

THE
MODERN
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WORLD

MIGRATION, SECURITY, AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE MIDDLE EAST

New Perspectives

Edited by Peter Seeberg
and Zaid Eyadat

Migration, Security, and Citizenship in the Middle East

THE MODERN MUSLIM WORLD

Series Editor: Dietrich Jung of the Center for Contemporary Middle East Studies, University of Southern Denmark.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Migration, Security, and Citizenship in a Changing Middle East

Peter Seeberg and Zaid Eyadat

Introduction

From late 2010, the international community had witnessed a hitherto unseen spread of public unrest in several states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).[1] The course of events seemed to defy the established image of unshakeable authoritarianism attributed to the region. Because of the widespread civil uprisings, several dictators of Arab states had been forced from power and an unclear political situation prevailed, followed by instability and uncertainty. The so-called Arab Spring[2] did not end with breaking authoritarian resilience. For example, shortly after the Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had left office and sought refuge in Saudi Arabia, several thousand Tunisians started to migrate to the Italian island Lampedusa, to escape turmoil in their country.

The arrival of the Tunisian migrants made the Italian government declare the immigration situation a humanitarian emergency and raise the issue at the EU level.[3] The migration issue once again grasped the media headlines in Europe, reignited many of the former migration debates at the policy level and mobilized attention within scholarly research, where migration already for decades had been one of the most significant themes.[4] Maybe the EU's initial responses, as discussed by Leonhard den Hertog (2011: 17), were restrictive and security-driven, but it emphasized the European quandary over the past decades: on one side, the need for a cheap workforce in the European labor market; on the other side, the negative, skeptical perspective often emphasized in the European immigration discourse: Europe flooded by millions of Arab and African immigrants.[5] The influx of the Tunisian migrants at Lampedusa was, in the media as well as in the public discourse, described and interpreted as a phenomenon, which might threaten stability and security in the Mediterranean region and thereby affect Europe.[6]

As indicated, for instance, in the *New York Times,* one of the unofficial ambitions behind the EU policies was to hold off new waves of Arab migration toward Europe: a poll in France pointed at a paradoxical, but easily understandable, contradiction in the way the recent development in the Middle East was perceived in Europe: "while the events of the Arab Spring were presented positively by the media, most people were mainly worried that they would mean even more potential immigrants" (Vinoceur 2011). In other words, it seemed that the European public was for supporting democratic progress in the Middle East, but skeptical about the consequences of the increasing number of immigrants arriving in Europe.[7]

Within the past few decades, new developments have taken place in the Middle East regarding migration movements and policy reactions to this important phenomenon. What used to be a system based on the distinction between countries of immigration and countries of emigration has changed into complex patterns of continued migration toward the West, transit migration through southern and eastern Mediterranean states, and transregional globalized migration as shown by for instance Philippe Fargues (Fargues 2008, 2009a, 2009b). The Arab uprisings have contributed to the complex reality and the new development in the MENA region in 2011–2012 with the more diverse and unstable Middle Eastern reality will most likely contribute to changing local, regional, and transregional migration movements (Seeberg 2013a; Abdelfattah 2011; den Hertog 2011).

The complex relations between migration, security, and citizenship in MENA have not been thoroughly analyzed in migration research.[8] The chapters of this volume contribute to the research on the implications of migration in and from the MENA region, emphasizing both the significance of the migration movements, policy reactions to this important phenomenon, and questions concerning human rights, governance, and citizenship in relation to policymaking processes.[9] The contributions cover different, yet interrelated, fields of migration research. The first part consists of two analyses dealing with citizenship and migration in Arab Gulf states and the human rights conditions for low-skilled female migrant workers in Jordan, respectively. Also, in this part, two chapters from a Mediterranean perspective can be found. Chapter 3, looking into what can be termed “the Middle East in Europe,” examines how Moroccan migrants in Piemonte, Italy, perceive democracy, while chapter 4 presents an analysis of Amazigh Diaspora in the context of Algeria. The second part focuses, from different perspectives, on transnational migration: first, an analysis on governance and migrants rights in Lebanon; second, a study of irregular migration, migrant smuggling, and refugee flows in Libya; and, finally, a chapter on Syrian migration. The chapter on Syria examines migration to Lebanon and the Gulf states from a security perspective and includes an analysis of the recent unfortunate development in Syria: the internal crisis forcing a significant number of refugees to the neighboring states, to Turkey (in the first place) and Lebanon and Jordan.

The analyses present new perspectives on migration and security in the Middle East, showing how recent developments in the actual migration in the MENA region challenge our traditional interpretations of the migration phenomenon. Furthermore, the different chapters discuss how migratory movements in the Middle East raise new questions concerning human rights, governance, and citizenship, demonstrating how the lack of representation and political inclusion—already a problematic issue given the authoritarian nature of states in the Middle East—is even more relevant with respect to migrant populations.

At the same time, increasing securitization of immigration by European and attempts at controlling migration movements from the Middle East seem to emphasize that security concerns both in the Middle East and the West are not only abstract questions of external security and North-South issues, but also focus on internal challenges in the involved states (Seeberg 2013b). Also, transnational developments in MENA such as the transfer of remittances, irregular migration, cross-border crime, and transnational terrorism add to the challenges the involved states, international organizations, and other nonstate actors have to face (see, among others, Tabutin et al. 2005; Baldwin-Edwards 2005, 2006; Hooghe et al. 2008; Icduygu 2007; Jureidini 2009).

The incumbent regimes in the Middle East are concerned with their own security now more than ever and the migration issue constitutes an important aspect, often connected to conflicting national narratives attached to ethnic or religious minorities and to political conflicts in which Islamist movements and parties play an essential role (Seeberg 2012). A growing, yet mostly unspoken, consensus between the governments in the Arab world developed before the Arab revolts related to the securitization of oppositional groups. Behind this development lie political agendas in the MENA states, which seriously affected the condition of the ethnic minorities, migrants, and refugees regarding citizenship, human rights, and so on.

As emphasized by Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller in their classic, "The Age of Migration," all relevant contexts for producing migrants can be found in the Middle East. It is "an area where enormous political, cultural and economic diversity has resulted in many varied types of migration and mobility" (2009: 159). In his widely read article, Fred Halliday describes the different types of migration in the Middle East, taking his point of departure in the fact that "in an historical context, the Arab world has been the site of a variety of migratory flows consequent upon the internationalization of capitalist relations" (1984: 4). The migratory movements are internal, meaning that they take place behind borders—like taking refugees, for example, in Iraq where the problematic development following the US-led invasion in March 2003 resulted in a huge number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). They are also regional—a large number of Egyptians work in Libya (the local perspective) as well as a large number of Egyptians work in the Gulf (the interregional perspective), as shown by Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim (Ghoneim 2010).

There are few regions in the world where population movements have had wider implications and significance than in MENA.[10] Due to civil and regional wars throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, diaspora population is exceptionally high in many of the MENA countries. In 2009 almost half of the world's refugees as recorded by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) originated from Afghanistan or Iraq; Pakistan, Iran, and Syria together hosted about 60 percent of the world's refugee population. In Syria, a refugee population of 1,005,472 was registered, compared to a resident population of 22 million, and in the UK, the refugee population was 238,150 and in the United States it was 264,574 (UNHCR 2011). In 2012, due to the internal crisis in Syria, the number of refugees with a Syrian background leaving the country had increased to more than half a million, of which 147,107 were registered in Turkey, 123,224 in Lebanon, 112,379 in Jordan, 66,809 in Iraq, and 11,260 in Egypt (UNHCR 2012). The data show the tendency to increase, and according to UNHCR, many more Syrians, who were not registered, stayed in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt (ibid.).

In addition, since the late twentieth century, Middle Eastern peoples have been among the most mobile peoples emigrating to Europe and North America for both political and economic reasons. Intraregional migration has also been exceptionally high, so that globally in 1990, the Middle East hosted the second largest foreign-born population, accounting for 10.9 percent of the entire population (Zlotnik 1998: 431). This trend has been amplified more recently, as the Middle East has increasingly become a destination of global economic migration (Richards and Waterbury 2008: 385–406). This has further blended the race, ethnicity, and religion in an already diversified cluster of peoples.

The analyses in this volume address new global tendencies related to the migration phenomenon from a Middle Eastern perspective. The latest decades have witnessed a growing connectivity between processes of globalization, social transformation, and migration, which has considerable consequences for the global migration trends and patterns, yet to a different extent in different regions of the world. The idea is—in a number of case studies—to analyze migration in the Middle East from a security perspective with citizenship as a central notion. The chapters cover a broad range of migration-related issues and discussions including differentiation of citizenship rights, human rights issues related to female migrants, narratives among migrants in diaspora, multinationalism in a Maghrebian context, migrant workers and governance, human smuggling and transnational social formations, securitization of migration, transnational migration networks, and control of migration flows.

The chapters focus on migration movements in the MENA region and how these movements affect the security relations in the Middle East. The region contains a differentiated range of migration "types" and the interconnectedness between migration and security leads, as demonstrated in the chapters, to a shift of focus from external security and North-South issues toward a focus on transnational developments, such as irregular and illegal migration, cross-border crime, transnational terrorism, and internal challenges in the involved states. Taking these issues as point of departure, the different analyses seek to present new perspectives on migration, security, and citizenship in the Middle East, which reflect both the main tendencies concerning migration in the Middle East in recent years and the theoretical discussions related to the research on migration in the region.

Migration in the MENA Region: Local, Regional, and Global Challenges

Numerically speaking, the largest migratory movements related to the Middle East are regional, that is, from one state to another within the region. But the transregional movements, primarily toward Europe, are also very significant and counted in millions. These transregional movements seem to be rather stable, as convincingly demonstrated by Philippe Fargues: the "emigration from South and East Mediterranean countries (SEM) is continuing at a steady rate, while immigration to these countries is increasing, particularly in various irregular forms" (Fargues 2009a: 19).

A large amount of research projects have been documenting the migratory movements within the MENA region (Baldwin-Edwards 2005; Fargues 2008; Sørensen 2006). The interconnectedness of the concepts of migration and security related to the migratory movements toward the West, especially after September 11, 2001, is also no novelty and has been demonstrated by several scholars (see, for instance, Seeberg 2007b; Bicchi and Martin 2006; Collyer 2006; Huysmans 2006; Lecha and Garcia 2009).

Taking the Middle East as a point of departure, it can be claimed that the recent political and institutional developments are creating huge challenges for the continued economic and social development of the region. The Middle East does not constitute an important part of a reconfiguring global reality in the sense that the region is developing into a growth center in the world economy. On the contrary, the Middle East seems, unintentionally, to avoid becoming part of the positive economic and political aspects of globalization. Besides, it is suffering from the consequences of the securitization of migration in the West, which seems especially to concern itself with the migration from the MENA region (Dijck 2006). Essentially, it seems that the Middle East is a victim of global competition in an emerging new world order. The Middle East is losing ground in a new multipolar world of regions and this reality has an impact on the demographic movements related to migration within and from the Middle East region.

In a highly competitive global environment, migration plays an important role as a phenomenon that challenges security and, therefore, becomes high politics—and a core issue in European-Middle Eastern relations. In order to conceptualize this reality, it is relevant to draw on a terminological distinction suggested by Rainer Bauböck (2003) in connection with an attempt at developing a political theory of migration in a transnational perspective. Bauböck discusses to which degree it can be seen as useful to differentiate between international and transnational relations and phenomena. He makes the point that whereas the term international can be attached meaningfully to activities or relations undertaken by nation-states within a "traditional" neorealism scheme, the term transnational can be attached to activities or phenomena related to noninstitutional or nonstate actors, “be they organized groups or networks of individuals across borders” (Vertovec 2003).

In connection with attempts at developing these concepts further, Steven Vertovec discusses how opportunities and constraints in the migration processes arise from the character of social capital in the involved networks and goes through a number of studies within this area. He points to political opportunity structures as important for the process, defined by “the openness or closure of formal political access, the stability of alignments within a political system, and the presence or absence of influential allies.” Furthermore, he underlines the importance of mobilizing structures, defined as “collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action.” The lack of opportunity structures in the Middle East, as demonstrated by several Arab Human Development Reports (UNDP 2002, 2006), contributes to creating a permanently high motivation for migration.[11] This also adds to the potential radicalization of unemployed, marginalized groups of young Arabs and, of course, in a more general sense to political unrest, as it has happened over the past two years in many Middle Eastern states in connection with the Arab revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and other regions. The surprising and highly interesting phenomenon is very complex, but has already been examined in several convincing analyses (Paoletti 2011; Mikail 2012; Cavatorta and Haugbølle 2012; Kandil 2012; El Sherif 2012).

As emphasized by Michelle Pace and Francesco Cavatorta, it seems that the “authoritarian resilience paradigm has been thrown into some disarray by the ‘success’ cases of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen” (2012: 135)[12] But, as they also point out, the “cases of Syria, Morocco and the Gulf states show that there remain struggles ahead, quite specific to each case, which in turn uncover the underlying validity of scholarly work that focuses on the resilience of authoritarianism in the MENA region” (ibid.).[13] Analyzing the Arab unrest and its impact on migrations patterns in a security context, it is relevant to draw on the work by Lenore G. Martin (1998), who suggests an interdisciplinary approach to security research concerning the Middle East, where five variables are combined into a security paradigm: political legitimacy, ethnic and religious tolerance, economic capabilities, availability of essential natural resources, and military capabilities. This approach has contributed to establishing the theoretical framework, especially for the case studies in this volume, where security is the focus and the variables mentioned by Martin are taken as point of departure for the specific analyses.

In understanding migration as an important issue within a security framework, the role of transnational networks also becomes highly relevant. Different phenomena attached to migration processes like chain migration related to family reunion, migration networks (be they official, semiofficial, or clandestine), or ethnic diasporas all constitute examples of transnational social formations. Also, more problematic phenomena like human trafficking or illegal migration activities organized by people smugglers can be seen as manifestations of transnationalism. With the tendency of securitizing migration movements and with the growing focus on radical Islamist organizations in the past decade, the interconnectedness between security and migration develops new dimensions in the narratives related to transnational social movements. Middle Eastern migration should certainly be seen as a globalized as well as a regional and local phenomenon with significant perspectives related to the European policies aiming at controlling and regulating migration movements, refugee flows, and illegal migrants trying to reach European shores (Lischer 2008; Luedtke 2009; Bredeloup and Pliez 2011).

At the national level, as Laurie Brand explains, migration poses challenges to the coherence of the nations. Taking Jordan as example, she demonstrates how "Jordan has been profoundly shaped by multiple episodes of immigration and emigration, voluntary and forced, economic and conflict-induced" (2010: 96). National narratives can, in more or less obvious ways, function as state strategies, where migration movements are used by the incumbent Middle Eastern regimes to include or exclude migrants from the nation (Antoun 2009). However, they can also function as part of an ideological basis for oppositional movements and as such represent contestations of regime legitimacy. In addition, we find a plethora of informal networks attached to transnational social formations. A large number of these are connected to migration processes that become subject to securitization by the Middle Eastern regimes. The interconnectedness between migration and security is a reality and plays a role in the policies on behalf of the governments south of the Mediterranean.

As discussed above, globalization challenges the Middle East in the sense that global competition tends to place the Middle East among states of secondary importance on the international political scene (compared, for instance, to some of the growth-states in Asia or Latin America). Resulting high unemployment rates lead to migration pressure and to political unrest in the big cities in the Middle East as we have seen in 2011–2012. What we, with Postel-Vinay, can call a provincialization of the Middle East affects the conditions for migration (Postel-Vinay 2008). Transnational social formations like illegal migration, human trafficking, including migrants from the Middle East, are in other words subject to perceptions of the interconnectedness of migration and security. The migration phenomenon seems, therefore, paradoxically, to function as a conservative factor, contributing to avoiding both globalization and the development of social transformation processes in the MENA region.

As shown by Fargues and others, the Arab world displays a hugely differentiated amount of migration patterns. And from Morocco in the West to the Gulf states in the East, a range of more or less corresponding migration policies are pursued by the Arabian states. Attached to the policies are national narratives, which express ideological interests on behalf of the regimes but not always in a consistent way serving a national purpose. Rather, as previously mentioned, the regimes launch migration narratives as state strategies in order to include or exclude migrants from the nation. The Arab states are not efficient in providing jobs or educational opportunities for young Arabs (especially, young Arab women) and this lack of opportunity structures certainly contribute to creating a state of mind among many young people in the Middle East, where getting away more or less becomes the purpose of life.

The marginalization and radicalization tendencies are important aspects of this dimension of the living conditions in the MENA states. Marginalization and radicalization processes constitute an important part of a new migration-security nexus, in relation to which the chapters in this volume demonstrate that migration has become high politics, that migration and security are interrelated concepts in recent political discourses in the Middle East, and that migration phenomena are building stones in a threat perception, which tend to securitize immigrants with a Middle Eastern background in the West.

The Arab states, like all states, are concerned with their own security and are, therefore, interested in contributing to control irregular migration movements, illegal migration, and so on. The "traditional" work migration does create legal and political problems as well, and the development over the past decades, which includes a gradual replacement of the Arab work force by Asian workers from the Philippines, India, Thailand, and such countries, adds to the complexity of the phenomenon.

Migration, Rights, and Citizenship

As mentioned earlier, the ambition of this volume is to analyze how migratory movements inside and across the Middle East raise new questions concerning human rights, governance, citizenship, as well as the policymaking processes, especially since human rights are not applicable just to national populations, but also to an increasing percentage of the populations on the move.

With a focus on citizenship and migration in the Arab Gulf countries, Sater argues in his first chapter that what appears as a clear case of an unequal distribution of citizenship rights between migrant and national populations is also a reflection of citizenship hierarchies within national populations.[14] When assessing the medium-term potential for reform, he shows how state-led debates on national security, identity, and development are replicated in nongovernmental fora, leading to a pessimistic outlook concerning changes in the distribution of citizenship rights. Sater argues that in conservative Gulf monarchies, the differentiation of citizenship rights among migrants and nonmigrants serves to strengthen social and political cohesion and, therefore, provide stability by legitimating the state in multiple ways. This is because the differentiation of citizenship constitutes a social and economic hierarchy that involves the redistribution of wealth from the more vulnerable migrants to certain categories of nationals and members of the professional expat community. Also, this differentiation of citizenship rights is by no means a phenomenon exclusive to the rentier states of the Gulf. Instead, Sater claims—drawing on the literature on global cities and care work—that the differentiation of citizenship rights follows a pattern of global mobility. This mobility involves both a large number of professionals and the development of a new "serving class" in the care industry, leading to the creation of added value in favor of a broad category of professional expats and nationals. Sater suggests that while global economic factors have led to this differentiation of citizenship, politically it is compounded by a state-led discourse based on fear and insecurity. It is this discourse that prevents a substantive reform process that may lead to the greater inclusion of migrants in what is fast becoming their home society.

Discussing the human rights conditions of female migrant laborers in Jordan, Zaid Eyadat mentions that female migrants constitute almost half of the world's migrant population, but they account for more than half (52.2 percent) of all international migrants in developing countries. A significant number of the female migrant workers are employed in low-skilled occupations. Often the conditions related to the migration process for the female workers are unsafe; they are more exposed to human rights violations than male workers. Eyadat critically evaluates and assesses the status of migrant workers', particularly female migrant workers', rights within the framework of migration, security, and citizenship in Jordan. Assuming that the push/pull dynamics of migration has changed in the region due to the events of the Arab Spring, it is necessary to reevaluate the changing notions of migration and security in the Middle East, with citizenship playing an integral role in the linkage between the two concepts.

Using Jordan as a case study, the chapter explores how a human rights approach based on the existing international legal framework on migration can be successfully implemented in order to solve security issues and questions of citizenship and identity, thereby providing a positive transition between the ever-changing social frameworks of the state. Eyadat points at the problematic reality in Jordan, where many female migrant workers are severely abused and some are even deprived of their basic human rights, a situation that seems to be very difficult to deal with by the Jordanian state.

The MENA region not only receives immigrants from Asian countries; it also produces migrants who leave for Europe. Most European states are receiving migrants from the Middle East, one of the largest groups of which are Moroccans, who especially are represented in Spain, France, and Italy.[15] The chapter by Rosita di Peri focuses on how the concept of democracy takes shape, changes, and develops among Moroccan immigrants in an Italian context, more specifically in Piemonte, where a little less than 20,000 are Moroccan immigrant residents.

Di Peri is testing two hypothesis in his chapter. The first one states that the understanding of democracy among the immigrants "is not constructed only from experience of an authoritarian regime, part political engagement, 'discourses' and the migratory process, but also from 'living in a democratic country'" (see di Peri, this volume 66), or, in other words, "how democratic the host country is regarded as being will influence the construction of this perception" (ibid.) The analysis is based on interviews with a sample of Moroccan immigrants, divided according to gender, educational level, years of residence, and age. The second hypothesis takes its point of departure in claiming that citizens living in advanced democracies are likely to take democracy for granted. This reality influences the perception of democracy by third country nationals, both in a positive and negative direction and can thereby inform us about vital dimensions of democratic processes from a Middle Eastern perspective.

Italy might be democratic in form, but it is, according to di Peri, undemocratic in its treatment of immigrants.[16] The Moroccans for many reasons like living in Italy but their understanding of the nature of democracy is not surprisingly affected by their experiences of being immigrants in a sometimes hostile environment. And, Italy is considered fragile and unstable, not being able to provide quite the same level of democracy as other European countries. Hence, Moroccan immigrants feel Italian democracy is, to some degree, in a state of crisis. The immigrants realize that the Italian democracy is imperfect, not only because of its laws concerning immigrants, but also in several other ways; for example with regard to issues such as corruption, the immigrants find Morocco and Italy similar. Di Peri suggests that the immigrants can play a role as active proponents of democracy and—by developing their own understanding of democracy—contribute to the development of democracy in their new host countries.

The Maghreb is like the rest of the MENA region a patchwork of nations, ethnic and religious groups, minorities, and majorities. The coming years will probably see a development in Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya, where the most important issue will be how to secure a positive development based on the democratic improvements over the past years. Regarding Algeria it seems necessary to continue moving away from tragedies of the 1990s. Under all circumstances it seems to be very important again to breathe life into pan-Maghrebian cooperation.[17]

In his narrative "The Battlefield Algeria," Hugh Roberts discusses how the problem of national identity has played a role in the history of modern Algeria and demonstrates that both the religious contradictions and the ethnic conflicts have to be dealt with, before Algeria can solve what seems to be a chronic crisis.[18] Important aspects of this are analyzed by Eva Pföstl in chapter 5, which focuses on the Amazigh Diaspora and its role in conflict and postconflict reconstruction in their homeland. The chapter emphasizes that diasporas as political actors with local and transnational agendas may play an important and sometimes also controversial role in conflicts, political unrest, and transition to democracy in their countries of origin. This is by no means a new phenomenon. Yet, the enhanced possibilities for transnational communication, mobilization, and action as well as the upsurge in domestic and international security concerns after 9/11 and the Arab Spring 2011 have heightened attention to the role of diasporas.

Pföstl mentions that until the 1990s the majority of diaspora studies focused on the problematic features of the diaspora. In essence, the following core arguments were identified: diaspora contributes to sustaining and perpetuating war at the home countries; they serve as irresponsible long-distance nationalists less inclined to compromise or fundamentalists who perpetuate conflicts through economic and political support or intervention, and finally are driven by a sense of guilt, nostalgia, and deprivation. More recently, some scholars have noted that such accounts are one-sided, not capturing how diaspora and exile groups are committed to nonviolent conflict resolution and may stimulate and reinforce local processes of democratization and postconflict reconstruction in their countries of origin. Pföstl goes beyond the mentioned dichotomy, demonstrating that diasporas are complex communities that relate differently with respect to different phases of the conflict cycle in their home country. Pföstl's focus is on the role of the Algerian Amazigh Diaspora in the processes of political reform in postcolonial Algerian society. The chapter demonstrates that the changing political context in North Africa has opened up spaces for an increased participation of the Amazigh Diaspora in political affairs with long-term implications for the political trajectory of the country.

Governance, Migration, and Security

As mentioned above, work migration constitutes an important part of the migratory movements in the Middle East. Over the past decades, replacement migration processes have taken place, where Egyptian, Palestinian, Syrian, and Yemenite workers gradually have been pushed out by migrants from countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. This is the case in the Gulf states and in Lebanon. In these states it might be meaningful to speak of a kind of ethnic hierarchy, where migrants from different countries fill out work functions in a specific pattern with nationals and Westerners in the top layers and the other nationalities placed downward according to qualifications, skills, "normal" wage levels, and other more irrational and sometimes discriminatory factors.

J. Sater discusses in chapter 6 the political inclusion of migrant rights in the policymaking process in Lebanon; he uses a variety of resources both from international organizations such as ILO and the UNHCR and from national organizations such as Caritas Lebanon. As he demonstrates looking at what is arguably one of the most vulnerable groups of migrant workers—female domestic workers from sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia—it is the convergence of interest across multiple actors that determines how migrant rights are effectively included in the policymaking process. More specifically, Sater raises the question about how particularly vulnerable groups of the population are included in the policymaking process when the lack of representation vis-à-vis the dominant groups is such an important feature? What types of mechanisms exist and on what type of resource do such mechanisms rely given the inequality of power relations that characterize the domestic and international political economy of migrant domestic work? What conclusions can be drawn about the reality of mechanisms of governance and spheres of authority in the area of migrant and labor rights? Possible conclusions seem to be that even though migrants' representation remains marginal, the crises of unregulated labor relations in Lebanon have triggered responses from these power structures in the form of meetings, reports, and public statements. And, furthermore, while entrenched power structures of courts, the police, and household/employers have so far resisted more radical reforms, the Lebanese *kafala* system will remain the focus of efforts to reform, whether based on a care-taking discourse or on that of human rights.

Irregular migration constitutes a significant part of Mediterranean population movements—sometimes as transit migration with Europe as the goal and Africa south of the Sahara as starting point.[19] In 2009 the Italian and Libyan governments reached an agreement on cooperation in immigration control, which led to the Italian authorities returning intercepted migrants to Libya. The migrants are not Libyans, but people from sub-Saharan Africa. Derek Lutterbeck explores the extent and nature of migrant smuggling into Libya, and from Libya to Europe in a chapter based on interviews conducted with some 60 migrants of different nationalities who traveled from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya and from there by boat to Europe. Lutterbeck mentions that whereas some analysts suggest that migrant smuggling from Africa to Europe is characterized by a growing degree of organization, professionalism, and internationalization, others have emphasized the still rather local, small-scale, and amateurish character of human smuggling.[20]

The main argument by Lutterbeck is that human smuggling is indeed pervasive when it comes to irregular migration into and through Libya to Europe. However, claims often made regarding the level of organization, sophistication, and transnational character of migrant smuggling seem exaggerated. Human smuggling is indeed organized, to some extent, during certain parts of the migrants' journey from Africa to Europe and there is certainly a degree of professionalism involved; yet, this varies greatly between the different legs of their trip. Moreover, whereas cross-border linkages between migrant smugglers in different countries exist, one cannot really speak of integrated forms of transnational organized crime. Overall, migrant smuggling seems to be carried out by largely locally based and loosely structured networks with equally loose cross-border connections.

The complex political relations between Lebanon and Syria contain a migration dimension, which is closely related to the conflictual political history of the two countries. The reconstruction of Lebanon and especially Beirut after the Civil War ended in 1990 was partly made possible through the import of cheap labor from Syria, which—given the political dominance from Damascus—not necessarily was popular in Beirut. However, the laborers were accepted as long as they didn't interfere in societal and political life. The assassination on February 14, 2005, of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who in many ways personified the reconstruction process, changed this situation, as the Syrian laborers in Lebanon became scapegoats for the tragic incident. Many Lebanese believed that agents from the Syrian regime was responsible for the assassination and were angry about the persistent rumors in Lebanon, that despite the withdrawal of the Syrian military in the spring of 2005, the Syrian intelligence network prevailed. Therefore, post-Hariri, life for the Syrian immigrants in Lebanon changed, with numeral Syrian workers persecuted and in some cases exposed to lynching by the Lebanese. The presence of Syrian workers became a major grievance for the Lebanese. Hence most of the workers went back to Syria. It is believed that many of them returned to Lebanon but, apparently, it took some time, as discussed by Peter Seeberg in chapter 8. Seeberg describes Syrian migration to the Gulf and the specific conditions there—highly different from the situation in Lebanon and based on local practices, including the so-called *kafala* system, which has a long history in the Gulf region and still plays an important role in organizing the conditions for the migrant labor in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.[21]

The chapter describes changes in migration movements in and out of Syria over the past ten years and discusses the effects of the migration phenomenon for the Syrian state from a security perspective. It analyzes how historical, political, and societal changes in the region over time have created new tendencies in migration dynamics in and out of the country. Furthermore the chapter looks at the migration dynamics in Syria in the later years and the recent development related to the so-called Arab Spring, which, in Syria in 2011, seemed to develop into a violent confrontation between Syrian demonstrators demanding political reforms and an extremely repressive and brutal Ba'athist regime.[22] The Syrian army, paramilitary forces, and system-loyalists clamped down on the groups of protestors in Syrian cities throughout the year, which led to some other parts of the Middle East to experience new tendencies to embrace democracy and active political participation by the young citizens of Tunisia, Egypt, and several Middle Eastern states. This development has had and is likely to have significant consequences for the migration movements in the

MENA region, not the least due to the large refugee populations as a result of the Syrian crisis. Also, the chapter discusses to which degree the migration phenomenon can be seen as an expression of transnational integration in the Arab region, demonstrating how this tendency leads to changes in the conditions for citizenship.

Concluding Remarks

This volume chose to focus on two areas of migration issues outlined above (Part I: Migration, Rights, and Citizenship; Part II: Governance, Migration, and Security), though the analyses in the chapters do not provide any definitive answers. It is our intention to contribute to filling some gaps in research on migration in the context of the MENA region, a region that is experiencing rapid changes since early 2011.

The first part of this Introduction took its point of departure in the fact that hardly any region in the world can be found where migratory movements have had wider significance and implications than in the MENA region. The population in MENA has been among the most mobile regarding emigration to the West. However, the intraregional migration has also been very significant and, added to that, MENA has itself become a destination for global migration, partly as a transit area. Finally, the revolts in the Arab countries since 2011 have added new dimensions and modalities to the Middle East as a region, where migration plays a significant role.

The chapters thus, from a multidisciplinary perspective, demonstrate a highly diverse pattern of migration phenomena in the MENA countries, which seem to become more complex following the dramatic and in many ways unexpected and incomprehensible development in 2011. The ambition of this volume is double sided: (1) the chapters discuss how migratory movements inside and across the Middle East raise new questions concerning human rights, governance, and citizenship; (2) the analyses both present new perspectives on migration and security in the Middle East, reflecting significant tendencies concerning the actual migration in the Middle East, and at the same time involve themselves in theoretical discussions related to recent research on migration in the region.

Notes

1. The dramatic and unexpected events in the Middle East since late 2010 have been followed closely in the international media and in

political debates, and gradually in the scholarly research as well. An interesting example of the latter can be seen in a themed issue of Mediterranean Politics entitled "Political Developments in the Arab World: Theoretical Reflections on the Uprisings." See the "Introduction" in Michelle Pace and Francesco Cavatorta (2012).

2. The events started in late December 2010 in Tunisia and have, mainly in the media, created a large number of metaphors, of which the Arab Spring probably is the most common, but maybe also most misleading (if one for instance looks at the tragic development in Syria). Other "labels" were the Arab Awakening, the Arab Revolts, the Arab Revolution etc.
3. The EU has since the start of the Arab revolts been working on a new approach to migration in Mediterranean context, but also with explicit ambitions of issuing a policy with global aspirations, see (EU Commission 2011, 2011).
4. The monumental collection of many of the most significant and interesting articles on migration in the four-volume work edited by Andrew Geddes is an evident manifestation of this reality, see Geddes (2011).
5. The discussions about immigration to Europe with a focus on the agreements entered can be found in Adepoju, van Noorloos, and Zoomers (2010).
6. For an introduction to many of the debates related to the European policies concerning stability and security in a Mediterranean and Middle Eastern context, see Seeberg (2007).
7. For an overview of migration towards Europe and policies related to the main trends, see Aubarell and Aragal (2005).
8. It should be mentioned, though, that several think-tanks and other migration research institutions focus on the Middle East and include the mentioned dimensions, see for instance Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) in Florence. Examples of their research of relevance for this volume can be seen in Bartolomeo, Fakhoury, and Perrin (2010); Bartolomeo, Jaulin, and Perrin (2011, 2012).
9. For a profound presentation of the notion of citizenship in relation to migration see Joppke (2010).
10. An economically extremely important phenomenon is the remittances transferred from the country of immigration to the country of emigration, as for instance see in the relations between Libya and Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf states. The phenomenon is documented in reports from—among others—the World Bank and IOM. See Ratha, Mohapatra, and Silwal (2011) For an interesting study in a Jordanian context, see Mansour, Chaaban, and Litchfield (2011).
11. The much read Arab Human Development Report from 2002 with the subtitle Creating Opportunities for Future Generations documented

a widespread interest in migration among youngsters in the Arab countries, not the least for education purposes, see UNDP (2002).

12. The discussions about authoritarian resilience built on a number of academic works, among which two texts by Heydemann and Hinnebusch, respectively, see Heydemann (2007); Hinnebusch (2006).
13. For a discussion of new perspectives in the discussions about authoritarianism, where the Arab revolts are taken into consideration, see Teti and Gervasio (2011).
14. Building on material from a German context Rob Euwals et al discuss the issue of ethnic hierarchies in connection with the relation between citizenship and migration. See Euwals, Dagevos, and Roodenburg (2010).
15. The youth unemployment in Morocco is very high, constituting one of the main reasons for the propensity to leave the country and go to Europe, if possible. For an analysis of the social situation for the youth in Morocco with a focus on educated youngsters, see Bogaert and Emperador (2011).
16. For a discussion of discriminatory European practices related to immigrants arrived within the latest decades, see Reyneri and Fullin (2010).
17. For an economic analysis on the possibilities and perspectives in Maghrebian integration, see Péridy and Bagoulla (2012).
18. The rather closed Algerian society has been exposed only to a limited degree to scholarly research. A recent and well-informed contribution is Cavatorta's (2009).
19. For an introduction to the main issues related to the reconstruction of Libya and its importance for Europe, see Mikail (2012).
20. The European-Libyan relations are potentially significantly affected by the migration issue, not the least regarding transit migration via Libya to Europe. It is a field within which the EU and Libya share interests in controlling the phenomenon, as mentioned by George Joffé (2011).
21. For a description of the historical background for the conditions for labour migration to the Gulf and the *kafala* system, see Errichiello (2012).
22. The brutality has been documented by a large number of reports throughout 2011 and 2012, see for instance Human Rights Watch (2011).

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PART I

Migration, Rights, and Citizenship

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CHAPTER 2

Citizenship and Migration in Arab Gulf Monarchies

J. Sater

Introduction

The concept of citizenship has traditionally been defined with reference to Marshall's distinction between three types of citizenship rights: negative, political, and positive rights. Negative rights include civil rights such as religious freedom, privacy, while political rights focus on the right to participate in politics through election and freedom of association; positive rights include those rights that are necessary in order to have a minimum standard of living, that is, welfare rights including access to education, health care, minimum income (Marshall 1950/1973). Citizenship consequently means enjoying these rights that the territorial state and its institutions set out to protect for its members and, in the case of positive rights, to guarantee.

At different periods throughout the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, these citizenship rights had not been granted to all status of citizens. Gender, class, race, and ethnic origin were among the categories used to draw distinctions explicitly or implicitly, expressing power relations. Settler communities in North America and other colonial states were particular in that foreign settlers often established discriminatory practices vis-à-vis indigenous populations, also reflecting power hierarchies. In the second half of the twentieth century, such hierarchies increasingly developed between foreign, migrant populations and national citizens. Even if other categories such as gender remain relevant, the migrant-national distinction appeared as an equally overarching category that prompted more liberal legislation in particular in the area of naturalization and other assimilation practices (Joppke 2010: 50–51).

Examining legislation on naturalization in 25 countries Patrick Weil (2001) identified three factors that are mainly responsible for more inclusive citizenship and liberal naturalization laws: (1) past and consolidated immigration that accounts for a high number of permanent noncitizens; (2) entrenched liberal-democratic values; and (3) consolidated borders and absence of incomplete nation-building concerns that might cause a perceived need for discrimination based on national origin. These three factors are revealing concerning the European experience and obstacles toward naturalization, especially, in the case of Germany where a more liberal regime was adopted after a major step was taken in nation-building with the unification of East and West Germany (Joppke 2010: 51). They also shed light on other parts of the world where citizenship rights and migration figure high on the priorities of scholars and decision makers. The Arab Gulf region reveals an important fourth factor that this chapter wants to examine in further detail. This fourth factor is that migration and the lack of migrants' citizenship status substantially contributes to positive rights that official citizenship holders enjoy. This means that in spite of the consolidation of immigration in Arab Gulf countries, and arguably the absence of meaningful nation-building concerns, it is the absence of liberal-democratic practices and corresponding negative and political rights that is the primary factor that explain why migrants will continue to be denied citizenship rights.

To be precise, this chapter does not advocate or examine any naturalization or assimilation policies in the Gulf. Given the high number and diversity of migrants, reaching critical thresholds of 90 percent in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), such a policy would be highly problematic. Instead, it examines three interrelated broad hypotheses: First, there is a link between the lack of citizenship rights enjoyed by migrants and the absence of such rights among nationals of Middle Eastern countries. Second, the denial of citizenship rights to migrants follows a more general pattern of political exclusion that official citizenship holders as well as migrants experience. Third, that attempts to reform migrants' citizenship status are hindered by the role that it plays for the citizenship status of national populations.

This chapter argues that in conservative Gulf monarchies, the differentiation of citizenship rights among migrants and nonmigrants serves to strengthen social and political cohesion and, therefore, provide stability by legitimating the state in the following ways: (1) It increases the welfare of citizenship holders; (2) it creates a legal hierarchy of power relations, corresponding to a sense of fear vis-à-vis the numerical majority; (3) it legitimates the state to secure the welfare and to assure the protection of national populations from the foreign population's culture and language and crime and diseases that it may bring.

The core of this chapter's argument is that the differentiation of citizenship constitutes a social and economic hierarchy that guarantees the redistribution of added value from the more vulnerable migrants to certain categories of nationals and members of the professional expat community. It also establishes that this differentiation of citizenship rights is by no means a phenomenon exclusive to the rentier states of the Gulf. Drawing on the literature on global cities and care work, this chapter demonstrates that the differentiation of citizenship rights follows a pattern of global mobility. This mobility involves both a large number of professionals and the development of a new "serving class" especially in the care industry, leading to the creation of added value in favor of a broad category of nationals and professional expats. Finally, this chapter suggests that though global economic factors have led to this differentiation of citizenship, politically it is compounded by a state-led discourse based on fear and insecurity. It is this discourse that prevents a substantive reform process that may lead to the greater inclusion of migrants in what is fast becoming their de facto home society.

Outline of Study

After giving a brief historical background of the diversity of migration in relation to the establishment of states in the Middle East, this chapter examines in its second section the particularities of positive rights among Gulf nationals. This serves to illustrate the nexus between such welfare rights and the existence of large migrant communities, as this chapter will elaborate in its third section. The fourth, main, section will review the rationale for reform and actual state-sponsored reform schemes. It emphasizes how the debate is dominated by security concerns (i.e., protection of national populations) that, as outlined in the argument above, legitimate the state's harsh policies on immigrant population and control. It also creates a sense of political cohesion based on the lack of rights enjoyed by certain categories of migrants. Subsequently, the chapter reviews how the language of nonstate reformists remains strongly embedded in the welfare language adopted by the state, showing both the power of the welfare-security concern as well as the limits of any reforms of citizenship laws that may favor migrant communities. The conclusion discusses the chapter's findings in relation to global trends in what Saskia Sassen calls global cities. As much of the welfare function of migrant workers relate to the unstable citizenship status that makes them particularly vulnerable and exploitable, it is important to point out that these are not isolated cases but are rather in line with worldwide trends toward the erosion of classical notions of territorially defined citizenship.

Background

Migration within the Middle East has always been a remarkable feature. Migration movements can even be considered to be fundamental to the construction of a multisectarian Arab-Islamic identity in the Middle East (Nisan 2002). This can be seen from the early Arab conquests, to the later presence of Armenians in Lebanon and Syria, Arabs and Persians on both shores of the Gulf, settled North African pilgrims in Jerusalem, nomadic lifestyles across deserts, and mobility among Ottoman military and administrative officers. With the advent of postcolonial nation-states, such movements continued but entailed a restriction of formal citizenship rights centered on states. One of the reasons was that, in line with Weil's argument (2001), states were in the process of cementing fragile national identities and territories, based on the distribution of some rights to newly "constructed" communities. New communities, such as the Palestinians in Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan or various sectarian and linguistic groups in Kuwait and other parts of the Gulf, were, therefore, excluded when the state- and nation-building process began. As a consequence, in 1990 the Middle East was home to the world's second-largest foreign-born population, that is, children of now "foreign" parents were residents in countries in which they were not official citizens (Zkotnik 1998: 431)

This issue has become particularly relevant in the Gulf. From the mid-1970s onward, countries such as Qatar and the UAE has had a migrant population of more than 75 or 80 percent. These migrants are mostly from Arabia, Iran, and the Subcontinent. Due to its larger population, Saudi Arabia has had a lower proportion of migrants, of about 40 percent (Winckler 2010: 12). This migration has been at the core of Gulf Arab states' developmentist ideology, as these states pursued a policy in which rapid socioeconomic development could be achieved by hiring skilled workers from abroad to teach students, construct bridges, build factories and high-rise buildings, and create markets for commodities and finances (Davidson 2008). During the past 40 years, the presence of the Gulf's migrant population has been at the heart of the state's developmentalist paradigm; nonetheless Gulf states have yet to produce a more inclusive approach to the distribution of citizenship rights. In their current state, migrants enjoy few, if any, of the civil, political, or social rights associated with citizenship.

Citizenship in the Gulf

Examining the concept of citizenship in the Gulf reveals a number of particularities. First, it is noticeable that citizens of these countries enjoy only some civil rights, few if any political rights, and quite a substantial number of positive rights. In fact, there appears a very clear imbalance between welfare rights and civil and political rights, to the extent that the famous "no taxation no representation" formula has been given an added, explicit welfare dimension. Due to the continuing reliance of many Gulf states on oil and gas income, the distributive spending of income accrued from abroad remains a core characteristic of these rentier states (Beblawi and Luciani 1987). In the states with the highest proportion of migrant communities (Kuwait, Qatar, UAE), these welfare provisions also appear strongest. For example, on the occasion of Kuwait's celebration of 50 years of independence on February 25, 2011, its citizens received US$3,000 as a gift from the government. Similarly, the widespread, revolutionary protest movements in the Middle East have triggered Gulf governments to significantly increase spending on less wealthy citizens and areas. Prestige objects such as the Abu Dhabi Guggenheim or Abu Dhabi Classics appeared on hold, while spending on housing, electricity, and credit facilities for citizens significantly increased.[1]

Second, in addition to gender as a basic category that already limits civil and positive rights of women (Brand 1998), Gulf states have substantial populations identified by alleged origin, religion, or language that enjoy fewer civil and social rights than other citizens of these states. In fact, citizenship rights are negotiated through, and dependent on, the wider religious or tribal community to which individuals belong, which also appear in passports. This especially applies to Ajamis, Bidouns (stateless) "nationals" in Kuwait, and the UAE, and to Zanzibaris and Shi'a communities in Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. This is best illustrated in the UAE, where citizenship rights are contingent on wider kinship affiliation through each individual Emirate. This can make substantial differences in terms of protection (civil rights) and welfare and employment (positive rights). Systems of patronage or what Gulf citizens informally call *wasta* has in many ways become formalized through membership in any of the seven Emirates.

All of the above suggests that with the exception of sometimes quite substantial welfare provisions, the demarcation line between citizens and migrants is not quite as clear as may appear on first sight. In other words, citizens enjoy rights that only indirectly depend on being a passport holder of the country of residence. Even if systems of patronage and neopatriarchy are basic components of Middle Eastern political systems both of traditional rule and single-party and military rule, a tribal ethos that compounds patronage systems remains a lot stronger in the Gulf than elsewhere in the region (Naqīb 1990; Ayubi 1995; Sharabi 1988). More specific to the Gulf, the lack of political rights is compensated by strong welfare provisions generated from the distribution of oil and gas revenues. However, the distribution of such revenues is just one component of a distribution system, and migrants' contribution to the generation of wealth has become a second component that contributes to the reproduction of traditional rule.

The Fragmentation of Citizenship in Gulf Migrant Societies

Gulf migrants do not have many of the civil rights associated with citizenship. Above all, the right to own a private company is limited in that foreigners need local sponsors, who in turn take a 51 percent ownership stake in whatever company is founded. Second, the right to hire employees is limited through the sponsorship system (*kafala*), so that only citizens may sponsor workers who are invariably foreigners. Third, foreigners are not allowed to own property except in special freehold areas. As a result, property markets generate a substantial amount of rents that becomes part of a redistribution system from foreign, private enterprise to the local population.

This means that the lack of civil rights of a revenue-generating migrant community directly leads to a transfer of wealth generated by an expanding expatriate community. While data about the extent of this wealth transfer is not readily available, a clue can be taken from examining the growth in Gross National Product per capita (GNP) among nationals. According to World Bank statistics, the UAE has experienced an unprecedented increase in GNP per capita from about US$21,000 in 2002 to almost US$60,000 in 2008. In Dubai, an emirate without any major oil resources, this increase was from US$19,000 in 2000 to US$33,500 in 2006 (Hvidt 2009: 397) (table 2.1).

Table 2.1 GNP Per Capita in Current USD in the UAE

Year	*2002*	*2003*	*2004*	*2005*	*2006*	*2007*	*2008*
GNP per capita in current USD	20,965	23,523	26,389	32,526	38,581	47,565	58,272

Source: http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-arab-emirates.

In addition to such entrenched systems of redistribution, hierarchical citizenship rights give meaning to the value of Gulf nationals' own identity. In contrast to different groups that are perceived as external to the geographical boundaries, identity is also constructed through the domestic difference that citizenship offers (Partrick 2009). As Lavargne argues for the case of Dubai, from a national individuals' perspective, the meaning of civil rights is not related to the liberal notion of protection from the state, but instead to the nationalistic notion of protection from foreigners in the event of disputes. This applies in particular to economic transactions and, ironically, traffic accidents (2007: 144). This is especially true because foreigners constitute such a large majority in Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE. Analyzing the question of identity in Kuwait, Longva coined the term "besieged empowerment" (125) to refer to nationals' relationship to migrant domestic workers in the care work industry. This term illustrates the combination of economic, and in some cases physical, power that Kuwaiti nationals have over this socioeconomic group, with a sense of vulnerability due to the omnipresence of foreign workers in all aspects of social life. While this certainly applies to domestic workers given the amount of knowledge migrant workers are able to accumulate about private family homes, the larger dichotomy of besiegement versus domination also informs more general approaches to citizenship rights and migrants. Interestingly, given the complexity of foreign communities with different citizenship status that live in the Gulf—from wealthy Iranian communities, to Western professionals, to Russian, central Asian, Indian, and Arab service sector employees, and to Sri Lankan domestic and Pakistani construction site workers—what can be called a citizenship hierarchy extends beyond the simple national/expat dichotomy. The hierarchy is composed of a myriad of power relationships that depend on gender, ethnic origin, religion, and nationality.

Those at the bottom of the hierarchy are in no position to bargain, except for the sometimes nonnegligible option of leaving. This is not just because trade unions are banned in many Gulf countries, but because of the institutionalized "illegality" in which the practice of renewable visa and frequent deportation puts workers and residents. The vulnerability is particularly prevalent among women with dependents abroad, who work in the care-taking industry or in (illegal) sex work. It is important to point out that this vulnerability is central to the production of added value and it significantly enables the professional classes to have access to wealth: First, for both parents career development and family life are no longer contradictions. Second, the state does not need to provide for care-taking facilities of a large proportion of the population; instead, it can focus on its role as the provider of economic opportunities.

Interestingly, some countries such as Kuwait and Bahrain have moved toward allowing trade unions—the UAE has professional associations—although it must be pointed out that they are restricted to citizens. However, even if these organizations were to include noncitizens, the lack of broader citizenship rights means that such representation may, in the end, be quite meaningless or even counterproductive (if activity in unions becomes grounds for deportation). After all, personal security and safety continue to depend on being "granted" residency rights.

Reforms

This differentiation of citizenship could conceivably persist indefinitely if it were not for fundamental problems that some states within the region are encountering.

First, some of the abuse such as the nonpayment of wages have damaged the UAE's but also Qatar's and Kuwait's international reputation. These countries' exposure—evidenced by Qatar's World Cup bid, Dubai's major international tourist industry, or Abu Dhabi's cultural and educational mega projects in Saadiyat Island—encouraged them to limit the amount of abuse. In order to tackle inappropriate housing for construction site workers, the emirate of Abu Dhabi installed model housing units. The UAE has introduced Electronic Payment Systems in order to avoid labor conflicts related to unpaid wages.

Second, the economic pull/push factors are so strong that people are quite likely to ultimately stay, leading to second, third, and more generations of migrants with no sense of belonging/loyalty to the state. From personal observations, I can conclude that "expatriate" residents who were born and raised in the UAE seem to reveal a substantial lack of belonging and emotional attachment to the UAE. Such a lack of belonging, while causing a disinterest in political matters and the lack of stakes in the political system, also impedes a work-and-life ethic that surpasses immediate economic interest. A frequently encountered economic problem is that of job poaching—employees are lured into higher paying jobs in other Gulf countries (Okruhlik 2011: 130). Such frequent practices lead to a loss of institutional memory and competitiveness that may in the long run hinder further economic development. Dubai's underperforming Jebel Ali industrial zone, restricted to low-value-added economic activities such as repackaging, may be suffering from such fluctuations quite substantially. In turn, community life is characterized by an absence of charity work or other community-building activities by residents, causing social problems from eating disorders to high drop-out rates from schools. In the UAE, with 22 percent of each generation, the latter mainly affects male Emiratis (*National*, June 22, 2011).

Third, lack of loyalty may turn parts of the population to outside ideologies that creates security concerns. Regimes in the Gulf have begun to fear the influence of Iran and nuclear proliferation, as evidenced by wikileaks publication of comments by Gulf leaders in November 2010 calling for an immediate US intervention in Iran. The lack of loyalty also prevents policies from being implemented properly. Policies such as nationalization of the workforce are not being implemented and are often avoided using illicit means, not just because of the economic risks involved in having overprotected national employees. Clearly, a lack of loyalty leads to lack of cooperation unless the state uses its coercive apparatus—increasing the transaction costs of policy reforms.

Finally, the UAE has set up housing and business units that require long-term, stable residency. While Dubai's property boom may again take advantage of the uncertainty in surrounding Arab states since the Arab Spring, it remains questionable whether Dubai's free-riding in terms of attracting foreign capital can persist much longer. In fact, according to some reports, by the end of 2011 there were 115,000 empty units in Dubai alone (Dubai Property Mall 2010), requiring a 500,000-person increase in the population as long-term end-users willing to live and invest in Dubai's property market.

Given these considerations, reforms of the status quo have been occasionally announced and some have been implemented. The most far-reaching of these reforms took place in the Emirate of Dubai, which has moved to giving de facto ownership rights in special freehold areas, both in real estate and in private enterprise. For such property owners, it has also been in the process of delinking residency rights from having full-time employment, in order to find investors willing to take up residency in Dubai.

In order to avoid the domination of particular nationalities, the UAE has pursued a policy of multinationalism: From countries such as India and Pakistan only specific quotas are admitted, with specific end-of-contract return dates for workers in low-wage categories. For other types of labor, the UAE has reduced to two years the time period that migrants cannot change their employer without a so-called non-objection letter. While this ossified the employment market, it also gave employers disproportionate power over employees as it was at his/her own discretion to either issue such a letter or not. Without such a letter, a migrant worker who wanted to change the employer needed to return to his/her home country and wait for a period of six months before another visa could be issued. Some countries such as Kuwait and Bahrain have announced an end to the sponsorship system altogether, which is also at the base of the nonobjection letter. However, this proposed change is controversial and if implemented would affect certain types of professionals. In Bahrain, naturalization has been offered to those with sufficient wealth to afford property; however, sectarian considerations have led to the criticism that the proposal would change the fabric of the island's population by reducing its Shi'a numerical majority (Partrick 2009).

Amidst these changes, it is important to analyze the type of discourse that policymakers are involved in. The purpose of such an analysis is to assess the long-term direction of migration policies. At the heart of this debate is the Ministry of Labor, which is challenged by immediate problems such as strikes and protests, as well as criticism that inform various international fora organized by UN organizations such as the International Labor Organization. In an explanation to the reform of the nonobjection letter, the UAE minister of labor Saqr Gobash declared that "the UAE is determined to protect the rights and benefits of the labourers as well as their employers, particularly those concerned with international labour policies" (*The National*, December 24, 2010). In November 2009 he declared in Athens that "the UAE is very conscious of the contribution contractual workers make to its economy. In return, it is committed to protecting their rights and empowering them to fully benefit from their residency in the country" (*Gulf News*, November 5, 2009). While he declared that the UAE favors circular migration as a preferable model, given the country's demographics and labor needs, he emphasized that it is open to other models and would like to see what best practices can be applied. An important statement that requires careful reading is that "fundamental human rights of all people are not to be considered negotiable" (ibid.), which refers to both basic human rights of laborers *and* the rights of people to choose their own policies, that is, the sovereignty of the state. The latter continues to be a very important preoccupation among Middle Eastern states, as evidenced by the 2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights, which stresses the rights of people and governments to be sovereign (Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004, Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 2). This demonstrates a common fear that the increasing number of migrants and the increasing internationalization of labor laws has brought: States in the Gulf may be forced to adopt labor policies that reflect international standards, including naturalization of migrant populations after a certain number of years in residence.

Such fears have been best expressed by Bahrain's former minister of health and education, Ali Fakhro, who asserts that "the region would be on the verge of disaster more dangerous than a nuclear bomb, as we are facing changes that are likely to alter the demographic outlook of the region" (*The National*, January 7, 2011). In turn, the former Bahraini minister of labor Majeed al Alawi called migrant workers an "Asian tsunami" explaining that foreign workers represented "a danger worse than the atomic bomb or an Israeli attack…I am not exaggerating that the number of foreign workers will reach almost 30 million in 10 years from now" (cited in Okrhulik 2011: 133). In the UAE, the Chief of the Dubai Police, General Dahi Khalfan Tamim, declared that "we are building buildings but losing the Emirates" (cited in ibid. 133), and with respect to the Asian background of migrants, he declared that Arab expats "are better than non-Arabs" (*Gulf News,* December 27, 2010). As to migration policies, the then UAE labor minister Ali Bin Abdulla Kaabi announced in 2008 a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) wide policy that defines "Asian workers…[as] contracted workers, not what some call immigrant workers." As in Kuwait, the prevailing approach is based on the notion of besieged empowerment; he argues that "we want to protect the minority—which is us" (cited in Okruhlik 2011: 133).

A Nonstate Approach to Reforms

Such alarmist approaches can be considered as representing national and international political struggles about identity and sovereignty. Further insight can be obtained by looking at Gulf intellectuals' contribution to the debate, and while such evidence is scarce, there are nevertheless some ideas that were published in the local press. One such intellectual is the Emirati Sultan Sooud Al Qassimi, a nonresident fellow at the Dubai School of Government, and founder of the quasi-NGO Young Arab Leaders Forum. He writes a column for the UAE *The National* on weekends, and he has his own blog. One of his columns deserves special attention for the purpose of this chapter.

In this column entitled “The Sponsorship System Is on the Wrong Side of History,” Qassimi deals with foreign-owned companies that require local sponsorship and a 51 percent local participation. As aforementioned, migrants need a sponsor for their local businesses, which reduces their right to private property quite substantially. The first point he makes is that if the federal government of the UAE does not end this practice, international labor laws will, given the increasing importance of these laws and the UAE’s international integration. He suggests that the individual sponsorship system should be taken over by an Emirates National Residency Authority, who could collect fees and distribute them to needy Emirati Families, in order to avoid some of the loopholes in the current system. It would also liberate the job market from sponsorship constraints, which would make the UAE more competitive. Last, it may even reduce the number of UAE residents, as citizens would no longer grant sponsorship to an unusually high number of foreigners in order to generate revenue (*The National,* October 17, 2010).

These ideas illustrate how citizenship and migration questions are being analyzed by contemporary Gulf thinkers. First, the sponsorship system should be reformed because according to Al Qassimi, individual nationals are able to take advantage of it, but it does not benefit Emirati society as a whole. Furthermore, it prevents innovation and competition in the UAE. Third, it may even have caused more migrants to come to the UAE, due to corrupt practices. What needs to be pointed out is that all three reasons do not reflect a discourse based on integration, citizenship, or fundamental civil rights that should be extended to nonnational populations. Rather, it reflects a utilitarian and technocratic discourse that is very much in line with the developmentalist ideology of the state.

While the author’s analysis is certainly less alarmist and more nuanced compared with the more politicized state discourse, similar themes appear. This means that it strengthens the state’s current practices while carving out some space for reforms that, however, are not substantive. It would be simple to conclude that the power hierarchies are being reproduced among national populations, and that due to the substantive welfare provisions that the state has been able to offer, the differentiation has become acceptable. However, it also needs to be pointed out that migrant communities are themselves involved in similar power hierarchies, which indicates that the trend toward the erosion of citizenship appears to be global. In a very interesting analysis of foreign business elites in Dubai, Neha Vora concludes that this group has become quasi-citizens who support the ideology of "equality in neoliberal terms," one that includes the hierarchy of citizenships. In the age of global cities, "the state satisfies these expatriate clients by affording them particular rights, which include the ability to govern other populations and access to wealth accumulation" (2010: 48). Cities such as Dubai may, therefore, be at the forefront of a process in which universal citizenship rights are being traded in against the ability to govern other populations that entail the generation of surplus and wealth.

Conclusion

The study of citizenship and migration in the Gulf offers a unique perspective for examining power dynamics in politics and society, and to place them in a global context. This chapter illustrated how different categories of citizenship coexist in the GCC and how the relative disempowerment of migrant workers is related to the lack of civil and political rights that official citizenship holders enjoy. In addition, inexpensive migrant labor has been a key component of the developmentist ideology of the state. It allows for the generation of surplus while it serves both to attract a surplus-generating professional expat community without having to provide for care-taking infrastructure. Slow moves toward granting quasi-property and residency rights to a wealthy class of expats underscores a redefinition of citizenship rights based not on universal criteria, but on monetary value.

Particular in the Gulf is that based on different citizenship rights; some categories of residents and nationals lend legitimacy to the state. In the case of the wealthy foreign business elite, this is even translated into an active attraction to the state.

Some further conclusions relate to the absence of effective and widespread public lobbying based on universal rights both domestically and regionally. As pointed out, on the one hand, fears of losing sovereignty are particularly prevalent in the Middle East state system. This has been fueled by a long history of foreign involvement in domestic Arab affairs as well as authoritarian states adopting an Arab nationalist discourse. At the same time, the de facto differentiation of citizenship rights among national populations remains prevalent in most, if not all, Arab states, leading to low levels of awareness concerning the importance of universal rights.

Finally, concerning care work, the Gulf places itself in the context of the expansion of "global cities." Sassen has analyzed the care industry in the major global megacities from the perspective of rising demand for inexpensive care-taking labor. She observes that

> urban professionals want it all, including dogs and children, whether or not they have the time to care for them . . . We can call this type of household a "professional household without a 'wife'" regardless of whether its adult couple consists of a man and a woman, two men, or two women . . . As a consequence, we see the return of the so-called serving classes in all the world's global cities, and these classes are largely made up of immigrant and migrant women. (Sassen 2006: 32–34)

In the past, high demand in developing industries, such as care, was associated with granting rights to those who worked in them, that is, the expansion of citizenship rights. As Sassen explains, in global cities this link has been made redundant by the widespread employment of illegal, often female, migrants, who neither enjoy nor expect to enjoy anytime soon citizenship status. From long working hours to low wages, these individuals are in no bargaining position due to the threat of deportation and the lack of legal means of empowerment (ibid.).

Consequently, this chapter also illustrates how the Middle East lines up with global trends: the importance of global cities in which the differentiation of citizenship rights is becoming an increasingly important phenomenon. In the more industrialized nations, such citizenship rights are denied through processes of immigration that turn lower-paid workers without the appropriate documents into clandestine workers; in the Gulf this status is made more formal. Interestingly, the focus on cultural alienation and fear is similar in industrialized countries and in the Middle East. It can be argued that as long as such fears are stoked, it will be difficult to extend broader citizenship rights to migrant populations. At the same time, reforms of the citizenship status of migrants, such as property and residency rights that are initiated by the state, tend to follow developmentalist objectives; as Al Qassimi's contribution illustrates, nonstate reform proposals also remain strongly embedded into this objective.

NOTE

1. http://www.mediabistro.com/unbeige/uaes-financial-woes-and-arab-spring-instability-the-likely-causes-for-the-hold-on-abu-dhabi-guggenheim_b18463; http://www.emirates247.com/business/abu-dhabi-spend-at-all-time-high-2012–06–21–1.463928

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CHAPTER 3

Balancing Security and Human Rights: The Case of Female Migrant Workers in Jordan

Zaid Eyadat

INTRODUCTION

In today's highly globalized world, labor migration has become an essential part of world economy, given the continuous demand for cheap and low-skilled migrant labor, as well as the flexibility of labor migrants in regard to employers' demands and working conditions. Several powerful factors affect the movement of people and their decision to migrate, including economic disparities, employment opportunities, and poverty. Also, demographic factors, such as the age distribution of the population in a given country, affect the general supply and demand of foreign workers. In addition to the aforementioned factors, the escalation of armed conflicts, human rights abuses, and environmental and natural disasters cause more people to leave their homes in search of a safer place to live and work.[1] Thus, the number of migrants increased globally from 75 million[2] to 215 million[3] during the years 1970–2009. In light of this growing trend, the need for enforced international standards of migration and its corresponding human rights abuses has become crucial.

Female migrants, in particular, constitute almost half of the world's migrant population and account for 52.2 percent of all international migrants in developing countries, as of 2005.[4] A significant number of female migrant workers are employed in low-skilled occupations; they are also present in skilled welfare and social professions, including health, education, and social services. These employment opportunities and labor migration, in general, can bring both economic and sociocultural consequences, though, because the experience of migration is not always secure for female migrant workers, as they may be more so exposed to human rights violations compared to their male counterparts. Female migrant workers regularly have to face difficulty in both living and working conditions, increased health risks, a lack of access to social services, as well as being subjected to various forms of abuse, mainly the confiscation of passports by their employers. This is due, in part, to the fact that they usually work in gender-segregated fields that are mostly unregulated. As a result, they have little or no protection at all. However, the most vulnerable individuals are irregular female migrant workers, for they are exposed to severe intimidation, as well as economic and sexual exploitation, including trafficking and racial discrimination.

Jordan is a state that both sends and receives labor migrants. Jordan's labor market started receiving migrant workers in the 1970s and eventually became a destination country for migrant Arab workers, especially in the fields of domestic construction and agriculture.[5] However, it also became a destination for foreign workers, particularly from Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Migrant workers in Jordan's qualified industrial zones (QIZs) generally come from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, and China.[6] The influx of foreign workers in Jordan's labor market is due to the rising demand in some fields that Jordanian citizens refrain from working. There are numerous reasons as to why Jordanians abstain from particular jobs; they are summarized as follows:

1. Low salaries, wages, or income.
2. Exemption from Social Security.
3. Lack of health insurance.
4. Working environment.
5. Social perceptions toward particular types of low-income jobs.

According to the Jordanian Ministry of Labour (MoL), the number of female migrant workers reached 51,823[7] with work permits and residencies for the year 2008. Female migrant workers have a higher concentration in both manufacturing and social/personal services. However, the figures of the Non-Jordanian Work Force Employment Union indicate that there are over 75,000 workers employed in households alone.

With the increasing influx of female migrant workers in Jordan, considerable human rights challenges began to surface over time, such as undesirable employment conditions, a lack of social security and health insurance, income obtained from employers, and their treatment by the authorities and society.[8] The National Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), established in 2002, received over 140 complaints related to female migrant workers' exploitation in the year 2008, including cases of human trafficking by the migrant workers' recruitment offices. The NCHR also found the phenomena of violating contracts signed between the workers and the owners of these recruitment offices in terms of wages and the nature of work agreed upon.[9]

Despite the challenges for female migrant laborers, including the human rights abuses, Jordan is the leading state in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in terms of aggressively pursuing the issue through legislative reform. Both Human Rights Watch[10] and the International Labour Organization[11] cite in their extensive reports of the region that while Jordan has many issues at hand that should promptly be addressed, most notably in the actual enforcement of legislative reform, no other state in the MENA region has handled and responded to the human rights abuses as such, and Jordan should act as a leader and role model for its neighboring states with increasingly large migrant labor populations.

To fully understand how and why Jordan has responded to the challenges at hand, one must look at the concept of human rights and the respect for human rights within the framework of the concepts of migration, security, and citizenship. This approach is highly unique but necessary because the relationship between migrants and human rights, as well as human development, is purely defined by the existing structures of law, institutions, and processes and policies. As will be explored throughout this chapter, concerns about migration, whether justified or not, directly affect the national and social security of a state. Furthermore, these security concerns correspondingly influence notions of identity and citizenship within the state and these subjects can become highly securitized and politicized.

Adding a further level of analysis, the three concepts of migration, security, and citizenship in the MENA, as well as Jordan in particular, need to be revaluated in light of the so-called Arab Spring, which has drastically altered the dynamics of the region. The long-standing push/pull factors of migration have been transformed by recent nontraditional security concerns, including the respect for and protection of human rights. Moreover, these nontraditional concerns were approached by and received pressure from both international and domestic actors. While innumerous human rights abuses have been committed by many players within the region over the years, there has never before been such blatant condemnation of these abuses from the citizens within the states, as well as from the international community. This demonstrates a significant shift in rhetoric, and, therefore, a new and human-rights-based approach to the notions of migration, security, and citizenship is urgently needed.

Addressing the sanctity of human rights within an international framework is easy in the sense that numerous protective structures are already in place, as will be elaborated later in this chapter. However, the problem with adhering to these international human rights standards lies with the state, as it can be forced to compromise its sovereignty in order to comply with the international protocol. That being said, many states refuse that course of action because they see it as automatically comprising state security. Further complicating matters is the role that NGOs play in human rights promotion, particularly in the case of migration. NGOs constantly release scathing reports of human rights abuses in various states, bringing to light many injustices and always showing the migrant as the victim and the state as the enemy. However, these entities never take into account the realities of the state and the rational choices that it must make for the sake of security. Jordan, for example, isn't placing restrictions on Iraqi or Palestinian migrants for the mere purpose of disregarding their human rights. Rather, Jordan is extremely lacking in resources and with enormous refugee populations already in place, it has no choice but to make some decisions that are best for its security and citizens. When NGOs, and sometimes IGOs, produce these reports without even considering the situation at hand, in terms of state security, states do not take their valuable human rights advice and suggestions, therefore, hindering the entire process. It is absolutely essential that these three types of entities realize the benefits that can be had from working productively with one another in order for human rights to be effectively implemented in any given state.

This chapter strives to critically evaluate and assess the status of migrant workers', particularly female migrant workers', rights within the framework of migration, security, and citizenship in Jordan. Assuming that the push/pull dynamics of migration has shifted in the region due to the events of the Arab Spring, it is necessary to reevaluate the changing notions of migration and security in the Middle East, with citizenship playing an integral role in the linkage between the two concepts. Using Jordan as a case study, this chapter seeks to explore how a human rights approach based on the existing international legal framework on migration can be successfully implemented in order to solve security issues and questions of citizenship and identity, thereby providing a positive transition for the ever-changing social framework of the state.

Migration, Security, and Citizenship: Linkage

Before examining the linkage of migration, security, and citizenship within the context of the events of 2011 in the MENA region, it is essential to first look at the theoretical work regarding each of these notions both separately and as a whole. Although the three are invariably intertwined, they do possess individual attributes that are worth investigating before attempting to make associations between them.

In 1992, Myron Weiner's work[12] on international migration was published in MIT's journal *International Security*, in which he asserts that migration is no longer an issue limited solely to the jurisdiction of one state, as it is now an international phenomenon involving a rising number. More importantly, however, it is a matter that increasingly affects the relations between states, as well as the entire international security framework. He notes that migration is commonly misunderstood as a phenomenon in which laborers from developing countries leave for better economic opportunities in the developed world. However, the numbers suggest that in reality, a larger percentage of migration flow occurs between developing countries. Point and case is the Middle East, where although quite a number of migrants leave their homes for the "West," a large number of them migrate to neighboring Arab countries. Economic incentives for doing so are indeed present, but political factors tend to shape the process of migration much more prominently, according to Weiner.

Jordan, which hosts a very large amount of foreign workers, has its influx of migration characterized by the Palestinian population, which now constitutes almost half of the entire Jordanian population. This is, of course, due to political factors involving Jordan's neighbor, Israel, rather than economic motives. Although economic inducements can be present for any migrant, at the end of the day, it is the governments that decide whether or not citizens can leave the state, if immigrants can enter, and which immigrants can enter; these decisions are usually politically motivated. Laurie Brand[13] claims that there are several definitive factors that determine the way regimes treat/view migrants and they are as follows: the relationship of emigrants to the colonial versus the postindependence state, the relationship between migration and state economic development, and the relationship between migrant and home state elite (Brand 2010: 78).

In regard to migration and security, Weiner's primary assumption is that security is wholly a social construct. Threats can either be physical or merely social, but threat is socially constructed due to the fact that different governments respond to threats in various manners, with underlying social factors being the principal cause of those distinctions. Weiner essentially states that the basis for these social perceptions and a state's particular immigration policy is that state's "ethnic affinity."[14] This is not to say, however, that other factors, especially economic dynamics, are not considered in the decision-making processes. The reason the idea of a society's ethnic affinity is so strongly propagated is because it is directly linked to the notion of identity, which is the core of any given society in the world. If the identity of a society is threatened by migrants who possess a different identity, ethnically or otherwise, then the native identity appears threatened, which leads to increased securitization and politicization of migration, manifesting itself in the notions and legal apparatuses of citizenship. Europe, or more specifically the EU, is the victim of such a large-scale identity crisis. After World War II and the corresponding labor shortage, large numbers of guest workers, many from North Africa, arrived to fill the void. During this time, immigration policy was rather lax, especially in France, which had a notable open-border policy. Not surprisingly, many of the migrants decided to stay and generations were formed. Now, states in the EU are particularly concerned with not only incoming migrants, but also well-settled migrants, because their diversity threatens the European identity. Citizens and states alike have responded to this "crisis" by claiming that their concerns are merely security related—after all, xenophobes believe that Muslim migrants will bring only terrorism rather than productivity to their doorsteps. By turning the identity issue into a securitized one, it is an attempt to legitimize fears, no matter how politicized and misinformed it is in reality.

It is also to be strongly noted, though, that these social perceptions, especially in regard to ethnic preferences, can be transformed over time, particularly by looking through the lens of human rights. The United States, known as the "melting pot" due to its extremely diverse demographics, has had and continues to have its fair share of ethnic clashes, as well as discriminatory immigration policies. One of the most notable pieces of immigration legislation the United States enacted was the Immigration Act of 1924,[15] also known as the Johnson-Reed Act, which was aimed at restricting the immigration of

Eastern and Southern Europeans, as well as entirely prohibiting the immigration of East Asians and Indians. However, after recognition that this policy was a violation of human rights as it was ethnically discriminatory in nature, over time, it was reversed and the populations the legislation had formerly targeted are now essential components to the American identity. Not to say that the United States doesn't possess any sort of ethnic tensions now, for it certainly does, but these social constructs have completely changed with the passage of time, and they will continue to transform themselves in the years to come.

More so relevant to the MENA is that if a state continues to receive a large influx of immigrants, refugee or otherwise, it will be forced to make some sort of a policy change to include the population at hand be it full citizenship with corresponding equal rights or merely the basic recognition of human rights. Jordan, in particular, demonstrated this phenomenon in 2008,[16] as the state implemented legislation and legal frameworks that gave all migrant laborers the same labor protection as its citizens, thereby increasing the inclusion of migrant laborers in Jordanian society. This recognition and inclusion demonstrates that the notions of security and citizenship, as they are socially constructed, can always undergo societal change and be implemented through governmental policies and institutions.

As opposed to Myron Weiner's approach, Nazli Choucri's 2002 article[17] in the *Journal of International Affairs* focuses entirely on the linkage between migration and security, a field he deems as entirely underdeveloped. Choucri begins by noting the highly important concept that both migration and security are entirely subjective matters. Simply stated, "Security is in the eye of the beholder" (2002: 98). Security itself can be broken down into three highly interdependent factors: Military capacity and defense, modes of governance and regime performance, and structural conditions and environmental viability. These factors are so interdependent due to the fact that a state, according to Choucri, feels secure only if all three of these mechanisms are productively in place. Without a doubt, his most important assertion is that when a large proportion of a particular state's population consists of noncitizens, usually due to an influx of migrant laborers, then the native population defines the boundary of that polity—who is counted and who is not. Corresponding "fault lines" occur. Therefore, the ideas and implementation of citizenship in that given state are defined by the social construct that the citizens possess. Choucri then delivers the classic example of Lebanon, a state that decided to clearly define its demographics and create polities accordingly. However, this move made the citizens so clearly aware of their differences, rather than similarities, that a full-scale civil war erupted.

Another striking assertion about the linkage between migration and security is that the notion of citizenship in a state is the clearest indicator of that state's politicization of migration. If clear access rules to rights are established, then violating them is reason of an infringement of that state's security. As Weiner has stated, migration in and of itself seldom poses a real threat to state security, rather, it is the society that creates these perceptions. Migration can, over time, "provide the basis for changes in the social contract," and those changes are "formalized through manifestations of citizenship and of access."[18]

International Legal Framework of Human Rights

In response to the fact that states in their sovereignty acknowledge the human rights of migrants in many different forms due to differences in societal identities and structures, the international community, namely the United Nations and the International Labour Organization, have created parameters that specifically define the rights that every human is entitled to.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights came in response to the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human race. Adopted in 1948, it enshrines "the equal rights of men and women," and addressed both issues of equality and equity.[19]

Workers' rights as human rights vary from one state to another; however, the International Labour Organization (ILO) provides universal standards and guidelines for labor practices around the world. The ILO is devoted to advancing the opportunities of all women and men in order to obtain decent and productive work, in conditions of freedom, equity, security, and human dignity. Moreover, the ILO promotes rights at work, encourages decent employment opportunities, enhances social protection, and strengthens dialogue in handling work-related issues, and calls for internationally recognized human and labor rights.[20]

As the number of migrant workers increased dramatically in the past several decades, the need for an internationally recognized treaty or instrument for the protection of migrant workers' rights became a priority. The United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families

(ICRMW) emphasizes the connection between migration and human rights and was adopted on December 18, 1990, and came into force on July 1, 2003.[21] The Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) monitors implementation of this convention.[22] As its title expresses, the convention aims to protect migrant workers and members of their families, as well as setting an international moral standard for the promotion and respect of migrant workers' rights.

In 1979, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).[23] CEDAW is described as the International Bill of Rights for Women and came into force on September 3, 1981, and is monitored by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, which is an expert body established in 1982 and comprises 23 experts on women's issues from around the world. CEDAW's main issues of concern regarding female migrants are human trafficking and sexual exploitation.[24] Of all these international bodies and conventions, there is still not one completely dedicated to the rights of female migrant workers.

The traditional system of invoking international law to govern the treatment of "nonnationals," in addition to diplomatic protection, has been replaced by a set of both national and international means and instruments to enhance reformulated international norms. International law provides legal instruments and remedies to protect the rights of migrant workers and their families, and bilateral and multilateral treaties are a primary source of obligations indicating the limits of state powers in matters of entry, expulsion, and safeguarding the rights of migrant workers and their families.[25] The protection of the rights of workers employed outside their countries of origin has been the subject of increasing concern throughout the various United Nations organizations, and a corresponding large array of international instruments exist to provide parameters for the regulation of international migration and standards for human and labor rights.

International human rights law is primarily composed of the International Bill of Rights, which consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights[26] and two general human rights treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)[27] and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).[28] These rights include freedom from slavery, forced labor, and degrading or inhuman treatment or punishment. There is little doubt that the working and living conditions of some migrant workers in certain parts of the world, including Jordan, are very similar to the situations depicted in violations of these rights. Such treatment is often evident in the situation of those migrant workers who have been trafficked or abused, or placed in situations of debt bondage where they find themselves unable to escape a certain abusive employment situation until they have paid off their debts to employer, agent, or recruiter. Female migrants, because of the gender-specific jobs or sectors in which they tend to dominate, are particularly vulnerable to such abuses. Slavery and forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by general international human rights law, specific international instruments against slavery and slavery-like practices, as well as ILO standards.[29]

All migrant workers and their families, regardless of their legal status, are also entitled to the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention, which is protected by international human rights standards against deprivation of liberty, such as those in ICCPR (Article 9). Particularly important for migrant workers is the freedom of movement within the country and the right to leave the country if and when they wanted. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for employers, recruitment agents, or even government officials in certain countries to confiscate the passports of migrant workers in an attempt to prohibit them from leaving the country.[30] While these rights might justifiably be restricted for a number of legitimate reasons, such as the protection of national security and public order, the confiscation of a passport cannot constitute a legitimate state objective. Special attention should also be paid to ensuring that migrant workers and their families are provided with effective protection from violence, threats, intimidation, and from xenophobia and discrimination, including violations by public officials and private persons or entities (e.g., employers) as well as the general population. In this regard, an important freedom is the right of equal access to the courts (including labor courts or tribunals), so migrant workers can seek redress for abuses in the country of employment. This right should be facilitated and also include provision for free legal assistance, particularly if migrants do not possess the means to pay. Finally, while not central to the protection of migrant workers, international refugee law, as embodied largely in the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (UN 1951, 1967), is of some relevance.

International labor standards have grown into a comprehensive system of instruments on work and social policy, managed by a supervisory system designed to address all sorts of problems in their application at the national level. The principles enshrined in ILO instruments provide an important framework for the basic components of a comprehensive labor migration policy, the protection of migrant workers and measures to facilitate as well as to control migration movements. More specifically, they call for measures aimed at regulating the conditions in which migration for employment occurs and at combating irregular migration and labor trafficking, and measures to detect the illegal employment of migrants with the aim of preventing and eliminating abuses.[31]

They also contain provisions on cooperation between states and with employers' and workers' organizations. In addition, the instruments[32] call for measures relating to the maintenance of free services to assist migrants and the provision of information, steps against misleading propaganda, and the transfer of earnings. They define parameters for recruitment and contract conditions, participation of migrants in job training and promotion, family reunification, and for appeals against unjustified termination of employment or expulsion. They also contain special provisions on access to social services, medical services, and reasonable housing. Finally, but essentially, they call for the adoption of a policy to promote and guarantee equality of treatment and opportunity between regular status migrants and nationals in employment and occupation in the areas of access to employment, remuneration, social security, trade union rights, cultural rights and individual freedoms, employment taxes, and access to legal proceedings.

In reality, all states will not recognize these international parameters that are meant to protect all human beings, regardless of status. As migration challenges sovereignty due to the fact that it is a transnational affair, so does the notion of international institutions and their legal provisions. Despite this fact, having an international standard at least sets the basic parameters for universal human rights so that when normalization actually does occur in a given state, the framework is already in place.

Examining Migrant Labor in Jordan

Domestic laborers constitute a large part of the foreign labor workforce in Jordan, and an overwhelming majority of the women who migrate are engaged in domestic work.[33] The available data helps in answering the question whether migrant workers are actually putting the local workforce at a disadvantage by their availability to perform the same tasks for less compensation. While female migrant workers are less educated and skilled than unemployed Jordanian females, male foreign labor has approximately the same level of education and skill as Jordanian males who are unemployed. Skilled and educated Jordanian women are less likely to apply for a job in the services sector or in the QIZs, because of cultural factors and the fact that these sectors require neither high level of education nor skills. Therefore, the female migrant worker is not really taking the Jordanian woman's space in the labor market; she is filling a spot that Jordanian women are probably not interested/prepared to fill.

The number of migrant labor are increasing dramatically because a large percentage of Jordanian families are willing to employ a foreign helper, regardless of the difficult economic situation that the country is currently facing. It has been estimated that only 615 domestic workers are working illegally in the country.[34] However, the Association of Recruitment Agencies figures that there are closer to 75,000 domestic workers.[35] Jordanian labor law has typically failed to cover female migrant workers, particularly domestic workers.[36] They are sometimes deported by order of the administrative governor on the basis of a claim by their employers that they are engaged in immoral practices or that they have committed such crimes as theft. The irregular domestic workers may be detained in the correction and rehabilitation centers until a decision of deportation is issued. At that point, they may be further detained for up to several months, pending the completion of deportation procedures. However, the labor law was amended in July of 2008 in order to better include domestic workers by giving migrant workers equal labor protection.[37]

Domestic work is generally not regulated and the terms and conditions of work are governed by a two-year contract between the domestic workers and their employers. The employers pay the residency and work permit fees to the government, in addition to the fees required by the private employment agencies through which foreign domestic workers are recruited. The MoL must endorse these contracts in order for them to become legal and effective. Furthermore, the approval of the embassies of the countries that send the migrants to Jordan is sometimes needed for the endorsement of the contract. Currently, only workers from the Philippines can come to work in Jordan without the permission of the national embassy in Jordan.[38] For Sri Lankan[39] and Indonesian[40] helpers, permission from the national embassy remains mandatory and the two countries still reserve the right to prevent their citizens from leaving the country of origin without embassy endorsement. The government is still formulating new instructions for governing the recruitment of domestic workers.

Some foreign domestic workers and foreign QIZ workers are subject to forced labor conditions and consequently, these conditions can be described as tantamount to human trafficking. These circumstances include the nonpayment of wages, unlawful withholding or impounding of passports, and physical or sexual abuse.[41] Due to the highly secretive nature of trafficking and smuggling, it is extremely difficult to quantify the size and nature of this international and organized phenomenon in Jordan. Jordan is also a destination and transit country for individuals from South and Southeast Asia, trafficked for the purpose of forced labor. Foreign female workers often enter Jordan with tourism visas, but ultimately find themselves working in sweatshops, nightclubs, and bars, and sometimes are forced into prostitution.[42]

Jordan is not party to the 2000 UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, but it applied to join the Paled Protocol on the Prevention and Punishment of Human Trafficking (TIP) on March 14, 2007. In order to comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons provided in the TIP, Jordanian authorities are considering the adoption of a law incorporating Palermo's antitrafficking provisions into Jordanian law. This new law would criminalize and punish all forms of trafficking set forth in Article 3 of the TIP. It would further provide appropriate shelter for trafficking victims (Article 6 of the TIP).[43]

To summarize the situation in Jordan, Human Rights Watch released a report[44] in September of 2011 that detailed the plight of migrant laborers in Jordan. First and foremost, it stated that "Jordanian law contains provisions and omissions that facilitate mistreatment, while officials foster impunity by failing to hold employers and agencies to account when they violate labor protections or commit crimes" (2011: 6). With 70,000 abuses reported, the primary grievances listed were the workers' need for permission to leave the home, withholding of wages or failure to pay the wages on time, a lack of shelter for those escaping abuse, the lack of accountability for the violations of recruitment agencies, and the illegal holding of workers by the police on the basis of accusations from employers.

However, despite the allegations that the report made, it did commend Jordan for its aggressive legislative reform regarding these matters, although the state has much room for improvement. In 2003, it became the first regional country to use a Unified Standard Contract for migrant workers. Following that move, in 2008, Jordan finally included domestic workers under its labor laws, and in the next year, it issued regulations specifying rights of the workers, toughened some of the regulations on the recruitment agencies, and criminalized slavery, servitude, and forced labor for exploitation under a new law banning human trafficking. Also, 2010 brought the implementation of a base salary of US$200 a month, as well as increasing the number of labor inspectors.

It is to be noted, however, that migrant workers have been victimized and disempowered by constant and well-meaning but biased efforts aiming at unveiling the violations of migrant workers' rights and neglecting to highlight their obligations and the rights of the employer. They have been cast as a victim for too long but have not been given tools to empower themselves. Their status as a vulnerable group has dominated the attention and thinking of local and international organizations, which increased the vulnerability of the other part of this relationship, the employer, and rendered him/her more susceptible to violations by other stakeholders

Contextualizing Migrant Workers within Jordanian Legal Structures

The Jordanian Constitution was promulgated in 1952 and was amended in 1974, 1976, 1984, and 2011. The constitution has stated a number of labor rights including equitable working conditions, limited working hours per week, weekly and annual paid rest, special compensation for workers supporting families and on dismissal, illness, old age, and emergencies arising out of the nature of the work, special conditions for the employment of women and juveniles, equal pay for equal work, and free trade unions establishment within the limits of the law.[45]

The Jordanian constitution clearly reserves the right to equality and nondiscrimination, but it does not guarantee the principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of sex. Therefore, a constitutional amendment to incorporate equality on the basis of gender and to ban gender-based discrimination in employment is needed. Furthermore, although the Jordanian constitution distinguishes the right to work and equal opportunity for all Jordanian citizens in Articles 22 and 23, workers and employers are both described in gender neutral language in the labor law, which leaves an allowance for human rights violations. The text should, therefore, be more precise and use the language "male and female."

Jordan is party to a significant number of international conventions on human rights and migration, as well as international labor organization conventions. Although Jordan ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1992, it held three reservations related to citizenship, housing, and women's mobility clauses in personal status law.[46] Jordan has also not yet ratified other international conventions related to female migrant workers, such as the 1990 ICRMW. Jordan, like many other countries, remains hesitant to ratify international conventions that limit the state's ability to restrict the rights of migrants living and working in their territory. This is the notion that state sovereignty and security comes before international standards. The realization needs to be made by Jordan, as well as other states, that through promoting human security and human rights for citizens and migrant laborers alike, state security is increased. It is worth mentioning, however, that Jordan refuses to observe the ICRMW due to the potential loss of jobs for its nationals in the Gulf states as a result of ratification.

The Jordanian constitution is not clear on what law takes precedence in the case of discrepancies between ratified treaties and Jordanian laws. Nevertheless, the country's ratification of most international conventions on human rights reflects the political will to work toward full implementation of international human rights standards. Consequently, women from Southeast Asia who are working in the homes of the Jordanians are entitled to the same rights of the working Jordanian women. However, many employers and recruitments agencies in Jordan do not observe this notion, as the social disconnect still exists between the Jordanian citizens and the migrant laborers. They explicitly violate the provision of the International Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment[47] and for children that are already approved and in effect in the Jordanian law and regional entities.

Arab Spring and Migration

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the context of the migration policies in both Jordan and the region as a whole will invariably be affected by the events of the Arab Spring. As the citizens en masse marched to protest the human rights abuses that were being committed against them by their governments, the topic of human rights is finally being recognized and approached again by national, regional, and international institutions.

Royal Highness Prince Hassan bin Talal's speech[48] explores the idea of human security, a crucial component of human development and human rights, and the effect it has on the global commons. Although states have traditionally used the term "security" to refer to matters of state, human security focuses on the plight of the individual, asserting that securing the environment of an individual, sustainable development can take place and flourish, thereby affecting others in the environment as well. An interesting notion that Prince Hassan broached was the idea that "cultural security sets the stage through which all other forms of security ought to be defined and understood." Further, "Perceptions of too-rapid cultural change spurred by globalization and migration have strained interpersonal and international relationships. Lasting security for the individual and the nation necessitates a practical approach which understands culture as a pivotal component of human experience and political dialogue" (2008: 5).

In the spirit of the Arab Spring that seeks to shatter old assumptions, it must be realized that migration is a topic that challenges both the state and the intellectual. Migration is a phenomenon that transcends national borders. Thus, neither states nor markets are able to fully control the movements and the problems associated with migration and its corresponding security. For the intellectual, migration challenges the traditional disciplines by crossing boundaries and categories. Migration is also a difficult topic to address because, besides its subjective nature, it can either enable human development or hinder it. Rather than viewing the framework of international rights as the enemy to state sovereignty and a challenge to security and citizenship, the two entities should be viewed as a source of indivisible strength and unity. Instead of creating more conflict with the issue of migration, the positive collaboration of states and international institutions and frameworks would create solutions for the problems at hand and for those that will arise in the future.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed at examining the overall situation of female migrant workers in Jordan, as this issue involves a vast number of females who left their native countries to become migrant workers, specifically as domestic workers or maids in Jordan.

Although many countries have lately imposed restrictions on female migrant workers to "prevent" them from falling into abusive situations, banning the migration of females and increasing regulations in the name of security often forces the industry to go underground, placing female migrants into even more vulnerable positions due to the action's illegal status.

Moreover, the protective measures the labor-sending countries employ will not be as effective if legislation, protective measures, and labor inspection are not well developed in labor-receiving countries, especially in the sectors that a majority of female migrant workers are employed.

After having examined the overall situation of female migrant workers in Jordan and the international legal framework in order to provide larger protection for female migrant workers, two recommended areas of action are necessary in terms of intervention: enhancing mechanisms and procedures of female migrant workers' rights protection in *both* the countries of destination and the countries of origin.

Although some progress has been made in Jordan, and the state attempts to adapt to international laws in terms of human rights, constant abuse by household members is committed against the foreign maids who work in their homes.[49] Consequently, this chapter aimed to critically assess the situation of female migrant workers in Jordan within the framework of migration, security, and citizenship, highlighting the great strides that Jordan has made in the past decade while seriously critiquing the lack of progress in other sectors. True progress will be made when states, NGOs, and IGOs recognize the benefits to be had from working with each other. NGOs need to continually push for human rights but simultaneously be realistic and realize the rationale and security limitations of the state. Finally, states can work with, rather than work against, international institutions and parameters, receiving strength from solidarity instead of singularity. The path to full equality and recognition of all human rights, especially in regard to female migrant workers' rights, is far from complete, but in the spirit of the Arab Spring, regional transformation is on its way.

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CHAPTER 4

Perceiving Democracy in Migration: The Case of Moroccans in Piemonte

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Introduction

Since the 1990s, migratory flows to Italy have multiplied and the presence of immigrants of various nationalities has begun to take on a considerable weight along with the stabilization of many immigrant groups (Massey et al. 1998). In particular, immigrants from Morocco stand out not only in terms of sheer numbers, but also because of their patterns of settlement across the country.[1] This has largely been due to changes in many of these people's migratory project, where what was first thought of as a temporary move has, as we will see, become increasingly permanent.

With this change in plans and the decision to settle in the host country, many of the immigrants in Italy, and not just the Moroccans, have made some effort to enter into forms of civic participation at various levels, though these attempts have remained quite weak (Caponio 2005; Mantovan 2007; Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2005). The attention devoted to immigrants' involvement in voluntary associations and participation in the public and cultural life of their European host countries has grown over the years (Morales and Giugni 2011; Martiniello 2007; Withol de Wenden 1994), as has the study of migrants' role as political bridges or mediators between their homeland and hostland (Shain and Barth 2003). The perception of politics, civic participation and human rights promotion has been studied through migrants activism and participation.

By contrast, how the perception of the concept of democracy takes shape, changes, and develops among groups of immigrants has been neglected. A part of the literature, for example, has concentrated on how groups of immigrants perceive the European Union (EU) and its values, and thus, indirectly, democracy and human rights (Timmermann, Heyse, and Van Mol 2010), and on how immigrants form their perception of democracy and the protection of human rights on the basis of whether or not they have lived in an authoritarian regime (Anderson, Regan, and Østergard 2002), have been politically engaged at home or in their new country (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003), or have experienced a migratory process (Adamson 2002). In other cases, scholars have focused on the 'culture of migration', or in other words, on how the migratory process contributes to forming an original cultural substrate that starts from the culture experienced (and/or perceived in the country of origin) and is constructed from migrants' 'discourses' and those of the destination country (Collyer 2006). In other word, how migrants are related to a civic culture alimented by horizontal links that contribute to the creation of 'civicness' and provide resources to members that improve their political participation (Fennema and Tillie 1999, 2001, 2004, 2005; Vermeulen 2006).

While it is true that all of these factors have been demonstrated to weigh heavily on migrants' perceptions, aspirations, and behavior, especially as regards democracy and human rights (Collyer 2006), it is no less true that the role of the perceptions of democracy and human rights of migrating individuals remains understudied (Boneva and Frieze 2001).

Though this chapter builds on the considerations discussed above, it will take a different approach. Starting from an analysis of how a group of Moroccans in Piemonte (an Italian region) perceives the concept of democracy, the first hypothesis that will be advanced is that this concept is not constructed only from the experience of an authoritarian regime, past political engagement, "discourses," and the migratory process, but also from "living in a democratic country." In other words, how democratic the host country is regarded will affect more the construction of this perception.

This hypothesis springs from a research project sponsored by the University of Turin and Paralleli-Istituto Euromediterraneo del Nord Ovest, entitled "New Citizens and Political Participation. Immigration, Colonial Legacies and Perception of Democracy by Groups of Immigrants from the Southern Shore of the Mediterranean." Fieldwork was carried out in Piemonte between 2009 and 2010, with semistructured qualitative interviews of a sample of 30 individuals chosen according to gender, educational level, years of residence in

Italy and age.[2] The sample was selected after ten preparatory meetings with a series of experts in the field chosen on the basis of their skills and knowledge of the area and the issues addressed in the investigation. In addition, three focus groups with individuals who did not belong to the sample were held. The interviews were conducted in depth and in some cases were repeated.

In view of the study's goal and the difficulties encountered during the five pilot interviews that were conducted, an interview guide (given at the end of the chapter) was developed that, alongside the direct question "what does democracy mean to you?" also contains a series of questions that deal with immigrants' daily lives and helped the interviewees to "construct" their own concept of democracy. Accordingly, attention was focused on the perception of a number of rights (and duties) in the countries of origin and destination, which has proved useful in clarifying the perception of democracy. Apart from the objective difficulties that were often encountered, the interviewees' responses on the whole provided a full panorama that made it possible to achieve the study's goals.

The second and related hypothesis advanced in the following pages is that, in an increasingly globalized and hence ever more interconnected world, migrants' perceptions are not influenced only by the host country's level of democracy, but also by the fact that citizens of the so-called consolidated democracies are more and more likely to take democracy for granted. Our hypothesis is that for third-country nationals and aspiring citizens hailing from neodemocracies, pseudo-democracies, or authoritarian systems, living in a setting where democracy seems to be an entitlement that no one pays much attention to, can influence how democracy is perceived, both positively and negatively.

We believe that, analyzing this perception, both inside and outside long-established democratic systems, can shed light on the status of the consolidated democracies (and in our case, that of Italian democracy), revealing their strong points as well as their shortcomings.

What Democracy Are We Talking About?

The twentieth century's democratization processes and the global spread of democratic values (Grassi 2002; Johansson 2002) have paved the way to more thorough analyses of democracy, of its meaning (Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1997), and of its "quality" (Morlino 2003; Diamond and Morlino 2005). The increase in the overall number of democratic countries, moreover, has encouraged scholars to take a closer look at democratic consolidation (Munck 2001), the patterns and prospects of democracies around the world (Lijphart 1999; Vanhanen 1997), and so-called transnational democracy (Held 1995; Clark 1999; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005). The literature has shown that in the consolidated democracies, the decline in the values that enabled them to grow and reach democratic maturity has often led to a retreat from political participation, a loss of confidence in institutions (Pharr and Putnam 2000), and antipolitical sentiments (Mastropaolo 2000, 2011). While the democratic model has been called into question per se, it has chiefly been challenged as a result of the restrictive polices targeting minorities and certain social groups that have been put in place by consolidated democracies (Kengerlinsky 2007), or because of policies for promoting and exporting democracy that have had highly negative results (Gills 2000; Youngs 2001). At the same time, studies of the new democracies have highlighted the limits of the so-called "third wave" of democratization (Huntington 1991), pointing out the shortcomings of many of the new political systems that have arisen, where, what has often prevailed is a neoliberal view of democracy linked to the market and processes of globalization (Plehwe, Walpen, and Neunhoeffer 2006; Cowling 2008). Nevertheless, the emergence of new subjects of political action, the spread of a transnational culture of democracy, and the demise of authoritarianism have in some ways enabled many of the newly democratized countries to provide a new stimulus to the exercise of democracy.

Regardless of how it is judged, the Western democratic model has become a benchmark, especially as regards certain rules of the game that seem to be unanimously accepted (Dahl 1971). Over the past 20 years, an expanded procedural minimum definition of democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997) has been in vogue, which extends the minimal formulation by adding a series of adjectives to specify subtypes. In this view, democracy has a number of defining attributes that have received general acceptance, such as the protection of basic rights of citizenship and civil liberties, participation, full contestation, and elections.

At the same time, it must be recognized that the term democracy designates not only a political system, but also a set of ideals that can be summed up in a number of definitions of the principles of liberty and equality (Held 1997; Sartori 1957), which have been translated empirically into the rights of citizenship guaranteed by the consolidated democracies (Beetham 1999).

In this setting, where human flows and movements are ever more conspicuous, citizens of consolidated democracies often take democracy for granted. Can the same be said of those who emigrate from a country with nondemocratic characteristics to a democratic country? In this case, how is the perception of democracy constructed, and what factors influence it? Is democracy, for these individuals, something to be taken for granted?

Individuals form their perception of democracy and of the protection of human rights based on the background of where they were born and live, and, above all, on a range of local and international sources that have a major impact on them from the social and cultural standpoint (Anderson, Regan, and Østergard 2002). Groups in migration must obviously come to grips with the migratory process itself, as well as with the migratory tradition in their country of origin. As de Haas (2008) has stressed, in those areas of the world with a long tradition of migration, immigrants have been able to form broad communities that over time have created their own self-sustaining channels of representation. Considering the massive migratory flows that took place in the course of the past century, we can say that a "culture of migration" (Collyer 2006; Theo 2003) has developed, and is fueled by the discourses and the imagined stories of compatriots who have already immigrated (King and Wood 2001), the media (Mai 2004), the social networks, and the cultural artifacts (Koser and Pinkerton 2004). These "discourses" are to some extent formulated in the country of origin, but then take their full form in the host country.

While scholars have, as we have seen, addressed various interpretations of democracy, little attention, has been devoted to how this concept becomes relevant to individuals (Aguilar 2008), or to how it is perceived in non-Western cultural contexts (Carlson and Listhaug 2007; Arab Barometer).[3]

In the following pages, we will first give an overview of the Moroccan migration in Europe and Italy. We will then examine how the concept of democracy among a group of Moroccans living in Piemonte is constructed both from the factors mentioned above, and from the level of democracy in the receiving country. Democracy is a concept that is built up, in other words, not only from individuals' past experience, but also and primarily from the characteristics of the host country and from how its citizens perceive to live in it.

The Moroccan Immigration in Europe and Italy

Morocco is one of the Mediterranean countries with the highest level of out-migration. According to 2010 data, the Moroccan emigration to Europe has now exceeded 2,800,000 units out of a population of over 32 million inhabitants, with net migration totaling 3 million units (World Bank 2011). Moroccan emigration to Europe began in the 1960s and has not stopped since, despite restrictions imposed by Europe. Among the Mediterranean populations living in the countries of the EU, the Moroccan Diaspora is second only to the Turkish Diaspora in order of importance. Moroccans abroad are dispersed, but are heavily represented in several countries. Moroccan migrants rank first among non-EU nationals in Italy, Spain, and Belgium, and second in France (after the Algerians) as well as in the Netherlands and Germany (after the Turks).

During the postindependence period, the Moroccan government regarded emigration not only as a "safety valve" for preventing social tensions (especially in the Berber areas), but also as a means of economic growth. Initially at least, the Moroccan government thus did not encourage Moroccans abroad to integrate, but sought to maintain control over its citizens inasmuch as was possible. In view of the nondemocratic nature of the Moroccan state, especially during the reign of Hassan II, this policy had at least two goals (Belguendouz 2006): on the one hand, to prevent the migrants of the diaspora from organizing themselves politically and thus forming an opposition force to the regime from abroad; on the other hand, greater integration in the host country would probably have endangered the flow of remittances to the home country (de Hass and Plug 2006).[4]

Given the failure of this policy, the Moroccan government's stance changed in the course of the 1990s (and in particular after Mohammed VI acceded to the throne in 1999): this has meant a more positive attitude toward naturalization and dual citizenship, voting rights for emigrants, and the creation of institutions to assist Moroccans residing abroad (de Hass 2007; Fargues 2005).[5] In general, however, we can say that the Moroccan government's policy during the 1990s and since the year 2000 has changed not only as regards immigrants, but also for Moroccans living in the country: like other North African and Middle Eastern nations, Morocco is engaged in a process of economic (and political) liberalization, though this has not led to structural reforms and, above all, an effective democratic system (Cavatorta and Dalmasso 2009).[6] Nevertheless, these reforms have made Morocco a transit country for other African migrants (de Haas 2005).

It should be emphasized that the shift in Morocco's policy toward its immigrants has gone hand in hand with changes in outward flows and the stabilization of Moroccan emigration, to Europe in particular. While the first wave of migration in the 1960s was fairly unstructured and consisted essentially of single males (like the other immigrants from the Maghreb area), from 1974 onward, and partly as a result of the oil crisis, rising unemployment in the West sparked a tightening of immigration policies that curbed the flow of Moroccans (and others) departing for Europe. This was accompanied by a diversification in emigration, with changes in flows and in the migratory project. Family reunification replaced individual emigration, while the migratory project began to contemplate permanent settlement rather than temporary residence. The demographic profile of the Moroccan Diaspora thus changed radically: immigrants included more younger people and, above all, more women, while the level of secondary education increased (Pace and El Mouaatamid 2006). The 1980s saw an increase in seasonal emigration and in the number of woman migrants, who began to be independent of the dynamics of family reunification. Since 1990, emigration flows toward the traditional receiving countries have dropped sharply. The measures introduced after the Schengen Convention in June 1990 drastically reduced legal emigration, and at the same time created perverse effects that encouraged the spread of undocumented emigration, which has thus become increasingly common. Migratory projects changed: there are very few return migrants, and in a process that had begun in the previous decades, the number of family reunifications multiplied (partly out of a fear that the borders would be closed suddenly, but also because of Morocco's political instability and repression caused by the iron fist of King Hassan II).

In Italy, Moroccan residents numbered as of January 1, 2011, over 452,000 (out of a total of more than 4 million immigrants), and were the country's third-largest foreign-born group, after the Romanian and Albanian communities.[7] The total number of Moroccan nationals in Piemonte was over 64,000 units, accounting for 16.1 percent of the region's entire immigrant population (398,910). The Moroccan community is the region's second-largest, coming after the Romanians and before the Albanians. As was the case for other countries on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean, the number of people emigrating from Morocco rose gradually from the 1960s, becoming a significant social phenomenon. The pattern of Moroccan emigration to Italy has gone through the metamorphosis discussed above, and is now characterized chiefly by a process of stabilization: Moroccan immigrants are becoming a permanent and increasingly important part of Italian society. Starting from statistical data and the observation of social reality—and especially the changes in the demographic and occupational structure of this community—we can see that this emigration has matured and taken root. Despite the difficulties, then, the Moroccan presence has grown and become much more stable (Pugliese and Macioti 2003) but Italy seems increasingly to be concerned about the multiple impacts of the immigration process (Ambrosini 2012).

Many Definitions for a Single Concept: How the Moroccan Diaspora in Piemonte Perceives Democracy

"What does democracy mean to you? Could you define it?" This was the direct question put to a sample of Moroccans residing in Piemonte. A general analysis of the interviewees' responses indicates that the prevailing definition they give is procedural: democracy is seen chiefly in terms of the presence or absence of laws protecting the citizens and a series of constitutional and political guarantees. If we go into the details of the responses, however, we can find that democracy is not just a "procedure," but involves the immigrants' life experience, their everyday difficulties, the fact that they are at the center of a process of social growth and maturation. In this sense, what we see is a "maximalist" approach that takes a different level of democracy into account that, in addition to procedures, is alert to the substance of the democratic process, or in other words, to how democratic principles are put into practice, not only through the classic participation mechanisms—elections, competition, and debate—but also in the private sphere, where citizens are directly and personally involved. Democracy is a "container" that must be given substance through an engagement and participation that go beyond those envisaged "through procedures" (Sen 1999). This is an interesting point: even where the interviewees could not give a clear, concise definition of democracy, they were always able to express what they see as the essential principles of a democracy, its "practical" implications. The most frequently mentioned principles were equality, justice, free speech, and mutual respect: democracy means equality of rights and duties between citizens in a society where basic human rights are safeguarded.

While democracy thus assumes a practical aspect, its perception changes in passing from the country of origin to the receiving country, particularly among immigrants who have long resided in the host country. This can be attributed to a number of factors. First, there is the question of age: with the passage of time, the perception changes, matures, becomes more nuanced. Second, it has changed because of the migratory experience itself: living in a country that is seen as more democratic than the home country affects the meanings assigned to the democratic experience. The everyday rules of democracy, and democratic practice, despite the limitations encountered in certain Italian settings, have in some way modified perceptions. As one of the interviewees stated, "my perception of democracy has been changed by the fact that I can benefit of it."[8] Personal growth would also appear to play a fundamental role. Democracy is perceived both positively and negatively. Positively, because of the opportunity to live without being conditioned by the institutional context; negatively because the marginalization faced by many immigrants in Italy, partly as a result of inadequate legislation, is an experience that changes people, undermining confidence in the institutions and, consequently, in the democratic system. Often, however, perceptions have also changed through a reverse process, that is, by the fact of going abruptly from a condition of full citizenship in the home country to one of suspension, of absence of citizenship in the strict sense, in the host country.

The perception, moreover, changes because the conditions of political action change. Many of the immigrants we interviewed said that when they arrived in Italy, democracy and its meaning was far from their thoughts. Having to cope with daily life and its problems made them more aware, more interested in participating in public and political life. In this sense, the interviews confirm the findings of other studies carried out in Italy (Carli 2007) that the question of participation, and of active participation, is a duty, a matter of assuming responsibility, chiefly—but not only—toward one's own community.

Also, perceptions change in relation to what it means to live in a non-Islamic country. Many of the interviewees remarked that in Italy they have finally been able to look at politics and democracy without being conditioned by religion, and thus form an opinion that is different from the one they had in their home country. They now have a secular view of Islam and its role in the social and political system. For most of the interviewees, Islam (like other religions) should be relegated to the individual's private sphere: when Islam becomes political and seeks to regulate areas that do not concern it, when it intrudes into the public sphere, it becomes incompatible with democracy.

Other interviewees, by contrast, maintain that the Islamic model is an important example of how to live together democratically and that the diaspora can have a key role in its spread. The problem that the interviewees complain about most frequently is that in Italy, very much under the Vatican's sway, religious minorities are poorly protected.

Interestingly, much depends on what is meant by Islam and the Islamic system. Here, interpretations cover a wide range, from the orthodox to the more "personal." We can thus find a "feminist" version of Islam, where "religion is used politically to justify sexists and politicians."[9] Or a version that sees Islam not just as a religion, but as a system that pervades society and provides a foundation for the state, harkening back to the idea of Islam at its origins, when there was no distinction between religion and politics. An Islam that takes different shapes to reflect different needs and times, that changes without losing the features that made it what it is. An "anticapitalist" Islam, a bastion in the struggle against imperialism to free the Arab peoples from the West.

Issues involving the Islamic system are significant in all the interviews, whether they maintain that it should be kept in the private sphere or tend in the opposite direction. In both cases, Islam, in the broadest sense as a religious and cultural system, plays—or could play—an important part in the interviewees' claim for a fairer democratic system, even for those who would prefer the system to have a secular basis.[10] In the majority of the interviews, even those who sided in favor of a secular society do not oppose the Koran and religious teachings, but affirm that religion and politics should remain in separate spheres. It is politics that "spoils" the Koran, not the other way around. The opposing thesis has been carefully constructed by the media or by dominant Western thought (EUMC 2006).

Several points emerge from the analysis we have just outlined: that the perception of democracy is built up in daily practice; that the perception of democracy changes over time and according to life experience, contexts, and outside stresses; that cultural and social baggage has an important role in this process. In the following paragraphs, we will see how a group of Moroccan immigrants living in Piemonte has constructed this perception from the experience of the host country and of the home country, and how the "discourse" of the host country intersects that of the home country and vice versa.

Does Living in Italy Strengthen or Limit the "Sense of Democracy"?

As we have seen, how the concept of democracy is perceived and constructed changes and diversifies according to a number of factors. Two of these factors in particular are emphasized in the interviewees' answers to the question “What does democracy mean to you?”; the first regards the fact of living as an immigrant in a democratic country (and of having experienced the migrant’s condition), while the second is the fact of coming from a nondemocratic home country. In the first section, we will analyze whether and how the concept of democracy is constructed (and changes) on the basis of the level of democracy perceived of the receiving country. To do so, we sought to understand how Moroccans living in Piemonte consider the condition of Italian democracy.

One point is clear from all of the interviews: for the Moroccans we spoke with, Italy is a country that on the whole is democratic in form, but undemocratic in its treatment of immigrants.[11]

Generally speaking, Italy has its bright spots and shadows: while almost all of the interviewees see the move from Morocco to Italy as an improvement in terms of their living conditions, at least in certain respects, the same cannot be said of a series of civil and political rights. The Moroccans “like living in Italy,” but feel that racism and discrimination are still very strong, particularly against Muslims, their traditions, and their culture. This is an attitude that worsened dramatically in the aftermath of September 11, especially with the stereotyped portrayal of Islam in the Italian media (Belluati 2007; Negri and Introvigne 2005; Di Peri 2008). Italy is considered to be a country that grants a measure of acceptance, but a correct approach to otherness and to the foreigner is lacking. This creates “*problems in the exercise of democracy with foreigners*.”[12] The most serious problems mentioned in the interviews concern chiefly the difference in the treatment accorded to Italian citizens and immigrants.[13]

Nevertheless, Italy is a country that has become part of the interviewees’ identity, especially for the young people. Those who, like part of the young people we interviewed, went to school or attended a course in Italy and reached intellectual maturity here, are aware of the problems involved in integration, but put them on a different level, making a concrete distinction between the two facets of their identity: myself as Moroccan (immigrant) and myself as Italian. This enables them to have a more carefully thought-out perception of democracy, constructed starting from the host country but also nourished by the other. This also happens among the interviewed immigrants who have had “political” experience in Italy or their country of origin. They point out, for example, that Italian democracy reflects many other Western democracies in form, but not in substance. They note that Italy has an important democratic past to its credit, but that there is much room for improvement, particularly as regards second- and third-generation immigrants, who are highly resentful of the uncomfortable condition into which they are often forced. The perception of what a democracy should or should not be is thus clearer among those immigrants who have a deeper and more engaged relationship with the host country.

At the same time, however, the perception of the host country's level of democracy (and, consequently, of democracy itself) is built and transformed through the migratory experience: before emigrating from Morocco, most of the interviewees did not regard Italy as a democracy because of its corrupt political system, the lack of any real turnover in the state, and its structural political instability. This perception of the host country changed while living in Italy; above all, however, what changed was the perception of democracy in the strict sense—the respect of human rights—as opposed to democracy in the broad sense of participation in the political game. The interviewees now acknowledge that fundamental rights and the rule of law are one thing, and the problems of the Italian political elite are another.

At times, the interviewees even manage to find a justification for the difficulties that Italy puts in the way of integration and assimilation, for the imperfections of Italian democracy: a justification that lies in the fact that migration to Italy is still a recent phenomenon, unlike in other European countries such as France or Germany. This is not an acritical defense of the host country, but we can see that it reflects a desire to find an explanation for a state of things that seems to do more harm than good to immigration. In this sense, the Moroccans we interviewed are by no means naive: some have lived in Italy for many years (10 or 20), others have had experience as migrants to other European countries and are familiar with the models of integration or ways of handling migratory flows found outside of Italy. Yet others have already become Italian citizens. This awareness contributes to creating a "political situation" even where the immigrants are not active in parties, political associations, or trade unions. The need to deal with questions regarding their residency card or changes in flows decrees obliges migrants to follow the host country's politics, expanding their horizons past their own personal concerns and condition.[14] Immigrants feel that they should take an interest in the "state" of Italian democracy, bringing their own experiences from the home country to it (Jones-Correa 1998). This is also because they feel that they are an active part of the changes that are taking place. Many interviewees recognize that immigration has contributed to bringing problems and economic and social tensions to light (even though the media has often amplified this impact). However, they complain of the Italian political class's shortcomings, saying that the country's leaders "should be able to provide ideas, to look ahead. They shouldn't just pander to society's fears."[15]

Italy is indeed a democracy in certain respects, but is considered on the whole a fragile country, unstable, a country that cannot be expected to provide the same civil and political guarantees as other European countries, the same standards of democracy. This is confirmed not only by the interviewees, but also by a series of studies carried out in Morocco (Pellegrino 2009). Italy is by no means the preferred destination for Moroccans who decide to emigrate, but comes after Canada and the United States (which, despite the cultural differences, are regarded as the countries that hold out the greatest opportunities). Italy is often thought of as a transit country, a bridge between the Southern shore of the Mediterranean and Northern Europe. As many interviews emphasize, Italy is closer to Morocco than Europe.[16]

Those who decide to cross the Mediterranean to Italy know that they are not coming to a country where the rules are as strict as in France or Belgium, and in certain respects this is an advantage: they know that in Italy, an immigrant will be able to "get by" in one way or another. This fact divides and breaks up the Western world, which is thus not perceived as a single, defined entity, but as many different "Wests" (Pellegrino 2009). At the same time, it contributes to creating a "discourse" and a mental picture that is reinforced by the narratives of immigrants who return home on vacation, and can talk about the positive aspects of life abroad, not its difficulties.

What we see from the interviews, then, is a country that is democratic on paper but not in substance. The gap between these two levels is widest in the area of rights and of the relationships between immigrants and Italian citizens. The question is problematic chiefly because of the Italian immigration laws, which are seen as discriminatory and often oppressive. By far the most discriminatory aspect is that regarding the residence permit and the importance it assumes in the migrant's life, especially in terms of political rights and active participation in the life of the host country. And not only that: even if they have equal rights, immigrants often feel that they are mistreated and, though they have Italian citizenship, are regarded as second-class citizens. The problem is not so much one of being able to access a series of services, but what some interviewees called "social relationship." This essentially refers to the difficulties that immigrants (and those of Muslim faith in particular) have in integrating in the host country: renting a house, standoffish neighbors, the difficulties in obtaining citizenship, family reunification, finding a job or religious freedom.

The interviewees feel more protected when they have a thorough knowledge of their rights.[17] In this regard, there is a huge difference in social scale, as was very apparent from the interviews. And this in turn also depends, obviously, on the areas of origin of the Moroccan immigrants living in Torino, who chiefly come from the rural region of Khouribga, where there is a high illiteracy rate (Coslovi 2007; Capello 2003).[18]

Finally, the question of immigrants' representation and the lack of active and passive voting rights is a sore point (Mantovan 2007; Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2005). How is it possible to be full citizens without being able to participate actively in the life of the country (Carpo et al. 2003; Caponio 2001; ASGI-FIERI 2005; Caritas 2005)? But here is also an awareness that granting voting rights to immigrants is a question that, as several interviewees emphasize, is instrumentalized for electoral purposes both from the Right and from the Left.[19]

. . . And Does Coming from Morocco?

In the preceding paragraph, we saw that the perception of democracy among the group of interviewees takes on different shades, according to the issues discussed, each interviewee's analytical capacity, level of political knowledge, and, above all, their ability to see themselves as part of one group—or community—rather than another. In the interviews, passing from the perception of democracy in the host country to that in the home country offers a change in perspective that we found particularly interesting in furthering an understanding of how the perception of democracy is constructed in the migrant's thoughts.

While Italy is seen as a democratic country "with reservations," the panorama for Morocco is more diversified. Though all interviewees feel strong ties with Morocco, as it is there that they have their origins, family, friends, and cultural roots, the picture becomes more intricate when we go into the details of democratic practices. In some cases, criticisms of the home country are quite harsh, especially as regards the reign of Hassan II (1961–1999), while in others Morocco is described as a democratic country, where corruption does indeed exist but fundamental rights are guaranteed. For all interviewees, the death of Hassan II (1999) and the accession to the throne of Mohammed VI marked the end of a time that all see as a period of repression and tyranny.[20] Half of the interviewees agree in saying that Morocco is changing, that under the new king the country is being transformed, is looking for "its own model," and that the changes that are now taking place are real and not simply a façade, both on the social level and in terms of gender equality, as well of greater political liberty and freedom of speech. One of the factors that is most often cited in order to emphasize that the changes affecting the home country are genuine is civil society and, more generally, the population's greater maturity in dealing with the country's problems: the widespread involvement in voluntary associations and the greater freedom of the press and of expression.

But the changes also appear to bring new problems, with the erosion of traditional society and the marginalization of weak groups, the diminishing sense of "community." A full 50 percent of the interviewees concur that the change has not been effective: living conditions have perhaps improved, but not because the sphere of social and political rights has broadened. Here, despite the promises, little has been done, and the political elite's internal mechanisms remain the same. The claims to alternation of power are seen as a sham, the parties do not represent general interests, and voting, rather than being an occasion for expressing the popular will, is regarded by the Moroccans as a meaningless exercise.[21]

A minority of the interviewees describe Morocco as a nondemocratic country and attack the role of the king, but most of the immigrants we spoke to expressed no opinion of the ruler and his work, though they acknowledge that the country is still afflicted by many ills.[22]

The yardstick against which Morocco's level of democracy is gauged is Italy. In this connection, there can be no doubt that the experience of migration, the fact of having lived for years in a country that, even with the distinctions underscored earlier, is democratic, has heavily influenced the perception of the home country, probably also changing it over time. Morocco is seen as very close to Europe and to Italy: both in corruption and, above all, in the similarities shown in political behavior during the elections, the electoral campaigns, the waning voter turnout, and so on. Some of the interviewees thus draw a picture of their home country as having problems similar to those of the most mature Western democracies.[23] Finally, one particularly striking point emerging from the interviewees' statements is that the democracy of a system is often connected with the form of government: Italy is said to be a more democratic country because it is a republic, whereas Morocco is considered less democratic because it is a monarchy.

In some cases, the lack of information about the home country is evident. Immigrants are often so completely absorbed in their new lives that they have no time to find out what is going on in their country of origin, or, in other cases, have preferred to sever all ties, leaving a troubled past behind them and thus living through a difficult "double absence" (Sayad 1999). In general, however, there is a lively interest in the changes that are taking place in the home country, which interviewees follow closely on the Internet and satellite TV, as well as through trips to Morocco in the summer and talking to relatives.

Conclusion

The Moroccans we interviewed have a view of the concept of democracy that springs from each individual's lived identity, but there can be no doubt that it also depends on the level of interaction with the host country.

Democracy is not only an ideal aspiration to be pursued in a perfectible world, but also the stuff of everyday life. Migrants see it with their own eyes, touch it with their own hands, continually: when they have to fight to have a residence permit, when their civil and political rights are not recognized, when they are treated as second-class citizens. What we see, then, is a perception that hinges on how a series of fundamental human rights are guaranteed and how the conditions are established for fulfilling a series of duties. But democracy is more than this. We have seen that many of the interviewees are perfectly able to recognize the qualities of a good democracy, first from the minimum requirements that correspond roughly with those identified by Dahl (1971), and even considering the institutional guarantees, as the many positive comments about the Italian constitution demonstrate. On the whole, however, the interviewees feel that democracy as a value is in danger. It is in danger in Italy, chiefly because of the immigration laws, and it is in danger also in Morocco and, more generally, in the world. Without doubt, all of the interviewees perceive democracy as a precious asset to be safeguarded, to be guaranteed, to be fought for, day after day. In this connection, more than one interview reveals a certain puzzlement about the state of democracy in Italy and the West: people who come from a country that is perhaps taking its first steps toward a more open system cannot understand a country where the social state is being dismantled and hard-won rights are being lost every day. Here, the fact that the interviewees have lived in an authoritarian system plays a very important role. It is clear that experiencing the Moroccan regime during the reign of Hassan II has left deep marks on many of the interviewees, contributing to forming a much more informed "democratic conscience."

If, as was often said, Italy is wasting an opportunity (to benefit from full integration of migrants in the social and political spheres, as well as in labor, for instance), in some respects it is still seen as a model of protection that offers a series of guarantees. Italy gives with one hand and takes away with the other. It gives in terms of health care (with a few exceptions), housing (though some problems were reported), and education (despite a few gaps). It takes away in terms of political rights, equality of rights for all citizens, or in other words, in those realms where, according to the interviewees, recognizing that Italian citizens and foreign nationals should be treated equally could spark a backlash of resentment among the Italian population, which according to many of the interviewees is not yet ready for true integration on the part of immigrants.

Italy, moreover, is also missing an opportunity for democracy within the European context. Though on the whole the EU is rarely mentioned (and this in itself is an interesting point), as if the supranational considerations governing the Union's states had little real influence on the individual member states, it is clear from the interviews that Italian democracy is seen as a model in crisis. By comparison with countries such as France, Belgium, and Spain, Italy is on the sidelines because of a series of shortcomings (chiefly, but not only, as regards immigrants). According to many of the interviewees, this fact, which has worsened since the early 1990s—the period when migratory flows to Italy increased—is not recent, but firmly rooted in the Italian political system, in the actions of its institutions and population. Historically, Italy is perceived as a country that is unstable from the political and institutional standpoint, and in many ways quite similar to Morocco (especially as regards the issues related to corruption). In some respects, this similarity creates a feeling of brotherhood between Moroccan citizens and Italian citizens, which many interviewees say has made it possible (at least in some cases) to overcome the problems resulting from the lack of clear rules and rights in Italy.

From this perspective, being an immigrant does not help Moroccans forge links with their own community. This shift in interests influences both the construction of a new and diversified sphere of identity and, accordingly, of a better perception of the concept of democracy. In this sense, the fact of having migrated has contributed to changing the interviewees' political interests: interest in their country of origin is gradually flanked by (and at times replaced by) interest in the host country. This does not depend only on the "level of democracy" of the host country or of the home country, but is part of an inevitable process of substitution that affects whoever migrates. On the one hand, this is seen as the price to be paid in order to have a better life; on the other hand, however, the expected safeguards often turn out not to be the ones that can in fact be achieved, and this aspect also contributes to changing the terms of the perception: the immigrants we interviewed have "sized up democracy." This aspect, in addition to being linked to the experience of migration, is doubtless influenced by the personal growth and changes in expectations that come with age. Democracy as a perfect ideal, if mentioned, is supplanted by a more realistic vision that, though not losing its ideal aspirations, takes day-to-day experience and life's difficulties into account. It should be noted that the disenchantment and, often, the disillusionment that life in the host country has engendered in the immigrants has not destroyed their hopes that a full and effective democracy can one day arise in their home country.

Only in a few cases is the home country depicted as an ideal world to be returned to some day: most of the interviewees painted Morocco in dark colors, a country where wealth has perhaps increased (though only for the few), but where social tensions, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, corruption, and political problems remain. Almost all the interviewees feel that the attempts at change have been effective, but that much remains to be done. One aspect in particular seems to be significant: virtually none of the interviewees ever spoke of returning; if they intend to move at all, they talk about emigrating to another "Western" country. Even though certain things have changed and the outlook in Morocco is better, our interlocutors show that they have put down roots in the host country, and many have become citizens. Theirs is now a stable, long-term migratory project, and the improved conditions in the home country do not alter the basic prospects, nor does this seem to influence the perception of the concept of democracy in any way. What does change are the prospects for cooperating with the home country, which many of the interviewees see as positive opportunities, both in business terms and as regards cultural exchange or cooperative projects.

The transformations that are now taking place in Morocco should help dismantle the stereotyped and often negative image that the country has in the eyes of a certain portion of the public opinion and, in turn, the world's perception of Moroccan immigrants, who are all too often associated only with the equation Moroccans = Muslims = Not Democratic. The Moroccans we interviewed are aware of the political implications of this perception, and of how it is also constructed from a stigmatization of the Islamic system as a whole. What we have witnessed in the past 20 years, especially since theories regarding the clash of civilizations began to circulate (Huntington 1993) is a media instrumentalization of Islam in its most radial versions, which represent only a minority, and not the real Islam. The interviewees call for a true democracy, a "right to their image."

Democracy, then, is first a value that must be defended, and second a right that must be earned. It is not something that is acquired once and for all, but changes according to conditions, way of life, and lifecourse. It is here that the perceptions of new citizens are farthest from those of the native-born, for whom democracy, rights, guarantees, and protections are a given, something that can be taken for granted. We thus believe that over the next few years, these new social actors' experience of identity and democracy could play an increasingly important role in our societies, and in time will be able to instill fresh life in consolidated democracies (where the concept of democracy is in crisis) and spark a new debate about the issues of democracy, political participation, and rights.

NOTES

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1. Moroccans are one of the principal immigrant communities in many regions of Italy. The region with the highest number of resident Moroccan immigrants is Lombardia (109,245 in 2010), with Piemonte coming third, with 19,185. Torino ranks first among the Italian provinces in number of Moroccan immigrants. ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica) data available at http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/39726 (accessed April 25, 2012).
2. The sample consisted of an equal number of men and women. Age of the interviewees ranged from 21 to 56: 10 interviewees from 21 to 31 years old, 10 from 32 to 42 years old; and 10 from 43 to 56 years old. Two-thirds of the interviewees have lived in Italy for at least 10 years, and two-thirds hold a university degree.
3. The Arab Barometer is an Institute that conducts surveys of democracy in the Arab world (http://www.arabbarometer.org).
4. According to World Bank data, remittances entering Morocco totaled 6.4 billion dollars in 2011, accounting for 6.8 percent of the county's GNP. Morocco is thus one of the top ten remittance receiving

countries in the Middle East and North Africa. See http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/0,,contentMDK:21924020~pagePK:5105988~piPK:360975~theSitePK:214971,00.html#fragment-4 (accessed November 6, 2012).

5. In particular, the Hassan II Foundation was created in 1990.
6. The events of the so-called Arab Spring led to mass protests in the country. These manifestations, led by the 20 February Movement, have forced king Mohammed VI to approve a series of constitutional reforms. Most part of the analysis of this phenomenon, however, are agreed on the fact that these concessions do not change in a signifying way the true authoritarian nature of the Moroccan regime. See, among others, Molina (2011); Volpi (2012); Maghraoui (2011).
7. ISTAT data available at http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/39726 (accessed April 25, 2012).
8. Interview with a 45-year-old translator who has lived in Italy for 15 years.
9. Interview with a 49-year-old business woman who has lived in Italy for 2 years.
10. Only a couple of the interviewees took a strong stance against Islam, maintaining that it is clearly incompatible with democracy.
11. The interviewees' opinions tend to converge irrespective of their age, gender, and level of education.
12. Interview with a 40-year-old male educator who has lived in Italy for 10 years; italics added by the author.
13. Though the interviewees are critical of the Berlusconi governments, in connection with immigration the finger of blame is pointed at all political parties in general, center-right and center-left alike. 'The parties' slogans change, but the substance is often the same". Interview with a 46 year old man, a cultural mediator, who has lived in Italy for 20 years.
14. The immigration in Italy is regulated by the Legislative Decree 25/07/1998, n° 286, then modified by the Law 30/07/2002, n° 189. This law became operative in 2005 and in 2009 was further modified by the so-called Pacchetto Sicurezza (Law 15/07/2009, n° 94). Italy has quotas for immigrants who arrive in Italy to work. These quotas are subordinated to the "contratto di soggiorno," which is a requirement to obtain the residence permit.
15. Interview with a 47-year-old man, a company official who has lived in Italy for 20 years.
16. The interviewees see this as a loss for the host country that, after years of investing in these people, sees its human capital disappear from one day to the next. The Moroccans who arrive in Italy often have academic and job qualifications, speak at least three languages, and are a potential resource that is not put to good use (e.g., the interviewees emphasize on the enormous difficulties involved in having their academic degrees recognized).

17. One case in particular was mentioned by many interviewees. The 2006 Italian Budget Law contemplated a 1,000 euro payment to mothers with newborn babies, regardless of citizenship. Subsequently, however, after granting the bonus, the Italian government decided that it would not be given to foreign nationals. In the past few years, many foreign citizens have appealed this decision and won.
18. Between the 1980s and 1990s, rural areas such as Beni Mellal and Khouribga in Morocco's backcountry became an inexhaustible source of immigrants to Italy, and Piemonte in particular. Morocco's poor harvests during those years and the crisis of the phosphate industry (which had sustained the region's fragile productive fabric) triggered an exodus toward nontraditional European countries such as Italy and Spain. This emigration initially consisted of people with a low level of education and large numbers of illegal immigrants.
19. In the past ten years, there have been a number of failed attempts in Italy to encourage immigrants' participation at the local level. In particular, mention should be made of the "consulte per l'immigrazione" offices set up in town halls to advise immigrants and the introduction of "adjunct city councilors" representing the immigrant population in the City Council.
20. The current political scene in Morocco is complex and shifting. The year 1999 was the beginning of a new era for the Alaouite dynasty. Expectations were very high when the youthful new sovereign rose to the throne: there was talk of a "break with the past," of "democratization from above," of "war without quarter on corruption," and so forth (Willis 1999). Nevertheless, the political challenges facing the new king were arduous indeed: the demand for greater freedom, for the restoration of civil rights, advanced chiefly by new, often Islamist-inspired, political groups such as the Justice and Development Party (PJD). The new king's democratic rhetoric would appear to assign a decisive role to the people. But the real test lies in abolishing or controlling the so-called *makhzen*, or the royal court and its entourage, which has always pulled all the major strings of Moroccan life, from the economy to religion (Tozy 2008). The changes at the political level seem to be little more than window-dressing, and even the new parties often readjust their policies to toe the king's line. However, over and above his democratic rhetoric—which has not translated into democratic results—the king has promoted a series of social reforms, like the new Family Code or the Labor Code, which have tangibly signaled his commitment to change. The recent events of the Arab Spring, the new reforms and the criticisms voiced through the 20 February Movement are once again calling the Moroccan establishment into question. See, among others, Denoeux (2000, 2007); Boukhars (2010); Cavatorta (2005); Desrues and Moyano (2001); Laskier (2003); Maghraoui (2001).

21. The most recent elections in Morocco (November 2011) saw rather low voter turnout (around 45 percent, but still better than 2007's 37 percent) and resulted in a victory for the Islamist PJD.
22. When the tape recorder was off, some of the interviewees expressed opinions that were highly critical of the king and his actions, but showed reluctance and fear of criticizing him publicly or saying something unfavorable about Morocco.
23. The question of Morocco's depoliticization dates back to the 1960s. In using this term, however, we do not mean that there is no defined political context. The country's first constitution, adopted in 1962, provided for a multiparty system with a legislature elected by universal suffrage. The constitution called for a National Assembly consisting of a Chamber of Representatives, whose members were elected directly, and an upper house, or Chamber of Councilors, whose members were elected indirectly. However, their powers were granted directly by the king. Dozens of national and local elections were held between 1963 and 2002; constitutional amendments made the system more open and liberal. Nevertheless, the reforms that took place after independence had only a marginal effect on the general configuration of power and the political system. See Dalmasso (2012); Hibou (2011); Maghraoui (2002).

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Appendix 1

INTERVIEW GUIDE

1 Personal Data

Age
Gender
Work (employed/unemployed)
Marital status
Qualification
How many years have you been living in Italy? In Turin?
Is Italy the first country of destination after leaving Morocco?

1. Definitions

- What is democracy for you? Could you give a definition?
- Are there, according to you, basic principles that define democracy? If yes, which ones?
- According to you, are democratic principles compatible with Islamic system?

2. Host Country

- What is your opinion about democracy in the host country?
- Do you feel protected by Italian state during your everyday life?
  at work
  at school
  in your family
  in health facilities
  in judicial structures
  in your search of job/house
  in the streets
- Do you feel that your rights are respected?
  at work
  at school
  in your family

in health facilities
in judicial structures
in your search of job/house
in the streets
in politics/political participation
in the streets

3. Comparison between the Country of Origin and the Host Country

- Which bond do you have with your country of origin?
- How are, according to you, from a democratic perspective, the Italian specificities? And how are Morocco's specificities?
- Did you find some differences in the rights protection?
- Did you find some differences in the political process (political class and representation process)? Could you give me some examples?
- Please express an evaluation about some aspects of Italy and of Morocco in a range between 1 and 10:
  freedom of movement
  freedom of expression
  freedom of association
  freedom of press
  freedom of religion
  freedom of sexual choice
  political rights (representation, participation)
  trust in institutions

CHAPTER 5

Diasporas as Political Actors: The Case of the Amazigh Diaspora

Eva Pföstl

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of diaspora studies is fairly recent. They first emerged from cultural studies, anthropology, and sociology: migration studies and political science followed this trend starting in the 1990s (Sheffer 2003; Shain and Barth 2003; Kaldor 2001; Østergaard-Nielsen 2006; Smith 2007).

The term diaspora is derived from the Greek *diaspeirein,* meaning "dispersal or scattering of seeds." Originally, the concept referred only to the historic experience of particular groups, specifically Jews and Armenians. Later, it was extended to religious minorities in Europe. Since the late 1970s the term diaspora has undergone an impressive broadening of definition. The classic description is based on Sheffer's three criterias (from his work of 1986): the dispersed group must hold a distinctive collective identity across international locations; the group must have some internal organization of its own; the group in dispersion must keep ties with the homeland (be it symbolic or real). Changing realities modified this understanding of diaspora and in 1995 Sheffer introduced the concept of ethnonational diasporas, and in 1997, Cohen changed the concept of voluntary migration, focusing on the requirement of internal organization that keeps diasporas together in contemporary times. Recent literature is framing diaspora as almost any population on the move and no longer referring to the specific context of their existence (Vertovec and Cohen 1999; Castles and Miller 2003). This formulation, however, makes diaspora hardly distinguishable from a transnational view of migrant communities (Vertovec and Cohen 1999; Bauböck and Faist 2010).

Conceptual ambiguities surrounding the term diaspora includes also a discussion on the extent to which diaspora is an essential or a constructed category (Koinova 2007). Such a discussion links the debate to constructivist explanations of collective identities. Some scholars are strengthening an essentialist conception: diaspora groups as a natural and an automatic result of migration, exile, or dispersion (Adamson and Demetriou 2007). According to this viewpoint, "diaspora is a monolithic body, a group related to the people in the home country by affinity ties; kin and common descent." Others argue that diaspora is an elite mobilized political project, and diaspora identity is constructed; it's not a natural result of mass migration (Koinova 2007). One should also place emphasis on the heterogeneity of diaspora groups: "diaspora groups are internally heterogeneous...and different parts of the same diaspora can and do have different interests, defined among other things by class, gender, generation, occupation and religion" (Smith and Stares 2007). Furthermore diasporas in the global age have multiple national identities and loyalties and are interlinked (Bauböck and Faist 2010). Therefore, it is very important to avoid generalizations when we talk about a diaspora community in general. Without trying to resolve conceptual ambiguities surrounding the term "diaspora," this chapter will approach the diaspora debate from a constructivist point of view. It defines diaspora as a *political project* and places emphasis on the political identity of the group members as *political actors*. It is assumed that diaspora is not a natural result of mass migration and there is a difference between migrant communities and diaspora groups. Diasporas maintain ties to the homeland with a strong sense of belonging, no matter whether the homeland is an existing country or an imaginary one. Diasporas are multilayered and their aims are manifold, not static.

In particular, the chapter will focus on the role of diasporas in conflicts and postconflict reconstruction in their homeland. The chapter emphasizes that diasporas as political actors may play an important but sometimes also controversial role in their country of origin. This is by no means a new phenomenon. Yet, the enhanced possibilities for transnational communication, mobilization, and action as well as the upsurge in domestic and international security concerns after 9/11 and the Arab Spring of 2011 have heightened attention to the role of diasporas. Till the 1990s the majority of diaspora studies were focused on the problematic features of the diaspora. In essence three core arguments were identified: first, diaspora contributes to sustaining and perpetuating war at the home countries; second, they serve as irresponsible long-distance nationalists (Anderson 1991) less inclined to compromise or fundamentalists who perpetuate conflicts through economic and political support or intervention (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Lysons 2006), and, finally, are driven by a sense of guilt, nostalgia, and deprivation. More recently, other scholars have noted that such accounts are one-sided, not capturing how diaspora and exile groups are committed to nonviolent conflict resolution and may stimulate and reinforce local processes of democratization and postconflict reconstruction in their countries of origin (Emanuelsson 2005). This is reflected in current recommendations and policy chapters underway at both the European Union (EU) level of institutions and in several EU member states, promoting an enhanced role of diasporas, especially with regard to development, and democratization in their countries of origin (Van Hear, Pieke, and Vertovec 2004). Both perspectives provide insufficient evidence for their respective worldviews. In fact, they fail to capture the complex nature and dynamics of diaspora politics and obfuscate the real issues. This chapter goes beyond the mentioned dichotomy, demonstrating that diasporas are complex communities that relate differently with respect to different phases of the conflict cycle in their home country. The focus will be on the role of the Algerian Berber/Amazigh Diaspora[1] in the processes of political reform in postcolonial Algerian society. It is argued that the changing political context in North Africa has opened up spaces for an increased participation of the Amazigh Diaspora in political affairs with long-term implications for the political trajectory of the country. There are currently an estimated 2.5 million Algerians and Moroccans of Amazigh origin in Europe, more than half of them in France, and the rest mainly in the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, and Italy. An interesting question concerns, therefore, the evolution of this new category of political actor.

Section I of the chapter examines the driving factors and the internal as well as external dynamics to shed light on the complex and multifaceted nature of the Amazigh Diaspora politics in postcolonial Algeria. This chapter suggests looking at the Amazigh Diaspora as political actors vested with interest and agency. This concept entails a dynamic understanding of actors, who are subject to change based on the context and the options available for them to maximize and optimize their efforts. The inadequacies of both aforementioned stands of thinking—diasporas as peace promoter or spoiler—partly results from the descriptive analyses of the diaspora. This chapter looks at the Amazigh Diaspora from a different angle not by what it is doing but by *why* it is doing what it is doing.

Section II of the chapter argues that the Amazigh Diaspora will remain a critical factor in the process of a future transition to democracy of Algeria. The focus is on the potential transformative capacity of the Amazigh Diaspora vis-à-vis the Algerian state and provide for an assessment of a future role of the diaspora after the 2011 uprisings in the Arab world. The chapter emphasizes that the Amazigh Diaspora can become a credible actor if it engages critically with its own stereotypes and if it explores new grounds in terms of new networks and strategic alliances that transcend ethnic boundaries. The success of the Amazigh Diaspora in the transformative process of Algeria depends not only on their capacity to mobilize their own constituency and on the access they have to power centers especially in Europe but also on how willing they are to assess their own strengths and weaknesses.

Contours of the Amazigh Diasporic Political Identity

Amazigh Diasporic political identity is rooted in contemporary Amazigh challenges to the Algerian national authority. The following discussion examines briefly the historical evolution of the relationship between the state and cultural identity in the Maghreb in three main phases. The focus will be on (1) the legacy of the millet system; (2) colonial and neocolonial manipulation; and (3) the imperatives of postcolonial state-building. Taken together, these factors go at least part of the way to explaining the hostility to minority politics in the Arab world and explain the complex and multifaceted role of the Amazigh Diaspora politics in Algeria.

Prior to colonization, as elsewhere in the Muslim world, the primary markers used to designate social groupings in Maghreb were religious classifications, with the major division drawn between Muslims and non-Muslims (Gellner 1983). Under the so-called millet system, the Ottoman Empire recognized that the other monotheistic "peoples of the Book"—particularly Christians and Jews—were entitled not only to tolerance, but also to a degree of self-government and internal autonomy. Within this system, Muslims and non-Muslims, as subjects of the ruler, rather than citizens, had different statuses in terms of taxation, military service, and judicial systems (Braude and Lewis 1982). No Muslim ethnic group could attain separate legal status by virtue of its ethnic or linguistic differences. Nation was coterminus with religious affiliation. Linguistic and cultural identities, however, were somewhat fluid. Arabic, Persian, and Ottoman Turkish were used by various Muslim states as the official languages, and a multitude of other languages and dialects also were in use. As in other parts of the Muslim world and in Europe (until the industrial revolution), the economic and political system in precolonial North Africa did not require a strong linguistic and cultural homogenization (Wyrtzen Forthcoming).

It was with the advent of French colonialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that this paradigm shifted. "Protection of minorities" was one of the central justifications given for colonial rule, on the assumption that local majorities could not be trusted to govern fairly. Colonial rulers not only "protected" certain minorities, but also privileged some of them, both materially (e.g., by giving them easier access to schooling, and hence greater access to civil service jobs), and symbolically (e.g., by describing the minorities as more civilized or more freedom-loving), while denigrating majorities (Le Thomas 2012). In Algeria, this was clearly evident in the development of the "Berber myth" that overly generalized a division between Arabs and Berbers and superimposed a set of racial and cultural stereotypes on these categories (Lorcin 1999), attempting to exploit this as a cleavage through which they could divide and rule (Wyrtzen Forthcoming).

One of the consequences of the Berber myth on contemporary politics was the French government's preference for Berberophone populations, opening wide avenues for Kabyle emigration to France and the establishment of a permanent connection between the two regions. In the first half of the twentieth century, as much as 80 percent of the self-designated "Beur" militants were of Kabyle origin (Khellil 2000). It is of little surprise that a number of the public manifestations (in the form of novels, radio programs, and artistic presentations) adopted explicit Amazigh symbols. The significant, relatively wealthy and educated community of Kabyles outside Algeria facilitated the development of a cultural identity separate from the postindependence nation-building initiatives in Algeria (Chaker 1985).

With the overthrow of the colonial state, the postindependence Algerian regime initially sought to eliminate any distinction between Arabs and Imazighen, rejecting the Berber myth as a colonial invention and advocating a shared "Arabo-Muslim" heritage. The historiographical production of Algerian salafist historians retained Arabs, and Berbers were a conjoined race, "brothers" who had been reunited with Arab conquests and the spread of Islam into North

Africa (Wyrtzen Forthcoming). Such a definition of Algerian identity abolished the contemporary relevance of Berber as an ethnic category, subsuming it under Arabness. As the Algerian Popular Party (PPA) emerged after World War II, these tensions over the Arab and Berber dimensions of national identity came to a head in the 1948–1949 Berberist Crisis. The immediate context for this crisis was the determination of the Algerian national movement to cast Algerian identity in exclusively Arab and Muslim terms; thus, rejecting the concept of an *Algerian Algeria* in which cultural pluralism could be allowed as an operative sociopolitical force. Tensions about the parameters of Algerian identity continued to be expressed also in the following years, but ultimately a firm conviction to consolidate a strong Arab-Muslim cultural hegemony prevailed within the FLN leadership that took power in 1962. The Arabic language became the symbol of Arab nationhood for all Arab nationalists and pan-Arabism affiliation in order to be able to face colonialism. This adherence to pan-Arabism led them to undermine the other components of the local society and to consider local dialects, vernaculars, and cultures as backward and divisive elements for a modern society Algeria's first independent president, Ben Bella, proclaimed in 1962: "We are Arabs…ten millions of Arabs" in reference to Algeria's entire non-French population at the time. Although the Imazighen satisfied the prerequisites of Islamic faith and geographic residency, their use of Tamazight and their perceived non-Arab culture excluded them from national inclusion. Although Imazighen played an essential role in the struggle for independence, at both the elite and mass levels (Silverstein 2002), the impact the colonial legacy rendered any particularist assertion of Amazigh identity extremely suspect in nationalist eyes. The Algerian state never excluded Imazighen from power (Roberts 1980),[2] but as Arab nationalism is central to the way in which the Algerian constructed their nation, Amazigh identity was recast as anathema to the ideal of national unity, and active repression of Amazigh culture was the result (Roberts 2001). Amazigh were suspected of collusion with European powers. Instead of being part of the legitimate political game, Amazigh became stigmatized as manipulation by European powers, suspected of disloyalty, perceived as backward and uncivilized and Berber-speaking territories and its resources considered as vital for the economic development of the nation. Indeed, in postcolonial Algeria, there exists an ambivalent denial of the Amazigh dimension (Mundy 2010). This is not because of a stable, permanent suppression of the "Amazigh dimension," but rather the Algerian state's Jacobin insistence on the "exclusively" Arab-Muslim identity of Algeria. During this period the Algerian Diaspora has been a key actor for political innovation and contestation. Any challenge to the exclusively Arab-Muslim vision of the Algerian state was not tolerated and the Algerian regime paid great attention to developments of political activism in France. Sophisticated surveillance methods developed (Collyer 2006). In the mid-1970s Kabyle activism in France took a particularly academic form: explicit political activism was under heavy scrutiny, whereas ostensibly educational or research institutes had greater freedom to operate (Chaker 1998). The establishment of the Berber Academy for Cultural Exchange and Research in 1967 and the Berber Study Group, at the university, Paris VIII, in 1973 marked the first organizational developments in this regard. They countered the Algerian state's ideological repression with a modernization of the outlawed Berber language and a resurrection of the written script, *tifinagh*.[3]They published grammatical treatises, translated poetry, and so on, which were then used in Kabylia. Thousands of young Kabyle have learned to read and write in their language from those works published in France. The suppression of Amazighness in Algeria and its simultaneous rehabilitation in France served according to some scholars to codify and reinforce an Arab/Amazigh dichotomy in nearly the same terms as the colonial Kabyle myth. Others have seen the continuing development of Kabyle culture and transnational activism, especially the cultural flourishing of Amazigh music and poetry in France as an opportunity that would not have existed without significant emigration and which would not have occurred in the hostile climate of Algeria (Collyer 2006).

In 1980–1981, the uprisings of Kabyle students in Tizi-Ouzou, stimulated by the cancellation of a scheduled lecture on Amazigh poetry by Mouloud Mammeri, a well-known Amazigh writer and anthropologist at Tizi-Ouzou University, in March 1980 signaled the emergence on the political scene of a new transnational generation of militants, mobilized around cultural difference. This set off a wave of student riots, which spread throughout Algeria and even to France. The protestors demanded the recognition of linguistic and cultural differences in addition to the social and economic reforms initiated by the newly installed Algerian president, Chadli Benjedid. Although the Amazigh spring failed to win Amazighs the rights they so desperately wanted, the events in 1980 paved the way for political openings in 1989, when a new constitution allowed the creation of a multiparty system and competitive elections. The push for greater cultural pluralism by organizations such as the Amazigh Cultural Movement (MCB) that emerged after the events of 1980 helped to prepare the demand for political pluralism. This allowed the legalization of the FFS and the creation of the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) that represented, some have argued, a further generation of Amazigh activism. Both the FFS and RCD had strong support in France and the diaspora community was apparently involved at every stage of debate and organization of the changing events in Algeria. According to some scholars, from 1992 onward the international environment has become gradually more significant and the growing significance of the international context has allowed Algerian emigrants to exert a much greater influence on events in Algeria than would be the case if they were present in the country (Roberts 2003). Several reforms that gave greater accommodation to Amazigh identity were approved. These reforms included the establishment of an Institute for Amazigh studies at the University of Tizi-Ouzou in 1990, the broadcasting of nightly news in Tamazigh in 1991, the introduction of teaching Tamazigh in amazighphone regions in 1995, and a clause in the constitutional revision of 1996 that recognized Amazigh identity as one of the constitutive elements of Algeria national identity alongside the already acknowledged Arab and Islamic components. In 1995, the Haut Commissariat de l'Amazighite was founded, the first governmental institution for Amazigh culture with the main objective of facilitating the teaching of Tamazigh as one of Algeria's "national" languages. In 1996, a constitutional referendum passed a three-pillar construction of the Algerian nation: Islamness, Arabness, and Amzighness.

The Rise of a New Movement in Algeria and New Role of the Diaspora

A renewed and more sustained period of popular unrest in Kabylia grew out of the clashes with the authorities in April 2001 during the annual commemoration of the events of spring 1980 (ICG 2003). The killing of an 18-year-old student, Massinissa Guermah, in the custody of the Gendarmerie enflamed the push for the Amazigh cause. This event combined with socioeconomic difficulties faced by people in the region and the impression of a detached, corrupt, and uncaring government, usually referred to simply as *hogra*, or contempt, gave rise to violent confrontations with the police force left 36 people dead and hundreds wounded. The brutality with which the security forces responded, primarily the Gendarmerie Nationale, had no precedent in the region since independence and provoked an enormous trauma in Kabyle public opinion and a degree of international mobilization not seen at any other time during the entire history of the Algerian conflict. The Algerian emigrant community was extremely active during this period: a diverse collection of Amazigh associations in France and elsewhere rapidly constituted themselves into pressure groups. Demonstrations of solidarity with people of Kabylia were held in France and major cities across Europe as well as in Washington, DC. There is some debate over whether these events represented a concerted, coordinated international attempt to influence the Algerian government, or it was simply a coincidence that different emigrant communities across the world chose to express their indignation more or less spontaneously in similar ways on similar days (Collyer 2008).

The uprising gave birth to a new movement grounded in local Amazigh specificities but with claims for engaged citizenship and grassroots consensual democracy and presented one of the greatest democratic challenge the postcolonial Algerian state had ever faced. The emergence of this movement was referred to as the Kabyle citizen's movement and the *aarouch*. The former stressed a "contemporary democratic character and purpose," the latter a "traditional form of Kabyle self-organization, in which the *aarouch* were an umbrella structure comprising a number of villages" (International Crisis Group [ICG] 2003). As the names implied, this new formation was composed of elements of traditional social organization and simultaneously featured a revolutionary discourse that voiced "modern" (democratic) political goals (Salhi 2002). Indeed, the structures that did emerge from this protest movement were founded firmly on the significance of territorially based organizations in Kabylia. The notion of the *aarouch* was interpreted by the diaspora as an important tool for the shared symbolic identity to imagine, or reimagine the homeland. As underlined by some authors, it was especially this shared "reinvented identity" that was able to drive effectively the political mobilization (Collyer 2008).

For the activists in Kabylia the principal complaints were poverty, cultural injustice, and *la hogra*. On June 11, 2001, the representatives of the movement drew up a list of 15 demands to the Algerian state, and the majority of demands in the El Kseur document are of a socioeconomic nature and do not deal with specifically Amazigh cultural identity. The first seven demands related to security and justice issues, stemming from the gendarmerie's heavy-handed response to the Kabylia uprising. These included a demand for criminal proceedings against the responsible state agents, an amnesty for all imprisoned demonstrators and those awaiting trail, medical care, reparations for the families, including the granting of "martyr" status, and the termination of the state inquiry launched by President Bouteflika. The last eight demands focused mainly on socioeconomic issues. As many observers noted, the only concrete demand relating specifically to Amazigh identity was the request for the recognition of Tamazight as an official language. Indeed many of the 15 demands the *El Kseur Platform* made addressed socioeconomic or political mismanagement and nationwide grievances and aimed at transforming the state. For the diaspora these factors played a significant role but the broader questions of cultural identity were also typically emphasized.

In the month after the riots of 2001, new politics seemed to be emerging out of the Kabyli crucible. The grand demonstrations of May and June 2001, followed by the electoral boycotts of 2002, were displays of the power of coordinations, grounded in the submerged network of Kabyli society (ICG 2003). However, this power was not used for the creation of a new political space with a new vision of the state. After an initial success, the coordinations were now a spent force—internally divided and externally co-opted—and have neither been able to generate a wide popular mobilization beyond the Amazigh-speaking region of Kabylia, nor within the region itself, which might have otherwise replicated and diffused the idea of a national citizen's movement for democracy (Pföstl 2013).

Not even one of the *El Kseur Platform* demands came to fruition. Concessions obtained from the government were more symbolic, such as the recognition of Amazight as a national language, though not yet official. The rest are still blocked in an intractable negotiation process. The negotiations progressed without significant protest or involvement from within the emigrant community, though on a smaller scale emigrants were involved in lobbying European governments and providing continued logistical support. Like all previous Algerian political movements, the coordinations lost to the *pouvoir* (Mundy 2010).

During this period the potential impact of diaspora on affairs within the Algerian state were limited. As underlined by Collyer, the great emphasis on territorial legitimacy was one of the key elements that emerged during this protest phase and resulted in a dramatic loss of autonomy within the diaspora. Once the protests within Kabylia had come to an end, the diaspora was not able to offer any new dynamic to the movement. This represents a chief difference from earlier periods of Kabyle Diaspora activism, when in the 1960s and 1970s the Amazigh community in France played a central role in defining the modern understanding of Kabyle culture.

A New Role for the Diaspora after the Arab Spring?

Having examined the historical context of nation-building in Algeria and the role of the diaspora, we now focus on the potential transformative capacity of the Amazigh Diaspora vis-à-vis the Algerian state after the 2011 uprisings in the Arab world.

Today, the enhanced possibilities for transnational communication, mobilization, and action as well as the upsurge in domestic and international security concerns after 9/11 and the Arab Spring 2011 have heightened attention to the role of diasporas (Østergaard-Nielsen 2006; Cochrane 2007). As underlined, the Amazigh movement in Algeria has had a long and established history as a movement with a perspective and vision for the whole country, rather than for one or more of its Amazigh-speaking regions. In this sense the focus of the movement on linguistic and cultural rights has been seen as a strategy to transform national politics in a more progressive, inclusive, democratic, tolerant, and peaceful direction. Moreover, the cultural and linguistic demands were for Berber generally, rather than specifically for the population of one region. To be sure, moderate claims of Amazighs neither pose a current threat to the territorial integrity of the state[4] nor to ruling elites, which themselves contain important Amazigh components. Imazighen, despite their political consciousness, are remarkably loyal and dedicated to the concept of nationalism. For Imazighen, the national (nation-state) identity is powerful and also "authentic" as the basis for a sense of identity and belonging. The power of national identity derives, not just from the hegemonic nature of the state ideology, but also from the "vernacular communitarism," reflecting the "nested relationship" between Amazighs and the nation-state (Miller 2000). This is also reflected in the recent events of the so-called Arab Spring. During the demonstrations in 2011 and 2012 Amazigh activists focused on the linkage between political change, democratization, and a greater space being given to Amazigh identity within a continuing commitment to a nationalist vision and agenda. It is interesting to see how the issues at the heart of the insurrection in Kabylia in 2001 have been similar to and in some cases even identical with those that drove young North Africans into the streets in 2011: the unsolved question of national identity, high unemployment, mismanagement of public resources, and a popular sense that *la hogra* is the main element marking the relationship between the governing and the governed. Whereas in Marocco King Mohammed VI responded quickly to the protest movements, accelerating the reform process that has been ongoing for some time in there, including a new constitution with a surprising new multicultural approach to national identity,[5] in Algeria the government till today has not been pressured enough to undertake important reforms. However, it can be assumed that the recent events of the Arab Spring and the reforms adopted in Marocco have the potential to upset the political status quo and to force the Algerian elite to develop new strategies and modify the political system, also with regard to new multicultural approaches to national identity. As it is well documented, in every region of the globe, debates on issues of ethnic minorities have both a local and a global dimension, and draw upon both global discourses and local vernaculars (Kymlicka 2007). On the one hand, there is a global discourse of multiculturalism, which is strongly shaped by Western liberal-democratic experiences of multiculturalism, that frames minority rights as one of the requirements of a decent and modern state (ibid.). These normative expectations are increasingly applied to Arab states. Indeed, some commentators have argued that "for every state of the Middle East, respect for minority rights has become—together with women's rights—the barometer of its successful transition to democracy" (Picard 2012: 67). On the other hand, every region of the world has its own traditions of ethnic coexistence, which continue to strongly shape people's expectations about what constitute legitimate and appropriate forms of state-minority relations. As we have seen in the Algerian state, these include (1) the legacy of the millet system; (2) the legacy of colonial rule; and (3) the postcolonial state-building.

Diasporas as "bridges or mediators between their home and host countries" (Shaine 2003) have a constructive potential to contribute to the renegotiation on a multicultural national identity, taking into consideration both the discourses. Diaspora presents an interesting facet of civil society in that it is neither wholly external nor internal, but somewhere between the two. This unique position, therefore, anchors the diaspora organization as "a key part of civil society activism and they can play a number of roles in conflict and attempts to build peace within divided societies" (Cochraine 2007). Diaspora is not a rigid, static bloc, but a rational set of actors making their choices based on a diverse array of options and the political opportunity structures available in the homeland to bring change to the situation in their homeland. As Adamson (2002) rightly pointed out, "the relationship of the diaspora to the homeland is defined by the desire for transformation, contestation and political change." I feel that the diaspora could promote a model of governance in Algeria within a larger democratic constitutional order that all citizens can endorse and identify with. Yet, Algeria, like most postcolonial states, object to the very idea of empowering national minorities. In Algeria, after independence from France in 1962, it was widely expected that the new state would successfully incorporate and assimilate Imazighen under the rubric of homogenous "national" identity, based on common Islamic faith, the Arab language, the legacy of the struggle for independence, and a pan-Arabic ideology. As underlined, the ethnic conflict between Amazigh and Arabs in Algeria is driven by the state's rigid and culturally homogenous ideal of Algerian culture, citizenship, and national identity. National citizenship (as opposed to legal citizenship) has become synonymous with Arabism. This definition inherently casts Amazigh culture as nonnationalist and alien, and frames Amazigh identity as anathema to state and social solidarity and was the underlying basis for human rights violation against Amazigh. The violations Amazigh suffered were not just the result of the abusive exercise of the Algerian *pouvoir*, but were also the result of this deeply rooted supremacist Arab nationalism. This view is complemented by the widespread depiction of Algerian nationalism as reactive, first against French colonial denomination, and more recently, against dominant Western neocolonialism or the dominant influence of "Western values." There is also a related argument, that the authoritarian and rentierist tendencies of the Algerian elite concern its intent on prioritizing their own interest over those of the society they govern (Werenfels 2007). But it is precisely for these reasons that it may be important for the diaspora to raise the national question (Pföstl 2013).

Till today the Amazigh Diaspora has been seen by the Algerian state as a critical actor; it has not been regarded as a partner in the efforts to achieve a sustainable peace in Algeria. On the contrary, the political activities of the diaspora are stigmatized by the state government as neocolonialist projects to divide and rule the postcolonies and perceived as security threat. However, as the international experience shows, the continuing labeling of certain actors as "spoilers" or "extremist" with the concomitant isolation policy can be, especially in a period of transition to democracy, as counterproductive and can end up in a radicalizing and marginalizing crucial factors (Paige 2011). In order to become a credible actor, it is necessary that the diaspora engages critically with its own stereotypes and explore new grounds in terms of new networks and strategic alliances that transcend ethnic boundaries. The success of the Amazigh Diaspora in the transformative process of Algeria depends not only on their capacity to mobilize their own constituency and on the access they have to power centers, especially in Europe, but also on how willing they are to assess their own strengths and weaknesses. A potential success of the Amazigh Diaspora activism depends, therefore, on many issues, such as internal factors (legitimacy, transparency, ability to form a common platform, support from the counterparts in Algeria), external factors (permeability of the host countries, especially France, importance of the diaspora for foreign and domestic policies), and outreach (international network, solidarity groups). All these factors influence how the Amazigh Diaspora is perceived and assessed.

Notes

1. Today, the term Berber is viewed by many Amazighs as pejorative and is increasingly being substituted by "Amazigh" (lit. "free man"; pl. "Imazighen"; f. singular "Tamazight").
2. A large number of Imazighen have played and continue to play important roles in key political and military positions. Likewise, many of Algeria's most celebrated artists and intellectuals have been Imazighen. There are also two main Kabyle-based political parties: the Socialist Forces Front (Front des Forces Socialistes [FFS]) and the Rally for Culture and Democracy (Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Democratie [RCD]).
3. Tifinagh was borrowed, with some revisions, from modern Touareg writing, which they claimed was the original writing of all Berber dialects on the basis of evidence from a 2000-year-old archaeological site.
4. In June 2001 the Movement for Autonomy in Kabylia, led by Ferhat Mehenni, was established. This development was indicated as a move from civic nationalism to ethnic nationalism.
5. The new constitution of Marocco states: "The Moroccan Kingdom is an Islamic state, which is committed to its national and territorial unity, and to the preservation of the solidarity between the components of its national identity, which are unified through the melting of all of its components, Arab-Islamic, Amazigh, and Hassani Sahrawism; and which is rich due to its African, Andalusian, Hebrew, and Mediterranean sources." The new constitution came also declaring the officialization of the Amazigh languge in parallel to Arabic. Article 5 specifies: "Arabic remains the official language of the state, with the state laboring to protect it, develop it, and increase its usage. The Amazigh language is also considered as an official language of the state, since it represents a common heritage for all Moroccans without exception. A law is to be formulated to determine the stages of the officalization of the Amazigh language and the manner of its inclusion in the field of education and the spheres and public life, so that the Amazigh language could, in the future, perform its task as an official language."

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PART II

Governance, Migration, and Security

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CHAPTER 6

Migrant Workers, Labor Rights, and Governance in Middle Income Countries: The Case of Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon

J. Sater

INTRODUCTION

Labor migration has become an increasingly pressing issue for Middle Eastern governments. In addition to questions of basic human rights that have occupied national and international public opinions, labor migration raises important questions of governance, citizenship, and political representation. This chapter's focus on Lebanon with its relatively open and plural political and social systems aims to illustrate the means of political inclusion of migrant domestic workers' rights in the policymaking process. While the inclusion of such rights has so far been very limited, it still warrants special attention as it illustrates the interaction of civil society groups with international actors that surpass the more narrow institutions of the state. This chapter uses Rosenau's concept of spheres of authority for the study of Lebanon's system of governance and the inclusion of migrant rights in the political process.

As outlined in the introduction to this volume, significant new population shifts inside the Middle East raise new questions in the study of political processes in MENA. While some studies have focused on the security-related implications of these population shifts mainly inside the developed world (O'Neill 2006), the impact of economic migration in the Middle East remains underexamined except for studies that have focused on economic rentierism (Luciani and Beblawi 1987; Shambayati 1994; Losman 2010). In contrast, globalization scholars have regularly focused on global governance and inter alia democracy, identity, representation, and citizenship that are raised by global population shifts, given the fluidity introduced by increasing global mobility (Rosenau 2003: 223–233; Nagel 2004).

In the study of Middle East political economy, the unstable nature of labor migration through global market pressure has raised concerns about human rights and labor abuse. In turn, governments' responses to such concerns especially in Gulf countries that heavily rely on migrant workers have become a significant field of study in the political economy of the Middle East. As citizenship rights and comprehensive labor protection are fairly limited across the Middle East to start with, migrants are among the least protected population groups in the region (see other contributions to this volume). Since the early 1990s, international regulatory bodies and labor rights organizations such as the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and International Labour Organization (ILO) have recognized this, while local human rights groups have picked up demands that official domestic governmental organizations have failed to address. In other words, the transnational reality of population movements have brought to the fore a dialectic involvement of national, regional, and international organizations in the policymaking process concerning migrant workers' rights. What Rosenau calls spheres of authority (2003: 230) is, therefore, of particular relevance in the study of governance in the area of migrant rights; after all national institutions such as representative and electoral organizations, as well as ideologies of nationalism and citizenship, had the effect of excluding migrants from the domestic policymaking process (Castles and Davidson 2000). Governance evolved in the 1990s as a leading concept in political science and public administration in order to account for the multiplicity of actors and the uncertainty of outcomes that characterizes public decision making (Chhotray and Stoker 2009: 16–52). In turn, Rosenau's introduction of global spheres of authority acknowledges that an increasingly sophisticated system of compliance with international rules and regulations is embedded in national decision-making processes (2003: 225), which provides for at least some certainty and measures of success in the outcomes of national decision making. As this contribution aims to show, this especially applies to areas in which national regulatory systems are underdeveloped, such as intraregional migration in the Middle East.

Given the different power structures based on income and other types of social stratifications and stigmata such as gender, race, and nationality, issues that concern the governance of migration vary greatly from country to country even among similar categories of migrant workers. Consequently, a case study approach sheds most insights into mechanisms of governance in the area of migrant rights. To narrow down the case study and to avoid too broad generalizations, this chapter examines one group of migrants in a country with particularly weak government structures: migrant female domestic workers in Lebanon. In particular, this chapter aims to address the following questions: How are particularly vulnerable groups of the population included in the policymaking process when the lack of representation vis-à-vis the dominant groups is such an important feature? What types of mechanisms exist and on what type of resource do such mechanisms rely given the inequality of power relations that characterize the domestic and international political economy of migrant domestic work? What conclusions can be drawn about the reality of mechanisms of governance and spheres of authority in the area of migrant and labor rights?

In order to answer these questions, this chapter first analyzes the Lebanese system of governance that forms the background to the formulation of migrant rights. In the first part, I argue that due to its weak state system Lebanon is a particularly suitable case for the analysis of governance especially concerning the question of migrant rights. In its main empirical part, this chapter subsequently reviews the informal policymaking process as well as the resulting reform initiatives, and identifies three distinctive discourses and their actors that provide the main resources for global spheres of authority as they overcome the global/local divide. As is explained, these are humanitarian, security-oriented, and care-taking discourses. As this chapter seeks to show, the Lebanese case illustrates how spheres of authority are created by the coalescence of such discourses that, in spite of sometimes contradictory features, may also create synergies and push toward policymaking and implementation.

Migrant Rights and the State in Lebanon

Lebanon is unique in the Middle East as its political system is based on the idea of consociational democracy. This means that since its formal independence from France in 1943, there has been a power-sharing system among the 18 recognized religious groups. Quota regulations affected the executive, legislative, and juridicial branches of the government. A Christian domination over the political system was ensured by a 6–5 ratio in the 99-member parliament (later increased to 128) in favor of Christian religious denominations, which reflected a census of the early 1930s. In addition, the president of the republic is a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni, and the speaker of the house a Shi'a Muslim, as a result of elections and power-sharing deals among the political elite.

As this system encouraged sectarianism as a political identity, political conflicts amplified sectarian identities at the expense of Lebanese nationalism. Core political questions such as Lebanon's Western alliance or the Arab-Israeli conflict had a dividing effect especially along Muslim-Christian lines. The sectarian divisions and balance became even more precarious as the Christian-dominated state lost its demographic justification since the early 1960s due to emigration and population growth. Given the already strong kinship-based social fabric of Lebanese society, this system rendered the Lebanese state particularly weak (Migdal 1988), as strong local structures increasingly supported by outside forces have been able to use the state to further their own class and increasingly politicized sectarian interests. Throughout the country's postindependence period, this led to long-term interruptions of its parliamentary and executive institutions triggering foreign interventions including its 15-year civil war (1975–1990), as competing political fractions were unable to reconcile their conflicts given the availability of foreign support and increasing ideological divisions. This lack of the state's relative autonomy vis-à-vis domestic and international forces led the country once again to the brink of civil war in April 2008.

Within the context of its consociational democracy and sectarian identities, the issue of migration is of particular relevance in Lebanon. Throughout the twentieth century the country has become home to a large number of migrants while its own population has migrated to other parts of the world. Although exact numbers on in- and out-flows are not available due to politicized data and unreliable public records (Di Bartolomeo, Fakhoury, and Perrin 2010), it is clear that the two most important groups that migrated to Lebanon in the twentieth century have been Armenians and Palestinians. In the case of both groups, the sectarian fabric of the Lebanese state has led to the preservation of their identity. However, with the Armenians' arrival before and during the French-initiated state-building process, this group was able to obtain full citizenship rights. In contrast, the arrival of Palestinians after 1948 and 1967 respectively meant that their presence upset the fragile politico-sectarian balance that was established in 1943 with the National Pact, a power-sharing agreement between Christian and Muslim sects. Pan-Arabism and Arab socialism upset the fragile sectarian balance even more. A major political crisis erupted in 1958 and even triggered the first direct US intervention in the Middle East. Together with the Palestinians' increasing military presence through the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, this meant that Palestinians were denied citizenship and labor rights and were confined to their refugee status. The presence of Syrian laborers, as well as the wave of Iraqi refugees to Lebanon since 2003, has triggered a similar response among Lebanese political groups. Lebanon has been among the states that have not recognized Iraqis' refugee status and has deported refugees fearing a repetition of the politically explosive situation of Palestinian militarized migrant communities.

While the question of Arab-Muslim migrants remained politically sensitive, Lebanon has attracted a large number of migrants from less developed countries with surplus labor, such as Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Kenya, and Bangladesh. While the existence of labor from these countries has become an increasing source of debate among human and labor rights activists elsewhere, the ethnic composition of this labor has led to a relatively low level of public debate in Lebanon. In contrast, the presence of Syrian labor especially in the booming construction sector has been politically sensitive due to the virtual Syrian occupation of Lebanon until March 2005 as well as widespread unemployment among the Lebanese. This is without mentioning the Syrian civil war and the role of Lebanese factions in it. As domestic labor has also not been publicly visible, locked as it is within the privacy of the family, very few public pressure groups have raised the issue. In fact, a vast majority of households has started to benefit from the cheap availability of housemaids.

Consequently, although Lebanon may be viewed as an unusual case for the study of migrant workers' rights in the Middle East due to its exceptionally open, yet highly conflictual political system, a study of governance of migrant rights is particularly warranted here because it has experienced many major disruptions in its formal decision-making process. As a result, alternative representation and informal political channels have been frequently used, which created one of the Middle East's most vibrant civil societies (Abbou Asssi 2006) with sectarian (Palmer Harik 2004: 81–95; Clark and Kingston 2010), and sometimes revolutionary, anticonstitutional tendencies (Karam 2005: 331–335). As is shown in the subsequent sections, it has been this vibrant civil society that has been able to engage in activities and debates that have increasingly been internationally embedded to create spheres of authority that transcendent Lebanon's national borders.

MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS AND THE POLITICS OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION

Demographic Background

According to a report issued by the ILO in 2005, there are about 140,000 migrant domestic workers in Lebanon including 80,000 from Sri Lanka, with other main groups originating from the Philippines, India, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan (ILO 2005: 1). In addition, embassies and NGOs have observed a large number of illegal migrants, so that the entire population of migrant domestic workers is estimated at around 200,000 (Human Rights Watch 2010: 13) for a population of about 4 million. While this number serves as a good reference, the summer 2006 war led to numerical changes, as some countries, especially the Philippines and Ethiopia, attempted to limit migration to Lebanon by imposing travel bans due to widespread complaints about abuse (Caritas Lebanon 2009).

The origin of the demand for Asian and African migrant labor relates to a number of domestic and regional changes that have occurred since the early 1970s. First, increasing levels of education in Lebanon meant that there are fewer relatively uneducated Lebanese who are willing to work as housemaids due to its low status. While in the immediate postindependence period such tasks were fulfilled by young women often from rural areas to support their families (as in many other low-income countries), this became increasingly unacceptable with the spread of mass education and the presence of lucrative employment possibilities abroad, especially in the Gulf. Second, the Lebanese civil war made it socially and politically difficult to work for or employ a Lebanese outside one's own communal and sectarian boundaries. Third, while Syrian and Palestinian labor often fulfilled household tasks until the late 1970s, the increasing involvement of Palestinians and Syrians in the Lebanese civil war restricted the employment of such politically sensitive labor in Lebanese households. The consequence of these political developments was that during the civil war the domestic labor market became stratified and ossified. Consequently, employment agencies developed and promoted the hiring of inexpensive domestic labor from politically neutral countries, especially from Sri Lanka, while social hierarchies based on wage, origin, and religious orientation developed among an increasing number of migrant workers. Bangladeshi women are reportedly the cheapest earning US$150 per month, while Filipino are the most expensive with average salaries at US$200–250 (Zimprich 2011).

Legal and Regulatory Framework

Since the 1960s the Lebanese legal framework for domestic labor has remained virtually unchanged. As in many other Arab countries, the Lebanese labor code explicitly excludes all of its provision for domestic labor in Article 4 (ILO 2005: 1). It thereby acknowledges and reinforces the difficulty of regulating domestic labor, while relying on informal links between members of households to control working conditions. After all, links to Lebanese rural areas have always been very strong among Lebanese communities, partly because of the relative concentration of populations in valleys and along the short Mediterranean shore. This means that all questions related to work hours, minimum pay, time for recreation, as well as types of duties would be negotiated between domestic labor and the household. Family and confessional links between the domestic labor force and the household would regulate potential conflicts.

With the influx of foreign labor, the Lebanese state has simplified visa processing by making individual heads of households responsible for labor. In the 1950s, the state introduced the *kafala* system that has also marked labor relations in other parts of the Middle East, notably the Gulf. This means that legal residency has been restricted to being employed by a private person who acts as a sponsor, and legal residency will be withdrawn as soon as employment ceases. As this also means that employers are considered legally responsible for their employees, many employers often seize the passports of their employees, in order to maximize control and minimize the risks that may arise with mobility (ILO 2005: 1). According to a survey among 600 migrant workers, this practice concerns about 85 percent of all women (Human Rights Watch 2010: 21). It has been this legal situation that disproportionately empowers the employer at the expense of the employee that has given rise to much physical, sexual, and other psychological abuse and has been regularly reported by newspapers and labor rights websites. This regulatory framework has also resulted in an increasing number of emergency situations. “Runaway” employees are caught without papers or the financial means to be repatriated, charged with crimes such as theft, and held in the country’s only detention center in Beirut. Each week, there is about one violent death of a migrant domestic worker that occurs inside the confines of a Lebanese household, often suicide (Human Rights Watch 2008).[1] Both Lebanese authorities as well as embassies have consequently been called upon to solve such human tragedies.

The Policy Process and Migrants' Rights

The process of increasing migrant labor rights has taken place in a setting that has not involved parliamentary or party decision-making bodies. The reasons relate to the lack of representation of these transitional groups in a state whose decision-making institutions are already very weak. The process started in the early 2000s, when one NGO, the Caritas-sponsored Migrant Center, was faced with an increasing number of female migrants in detention centers. These migrants' social, psychological, and economic condition required social work as well as medical, judicial, and psychological services that the administration did not provide. The Migrant center's projects included activities in the country's detention center such as medical and legal assistance especially to pregnant and sick women and students. The center also provided food, and improved hygienic conditions, organized summer camps, and provided assistance to Iraqi refugees. Early in 2002, the Migrant center supported by Caritas Sweden and the Catholic Relief Service was cofinanced by a €600,000 grant from the European Union (EU). From this grant the center started what became the initiator of more substantial reform, the Project for the Protection of Migrant Workers' and Asylum Seekers' Human Rights in Lebanon. The project had particular political ambitions beyond social work and assistance, as it included initiating legal and social changes inside Lebanon, through public relations campaigns and workshops that included government authorities (Centre de Migrant 2009: 6). This project was paralleled by activities of OHCHR and ILO, which had reopened its regional office in Lebanon in 1995. In 2002, a regional ILO publication on domestic workers focused on Lebanon, Bahrain, and Kuwait. The ILO's awareness campaign culminated in a film, *Maid in Lebanon,* which was the result of a cooperation between Caritas and ILO.

From Awareness Raising to Policy Changes

Central to the transition from awareness raising to policies was a conference that the ILO organized in November 2005; the role played by ILO's charismatic regional director Simel Essim also is significant. The purpose of the workshop was to "advocate for a policy framework to regulate domestic work through creating partnerships and establishing cooperation between different stakeholders within the government and civil society in order to raise awareness of the human and labour rights issues facing women migrant domestic workers in Lebanon" (ILO 2005: i). The workshop included important governmental stakeholders from the Ministry of Labour including Minister Trad Hamade, the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of Interior as well as embassies. Other participants included Caritas, international organizations (OHCHR; UNIFEM), as well as the Lebanese bar association. The first session established the expectation of participants from the workshop, dividing these expectations into three sections: (1) human rights; (2) legislation; (3) operational issues. Caritas specifically addressed four issues that it wished to discuss and see changed:

> 1. Enforcing coordination and collaboration with the MOL [Ministry of Labour] for a joint plan of awareness raising on the state of migrant workers and the rights, duties and responsibilities of concerned parties;
> 2. Promoting and activating the role of the complaint unit at the MOL to provide assistance, guidance and counselling (social and legal) through Caritas staff;
> 3. Collaborating with the MOI to review or modify laws on migrant workers;
> 4. Establishing a local committee (NGOs, CBOs, and other concerned parties) to regulate the prevailing status of foreign workers that will provide a medium for promoting awareness raising about the Lebanese cultural image of migrant workers and existing cultural attitudes and behaviour of Lebanese society towards these groups. (ILO 2005: 6)

After three days of presentations and workshops, the participants concluded with ten recommendations, the most important one being the appointment of a steering committee to "review the situation of migrant domestic workers and make recommendations for the necessary amendments to the Labour Code, for improvements in the monitoring of employment agencies and for changes in labour migration policy. The Committee will also propose protective measures for migrant workers to be included in the national Plan of Action on Human Rights" (18). Other recommendations focused on the drafting of a standardized, official contract in Arabic, English, and the language of the migrant, to ensure that migrants as well as employers keep the terms of the contract the same across the different geographical locations; capacity building in the form of a help desk in the Ministry of Labour to investigate abuse and offer support; awareness raising among the Lebanese public through media campaigns and booklets. All these efforts focused on basic rights such as freedom of movement, the right to retain identity documents, and the right to privacy and decent work conditions.

One and a half year later, on April 10, 2007, the prime minister appointed a steering committee to follow up on these recommendations.[2] The members of the committee were roughly the same as that of the original workshop—including Caritas, the ILO, as well as the embassies of the Philippines and Sri Lanka. The work of the steering committee was divided into three areas: The first area was the imposition of unified contract, second came the drafting of a new labor bill, and the third initiative was the drafting of an official handbook for migrant workers.

Unified Contract

Up to this date, the adoption of a unified contract has been the only tangible outcome of the workshop and steering committee sessions. It is targeted at the widely observed problem and source of abuse that migrant workers sign contracts in their home countries (often with the promise of higher salary) that do not correspond to the final contract that they sign upon arrival at employment agencies in Lebanon, that is, once they have already invested in their journey to Lebanon and incurred significant debts. In addition, working hours, rest days, freedom of movement, the right to call their home country, would also be included in different versions of contracts. Given the lack of applicability of the labor code, a unified, mandated contract could clarify the rights and obligations of both the employer and the employee. It is important to note that the imposition of a unified contract means the introduction of public law into a contractual relationship, and it is perceived by lawyers to be a labor code "through the backdoor."[3] However, for the same reason lawyers believe that without a law, it may easily be altered and challenged in the courts, as a contractual relationship always exists between a priori two equal partners unless otherwise stated. While the de facto unequal relationship is being acknowledged by such a unified contract, the legal uncertainty surrounding its future remains. The discussions in the steering committee focused on questions of minimum pay, rest days, freedom of movement, health insurance, sick leave, work hours, as well as phone communication to home and home country. The idea of minimum pay did not enter the unified contract, as accommodation and food is free of charge, and employers may otherwise charge for such expenses. The unified contract also does not include stipulations on the retaining of passports or freedom of movement, as it is in principle not legal in Lebanon anyway. In turn, employees have the right to one rest day per week, a maximum of ten hours of work per day, as well as six holidays per year, while uninterrupted sleep should be at least eight hours per day. Sick days are to be paid if certified by a doctor, and hospitalization and other medical costs need to be covered by the employer, through an obligatory health insurance. Finally, the unified contract included one phone conversation home per month as well as the right to receive phone calls. It needs to be pointed out that the last sets of rights were included only after the ILO and the OHCHR criticized the original draft contract. The US State Department also played an important role when it issued a negative report on human trafficking in which it reported that "women from Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Ethiopia migrate to Lebanon legally, but often find themselves in conditions of forced labor, through unlawful withholding of passports, non-payment of wages, restrictions on movement, threats, and physical or sexual assault" (US State Department 2008). The contract increased in size from one and a half pages to four.[4]

In spite of these improvements, the contract still reflects an imbalance of power between the Lebanese employer and the employee, partly reflecting the fact that the place of work remains a private household. For example, it includes imprecise language that can easily be used by the employer, such as "the employer has to pay the monthly salary on time, unless it is justified," or "the employer can cancel the work contract if the employee has committed an error, has been negligent, has committed an act of aggression, or has been responsible for damages" (El Hague 2009).

Labor Bill

As mentioned above, the legal situation of women migrant domestic workers results from Article 4 of the labor code. Domestic work is excluded from all provisions, and the migration status is linked to the *kafala* system of personal sponsorship. For this reason, changes to the Lebanese labor code, or a specific code that regulates foreign labor, have been proposed from the outset. Critics of new legislation argue that any labor bill does not lend itself to be easily implemented, due to the dual nature of (private) households and (public) workplace. In addition, the constituents of Lebanese lawmakers are by definition Lebanese, and a legislative project that limits the power of the Lebanese may hence be very difficult to pass. After all, the goal of Lebanese parliamentary institutions is to serve the Lebanese. As Ghassan Mukhaibar, MP and chair of the parliament's human rights commission, argues, because of more or less open racism "there are few people who don't sleep because of human rights abuses that migrant workers suffer from."[5] Trade unions are often pan-Arab in orientation, and the labor code even allows foreigners to vote for labor union representatives. However, given that non-Arab migrant women do not vote because they are not included in the labor code, labor unions do not promote the rights of these women. Actually, they have even resisted extending rights to migrant domestic labor, based on racist and gender stereotypes. The Lebanese working group on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) had similar reservations, and did not include these women in its report, given that these women were not Lebanese.[6]

A legislative draft was still prepared by the Ministry of Labour. This was partly because in the absence of legislation, its own regulatory function has been greatly reduced in spite of the increasing need given the great number of both migrants and disputes that have arisen.[7] For example, while a phone hotline has been established in the Ministry of Labour to inform migrants about their rights, in the absence of a labor law and with the continuation of the *kafala* system there is little a legal advisor can tell a migrant in need of legal advice, unless she has become irregular and illegal by leaving the household.[8] A Human Rights Watch report somewhat ironically observes that

> in a welcome move, the Minister of Labor on June 1, 2010, announced a new hotline at the ministry to receive complaints from migrant domestic workers (MDW) and other workers. However, as of July 7, 2010, it had yet to receive a single call from a domestic worker, possibly because the Ministry has not disseminated information about the hotline within communities of MDWs. (2010: 2–3)

While the Ministry of Labour recognizes the need for new legislation, the absence of parliamentary support and lobbying, the overwhelming political questions that Lebanon is dealing with, together with a dysfunctional parliamentary system (with long breaks between sessions due to internal power struggles), has blocked the legislative initiative. In addition, the Ministry of Labour is considered a "weak" ministry in Lebanon, given that factional and ideological disputes focus on foreign policy and security questions. Ironically, this seems to have pushed the ministry into a more proactive role "in the shadow" of other ministries and political conflicts, as a consensual approach to solving labor problems is a lot more likely than elsewhere. This is evidenced by the confessional "belonging" of the ministry—while it used to be a Shi'a, Hezbollah-led ministry under Trad Hamade, in 2010 it was led by the Maronite Christian Boutros Harb. As a potentially high-profile candidate for the presidency, the minister was considered very active in pushing toward new legislation and the revised version of the unified contract, thereby transforming his own image among NGOs. Though a draft law had been produced, it has not been rendered public at the time of writing.

Handbook

Given the difficulty of obtaining appropriate legislation and the lack of real support from within the Lebanese system of governance, raising awareness has been the main focus of ILO, OHCHR, and Caritas. As to the main problem that migrant labor experiences—lack of payments—Lebanese employers often quite simply underestimate the financial costs involved in having a housemaid. In addition to a US$200 monthly salary, the costs of a return flight ticket and annual US$500 in medical insurance and other fees may pose a significant financial burden to households. After all, the average salary hardly exceeds US$600 with a 2008 GDP per capita at around US$6,700.[9] While the need for awareness raising seems clear at first sight, during steering committee meetings it was agreed that a handbook was to provide information for employees, not employers, and that an awareness campaign should rather be conducted with the help of NGOs, not the state. As the coordinator of the Ministry of Labour emphasized, the role of the state is to protect Lebanese citizens, not to raise awareness.[10] One of the main forces behind the handbook was the ILO, who volunteered to translate the Arabic version into English, French, and the languages of the migrants' home countries. Reflecting its own role as a UN intergovernmental agency, it relied on the Ministry of Labour's approval, and the general security's resources inside airports, in order to distribute the handbook. At the time of writing, it had not been approved and copies had not been distributed. It is not a "rights" document as it only contains information about work conditions, helpful phone numbers, and general information about Lebanon such as geography and climate. Still, it is a step toward regulating labor relations that remains outside of the control of inspectors from the Ministry of Labour.

The Dynamics of the Protection of Migrant Labor Rights in Lebanon

Following up on the descriptive analysis, this section analyzes two distinct political processes that merit special attention. As mentioned in the introduction, particular actors have been promoting particular types of discourses that act as resources in the promotion of female domestic workers' rights. Depending on these actors' particular position in the global political economy of migrant labor rights, both domestic and international, they illustrate that discourses are embedded in particular value systems that often, but not always, converge. As these value systems tend to cause compliance among local decision makers as illustrated above, they form part of Rosenau's idea of "Spheres of Authority" (2003: 230). As I describe shortly, in the case of migrant domestic rights, this authority is multidimensional. From this empirical observation is drawn some theoretical conclusion about the nature of global governance, which in this case has been based on the convergence of value systems that lead to reform processes.

Actors

Caritas has been active in Lebanon since the early 1970s, and many associated individuals have a long history of providing relief to residents and nationals. In the early 1980s during the civil war, Father Salim opened a shelter *Badare* between East and West Beirut. Early in the 1990s, another shelter was opened by Sister Angela Fernando *Lakseta*. Due to such long-established relief efforts to all Lebanese communities, Caritas has obtained a very important role as its efforts are respected and its opinions listened to across all communities. Yet, this occasionally creates competition with other groups, primarily because of its cooperative position towards the Lebanese state to pursue its ends, not for its religious or communitarian identity. After all, it lacks an ideological, that is, political position to the state and focuses on providing relief. More politicized organizations such as Frontiers do not agree with this position, especially as Caritas has obtained a privileged position in its work in detention centers, effectively running the detention center's welfare programs.

ILO, in turn, is an intergovernmental organization and relies on the Lebanese state for approval and monitoring. It is not an NGO that raises awareness, nor does it try to provide services to those in need. Instead, it monitors a country's labor laws based on agreements that the state itself has signed, and essentially reports to its headquarters where discussions take place between ILO officials and government representatives. Rather than initiating debates, it transfers debates from Geneva to the domestic political sphere and acts as an intermediary. Depending on its composition and the history of personal involvements, it may set the agenda in different ways. For example, it was only with the arrival of the non-Lebanese Simel Essim in 2004 to head the ILO's regional office in Beirut that the ILO became so strongly involved in the decision-making process. Before, the ILO staff hesitated to put the question of migrant workers at the center of ILO's activities.

Despite some limitations, both organizations strongly benefit from their international exposure, and they project international norms and standards onto the domestic scene. Even if these norms and standards slightly differ, they have proven complementary in the protection of women migrant domestic workers and in the process of governance in the area of migration.

The courts have been the most public arena where interests have conflicted. In 2007/2008, 238 cases involving Migrant Domestic Workers were brought before the courts, and after an extensive analysis of about half of these cases, Human Rights Watch concluded that migrant domestic workers remain unprotected and judges have consistently favored Lebanese complaints of, for example, theft at the expense of a fair trial. Judges have also attempted to legitimize the practice of withholding passports. In a 2001 ruling, a Beirut judge reasoned that

> it is natural for the employer to confiscate the maid's passport and keep it with him, in case she tries to escape from his house to work in another without compensating him. (Human Rights Watch 2010: 3)

While such rulings may be subject to change, the more lawyers and human rights groups manage to raise awareness among the Lebanese public, a significant weakness concerns the extended period of time between complaint and final judgment. The most common complaint is that of lack of payment, and once a migrant worker files a complaint, the final judgment may be rendered between 21 and 54 months later (32). This makes it quasi impossible for migrant workers to file complaints about lack of payment and wait for judgments, given that in order to legally stay in the country, they would need to continue to work for the employer against whom they have filed a complaint.

These actors are involved in the production of meaning and authority in multiple ways. As a religious NGO, Caritas' main resource comes from its care-taking and relief-providing ideology, looking at housemaids as potential victims of exploitation in a global economy marked by poverty and insecurity. Given the inequality of power relations both globally and domestically between receiving countries and their nationals and sending countries and their nationals, it is the aim of Caritas to bridge the gap in order to secure basic human dignity. This strongly echoed United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) ideas that, among others, also entered the language of the US Department of State, such as "modern-day slavery" and "slave-like conditions." Its focus on women developed after finding the conditions in the detention center inhumane and the treatment of women cruel in the early 2000s. Caritas links the housemaid debate to that on human trafficking, which for security-related reasons such as narcotics and arms trafficking as well as illegal migration toward Europe and the United States, strongly echoed among Western foreign-policymakers. Among the Lebanese public, this discourse has had some effect, and other religious authorities such as the late Shi'a cleric and spiritual guide Seyyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah also criticized the inhumane conditions in which some housemaids are forced to stay.

On the other side of the scale is the prevailing focus on potential insecurity and law and order. What would happen if housemaids were allowed to freely walk and spend time on the beach, in public parks, or in the street? Would they not be involved in illegal activities such as prostitution, theft, or espionage, especially as they have access to private homes and as they are from economically deprived backgrounds? The potential contradiction between individual rights and security is viewed as paramount, considering the prevailing insecurity in Lebanon, especially with reference to both crime and political violence (Kiwan 2008: 5). A family judge who preferred to be anonymous explained,

> If my housemaid had the right to move around freely, I would rather prefer not to have a housemaid at all. After all, this is Beirut with very weak institutions, and not a European town with proper law and order enforcement. (Interview with the author, anonymous family judge, 2010).

Even if problems of abuse may be recognized, and help lines, social workers, standard contracts, awareness raising campaigns, and so on are initiated to alleviate some of the abuse, the law and order paradigm, together with open racism, is very powerful in a country whose state institutions are weak and whose family networks are extremely strong. The Interior Ministry represents this view, and the key question remains how to prevent maids from walking in the streets while ensuring that conditions are not so bad inside homes that maids either commit suicide or run away. The *kafala* system as it creates and reflects unequal power relations that often lead to abuse remains part of the problem even from this security perspective.

The third perspective is a labor perspective espoused both by the Ministry of Labour and the ILO. It looks at labor market needs and specific types of work that have become increasingly in demand. A housemaid is not seen as somebody who helps out inside the house, or who "serves," but somebody who fulfils an increasingly important aspect of the economy, that of care. Housemaids look after children, help old people do their shopping, prepare food, and so on, all of which are associated with a care-taking economy that Lebanese and other Middle East societies rely on in the absence of a welfare state and institutions. In other words, work performed by housemaids is a type of work that is highly in demand and needed for social reasons. From a gender perspective, it also liberates professional women from traditional care-taking functions. Hence, this need requires proper recognition and regulation for security and safety reasons that do not relate just to the worker, but also to all members of the household and types of services provided (ILO 2009).

These three perspectives on migrant labor have been the driving force behind the policymaking project, and they accounted for governance with its characteristics of pushing and pulling back. At a minimum level, all three perspectives coalesced and produced a smallest common denominator, which created some synergies toward attempted regulations. The parliament's human rights committee has in the meantime issued an impressive 54-page document on domestic workers as part of its National Human Rights Action Plan, which was financed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Al Khateeb n.d.). In spite of this dynamic, an important cultural perspective based on racism, together with lack of representation and effective lobbying, remains a structural weakness in the representation of migrant rights. While some international organizations such as ILO have been able to push the agenda, national embassies that are often understaffed and ineffective did not play an important role. Their weakness can be seen in the composition of the steering committees. While the first steering committees included some embassies, they were no longer included in the discussions that were increasingly regarded a “Lebanese” matter.

Conclusion—Governance and Migrant Rights

The above discussion illustrates how the inclusion of migrant rights in a developing country’s fragile parliamentary system hinges on the work of NGOs and international organizations within global spheres of authority. The country’s parliamentary system plays only an observing function, while some of its initiatives such as the National Human Rights Plan catalyze some of the efforts that take place elsewhere. Still, a symbiosis between national institutions and NGOs exists due to close links between the country’s educational elite that, in the case of Lebanon, also transgress confessional boundaries, through lawyers and human rights associations. While it has not been possible to include a thorough analysis of the media for the purpose of this chapter, it is important to point out that it reflects the discourses that take place among stakeholders. The security paradigm is as much reflected as the humanitarian paradigm. As one journalist explains, when she reported on the abuse of housemaids that reinforced the humanitarian paradigm, some TV channels asked their viewers to report when they were allegedly abused by housemaids, thereby reinforcing the security paradigm.[11]

Clearly, a basic-rights-oriented approach is slowly developing. Ironically, from the point of view of gender studies, the cheap availability of housemaids is both an issue of gender discrimination and hierarchies, *and* a form of liberation of professional Lebanese women from traditional care-taking tasks. Clearly though, the larger context of a fragile and divided national identity that has tended toward militarization has made Lebanese society not receptive to broader ideas concerning citizenship rights. In addition, the existence of relatively inexpensive mobility allows for rapid turnover rates of this migrant population, so that few migrant workers stay for longer than five or six years. Given this reality, international organizations and NGOs established networks with ministries, embassies, attempting to create a process toward reform that will ensure some of the basic rights to safety, decent work conditions, and fair arbitration in case of conflict. Human Rights Watch refers to legal obligations emanating from International Law, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, ILO declarations, and CEDAW (2010: 52–53). It seems that the reporting mechanisms that link the Lebanese government to these conventions will reinforce the process of internal reform, which may also gain momentum as parallel reforms are currently underway: the right to work of other migrant communities, notably the Palestinian refugee population.

From this discussion, it is possible to identify how domestic horizontal and vertical power structures interact with international semi-horizontal structures such as the EU, US State Department, and UN agencies such as ILO and UNHCR. While migrants' representation remains fairly marginal, the repeated domestic crises of unregulated labor relations have triggered responses from these power structures in the form of meetings, reports, and public statements. While entrenched power structures of courts, the police, and household/employers have so far resisted more radical reforms, the Lebanese *kafala* system will remain the focus of efforts to reform, whether based on a care-taking discourse or on that of human rights.

NOTES

1. Independent Internet blogs document some of the dramatic events; see www.ethiopiansuicides.blogspot.com.
2. Office of the Prime Minister, Decree Number 40/2007, Beirut, Lebanon.
3. Interview with the author, Nidal Juri, OHCHR, Beirut, March 18, 2010, Joseph Aoun, Caritas, March 22, 2010.
4. Interview with Simel Essim, ILO, March 26, 2010.
5. Interview with the author, Beirut, March 25, 2010.
6. Simel Essim, ILO, interview with the author, Beirut, March 26, 2010.
7. Marlene Atallah, MoL, interview with the author, Beirut, March 19, 2010.
8. Joseph Aoun, Caritas, interview with the author, Beirut, March 22, 2010.
9. United Nations Statistics Division, http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Lebanon
10. Marlene Atallah, Ministry of Labour, Interview with the author, Beirut, March 24, 2010.
11. Interview with Anne-Marie El Hague, L'Orient Le Jour, Beirut, March 18, 2010.

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CHAPTER 7

Across the Desert, Across the Sea: Migrant Smuggling into and from Libya

Derek Lutterbeck

INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, Libya has emerged as one of the most important transit countries for irregular migration toward the EU. Since around 2000, a growing number of migrants from sub-Saharan African countries have sought to reach European shores from Libya. A commonly held perception has been that this growing flow of undocumented migrants through and from Libya to Europe has not only been an issue of irregular migration as such but also of human smuggling and organized crime. It is often claimed that the transport of migrants by boat across the (Central) Mediterranean, as well as during earlier parts of migrants' journey toward Europe, has been in the hands of highly organized transnational crime syndicates that have been deriving huge profits from this business.

The aim of this chapter is to explore the extent and nature of migrant smuggling into Libya, and from Libya to Europe.[1] While Libya's role as a migration hub after the fall of the country's long-standing ruler, Muammar Qaddafi, in mid-2011 remains to be seen, it seems clear that migration will remain a key issue in post-Qaddafi Libya and its relationship with Europe. There is thus a need to better understand the nature and evolution of irregular migration and human smuggling through Libya in recent years. The chapter is based on in-depth interviews conducted with 60 migrants of different nationalities who traveled from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya and from there by boat to Europe between the years 2005 and 2011.[2]

The chapter is divided as follows. The first section discusses briefly the emergence of Libya as a major transit country for irregular migration toward the EU. It then provides an account of how irregular migrants travel from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya, and from there to Europe by boat. This is followed by an analysis of various aspects of migrant smuggling, such as the internal organization of smuggling networks, smuggler profiles, as well as fees and methods of payment. The chapter then turns to the role of state officials in the smuggling process and the issue of corruption, as well as the smuggler-migrant relationship. The last sections focus on the effects of the Italian-Libyan cooperation initiated in mid-2009 on irregular migration and migrant smuggling, as well as emerging human smuggling practices in the context (and aftermath) of the Libya uprising in early 2011.

The Emergence of Libya as a Transit Country for Irregular Migration

While Libya has traditionally been a destination country for migrants from other Arab and African countries, irregular migration through and from Libya to Europe is a relatively recent phenomenon, which began around 2000. There was some limited boat migration across the Central Mediterranean throughout the 1990s, but the main country of departure during this period was Tunisia. Migrants traveling along this route came mainly from North African countries, in particular Morocco and Tunisia itself. However, as Tunisian authorities began to clamp down on irregular migration from its shores, the migratory flows moved eastward, with Libya becoming the main country of departure toward Europe (Monzini 2007). The country's geographical features, especially its vast desert borders and long coast, have certainly contributed to its emergence as a key migration hub.

The main "entry gates" into the EU for migrants traveling through Libya have been Southern Italy (mainly Sicily and Lampedusa) and Malta. Indeed, arrivals of seaborne migrants departing from Libya have increased dramatically in both southern Italy and Malta since 2000 onward. In Sicily, the number rose from around 3,000 in 2000 to some 22,000 in 2005, and more than 35,000 in 2008; in Malta from a mere 20 in 2000, to 1,800 in 2005, and almost 3,000 in 2008.[3]

Libya's role with regard to these migratory movements from the African continent to Europe has almost exclusively been one of a country of transit (and destination), and not of origin. Moreover, even though migrants from other North African countries (except Libya) have continued to attempt to reach Europe along this route, in recent years, seaborne migrants departing from Libya have hailed predominantly from sub-Saharan Africa, in particular countries such as Somalia, Eritrea, and Nigeria.[4]

From the perspective of EU countries, a major problem at least prior to mid-2009 was Libya's refusal to cooperate in stemming the flow of irregular migrants across the Mediterranean. Since around 2000 there has been some collaboration between the Italian and Libyan governments in preventing migration, and Italy has also provided Libya with material and technical assistance in this area (European Commission 2004; Frontex 2007; Human Rights Watch 2006). Nevertheless, the Libyan government was generally considered to be turning a blind eye on the departure of irregular migrants from its shores, and according to some observers, has even actively promoted the transport of migrants across the Mediterranean (Human Rights Watch 2009; Fortress Europe 2007). A major turning point, however, came in mid-2009 when the Italian and Libyan governments reached an agreement on cooperation in immigration control, and Italian authorities began returning migrants intercepted on the high seas back to Libya (Human Rights Watch 2009). As a result of this Italian-Libyan collaboration, and the controversial "push-back" policy, irregular migration in the Central Mediterranean was reduced sharply, with a steep decline in arrivals in both southern Italy and Malta from mid-2009 onward.[5]

A further twist to Libya's role as a transit country for irregular migration toward Europe has, however, been added with the popular uprising against the Qaddafi regime that began in early 2011, in the aftermath of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. With the eruption of the Libyan crisis, during which European (and Western) countries generally expressed their support for the anti-Qaddafi rebellion, and even took military action to protect the Libyan population against the regime, the Italian-Libyan cooperation on immigration control was also suspended. This has lead to a renewed increase in boat migration from Libya toward Europe, and arrivals of irregular migrants in both Italy and Malta have climbed to roughly pre-2009 levels.[6] It is still too early to assess the more long-term migratory patterns from (and through) Libya after the fall of the Qaddafi regime in late 2011, but it seems clear that migration remains an issue of major concern in EU-Libyan relations in the post-Qaddafi period.[7]

While irregular boat migration from Libya, at least from the perspective of EU countries, has been perceived as a "security challenge," it has also been an important humanitarian concern. As migrants often travel in unseaworthy and overloaded boats across the Mediterranean, accidents are frequent. According to the Internet blog Fortress Europe, which tracks migrant fatalities in the Mediterranean, at least 6,449 people have died or went missing in the Central Mediterranean alone over the past ten years. Year 2011 is commonly considered to have been the deadliest year so far, with estimates putting the number of deaths in the Sicily Channel to at least 2,000.[8]

Migrant Routes and Travel Modalities

How do irregular migrants travel from sub-Saharan Africa through Libya to Europe, and what is the role of migrant smuggling in this context? In most general terms, the interviews with migrants conducted by this author reveal that migrants undertake their journey in a step-by-step, piecemeal manner, and not at one go. The typical pattern is that migrants travel from their country of origin across the border with a neighboring country, from where they arrange the onward trip to the capital city of that country, and from there to the border with the next country, and so on. The intervals between these different legs—and thus also the total length of the journey—can vary widely from just a few days to several years. It is not uncommon, for example, for migrants to stay and work for extended periods of time in one of the main cities along the way in order to raise money for the onward trip. This is also the case for the transit through Libya: while around half of all migrants interviewed by this author spent only a few days or weeks in Libya before they crossed the Mediterranean by boat, the other half stayed several months or even years in Libya before they decided to cross over to Europe.

Human smuggling—in the sense of assisting migrants to cross state borders in an irregular manner against pay[9]—usually plays a key role, but as will be argued in subsequent sections, the nature of smuggling activities differs considerably between the different parts of migrants' journey from Africa to Europe. In terms of travel modalities, travel on land with different types of vehicles is the most common mode of transport from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya, from where the crossing is made by boat. In the following sections, the two most important—and most difficult—parts of migrants' journey from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya and Europe are discussed: the crossings of the Sahara from Sudan or Niger to Libya, and the journey by boat from Libya to Europe.

Crossing the Sahara from Sudan

Migrants coming from the Horn of Africa—that is, from countries such as Somalia, Eritrea, or Ethiopia—usually enter Libya via Sudan. Khartoum is the principal hub from where the migrants arrange the trip through the Sahara to Libya. The journey across the desert is an extremely arduous one, not only due to the long distances involved but also because of the very harsh weather conditions, with extreme heat during the day and freezing chillness in the night. Moreover, the conditions of the roads are also very uncertain so that it is difficult to predict the length of the journey, which can range anywhere from a few days to several weeks. It is not known how many migrants perish in the Sahara each year, but several migrants interviewed by this author said that some of their cotravelers had died in the desert due to dehydration, hunger, or heatstroke. Many of them considered this to be the most difficult part of their journey to Europe.

The trip from Khartoum across the Sahara to Libya invariably involves some form of migrant smuggling. The typical pattern is as follows: in Khartoum, the migrants look for a "broker," that is, an intermediary who will arrange the trip across the Sahara for them, usually for a fee of around US$500. Once the migrants have paid the money to the broker, they are driven in minibuses to the outskirts of Khartoum, or to the city of Omdurman, which is located just north of Khartoum. The migrants are then kept in safe houses until they embark on the actual journey across the desert. One Somali migrant described this as follows:

> We paid the money to the broker, but you don't yet see the driver. First, they give you a code number. Then they drive you out of Khartoum to a small house, which is north of Khartoum. The migrants are assembled in a hall, and they tell you to keep quiet. There were around 40 or 50 Somalis in this hall. They ask you, what's your name? Are you from the broker of this name? If yes, you tell them the code number…If you forget your code, they might not take you. There are around 10 to 15 brokers who bring people to this hall; it was like a transit hall.[10]

The migrants' stay in these safe houses can vary widely, from just a few hours to several weeks, for example, in case there are not enough migrants to fill up the car. One Somali migrant, for instance, claimed he had to wait two months in such a safe house because there were not enough people traveling at that time.[11]

The most commonly used vehicles to cross the Sahara are open pickup trucks, with two or three trucks usually traveling together.

Around 30 migrants travel in each pickup, which means that the trucks are very crowded. As recounted by an Eritrean migrant who traveled from Khartoum to southern Libya,

> We were more than 30 people in a small car. We even sat on the roof of the car...The car was very crowded, you didn't even have space to move, and we were sitting on top of one another. The road was not very smooth; it was very bumpy and sometimes the soil was very deep.[12]

During the first part of the journey across the Sahara, the migrants are driven by Sudanese drivers. Somewhere in the middle of the desert, most likely at the border with Libya, the migrants are transferred to other cars that are driven by Libyans. Sometimes, the journey is done in three parts, with Chadian drivers taking over from the Sudanese, and then passing the migrants on to the Libyans.[13] There is clear evidence of close collaboration between the Sudanese and Libyan smugglers operating in the Sahara. As highlighted by one Somali migrant who had traveled this route,

> Before you arrive in Libya, in the middle of the desert, the cars stop. The Sudanese drivers have Thuraya satellite phones. They contact the other drivers who are Libyan and who live in Ajdabiya or Al-Kufra. The Sudanese drivers contacted them before and during our journey. In the middle of the desert they join. The Sudanese go back to Khartoum and the Libyans take over.[14]

At the moment when the migrants are handed over from the Sudanese to the Libyan smugglers, they are usually not immediately asked to pay again to continue their trip, although this does happen sometimes. Rather, the migrants are first brought to the Libyan towns of Al-Kufra in southern Libya or Ajdabiya in Northeastern Libya, where they are again kept in safe houses located at the outskirts of these cities. In this case, however, this is practically a form of detention. Most migrants interviewed by this author said that they were locked up and sometimes even physically abused by the Libyans inside these safe houses. While the smugglers running the safe houses would offer the migrants onward transport to Tripoli, the migrants often did not really have a choice: if they refused to pay, the Libyans would threaten the migrants to inform the police, and sometimes even beat or otherwise mistreat them (see also below).[15]

Crossing the Sahara from Niger

While Khartoum is the hub for migrants from the Horn of Africa seeking to cross the Sahara, along the West African route, the Niger city of Agadez is the main staging ground for the trip across the desert. In contrast to the journey across the Sahara from Khartoum, migrants departing from Agadez usually travel in large trucks carrying 100 or even more migrants. These trucks typically transport not only migrants but also animals, such as cows, sheep, and camels, as well as goods. In this respect, there seems to be a significant difference between the journey across the Sahara from Agadez, and the one from Khartoum: unlike the crossing from Khartoum, there does not seem to be a specific smuggling business from Agadez that is dedicated (almost) exclusively to transporting undocumented migrants. Rather, the smuggling of migrants seems to be only one of several—licit or illicit—commercial activities of those organizing transport from Agadez across the Sahara.

Another difference to the crossing from Khartoum is that migrant smuggling activities from Agadez are not undertaken in a clandestine or hidden fashion. While, as argued above, the crossing from Khartoum usually begins at the outskirts of the city or in Omdurman, and the migrants are hidden in safe houses before departure, the trucks transporting migrants from Agadez leave from the main station of the city, where they can be seen by everyone.[16]

The journey through the desert from Agadez seems to be equally if not even more dangerous than the one across the Eastern Sahara to Libya due to the various rebel groups and bandits active in the area. Many of the migrants interviewed claimed that they encountered rebel fighters or robbers while traveling through the Sahara who demanded money from them, and sometimes beat, raped, or even killed some of the migrants. According to practically all migrants who had this experience, the smugglers and the rebels were working together.[17] One Nigerian migrant who traveled by truck from Agadez to Libya gave the following account:

> The drivers and the rebels were working together. The rebels wanted to come and attack us and take money from us. The drivers were talking to the rebels on Thuraya phones; I heard them. I begged the driver and said, please don't let them kill us. I said, I have some money to give you. He said, how much? I said ten dinars; the others would also give five dinars each. So everybody paid the driver.[18]

Crossing the Mediterranean

The smuggling of migrants by boat from Libya across the Mediterranean also follows a relatively clear pattern. As the journey across the Sahara, the trip by boat is arranged through a broker or intermediary who is usually—but not always—of the same nationality as the migrants who are traveling. In Tripoli there seem to be specific meeting points where migrants find their brokers, such as certain cafes, or even the embassy of the respective country. As explained by one Somali migrant,

> In Tripoli, I went straight to the Somali embassy. When you come to the embassy, they will tell you a lot of stories about brokers. Brokers offer you boats, but they all charge the same price...You must know one thing, the embassy is the main place of the brokers. Every broker comes to the embassy.[19]

Once the migrants have paid the money for the trip to the broker, they are given a time and place where they are to be picked up. The migrants are then driven—usually in closed pickup trucks and at night—to the place of departure along the seafront, where they are kept in safe houses until their boat leaves. In this case, as well, their stay in the safe houses can vary widely, from just a few hours to several weeks or even months. One Nigerian migrant, for example, claimed that he had to stay for three months in such a safe house because the sea was too rough to cross.[20]

Until around mid-2009, the two main points of embarkation along the Libyan coast were the Libyan port towns of Zuwarah and Zliten, both of which are located in the larger Tripoli area, although occasionally migrants also left from other towns. As for the types of boats used, the most common boats were grey fiberglass boats, which were most likely fabricated for the sole purpose of transporting migrants. Typically, around 28 migrants traveled in these fiberglass boats. Occasionally, however, other types of boats were used as well, such as small wooden boats, rubber dinghies as well as larger boats carrying 100 or more passengers. For the crossing, the migrants were usually also provided with a compass and sometimes a satellite telephone.

While during the 1990s boats carrying migrants from Tunisia to Europe were usually driven by a "professional" captain, the boats departing from Libya have typically been "pilotless" in that they have been driven by one of the migrants themselves. The disappearance of captains on the boats transporting migrants has most likely been a consequence of stricter controls in European countries under which a captain would have faced prosecution for human smuggling.[21] For this reason the migrants upon arrival will also usually claim that they all drove the boat so as to make it impossible for the police to identify and prosecute the migrant-captain. The migrant-captain does, however, receive a special treatment by the smugglers in that he usually travels for free. In addition, he may also bring along two "assistant captains" to support him (who will also travel for free). In many cases, the migrant-captains indeed seemed to be experienced fishermen or seafarers, and some migrants claimed that the smugglers even tested the captain before the boat departed. However, other migrants interviewed by this author said that their captain actually did not know how to drive a boat and that he had claimed to be experienced only so he could travel for free. [22] One Ivorian migrant recounted his trip by boat as follows:

> When we got into the boat, the Libyan smugglers gave us a compass. They said, this direction is Lampedusa, this is Sicily, this is Malta. But the people to whom they gave the compass never went to school, so they didn't understand. That's why there are so many people dying. Those who drive the boat tell the Libyan smugglers, I know how to handle a boat. If they can go for free, they are prepared to risk people's lives. The one who drove us from Libya, didn't have any idea about how to drive a boat.[23]

MIGRANT SMUGGLING: INTERNAL ORGANIZATION AND SMUGGLERS' PROFILES

As already suggested, migrant smuggling—in the sense of assisting irregular migrants in crossing state borders against pay—plays a key role in migrants' journey from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya and from there to Europe. The question, however, remains how such human smuggling activities are organized, and who the smugglers are. In the literature on irregular migration from Africa toward Europe, somewhat contrasting claims regarding the nature, and in particular the degree of organization and sophistication of human smuggling, can found. David van Moppes, for example, in his analysis of African migration routes to Europe, argues that "the smuggling of migrants is becoming more professional, and that networks operate internationally," although he does not present any significant evidence to support this claim (2006: 5). A somewhat different view has been proposed by Hein de Haas, who focuses mainly on irregular migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and Europe. He suggests that "trafficking is relatively rare, and smugglers are usually not part of international organized crime but locally based *passeurs* operating alone or in small networks" (2008: iv). Similarly, in their discussion of human smuggling between Libya and Lampedusa, Coluccello and Masey argue that migrant smuggling is carried out not by rigid hierarchical organizations, but rather by loose networks with diffuse identities, although they too do not base their claim on any significant research (2007).

What then do the interviews with migrants reveal about the nature of human smuggling into and from Libya? The first observation that can be made is that even though all irregular migrants traveling from sub-Saharan Africa through Libya to Europe are assisted by smugglers at some stage of their journey, one cannot speak of an encompassing smuggling organization or network that stretches from the countries of origin all the way to Libya (and beyond). While smugglers working in one country often have contacts with smugglers in a neighboring country, these cannot really be said to form part of the same organization or even the same network. The clearest evidence of this is that all migrants travelling from sub-Saharan Africa through North Africa to Europe undertake their journey in a step-by-step, piecemeal manner, whereby each leg of the journey is arranged and negotiated separately, and there are often large intervals—sometimes several months or even years—between the different steps of their trip. All inclusive trips from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya (and from there to Europe), which would be organized by one encompassing organization or network, seem to be unknown along this route.

While it is thus more accurate to speak of separate, and largely locally based, smuggling networks, the degree of organization of the smuggling activities along the different stages of migrants' journeys varies significantly. It can be argued that the more difficult a given leg of the trip in terms of physical and other obstacles, the higher the degree of organization of the smuggling network. Another factor is arguably the number of migrants traveling on a given route: the larger the number, the better the organization. Thus, the most sophisticated and most well-organized smuggling networks between sub-Saharan Africa and Europe are clearly those that organize the trip by boat from Libya across the Mediterranean, followed by those transporting migrants across the Sahara.

Given the largely clandestine nature of human smuggling, and that the migrants themselves usually come into contact only with the lowest level of the smuggling network, it is, of course, difficult to say anything certain about their internal structure. Generally speaking, however, at least two levels of the smuggling organization can be distinguished: intermediaries or brokers who establish contact with the migrants, and those running the smuggling network—the smugglers—who usually own the main assets involved, such as safe houses, vehicles, and boats. The migrants themselves often refer to the brokers or intermediaries as "connection men," whereas the smugglers—at least those who transport migrants by boat from Libya to Europe—are sometimes referred to as "pushing men."

Brokers or connection men are often of the same nationality as the migrants themselves, although there are considerable differences between different migrant nationalities in this respect. Somali and Eritrean migrants practically always use brokers of their own nationality, be it for the trip across the Sahara or across the Mediterranean, while for other migrant-sending countries this seems to be less the case. This, as well, seems to be a consequence of sheer numbers, as Somalis and Eritreans are also the most important migrant nationalities traveling along this route.

The smugglers, that is, those who are ultimately in charge of the smuggling operation, invariably are nationals of the country from or into which migrant smuggling takes place. Thus, while the smugglers who control the transport of migrants from Khartoum up to the border with Libya are Sudanese, Libyans operate on the Libyan side of the border. Similarly, those running the boats from Libya to Europe invariably are Libyans. The difference between smugglers, or "pushing men," and brokers was highlighted by one of the Somali migrants interviewed by this author:

> In Libya, it is exactly like in Sudan. The guys who own the boats are Libyans. The Somali brokers, the only thing they do is to take you to the Libyans. The money, you hand it over to the Somali broker, not to the Libyans…The Somali broker will then give it to the Libyans. If you give 1,200 USD to the broker, he will tell you, 200 USD are mine, the rest is for the Libyans.[24]

Another migrant from Nigeria put it this way:

> When I came to Tripoli, I met a Nigerian broker. Through that guy, I got to know the pushing man, the Libyan…In Libya, only Libyans can push, but you cannot talk to them directly. You give the money to the Nigerian, and he will take you to the Libyans. The Nigerian is like an agent to the Libyans.[25]

The moment the migrants pass over from the sphere of the broker to that of the smugglers seems to be when they enter the safe house where migrants are gathered prior to departure. At least as far as the trip by boat across the Mediterranean is concerned, there seems to be a clear division of responsibility. Whereas the brokers are responsible for bringing the migrants to the safe houses, once the migrants enter the safe houses, they are "on Libyan territory," as it was described by a Somali migrant.[26]

What about the social profile of the human smugglers and brokers? As the migrants themselves come into contact mainly with brokers or intermediaries, the social background of the migrant smugglers is more difficult to identify. At least as far as Libyan smugglers are concerned, it seems clear that they are relatively well-connected to the countries' security structures (possibly at the highest levels), and some of them probably are members of these security agencies. Evidence of the connection between migrant smugglers and state officials is presented in the section on corruption.

As for the social profile of the brokers or "connection men," the interviews with migrants provide a somewhat clearer picture. Based on migrants' accounts, at least two types of brokers can be distinguished. One type are brokers who themselves were traveling as irregular migrants and intended to reach Europe, but were "stranded" because they ran out of money. In Libya there seem to be numerous brokers who started doing this job mainly in order to raise money for the trip by boat. Indeed, several migrants interviewed by this author said that they themselves had worked as intermediaries for smugglers to finance their journey by boat to Europe.[27]

On the other hand, there are also brokers in Libya who have been living in the country for a long period of time and who have no intention of traveling to Europe. According to one Somali migrant, who himself worked for such a broker in Tripoli, there were three "big" Somali brokers in Libya who have been living in the country for many years, and who are said to be responsible for a large majority of boats departing from Libya's shores. According to this migrant, these well-established brokers are closely connected to the Somali embassy in Libya. He explained it as follows:

> One of the activities going on inside the Somali embassy in Tripoli is to send boats. The ambassador himself knows the brokers, and they have confidence in him. There are three main Somali brokers in Libya, and they are all supported by the ambassador. I would say they are responsible for around 85 percent of the boats leaving from Libya.

> They have all lived in Libya for 20 years or more. They used to work for Libyan construction companies, but they stopped because they could get more money working as brokers.[28]

The relationship between the migrant smugglers and brokers does, however, not seem to be a firm and exclusive one. One migrant who had some insight into this business argued that brokers organizing the trip by boat from Libya worked for different smugglers.[29] Another female migrant who attempted the crossing several times before she was successful said that while she used the same broker each time, the Libyan smugglers were different.[30] This suggests that smugglers and brokers do not really form an "organization" with a firm internal structure. Rather, given the tenuous nature of their relationship, the concept of a (loose) "network" seems more accurate.

While the smuggling networks operating across the Sahara and the Mediterranean are thus characterized by a certain degree of organization with an internal division of labor, migrant smuggling across the borders further south seems to be considerably less organized. In traveling from Addis Ababa to Khartoum, for example, undocumented migrants often resort to smugglers, but these do not seem to be characterized by the same degree of professionalism and specialization. There is also not a clear division of labor between brokers, smugglers, and drivers, for example, and safe houses are usually not used in these smuggling activities. Somali migrants interviewed by this author spoke of Somali and Ethiopian connection men in Addis Ababa who usually worked together and who sometimes themselves would drive the migrants across the border to Sudan.[31] Even less organized is migrant smuggling between Somalia and Ethiopia, or between Eritrea and Sudan, which seems to be largely carried out by individual *passeurs* who might assist migrants only on an occasional basis, and can thus hardly be considered professional smugglers.

Even though not part of the smuggling networks per se, the immigrant communities in the countries through which the migrants transit are of key importance to their journey toward Europe. Typically, when migrants arrive in a new country or city, they look for their conationals or members of their tribe or (extended) family. In these communities, the migrants usually get help not only with finding accommodation or work but also with organizing their onward journey. Many migrants interviewed by this author said that when they arrived in cities such as Addis Ababa, Khartoum, or Tripoli, they stayed with relatives, friends, or conationals, and often these also helped them arrange the next part of their journey toward Europe.

While the degree of organization and professionalism of the smuggling networks thus varies widely between the different parts of migrants' journey to and through Libya, and one can generally not speak of highly structured and professional forms of organized crime, the transnational or cross-border dimension of human smuggling, as well, seems rather limited. To be sure, the smugglers or brokers usually do have connections to smugglers in other countries. Smugglers in Ethiopia, for instance, have connections to smugglers in Sudan, and Sudanese smugglers have connections to smugglers in Libya, as described above. Indeed, the migrants themselves often use the metaphor of a "chain" to describe the linkages between smugglers in different countries.

However, despite these linkages, it cannot really be said that the smugglers or brokers active in different countries form an integrated and coherent smuggling network. As argued previously, throughout their journey, migrants have to deal separately with smugglers operating along the different legs of their journey. Indeed, there does not seem to be any real incentive for the smugglers in different countries to form a more closely knit network. The very loose connections that exist are to the advantage of the smugglers, and to the disadvantage of the migrants, as the migrants can more easily (and more often) be exploited by the smugglers along the way. This is most clearly manifest in the journey across the Sahara. When the migrants are received by the Libyan smugglers on the Libyan side of the Sahara; the migrants are in a position of extreme vulnerability, and in this situation it is clearly to the smugglers' advantage that they can negotiate the onward journey with the migrants "from scratch." If migrants would be able to buy an entire "package" from Khartoum to Tripoli, for example, it would arguably be more difficult to exploit them along the way. This was illustrated by the following account of an Eritrean migrant who travelled from Khartoum to Libya:

> When the Sudanese transferred us to the Libyans, the Sudanese left. After they left, the Libyans started to ask us for money again. We told them we already paid 300 USD to the Sudanese to take us to Tripoli. The Libyans said, the 300 USD are until this border, not until Tripoli. They asked for 200 USD. We had no choice; those who had money paid the Libyans.[32]

Fees Paid and Methods of Payment

How much do irregular migrants pay for their journey from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya and Europe? The most costly legs of migrants' journey to Europe are clearly the trip by boat from Libya and the crossing of the Sahara, although there are considerable differences between the journey across the Eastern Sahara from Sudan and the one across the Western Sahara from Niger. Fees and methods of payment for these and other parts of migrants' trip from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe are discussed separately below.

From Libya across the Mediterranean

The large majority of migrants interviewed by this author paid between US$900 and US$1,200 for the trip by boat from Libya across the Mediterranean. It seems that in this respect as well there is a difference between Somalis and other nationalities. Practically all Somali migrants interviewed paid US$900 for the boat, whereas most migrants of other nationalities paid more, sometimes up to US$1,500. One Somali migrant argued that because of the large number of Somalis traveling by boat, they were able to get a better price than migrants from other countries.[33]

While the fee for the trip by boat across the Mediterranean has been relatively constant over the years, there have been a few notable exceptions among the migrants interviewed. One Ghanaian migrant, for example, said that he paid only US$150 for the crossing by boat. He said that he begged the Libyan smuggler to take him on the boat, even though he could pay only US$150, and eventually the Libyan considered his request and let him travel.[34] Two Somali migrants claimed that they did not pay anything at all for this trip because friends or others in their group paid for them.[35]

The fee for the trip is invariably paid in cash and in advance, that is, before the migrants are brought to the safe houses at the point of departure. This also means that the migrants have no control over the moment of embarkation. They have to leave whenever the smugglers decide to send the boat. If the migrants refuse to leave, for example, because they consider the sea too rough, their money would be lost.

From Khartoum to Tripoli

The fee for the trip across the Sahara from Khartoum varies according to destination, that is, whether the migrants travel to Al-Kufra in southern Libya, or to Ajadaiya, which is located in northeastern Libya. The cost of the journey to Al-Kufra is usually between US$300 and US$400, whereas the trip to Ajdabiya amounts to between US$500 and US$600. Another factor influencing the price seems to be the number of people traveling in, and the condition of, the car. One Somali migrant who journeyed with only five other migrants in the same car that he claimed was brand new, paid US$600 to Ajdabiya.[36] In order to reach Tripoli, however, the migrants will have to pay for at least one more trip. If they are cheated, that is, dropped off in a town before Tripoli, something that seems to happen quite often, they would have to pay two or even three more times until they reach the Libyan capital. The price for the onward journey from Al-Kufra or Ajdabiya to Tripoli varies considerably, ranging from US$300 up to US$800.

While payment in cash in advance is the rule, the use of money transfer systems is also quite common. Somalis in particular rarely carry large sums of cash on themselves, but rather transfer funds to the smugglers (or brokers) through one of the several (informal) money transfer agencies such as Dahabshiil, Mustaqbal, Qaran, Amal, or Tawakal.

From Agadez to Tripoli

The fee for the journey across the Sahara from Agadez to Libya is generally much lower than for the trip from Khartoum, possibly reflecting the fact that the trucks operating along this route transport not only migrants but also goods and animals, and that many more migrants travel in these lorries than in the pickup trucks crossing the Sahara from Khartoum. There is considerable variation, however. Some migrants interviewed by this author paid a total of around US$50 for transport from Agadez to southern Libya. Others, however, paid considerably more, up to US$200 for this trip. In order to reach Tripoli, migrants would spend another US$100–300 for transport, whereby the journey is usually made step-by-step with stops in different Libyan towns along the way, such as Qatrun or Sabha.

Total Costs of the Journey

The total cost of migrants' journey from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya and from there to Europe varies considerably, with the East African route generally being more costly than the West African one. Most migrants from the Horn of Africa paid a total of US$3,000–5,000, but depending on the difficulties they might have faced on their way, this sum could be considerably higher. The main factors increasing the costs were if the migrants were cheated by the smugglers and thus had to pay twice or even more times for a given leg of the trip, or if they were detained and had to bribe themselves out of prison. One Ethiopian migrant, for example, said he spent as much as US$8,000 for his trip, mainly because he was cheated several times in Libya when trying to cross by boat.[37] Costs along the West African route are generally much lower; migrants usually spent a total of less than US$2,000 from the country of origin to Libya and to Europe.

Corruption and the Role of State Officials in Migrant Smuggling

Perhaps unsurprisingly, corruption is often a core aspect of human smuggling from sub-Saharan Africa via Libya to Europe. It comes in different forms, ranging from the "mere" taking of bribes by border guards who let irregular migrants enter the country, to more active and direct involvement of state officials in human smuggling activities.[38]

Regarding the crossing of the Sahara between Sudan and Libya, many migrants interviewed by this author highlighted the role of Libyan officials in this context. Several migrants said that when they traveled through the Sahara they were stopped by Libyan border patrols who asked them for money and then let them continue. As recounted by one Ethiopian migrant,

> After traveling for seven days from Khartoum to the border we stopped somewhere, and the Libyans appeared. They were driving a land cruiser with a machine gun on top. They were wearing military uniforms and said they were the border patrol. They told us, everyone has to pay US$50, which is what we did. I think they had a deal with the smugglers.[39]

In a similar case experienced by another Ethiopian migrant, the Libya border patrol took some of the women who were traveling with his group, brought them back after several hours, and then let the migrants continue.[40] Most of the migrants interviewed had the impression that there was collusion between Libyan security personnel and the migrant smugglers.

As for the transport of migrants across the Mediterranean by boat, Libyan security officials also play a significant role. Law enforcement agencies in EU countries such as Italy or Malta have long argued that, at the very least, Libyan officials have been turning a blind eye on the smuggling of migrants from the Libyan coast across the Mediterranean. As the points of departure were well known, they have argued, these activities could have easily been stopped if the Libyans only wanted to. Libyan complacency was also confirmed by several migrants interviewed by this author who said that when they departed from Libya, they encountered Libyan naval vessels that let them pass without intervening.[41]

Migrants' accounts, however, suggest that the role of Libyan security services has gone well beyond mere tolerance, and that they have been profiting directly from the smuggling of people from Libya across the Mediterranean. One Somali migrant described his experience when waiting in the safe house as follows:

> In Libya, there is corruption everywhere. The safe house where we were waiting for the boat was owned by a very high military man from the navy. When he came, wearing his uniform, everyone in the safe house greeted him. When we left by boat, we passed a boat of the Libyan navy, but they didn't do anything.[42]

Another migrant argued that the brother of one of the main smugglers in the Libyan port town of Zliten was an admiral in the Libyan navy; he described it as a "family business."[43] A more detailed description of the collaboration between the smugglers and the Libyan navy was provided by one migrant from Chad who had worked for a while for a smuggler in Zliten:

> The Libyans who send boats often have relatives in the navy. They will call these relatives when they want to send a boat with migrants. The relatives will then go and talk to the head of the shift of that night. When they talk, they will arrange something together; the money they ask for usually depends on the size of the boat, not the number of migrants. When they have concluded the deal, the authorities will never come to stop the boat; they will just relax.[44]

The fact that an arrangement between the smugglers and the respective patrol shift was necessary was also pointed out by an Eritrean migrant. He said he had to wait for 26 days in the safe house even though the weather was good, because the smugglers—apparently—had to wait for the right shift to take its turn.[45] According to another migrant, the involvement of the Libyan navy in the transport of migrants across the Mediterranean was particularly pronounced when it came to the very large boats that departed occasionally from Libya's shores. He claimed that these boats were directly run by the Libyan navy, and that Libyan security personnel actually encouraged migrants to travel on these boats.[46]

Experiences of Migrants with Human Smugglers

For most of the migrants interviewed by this author, the journey to Europe was a traumatic experience. Many of them confronted extreme hardship, ranging from thirst and hunger to physical abuse. Crossing the Sahara and the Mediterranean were particularly difficult parts of their trip, where many of the migrants felt they escaped death only narrowly.

Often the treatment of the migrants by the smugglers also directly contributed to their ordeal.[47] The relationship between migrants and smugglers is indeed a somewhat ambiguous or unusual one. One the one hand, the migrants are, of course, "customers" of the smugglers, as they purchase their "services" against pay. On the other hand, the migrants are not like "ordinary" customers; rather their extreme vulnerability—in particular due to their irregular status and the fact that they might have little knowledge of the country through which they are traveling—makes them much easier to abuse and exploit by the smugglers than would be the case for "normal" customers. Most migrants interviewed by this author highlighted that the human smugglers generally showed little or no respect for human life, and that if they could make a profit they would not hesitate to put migrants' lives at risk. They pointed out that the smugglers would often lie about the dangers of the trip across the Sahara or the Mediterranean. They would say, for example, that the journey across the desert would take only a few days, or they would lie about the size and condition of the boat. One Eritrean migrant gave the following account of the moment of embarkation from Libya:

> They drove us in small cars down to the seafront. We were 25 people. When we saw the boat, we almost started crying. It was very small, about 6 meters, and we were 25 people. They had told us that it was going to be a big boat with a powerful motor. We were also told that there will be enough fuel, but we had only 10 canisters of 20 liters. And they didn't give us any food; only some bread and water. But we had no choice, we had already paid the money. We could not go back safely to Tripoli, so we had to take the risk. They also told us that there would be a captain, but they just told us that one of us should drive the boat.[48]

The fact that migrants are treated by the smugglers primarily as commodities was also evidenced in migrants' accounts of having been sold by smugglers to the police (and vice versa), especially in

Libya. One Eritrean migrant described his arrival in southern Libya as follows:

> The smuggler who drove us through the desert brought us to the police [in Ajdabiya]. The police gave him around US$2,000, and took us straight to jail. Then the police told us, everyone has to pay US$1,200. If we didn't pay, they said, we would stay for life. They gave us a phone so we could call our families and tell them to send the money.[49]

Another Eritrean migrant experienced the following when he arrived in Tripoli, after having been transported by smugglers from Al-Kufra:

> After staying for one week in Tripoli, I was arrested. The police put me in a deportation camp in Tripoli for four months, before I was deported back to Al-Kufra. The police in Al-Kufra then sold us to the same smugglers who had brought us to Tripoli; I saw the police taking money from them. The [Libyan] authorities cannot send us back to our country or to Sudan, so what they do is to sell us to the smugglers so they can take us again.[50]

Migrants were cheated most often by the smugglers after crossing the Sahara from Khartoum. The seemingly frequent collusion between smugglers and Libya's security officials along this route has already been described above. Moreover, many migrants interviewed said that they were cheated, sometimes several times, by the Libyan smugglers who were supposed to bring them from Al-Kufra or Ajdabiya to Tripoli. Instead of bringing them directly to Tripoli, the Libyans would rather leave the migrants in other towns along the way, such as Benghazi or Misrata often with another smuggler who would then ask the migrants for more money to continue to Tripoli.[51]

It was also during this part of the journey that mistreatment of the migrants by the smugglers seems to be the most widespread. Practically all migrants who traveled through the Sahara from Khartoum said that the Libyan drivers, in particular, were extremely harsh. They pointed out that the drivers would regularly beat the migrants, sometimes with iron bars. The drivers' lack of any consideration for migrants' lives was highlighted by one Somali migrant who had fallen asleep when his group was taking a short break in the middle of the Sahara. When he woke up, the car had left. He then started walking, and to his incredible luck, he was picked up after three days by another car that was driving through the Sahara.[52] Many migrants also claimed that the Libyans did not provide the migrants with sufficient and proper drinking water when traveling through the Sahara, and that they would, for example, mix the water destined for the migrants with fuel, so they would drink less.

The treatment visited upon the migrants by the smugglers in the Libyan towns of Al-Kufra or Ajdabiya seems to be even worse. As already mentioned above, when the migrants are received by the smugglers on the Libyan side of the Sahara and driven to these towns, they are often locked up and are beaten when they refuse to pay for the onward journey. Rape as well seems to be quite frequent in this situation, although none of the female migrants interviewed by this author had themselves experienced sexual aggression. Most migrants said that the Libyan smugglers were generally worse than the smugglers in any other country, and that they treated African migrants like animals. Many migrants considered places such as Al-Kufra or Ajdabiya the "worst places in the world," and experienced their treatment by the Libyan smugglers as an extreme humiliation. The majority of migrants also viewed Libyan society as a whole as strongly racist and hostile to sub-Saharan Africans.

While cheating and mistreatment of the migrants by the Libyan smugglers was quite common, very few migrants did report certain positive experiences they had in Libya. One female migrant from Eritrea, for example, claimed that she was well-treated by the Libyan smugglers in Al-Kufra who received her group on the Libyan side of the Sahara.[53] Another Ghanaian migrant said that the Libyan smuggler with whom he negotiated the trip by boat let him travel for only US$150, which is far below the usual rate, because he was not able to pay more. The Ghanaian migrant himself considered the Libyan smuggler to be a "good man." [54]

THE ITALIAN-LIBYAN COOPERATION IN IMMIGRATION CONTROL

Wile Libya, as already mentioned, has regularly been accused by European countries of complacency if not direct involvement in the transport of undocumented migrants from its shores, a major policy shift occurred in mid-2009, when Italy and Libya began implementing their aforementioned cooperation agreement on immigration control. This included not only a commitment on the part of Libya to enforce stricter controls along its coast, but also to take back irregular migrants intercepted at sea (the so-called push-back policy). Whereas this policy seems to have been quite effective in reducing the number of irregular migrants arriving in both southern Italy and Malta, the implications on human smuggling practices are more difficult to assess. Nevertheless, based on the interviews conducted with migrants who departed from Libya after mid-2009, as well as some other available information, a few observations can be made.

The first point to note is that the sudden drop in boat migration from Libya toward Europe after May 2009, when the Italian-Libyan collaboration was initiated, suggests that irregular migration (and human smuggling) from Libyan shores is a phenomenon that indeed can be controlled, if there is a (political) will to do so. In the past, the Libyan leadership had usually exculpated itself from being responsible for irregular migration from its territory, arguing that its long coastline was practically impossible to monitor. However, if this had been the case, stricter controls on the Libyan side would have hardly had such an immediate impact on the number of migrants seeking to cross. The almost instant decline in irregular migration after Libya's policy shift can thus also be seen as (further) evidence of Libyan authorities' involvement in the transport of migrants from its shores, as described above.

When it comes to the modalities of human smuggling from Libya, several changes seem to have occurred as a result of stricter enforcement on the Libyan side. First, the points of departure of the boats have shifted further east. Up to mid-2009, the large majority of migrants, as mentioned previously, left from the Libyan towns of Zuwarah and Zliten, both of which are located in the larger Tripoli area. Subsequently, however, many boats left Libya from towns located (much) further East, such as Misrata, Sirte or even Benghazi. Second, there has been a change in the type of boats used. In 2009, the previously predominant fiberglass boats disappeared almost entirely, and the most widely used boats in 2009 and 2010 were large rubber dinghies carrying between 50 and 100 migrants.[55] The shift from fiberglass boats to rubber dinghies has most likely also been a consequence of stricter monitoring on the Libyan side, as rubber dinghies (if they are deflated) are more easy to transport and conceal.

Whereas within Libya itself, the points of embarkation have shifted further east, alternative routes from Libya through other North African countries toward Europe also seem to have emerged as a result of Libya's crackdown on irregular migration. For example, there appears to have been an increase in irregular migration and migrant smuggling from Libya toward Egypt, from where the route to Europe continues to Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey toward Greece. Along this route, as well, migrants smuggling seems to have played a significant role. In late 2010, for example, it was reported that 80 Eritrean migrants who had been diverted from the Libyan route to Europe were held by smugglers on the border between Egypt and Israel, who were asking for US$8,000 for their release.[56]

Apart from these shifts, however, the basic modus operandi of migrant smuggling from Libya to Europe seems to have remained largely similar. Migrants who left Libya by boat in 2010 reported that, as a consequence of stricter monitoring, it was generally very difficult to find boats to make the crossing and that much greater care had to be taken to avoid being arrested. Nevertheless, the ways in which the trip was organized was largely the same as earlier. As during previous years, the trip was arranged through a broker (usually of the same nationality as the migrants), the migrants were kept in safe houses prior to departure, and the price for the crossing was also roughly the same.[57]

The Libyan Uprising of 2011 and Its Aftermath

When the antiregime uprising in Libya began in early 2011, the decline in boat migration from Libya came to a rather abrupt halt, with an equally sharp increase in departures of seaborne migrants toward Europe. To be sure, the main impact of the Libyan crisis of 2011 on migratory patterns in the Central Mediterranean was a large outflow of migrants and refugees from Libya across the borders to neighboring Tunisia and Egypt, but it also led to renewed boat migration from Libya toward southern European countries, which roughly reached pre-2009 levels.[58]

While the volume of irregular boat migration from Libya toward Europe rose substantially, potentially changing migrant smuggling modalities as a result of the upheavals in Libya are again more difficult to identify. What seems clear is that the controls Libya had enforced in 2009 and 2010 were lifted as soon as Western countries expressed their support for the anti-Qaddafi rebellion and began launching air strikes against the Libyan regime. Indeed, in response to Western involvement in the Libyan crisis, Colonel Qaddafi himself declared he would "unleash an unprecedented wave of illegal immigration" toward Europe.[59] Most migrants interviewed by this author who had left Libya during the crisis said that, as soon as Western countries began enforcing the UN no-fly zone over Libya, the Libyan regime ended its cooperation in immigration control, and also released persons previously arrested for human smuggling.[60]

In contrast to previous years, when migrants (largely) left Libya out of their own free will, the upheavals in Libya have added a push factor, driving migrants out of the country. Many of the migrants interviewed who crossed from Libya in 2011 actually had no intention of leaving Libya; they only got on a boat to Europe because they no longer felt safe in the country, and some of them were even threatened and mistreated in Libya.[61] As explained by one Ethiopian migrant who had fled to Malta by boat with his family,

> we had no plans of coming to Europe. I was living in Libya with my family, and we were doing fine. But one day, some Libyans came to the place where we were staying and told us we could no longer stay here. Africans were being attacked all over Libya, and we were being threatened; we had no choice but to take a boat.[62]

Moreover, there is clear evidence that state officials have again—and even more actively and openly than before—been involved in facilitating irregular migration from Libya. Many migrants who left Libya during the uprising said that on their way to the coast they encountered police or military officials who effectively guided them to the point of embarkation. One Ethiopian migrant even reported that his group was kept in a military camp run by the Libyan army before his group boarded the ship to Europe.[63] As migration controls were lifted by the Libyan regime, the practice of hiding migrants in safe houses prior to departure also no longer seemed to be necessary. The type of boats used, as well, has changed once again. Practically all migrants interviewed by this author traveled with relatively large fishing vessels from Libya across the Mediterranean, carrying between 100 and 300 migrants each. This too testifies to the absence of controls on the Libyan side.

Although irregular migration and human smuggling from Libya has resumed since the popular uprising, it is still too early to assess the more long-term migratory trends and human smuggling patterns through and from Libya after the fall of Qaddafi in mid-2011. In 2012 fewer migrants departed from Libyan shores toward Europe than in previous years, but reports suggest that considerable number of irregular migrants are again crossing the country's southern borders with the help of human smugglers.[64] One local observer has suggested that some of the very same smugglers who were operating under the previous regime have again become active (Attir 2012). One of the key challenges of the post-Qaddafi period when it comes to preventing irregular migration and human smuggling is certainly the fact that the new Libyan government still does not control the country's entire territory. Many parts of Libya, and in particular the far south, are under effective control of militias that were formed during the antiregime uprising and are now reluctant to cede power to the new authorities, whereas the country's official law enforcement institutions have been severely weakened during the crisis.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to explore the nature of migrant smuggling through Libya toward Europe using a "bottom-up" approach, that is, focusing primarily on migrants' own account of their journey to Europe. As the analysis above has shown, human smuggling is indeed a key aspect of irregular migration via Libya to Europe, and it is certainly a rather profitable business—the sending of even only a small boat from Libya to Europe, for example, can net a profit of around U$30,000. On the other hand, claims often made regarding its degree of organization, professionalism, and transnational character seem exaggerated. The preceding analysis suggests that, overall, human smuggling along this route is largely a locally based activity carried out by relatively small and loosely structured groups with only limited cross-border connections. One can thus hardly speak, as it is sometimes done, of integrated and highly sophisticated forms of transnational organized crime. Moreover, the article has also highlighted that migrant smuggling is not a static but rather a very dynamic phenomenon, which adapts to changing circumstances, be they physical obstacles or stricter law enforcement.

Another key point revealed by the analysis above is the crucial role played by the state and state corruption in migrant smuggling into and from Libya. Although officially denied, and difficult to investigate in any detail, migrants' accounts of their trip from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya and from there to Europe suggest that the involvement of state officials in the smuggling process has indeed been endemic, not only in the form of mere tolerance but also of more active involvement. Though deplorable, the last point has at least one positive implication. If the role of state officials is indeed crucial to migrant smuggling, it means that human smuggling is sensitive to changing state practices and attitudes, rather than being largely uncontrollable. Clear evidence of this in the Libyan case has been the almost immediate decline in boat migration after the Italian-Libyan cooperation came into effect, and the equally sharp increase in irregular migration and migrant smuggling once this collaboration came to an end.

Of course, stricter enforcement might also come at a cost, not least in terms of migrants' rights, and in Libya under Qaddafi abuses of migrants were certainly widespread. Nevertheless, the Libyan experience indicates that state action can be to some extent at least be effective in preventing irregular migration and human smuggling by sea. Needless to say that this finding is also highly relevant for the post-Qaddafi period, as the country's new leadership has declared its resolve to address the migration issue, hopefully in a manner more humane than the previous regime.

Table 7.1 Annex: Overview of Migrants Interviewed

	Migrants interviewed
Nationalities	
Somalia	25
Eritrea	12
Ethiopia	8
Nigeria	4
Togo	3
Ivory Coast	3
Ghana	2
Cameroon	1
Chad	1
Sudan	1
Gender	
Male	53
Female	7
Age	
>20	2
20–30	43
31–40	8
41–50	6
Years of arrival	
2005	2
2006	6
2007	9
2008	16
2009	14
2010	2
2011	11
Total	60

NOTES

1. Following the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, human (or migrant) smuggling will be defined as "the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a

financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a state party of which the person is not a national" (Article 3 of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime).

2. The interviews were carried out in Malta between December 2009 and July 2011, many of them within the framework of a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) project on human smuggling through and from North Africa, for which the author acted as the country expert for Malta. An overview of the migrants interviewed according to nationality, gender, age, and year of arrival is provided in the annex. The fact that the interviews were carried out in Malta as opposed to, say, Lampedusa, is (largely) irrelevant, as (practically) all migrants crossing the Mediterranean by boat from Libya intend to reach Italy and not Malta (they landed on Malta either because they lost their way or were shipwrecked). In other words, southern Italy and Malta form part of the same route as far as boat migration from Libya to Europe is concerned.
3. While the Italian government does not systematically provide data on irregular migrants arriving by sea, the Maltese National Statistics Office publishes this information on a yearly basis in its *Demographic Review*.
4. In Malta, by far the most important country of origin of undocumented immigrants has been Somalia, followed by Eritrea and Nigeria (National Statistics Office, *Demographic Review*, various years). The Italian government has published figures only for 2008, which suggest a similar composition of the migratory flows from Libya (Ministero dell'Interno 2009).
5. In Italy, around 1,500 irregular migrants arrived by boat in 2010, whereas in Malta, the figure dropped to a mere 28.
6. In 2011, Italy received an estimated 45,000 seaborne migrants from Libya, whereas Malta saw around 1,500 migrants landing on its shores.
7. Even before the fall of the Qaddafi regime, Libya's interim governwment, the so-called National Transitional Council, declared that it would cooperate with European countries in preventing irregular migration from its territory to Europe. See "Libia, intesaItalia-Cnt su rimpatrio immigrati," *Reuters* (Italy), June 17, 2011. In April 2012, the Italian and Libyan governments signed an MoU on cooperation in immigration control (although the text itself has not been made public). See Ministero dell'Interno, "Cancellieri a Tripoli a colloquio con le autorità libiche: siglata un'intesa per il contrasto al traffico di migranti," Press Release, April 3, 2012.
8. See the website of Fortress Europe at http://fortresseurope.blogspot.it (accessed January 22, 2012).
9. See note 1.
10. Author interview with Somali migrant, Malta, December 17, 2009.

11. Author interview with Somali migrant, Malta, December 19, 2009.
12. Author interview with Eritrean migrant, Malta, January 1, 2010.
13. Author interview with Somali migrants, Malta, December 17–18, 2009.
14. Author interview with Somali migrant, Malta, January 4, 2010.
15. Author interview with Somali and Eritrean migrants, Malta, December 17, 2009, January 1, 2010, January 14, 2010, and January 21, 2010.
16. Author interview with Togolese, Cameroonian, Nigerian, and Ivorian migrants, Malta, January 7, 2009–February 1, 2010.
17. Ibid.
18. Author interview with Nigerian migrant, Malta, January 21, 2010.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. The same development has also been observed along other sectors of the EU's southern maritime border, for example, between the West African Coast and the Canary Islands. See Amnesty International (2005: 50).
22. Author interview with Somali, Eritrean, and Ivorian migrants, Malta, December 17, 2009–February 1, 2010.
23. Author interview with Ivorian migrant, Malta, January 19, 2010.
24. Author interview with Somali migrant, Malta, December 17, 2009.
25. Author interview with Nigerian migrant, Malta, January 21, 2010.
26. Author interview with Somali migrant, Malta, December 17, 2009.
27. Author interview with Chadian, Somali, and Ivorian migrants, Malta, December 17, 2009–February 2, 2010.
28. Author interview with Somali migrant, Malta, January 29, 2010.
29. Author interview with Chadian migrant, Malta, February 2,. 2010.
30. Author interview with Eritrean migrant, Malta, February 3, 2010.
31. Author interview with Somali migrants, Malta, January 21,. 2010.
32. Author interview with Eritrean migrant, Malta, January 8, 2010.
33. Author interview with Somali migrant, Malta, January 4, 2010.
34. Author interview with Ghanaian migrant, Malta, January 18, 2010.
35. Author interview with Somali migrants, Malta, December 17, 2009–December 20, 2009.
36. Author interview with Somali migrant, Malta, December 17, 2009.
37. Author interview with Ethiopian migrant, Malta, December 17, 2009.
38. The involvement of Libyan officials in human smuggling activities has also been highlighted by Human Rights Watch (2009).
39. Author interview with Ethiopian migrant, Malta, January 8, 2010.
40. Author interview with Ethiopian migrant, Malta, January 26, 2010.
41. Author interview with Somali and Eritrean migrants, Malta, December 11, 2009, and February 3, 2010.
42. Author interview with Somali migrant, Malta, December 11, 2009.
43. Author interview with Ethiopian migrant, Malta January 26, 2010.
44. Author interview with Chadian migrant, Malta, February 2, 2010.

45. Author interview with Eritrean migrant, Malta, January 18, 2010.
46. Author interview with Eritrean migrant, Malta, January 29, 2010.
47. Abuses of migrants by both state officials and human smugglers in Libya has also been highlighted by Fortress Europe (2007).
48. Author interview with Eritrean migrant, Malta, January 8, 2010.
49. Author interview with Eritrean migrant, Malta, January 5, 2010.
50. Author interview with Eritrean migrant, Malta, January 8, 2010.
51. Author interview with Somali and Eritrean migrants, Malta, December 19, 2009–January 29, 2010.
52. Author interview with Somali migrant, Malta, January 21, 2010.
53. Author interview with Eritrean migrant, Malta, February 3, 2010.
54. Author interview with Ghanaian migrant, Malta, January 18, 2010.
55. Author interview with Somali migrants, Malta, December 18, 2009–January 21, 2010.
56. "80 Eritrean Refugees Seized at the Border between Egypt and Israel," *EveryOne Group,* November 24, 2011.
57. Author interviews with Somali migrants, Malta, June 17, 2011 and July 15, 2011.
58. Almost 400,000 migrants are estimated to have fled into neighboring countries, with Tunisia and Egypt receiving the lion's share. Italy received around 25,000 migrants during the Libyan crisis, whereas the figure in Malta was around 1,500. For an overview, see International Organization for Migration (2011).
59. "Italy Is Rocky Shore for Europe's Boat People," *BBC News*, July 11, 2011.
60. Author interview with Somali and Ethiopian migrants, Malta, July 3, 2011.
61. There have been numerous reports of sub-Saharan African being mistaken for pro-Qaddafi mercenaries and mistreated by rebel forces during the uprising against the regime.
62. Author interview with Ethiopian migrant, Malta, July 5, 2011.
63. Author interview with Ethiopian migrant, Malta, June 20, 2011.
64. "Battles over Libya's Dangerous Migrant Smuggling Routes," *BBC News*, March 23, 2012; "Debates on Migrants Heat Up in Libya," *Aljazeera*, July 22, 2012; "Libya's South: Migrants' Journeys," *Libya Herald*, December 23, 2012.

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CHAPTER 8

Migration into and from Syria and Nontraditional Security Issues in the MENA Region: Transnational Integration, Security, and National Interests

Peter Seeberg

INTRODUCTION

Syria has traditionally belonged to the top ten countries with respect to migration in the Middle East. The country has played a role as a large producer of migrants: the bulk of Syrian migrants were work migrants going to Lebanon, the Gulf states, and Saudi Arabia, Libya, Turkey, and such countries. The internal tragic development in Syria with the civil-war-like confrontation between the regime and a growing opposition since the beginning of 2011 has led to a flow of Syrian refugees leaving for Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. The two largest groups of Syrian migrants have for many years been those in Lebanon and in the Gulf. Syria is also a recipient of large number of migrants and refugees from other Middle Eastern states and is also a transit migration country for migrants from Asia and Africa. Until the start of 2011 the largest group of migrants in Syria was the Iraqi refugees, arriving after the US invasion in March 2003 (Lischer 2008). This has changed now, first of all due to the Syrian crisis[1] following the revolt against the Syrian regime, which furthermore has resulted in a rapidly growing amount of Syrian refugees leaving the country.[2]

The complex migration patterns paint a picture of socially significant population movements, having evolved in the Syrian context over the past decades. The chapter will describe changes in Syrian migratory movements to Lebanon and the Gulf over the past ten years and discuss the effects of the migration phenomenon for the Syrian state from a nontraditional security perspective. It is the idea to analyze how historical, political, and societal changes in the region over time have created new tendencies in Syrian migration dynamics, which have significant political and economic repercussions.[3] The chapter also focuses on to which degree the migration phenomenon can be seen as an expression of transnational integration in the Arab region and also whether this tendency leads to changes in the conditions for citizenship in the relevant countries.

As emphasized by Thomas Faist, transnationalism refers to "sustained cross-border ties, events and processes across the borders of several national states" (2010). In this sense transnationalism differs from internationalism, which is concerned with relations between states and their agents, and also from globalization, taking world-spanning structures as point of departure. Transnational integration thus represents developments, where integration processes are crossing borders, but not generated by states and resulting in harmonization of state practices.[4]

Transnational migration formations challenge national security, as mentioned by Fiona B. Adamson, because they touch upon fundamental notions of the territorial state (2006). In a wider perspective, migration challenges existing national codes of practice concerning citizenship in the sense that long-term migration relations (like, for instance, the more or less permanent presence of Syrian workers in Lebanon) sometimes, but not necessarily, has a tendency to lead to a de facto assimilation. Still, of course, these processes can be interrupted by political developments, where state-to-state relations change due to dramatic incidents, wars, foreign intervention, and so on. The chapter intends to demonstrate that migration processes in the Middle Eastern context to a large extent are subordinated national interests and that the Syrians working in Lebanon and the Gulf (and elsewhere) are seen as a cheap, well-functioning labor force, which in times of crisis—be it economic or political—has been and will be manipulated accordingly.

Theoretically, the chapter, taking Syrian migration as a point of departure, is inspired by the concept of nontraditional security, showing that migration constitutes a phenomenon, which is becoming more and more important, and at the same time constitutes an anarchistic element in the relations between states, which goes beyond traditional foreign policy means and, therefore, might be included in what the so-called Copenhagen school has termed nontraditional security issues (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998). Here migration is to be seen as one of several such "noncontrollable" phenomena in a context where developmental problems, environmental disasters, illegal and irregular migration, rapid urbanization, and problems related to the uncontrolled growth of mega cities represent other possible trends related to nontraditional security.[5] The characteristics of threats like this are that they do not originate from state actors, that they are often transnational, and that they have an unexpected, anarchistic character.[6] States in the Middle East might not consider this type of threats just as important as "normal" security threats attached to state behavior, but they are nonetheless of great and probably growing importance in challenging the weak, authoritarian states in the MENA region.[7]

The discussions within research on international relations on the emergence of a new security environment in the twenty-first century have led to new insights related to the analysis of globalization and security, which underlines that there is no linear pattern in the response by certain states to the imperatives of globalization (Cha 2000: 401). A similar logic can be shown regarding nontraditional security issues, which also tend to complicate the nature of security and, therefore, must be analyzed in their specific context, where all relevant conditions and actors are involved in the analysis and taken into consideration. Some Syrian sources claim that the number of Syrian expatriates around the world count more than 10 million (Waed). Obviously this population abroad constitutes a field, where the regime is not in possession of total control.

An important aspect of the discussion on security has to do with identity. As mentioned by Latha Varadarajan, the "constructivist turn has been largely responsible for opening up of analytical space by focusing on questions of identity, such as what national security means, how those meanings have come about, the nature of the subject (the nation-state) that needs to be secured and the kind of threats it needs securing from" (2004: 320). The important point here, however, is that national security always is historically constituted and is dependent on given local, regional, and international circumstances and conditions. The chapter claims that only by focusing closely on the shifting historical conditions determining national security interests can the impact and significance of phenomena like migration be sufficiently analyzed and understood.[8]

SYRIAN MIGRATION TO LEBANON AND THE GULF

According to the World Bank the number of emigrants and immigrants in the Middle East in 2010 were 18.1 million and 12.0, respectively. The World Bank estimates, that Syria in 2010 had a stock of emigrants abroad numbering 944,600 and that the number of immigrants in Syria was 2.205.800, or almost one-tenth of the population. It is estimated that Syria in 2010 received an equivalent of more than 1.4 billion US$ in remittances, obviously a valuable asset for the regime (Ratha, Mohapatra, and Silwal 2011). The emigration is welcomed by the regime, since an excess labor force that leaves the country, of course, means less public expenses.

Syria has experienced an extreme population growth, according to the official national population census and recent official estimates: 1970: 6,304,685, 1981: 9,052,628, 1994: 13,782,315, 2004: 17,90,844, 2009: 23,027,000, 2011: 24,504,000, respectively (Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005; MENA 2013). Added to that there were 486,946 Palestinian refugees in Syria as of December 31, 2011 (UNRWA 2013). The dramatic demographic development of the Syrian population is, of course, part of the reason why Syria has obvious advantages in getting rid of its surplus labor force. According to official Syrian sources, Syrian migrants abroad are to be counted by the millions: 800,000 in Lebanon, 500,000 in Kuwait, 700,000 in Saudi Arabia, and 150,000 in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[9] These figures are much larger than the estimates by the World Bank.

Syrian Workers in Lebanon and the Syrian-Lebanese Contradictions

It is a well-known fact that since the end of the Lebanese Civil War, a large number of Syrians have worked in Lebanon in connection with the reconstruction activities in Beirut and elsewhere in the devastated country. The narratives attached to the Syrian migrants in Lebanon have changed over time. According to Chalcraft, "positive constructions of Syrian migrant labour before the civil war gave way to negativity and controversy in a context of economic crisis and Syrian control…Syrian workers started to be seen as a threat to Lebanese sovereignty, polity, economy and society" (2006: 1). This might be right, but it seems to represent something of a simplification. It was and is a rather complex phenomenon with both political and every-day-life discursive connotations.

My fieldwork in Syria and Lebanon in the late 1990s left the impression that the Syrian workers in Lebanon, broadly speaking, were looked at with some skepticism by the Lebanese, but that they were considered a necessary evil, first of all because they took care of the so-called 3D (dirty, dangerous, demanding) jobs—often the jobs the Lebanese did not want to do themselves (Seeberg 2000). The passive acceptance of the Syrian political dominance in Lebanon and a rather hostile, often discriminatory, public discourse about the unskilled Syrian workers were mixed together in a general negative image of Syria, which, for obvious reasons, were left unspoken.

Seen from the Syrian side, Lebanon served as an important outlet for surplus Syrian labor, as mentioned by Mona Yacoubian, "with an estimated 300,000 permanent Syrian workers in Lebanon. The figure rises to one million when including seasonal laborers who come to Lebanon to work on construction projects and in the agricultural sector" (2006). An important aspect of the presence of Syrian workers was (and is) a significant amount of remittances, which the migrants brought home with them after the work period or send home to relatives. Obviously, even small transfers would—by the sheer number of migrants—sum up to rather large figures, which represent a valuable contribution to the Syrian national economy. Some sectors of Syria were dependent on remittances from Syrian workers in Lebanon, as mentioned by Bassel Salloukh (2005: 19).

Following the Civil War in 1975–1990, Syrian women worked only rarely as domestic workers in Lebanese homes, since these positions were overtaken by women from Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Ethiopia (Jureidini 2009) (see also Sater, chapter 6, this volume). A number of Syrians have over time been naturalized as citizens in Lebanon (Hourani and Sensenig-Dabbous 2011). Apparently, they represent very different groups of people, ranging from Syriac Orthodox, Assyrians, Kurds, and traditional Sunni-Muslim Syrians. A large segment was formed by Beduin nomad tribes who—before the establishment of the modern states—used to bring their herds from different areas in Syria, Turkey, or Israel to graze in the fertile Bekaa Valley. According to Hourani and Sensenig-Dabbous, these Beduins settled permanently in Lebanon during the Civil War and bought land from Christians, who had fled the country. The Beduins then built houses on the newly bought land and settled down for good.

Shortly after the end of the Civil War in 1990 it was essential for Syria to dominate the Lebanese political sphere in order to secure control and legitimacy for supporting Syrian interests in Lebanon. The Syrians orchestrated the first parliamentary election and it was implicitly accepted by Israel, the European powers, and the United States that the Syrians established a hegemonic leadership maintaining stability and security (Rabil 2003, 2006). The fear of Lebanon returning to war and chaos made for a long period up for ideal democratic considerations, and the Syrians took advantage of that by Syrian interference in all important aspects of political life in the tormented country.

The Syrian interference was manifest in many areas, for example, in placing political pressure in connection with appointing new political leaders in Lebanon, foreign policy issues, the role of Hezbollah in relation to Israel.[10] Furthermore the Syrian influence was reflected in political practices in connection with the elections in Lebanon, where the naturalized Syrians actually tipped the demographic balance in some areas and thereby affected the outcome of the elections (Hourani and Sensenig-Dabbous 2011). The negativity and controversy were related to Syria de facto governing Lebanon that primarily was based on the influence from the Ba'ath elite in Syria, the 12,000 Syrian troops, and the pervasive Syrian intelligence network, which played an active role internally in Lebanon.

Contrary to that, the unskilled Syrians workers were not considered a problem by the Lebanese. For example, the "Green Guys," as the Syrian workers dressed in the Solidere-owned Sukleen Company's green waterproofs were called in the arrogant Lebanese jargon, were not feared but accepted. The Syrians had a low status in the ethnic-religious hierarchy of immigrants, only the Asian workers (from Thailand, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Pakistan, and India) were even lower paid. In the long, relatively peaceful period from 1990 to 2005, when Lebanon, and particularly Beirut, underwent dramatic reconstruction, the Syrian work force was not explicitly associated with the dominant Syrian regime.

They were exposed to a liberalist labor market characterized by the absence of control of the working environment, low wages, and long workdays, but accepted this in a few months in order to earn what might be the equivalent of the annual earnings in Syria. Some Lebanese companies did not officially use poorly paid foreign labor, but it was easy to hide this in the uncontrolled Lebanese labor market. However, the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri on February 14, 2005, changed these conditions almost immediately, because the Syrian laborers in Lebanon became scapegoats for the tragic incident. Many Lebanese, being aware of the fact that Hariri was unpopular in Damascus, believed that the Syrian regime was directly responsible for the assassination.[11] The frustration was deepened by the persistent rumors in Lebanon, that despite the withdrawal of the Syrian military in the spring of 2005, the Syrian intelligence network prevailed and still played a political role in Lebanese internal affairs.

The post-Hariri reality in Lebanon produced a situation, where the Syrian workers were persecuted and in some cases exposed to lynching by the Lebanese. After the killing of Hariri the presence of Syrian workers was a major grievance, as described by John Chalcraft: "There were even a number of attacks on these workers during the "Independence Uprising"...By May, it was reported that Suq al-Sabra in south Beirut—also known as Suq al-Hamidiyya...because of the numerous Syrians there—was virtually deserted" (Chalcraft 2005: 28). Fabrice Balanche mentions that between February 27 and March 23, 2005, 31 incidents were reported, where the homes of Syrians workers were set on fire (2007).

According to Chalcraft, the Syrians headed back to Lebanon after the turmoil related to the murder of Hariri and the Syrian troop withdrawal of April 2005. This is also mentioned by Philippe Fargues: "it is believed that they returned en masse to Syria. Today, however, most are believed to be back in Lebanon" (2009b: 553). To which degree this is the case is very difficult to estimate, since a large part of the Syrian migration to Lebanon is temporary and takes place "by chance," organized by the Syrian workers themselves. According to official Syrian statistics, the number of Syrian workers in Lebanon counted more than 800,000 in 2010. The process was and is supported by a Lebanese government-run agency, which, based on talks with the Syrian side, takes part in organizing the migration process (Wahbe 2008).

The migration has, of course, been affected by the development of the relations between Syria and Lebanon since the war in the summer of 2006 and also by the development related to discussions in the UN about the situation in Lebanon. The Syrian state was put under pressure by a French-American alliance in the UN, which on September 2, 2004, resulted in the approval of Security Council Resolution 1559, insisting on the "withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon."[12] The Syrians did not immediately bring home all troops; for them the situation was part of a complex tactical maneuvering, where they secured their influence by prolonging the term for Lebanese president Emile Lahoud and demonstrated that they partly took the UN decision seriously by pulling out a small number of troops and moving some of the rest to the eastern part of the Bekaa Valley (Nizameddin 2006: 96). The pressure, however, grew stronger after the assassination of Hariri, and Syria pulled out the last of its troops by April 26, 2005 (*Middle East and North Africa 2011* 2010).[13]

Syria has since then attempted to renew its influence in Lebanon—first of all in the foreign political field. This has been done via a permanent close relation with the Hezbollah, which since 2006, despite a certain lack of popularity among the Christian and Sunni-Moslem population, still is an extremely strong organization. The Hezbollah is able, partly because of its strong backing from Iran and Syria, to establish what I elsewhere have termed a "dual power" situation in Lebanon (Seeberg 2009; Cordesman 2006). The Iranian influence can be seen as a double-edged sword for Syria, since on one side the Iranian ally in principle gives Syria strength.[14] On the other side, close relations with Iran can also be a problem for Syria, if in a future situation it might want to deal with more moderate actors in the Middle East, like Turkey or Saudi Arabia. Overall Syria for many years has maintained an image of itself as being one of the radical states in the MENA region and a part of the "axis of resistance" against Israel, and this picture did in principle not change with the civil war-like reality of 2011–2012.

As for the legal relations between the two neighbors, Syria and Lebanon, a landmark agreement was reached in mid-July 2008, when it was announced that they were going to establish normal diplomatic relations with each other, open embassies, and so on. Syria formally recognized Lebanon's independence on October 13, 2008, and opened its first embassy in Beirut in December the same year and upheld its former dominance via the usual channels, that is, by influencing the appointments of the Lebanese leaders, as described in the section on Syria in *The Middle East and North Africa 2011*:

> Before the diplomatic exchange took place, Syria ensured that the Lebanese domestic balance of power had been, if not directly to its own advantage, then at least conducive to its own interests. The election of President Suleiman, probably Syria's favourite candidate for the job, and Gen. Michel Aoun's alliance with Hezbollah, brought relief to Syria. (Ibid.)

As mentioned earlier, the official Syrian statistics estimated the number of Syrian migrants in Lebanon in 2010 to 800,000.[15] It is not precisely defined which groups are ex- or included. They have an advantage compared to the other foreign immigrants in the sense that they can be more flexible than the others, for whom going home is difficult and costly. And gradually the negative attitudes from the Lebanese have changed. The development of the economic relations between Syria and Lebanon are also important, not the least for the Syrian state, because the migrant workers represent an economic asset. The migrants bring home an income, which they have earned in Lebanon, and some (who stay in longer periods in Lebanon) send home remittances. The saved expenses for the excess labor in Syria are also a significant element in the complex relation and altogether Syrian migration to Lebanon contributes substantially to the (weak) Syrian economy.

Summing up the overall picture is that migration in the relation between Lebanon and Syria cannot be considered an expression of transnational integration. There is very little evidence of improved cross-border ties as a result of many years of Syrian migration to Lebanon. The important point in relation to this chapter, however, is that the complex development of the security situation in the relations between the two countries is reflected in the migration phenomenon. In this perspective migration can be seen as an important nontraditional security issue, which is affected by the local and regional political development over time.

The Syrian migration to Lebanon is extremely complex and differentiated. It covers a wide field from seasonal employment to situations, where Syrian workers succeed in becoming a Lebanese citizen. From time to time a number of non-Lebanese have applied for citizenship and obtained it, thereby ending de facto assimilation. A situation like that is hardly in the interest of Syria, and this obvious conflict of interest underlines the lack of possibility of controlling the phenomenon.

Migration is in this perspective a dependent variable, which fluctuates according to political conditions. It is subordinated the handling of national interests on behalf of Syria, and establishes a paradoxical, antagonistic relation between Syria and Lebanon, where on one side Syria is dependent on the income from the migrants working in the (richer) neighboring state, but on the other side is politically dominant.

The dominance was in itself exposed to shifting historical conditions with 2005 as a kind of turning point in the sense that before 2005 Syria was more or less dictating what happened at the political level in Lebanon. After 2005 the relation changed and became more indirect—Syria was now making its influence count through the Syria-Hezbollah strategic alliance and through the Syria-Hezbollah-Iran axis. The in the introduction mentioned anarchistic, uncontrolled character of the migration phenomenon does certainly apply to the Syrian work migration in Lebanon. The migration in this context is highly dependent on the historical and political developments and in this sense subordinated Syrian foreign policy and security interests.

The Gulf and the Significance of Syrian Migration

The "classical" article on labor migration in the Arab world by Fred Halliday distinguishes between four different types of migration: (1) migration within the states of the region; (2) migration from the Arab world to countries outside the region; (3) migration from one Arab country to another; and (4) migration from outside the Arab world to the Arab states (1984). The migration to the Gulf is represented both in type 3 and 4, and as for the recent ten-year period, type 4 outnumber type 3. But still the Arab migration to the Gulf is significant. The attraction and main pull factor has to do with the relatively high wage level in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) area. Onn Winckler analyzed the Syrian migration to the Gulf states in the late 1990s and found that on average the salaries offered to industrial workers in the Gulf States exceeded wages in Syria by 700 percent (1997: 108).

According to Winckler the Syrian migration to the Gulf in 1970 was larger than the migration to Lebanon, 58.821 workers compared to 33.800. The number of Syrians in the Gulf increased during the 1970s and the 1980s, but in 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, 110,000 Syrians left Kuwait and returned home. Many of them, however, returned to Kuwait again after the end of the war in 1991. Nevertheless the war probably can be seen as something of a turning point in the sense that the beginning of the 1990s was the time when a rapid increase in Asian migration to the Gulf took place. The migration to the Gulf has been a cause of concern for the Syrian state, because it has had a tendency of creating a shortage of specific categories of professional workers in Syria, the so-called brain drain. At the same time the Syrian state has been interested in maintaining the obvious economic advantages related to the huge amounts of remittances from the Gulf to Syria.

Many Syrians have spent long periods as guest workers in the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. It is estimated that around 1 million Syrians are living and working in this wealthy, rentier state region (Braine 2010). According to Maya Braine in recent years two groups of Syrian workers in the Gulf states have been represented. The first group is rather well-off, skilled labor, living there with their families. They have been there for decades, are doing well, and will probably stay there. They still send home remittances, but do not spend much time in Syria except for short visits and holidays. The second group of workers has arrived more recently and is typically younger. They are often single, young men, and if they are married they travel to the Gulf without their wives. The migration period is, as is the case for the migrants in Lebanon, rather short, and they are there with the purpose of saving up money to buy a home, get married, or make possible private investments in small-scale businesses.

Also, Martin Baldwin-Edwards demonstrates that the migration to the GCC states has a long history, which goes back to the times before the oil boom in the region. There was a small, local migration attached to pearl diving and fishing, but the rapid development in the migration processes came after the so-called oil-crisis in the beginning of the 1970s. By 1972, according to Baldwin-Edwards, there were about 800,000 migrant workers in the Arab OPEC countries, but only three years later, in 1975, 3.5 million foreign workers lived there, constituting 40 percent of the total population (Baldwin-Edwards 2005).

The labor market in the Gulf has a special character in the sense that one of the expressions of the closed character of the region is the system of *kafala*, contracts, where the individual migrant must find a sponsor in order to be able to enter the specific country. It might seem that in recent years some of the Gulf states have begun to abandon the *kafala* system—this is at least the official version of the story. The question is, however, to which degree this is the case in reality. The system has a tendency to produce mechanisms to exploit the system by denying the migrants proper wages and conditions, retaining passports, or threatening to report them to the police (Castles and Miller 2009).

From the start the Syrian migrants were one of the larger groups, even though they were outnumbered by the migrants from India, Pakistan, Egypt, or Yemen. According to official Syrian statistics, the number of Syrian migrants in the Gulf states in 2010 counted more than a million.[16] The largest recipient was Saudi Arabia, which attracted more than 700,000 Syrian migrant workers, followed by Kuwait (500,000) and UAE (150,000). The majority of Syrian migrants in the Gulf perform low-skilled job functions; of course, some of the Syrians are employed in well-paid jobs, working as engineers, doctors, teachers, and businessmen.

The Gulf states are attractive for the Syrian migrants in the sense that the wages there are rather high. The expenses in connection with going there are, of course, much higher than going to Lebanon, and the costs of living are also higher. The labor market in the Gulf is very tough and the Syrian migrants have to compete with large amounts of migrants from Asia, especially from the Philippines, Pakistan, and India. Together with them (and the Egyptian migrants) the Syrians constitute the lowest ranks of the migrant's hierarchy. It seems that the Syrians on average are better paid than the Asian workers, but still belong to the lowest ranks compared to migrants from other parts of the world, with Turkey in a middle position and Europeans and Americans at the top level, under all circumstances part of what, referring to Arjun Appadurai, can be spoken of as *ethnoscapes*, "persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guests workers and other moving groups and persons who constitute an essential feature of the world" (1990: 297).

Sulayman Khalaf and Saad Alkobaisi analyze different cases of migrants in a Gulf context, taking a group of Syrian migrants from a rural community in the northeast of Syria as one of their case studies (1999). They are skilled laborers who plan to stay for long periods in the Gulf and deliberately lay plans for bringing relatives to the Gulf and arrange for them to become employed within the same work field as themselves. The point is that migrants are not to be considered as mere victims of socioeconomical or structural developments, but as persons making rational decisions, strategic decisions on behalf of the specific family member, and/or the family as a whole.

For the specific group of Syrian migrants in the case analyzed by Khalaf and Alkobaisi it seems that they rely on their work skills in order to obtain possibilities for permanent work positions and for bringing family members to the Gulf. The migrants are in a relatively privileged position, a position that not necessarily is typical for all Syrians, but on average is more common for Syrians than for Asian migrants in the Gulf. The problem for the Syrians in the fight about getting employed is the fact that they often, as mentioned, on average have been used to higher wages than what it might be possible for the Gulf employers to negotiate with the Asian workers.

The gradual shift from Arab to Asia regarding the countries of origin has simply to do with traditional labor market mechanisms. There is a tendency to see if it is possible for the specific migrant-receiving state and its labor market to seek replacement of any labor force if a cheaper labor force with similar qualifications is provided. But there is certainly also political dimensions attached to the whole issue. Political issues also play a role, as mentioned by Tabutin et al.: "Among the other factors that have helped to stimulate immigration by Asian workers are their more 'controllable' behaviour—they are less politicized and less inclined to protest than Arab populations—and their shorter stays" (Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005: 577). The reverse aspect of this is naturally important as well. "Politicized" migrants, who have left their country of origin—*in casu* Syria—will in the nature of the case cause less trouble for the Syrian regime, while they are abroad.

The Syrian migration to the Gulf is for several reasons very important for Syria, not the least for economic reasons. It is difficult to estimate the exact number of workers, and the difference between the official Syrian numbers and estimates from, for instance, the World Bank is large (Baker 2010). The Syrian government estimates the volume of remittances from expatriate Syrians to about 2 billion dollars in 2007, while a report by the World Bank noted that the transfers did not exceed 850 million dollars for the same year. The transfer of parts of the earnings from Syrian nationals in the Gulf makes it possible for Syria to improve a deficit in the balance of payments and thereby finance a necessary import of foreign technology. Probably the remittances from the Gulf (and also from Lebanon) have functioned as a pretext for inaction in the sense that they have enabled the regime to postpone liberalization measures with their well-known negative effects on the regime's social welfare commitments. The wealth originating from the remittances functions thereby like the income from oil in the rentier economies of the Middle East, but, of course, on a different, lower level.

As such it is important for the political situation internally in Syria, where less pressure is put on the government from the young, often unemployed Syrians. The Syrian regime is, as described by Søren Schmidt, built on a combination of repression and "a precarious legitimacy based on economic subsidies to peasants, state employees and the general public, as well as on handouts to businessmen closely connected to the regime" (Schmidt 2006: 93; Hinnebusch 2008; Hinnebusch and Schmidt 2009). Syria's public sector is characterized by corruption, bureaucracy, and inefficiency, and the Syrian state has in many ways a problematic reputation for being a radical, "rogue" state.[17] This is viewed with some skepticism by the conservative states in the Gulf and has on some occasions resulted in reprisals for the Syrian migrants living and working in the Gulf states.

There is, therefore, a discrepancy between the Syrian foreign policy interests and the interests of the Syrian workers in the Gulf, who do not share the views of the Ba'ath regime in Damascus. As with the case of the Syrian migration to Lebanon the migration to the Gulf cannot be seen as an expression of regional integration, but to some degree rather the opposite. The point is underlined in connection with larger regional conflicts, for instance, when in 1990 the Kuwait war resulted in the expulsion of large numbers of migrants from the Gulf states, some of which from Syria. The Syrian state is economically dependent on the remittances from the Syrian migrants, but can hardly be said to pursue a policy, which represents efforts in support of the interests of the migrants.

The labor market in the Gulf is characterized by being regulated both by local law and practices related to visa issues. But added to that, as mentioned, the *kafala* system works as a very efficient, but not officially controlled mechanism. The overall conditions might be subject to planning, as when, according to the *Middle East and North Africa 2011*, Saudi Arabia decides to insist on a specific distribution of labor, so that expatriates (in 2007) "were mostly employed in private companies, while jobs in the civil service, autonomous government institutions and parastatal organizations were reserved exclusively for Saudi nationals" (2010: 1008). The same source informs that non-nationals comprised 88 percent of the 5.36 million total workforce in the private sector and that the Saudi state has tried, with limited success, to limit the share of foreign workers. In the long run, however, there is a tendency to enforcing the Saudiization policy.

Summing up the combination of normal measures like the possibility of regulating the number of foreigners through the visas and the general immigration policy (and the Saudiization policy) is an efficient tool. The system with the local *kafeel*, who in the end is responsible for the contract negotiations, adds another anarchistic element to the overall picture. It is at the same time a phenomenon that can have problematic aspects, as Anh N. Longva summarizes in the analysis of the *kafala* in the Gulf: "sponsorship severely circumscribes some of the most fundamental freedoms of migrant workers and exploits their dependency and vulnerability. The migrants structural dependence explains their readiness to comply with the sponsor-employer's dictates" (1999: 22).

From the Syrian side these measures are potentially highly problematic. A state like Syria is overdependent on external resources, of which the remittances phenomenon is an important example. For the Syrian state migration to the Gulf with its dependency both on the Gulf states and the local *kafeels* becomes a non traditional security issue, which constitutes an irregular, unstable, and potentially devastating factor for the Syrian economic balance vis-à-vis its trading partners. The Syrian migration to the Gulf does not lead to transnational integration.[18]

The conclusion seems to be that political contradictions between the conservative Gulf and radical Syria lead to self-protection on behalf of the Gulf states in the sense that they gradually replace Syrian (and other Arab) workers with an Asian workforce, which accepts lower salaries and creates less trouble. Security measures and national interests are the main determinants for the relations between Syria and the Gulf states, when dealing with the issue of migration. The interests are double sided: as emphasized by Castles and Miller, migrants "have often been used by their host countries or countries of origin to further political agendas" (2009: 164). The Syrian regime might seem extremely efficient in its repression of its population, but, as pointed out by Andrea Teti and Gennaro Gervasio, the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East are behind the masks characterized by a certain frailty, just as we saw it in Eastern Europe in connection with the fall of the Berlin Wall and as it can be seen in 2011 with the Arab uprisings (Teti and Gervasio 2011: 321).

Refugees and Security in Syria

As pointed out in the introduction of this chapter Syria has until recently been one of the largest recipients of migrants in the Middle East. Since the largest group of migrants arriving in Syria is refugees, it is first of all relevant to draw attention to the forced migration category, but Syria also receives work migrants from other Middle Eastern states and functions as a transit migration country for migrants from Asia and Africa heading for Europe. Syria was by far the country receiving the largest amount of refugees from post-2003 Iraq and for a long period it seemed as if more than a million Iraqis would be a long-term reality, mainly living in the suburban big cities of Syria. More than 2 million Iraqis left Iraq as refugees and looked for shelter outside the Iraqi borders, primarily in Syria and Jordan (Fagen 2009).

The actual number of Iraqi refugees was disputed upon, and estimates fluctuated between 1.6 million and 500.000, which, of course, is an absurd difference. It was claimed that the bulk of the Iraqis in Syria were concentrated in neighborhoods in greater Damascus (Mokbel 2007; Fagen 2009; Crisp, Jane, and Riera 2009). This information, however, only added to the fact that the number of refugees was disputed, because, as polemically put by Fargues,

> Do the math, 80 percent of 1,5 million, i.e. 1.2 million Iraqi refugees would live in the Damascus area and bring its 2.5 million population to 3.7 million; in other terms one out of every three persons a visitor would meet in the streets of the capital city of Syria today would be an Iraqi refugee. This seems a very unlikely situation. (2009b: 563)

For the Iraqis in Syria the Arab revolts after 2011 meant a worsening of the living conditions and during 2011–2012 a steady stream of Iraqis left Syria and went back to often highly problematic conditions in their home country. Tightening of laws concerning visas from 2007 and onward transformed hundreds of thousands admitted to Syria as "guests" into irregular migrants, without their status as refugees being recognized (ibid.). However, the tendency of having a larger amount of irregular migrants compared to the amount of refugees in a regular situation was already a reality early in the 1970.

The tightening of the border in 2007 from the Syrian side was a result of growing economic and social stresses. Initially, as mentioned by Sarah K. Lischer, Syria opened its borders to the Iraqis and allowed them access to state-provided social programs, but as a result of the problems caused, the Syrian government began to issue one-month visas and in other ways to limit the intake of Iraqis. Partly it was because of the financial burden, as explained by Lischer: "The crippling costs inflicted by the refugee crisis have undermined the Syrian economy, which, in turn, has heightened local resentment of Iraqis and dissatisfaction with the government" (2008).

The MENA region has been exposed to several instances where major refugee groups have arrived in a neighboring country. The Afghan refugees leaving their home country after the Sovjet "Christmas" invasion in 1979 is an example, the expulsion of Palestinians from Kuwait in 1990 is another, in both cases with significant consequences for the receiving countries (Iran and Jordan, respectively). The refugees are being taken advantage of in the sense that the receiving country uses their presence politically in "campaigning" for international donors to (help) cover the often large expenses. But added to that it is being exposed that there is a potentially problematic situation, where an ethnic-religious composition might be affected or where radical groups might use the transfer of large amounts of refugees to hide in the chaos and maybe even establish a power base in new surroundings.

An important issue in relation to the refugees is the question of numbers. The above-mentioned extreme difference between the estimates in itself becomes a (politically) important issue. The reports from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have partly been built on figures from the Syrian government and it is almost impossible to tell to which degree they are reliable. According to the UNHCR Global Report 2010 the number of Iraqi refugees in Syria in 2010 were around 1 million (UNHCR 2011: 189). The report showed that 135,200 of them were "assisted by UNHCR," 47 percent were female and 37 percent were under 18 years old. The number or refugees was disputed. Patricia Weiss Fagen claimed that the Iraqis in Syria counted 1.5–1.6 million, representing up to 10 percent of Syria's population. Fargues argued that the number should be put lower (2009b). The UNHCR, like Fargues, indicated that in 2011 the number was going down, estimating that the number of refugees assisted by UNHCR was lower by the end of 2011 than early in 2011[19]—and there is no doubt that the number of Iraqi refugees in Syria fell dramatically during 2012.

The refugees created a dilemma for the Syrian government. On the one hand, the tradition of Arab brotherhood resulted in a moral imperative of accepting the Iraqis as guests, since they were subject to chaotic and dangerous conditions in Iraq—conditions that furthermore were imposed on Iraq by the United States and its Western allies. On the other hand, the Syrian regime did not want to end up in a situation where the refugees became a permanent part of the population (Fagen 2009). This was partly due to the fear of a possible destabilization potential of the refugees, related to the rise of politicized religiosity in post-Saddam Iraq (Hazran 2010). The Iraqi refugees were as such considered a (potential) security risk by the regime in Damascus and it was completely impossible to influence the ethnic-religious or social composition of the refugee population.

Idean Salehyan has discussed consequences of large refugee flows and demonstrates, mentioning the Iraqis in Syria as one of the examples, that they often, beyond the strains on national economies and social services, lead to internal instability and increase the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes (Salehyan 2008; Piazza 2008). Salehyan points out that there "is a growing body of literature on the security implications of migration in general and refugee migration in particular…Recent quantitative work confirms the intuition that political violence and persecution are significant determinants of flight…, refugees are not simply the unfortunate by products of war, but may serve as catalysts for conflict" (2008: 787). Furthermore, it can be shown that for some of the refugees, survival strategies include prostitution and criminality (Benjamin 2008).

In a society like the Syrian, which is characterized by ethnic diversity and potential strife along ethnic and/or religious lines, a huge input of refugees can easily create tension.[20] Already Syria has experienced very serious conflicts related to religious opposition, infamously well known in connection with the massacre in Hama in 1982. Added to the political-religious contradictions, Syria has strong tribal structures (Chatty 2010), which also influences political and social life, and contributes to population movements internally. The complex structures are unfolding in a country where extreme urbanization and internal migration are taking place, as demonstrated by Marwan Khawaja (Khawaja 2002). Even though the number of refugees in the big cities of Syria mentioned in the UNHCR material was exaggerated, the refugees as such obviously contributed to a demographically complex reality to deal with for the Syrian regime, with potentially negative security implications.

The Arab revolts have resulted in political changes in several Arab states, with Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya as the most significant examples.[21] In Syria the unrest started in February 2011 in Da'ra, a southern town a few kilometers north of the Jordanian border, where some schoolchildren had written antiregime graffiti on public walls. The arrests and brutal handling of the kids led to local demonstrations, which soon spread to other cities in Syria. Shortly after that, Human Rights NGOs such as Human Rights Watch began to report about violent crackdowns on the demonstrations and about incidents of barbaric torture even of children by Syrian security personnel (Report 2011).

The confrontations between protesters and the Syrian regime rapidly developed into an armed conflict, which in the international media coverage[22] more and more was described as a civil war, this despite the fact that in reality it was a war between uncoordinated groups of antiregime fighters (Leenders and Heydemann 2012) and the Syrian army, the secret services and regime-loyal militias.[23] Already in 2011 large numbers of Syrians left their homes and fled to the neighboring countries, and by the end of 2012 the number of refugees with a Syrian background leaving the country had increased to more than half a million, of which 147,107 were registered in Turkey, 123,224 in Lebanon, 112,379 in Jordan, 66,809 in Iraq, and 11,260 in Egypt (UNHCR 2012). The numbers showed tendencies to increase and according to UNHCR many more Syrians, who were not registered, stayed in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt (ibid.).

Summing up, it should be emphasized that before things changed as a result of the crisis, Syria was the largest recipient of Iraqi refugees and that this situation affected the regime financially and politically. The internal conflict from 2011 worsened the conditions for the Iraqis in Syria and led to an increase in return migration. Before this became a reality, Syria had begun to tighten the possibilities of entering the country, in an attempt to reduce the financial burden related to the refugees and probably also in an attempt to reduce the public dissatisfaction with the hosting of the Iraqis. Following the Arab revolts, huge numbers of Syrian refugees have left adding to the uncertainty regarding the future of Syria and—on a tragic background—emphasizing that refugees often are part of population movements, which are extremely difficult to control and affect both the states from which they depart and to which they arrive.

Conclusion

The idea of this chapter is to discuss migration in a theoretical context inspired by the concept of nontraditional security. Taking the development in Syrian migration to Lebanon and the Gulf and the inflow of refugees and migrants to Syria as point of departure it has been analyzed how complex patterns in migration related to Syria constitute anarchistic, uncontrollable developments, which affect the authoritarian Syrian regime by challenging its security. The chapter has also discussed how transnational migration does not necessarily result in transnational integration across borders, and in the case of Syria rather the opposite. It was demonstrated that only by focusing closely on important shifts in the historical conditions determining national security the impact and significance of phenomena like migration can be sufficiently analyzed and understood. Finally, the last part of this chapter takes a recent perspective discussing the refugee issue related to the dramatic and in many ways tragic development since early 2011.

The relation between Lebanon and Syria cannot be considered an expression of transnational integration. There is very little evidence of improved cross-border ties as a result of many years of Syrian migration to Lebanon. The Syrian migration to Lebanon is differentiated in the sense that it covers a wide range of migration types from seasonal employment to situations, where Syrian workers after years of employment in Lebanon succeed in becoming Lebanese citizens. Some Syrians have applied for citizenship in Lebanon and obtained it. The phenomenon is hardly in the interest of Syria and this obvious conflict of interest underlines the lack of possibility of controlling the phenomenon. The Syrian work migration to Lebanon is subordinated the handling of national interests on behalf of Syria but as a result of the shifting historical conditions due to the dramatic course of events in 2005 and 2006 it lives up to the above-mentioned uncontrolled character of the migration phenomenon.

As mentioned in the analysis of Syrian migration to the Gulf, a state like Syria is dependent on the remittances. For the Syrian state the migration to the Gulf with its dependency both on the Gulf states and on the local *kafeels* becomes an important nontraditional security issue. It is an unstable factor for the Syrian economy. In spite of the notorious efficiency of the Syrian regime in its repression of its population, it is characterized by a certain frailty—a reality that becomes more and more obvious in 2011–2012, where the Arab uprising has a specific, tragic Syrian variety, but still challenges the usual established image of unshakeable authoritarianism in the Middle East. The Syrian migration to the Gulf does not like the migration to Lebanon lead to transnational integration. Rather the political contradictions lead to self-protection on behalf of the Gulf states, resulting in a gradual "replacement migration" in the sense that the Syrian workers are replaced with an Asian workforce.

The conclusion seems to be that security measures and national interests are the main determinants when dealing with the issue of migration in a Syrian context. Transnational migration does in the Syrian case not lead to transnational integration, but first of all to the making and maintenance of a significant nontraditional security issue for Syria. The Syrian migration demonstrates the anarchistic character of the migration phenomenon. Migration is difficult to control and does not without resistance lend itself to state regulation. Partly in opposition to that, the Syrian state is trying to take advantage of the migration dynamics, but has to realize that the economic interests related to the remittances have political repercussions. Regarding the themes discussed in this chapter it seems that the perspectives are somewhat different. Whereas Lebanon has a rather weak position vis-à-vis Syria, despite the economic importance of the income of the Syrian workers in Lebanon, the Gulf states appear strong and able more or less to dictate the conditions related to migration processes in the Gulf region. Therefore, if it seems appropriate for the regimes in the Gulf to replace immigrant workers from the MENA states (including the Syrian migrants) with people from Asia, there is not much the Syrian state can do to influence such decisions. Migration remains thus an anarchistic and highly politicized element in the political and economic positioning of the Middle Eastern states.

Syria was the largest recipient of Iraqi refugees and this has consequences for the regime. In 2007 Syria began to close the borders for refugees from Iraq, mostly because of the large expenses related to the refugees. The Syrian regime considered the refugees from Iraq a potential security threat, which might contribute to a destabilization of the country. As shown, the number of refugees in the Syrian cities and camps was probably exaggerated in the official Syrian statistic data, but nevertheless they contributed to a problematic situation with potentially negative security implications.

The tragic development in Syria since 2011 worsened the conditions for the Iraqis in Syria and led to an increase in return migration. It furthermore led to the production of new waves of refugees, this time Syrians fleeing their own country in order to get away from the extreme repression and persecution by the Ba'athist regime in Damascus. The tragedy underlines the unpredictability and anarchistic character of the migration phenomenon, which has been the key issue of this chapter. Transnational migration does not in the Syrian case lead to transnational integration, but to the making and maintenance of a significant nontraditional security issue for the Syrian state.

NOTES

1. A fine, short presentation of the tragic development in 2011 in Syria can be seen in Lesch (2011).
2. For an overview of migratory movements related to Syria, see Bartolomeo, Jaulin, and Perrin (2012).
3. For an excellent overview of the past decade in Syrian history, see Wieland (2012).
4. Several years before the so-called Arab Spring, Thomas Scheffler came up with this interesting prophecy: "However, considering the immense social problems the Arab World is to face in the coming decades, there will be ample opportunities for a populist transnationalism of the "downtrodden of the earth" from all religions and faiths." The quotation is from Scheffler (2006).
5. The idea of moving away from the traditional focus on security related to the state, where untraditional security threats are in the center of the perspective, has been discussed on a number of workshops recently held in a cooperation between Centre for Advanced Security Theory (CAST, University of Copenhagen), Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI, an activity under the Danish Arab Initiative) and the al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo. See Greenwood and Wæver (2012).
6. An interesting study of the transnational and uncontrolled character of Middle Eastern migration can be seen in Antoun (2009).

7. In an interesting article by Daniel Brumberg, written before the Arab revolts; he characterizes the perceptions of democracy and security in the Middle East and discusses the reality of the difficult conditions for democracy promotion, since "prioritizing conflict resolution may sometimes require dealing with autocrats in ways that reinforce their power." See Brumberg (2010).
8. The "classical" article dealing with security, stability, and international migration is this recently reprinted one by Myron Weiner (2011).
9. See the Ministry of Expertise, "Official Statistics of Syrians in the Exile." Damascus: Faculty of Arts forum, University of Damascus. 2010, http://www.adab-sy.com/forums/showthread.php?t=17791 (accessed January 15, 2013).
10. For a description of the Syrian policies in the Mashreq region after the takeover by Bashar al-Assad in 2000, see Lesch 2005. For a general focus on the US-Middle Eastern relations, see Lesch (2006).
11. The extremely rich, influential Hariri family and its role before and especially after the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri on February 14, 2005, is analyzed in Vloeberghs (2012).
12. The UN Resolutions can be found at the official UN homepage, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04.html (accessed January15, 2013).
13. For an analysis of the complicated UN maneuvers resulting in the Syrian pullout, see the excellent discussion by Sami E. Baroudi and Imad Salamey (2011). Regarding the degree of internal Lebanese reconciliation, see Ghosn and Khoury (2011).
14. For an analysis of the relationship between Hizbollah, Iran, and Syria, which emphasizes the potentially problematic aspects for Syria, see Samii (2008).
15. Ministry of Expertise, "Official Statistics of Syrians in the Exile."
16. Ibid.
17. The image of being a rogue state, which for many years has been attached to Syria, has mainly to do with the foreign policy of Syria, not the least related to the harsh rhetoric against Israel. However, the rogue-ness can also be seen internally in every repressive character of the Syrian state, despite ambitions at carrying out economic reforms as shown by Hinnebusch (2012).
18. The Syrian migration to the Gulf is as such "immigration without inclusion," as pointed out by Fargues (2011). See also chapter 2, where this is theme is discussed in detail.
19. See the relevant UNHCR homepage, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486a76, (accessed January 15, 2013).
20. For an analysis of the significance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria with a focus on Syrian-Iranian relations, see Talhamy (2009).

21. For a brief discussion of the Arab revolts and their impact on migration in some of the MENA states, see Seeberg (2013).
22. The obvious differences between Libya and Syria regarding the conditions for intervention, which has been a significant element in the international media coverage of both conflicts, are convincingly analyzed in Buckley (2012).
23. Leenders and Heydemann (2012) present a convincing analysis of the reasons for the lack of coherence in the Syrian opposition, which faces an efficient and well-organized repression apparatus supported by loyal militias, Shabihas and so on. See Salih (2012). The original article in Arabic appeared in *Kalamon* 5 (Winter).

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