁴

Islamicity Indices provide Muslims with a benchmark to measure their progress toward reaching ideal Muslim communities as envisaged in the Quran and practiced by the Prophet Mohammad (sawa). They afford Muslims a yardstick to question their governments and rulers, a yardstick that could not be abruptly dismissed. Convinced that Islamicity Indices could be the seed for change in the Muslim world, we decided to write this book to provide a more comprehensive discussion of Islamicity Indices, give the results of improved and updated indices and discuss how these indices can be an important instrument for change in Muslim countries and in their relations with the non-Muslim World. We hope to follow up on this book with a dedicated website where we would report updated indices on an annual basis, invite others to upload their own

indices for all to see and compare and for interested parties to upload their comments and suggestions.

There is no one right index. Different indices serve different purposes. All indices have room for improvement in their construction and in the quality of the data and information used for their estimation. The transparent presentation of these indices and thoughtful conversation and debate is the path that could engage more and more Muslims around the world.

We hope that this book and the dedicated website to be developed in the very near future will be a spark for widespread debate on how best to develop efficient institutions and build the foundation for social, political, and economic progress in Muslim countries.

Notes

- 1 “Economic Islamicity Index,” Scheherazade Rehman and Hossein Askari, the 6th International Conference of the Middle East Economic Association, Zayed University, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, 14–16 March 2007.
 “How Islamic Are Islamic Countries?” Scheherazade Rehman and Hossein Askari, *Global Economy Journal*, Volume 10, Issue 2, May 2010.
 “An Economic Islamicity Index,” Scheherazade Rehman and Hossein Askari, *Global Economy Journal*, Volume 10, Issue 3, September 2010.
 “The Economic Development of OIC Countries: A Survey,” Hossein Askari and Scheherazade Rehman, in *Islamic Finance and Economic Development*, edited by Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor (Washington, DC: World Bank, July 2013).
- 2 “Malaysia Launches First Ever Sharia Index – Bernama,” *The Malaysian Insider*, 11 February 2015, <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/malaysia-launches-first-ever-shariah-index-bernama>
- 3 “IDB Group Seminar Calls for Shari’ah-Based Multi-Dimensional Development Indicators,” *Islamic Development Bank*, 15 May 2014, http://www.isdb.org/irj/servlet/prt/portal/prtroot/NewsAppEU.NewsDetails?idbNews=IDB_Group_Seminar_Calls_for_Shari%E2%80%99ah-based_Multi-dimensional_Development_Indicators.xml; <http://www.isdb.org/irj/portal/anonymous?NavigationTarget=navurl://a07714314550458aabo287888833e665>
- 4 “A Benchmark for Islamic Societies,” Hossein Askari, Hörsaal, *DRadio Wissen*, 8 February 2015, http://ondemand-mp3.dradio.de/file/dradio/2015/02/08/dradiowissen_a_benchmark_for_islamic_20150208_a799a3ac.mp3

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1

Introduction

Abstract: *Over a hundred years ago, Mohammad Abdou said: “I went to the West and saw Islam, but no Muslims; I got back to the East and saw Muslims, but not Islam.” Today the same words sum up what we explain in this book—the dimensions of Islamicity, or what Islam demands, and its practice around the world, to confirm that self-declared Muslim countries have not adopted Islamic teachings and have been left behind. In the chapters that follow we go on to show that the adoption and implementation of Islamicity Indices, along with a number of other initiatives, would enhance positive change in Muslim communities.*

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I went to the West and saw Islam, but no Muslims; I got back to the East and saw Muslims, but not Islam.

—Muhammad Abdou

Muhammad Abdou uttered these poignant words over a hundred years ago. The reason we have quoted him here at the outset is that the same words today sum up what we hope to explain—the dimensions of Islamicity, or what Islam demands, and its practice around the world, to confirm that self-declared Muslim countries have been left behind. We then hope to go on to show that the adoption and implementation of Islamicity Indices may enhance positive change in Muslim communities.

Beginning about ten–fifteen years ago, we started to hear the word “Islamists” to describe Muslims who were religious fanatics, hardliners, and fundamentalists. Even worse, acts of terrorism by Muslims were always, subtly and even not so subtly, connected to Islam. The backward state of many Muslim societies and their economies, including political and social freedom, provided commentators with ample ammunition. Unfortunately, many went on to attribute the failure of Muslim societies not only on Muslims but also on Islam. The Islam that they alluded to was not the Islam that we knew.

We asked ourselves how we would summarize the Islam that we knew to non-Muslims, or indeed even to Muslims. There was no readily available benchmark. Clerics, rulers, and governments insisted on telling Muslims what their religion was all about and discouraged any and all discussion and debate, and indeed in some countries even a simple question about the interpretations of the Quran outside state-sanctioned doctrines was deemed a subversive act and punishable under the law. Muslims were told to acknowledge the Oneness of Allah (swt) and Mohammad (sawa) as His messenger, to perform their daily prayers, carry out the Hajj pilgrimage if they were able, fast in the month of Ramadan as an act of self-purification, to contribute to the needy in order to cleanse their wealth, and maybe to simply “memorize” every word in the Quran for the most inquisitive and “religious” among them.

State-sanctioned interpretation of the Quran was not to be questioned. The teachings of the Quran were not to be debated and discussed as the philosophical foundation for establishing clearly defined institutions to enhance economic, social, and political justice, solidarity, and progress,

but instead was used as a weapon to control and rule. This is not to say that the so-called five pillars of Islam were not also essential, but these five more or less mechanical duties (with the exception of *Zakat*) are duties that are very much directed toward the *self* as opposed toward the broader goal of Islam in furthering the Unity of Creation and establishing just and flourishing societies. In reality many Muslim rulers actively work to impede effective institutions, as the effective institutions envisaged in the Quran and practiced by the Prophet with their scaffolding of justice would undermine their absolute rule.

In a recent two-part article, *The Economist* addressed the practice of capital punishment around the world.¹ The articles reported that capital punishment was on the decline everywhere except in the Muslim World. The author of the article goes on to raise a number of points. While the Old Testament assigns death as the punishment for thirty-six transgressions, the Quran lists only two—spreading mischief and murder; and in the case of murder, the murderer may be even spared the death sentence if the family of the victim forgives him. In Islam the death sentence and stoning are intended for a few very serious crimes.

Under the Ottoman empire, just one person was stoned to death in 600 years. But since the early 1970s, when only Saudi Arabia ruled according to the Koran, the trend has been for ever-harsher punishments. In 1979 post-revolutionary Iran brought in *sharia* (Islamic law); Pakistan, Afghanistan and Sudan soon followed... A bigger reason for reliance on bloody sentences, often carried out in public, is the instability that plagues the Islamic world... Reformist scholars... argue that the use of religion to cloak political decisions is distorting Islam to such an extent that some rulings contradict the Koran. Today adultery is punishable by stoning, whereas the Koran prescribes 100 lashes—and 80 lashes for falsely accusing another.²

So we had to go back to the Quran and the life of the Prophet Mohammad to develop a benchmark that represented the teachings of the Quran and the life and practices of the Prophet. We started working in the areas that we knew best. We began with researching and writing books on Islamic economics, Islamic finance, and most importantly on human and economic development in Islam. These books were based on the teachings from the Quran and the practices of the Prophet Mohammad during his brief time on this earth. One of us had been fortunate to have the opportunity to collaborate with a number of outstanding Muslim scholars (Zamir Iqbal, Nouredine Krichene, and Abbas Mirakhor) to look into various aspects of Islamic economics and finance.³ He then

had the fortune to collaborate and learn from Abbas Mirakhor about economic and social development in Islam.⁴

It was after a number of these books and numerous articles that we fully confirmed that what we understood as the essence of Islamic teachings had little to do with the practice of Muslim societies around the world and how Westerners saw Islam. There was no benchmark. Yes, there are the mechanical parts of Islam or the five pillars mentioned earlier, but there is much more to Islam that takes study, discussion, and self-examination. We needed a benchmark for measuring the practice of Islam, or a benchmark that could capture how a truly Islamic society should look like and how to measure how Islamic a society was, in other words, its “Islamicity.” So, we collaborated with a scholar of international finance to develop a number of indices that would measure the practice of Islam.⁵

Our first goal in writing this book is to give a preliminary answer to the question: How Islamic are Muslim countries? This is particularly important today since there is a growing misconception in the West that any shortcomings in countries with majority Muslim populations can be directly, or at least indirectly, attributed to Islam and that such shortcomings are a sign of some deficiency in Islam. Such conclusions have been put forward by a number of academics including Bernard Lewis (2003) and Timur Kuran (2007). Lewis blames Islam for lack of development and modernization in the Arab world, in its increasingly dogmatic rejection of modernity by many in the Islamic world, and in favor of a return to “a sacred past;” while Kuran argues that Islam and the Quran inhibit economic development due to “factors invoked as sources of retardation include fatalism, personalism, laziness, lack of curiosity, mistrust of science, superstition, conservatism, and traditionalism.”⁶ As to be expected, while some support the conclusions of Kuran and Lewis, others do not.⁷ Abbas Mirakhor is one economist who vigorously rejects their claims (Mirakhor 2003, 2007; Mirakhor and Askari 2010):

A survey of the literature on Islamic economics over the past few decades reveals a reasonable degree of agreement on at least two important and fundamental issues. The first concerns what Islam itself is about: “Justice and Equity.”⁸

There is no avoiding the fact that in Islam all behavior is rules-based, that ethical values underline the rules.⁹

[W]e have cited considerable evidence that Islam not only does not rule out economic progress, but that it clearly endorses several of the basic factors

cited frequently by Western commentators as essential in historic economic transformation—private property, recognition of the profit incentive, a tradition of hard work, a link between economic success and eternal reward. Thus Islam seems unlikely to rule out rapid economic growth or even the construction of a strong system more or less capitalist in essence. On the other hand, Islamic principles cannot readily, if at all, be reconciled with economic “progress” that is contradicted by blatant economic and social injustice in the context of general social welfare.¹⁰ . . . Work, however, is not only performed for the purpose of satisfaction of needs and wants, but it is considered a duty and an obligation required of all members of society.¹¹

These conclusions stand in stark contrast to those of Kuran. It is this very fundamental difference of opinions that underscores the need to shed light on the question before us, namely, how Islamic are countries that profess Islam and are “labeled” as Islamic, so that shortcomings are appropriately attributed to rulers, clerics, and governments (and their policies), culture, religion, or to some other combination of factors.

Our second goal is to provide broad explanations for the Islamicity rankings of Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Why is it that Muslim countries have performed so?

Our third goal is to provide Muslims with a practical benchmark to start a conversation about what their religion demands. What should be the characteristics of their societies if they follow the rules outlined in the Quran and practiced by the Prophet? What should be their contours? What are the essential institutions that Islam recommends? What should they demand of their governments to establish the just society that Islam recommends? What must they, individually and collectively, do to put the Islamic paradigm into practice? And what must they ask of their rulers and of themselves? How best to make their governments accountable? These are both individual and collective responsibilities for affecting change.

In this book, we propose to develop five Islamicity Indices that are more refined and more easily updatable than what we have done in the past:

- 1 Economic Islamicity
- 2 Legal and Governance Islamicity
- 3 Human and Political Rights Islamicity
- 4 International Relations Islamicity, and
- 5 Overall Islamicity (a combination of the earlier four indices)

These indices, as will be obvious, are and will continue to be a work in progress. No index that we could ever hope to develop could be a “permanent” marker. Instead, they are indicators that have to be continually debated and updated as new ideas and information become available. In this spirit, it is our hope that many such indices will be developed and overtime some consensus is reached on the elements to be included, but we would not expect or even recommend that the quest should be to arrive at one index with immutable elements and weights. To promote such an idea would be akin to doing exactly what we see as a dogmatic approach of many leaders in Muslim countries to stifle conversation, dialogue, debate, change, and understanding. We are afraid that this may still happen as Muslim rulers and governments see Islamicity indices as a threat and a Trojan horse that must be joined with their own politically motivated index to squash any and all debate and discussion. While we applaud the recent emergence of *Shariah*-based indices, we caution that Muslims should not develop these indices as a defensive mechanism. By including variables such as percentage of Muslims in a country, Friday Prayer attendance, and percentage of the population making the Hajj Pilgrimage in an index, a strong bias against non-Muslim countries is introduced. We urge academics to resist any “official” index from any source designed to stifle debate and change from the status quo.

After developing our indices, we will discuss the results, giving reasons for the prevailing conditions we observe in Muslim countries and recommend policies for a positive turnaround. For the future, we hope that our planned dedicated website would serve as a site where the indices are continually refined and updated to afford continuous assessment of conditions. We believe that these indices can be the seed for positive economic, social and political reform in the Muslim World, provide non-Muslims with a better understanding of Islam, and act as a bridge to narrowing the chasm between the Muslim and non-Muslim Worlds.

Notes

- 1 “On the Way Out—with Grisly Exceptions” and “Islam and Punishment—By the Book,” *The Economist*, 4 July 2015, 51–52.
- 2 Ibid.

- 3 This led to numerous books and articles, including: Hossein Askari, Zamir Iqbal, Nouredine Krichene, and Abbas Mirakhor, *The Stability of Islamic Finance: Creating a Resilient Financial Environment for a Secure Future*, Foreword by Sir Andrew Crockett, Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, 2010; Hossein Askari, Zamir Iqbal, Nouredine Krichene, and Abbas Mirakhor, *Risk Sharing in Finance: The Islamic Finance Alternative*, Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, 2011; Hossein Askari, Zamir Iqbal, and Abbas Mirakhor, *Challenges in Economic and Financial Policy Formulation: An Islamic Perspective*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014; Hossein Askari and Nouredine Krichene, *The Gold Standard Anchored in Islamic Finance*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014; Hossein Askari, Zamir Iqbal, and Abbas Mirakhor, *Introduction to Islamic Economics: Theory and Application*, Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, 2015.
- 4 This led to a book: Abbas Mirakhor and Hossein Askari, *Islam and the Path to Human and Economic Development*, Foreword by Ali Allawi, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- 5 Scheherazade Rehman and Hossein Askari, “An Economic Islamicity Index,” *Global Economy Journal*, Volume 10, Issue 3, September 2010; Scheherazade Rehman and Hossein Askari, “How Islamic Are Islamic Countries?,” *Global Economy Journal*, Volume 10, Issue 2, May 2010.
- 6 Timur Kuran, “Economic Underdevelopment in the Middle East: The Historical Role of Culture, Institutions, and Religion,” Department of Economics, Duke University, September 2007, p. 1.
- 7 Abbas Mirakhor, “A Note on Islamic Economics,” Islamic Research and Training Institute, IDB Lecture Series No. 20, Islamic Development Bank, 2007, p. 26.
- 8 *Ibid.*, pp. 10–12.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- 10 Abbas Mirakhor, *The General Characteristics of an Islamic Economic System*, New York: Global Scholarly Publication, 2003, pp. 45–46.
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

2

Fundamental Islamic Teachings

Abstract: *Islam provides the roadmap for just and flourishing societies where free individuals pursue their development with governments that are answerable to the community. The Islamic system differs from the capitalist market-based system in a number of important dimensions: greater degree of justice, higher moral standard, honesty and trust in the marketplace and in economic transactions, poverty eradication, a more even distribution of wealth and income, no hoarding of wealth, less opulence in consumption, no exploitive speculation, risk sharing as opposed to debt contracts, better social infrastructure, better treatment of workers, higher educational expenditures relative to GDP, higher savings and investment rates, higher degree of environmental preservation, and vigilantly supervised markets. It would be expected that these differences would be reflected in higher quantitative and qualitative economic growth.*

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First and foremost, the foundation, or the fountainhead, of Islam is the Quran. Second, the Prophet Mohammad's (sawa) interpretation and practice affords its application in the real world. The Quran and the practice of the Prophet provide humankind with the foundation and the rules to build a just and flourishing Muslim society. In this chapter, we begin with the foundational teachings and then draw out the rules prescribed.¹ In this chapter, we apply the rules to construct what we consider to be indicative indices for measuring Islamicity.

The Principal Teachings and the Rules of Behavior

The Unity of Creation and Freedom of Choice

There are four fundamental concepts supporting the Islamic system. The first is *walayahh*, the unconditional, dynamic, active, ever-present Love of the Supreme Creator for His Creation manifested through the act of creation and the provision of sufficient resources to sustain life. Humans reciprocate this Love by extending their love to other humans and to the rest of creation. The core activity of *walayahh* is love manifested through knowledge and the upholding of justice. The second is *karamah*, human dignity. The Quran considers humans to be the crowning achievement of the creation for whose individual and collective development everything else has been created. Humans are endowed with intelligence to know their Creator, to recognize and appreciate the universe and everything in it, and to understand the reasons for their own existence. The third is the *meethaq*, the primordial covenant in which all humans are called before their Supreme Creator and asked to testify that they recognize in Him the One and Only Creator and Sustainer of the entire Creation and all other implications flowing from this testimony. The fourth concept is *khilafah*: agency-trusteeship. Jointly, *walayahh* and *karamah* provide the basis for *khilafah*. The Love of the Creator endows humans with dignity and intelligence so as to manifest *walayahh* through the instrumentality of *khilafah*. *Khilafah* is the empowerment of humans by their Creator as agent-trustees to extend *walayahh* to one another, materially through the resources provided to them by the Creator, and nonmaterially through unconditional love for their own kind as well as for the rest of creation.

A number of verses of the Quran affirm the unity of mankind [1: 4; 13: 49; 28: 31].² These verses plus those dealing with the availability

of resources as well as human endowments are the foundation of the legislative framework of rules (institutions) for the socio-economic-political behavior of humans. Resources are created for all humans. The diversity of humans does not and should not mean their disunity. The most important dimension of the adoration of Allah is removing barriers on the path of other humans. For example, poverty and destitution are barriers for the poor on their path to reach perfection. Removing these barriers from the path of the poor is a demonstration of the *walayahh*, as in politics, by ensuring that no human is deprived of the freedom of choice by standing up for justice. Actions taken to ensure the ability of other humans to activate the gifts granted to them by their Creator is an act of adoration of the Creator.

Human and Economic Development in Islam

The concept of development in Islam has three dimensions: individual self-development called *rushd*, the physical development of the earth called *isti'mar*, and the development of the human collectivity, which includes both. The first specifies a dynamic process in the growth of the individual toward perfection. The second specifies the utilization of natural resources to develop the earth to provide for the material needs of the individual and all of humanity. The third concept refers to the progress of the human collectivity toward full integration and unity. Fundamental to all three is the belief that the Supreme Creator has provided the ways and means to facilitate the achievement of all three dimensions of development.

With regard to the physical development of the earth, the Islamic view would suggest that the Almighty would not leave humans without sufficient resources to perform the duties expected of them. Indeed, the Quran makes it clear that Allah has created sufficient resources to meet the needs of all humans at any time and He has done so dynamically, meaning that this sufficiency holds regardless of timeframe and population [49: 54; 8: 13; 3: 65; 21: 15]. Consequently, the assumption that at a general level humanity (macro) faces scarcity would be untenable. This, however, may not be the case at the micro level.³ As one of the important tests of human experience on this plane of existence, individuals, and groups of humanity experience conditions of plenty as well as conditions of scarcity [15–18: 89; 37–42: 30; 34–36: 34]. Allah's rules specify the appropriate response to these tests. The wealthy and

the opulent are those who are most susceptible to responding inappropriately. The Islamic view of scarcity is thus in contrast to conventional economics, where there is never enough to go around. According to Islam, there are sufficient resources if individuals *share*. With regard to exhaustible resources, Islam teaches that these are the heritage of all generations, and current generations must preserve the right of future generations—for every individual in each generation to reap the same benefit. Robert Solow reached a similar conclusion when he said: “The finite pool of resources (I have excluded full recycling) should be used up optimally according to the general rules that govern the optimal use of reproducible assets. In particular, earlier generations are entitled to draw down the pool (optimally, of course!) so long as they add (optimally, of course!) to the stock of reproducible capital.”⁴

When it comes to the development of the human collectivity, the Quran recognizes legitimate authorities in a Muslim society. The important point here is that those in positions of authority must be rule compliant if they are to oversee the implementation of the prescribed rules. Believers are the first to recognize the strength of the belief in such people and then by exercise of their free choice to follow and obey them. The Islamic concept places great emphasis on the need to focus human energy on the achievement of social solidarity and unity. The fundamental objective of creation is to create a society in which individuals become cognizant of all their capabilities, including the spiritual. The final objective of such a society is to ensure the actualization of the capabilities of humans to progress along the path to perfection toward their Creator.

Institutional Economic Structure (Rules of Behavior)

Corresponding to the objectives of the messengers and prophets, humans are to listen to the revelation with the aim of internalizing the rules of behavior (institutions) prescribed in the message, cleanse themselves of character traits unworthy of the human state, develop the earth [11: 61], establish social justice [57: 25], and finally, move from darkness into light [2: 257; 5: 16], and help others of their kind to do the same. All these outcomes humans can achieve by being fully rule compliant. We now turn to important Islamic values, such as abstinence from hoarding of wealth, and summarize the rules for property rights, market behavior, exchange and trade, and contracts and trust.

Rules of governance, accountability, and transparency; rules regarding property ownership and protection; rules regarding the formation and structure of the market; rules concerning the role of the state vis-à-vis the market; rules of behavior by market participants; rules regarding distribution and redistribution; rules related to education, technological progress, and society's infrastructure; and rules regarding sources of government income and its expenditures were all promulgated during the ten years of the Prophet's life in Medina. The central axis of design and operation of these rules is justice. The Prophet taught the responsibility of the individual and the collectivity. He particularly emphasized the equality of individuals before the law. The social contract with the inhabitants of Medina constituted agreed-upon procedures for administering society as well as procedures for the mutual support and defense.

The Prophet clarified rules of property rights over natural resources, and again as we shall see these rules shape the boundaries of distributive justice in Islam. Property relations are governed by a set of rules regarding rights and obligations. The first rule governing property relations is that everything in creation, including humans, is the property of the Creator. He has created natural resources for the benefit of all of mankind. The second rule asserts the rights of the human collectivity to these resources: "He it is who created for you all that is in the earth" [29: 2]; and "Do not give your resources that Allah has made you (responsible as) its preserver on to the foolish" [5: 4]. These two verses, and a number of others, establish the right of access to these resources by all humans. The third rule establishes that once the property is accessed and combined with work by individuals, a full right of possession of the resulting product is established for the individual without either the Creator losing His Original Property Right or the collectivity losing its initial right of possession to these resources. The fourth rule recognizes only two ways in which individuals gain legitimate property rights: (1) through their own creative labor, and/or (2) through transfers—via exchange, contracts, grants, or inheritance—from others who have gained the property rights title to an asset through their own labor. Fundamentally, therefore, work is the basis of the acquisition of right to property. Work, however, is not only performed for the purpose of satisfying one's desires, it is considered a duty and an obligation. The importance of work has been emphasized in over 300 Quranic verses and reflected in the *Sunnah*. An important corollary of the importance of work is a fifth rule that forbids gaining instantaneous property rights without having worked to earn them,

with the exception of lawful transfer. This rule prohibits property rights gained through gambling, theft, earning interest on money, bribery, or, generally, from sources considered unlawful [188: 2; 29: 4]. Although Islam prohibits debt-based contracts, it embraces a contract of exchange that allows risk sharing and consumption smoothing [275: 2; 29: 4].

Just as work is a right and obligation of all humans, so is access to and use of natural-physical resources provided by the Creator for producing goods and services. If an individual, for whatever reason, lacks the ability to work, it does not deprive him of his original right to resources granted to every human. Therefore, the rule of the “immutability of property rights” constitutes the sixth rule of property relations. Before any work is performed on natural-physical resources, all humans have an equal right and opportunity to access these resources. When individuals apply their creative labor to resources, they gain a right to priority in the possession, use, and exchange of the resulting product without nullifying the original property rights of the Creator or the rights He granted to all humans in the final product or the proceeds from its sale: this is the justification for the rule of sharing [33: 4; 180: 3; 36–37: 4; 5–11: 92]. The duty of sharing the product or the income and wealth proceeding from its sale constitutes the seventh rule of property relations, which relates to property ownership rights as a trust. This rule is operationalized through the ordained duties imposed on income and wealth, which must be paid to cleanse income and wealth from the rights of others. This is perhaps the reason why the Quran refers to these duties as *zakat*, from the root word meaning cleansing and purification, akin to tree pruning that simultaneously rids the tree of its undesirable parts and allows its further growth. The eighth rule of property relations imposes limitations on the right of disposing of property—a right that is presumably absolute in the Western concept of property rights. In Islam, individuals have a severely mandated obligation not to waste, squander, or destroy, or to use property for opulence or unlawful (*haram*) purposes, such as bribery. Once the specified property obligations are appropriately discharged, including that of sharing in the prescribed amount and manner, property rights on the remaining part of income, wealth, and assets are held sacred and inviolate and no one can force their appropriation or expropriation. While these eight rules strongly affirm mankind’s natural tendency to possess—particularly products resulting from individual labor—the concomitant property obligations promote interdependence and cohesion among the members of society. Believers are persons in

a relationship of reciprocity. Private initiative, choice, and reward are recognized and acknowledged, as legitimate and protected but are not allowed to subvert the obligation of sharing.

The Quran fully acknowledges the important contribution of markets and places great emphasis on contracts of exchange and trade. The Prophet implemented a number of policies to enhance the market mechanism and to encourage the expansion of trade. While Medina had its own existing market, the Prophet, with the advice of the leading merchants, selected a location for a new market for Muslims. Unlike in the existing market in Medina, the Prophet prohibited the imposition of taxes on transactions and individual merchants. He also implemented policies to encourage trade among Muslims and non-Muslims by creating incentives for non-Muslim merchants in and outside of Medina. The rules included, *inter alia*, and in addition to those mentioned earlier, no restrictions on international or interregional trade (including no taxation of imports and exports); the free spatial movement of resources, goods, and services from one market to another; no barriers to market entry and exit; free and transparent information regarding the price, quality, and quantity of goods, particularly in the case of spot trade; the specification of the exact date for the completion of trade where trade was to take place over time; the specification of the property and other rights of all participants in every contract; guaranteed contract enforcement by the state and its legal apparatus; the prohibition of the hoarding of commodities and of productive resources for the purpose of pushing up their price; the prohibition of price controls; a ban on sellers or buyers harming the interests of other market participants, for example, by allowing a third party to interrupt negotiations between two parties in order to influence the negotiations to the benefit of one of the parties; and a ban on the shortchanging of buyers, for example, by not giving full weight and measure.

The moral-ethical foundation of market behavior prescribed by the Quran and implemented by the Prophet was designed to minimize the risk for participants and increase the efficiency of exchange. Moreover, rules specified in the Quran regarding faithfulness and upholding the terms of contracts and the knowledge of their enforcement increased certainty and reduced the cost of contracts. The Prophet would advise the participants to go beyond mere rule compliance and to treat their fellow humans with beneficence. While justice in the market would be served by rule compliance, which limits and controls selfish behavior,

beneficence rises higher by actually sacrificing one's self-interest for the interests of others.

The Prophet emphasized that it is always the rich, powerful, and the opulent who are exploiters of other humans, who, in order to amass wealth, are the source of the persecution and suffering of the prophets and their followers.⁵ The Prophet is reminded in the Quran that the crucial aspect of his own mission, and that of the prophets before him, is to establish justice. In practical terms, the Quran is clear that this means creating a balanced society that avoids extremes of wealth and poverty, a society in which all understand that wealth is a blessing afforded by the Creator for the sole purpose of providing support for the life of all members of society. While the rich consume opulently, the poor suffer from deprivation because their rights in the wealth of the rich are not redeemed.⁶ Islam ordains that what is left after one has reached a modest living standard must be returned to the less able members of society as an act of redeeming their rights [7: 57]. Therefore, while Islam ordains hard work, the development of the earth and natural resources provided by the Creator, and the use of proceeds for the satisfaction of the needs of all humans, it prohibits the concentration of output in the hands of a few.⁷ Operationally, such an economy can be defined as the collection of institutions (described above), that is, the rules of conduct and their enforcement characteristics, to deal with the allocation of resources, the production and the exchange of goods and services, and the distribution and redistribution of the resulting income and wealth to establish balance and justice in society.⁸

As mentioned earlier, scarcity is not the problem; instead it is selfishness, the misuse of resources, and human greed that cause scarcity, poverty, misery, and destitution. Societies that reject divine law have institutions and power relations that allow significant inequalities, which, in turn, lead to inequality of income and wealth. It is the institutional structure of society that allows a pattern of wealth accumulation, creating abundance for some and scarcity for many. This is what creates social divisions, not natural scarcity. It is the institutional structure of society that determines the resource endowments of its members, which, in turn, determines the structure of their preferences and ultimately their economic behavior. Such an institutional structure combined with a poorly functioning process of self-development provides no opportunity for the self to transcend the focus of the self on "me and mine." Self-development is necessary to transcend selfishness. The Quran clearly

states the need for “a revolution in feeling or motivation” [11: 13]. The revolution, as defined comprehensively throughout the Quran, is a change toward compliance with the rules of just conduct for the individual. The “ethos of justice” is created in society by a critical mass of those whose behavior fully complies with the prescribed rules. We now turn to rules covering access to resources, production, exchange, distribution, and redistribution.

Although the Quran acknowledges that in His Wisdom the Almighty has created humans with differences, it also emphasizes that these differences are superficial and that the essence of all humans is the same. In a society in which there is poverty amidst plenty, the roots of inequality must be traced to distortions in the pattern of resource endowments, in the workings of the exchange, and/or distribution mechanisms and/or in the redistributive framework. The most fundamental among these is the pattern of resource endowment. This pattern determines the formation of individual preferences, which, in turn, determine behavior in the rest of the economy and in society. Individual preferences are not only influenced by the pattern of resource endowment, but also by the “ethos” of society. The ethos of society, in turn, is influenced by individual beliefs. The feedback processes between the pattern of resource entitlement, belief, ethos, and preference formation are complex, and distortions in these processes are highly consequential for the emergence of poverty, economic inefficiencies, and reduced economic growth and development.

Allah has ordained equally free access to resources by all humans and that the resulting income and wealth, which, by implication from the earlier principle, are also His Blessings, must not be hoarded, but must be shared with those who are less able to access the initial resources.⁹ This expenditure is over and above the mandatory portion of net income and wealth collected by the legitimate authority (*zakat*, *khums*, and *kharaj*).¹⁰ These charges are referred to as *sadaqat* from the root word meaning truthfulness and sincerity. Their faithful discharge indicates the strength of the sincerity of a person’s belief. These expenditures are essentially the repatriation and redemption of the rights of others in one’s income and wealth. It is for the good of the person paying them that they are ordained.¹¹ Since these expenditures are the repayment of what is the right of those who were unable, or less able, to access the natural-physical resources that the Creator has made available to all humans, it is as repayment of a debt without which one’s wealth would

be soiled. Redeeming these rights is a manifestation of one's belief in the essential axioms of the Oneness of the Creator and His creation. When one is granted the mental-physical capacity by the Creator to access more of these resources, it means others less able or unable to use these resources are in fact one's partners, whose rights in the final postproduction, postmarket proceeds have to be redeemed. The Quran affirms that because these are rights to be redeemed rather than charity, extreme care must be taken of the recipient's human dignity.

The next set of rules is for those covering contracts and trust. The key to market operation is decision-making autonomy. "Participation in exchange is voluntary; both buyers and sellers are able to veto any deal... [the choices of buyers and sellers] are not completely free though: they are constrained by the extent of their resources and by the rules of the market place."¹² The collection of devices that organize and support transactions—channels for the flow of information; laws and regulations that define property rights and enforce contracts; and the informal rules, norms, and codes that help markets self-regulate—he calls market design. A design that allows markets to keep transaction costs low, McMillan calls "a workable" market design. Appropriately, he argues that high transaction costs render a market dysfunctional. Two elements on which McMillan focuses as key to workable market design are the free flow of information and trust, both of which lower transaction costs.¹³

The rules prescribed by the Law Giver and explicated and implemented by the Prophet were intended to reduce transaction costs. As observed in the rules developed for the market of Medina, the Prophet ensured, through the propagation of the rules of market behavior, that there would be no interference with the free flow of information regarding the quantity, quality, and prices of goods and services in the market, and this to the point where he forbade a previous common practice of middlemen meeting trade caravans outside the city and purchasing their supplies before the caravans entered the market. Market supervisors, appointed by the Prophet, ensured that there was no fraud, cheating, withholding of information, or other practices that could lead to the malfunctioning of the price mechanism. Each physical segment of the market was specialized with respect to products. Prices were determined by competition among suppliers and every market was intensely supervised by a person called *Muhtasib*, a practice started by the Prophet. Market supervision was supplemented by guilds of each profession and trade.¹⁴ Supervisory devices were based on the rule-enforcement mechanism of commanding

the good and forbidding evil. These enforcement devices were fortified by the physical architecture of bazaars, which were constructed such that a grand mosque was located at the center of the bazaar. Every market participant, particularly the sellers, had an opportunity to attend at least two of the five daily prayers in the mosque, noon and afternoon. This was an opportunity for market participants to be reminded of their Creator, of their obligations to Him and to other humans, and of the accountability on the Last Day. Throughout the legal history of Islam, a body of rules, based on the Quran and on the traditions of the Prophet, has constituted a general theory of contracts. This body of rules covering all contracts has established the principle that any agreement not specifically prohibited by law was valid and binding on parties.

In a very important tradition, the Prophet says: “Three (behavioral traits) if found in a person, then he is a hypocrite even if he fasts, prays, performs bigger and small pilgrimages, and says ‘I am a Muslim’: when he speaks, he lies; when he promises, he breeches; and when trusted, he betrays.”¹⁵ Thus Islam demands much more than prayers from Muslims. There is a strong interdependence between contract and trust; without trust, contracts become difficult to negotiate and conclude, and costly to monitor and enforce. When and where trust is weak, complex, and expensive administrative devices are needed to enforce contracts. Moreover, it is well known that complete contracts—ones that foresee all contingencies—do not exist. Thus trust is an important element of a well-designed market. When and where property rights are poorly defined and protected, the cost of gathering and analyzing information is high, and trust is weak, it is difficult to clearly specify the terms of contracts and enforce them. In these cases transaction costs—that is, search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, contract negotiation and enforcement costs—are high. Where and when transaction costs are high, there is less trade, fewer market participants, less long-term investment, lower productivity, and slower economic growth.

One of the most important questions confronting mankind has been on what basis should economic resources be distributed? The answer depends on the underlying concept of justice and fairness, which, in turn, depends on the belief system. The concept of justice for humans is simple and unambiguous: justice is obtained when all things are placed where intended by the Creator! How are humans to know where the right (just) place is for everything? The answer is: follow the rules prescribed by the Creator.¹⁶ By the instrumentality of His *walayahh*, the Loving Creator

has provided all that is necessary for humans to achieve perfection of the human state. He has also clearly designated the path-to-perfection and has marked it with rules of behavior in all facets of human life. Rule compliance assures justice, which assures balance for individuals and for society. Compliance with rules, however, does more than create balance; it guarantees that humans draw near their ultimate objective, namely, their Creator. Morality, therefore, is a result of just behavior.

The Islamic Vision of Distributive Justice

The Quran's theory of justice is that societies do not need a separate theory of justice, and compliance with rules of behavior handed down in the Quran and interpreted by the Prophet *assures* the emergence of justice as a *natural outcome* of the practice of a rule-compliant society. Justice and a just political, social, and economic system is thus an essential outcome of the Islamic system if Muslims comply with Divine rules. Simply said, a society will be just in Islam if the rulers and the people are rule compliant. And in summary we could say that Islam has two simple propositions for a just society: (1) place things in their rightful position and (2) give everyone their rightful due. The first can be merged into the second. The rightful place and right dues are guaranteed by compliance with the rules.

Western writers have delineated the reasons for why rules and their observance are important. Their reasoning, though similar to each other, is very different from that the reasoning in Islam. There are numerous reasons for rules in Islam: establish social order; delineate for individuals what they can do as opposed to what they wish to do; reduce uncertainty and promote predictability; allow the appropriate formation of expectations; provide a reference structure against which fairness and justice of individual behavior can be assessed; and promote coordination, social cohesion, efficiency of the economy by reducing transaction cost, equal treatment, human dignity, and collective justice in society.

The Prophet (sawa) is constantly reminded in the Quran that the crucial aspect of his own mission is to establish justice. In practical terms, the Quran is clear that this means creating a balanced society that avoids extremes of wealth and poverty, a society in which all understand that wealth is a blessing afforded by the Creator for the sole purpose of providing support for the life of all members of society. And in the widely acknowledged words of the Prophet: "Authority may survive disbelief but

not injustice.” In the Quran, Allah emphasizes how He Loves truth and justice: “The word of thy Lord doth find its fulfillment in truth and in justice: None can change His words: for He is the one who heareth and knoweth all.”¹⁷ Islam did not invent theories of justice but *is* itself justice.

The central goals of Islam for the society are the welfare of all its members and socioeconomic justice. All members of an Islamic society must be given the same opportunities to advance; in other words, a level-playing field, including equal access for *each* member of society in *every* generation to the natural resources provided by Allah. For those for whom there is no work and for those that cannot work, society must afford the minimum required for a dignified life: shelter, food, health-care, and education. For those who cannot access the natural resources provided by Allah, society must preserve their rights, while preserving the rights of future generations. Thus Islam advocates an environment where behavior is molded to support the goals of an Islamic society: societal welfare and socioeconomic justice, with the goal of making humankind one, confirming the Unity of Allah’s creation. It is with the Unity of Creation as the goal that the Quran advocates risk sharing as the foundation of finance to enhance trust.

Allah could have easily created a world of total perfection inhabited by “perfect” humans that had no free will. But first and foremost, He created humanity as one, with individuals having freedom and freedom of choice, and equal and accountable for their actions. Thus Islam is founded on freedom, equality, and justice; and thus the conception of justice in Islam is founded on freedom and equality of humankind (Unity of Creation). He then gave humans bountiful resources that, if managed well and shared, could satisfy all human needs. As a result, the Creator is the ultimate owner of all things in this world. But He has placed humans above all else and made them trustees. Humans, as trustees, must obey His rules.

The most important economic institution that operationalizes the objective of achieving social justice is that of the distribution-redistribution rule of the Islamic economic paradigm. In practical terms, the Quran makes clear that this means creating a balanced society that avoids extremes of wealth and poverty, a society in which all understand that wealth is a blessing provided by the Creator for the sole purpose of providing support for the lives of all humankind. The Islamic view holds that it is not possible to have many rich and wealthy people who continue to focus all their efforts on accumulating wealth without simultaneously creating a mass of economically deprived and destitute. The

rich consume opulently while the poor suffer from deprivation because their rights in the wealth of the rich and powerful is not redeemed. To avoid this, Islam prohibits wealth accumulation and hoarding, imposes limits on consumption through its rules prohibiting overspending, waste, ostentatious, and opulent spending. It then ordains that the net surplus, after moderate spending necessary to maintain modest living standard, must be returned to the members of the society who, for a variety of reasons, are unable to work, hence the resources they could have used to produce income and wealth were utilized by the more able. The Quran considers the more able as trustee-agents in using these resources on behalf of the less able. In this view, property is not a means of exclusion but inclusion in which the rights of the less able in the income and wealth of the more able are redeemed. The result would be a balanced economy without extremes of wealth and poverty. The operational mechanism for redeeming the right of the less able in the income and wealth of the more able are the network of mandatory and voluntary payments such as *zakat*, *khums*, *kharaj*, and payments referred to as *sadaqat*.

Distribution takes place postproduction and sale when all factors of production are given what is due to them *commensurate with their contribution* to production, exchange, and sale of goods and services. *Redistribution* refers to the postdistribution phase when the *charge due to the less able are levied*. These expenditures are essentially repatriation and redemption of the rights of others in one's income and wealth. Redeeming these rights is a manifestation of belief in the Oneness of the Creator and its corollary, the unity of the creation in general and of mankind in particular. It is the recognition and affirmation that Allah has created the resources for all of mankind who must have unhindered access to them. Even the abilities that make access to resources possible are due to the Creator. This would mean that those who are less able or unable to use these resources are partners of the more able. The Expenditures (*sadaqat*) intended for redeeming these rights indicate the strength of the sincerity of a person's belief [2: 26; 2: 272]. The Quran insists that these are rights of the poor in the income and wealth of the rich; they are not charity [91: 26; 38: 30; 70: 25; 19: 51; 2: 177]. Therefore, the Quran asks that extreme care be taken of the recipients' human dignity of which the recipients themselves are fully aware and conscious to the point that they are reluctant to reveal their poverty. The Quran consequently recommends that payment to the poor be done in secret [2: 271–273].

Given the rules governing property rights, work, production, exchange, markets, distribution, and redistribution, it is reasonable to conclude that in a rule-complying and Allah-conscious society, absolute poverty could not exist. It can be argued that there are no topics more emphasized in Islam than justice and poverty and the responsibility of individuals and society to eradicate poverty. The Prophet said that poverty is near disbelief and that poverty is worse than murder.¹⁸ It is almost axiomatic that in any society in which there is poverty, Islamic rules are not being observed. It means that the rich and wealthy have not redeemed the rights of others in their income and wealth and that the state has failed to take corrective action.

The central proposition of Islamic finance is the prohibition of transactions in which a rent is collected as a percentage of a principal amount loaned for a specific time period without the transfer of the property rights, thus transferring the entire risk of the transaction to the borrower. The alternative is risk sharing, which allows both parties to reduce the risk of income of volatility and to allow consumption smoothing, a major outcome of risk sharing. It is generally recognized that equity participation provides a first-best instrument of risk sharing. While the beneficial and ethical attributes of Islamic finance are evident, most observers have largely ignored the economic benefits. Indeed, in the years between the two great wars, eminent Western economists, such as Keynes, raised serious questions about the stability of conventional finance. More recently, a number of economists are again questioning the stability assumptions of conventional finance, its debt-based characteristic and leveraging, and its contribution and the impact of financial crises on income and wealth inequality.

On the basis of the Islamic vision elaborated here, we expect the Islamic solution to differ in the following important ways from the conventional capitalist market-based system: greater degree of justice in all aspects of economic management, higher moral standard, honesty, and trust exhibited in the marketplace and in all economic transactions, poverty eradication, a more even distribution of wealth and income, no hoarding of wealth, less opulence in consumption, no exploitive speculation, risk sharing as opposed to debt contracts, better social infrastructure and provision of social services, better treatment of workers, higher education expenditures relative to GDP, higher savings and investment rates, higher trade/GDP, higher foreign aid/GDP, higher degree of environmental preservation, and vigilantly supervised markets. It would be

expected that these differences are reflected in higher quantitative and qualitative economic growth if the Islamic rules and objectives were adopted. One would expect a higher rate of growth because higher investment rate (as less hoarding of capital and absence of debt-financed consumption), higher educational expenditures, higher social awareness, better functioning markets, higher level of trust (lower transaction costs), and institutions have empirically been shown to be critical for growth. We must add that risk-sharing contracts in lieu of debt contracts are important in reducing the likelihood of financial crises and exacerbating income and wealth inequalities.

Finally, given the paramount important of justice in Islam, we again ask the question, how does Islam define justice? Justice thrives and proliferates when everything is placed in its rightful place and is achieved by simply following the divine rules. In order to generate genuine debate inside Muslim countries and thus be effective in bringing about the needed change, the criticisms of their policies and practices must be framed around the contradictions and inconsistencies of the behavior of these regimes against the *framework they are espousing*. In this way, first establishing the Islamic framework for a just society and then proceeding to compare policies and practices to this framework, any errors or failures can be readily identified and attributed. It is the institutional structure of society and its policies that allow a pattern of wealth accumulation, creating abundance for a few and scarcity for the many. This is what creates social divisions, not natural scarcity. It is the institutional structure of society that determines the resource endowments of its members, which, in turn, determines the structure of their preferences and ultimately their economic behavior. Such an institutional structure combined with a poorly functioning process of self-development provides no opportunity for the self to transcend the focus of the self on “me and mine.” Self-development is necessary to transcend selfishness. The Quran clearly states the need for “a revolution in feeling or motivation” [11: 13]. The revolution, as defined comprehensively throughout the Quran, is a change toward compliance with the rules of just conduct for the individual. In Islamic society, the state’s role is one of administrator, supervisor, and protector of society. It is the members of society who must develop themselves and ensure that justice prevails. Leaders and rulers are unlikely to change unless Muslims who have worked on their own development force their hands and compel their leaders to change course or be replaced.

Notes

- 1 This chapter is based on Abbas Mirakhor and Hossein Askari, *Islam and the Path to Human and Economic Development*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- 2 Quranic verses are referred to in the text as [verse: chapter].
- 3 A. Zaman, "Toward a New Paradigm for Economics," *Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics*, Volume 18, Issue 2, 2005, 49–59; A. Zaman, "The Ethical and Political Foundations of Scarcity," Draft Paper, International Institute of Islamic Economics, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan, 2005; A. Barrera, *God and the Evil of Scarcity*, Notre-Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2005; and Stephen Marglin, "How the Economy Is Constructed: On Scarcity and Desire," in *Social Inequality*, edited by Andres Solimano, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998.
- 4 Robert M. Solow, "Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources," *Review of Economic Studies*, Volume 41, Issue 5, 1974.
- 5 M.R. Al-Hakimi, M. Al-Hakimi, and Ali Al-Hakimi, *Al-Hayat, Maktab Nashr Al-Thaqrafa Al-Islamiyyah*, 6 Vols., Tehran: Maktab Nashr Al- Thaqrafa Al-Islamiyyah, 1989, pp. 285–318.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 3:211–214; 4:203–273.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 4:168–179.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 6:324–415.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 6:93–111.
- 10 *Ibid.*, 5:441–480; 6:33–92.
- 11 *Ibid.*, 6:66–75.
- 12 John McMillan, *Reinventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000, p. 5.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 9.
- 14 A. Metz, *Islamic Civilization in the Fourth Century of Hijrah*, translated by M. Abdil Hadi, Beirut: Dar al-Kutub, 1967, chapter 26; M.J. Kister, "The Market of the Prophet," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, January 1965; and H.H. Shihata, "Market Competition in Light of Islamic Sharia," Cairo, Department of Commerce, Al-Azhar University, 1977.
- 15 Al-Hakimi et al., *Al-Hayat, Maktab Nashr Al-Thaqrafa Al-Islamiyyah*; and Z. Iqbal and A. Mirakhor, *An Introduction to Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice*, Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, 2007.
- 16 Al-Hakimi et al., *Al-Hayat, Maktab Nashr Al-Thaqrafa Al-Islamiyyah*, 2:2–25; 6:324–451; and Seyed Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam*, translated by J.B. Hardie, Lahore, Pakistan: American Council of Learned Societies, 1953.
- 17 Quran 6:115.
- 18 Al-Hakimi et al., *Al-Hayat, Maktab Nashr Al-Thaqrafa Al-Islamiyyah*, 4:278–468; Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam*.

3

The Indices and Their Formulation

Abstract: *On the basis of the foundational Islamic teachings presented in Chapter 2, from the Quran and the practices of the Prophet, we categorize the important indices or dimensions of a rule-compliant Muslim society: economic, legal and governance, human and political rights, and international relations. In essence, our goal is to assess how well Muslim countries (countries that belong to the OIC and where a major percentage of citizens identify themselves as Muslims) perform relative to the teachings that they purport to uphold and relative to non-Muslim countries as indicated by our indices.*

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How Islamic are Islamic countries or what is their degree of “Islamicity”? In attempting to answer this question one must agree on the broad content of Islamic teachings and on the required conduct and behavior of those who could be legitimately classified as Muslims. Thus based on the foundational Islamic teachings presented in Chapter 2, from the Quran and the practices of the Prophet, we develop the important dimensions of a rule-compliant Muslim society. The dimensions are: economic, legal and governance, human and political rights, and international relations. In essence, our goal is to assess how well Muslim countries (member countries of the OIC, where a majority or a large percentage of citizens identify themselves as Muslims) perform relative to the teachings that they purport to uphold.

Before we delineate how we have divided Islamic teachings into the four dimensions mentioned (with overall Islamicity representing the fifth) and their components, we should briefly mention the important objections that some may raise about our effort to measure Islamicity.

First, some may criticize our approach because it does not conform to the *Maqasid Shariah* (the goal of *Shariah*—religion, life, lineage, intellect, and wealth). The foremost *Shariah* requirement is commitment to one’s Islamic beliefs. The acceptance of Islam’s fundamental axioms of *Tawheed* (unity), *Nubuwwah* (Prophethood), and *Ma’ad* (accountability) requires manifestation through commensurate action. *Tawheed* is recognizing *Allah* as the One and Only Creator and Sustainer of the entire Creation. It also implies the unity of creation and refusal of any kind of discrimination and disunity. *Nubuwwah* refers to the Prophets and Messengers entrusted with divine revelations for the guidance of mankind. *Ma’ad* establishes accountability and justice, for mankind will be judged and rewarded in accordance to their rule compliance or noncompliance. From the Islamic perspective, self-purification is not only crucial for professing *Tawheed* but also to enable development because it requires present consciousness and awareness of the self and its Creator. This ultimately leads to embodying Islamic virtues and compliance with the rules and principles prescribed by Allah. We believe that we have summarized the principal teachings of Islam from its indisputable fountainhead—The Holy Quran—and its accurate and indisputable implementation by the Prophet. But we have excluded some of the individual, or personal, requirements of Muslims as discussed in the next paragraph.

Second, and related to the first, there are a number of duties that are required of true Muslim—*shahadah* (only One God and Mohammad is

His Messenger), *salat* (daily prayer), *hajj* (pilgrimage), *zakat* (donating 2.5% of wealth each year to the poor and needy), and *sawm* (fasting in the month of Ramadan). We have excluded these elements for a number of reasons. Our goal is not to assess how rule-compliant individual Muslims are in their own self-purification and in their own oneness with the Almighty. Again, although Muslims must adhere to these “mechanical” requirements of the religion, these requirements with the exception of *zakat* do not directly impact the outward and observable characteristics of the societies that they inhabit and belong to. We want to determine to what degree Muslim societies have adopted and practiced the principal teachings, or in other words the philosophy and the rules, of Islam that affect society? Recalling how we started this book with the quote from Mohammad Abdou, *our goal is not to see Muslims but to search and see Islam*. Moreover, if we had included the five pillars, there would be a strong bias against non-Muslim countries (or more accurately countries with a low percentage of declared Muslims) in the index value, which may or may not exhibit the outward characteristics of a rule-abiding Muslim society. In the extreme, if we were include the percentage of the population who profess Islam as the variable to represent these duties of a Muslim, then we would at the outset be climbing up the wrong tree.

Third, some could argue that the principal Islamic teachings that we have summarized do not fully and accurately represent the characteristics, or the many dimensions, of a rule-abiding Muslim community. Of course we don't claim to have all the answers and to have correctly deduced the all-important teachings in Islam from the Quran and the practice of the Prophet. We are forever open to challenge and criticism. We invite other teachings to be added, some to be deleted, and new indices or benchmarks to be developed. We think that these are elements that can be deduced from the Quran and the life of the Prophet and generally represent the views of Muslim scholars as the most important teachings of Islam but with the one important exception that we have discussed earlier (i.e., setting aside some personal obligations of Muslims).

Fourth, even those that accept our presentation of foundational Islamic teachings may object to the breakdown (the elements) of what they mean in practice (Table 3.1). For example, a person may agree with us that economic justice is an essential principle in Islam but may disagree that this in turn means avoiding extreme income inequalities.

Fifth, even if there is agreement on the teachings and their elements, there may be objections to the information and data that we have chosen to represent these elements in the index (see the index, elements, and representation in Appendix 2). For example, even if a person agrees that extreme income inequalities must be avoided, he might disagree that this is well captured by differences in Gini Coefficients or in some other measure that we adopt. Along the same lines, there may be better data sources than what we have used.

Sixth, it should be noted that while there is clearly some overlap among the principal teachings, especially when it comes to economic principles, not only in content but also in terms of cause and effect, they still serve to highlight the areas of economic, social, and political success or deficiency among the Islamic countries. It should also be noted that it is problematic to precisely capture each of the dimensions of Islamic principles (and categories) with various variables serving as proxies that do not overlap. The proxies are not ideal indicators of the Islamic principles in question but they represent the measures that are readily available but may clearly overlap. It is hoped that time will at least allow improvements in having better proxies.

Seventh and a general problem with all indices is the importance or weights given to each element in the index in order to come up with an index. Of course, the more disaggregated the index, the less important is this problem. In our case, the International Relations Islamicity Index has less weighting issues than does the Economic Islamicity Index (which has many more diverse elements to be combined), which in turn has less elements than the overall index that also incorporates many dissimilar elements (economics, human and political rights, legal and governance, and international relations). We, like many others, took the least controversial approach, and adopted equal importance or weights for each of our elements within each of the four Islamicity indices (see Table 3.1). Again, anyone is encouraged to redo the indices using different weights, but at this point we do not have the required courage to take on this challenge! The only exception to this generalization is in the overall Islamicity Index. For the overall Islamicity Index (the combination of the four indices) we have used two weighting schemes. First, weighting the first three indices at the 0.3 level and international relations at the 0.1 level and, second, assigning 0.25 weight to each of the four elements.¹ While we believe that the International Relations Index should have a lower weight than the other three indices, we provide both sets of results.

Eighth, this should not be seen as a static exercise. These are indices whose construction can be improved. In cases where the missing information is limited, we have estimated the information from other sources, but in cases where it is extensive we have had to drop the country from consideration altogether. The availability of information (largely indices of characteristics such as freedom, poverty level, etc.) should increase with time, resulting in more accurate comparisons and in the inclusion of more countries. And of course, as the information is updated, the index should be updated. At this time, information is unavailable for a number of smaller countries. We have reported results for countries where we have information for at least 41 of the 52 indicators.

As we have said numerous times, a number of Muslim scholars have developed other indices since Askari and Rehman's original indices and papers.² Many of these, based on *Maqasid al-Shariah*, were delivered at the Islamic Development Bank's two conferences mentioned in Chapter 1. The essential justification for these indices is that they are based on the goals of *Shariah* and can be more readily justified than those based on individuals drawing out the principles directly from the Quran and the life of the Prophet. While we encourage diversity of approaches and competing indices, we worry that the entire project could be highjacked by "official" attempts to manipulate the results to suit rulers, governments, and clerics. For instance, while freedom and freedom of choice are essential in Islamic thought, official indices may focus narrowly on the economic dimensions (Economic Islamicity); and even then the official approach may downplay the importance of equal opportunity for all to develop but instead emphasize the number of mosques, the percentage of Muslims in the population, the number of pilgrims performing Hajj, the role of charities, and the like. According to us, in a rule-abiding Muslim community there must be political and individual freedom, no poverty alongside wealth, accountability of rulers and governments, and socioeconomic justice.

While the tendency may be to focus on the overall Islamicity Index, we encourage the examination of each of the four indices and their subelements. It is these subelements that provide more indisputable evidence and would be most useful for developing policies and practices to address shortfalls.

In Table 3.1, we present the components and elements of each of our five indices (we are still hoping to add items—for instance, a measure for abstinence from hoarding) if we can find the needed information. The

selection of these was first and foremost tied to what we have presented as Islamic teachings in Chapter 2, and secondarily on the availability of information and data for as many countries as possible.

TABLE 3.1 *Islamicity indices and their elements*

I. Economic Islamicity Index

- 1. Economic Opportunity and Economic Freedom**
 - 1.1. Gender Equality Indicator
 - 1.2. Economic Regulation Indicator
 - 1.3. Ease of Doing Business Indicator
 - 1.4. Economic Freedom Indicator
 - 1.5. Business and Market Freedom Indicator
- 2. Equal Access to Education and Health Care**
 - 2.1. Education Indicator
 - 2.2. Education Public Expenditures Indicator
 - 2.3. Education Equality Indicator
 - 2.4. Education Effectiveness
 - 2.5. Health Care Quality
 - 2.6. Provision of Healthcare Indicator
- 3. Job Creation and Equal Access to Employment**
 - 3.1. Equal Employment and Job Creation
 - 3.2. Labor Freedom
- 4. Property Rights and Sanctity of Contracts**
 - 4.1. Property and Contract Rights
- 5. Prevention of Corruption**
 - 5.1. Transparency International Indicator
 - 5.2. Freedom from Corruption Indicator
- 6. Provision for the Poor, Aid, and Basic Human Needs**
 - 6.1. Poverty Effectiveness Indicator
 - 6.2. World Giving Index
 - 6.2.1. Helping a stranger
 - 6.2.2. Donating money
 - 6.2.3. Volunteering time
- 7. Taxation and Social Welfare**
 - 7.1. Tax Burden as Percent of GDP
 - 7.2. Tax Revenue
 - 7.3. Social Welfare
- 8. Supportive Financial System**
 - 8.1. Investment Freedom and Financial Freedom
 - 8.2. Financial Market Risk Indicator
 - 8.3. Monetary Freedom
- 9. Adherence to Islamic Finance**
 - 9.1. Absence of Interest Indicator
 - 9.1.1. Central bank discount rate
 - 9.1.2. Commercial bank prime lending rate

TABLE 3.1 *Continued*

10. Economic Prosperity
10.1. Macro Economic Indicator
10.2. Price Stability
10.3. Economic Performance
11. Economic Justice
11.1. Income Distribution
II. Legal and Governance Islamicity Index

12. Legal Integrity
12.1. Legal and Judicial Integrity Indicator
12.1.1. Judicial independence
12.1.2. Impartial courts
12.1.3. Integrity of the legal system
12.1.4. Protection of property rights
12.1.5. Legal enforcement of contracts
12.1.6. Regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property
12.1.7. Business costs of crime
12.2. Military Interference Indicator
12.2.1. Military Interference in Rule of Law and the Political Process Index
12.2.2. Reliability of Police
13. The Management Index
13.1. Government Management
13.1.1. Level of Difficulty
13.1.2. Management Performance
13.1.3. Steering Capability
13.1.4. Resource Efficiency
13.1.5. Consensus Building
13.1.6. International Cooperation
13.2. Management of Natural Resources and Depletable Resources
13.2.1. Protection of Animal Rights
13.2.2. Environmental Health
13.2.3. Air Quality
13.2.4. Water Resources
13.2.5. Productive Natural Resources
13.2.6. Biodiversity and Habitat
13.2.7. Sustainable Energy
14. Government Governance
14.1. Voice and Accountability Indicator
14.2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence Indicator
14.3. Government Effectiveness Indicator
14.4. Regulatory Quality Indicator
14.5. Rule of Law Indicator
14.6. Control of Corruption Indicator
15. Perceptions about the Government
15.1. Actions to Preserve the Environment
15.2. Trust in National Government
15.3. Efforts to Deal with the Poor

TABLE 3.1 *Continued*

III. Human and Political Rights Islamicity Index

- 16. Human Development**
 - 16.1. Human Development Index
- 17. Civil and Political Rights**
 - 17.1. Civil Liberties Indicator
 - 17.2. Political Rights Indicator
- 18. Women's Rights**
 - 18.1. Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliament
 - 18.2. Ratio of Women to Men
- 19. Global Democracy**
- 20. Perception of Well-Being**
 - 20.1. Standard Living
 - 20.2. Safety
 - 20.3. Freedom of Choice
 - 20.4. Overall Life Satisfaction

IV. International Relations Islamicity Index

- 21. Globalization Index**
 - 21.1. Economic Globalization Indicator
 - 21.1.1. Globalization Index
 - 21.1.2. Restrictions
 - 21.2. Social Globalization Indicator
 - 21.2.1. Personal Contact
 - 21.2.2. Information Flows
 - 21.2.3. Cultural Proximity
 - 21.2.4. Freedom of Foreigner to Visit
 - 21.3. Political Globalization Indicator
- 22. Military/Wars**
 - 22.1. Militarization Index

V. Overall Islamicity Index (Summation of Indices I–IV)

Again, this has been weighted under two different weighting schemes:

Economic Islamicity Index (0.3)

Legal and Governance Islamicity Index (0.3)

Human and Political Rights Islamicity Index (0.3)

International Relations Islamicity Index (0.1)

and

Economic Islamicity Index (0.25)

Legal and Governance Islamicity Index (0.25)

Human and Political Rights Islamicity Index (0.25)

International Relations Islamicity Index (0.25)

In Appendix 2, we detail the precise proxy and the source we have used for each indicator in the elements of Table 3.1.

Notes

- 1 The other exception was in the Legal Integrity Indicator (12 in Table 3.1; we did not assign equal weights to 12.1 and 12.2 but gave Legal and Judicial Indicator a higher weight at 0.7 and 0.3 for Military Interference).
- 2 Scheherazade Rehman and Hossein Askari, "An Economic Islamicity Index," *Global Economy Journal*, Volume 10, Issue 3, September 2010; Scheherazade Rehman and Hossein Askari, "How Islamic Are Islamic Countries?," *Global Economy Journal*, Volume 10, Issue 2, May 2010; Hossein Askari and Scheherazade Rehman, "The Economic Development of OIC Countries: A Survey," in *Islamic Finance and Economic Development*, edited by Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013.

4

The Results—Islamicity Rankings of All Countries

Abstract: *As to be expected, Western countries dominate the overall Islamicity ranking with the Netherlands (1), Sweden (2), Switzerland (3), New Zealand (4), Denmark (5), Finland (6), Norway (7), Luxembourg (8), Australia (9), and Canada (10) rated at the top. Qatar (39) is the highest-ranking Muslim country, followed by the UAE (40), Malaysia (43), and Kuwait (46), with Muslim countries having a median ranking of 115 out of 153 countries ranked. These Western countries have adopted more of the rules that recommended in Islam: efficient institutions including the rule of law, respect for human rights and freedom, representative governments, better education systems and opportunities to develop the self, more prosperous economies with higher employment, and less poverty. Muslims have not taken charge of their own religion; their rulers are not rule compliant and have used religion as a vehicle to control. But none of the adverse results is due to Islam.*

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We report results for 153 countries. These are countries for which we have information on at least 41 of the 52 indicators (elements in the indices). We hope to add the missing countries as information becomes available in subsequent years.

Our results are shown in Tables 4.1–4.7 and in Tables A1.1–A1.7 in Appendix 1, with the scores and rankings for Muslim countries (or more correctly OIC member countries, Organization of Islamic Cooperation) shaded. Broadly speaking, the results indicate that Western countries, especially Northern European, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia, perform the best on these Islamicity indices. Muslim countries perform badly, with Malaysia and the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) generally the best performers among the Muslim countries. Of course and as to be expected country performance varies from one index to another.

These broad results should not be surprising. If one generally accepts the components and elements that we have included in our different indices, and if we are honest about it, we need no index, just eyes. But in order to have a leg to stand on and to be persuasive, a benchmark is essential. Recall what Mohammad Abdou said, with no data or indices, over a century ago: “I went to the West and saw Islam, but no Muslims; I got back to the East and saw Muslims, but no Islam.” Sure Western societies are far from ideal with elections and politicians bought by the wealthy in a number of countries, growing and almost obscene disparity of wealth and income, unemployment, pockets of poverty alongside unbelievable wealth, unequal opportunities (education, healthcare, and the basic necessities of life) whereby success or failure in the majority of lives determined in the womb, discrimination, corruption, and more, but compared to most Muslim countries, they are almost heavenly. It is for this reason that refugees the world over risk their lives to seek refuge in these high-performing Western countries. Sure Western countries have invaded other countries, sell arms, manipulate rulers in the third world, but just look at the regional conflicts around Muslim countries of the Middle East, with much of it due to Muslim countries’ policies and autocratic rules.

At the outset, we should emphasize that small differences in ranking, say from 1 to 5, is to us unimportant. But a ranking of 1 compared to 20 provides a big and noticeable difference in performance. We say this because the nature of these indices does not afford very accurate results. While rankings may be the easy result to note, the scores should be

emphasized as they provide a better comparator of countries. And once again, we emphasize that while the overall index and its ranking may be of most general interest, individual indices and the results of their subindicators (see Table 3.1) are even more revealing and accurate as they are not subject to the inherent weighting issues that arise with the four indices and with the overall index (we do not report the detailed result of the components of each because of space limitations).

Turning to the results in more detail, here are the highlights. First, the Economic Islamicity Index (Table 4.1) places the smaller Western countries (Northern Europe, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada) at the top (with Muslim countries shaded in the table). These are liberal democracies with sound institutions and freedom and opportunities for the individual to develop. These countries have extensive social programs and have excellent state-funded education system, an essential element for individual and societal economic development. They are market economies, but they are at the same time market economies with a heart! The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is the best performing Muslim country at number 36, followed by Malaysia (38) and the five remaining members of the GCC (Table 4.1 and only Muslim countries in Table A1.1) with the median ranking of Muslim countries at 101 (significantly below the 76.5 neutral point). Although oil revenues supported Malaysia’s early development, the six countries of the GCC have been totally dependent on exports of oil and gas. Moreover, the best performing Muslim country, namely, the UAE, has a score of 6.808 as compared to a score of 9.002 for Denmark the best performing country. This is a big difference if one takes into account that the UAE has the second highest GDP per capita in the world (albeit dependent on oil exports) and even the income from its external assets yields a very high income per capita for its nationals.

TABLE 4.1 *Economic Islamicity Index*

Country	Rank	Score
Denmark	1	9.002
Switzerland	2	8.933
The Netherlands	3	8.886
Austria	4	8.656
Finland	5	8.626
Sweden	6	8.625
Germany	7	8.506

Continued

TABLE 4.1 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
Canada	8	8.416
New Zealand	9	8.384
Norway	10	8.340
Australia	11	8.308
United Kingdom	12	8.249
Czech Republic	13	8.202
Belgium	14	8.090
Luxembourg	15	8.039
Ireland	16	7.989
Japan	17	7.910
France	18	7.909
Singapore	19	7.715
Estonia	20	7.671
Iceland	21	7.648
United States	22	7.635
Slovenia	23	7.610
Israel	24	7.336
Lithuania	25	7.303
Korea, Republic	26	7.222
Hungary	27	7.213
Poland	28	7.104
Malta	29	7.057
Hong Kong	30	7.011
Portugal	31	6.991
Spain	32	6.964
Cyprus	33	6.934
Latvia	34	6.932
Slovak Republic	35	6.931
United Arab Emirates	36	6.880
Italy	37	6.830
Malaysia	38	6.642
Romania	39	6.582
Chile	40	6.503
Bahrain	41	6.415
Qatar	42	6.357
Mauritius	43	6.304
Montenegro	45	6.209
Kuwait	46	6.114
Saudi Arabia	47	6.000
Bulgaria	48	5.962
Jordan	49	5.950
Croatia	50	5.934
Thailand	51	5.893
Greece	52	5.765
Macedonia	53	5.725

Continued

TABLE 4.1 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
Georgia	54	5.693
Uruguay	55	5.647
Trinidad and Tobago	56	5.500
Botswana	57	5.482
Turkey	58	5.384
Kazakhstan	59	5.379
Bosnia and Herzegovina	60	5.275
Serbia	61	5.193
Moldova	62	5.193
Peru	63	5.162
Mexico	64	5.147
Albania	65	5.130
Colombia	66	5.118
China	67	5.077
Tunisia	68	5.029
Mongolia	69	5.023
Azerbaijan	70	4.998
Costa Rica	71	4.974
South Africa	72	4.916
Jamaica	73	4.842
Morocco	74	4.819
Armenia	75	4.727
Philippines	76	4.676
Namibia	77	4.674
Belarus	78	4.634
Rwanda	79	4.579
Brazil	80	4.470
El Salvador	81	4.467
Russian Federation	82	4.438
Benin	83	4.431
Ghana	84	4.405
Panama	85	4.393
Kyrgyz Republic	86	4.371
Sri Lanka	87	4.265
Senegal	88	4.237
Swaziland	89	4.206
Indonesia	90	4.195
Tonga	91	4.189
Vietnam	92	4.186
Algeria	93	4.171
India	94	4.133
Ukraine	95	4.098
Burkina Faso	96	4.091
Niger	97	4.084
Lebanon	98	4.067

Continued

TABLE 4.1 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
Lesotho	99	4.021
Iraq	100	3.958
Gabon	101	3.928
Suriname	102	3.894
Cote d'Ivoire	103	3.893
Nepal	104	3.874
Guyana	105	3.777
Uzbekistan	106	3.766
Tanzania	107	3.762
Bolivia	108	3.696
Cambodia	109	3.669
Bangladesh	110	3.650
Dominican Republic	111	3.620
Egypt, Arab Republic	112	3.612
Iran, Islamic Republic	113	3.592
Pakistan	114	3.554
Ecuador	115	3.537
Lao PDR	116	3.493
Belize	117	3.474
Ethiopia	118	3.473
Togo	119	3.473
Syrian Arab Republic	120	3.455
Malawi	121	3.439
Paraguay	122	3.427
Nicaragua	123	3.374
Nigeria	124	3.362
Argentina	125	3.332
Madagascar	126	3.324
Tajikistan	127	3.296
Guatemala	128	3.200
Cameroon	129	3.193
Kenya	130	3.189
Uganda	131	3.158
Mali	132	3.102
Libya	133	3.078
Papua New Guinea	134	3.056
Afghanistan	135	3.046
Honduras	136	3.024
Liberia	137	3.004
Mozambique	138	3.004
Zambia	139	2.989
Mauritania	140	2.902
Yemen, Republic	141	2.873
Turkmenistan	142	2.812
Guinea	143	2.675

Continued

TABLE 4.1 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
Congo, Republic	144	2.542
Burundi	145	2.465
Venezuela, RB	146	2.341
Haiti	147	2.163
Zimbabwe	148	2.112
Chad	149	2.083
Angola	150	2.082
Sierra Leone	151	1.882
Congo, Democratic Republic	152	1.824
Sudan	153	1.755

Note: Median ranking for OIC members: 101.

Second, the Legal and Governance Islamicity Index (Table 4.4 and Table A1.2 for the ranking of Muslim countries only) again affords Muslim countries a low ranking. The same set of Western countries, with some change from the economic index, are at the top, with Singapore showing a strong performance and moving up to number 5. The median ranking for Muslim Countries is 108, only marginally better than the median ranking in the economic index. Qatar (15) and the UAE (21) perform marginally better than Malaysia (24) and Iran performs significantly higher (80) than it does on the economic index (113).

TABLE 4.2 *Legal and Governance Islamicity Index*

Country	Rank	Score
Switzerland	1	9.559
Luxembourg	2	9.493
New Zealand	3	9.267
The Netherlands	4	9.031
Singapore	5	9.009
Denmark	6	8.943
Finland	7	8.935
Norway	8	8.775
Sweden	9	8.731
Germany	10	8.723
Austria	11	8.576
Canada	11	8.576
Australia	13	8.557
United Kingdom	14	8.499
Qatar	15	8.325

Continued

TABLE 4.2 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
Ireland	16	8.219
Malta	17	8.118
Iceland	18	7.996
Belgium	19	7.955
France	20	7.887
United Arab Emirates	21	7.789
United States	22	7.759
Mauritius	23	7.557
Malaysia	24	7.456
Botswana	25	7.372
Japan	26	7.266
Spain	27	7.219
Cyprus	28	7.157
Chile	29	7.034
Portugal	30	6.988
Estonia	31	6.961
Slovenia	32	6.898
Uruguay	33	6.816
Kuwait	34	6.811
Costa Rica	35	6.748
Poland	36	6.539
Namibia	37	6.522
Hong Kong	38	6.457
Czech Republic	39	6.452
Saudi Arabia	40	6.424
Rwanda	41	6.394
Latvia	42	6.340
Italy	43	6.269
Korea, Republic	44	6.234
Jordan	45	6.163
Israel	46	6.117
Lithuania	47	6.095
Tonga	49	6.073
Georgia	50	5.891
Slovak Republic	51	5.833
Bahrain	52	5.752
Suriname	53	5.719
China	54	5.716
Turkey	55	5.689
Hungary	56	5.632
South Africa	57	5.553
Brazil	58	5.547
Thailand	59	5.466
Croatia	60	5.458
Philippines	61	5.452
Sri Lanka	62	5.387

Continued

TABLE 4.2 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
Montenegro	63	5.275
Morocco	64	5.199
Panama	65	5.117
Ghana	66	5.060
Zambia	67	4.943
Vietnam	68	4.943
Kazakhstan	69	4.877
Malawi	70	4.777
Nicaragua	71	4.771
Azerbaijan	72	4.760
Lao PDR	72	4.760
Tunisia	74	4.741
Ecuador	75	4.741
India	76	4.714
Bulgaria	77	4.711
Trinidad and Tobago	78	4.572
Macedonia	79	4.556
Mexico	80	4.542
Greece	81	4.540
Indonesia	82	4.518
Armenia	83	4.510
Iran, Islamic Republic	84	4.472
Jamaica	85	4.431
Papua New Guinea	86	4.417
Romania	87	4.393
Mongolia	87	4.393
Dominican Republic	89	4.376
Uzbekistan	90	4.303
Serbia	91	4.289
Tanzania	92	4.246
Senegal	93	4.213
Syrian Arab Republic	94	4.197
Cambodia	95	4.123
Belarus	96	4.118
Bolivia	97	4.099
El Salvador	98	4.090
Peru	99	4.066
Colombia	100	4.041
Turkmenistan	101	3.987
Moldova	102	3.843
Belize	103	3.739
Benin	104	3.725
Guatemala	105	3.693
Tajikistan	106	3.668
Algeria	107	3.655
Ethiopia	108	3.641
Burkina Faso	109	3.633

Continued

TABLE 4.2 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
Albania	110	3.627
Swaziland	111	3.619
Mozambique	112	3.617
Lesotho	113	3.559
Niger	114	3.527
Guyana	115	3.491
Argentina	116	3.491
Bosnia and Herzegovina	117	3.464
Uganda	118	3.461
Kyrgyz Republic	119	3.431
Kenya	120	3.396
Russian Federation	121	3.164
Gabon	122	3.156
Egypt, Arab Republic	123	3.113
Bangladesh	124	3.099
Libya	125	3.080
Venezuela, RB	126	2.996
Honduras	127	2.906
Sierra Leone	128	2.881
Paraguay	129	2.821
Liberia	130	2.721
Iraq	131	2.699
Nepal	132	2.663
Ukraine	133	2.601
Burundi	134	2.598
Zimbabwe	135	2.554
Lebanon	136	2.544
Afghanistan	137	2.478
Congo, Republic	138	2.367
Cameroon	139	2.328
Guinea	140	2.252
Mauritania	141	2.249
Mali	142	1.964
Togo	143	1.934
Yemen, Republic	144	1.906
Angola	145	1.901
Cote d'Ivoire	146	1.895
Nigeria	147	1.757
Sudan	148	1.648
Madagascar	149	1.506
Chad	150	1.473
Pakistan	151	1.329
Congo, Democratic Republic	152	1.147
Haiti	153	1.100

Note: Median ranking for OIC members: 108.

Third, in the case of the Human and Political Rights Islamicity Index (Table 4.3 and Table A1.3 for Muslim countries only), the top rankings are dominated by the same Western countries as in the other two indices, but most significantly, Singapore plummets to 37. The median ranking of Muslim countries drops from the Legal and Governance Index (108) to 113; and the highest-ranking Muslim countries are Guyana (49), Suriname (52), Albania (69), and Kuwait (72). These results should again be no surprise. The popular view is that human and political rights are not respected in Muslim countries with oppressive rule (hereditary and dictatorships) and absence of representative government. Most strikingly, Muslim countries of the Middle East (with some countries having vast oil/gas revenues) perform miserably, with only Kuwait in the top 76.

TABLE 4.3 *Human and Political Rights Islamicity Index*

Country	Rank	Score
Norway	1	9.850
Sweden	2	9.699
Denmark	3	9.529
Finland	4	9.438
The Netherlands	5	9.340
Iceland	6	9.314
Canada	7	9.222
Australia	8	9.176
New Zealand	9	9.157
Switzerland	10	9.150
Belgium	11	8.987
United Kingdom	12	8.902
United States	13	8.889
Germany	14	8.863
France	15	8.771
Austria	16	8.654
Ireland	17	8.621
Spain	18	8.601
Slovenia	19	8.425
Israel	20	8.412
Luxembourg	21	8.392
Costa Rica	22	8.307
Argentina	23	7.948
Poland	24	7.935

Continued

TABLE 4.3 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
Czech Republic	25	7.908
Italy	26	7.908
Lithuania	27	7.706
Uruguay	28	7.667
Croatia	29	7.601
Chile	30	7.601
Malta	31	7.510
Japan	32	7.497
Portugal	33	7.471
Estonia	34	7.379
Cyprus	35	7.144
Trinidad and Tobago	36	7.092
Singapore	37	7.085
Slovak Republic	38	7.039
Korea, Republic	39	7.020
Panama	40	6.804
Latvia	41	6.686
Mexico	42	6.654
Mauritius	43	6.647
Greece	44	6.588
Brazil	45	6.569
Belize	46	6.510
Serbia	47	6.464
Hong Kong	48	6.438
Guyana	49	6.405
Hungary	50	6.405
Ecuador	51	6.340
Suriname	52	6.190
Romania	53	6.163
Bulgaria	54	6.150
Peru	55	6.118
Montenegro	56	6.085
El Salvador	57	6.033
Jamaica	58	5.850
Mongolia	59	5.791
Bolivia	60	5.725
Colombia	61	5.654
Philippines	62	5.614
Thailand	63	5.601
Belarus	63	5.601
Moldova	65	5.497
Namibia	66	5.399
Venezuela, RB	67	5.353
Dominican Republic	68	5.314
Albania	69	5.288

Continued

TABLE 4.3 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
Paraguay	70	5.242
South Africa	71	5.092
Kuwait	72	5.085
Tonga	73	5.078
Kazakhstan	74	5.000
Macedonia	75	4.961
Malaysia	76	4.948
Nicaragua	77	4.928
United Arab Emirates	78	4.843
Indonesia	79	4.830
Qatar	80	4.771
Russian Federation	81	4.765
Ukraine	82	4.752
Ghana	83	4.745
Turkey	84	4.686
Bosnia and Herzegovina	84	4.686
Lesotho	86	4.614
Georgia	87	4.418
Botswana	88	4.405
Tunisia	89	4.392
Libya	90	4.359
Guatemala	91	4.346
Vietnam	92	4.314
Saudi Arabia	93	4.307
Uzbekistan	95	3.974
Senegal	96	3.967
Azerbaijan	97	3.824
Angola	98	3.817
Algeria	99	3.791
Papua New Guinea	100	3.745
Lao PDR	101	3.725
Bahrain	102	3.712
India	103	3.614
Turkmenistan	104	3.608
Bangladesh	105	3.562
Armenia	106	3.562
Honduras	107	3.536
Kyrgyz Republic	108	3.438
Zimbabwe	109	3.412
Tanzania	110	3.353
Haiti	111	3.320
Sri Lanka	112	3.314
Mozambique	112	3.314
Lebanon	114	3.281
China	115	3.196

Continued

TABLE 4.3 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
Nepal	116	3.170
Zambia	117	3.085
Jordan	118	3.078
Tajikistan	119	3.026
Rwanda	120	3.020
Iran, Islamic Republic	121	3.000
Cambodia	122	2.954
Kenya	123	2.935
Swaziland	124	2.895
Malawi	125	2.791
Gabon	126	2.752
Iraq	127	2.673
Morocco	128	2.667
Pakistan	129	2.608
Uganda	130	2.569
Liberia	131	2.523
Nigeria	132	2.458
Benin	133	2.458
Ethiopia	134	2.405
Sudan	135	2.386
Sierra Leone	136	2.359
Mauritania	137	2.320
Congo, Republic	138	2.261
Cameroon	139	2.209
Afghanistan	140	2.190
Madagascar	141	2.144
Burkina Faso	142	2.124
Burundi	143	2.092
Egypt, Arab Republic	144	1.863
Niger	145	1.810
Mali	146	1.791
Congo, Democratic Republic	147	1.725
Togo	148	1.490
Cote d'Ivoire	149	1.458
Chad	150	1.418
Guinea	151	1.301
Syrian Arab Republic	152	1.170
Yemen, Republic	153	0.935

Note: Median ranking for OIC members: 113.

Fourth, when it comes to the International Relations Index, the set of high-performing countries is somewhat different from those in the three previous indices, and smaller countries with low level

of militarization shine. Moreover, the highest-performing Muslim countries are Nigeria (15), Albania (30), Senegal (34), Qatar (45), and Iran falls all the way to near the bottom at 150. The median ranking for Muslim countries is 109.5.

TABLE 4.4 *International Relations Islamicity Index*

Country	Rank	Score
Iceland	1	8.660
Malta	2	8.627
Ireland	3	8.497
Panama	4	8.235
The Netherlands	5	8.105
Luxembourg	6	7.876
Costa Rica	6	7.876
Sweden	8	7.810
Belgium	9	7.745
Czech Republic	10	7.582
Mauritius	11	7.418
Canada	12	7.386
Slovak Republic	12	7.386
New Zealand	14	7.353
Nigeria	15	7.222
Spain	16	7.190
Germany	17	7.124
Trinidad and Tobago	18	7.092
Jamaica	19	7.026
Austria	20	6.961
Dominican Republic	21	6.765
Hungary	22	6.732
Ghana	23	6.569
Poland	24	6.569
South Africa	25	6.536
United Kingdom	26	6.471
Italy	27	6.438
Mexico	28	6.373
Japan	29	6.340
Albania	30	6.176
Guatemala	30	6.176
Latvia	32	6.144
Australia	33	6.111
Senegal	34	6.046
Denmark	35	6.013
France	36	6.013
Switzerland	37	5.980
Zimbabwe	38	5.948

Continued

TABLE 4.4 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
Argentina	39	5.915
Croatia	40	5.882
Zambia	40	5.882
Cote d'Ivoire	42	5.882
Papua New Guinea	43	5.817
Qatar	44	5.784
Slovenia	45	5.752
Malaysia	45	5.752
Lithuania	47	5.719
Philippines	47	5.719
Honduras	47	5.719
Lesotho	50	5.654
El Salvador	51	5.621
Portugal	52	5.588
Moldova	52	5.588
China	52	5.588
Kenya	52	5.588
Uruguay	56	5.523
Swaziland	57	5.490
Togo	57	5.490
Malawi	59	5.425
Norway	60	5.392
Nicaragua	60	5.392
Guyana	62	5.359
Indonesia	62	5.359
Mozambique	62	5.359
Burkina Faso	62	5.359
Mali	62	5.359
Bosnia and Herzegovina	67	5.327
Madagascar	68	5.294
Montenegro	69	5.229
Sierra Leone	70	5.163
Tunisia	71	5.163
Haiti	72	5.131
Chile	73	5.098
Benin	73	5.098
Libya	75	5.065
Cameroon	75	5.065
Niger	77	5.000
Finland	78	4.967
Romania	79	4.935
Guinea	79	4.935
United Arab Emirates	81	4.935
Brazil	82	4.902
Singapore	83	4.869

Continued

TABLE 4.4 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
United States	84	4.837
Liberia	84	4.837
Estonia	86	4.804
Cyprus	86	4.804
Kazakhstan	88	4.739
Uganda	89	4.673
Bangladesh	90	4.641
Congo, Republic	91	4.608
Peru	92	4.575
Gabon	92	4.575
Thailand	94	4.542
Bulgaria	95	4.510
Rwanda	95	4.510
Greece	97	4.477
Bolivia	98	4.444
Georgia	98	4.444
Tanzania	100	4.412
Ethiopia	101	4.346
Turkey	102	4.314
India	102	4.314
Serbia	104	4.281
Hong Kong	105	4.248
Tonga	105	4.248
Congo, Democratic Republic	107	4.183
Venezuela, RB	108	4.150
Paraguay	108	4.150
Lebanon	108	4.150
Namibia	111	4.085
Sudan	111	4.085
Macedonia	113	4.052
Israel	114	4.052
Bahrain	114	4.052
Kuwait	116	4.020
Kyrgyz Republic	117	3.987
Saudi Arabia	118	3.954
Ukraine	119	3.856
Pakistan	119	3.856
Jordan	121	3.856
Nepal	122	3.758
Morocco	122	3.758
Colombia	124	3.725
Suriname	125	3.693
Chad	126	3.627
Lao PDR	127	3.595

Continued

TABLE 4.4 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
Russian Federation	128	3.562
Burundi	129	3.464
Ecuador	130	3.366
Cambodia	131	3.333
Korea, Republic	133	3.235
Egypt, Arab Republic	134	3.203
Mauritania	135	3.137
Sri Lanka	136	2.974
Botswana	137	2.745
Mongolia	138	2.712
Azerbaijan	139	2.549
Yemen, Republic	140	2.484
Belarus	141	2.386
Angola	142	2.353
Afghanistan	143	2.320
Algeria	144	2.288
Armenia	145	2.092
Belize	146	1.961
Vietnam	147	1.830
Tajikistan	148	1.732
Iraq	148	1.732
Iran, Islamic Republic	150	1.438
Turkmenistan	151	1.340
Uzbekistan	152	1.275
Syrian Arab Republic	153	0.850

Note: Median ranking for OIC members: 109.5.

We now turn to the overall Islamicity Index results (Table 4.5 and Table A1.4 for Muslim countries only). As to be expected, Western countries dominate the ranking with the Netherlands (1), Sweden (2), Switzerland (3), New Zealand (4), Denmark (5), Finland (6), Norway (7), Luxembourg (8), Australia (9), and Canada (10). Qatar (39) is the highest-ranking Muslim Country, followed by the UAE (40), Malaysia (43), and Kuwait (46), with Muslim countries having a median ranking of 115. We prefer this overall ranking with a 0.1 weight for the international index to the ranking using equal weights for each of the four indices (Table 4.6) for two reasons. The international index has significantly less facets and content than the other three indices and much less stress is placed on it in Islamic teachings.

TABLE 4.5 *Overall Islamicity Index (weight of 0.1 for International Relations Index)*

Country	Rank	Score
The Netherlands	1	8.909
Sweden	2	8.865
Switzerland	3	8.778
New Zealand	4	8.726
Denmark	5	8.651
Finland	6	8.573
Norway	7	8.495
Luxembourg	8	8.478
Australia	9	8.443
Canada	10	8.437
Germany	11	8.433
Austria	12	8.410
Iceland	13	8.280
Ireland	14	8.263
United Kingdom	15	8.210
Belgium	16	8.063
Singapore	17	7.820
France	18	7.795
United States	19	7.767
Malta	20	7.576
Czech Republic	21	7.529
Japan	22	7.407
Spain	23	7.394
Slovenia	24	7.188
Poland	25	7.128
Estonia	26	7.068
Israel	27	7.022
Lithuania	28	6.953
Portugal	29	6.928
Cyprus	30	6.901
Chile	31	6.887
Costa Rica	32	6.871
Italy	33	6.800
Mauritius	34	6.784
Slovak Republic	35	6.694
Uruguay	36	6.680
Hong Kong	37	6.646
Latvia	38	6.541
Qatar	39	6.534
United Arab Emirates	40	6.434
Hungary	41	6.425
Korea, Republic	42	6.368
Malaysia	43	6.355
Croatia	44	6.279
Trinidad and Tobago	45	5.960

Continued

TABLE 4.5 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
Kuwait	46	5.882
Panama	47	5.720
Mexico	48	5.706
Montenegro	49	5.635
Namibia	50	5.588
Bulgaria	51	5.555
Brazil	52	5.521
South Africa	53	5.518
Thailand	54	5.496
Romania	55	5.491
Botswana	56	5.474
Georgia	57	5.427
Philippines	58	5.405
Saudi Arabia	59	5.395
Oman	60	5.356
Greece	61	5.339
Jamaica	62	5.329
Bahrain	63	5.260
Argentina	64	5.181
Turkey	65	5.139
El Salvador	66	5.103
Suriname	67	5.085
Peru	68	5.065
Serbia	69	5.064
Jordan	70	5.045
Ghana	71	4.968
Tonga	72	4.956
Mongolia	73	4.924
Ecuador	74	4.913
Kazakhstan	75	4.912
Macedonia	76	4.889
Moldova	77	4.888
Colombia	78	4.850
Albania	79	4.827
Tunisia	80	4.762
China	81	4.716
Rwanda	82	4.715
Dominican Republic	83	4.637
Bolivia	84	4.618
Guyana	85	4.560
Belarus	86	4.553
Nicaragua	87	4.531
Indonesia	88	4.519
Belize	89	4.454
Bosnia and Herzegovina	90	4.384

Continued

TABLE 4.5 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
Senegal	91	4.376
Lesotho	92	4.320
Azerbaijan	93	4.255
Vietnam	94	4.209
Sri Lanka	95	4.201
India	96	4.170
Morocco	97	4.146
Guatemala	98	4.118
Armenia	99	4.054
Russian Federation	100	4.025
Swaziland	101	4.008
Lao PDR	102	3.967
Papua New Guinea	103	3.940
Paraguay	104	3.923
Zambia	105	3.916
Tanzania	106	3.828
Malawi	107	3.759
Kyrgyz Republic	108	3.740
Uzbekistan	109	3.722
Ukraine	110	3.707
Venezuela, RB	111	3.634
Bangladesh	112	3.588
Algeria	113	3.580
Benin	114	3.580
Kenya	115	3.541
Iran, Islamic Republic	116	3.500
Libya	117	3.491
Cambodia	118	3.489
Burkina Faso	119	3.453
Mozambique	120	3.450
Gabon	121	3.424
Honduras	122	3.417
Uganda	123	3.373
Nepal	124	3.338
Ethiopia	125	3.335
Lebanon	126	3.256
Turkmenistan	127	3.236
Niger	128	3.221
Nigeria	129	3.163
Zimbabwe	130	3.154
Tajikistan	131	3.124
Iraq	132	3.045
Liberia	133	3.044
Cameroon	134	2.956
Cote d'Ivoire	135	2.876
Syrian Arab Republic	136	2.815

Continued

TABLE 4.5 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
Egypt, Arab Republic	137	2.726
Madagascar	138	2.718
Sierra Leone	139	2.712
Mali	140	2.705
Togo	141	2.625
Angola	142	2.593
Congo, Republic	143	2.590
Mauritania	144	2.555
Afghanistan	145	2.551
Burundi	146	2.548
Haiti	147	2.490
Pakistan	148	2.422
Guinea	149	2.307
Sudan	150	2.147
Congo, Democratic Republic	151	1.827
Chad	152	1.825
Yemen, Republic	153	1.818

Note: Median ranking for OIC members: 115.

TABLE 4.6 *Overall Islamicity Index (equal weights for each index)*

Country	Rank	Score
The Netherlands	1	8.909
Sweden	2	8.865
Switzerland	3	8.778
New Zealand	4	8.726
Denmark	5	8.651
Finland	6	8.573
Norway	7	8.495
Luxembourg	8	8.478
Australia	9	8.443
Canada	10	8.437
Germany	11	8.433
Austria	12	8.410
Iceland	13	8.280
Ireland	14	8.263
United Kingdom	15	8.210
Belgium	16	8.063
Singapore	17	7.820
France	18	7.795
United States	19	7.767
Malta	20	7.576
Czech Republic	21	7.529

Continued

TABLE 4.6 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
Japan	22	7.407
Spain	23	7.394
Slovenia	24	7.188
Poland	25	7.128
Estonia	26	7.068
Israel	27	7.022
Lithuania	28	6.953
Portugal	29	6.928
Cyprus	30	6.901
Chile	31	6.887
Costa Rica	32	6.871
Italy	33	6.800
Mauritius	34	6.784
Slovak Republic	35	6.694
Uruguay	36	6.680
Hong Kong	37	6.646
Latvia	38	6.541
Qatar	39	6.534
United Arab Emirates	40	6.434
Hungary	41	6.425
Korea, Republic	42	6.368
Malaysia	43	6.355
Croatia	44	6.279
Trinidad and Tobago	45	5.960
Kuwait	46	5.882
Panama	47	5.720
Mexico	48	5.706
Montenegro	49	5.635
Namibia	50	5.588
Bulgaria	51	5.555
Brazil	52	5.521
South Africa	53	5.518
Thailand	54	5.496
Romania	55	5.491
Botswana	56	5.474
Georgia	57	5.427
Philippines	58	5.405
Saudi Arabia	59	5.395
Oman	60	5.356
Greece	61	5.339
Jamaica	62	5.329
Bahrain	63	5.260
Argentina	64	5.181
Turkey	65	5.139
El Salvador	66	5.103
Suriname	67	5.085

Continued

TABLE 4.6 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
Peru	68	5.065
Serbia	69	5.064
Jordan	70	5.045
Ghana	71	4.968
Tonga	72	4.956
Mongolia	73	4.924
Ecuador	74	4.913
Kazakhstan	75	4.912
Macedonia	76	4.889
Moldova	77	4.888
Colombia	78	4.850
Albania	79	4.827
Tunisia	80	4.762
China	81	4.716
Rwanda	82	4.715
Dominican Republic	83	4.637
Bolivia	84	4.618
Guyana	85	4.560
Belarus	86	4.553
Nicaragua	87	4.531
Indonesia	88	4.519
Belize	89	4.454
Bosnia and Herzegovina	90	4.384
Senegal	91	4.376
Lesotho	92	4.320
Azerbaijan	93	4.255
Vietnam	94	4.209
Sri Lanka	95	4.201
India	96	4.170
Morocco	97	4.146
Guatemala	98	4.118
Armenia	99	4.054
Russian Federation	100	4.025
Swaziland	101	4.008
Lao PDR	102	3.967
Papua New Guinea	103	3.940
Paraguay	104	3.923
Zambia	105	3.916
Tanzania	106	3.828
Malawi	107	3.759
Kyrgyz Republic	108	3.740
Uzbekistan	109	3.722
Ukraine	110	3.707
Venezuela, RB	111	3.634
Bangladesh	112	3.588
Algeria	113	3.580

Continued

TABLE 4.6 *Continued*

Country	Rank	Score
Benin	114	3.580
Kenya	115	3.541
Iran, Islamic Republic	116	3.500
Libya	117	3.491
Cambodia	118	3.489
Burkina Faso	119	3.453
Mozambique	120	3.450
Gabon	121	3.424
Honduras	122	3.417
Uganda	123	3.373
Nepal	124	3.338
Ethiopia	125	3.335
Lebanon	126	3.256
Turkmenistan	127	3.236
Niger	128	3.221
Nigeria	129	3.163
Zimbabwe	130	3.154
Tajikistan	131	3.124
Iraq	132	3.045
Liberia	133	3.044
Cameroon	134	2.956
Cote d'Ivoire	135	2.876
Syrian Arab Republic	136	2.815
Egypt, Arab Republic	137	2.726
Madagascar	138	2.718
Sierra Leone	139	2.712
Mali	140	2.705
Togo	141	2.625
Angola	142	2.593
Congo, Republic	143	2.590
Mauritania	144	2.555
Afghanistan	145	2.551
Burundi	146	2.548
Haiti	147	2.490
Pakistan	148	2.422
Guinea	149	2.307
Sudan	150	2.147
Congo, Democratic Republic	151	1.827
Chad	152	1.825
Yemen, Republic	153	1.818

Note: Median ranking for OIC members: 115.

In Table 4.7 we present the score and ranking of each index for every country (with Muslim countries shaded).

TABLE 4.7 Complete rankings of all indices

Overall Rank	Country	Economy		Legal and Governance		Human and Political Rights		International Relations	
		Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score
1	The Netherlands	3	8.886	4	9.031	5	9.340	5	8.105
2	Sweden	6	8.625	9	8.731	2	9.699	8	7.810
3	Switzerland	2	8.933	1	9.559	10	9.150	37	5.980
4	New Zealand	9	8.384	3	9.267	9	9.157	14	7.353
5	Denmark	1	9.002	6	8.943	3	9.529	35	6.013
6	Finland	5	8.626	7	8.935	4	9.438	78	4.967
7	Norway	10	8.340	8	8.775	1	9.850	60	5.392
8	Luxembourg	15	8.039	2	9.493	21	8.392	6	7.876
9	Australia	11	8.308	13	8.557	8	9.176	33	6.111
10	Canada	8	8.416	11	8.576	7	9.222	12	7.386
11	Germany	7	8.506	10	8.723	14	8.863	17	7.124
12	Austria	4	8.656	11	8.576	16	8.654	20	6.961
13	Iceland	21	7.648	18	7.996	6	9.314	1	8.660
14	Ireland	16	7.989	16	8.219	17	8.621	3	8.497
15	United Kingdom	12	8.249	14	8.499	12	8.902	26	6.471
16	Belgium	14	8.090	19	7.955	11	8.987	9	7.745
17	Singapore	19	7.715	5	9.009	37	7.085	83	4.869
18	France	18	7.909	20	7.887	15	8.771	36	6.013
19	United States	22	7.635	22	7.759	13	8.889	84	4.837
20	Malta	29	7.057	17	8.118	31	7.510	2	8.627

Continued

TABLE 4.7 Continued

Overall Rank	Country	Economy		Legal and Governance		Human and Political Rights		International Relations	
		Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score
21	Czech Republic	13	8.202	39	6.452	25	7.908	10	7.582
22	Japan	17	7.910	26	7.266	32	7.497	29	6.340
23	Spain	32	6.964	27	7.219	18	8.601	16	7.190
24	Slovenia	23	7.610	32	6.898	19	8.425	45	5.752
25	Poland	28	7.104	36	6.539	24	7.935	24	6.569
26	Estonia	20	7.671	31	6.961	34	7.379	86	4.804
27	Israel	24	7.336	46	6.117	20	8.412	114	4.052
28	Lithuania	25	7.303	47	6.095	27	7.706	47	5.719
29	Portugal	31	6.991	30	6.988	33	7.471	52	5.588
30	Cyprus	33	6.934	28	7.157	35	7.144	86	4.804
31	Chile	40	6.503	29	7.034	30	7.601	73	5.098
32	Costa Rica	71	4.974	35	6.748	22	8.307	6	7.876
33	Italy	37	6.830	43	6.269	26	7.908	27	6.438
34	Mauritius	43	6.304	23	7.557	43	6.647	11	7.418
35	Slovak Republic	35	6.931	51	5.833	38	7.039	12	7.386
36	Uruguay	55	5.647	33	6.816	28	7.667	56	5.523
37	Hong Kong	30	7.011	38	6.457	48	6.438	105	4.248
38	Latvia	34	6.932	42	6.340	41	6.686	32	6.144
39	Qatar	42	6.357	15	8.325	80	4.771	44	5.784
40	United Arab Emirates	36	6.880	21	7.789	78	4.843	81	4.935

41	Hungary	27	7.213	56	5.632	50	6.405	22	6.732
42	Korea, Republic	26	7.222	44	6.234	39	7.020	133	3.235
43	Malaysia	38	6.642	24	7.456	76	4.948	45	5.752
44	Croatia	50	5.934	60	5.458	29	7.601	40	5.882
45	Trinidad and Tobago	56	5.500	78	4.572	36	7.092	18	7.092
46	Kuwait	46	6.114	34	6.811	72	5.085	116	4.020
47	Panama	85	4.393	65	5.117	40	6.804	4	8.235
48	Mexico	64	5.147	80	4.542	42	6.654	28	6.373
49	Montenegro	45	6.209	63	5.275	56	6.085	69	5.229
50	Namibia	77	4.674	37	6.522	66	5.399	111	4.085
51	Bulgaria	48	5.962	77	4.711	54	6.150	95	4.510
52	Brazil	80	4.470	58	5.547	45	6.569	82	4.902
53	South Africa	72	4.916	57	5.553	71	5.092	25	6.536
54	Thailand	51	5.893	59	5.466	63	5.601	94	4.542
55	Romania	39	6.582	87	4.393	53	6.163	79	4.935
56	Botswana	57	5.482	25	7.372	88	4.405	137	2.745
57	Georgia	54	5.693	50	5.891	87	4.418	98	4.444
58	Philippines	76	4.676	61	5.452	62	5.614	47	5.719
59	Saudi Arabia	47	6.000	40	6.424	93	4.307	118	3.954
60	Oman	44	6.239	48	6.073	94	4.078	132	3.301
61	Greece	52	5.765	81	4.540	44	6.588	97	4.477
62	Jamaica	73	4.842	85	4.431	58	5.850	19	7.026
63	Bahrain	41	6.415	52	5.752	102	3.712	114	4.052
64	Argentina	125	3.332	116	3.491	23	7.948	39	5.915
65	Turkey	58	5.384	55	5.689	84	4.686	102	4.314

Continued

TABLE 4.7 Continued

Overall Rank	Country	Economy		Legal and Governance		Human and Political Rights		International Relations	
		Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score
66	El Salvador	81	4.467	98	4.090	57	6.033	51	5.621
67	Suriname	102	3.894	53	5.719	52	6.190	125	3.693
68	Peru	63	5.162	99	4.066	55	6.118	92	4.575
69	Serbia	61	5.193	91	4.289	47	6.464	104	4.281
70	Jordan	49	5.950	45	6.163	118	3.078	121	3.856
71	Ghana	84	4.405	66	5.060	83	4.745	23	6.569
72	Tonga	91	4.189	49	6.073	73	5.078	105	4.248
73	Mongolia	69	5.023	87	4.393	59	5.791	138	2.712
74	Ecuador	115	3.537	75	4.741	51	6.340	130	3.366
75	Kazakhstan	59	5.379	69	4.877	74	5.000	88	4.739
76	Macedonia	53	5.725	79	4.556	75	4.961	113	4.052
77	Moldova	62	5.193	102	3.843	65	5.497	52	5.588
78	Colombia	66	5.118	100	4.041	61	5.654	124	3.725
79	Albania	65	5.130	110	3.627	69	5.288	30	6.176
80	Tunisia	68	5.029	74	4.741	89	4.392	71	5.163
81	China	67	5.077	54	5.716	115	3.196	52	5.588
82	Rwanda	79	4.579	41	6.394	120	3.020	95	4.510
83	Dominican Republic	111	3.620	89	4.376	68	5.314	21	6.765
84	Bolivia	108	3.696	97	4.099	60	5.725	98	4.444
85	Guyana	105	3.777	115	3.491	49	6.405	62	5.359
86	Belarus	78	4.634	96	4.118	63	5.601	141	2.386

87	Nicaragua	123	3,374	71	4,771	77	4,928	60	5,392
88	Indonesia	90	4,195	82	4,518	79	4,830	62	5,359
89	Belize	117	3,474	103	3,739	46	6,510	146	1,961
90	Bosnia and Herzegovina	60	5,275	117	3,464	84	4,686	67	5,327
91	Senegal	88	4,237	93	4,213	96	3,967	34	6,046
92	Lesotho	99	4,021	113	3,559	86	4,614	50	5,654
93	Azerbaijan	70	4,998	72	4,760	97	3,824	139	2,549
94	Vietnam	92	4,186	68	4,943	92	4,314	147	1,830
95	Sri Lanka	87	4,265	62	5,387	112	3,314	136	2,974
96	India	94	4,133	76	4,714	103	3,614	102	4,314
97	Morocco	74	4,819	64	5,199	128	2,667	122	3,758
98	Guatemala	128	3,200	105	3,693	91	4,346	30	6,176
99	Armenia	75	4,727	83	4,510	106	3,562	145	2,092
100	Russian Federation	82	4,438	121	3,164	81	4,765	128	3,562
101	Swaziland	89	4,206	111	3,619	124	2,895	57	5,490
102	Lao PDR	116	3,493	72	4,760	101	3,725	127	3,595
103	Papua New Guinea	134	3,056	86	4,417	100	3,745	43	5,817
104	Paraguay	122	3,427	129	2,821	70	5,242	108	4,150
105	Zambia	139	2,989	67	4,943	117	3,085	40	5,882
106	Tanzania	107	3,762	92	4,246	110	3,353	100	4,412
107	Malawi	121	3,439	70	4,777	125	2,791	59	5,425
108	Kyrgyz Republic	86	4,371	119	3,431	108	3,438	117	3,987
109	Uzbekistan	106	3,766	90	4,303	95	3,974	152	1,275
110	Ukraine	95	4,098	133	2,601	82	4,752	119	3,856
111	Venezuela, RB	146	2,341	126	2,996	67	5,353	108	4,150

Continued

TABLE 4.7 Continued

Overall Rank	Country	Economy		Legal and Governance		Human and Political Rights		International Relations	
		Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score
112	Bangladesh	110	3.650	124	3.099	105	3.562	90	4.641
113	Algeria	93	4.171	107	3.655	99	3.791	144	2.288
114	Benin	83	4.431	104	3.725	133	2.458	73	5.098
115	Kenya	130	3.189	120	3.396	123	2.935	52	5.588
116	Iran, Islamic Republic	113	3.592	84	4.472	121	3.000	150	1.438
117	Libya	133	3.078	125	3.080	90	4.359	75	5.065
118	Cambodia	109	3.669	95	4.123	122	2.954	131	3.333
119	Burkina Faso	96	4.091	109	3.633	142	2.124	62	5.359
120	Mozambique	138	3.004	112	3.617	112	3.314	62	5.359
121	Gabon	101	3.928	122	3.156	126	2.752	92	4.575
122	Honduras	136	3.024	127	2.906	107	3.536	47	5.719
123	Uganda	131	3.158	118	3.461	130	2.569	89	4.673
124	Nepal	104	3.874	132	2.663	116	3.170	122	3.758
125	Ethiopia	118	3.473	108	3.641	134	2.405	101	4.346
126	Lebanon	98	4.067	136	2.544	114	3.281	108	4.150
127	Turkmenistan	142	2.812	101	3.987	104	3.608	151	1.340
128	Niger	97	4.084	114	3.527	145	1.810	77	5.000
129	Nigeria	124	3.362	147	1.757	132	2.458	15	7.222
130	Zimbabwe	148	2.112	135	2.554	109	3.412	38	5.948
131	Tajikistan	127	3.296	106	3.668	119	3.026	148	1.732
132	Iraq	100	3.958	131	2.699	127	2.673	148	1.732

133	Liberia	137	3.004	130	2.721	131	2.523	84	4.837
134	Cameroon	129	3.193	139	2.328	139	2.209	75	5.065
135	Cote d'Ivoire	103	3.893	146	1.895	149	1.458	42	5.882
136	Syrian Arab Republic	120	3.455	94	4.197	152	1.170	153	0.850
137	Egypt, Arab Republic	112	3.612	123	3.113	144	1.863	134	3.203
138	Madagascar	126	3.324	149	1.506	141	2.144	68	5.294
139	Sierra Leone	151	1.882	128	2.881	136	2.359	70	5.163
140	Mali	132	3.102	142	1.964	146	1.791	62	5.359
141	Togo	119	3.473	143	1.934	148	1.490	57	5.490
142	Angola	150	2.082	145	1.901	98	3.817	142	2.353
143	Congo, Republic	144	2.542	138	2.367	138	2.261	91	4.608
144	Mauritania	140	2.902	141	2.249	137	2.320	135	3.137
145	Afghanistan	135	3.046	137	2.478	140	2.190	143	2.320
146	Burundi	145	2.465	134	2.598	143	2.092	129	3.464
147	Haiti	147	2.163	153	1.100	111	3.320	72	5.131
148	Pakistan	114	3.554	151	1.329	129	2.608	119	3.856
149	Guinea	143	2.675	140	2.252	151	1.301	79	4.935
150	Sudan	153	1.755	148	1.648	135	2.386	111	4.085
151	Congo, Democratic Republic	152	1.824	152	1.147	147	1.725	107	4.183
152	Chad	149	2.083	150	1.473	150	1.418	126	3.627
153	Yemen, Republic	141	2.873	144	1.906	153	0.935	140	2.484

Note: For the overall index the weight of 0.1 was used for the International Relations Index.

In Appendix 1, in Tables A1.1–A1.7 we present these results for Muslim countries only.

These results, though disheartening, are generally what one would expect. The liberal and socially conscious Western countries dominate the rankings, while Muslim countries exhibit subpar performance; and again as to be expected, the performance of Muslim countries is worst in the arena of human and political rights (with a median ranking of 113) and best in economic performance (with a median ranking of 101). Among the Muslim countries, the small rich countries (GCC) of the Persian Gulf and Malaysia are generally at the top of the Muslim rankings. But none of these countries is exactly shining lights to be copied. Malaysia's legal and political system has shown serious cracks in its treatment of opposition parties and dissidents; a large minority Malaysians of Chinese descent are treated as second class citizens and discriminated against; and recent revelations have exposed corruption at the highest levels of government. Most countries of the GCC are rich in oil and gas (the *equal* birth right of all Muslims of all generations) and enjoy phenomenal wealth, yet income and wealth distribution is highly skewed, corruption rampant, and oppressive rule and very limited freedom and respect for human rights. If these are the best performing Muslim countries, the reader can imagine the conditions of the worst countries in the Muslim world.

To us, the reason for Western success is traceable and attributable to political and economic freedom, respect for human rights and more effective institutions (rules and regulations and their monitoring and enforcement). In the presence of more political freedom, accountability of governments, more equal opportunities to develop and better and more effective institutions, men and women are more likely to realize their dreams and thrive. These are the conditions that encourage investment in oneself and hard work. These are the conditions that provide the fuel that drives progress—hope of a better future. In the absence of hope, there is only despair. Ironically, this dismal state of affairs even though Islam is a rules-based religion with the rules clearly delineated. These teachings and rules are the foundation of our indices. A high score and ranking on these indices indicates a rule-compliant and successful Muslim country. Most poignantly, in the realm of economics and development, the rules and institutions prescribed in the Quran and practiced by the Prophet are similar to those supported by Western thinkers such as Adam Smith, Amartya Sen, and Douglass North.

Again, we must stress the fact that one needs only eyes to reach a similar conclusion as indicated by our indices. In more recent times, an Iranian cleric was being driven from New York to Washington, DC. After seeing New York and American behavior on the roads, he turned to the man driving him and said, “These Americans are better Muslims than us.” Another Iranian cleric was taking photographs of people smiling and walking by birds on the National Mall in Washington, DC, when his companion asked him why to take the photos. He replied, “It’s amazing, the birds and people live in harmony here, but not in Tehran or in Qom.”

On another level, Muslims have not taken charge of their own religion by reading the Quran, asking questions to understand its contents better, and debating its meaning. Muslim rulers are not rule compliant and have used religion to control, rule, and live a life of opulence. Muslim rulers and governments have not let their subjects debate the meaning of their religion but have instead dictated what they want them to believe and follow. Muslim rulers have had no incentive (something they should not need if they are rule compliant) to follow rules and encourage good institutions. Foreigners who have exploited them have supported rulers in their un-Islamic policies. Muslims need to understand their religion, adhere to its rules, and hold their rulers accountable. The prevailing state of affairs in Muslim countries is not due to Islam but is due to non-rule-compliant societies that do not hold their rulers and governments responsible and accountable. These themes are further detailed in the next chapter.

5

The Seed for Change in Muslim Countries and in Their International Relations

► **Abstract:** *While the results are disheartening, there is much room for improvement! Why is this the state of affairs? Muslims, individually and collectively, have not internalized and practiced the rules detailed in the Quran. It is evident that if they had followed the rules, the foundation of our Islamicity Indices, they would have been the best performing countries with effective institutions that provide the foundation for a flourishing society with justice as its hallmark. To affect change, Islamicity Indices along the lines we have discussed in this book are a valuable instrument, but they are not sufficient. Muslims should study the Quran and the practices of the Prophet in their communities; and Islamicity Indices, not necessarily ours but a collection of them, can provide a useful instrument and a basis to determine deficiencies, design appropriate policies, and monitor progress over time.*

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Prevailing conditions in the Muslim world

On the one hand, the results of the Islamicity Indices are disheartening, and yet on the other hand, they are encouraging. They are disheartening because Muslim countries perform so badly across the board. But they are heartening because there is so much room for improvement! The question here is why? Why is this the state of affairs in Muslim countries today? How can Islamicity Indices help in improving conditions? And more broadly, what can be done to change the status quo?

What is our explanation for these results? Does Islam preach the benefits of unrepresentative rule, restricted freedom, determinism, selfishness, impoverishment, conflict, and hate? Clearly, Islam does not teach or condone such behavior in the Quran or through the interpretation of the Quran and its practice by the Prophet, as discussed earlier in Chapter 2. Islam preaches the polar opposites—representative governance answerable to the community, free will and freedom to develop individual talents, equality of opportunity (a level-playing field), indeterminism, sharing, eradication of poverty, peace, the Unity of Creation, and adoration and love for the Almighty and His Creation. Why is the state of affairs in Muslim countries so different from that envisaged in the Quran and practiced by the Prophet? The reasons are many.

First and foremost, and the most straightforward answer, is that Muslims, individually and collectively, have not internalized and practiced the rules detailed in the Quran and interpreted and implemented by the Prophet. It is evident that if they had followed the rules, the foundation of our Islamicity Indices, they would have been among the best performing countries instead of the worst. Yes, they may be Muslims who pray five times a day and do much more, but they have failed individually and collectively to implement the rules that translate into effective institutions and provide the foundation for a flourishing society with justice as its hallmark. While this explanation says it all, an inquisitive reader may want more flesh on this skeletal answer.

In our opinion, the religion was hijacked even before the death of the Prophet. As he lay dying, access to him was managed for political ends. Even before the Prophet was buried, some of his companions and his wife Aisha were plotting to select the leader of the nascent Muslim community. While Ali Ibn Abu Taleb, the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law, was washing the Prophet's body for burial, other companions were determining the Prophet's successor. The caliphs who followed were

caught up in a web of intrigue and the first four caliphs, referred to as the righteous ones by Sunni Muslims, were all assassinated. Violence became the way to settle disputes. Some caliphs were tyrannical, robbing Muslims of their personal freedoms and freedom to select leaders. Some caliphs and their cronies lived in luxury, while ordinary Muslims suffered in poverty. The rules of the Almighty and its practice by the Prophet were very quickly abandoned, and even the Prophet's daughter, Fatimeh, was denied her rightful inheritance as required in the Quran. All in all, it was an auspicious beginning for the religion in the aftermath of the Prophet's death.

From its early days after the death of the Prophet, Islam has been used as tool to exploit and rule. Soon after the Prophet's death, Islam was no longer human submission to the Almighty and the way of life but the instrument for domination and illegitimate rule. As we have elaborated earlier, in Islam rulers gain legitimacy if and only if they are the most rule-abiding members of the Muslim community. Rulers and leaders of Muslim communities must observe all Quranic rules more faithfully than ordinary individuals. The implementation and practice of the rules we should readily see with our eyes include serving the interests of the community, answerable and serving at the pleasure of the members of the community, love of humanity and kindness toward all, abstinence from hoarding and opulence, sharing wealth, standing against oppression and striving for justice, choosing the path of peace in settling conflicts, and generally living a life that supports the members of the community in their journey on this earth. Unfortunately, throughout history and most strikingly in our times in the postcolonial era, Muslim rulers have not exuded these behavior traits. Religion has been used as an instrument to gain legitimacy and control. A quick glance at the prevailing conditions in Muslim countries would bear little resemblance to the Quranic teachings we have described. Most Muslim rulers have little legitimacy; they are family rulers and or dictators; they live in opulence while others live in poverty; they infuse terror, not love, in the hearts of their communities; oppressive rule is their modus operandi; they are corrupt; they are unjust; and they wrap themselves in Islam in an effort to garner a whiff of legitimacy. And in many cases, they collaborate with foreigners for support to stay in power.

Muslims were, and are, denied the right to debate their religion in order to understand its deeper meanings and access to the Allah-Designed compass for life on this earth. While the Prophet encouraged

questions and debate and gave respectful answers and comments to all in the community, today Muslims are discouraged from questioning the interpretations and practices of their religion. Their rulers and clerics invariably tell them to mechanically practice the Five Pillars of Islam and refrain from questioning the “official” or “sanctioned” interpretation they are given. Muslims are even put in jail for expressing religious ideas that are not sanctioned by rulers, clerics, and governments. Instead of providing a way of life, comfort, and justice, religion is used to strike fear in the community. What do the Quran and hadith have to say about issues that Muslims face today? Ordinary Muslims cannot know as their rulers and clerics deny their subjects and their flock the right to debate and discuss issues such as these. Instead, rulers have hijacked the religion as was done centuries earlier and encourage their subjects to simply memorize the Quran and follow the path that they put forth for all to blindly follow.

The result of such practices would be readily predicted and is everywhere to see—conflict-ridden and unjust societies with disenfranchised masses. Muslims with little hope of a better future have become frustrated and angry.

Justice is the hallmark of a rule-abiding Muslim community. The contour of an Islamic economy is one where everyone who is able works hard, using knowledge to combine with their own labor and the resources provided by the Creator, to produce goods and services for society. Economic, social, and political affairs are conducted with the goal of removing barriers to the progress of all humans and in full compliance with rules, including those governing property rights, market behavior, exchange and trade, and contracts and trust. Knowing that they are responsible and accountable, individually and collectively, they invest allegiance in a legitimate authority to carry out their affairs, with the legitimacy of the authority established by rule compliance. The rule “commanding the good and forbidding evil,” applicable to individuals and society, assures the full and active participation of all in the affairs of society. The existence of absolute and relative poverty, along with significant income inequality, is evidence of rule-violation and governance failure, for which members of society are, individually and collectively, responsible.

While conventional economics assumes scarcity of resources, Islam acknowledges scarcity only at the micro level and this due to maldistribution of income and wealth resulting from noncompliance with

the rules of conduct; while conventional theory adopts the market and assumes that consumers maximize their own utility and producers maximize profits, the Islamic vision, although embracing the market-based system and proposing rules that enhance its functioning, includes a spiritual and moral foundation that attaches overriding importance to the welfare of society and of each and every individual in this and in future generations. Risk sharing in finance and throughout the economic system is important in itself as it promotes trust and brings humankind closer together—in support of the Unity of Allah’s Creation—and affords a number of other potential benefits if fully developed, including financial stability. All the while, Islam stresses the importance of distributive justice as an integral facet of a successful Muslim community that avoids all extremes, including extremes of wealth and poverty.

How does Islam define distributive justice? Justice thrives and proliferates when everything is placed in its “rightful place” and is achieved by simply following the divine rules. In order to generate genuine debate inside Muslim countries and thus be effective in bringing about the needed change, the criticisms of their policies and practices must be framed around the contradictions and inconsistencies of the behavior of these regimes against the *framework they are espousing*. In this way, first establishing the Islamic framework for a just society and then proceeding to compare policies and practices to this framework, any errors or failures can be readily identified and attributed and solutions developed. It is the institutional structure of society and its policies that allow a pattern of wealth accumulation, creating abundance for a few and scarcity for the many. This is what creates social divisions, not natural scarcity. No matter how much humans have, they want more as they compare and look to the wealth of others.

It is the institutional structure of society that determines the resource endowments of its members, which, in turn, determine the structure of their preferences and ultimately their economic behavior. Such an institutional structure combined with a poorly functioning process of self-development provides no opportunity for the self to transcend the focus of the self on “me and mine.” Self-development is necessary to transcend selfishness. The Quran clearly states the need for “a revolution in feeling or motivation” [11:13]. The revolution, as defined comprehensively throughout the Quran, is a change toward compliance with the rules of just conduct for the individual.

Thus an important difference between distributive justice in Islam and the Western theories developed is that the latter require government intervention to correct unjust patterns of distribution resulting from the operations of the market. From Rawls to Sen to Nozick, all recent theories of distributive justice require intrusive and comprehensive government intervention on a continuous basis to ensure the desired outcome or if the processes and procedures are determined to be unjust. In Islam, the state's role is one of administrator, supervisor, and protector of society. It is the members of society who must develop themselves and ensure that justice prevails.

The decades and even centuries of colonial rule in most Muslim countries have opened deep fissures and taken a toll. In many cases, these will take decades to redress and amend. Rulers have learned from their colonial masters how best to pursue their own interest and abandon their responsibilities to their communities. The most vivid example of this may be what has happened since World War II in the oil/gas rich Muslim countries. A small number of oil rich Muslim countries have had a golden opportunity to develop rapidly and create institutions and societies that reflect Islamic values, but the results have been anything but this. In Islam, Allah has given humanity of all generations these gifts. Humanity in its role as agent-trustee must manage these resources to benefit all (even those who cannot access the Almighty's Bounty) equally. In the case of depletable resources the state, acting as agent-trustee, must do all it can to assure that *all* inhabitants of *all* generations receive the *same* benefit. For us, this can be done only if the resource is extracted optimally, the proceeds invested optimally, and each inhabitant is given a check for the same real purchasing power now and forever into the future. Consumption of the proceeds by the state (to give subsidies and to buy the loyalty of cronies and the general citizenry) must be prohibited and even public expenditures in the name of economic diversification should be limited, as this will not afford all inhabitants of all generations the same benefit.

If the Muslim countries with the very highest oil/gas wealth per person (Qatar, Abu Dhabi /UAE, Kuwait) were to manage their affairs in this way, the average inhabitant would be so wealthy that they could help the less fortunate elsewhere; and for the lower oil/gas wealth per capita countries, it is even more imperative not to squander this wealth and to treat all inhabitants equally. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Rulers have enjoyed preferred access to these depletable resources

in large part to buy off the inhabitants and to afford a life of ostentatious wealth for themselves and their cronies. Even more important, the temptation of this wealth has impeded these Muslim countries from developing and nurturing effective institutions that Islam demands. Rulers have no incentive to nurture effective institutions, the foundation for sustained development, because effective institutions would very quickly take away their preferential access to this vast wealth, reduce their ability to buy off inhabitants, and ultimately undermine their illegitimate rule.¹ As an aside, and sadly for Islam, guest workers in some oil/gas rich countries have been treated in ways that should affront anyone who professes Islam. It is difficult to understand how a Muslim in any of these countries can idly stand by and allow fellow human beings to be treated in such an un-Islamic way. Again, this is not the Islam that we know.

More recently, the great powers have changed their colonial approach toward many of these countries. They have abandoned force in favor of collaboration and support of corrupt Muslim rulers to further their perceived national interests, a practice they have justified on the premise of stability and thus national interests. Numerous Muslim rulers, with no electoral (selection) legitimacy, have turned to the United States and other Western powers affording them military bases and repositioning of their forces and military equipment, purchasing vast array of arms from them, cementing a number of business and trade agreements and showering their leaders and cronies with lucrative consulting arrangements, all with an eye toward garnering their military, intelligence, and political support to hold onto absolute power. Colonialism is alive and well, albeit in a morphed collaborative form—something that disenfranchised Muslims see all too well, which will eventually end in disaster.

These realities have impeded the development of effective institutions (the adoption and practice of Divine rules) that would allow Muslim societies to flourish—political and human rights, freedom to choose their rulers, the rule of law, sound rules and regulations with unbiased enforcement, equal opportunity for all citizens to develop their talents, and social and distributive justice. An examination of the rules and institutions of Islam would reveal development goals and policies that are close to the most recent views of Western writers, and economic policies and practices that are akin to a liberal market system but with morality as the anchor and sympathy (and action) for all humanity.²

Islamicity indices as the seed for change

As we have said many times, Islamicity Indices provide an important benchmark for Muslims to monitor their rulers, leaders, and governments. If a Muslim in a Muslim country finds himself or herself disenfranchised and without freedom and opportunities to develop, one result could be hopelessness and a turn to terrorism against his government or against foreigners who in his or her mind might bear some responsibility for his predicament. But with generally accepted Islamicity Indices in hand and with some understanding of Islam he, and the community together, can factually challenge the government for its failures to fulfill its legitimate role—abiding by Quranic rules, developing effective and just institutions, and doing all it can to establish a thriving Muslim society. In the absence of such indices, their objections would be labeled as baseless and dismissed by rulers and governments; and importantly, his or her endeavors would not find thoughtful and dedicated backing from other Muslims in the community. These indices can provide food for thought and the basis for questioning the achievements and legitimacy of Muslim rulers and governments (their rule-abiding credentials) who invariably wrap themselves in Islam but ignore its teachings. Thus Islamicity Indices can provide a constructive foundation and the catalyst for peaceful and constructive change in Muslim countries.

While the Overall Islamicity Index and each individual Islamicity Index may be the numbers that people remember and bandy about, it is not the way to use these indices for positive change. Boasting about how a country ranks a few notches higher than another, or about how many notches a country has moved up over the prior year, may be fun but it gives little direction to individual Muslims and policymakers. Instead, the components of each index and its score (as opposed to rankings) should be studied in detail. In what area does a country do well and where does it perform badly? This would tell inhabitants and the policymakers where the challenges lie. What needs to be improved and by how much? Progress can then be monitored over time by developing longitudinal (over time) indices for individual countries. And institutions can look into why one country performs much better than another in a given area and how best deficiencies can be turned around.

We would recommend an annual conference where experiences and views could be exchanged to improve performance along the lines of these indices. Moreover, such a use of these indices and approach will more clearly indicate the distribution of responsibilities that lie with individual inhabitants, with policymakers and with society at large. To the extent that policymakers have failed to develop the needed institutional structure and monitor and enforce its rules, inhabitants must question their leaders and governments and hold them accountable. This is how peaceful change can come about in the context of a rule-compliant Muslim community. Muslims are encouraged in the Quran and by the Prophet to take an active interest in their governance and to hold their leaders, rulers, and governments accountable. Again, we repeat, the rule “commanding the good and forbidding evil,” applicable to individuals and society, demands full and active participation of all in the affairs of society. Muslims have failed individually as well as collectively in carrying out their responsibilities.

As we have said earlier, positive change can come about in Muslim countries when and if Muslims debate and discuss what their religion says: to work on their own development as Muslims, demand the needed institutions, and hold their leaders and governments responsible to be more rule abiding than themselves. These indices will indicate where the deficiencies lie. Consultation with successful countries can show the best way forward. And comparisons over time would indicate the degree of progress—that is, which policies have worked and which have not.

We use the word progress deliberately. Progress is not one-dimensional. It is not measured by per capita income alone. The Western world has realized this fact only recently in the course of the twentieth century and Muslims should have recognized this long ago if they had carefully studied and debated the contents of the Holy Quran and internalized the practices of the Prophet. Muslims are lucky that they have had a compass from the Almighty and the life of the Prophet to guide them.

In this book we have reported only the ranking and value of the five indices but have not included the value of each element (see Table 3.1) of the indices. To report such detail in this book would involve too many tables and take up much space. However, we hope to report all these details on our proposed website and provide its continual updating on a yearly basis. In the meantime, the values of the individual components are available to serious users through one of the authors—Hossein Mohammadkhan.

The required elements for change—informed Muslim communities, Islamicity indices, and supportive media

Our message is evident. Muslims have the perfect roadmap to develop effective institutions to achieve just and thriving communities—the rules outlined in the Quran and their practice by the Prophet. To affect this change, Islamicity Indices along the lines we have discussed in this book are a valuable instrument, but they are not sufficient. We need a combination of three ingredients.

First and foremost, Muslims should study the Quran and the practices of the Prophet by themselves and with others in their communities. Yes, they should consult legitimate teachers who do not serve the interests of illegitimate rulers, but they should not swallow the self-serving interpretations of those with personal agendas. Muslims would have to spend time and effort; they would need to question and debate their religion and its doctrines to better understand its content and meaning; and all the while, they should keep an open mind and refrain from adopting dogmatic positions. At the same time, Muslims should embark on the journey of self-development as envisaged in the Quran and taught by the Prophet.

Second, Islamicity Indices, not necessarily ours but a collection of them, can provide a useful instrument and a basis to determine deficiencies, design appropriate policies, and monitor progress. There is no right index and indices should not become a new instrument for control and division.

Third, the international media should stop connecting terrorism to Islam but to the terrorists who perpetrate them. Instead they should play a responsible role by educating Muslims and non-Muslims on the teachings of the Quran and the essence of the religion—the Unity of Humanity, the obligation to support all humans in their journey on this plain of existence, peace in favor of conflict and war, and self and societal development to establish just and thriving communities. The media should report on the successes and failures of Muslim countries in developing their societies and on the positive and negative collaboration of foreign powers with Muslim rulers and governments; such reporting would encourage positive change in Muslim countries and reduce the likelihood of selfish support of dictators and autocrats in the Muslim World; and this in turn would reduce the anger and frustration of disenfranchised Muslims toward the major powers.

These indices and the teachings that support them provide non-Muslims with a concise and an easy understanding of Islam. To improve relations between Muslims and non-Muslims it is essential for both Muslims and non-Muslims to gain a better understanding of Islamic teachings and its practice.

This approach will take time to bear fruits, but it will bear fruit and improve conditions in Muslim countries and in their relations with the non-Muslim World, especially with the great powers.

Notes

- 1 For further details of how an Islamically oriented policy of exhaustible resource management can be implemented, see Askari, *The Middle East Oil Exporters: What Happened to Economic Development?*.
- 2 For further elaboration, see Mirakhor and Askari, *Islam and the Path to Human and Economic Development*; and Askari, *Collaborative Colonialism: The Political Economy of Oil in the Persian Gulf*.

6

Concluding Comments

Abstract: *Islamicity Indices and their recognition the world over are an important element in this process of positive change in the Muslim World and reconciliation with the West. Each country may want a modified index as there is no one right index that fits all. Such benchmarks should generate further debate and encourage Muslims to ask why they are not free and prosperous as are other communities around the world. Muslims desperately need benchmarks to hold their rulers accountable. They need encouragement to do this in a peaceful way as envisaged in Islam. Leaders must be rule compliant. In the absence of a generally acceptable benchmark, clerics and absolute rulers are more apt to dismiss any challenge to their interpretation of Islam as those of Western liberals or those who have no understanding of Islam.*

Askari, Hossein, and Hossein Mohammadkhan.
Islamicity Indices: The Seed for Change. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. DOI: 10.1057/9781137587718.0012.

How can conditions in Muslim countries be turned around? There is no silver bullet. It requires commitment on the part of many groups, enhanced understanding of Islamic teachings, persistence and time. At a minimum it will require an integrated approach with at least ten simultaneous and essential elements and initiatives that includes Islamicity Indices to gauge conditions and progress.

First, individual Muslims must take charge of their religion. Study the Quran and the life of the Prophet. Most importantly, they should openly debate and question what their religion says about rules, institutions, and the outcomes that they should expect. They should engage and debate their teachers but not take their interpretations as something to be blindly followed. In turn, this should help developing what the religion indicates, in practical terms, for the political, social, and economic characters of a successful Muslim society. Memorizing the Quran, while useful in itself, is not a substitute for understanding it and its interpretation by the Prophet. Moreover, Muslims should not rely on individuals with agendas—dictators, extremists, selfish rulers politicians or clerics—to tell them what they should and should not do as “good” Muslims. Allah gave humanity the freedom to choose and Muslims are free to choose and should exercise Allah’s invaluable gift.

Second, Muslims must work hard to develop themselves as indicated in the Quran and practiced by the Prophet. Muslims cannot leave everything to the state. The Quran requires individual Muslims to develop themselves, the physical world, and their societies. Individual Muslims have the critical role and must do their part in creating just and flourishing communities. At the same time they must hold their leaders accountable for what the Quran expects of them.

Third, the indices and especially the individual elements of each index should be studied and debated to assess conditions and determine where and how improvements can be best achieved. Progress should be monitored over time.

Fourth, the development of alternative Islamicity Indices should be encouraged. They should be debated and transparency encouraged. These indices must not become another dogmatic instrument of control and deprivation with rulers adopting what suits their interests.

Fifth, The US government, along with a number of other Western governments and China and Russia should reduce their duplicity that is all too evident to Muslims. This they can do by ending their support of Muslim dictators, autocrats, absolute rulers of all sorts, including

hereditary rulers and clerics. The duplicitous stance of the great powers, preaching democratic rule and freedom while supporting autocratic rulers in the name of stability, is counterproductive and will eventually lead the region toward a catastrophic train wreck. The great powers should instead encourage meaningful political, social, and economic reforms in the framework of a transparent long-term timetable; this is in their interest as well as in the interest of Muslim communities. For absolute monarchies, the goal could be constitutional monarchies and for dictatorships of all sorts, the goal should be democratic and representative governance. Some will label this recommendation as naïveté, but we would characterize these recommendations of informed realists who can see beyond their nose!

Sixth, the great powers should tone down their rhetoric against Islam, lest they give the impression that they are at war with Islam and Muslims. It is not Islam that threatens them, but it is what dictators have manufactured in the name of Islam—extremists and millions of disenfranchised Muslims.

Seventh, Western countries should do a better job in assimilating their Muslim population and communities. This process will need more understanding of Muslims and of Islam, and backed up with access to better education and opportunities. We must add that in this one area the United States has done a better job than most other countries in the West and may provide some valuable lessons for others.

Eighth, the non-Muslim World should also invest a little time to understand what Islam is all about, and not the words of fanatics, politicians, and the recycled words of the popular media. More thoughtful educational programs and brief summaries of Islam may help. These indices and the teachings that support them provide a concise and easy-to-understand vehicle. The West and Western media should stop attributing and connecting acts of terrorism to Islam, by calling terrorist criminals “Islamists” and other such Islamophobic terms. Academics should also refrain from spreading their Islamophobic prejudices by calling Muslims lazy or saying that Islam preaches laziness. As Adam Smith, the great philosopher, recognized long ago, we all have similar talents but must have the freedom and opportunity to develop our capabilities.

Ninth, the international media has an important role to play. The media should report on successes and failures of Muslim countries in developing their societies and on the positive and negative collaboration of foreign powers with Muslim rulers and governments; such reporting

would encourage positive change in Muslim countries and reduce the likelihood of selfish support of dictators and autocrats in the Muslim World; and this in turn would reduce the anger and frustration of disenfranchised Muslims toward the major powers.

Tenth, we recommend an annual international conference where experiences and views could be exchanged to enhance political, social, and economic progress, recognizing the important role of individuals, policymakers, and of society at large. Such an annual conference could focus on developments in the use of indices, highlighting success, failures, and associated policies. It may be best to organize the conference under the auspices of respected nonprofit organizations with no government connections.

Let us emphasize an important premise. Our foundational belief is that dictatorships, autocratic rule, and economic failure and their unfounded association to Islam are an important cause of extremism, terrorism, and instability. It is the better institutions (collection of rules and their monitoring and enforcement) and meaningful reforms in Muslim countries in the context of Islamic teachings that are essential for the development and progress and peaceful coexistence with the West. This process needs a little bit of farsightedness from the great powers, not more intelligence gathering, crackdowns, and drone attacks, to narrow the divide and reconcile what today appears as irreconcilable.

Finally, we sincerely believe that Islamicity Indices along the lines that we have suggested, their continual updating on a dedicated website with publicity and emphasis the world over are an important element in this process of positive change in the Muslim World, and reconciliation with the West and the non-Muslim World generally. Each country (community) may want a modified Islamicity Index of their own as there is no one right index that fits all. Such benchmarks will generate further debate and encourage Muslims to ask why they are not free and prosperous as are non-Muslim and other Muslim communities around the world. Muslims desperately need benchmarks to hold their rulers accountable. They need encouragement to do this in a peaceful way as envisaged in Islam. In the absence of a generally acceptable benchmark, clerics and absolute rulers are more apt to dismiss any challenge to their interpretation of Islam as those of Western liberals or those who have no understanding of Islam. Moreover, most Westerners are unlikely to spend the time and effort to assess the state and the process of change in Muslim countries.

Interestingly, in February of 2015, Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, suggested that Muslims living abroad should not listen to the media and the opinion of others, but should instead go to the source—the Quran, and read and understand it. What he should have suggested is that *all* Muslims, no matter where they happen to live, should do the same and stop believing the words of leaders with their own agendas. Moreover, on 17 May 2015, President Rouhani of Iran remarks at the inauguration of the 32nd International Quran Conference endorsed the idea of developing the means to monitor practical progress in line with the teachings and rules delineated in the Quran: “We need to achieve the depth of the holy verses of Quran and witness its practical results in our lives.”¹

In late 2015, and for further understanding and progress, we hope to develop a professional website that will pursue a number of goals:

- ▶ Report the details of each index (the value and ranking of each index and its components).
- ▶ Update the indices.
- ▶ Upload papers on the topic of Islamicity Indices and related policies.
- ▶ Afford others a place to upload their indices and papers.

Note

- 1 “International Quran Competition Kicks Off,” *Tehran Times*, 17 May 2015, http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=246756.

Appendix 1: Islamicity Indices for Muslim Countries

TABLE A1.1 *Economic Islamicity Index for OIC countries*

Country	Rank
United Arab Emirates	1
Malaysia	2
Bahrain	3
Qatar	4
Oman	5
Kuwait	6
Saudi Arabia	7
Jordan	8
Turkey	9
Kazakhstan	10
Albania	11
Tunisia	12
Azerbaijan	13
Morocco	14
Benin	15
Kyrgyz Republic	16
Senegal	17
Indonesia	18
Algeria	19
Burkina Faso	20
Niger	21
Lebanon	22
Iraq	23
Suriname	24
Guyana	25
Uzbekistan	26
Bangladesh	27
Egypt, Arab Republic	28
Iran, Islamic Republic	29

Continued

TABLE A1.1 *Continued*

Country	Rank
Pakistan	30
Syrian Arab Republic	31
Nigeria	32
Tajikistan	33
Cameroon	34
Uganda	35
Mali	36
Libya	37
Afghanistan	38
Mozambique	39
Mauritania	40
Yemen, Republic	41
Turkmenistan	42
Guinea	43
Chad	44
Sierra Leone	45
Sudan	46

TABLE A1.2 *Legal and Governance Islamicity Index for OIC countries*

Country	Rank
Qatar	1
United Arab Emirates	2
Malaysia	3
Kuwait	4
Saudi Arabia	5
Jordan	6
Oman	7
Bahrain	8
Suriname	9
Turkey	10
Morocco	11
Kazakhstan	12
Azerbaijan	13
Tunisia	14
Indonesia	15
Iran, Islamic Republic	16
Uzbekistan	17
Senegal	18
Syrian Arab Republic	19
Turkmenistan	20
Benin	21
Tajikistan	22
Algeria	23

Continued

TABLE A1.2 *Continued*

Country	Rank
Burkina Faso	24
Albania	25
Mozambique	26
Niger	27
Guyana	28
Uganda	29
Kyrgyz Republic	30
Egypt, Arab Republic	31
Bangladesh	32
Libya	33
Sierra Leone	34
Iraq	35
Lebanon	36
Afghanistan	37
Cameroon	38
Guinea	39
Mauritania	40
Mali	41
Yemen, Republic	42
Nigeria	43
Sudan	44
Chad	45
Pakistan	46

TABLE A1.3 *Human and Political Rights
Isamicity Index for OIC countries*

Country	Rank
Guyana	1
Suriname	2
Albania	3
Kuwait	4
Kazakhstan	5
Malaysia	6
United Arab Emirates	7
Indonesia	8
Qatar	9
Turkey	10
Tunisia	11
Libya	12
Saudi Arabia	13
Oman	14
Uzbekistan	15

Continued

TABLE A1.3 *Continued*

Country	Rank
Senegal	16
Azerbaijan	17
Algeria	18
Bahrain	19
Turkmenistan	20
Bangladesh	21
Kyrgyz Republic	22
Mozambique	23
Lebanon	24
Jordan	25
Tajikistan	26
Iran, Islamic Republic	27
Iraq	28
Morocco	29
Pakistan	30
Uganda	31
Nigeria	32
Benin	33
Sudan	34
Sierra Leone	35
Mauritania	36
Cameroon	37
Afghanistan	38
Burkina Faso	39
Egypt, Arab Republic	40
Niger	41
Mali	42
Chad	43
Guinea	44
Syrian Arab Republic	45
Yemen, Republic	46

TABLE A1.4 *International Relations Islamicity Index for OIC countries*

Country	Rank
Guyana	1
Suriname	2
Albania	3
Kuwait	4
Kazakhstan	5
Malaysia	6

Continued

TABLE A1.4 *Continued*

Country	Rank
United Arab Emirates	7
Indonesia	8
Qatar	9
Turkey	10
Tunisia	11
Libya	12
Saudi Arabia	13
Oman	14
Uzbekistan	15
Senegal	16
Azerbaijan	17
Algeria	18
Bahrain	19
Turkmenistan	20
Bangladesh	21
Kyrgyz Republic	22
Mozambique	23
Lebanon	24
Jordan	25
Tajikistan	26
Iran, Islamic Republic	27
Iraq	28
Morocco	29
Pakistan	30
Uganda	31
Nigeria	32
Benin	33
Sudan	34
Sierra Leone	35
Mauritania	36
Cameroon	37
Afghanistan	38
Burkina Faso	39
Egypt, Arab Republic	40
Niger	41
Mali	42
Chad	43
Guinea	44
Syrian Arab Republic	45
Yemen, Republic	46

TABLE A1.5 Overall Islamicity Index for OIC countries
(0.1 weight for International Relations Index)

Country	Rank	Score
Qatar	1	6.534
United Arab Emirates	2	6.434
Malaysia	3	6.355
Kuwait	4	5.882
Saudi Arabia	5	5.395
Oman	6	5.356
Bahrain	7	5.260
Turkey	8	5.139
Suriname	9	5.085
Jordan	10	5.045
Kazakhstan	11	4.912
Albania	12	4.827
Tunisia	13	4.762
Guyana	14	4.560
Indonesia	15	4.519
Senegal	16	4.376
Azerbaijan	17	4.255
Morocco	18	4.146
Kyrgyz Republic	19	3.740
Uzbekistan	20	3.722
Bangladesh	21	3.588
Algeria	22	3.580
Benin	23	3.580
Iran, Islamic Republic	24	3.500
Libya	25	3.491
Burkina Faso	26	3.453
Mozambique	27	3.450
Uganda	28	3.373
Lebanon	29	3.256
Turkmenistan	30	3.236
Niger	31	3.221
Nigeria	32	3.163
Tajikistan	33	3.124
Iraq	34	3.045
Cameroon	35	2.956
Syrian Arab Republic	36	2.815
Egypt, Arab Republic	37	2.726
Sierra Leone	38	2.712
Mali	39	2.705
Mauritania	40	2.555
Afghanistan	41	2.551
Pakistan	42	2.422
Guinea	43	2.307
Sudan	44	2.147
Chad	45	1.825
Yemen, Republic	46	1.818

TABLE A1.6 *Overall Islamicity Index for OIC countries (equal weights for all indices)*

Country	Rank	Score
Qatar	1	6.409
Malaysia	2	6.255
United Arab Emirates	3	6.184
Kuwait	4	5.571
Saudi Arabia	5	5.155
Bahrain	6	5.059
Albania	7	5.052
Oman	8	5.013
Turkey	9	5.002
Kazakhstan	10	4.883
Suriname	11	4.853
Jordan	12	4.846
Tunisia	13	4.829
Guyana	14	4.693
Indonesia	15	4.659
Senegal	16	4.654
Morocco	17	4.081
Azerbaijan	18	3.970
Nigeria	19	3.839
Benin	20	3.833
Kyrgyz Republic	21	3.781
Burkina Faso	22	3.771
Mozambique	23	3.768
Bangladesh	24	3.763
Libya	25	3.753
Uganda	26	3.590
Niger	27	3.518
Lebanon	28	3.405
Algeria	29	3.365
Uzbekistan	30	3.314
Cameroon	31	3.307
Iran, Islamic Republic	32	3.157
Mali	33	3.148
Sierra Leone	34	3.121
Turkmenistan	35	2.920
Tajikistan	36	2.892
Iraq	37	2.826
Egypt, Arab Republic	38	2.805
Guinea	39	2.745
Pakistan	40	2.661
Mauritania	41	2.652
Afghanistan	42	2.513
Syrian Arab Republic	43	2.488
Sudan	44	2.470
Chad	45	2.125
Yemen, Republic	46	1.929

TABLE A1.7 Complete rankings of all indices for OIC countries

	World Rank	OIC Rank	Economy	Legal and Governance	Human and Political Rights	International Relations
Afghanistan	145	41	135	137	140	143
Albania	79	12	65	110	69	30
Algeria	113	22	93	107	99	144
Azerbaijan	93	17	70	72	97	139
Bahrain	63	7	41	52	102	114
Bangladesh	112	21	110	124	105	90
Benin	114	23	83	104	133	73
Burkina Faso	119	26	96	109	142	62
Cameroon	134	35	129	139	139	75
Chad	152	45	149	150	150	126
Egypt, Arab Republic	137	37	112	123	144	134
Guinea	149	43	143	140	151	79
Guyana	85	14	105	115	49	62
Indonesia	88	15	90	82	79	62
Iran, Islamic Republic	116	24	113	84	121	150
Iraq	132	34	100	131	127	148
Jordan	70	10	49	45	118	121
Kazakhstan	75	11	59	69	74	88
Kuwait	46	4	46	34	72	116
Kyrgyz Republic	108	19	86	119	108	117
Lebanon	126	29	98	136	114	108
Libya	117	25	133	125	90	75
Malaysia	43	3	38	24	76	45
Mali	140	39	132	142	146	62
Mauritania	144	40	140	141	137	135
Morocco	97	18	74	64	128	122

Continued

TABLE A1.7 *Continued*

	World Rank	OIC Rank	Economy	Legal and Governance	Human and Political Rights	International Relations
Mozambique	120	27	138	112	112	62
Niger	128	31	97	114	145	77
Nigeria	129	32	124	147	132	15
Oman	60	6	44	48	94	132
Pakistan	148	42	114	151	129	119
Qatar	39	1	42	15	80	44
Saudi Arabia	59	5	47	40	93	118
Senegal	91	16	88	93	96	34
Sierra Leone	139	38	151	128	136	70
Sudan	150	44	153	148	135	111
Suriname	67	9	102	53	52	125
Syrian Arab Republic	136	36	120	94	152	153
Tajikistan	131	33	127	106	119	148
Tunisia	80	13	68	74	89	71
Turkey	65	8	58	55	84	102
Turkmenistan	127	30	142	101	104	151
Uganda	123	28	131	118	130	89
United Arab Emirates	40	2	36	21	78	81
Uzbekistan	109	20	106	90	95	152
Yemen, Republic	153	46	141	144	153	140
Median for OIC Members	115	NA	101	108	113	109.5

Note: For the overall index the weight of 0.1 was used for the International Relations Index.

Appendix 2: Indicators and Sources

Economic Islamicity Index

1. Economic Opportunity and Economic Freedom

1. Gender Equality Indicators: Gender Inequality Index 2013, UNHDI
2. Economic Regulation Indicators: Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business, Economic Freedom of the World, 2014, Annual Report—Fraser Institute
3. Ease of Doing Business Indicators: Doing Business 2015, World Bank
4. Economic Freedom Indicators: 2015 Index of Economic Freedom—Heritage Foundation
5. Business and Market Freedom Indicator: 2015 Index of Economic Freedom—Heritage Foundation

2. Equal Access to Education and Health Care

1. Education Indicator: Population with at least Some Secondary Education (% Aged Twenty-Five and Above), Human Development Report 2013, UN
2. Education Public Expenditures Indicator: Expenditure on Education (% of GDP), 2005–2012, UNHDI
3. Education Equality Indicator: Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index 2013, UNHDI
4. Education Effectiveness: Literacy Rate—CIA Factbook, UNESCO

5. Health Care Quality: Percent of Satisfaction 2008–2012, UNHDI
6. Provision of Healthcare Indicators: Out-of-Pocket % of Total Health Expenditure 2011, UNHDI
- 3. Job Creation and Equal Access to Employment**
 1. Equal Employment and Job Creation: Unemployment, Total % of Total Labor Force (Modeled ILO Estimate)—WDI
 2. Labor Freedom: 2015 Index of Economic Freedom—Heritage Foundation
- 4. Property Rights and Sanctity of Contracts**
 1. Property and Contract Rights: 2015 Index of Economic Freedom— Heritage Foundation
- 5. Prevention of Corruption**
 1. Transparency International Indicator: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
 2. Freedom from Corruption Indicator: 2015 Index of Economic Freedom—Heritage Foundation
- 6. Provision for the Poor, Aid, and Basic Human Needs**
 1. Poverty Effectiveness Indicator: Population below Poverty Line (%)—CIA Factbook
 2. World Giving Index: World Giving Index 2014—Charities Aid Foundation
 1. Helping a Stranger
 2. Donating Money
 3. Volunteering Time
- 7. Taxation and Social Welfare**
 1. Tax Burden as Percentage of GDP: 2015 Index of Economic Freedom—Heritage Foundation
 2. Tax Revenue: Taxes on Incomes, Profits and Capital Gain (% of Total Tax Revenue), Average 2005–2012, WDI
 3. Social Welfare: Old Age Pension Recipient (% of Statutory Pension Age Population), Average 2004–2013, UNHDI
- 8. Supportive Financial System**
 1. Investment Freedom and Financial Freedom: 2015 Index of Economic Freedom—Heritage Foundation
 2. Financial Market Risk Indicator (Credit Rate): Country Default Spreads and Risk Premiums, Aswath Damodaran (Calculated Based on Moody’s Rating)
 3. Monetary Freedom: 2015 Index of Economic Freedom—Heritage Foundation

9. Adherence to Islamic Finance

1. Absence of Interest Indicator (Debt Contracts):
 1. Central Bank Discount Rate—CIA Factbook
 2. Commercial Bank Prime Lending Rate—CIA Factbook

10. Economic Prosperity

1. Macro Economic Indicator: GDP, PPP (Constant 2011 International \$), Average 2005–2014, WDI
2. Price Stability: Inflation, Consumer Price, Average 2005–2014, WDI
3. Economic Performance: GDP per Capita, PPP (Constant 2011 International \$), WDI

11. Economic Justice

1. Income Distribution—Gini Coefficient—CIA Factbook

Legal and Governance Islamicity Index**12. Legal Integrity: 2014 Annual Report—Fraser Institute**

1. Legal and Judicial Integrity Indicator
 1. Judicial Independence
 2. Impartial Courts
 3. Integrity of the Legal System
 4. Protection of Property Rights
 5. Legal Enforcement of Contracts
 6. Regulatory Restrictions on the Sale of Real Property
 7. Business Costs of Crime
2. Military Interference Indicator: 2014 Annual Report—Fraser Institute
 1. Military Interference in Rule of Law and the Political Process Index
 2. Reliability of Police

13. The Management Index: Transformation Index (BTI) 2014

1. Government Management
 1. Level of Difficulty
 2. Management Performance
 3. Steering Capability
 4. Resource Efficiency
 5. Consensus Building
 6. International Cooperation

2. Management of Natural Resources and Depletable Resources: 2014 Environmental Performance Index, Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy (YCELP) and the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) at Columbia University
 1. Protection of Animal Rights
 2. Environmental Health
 3. Air Quality
 4. Water Resources
 5. Productive Natural Resources
 6. Biodiversity and Habitat
 7. Sustainable Energy
14. **Government Governance: The Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank**
 1. Voice and Accountability Indicator
 2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence Indicator
 3. Government Effectiveness Indicator
 4. Regulatory Quality Indicator
 5. Rule of Law Indicator
 6. Control of Corruption Indicator
15. **Perceptions about the Government**
 1. Actions to Preserve the Environment: UNHDI 2014
 2. Trust in National Government: UNHDI 2014
 3. Efforts to Deal with the Poor: UNHDI 2014

Human and Political Rights Islamicity Index

16. **Human Development**
 1. Human Development Index: UNHDI 2014
17. **Civil and Political Rights: Freedom House 2014**
 1. Civil Liberties Indicator
 2. Political Rights Indicator
18. **Women's Rights: UNHDI 2014**
 1. Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliament (%)
 2. Ratio of Women to Men
19. **Global Democracy: GDI (2012–2013), the Democracy Ranking Association**

20. Perception of Well-Being: UNHDI 2014

1. Standard Living
2. Safety
3. Freedom of Choice
4. Overall Life Satisfaction

International Relations Islamicity Index

21. Globalization Index: The KOF Index of Globalization (2013)

1. Economic Globalization Indicator
 1. Globalization Index
 2. Restrictions
2. Social Globalization Indicator
 1. Personal Contact
 2. Information Flows
 3. Cultural Proximity
 4. Freedom of Foreigner to Visit
3. Political Globalization Indicator

22. Military/Wars

1. Militarization Index: GMI (2013)

We have a total of fifty-two elements in the four indices, which are made up of a number of subelements as indicated.

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