Ottoman Reform and Muslim Regeneration
Ottoman Reform and Muslim Regeneration

Studies in Honour of Butrus Abu-Manneh

Edited by

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A Note on Transliteration

For the benefit of the nonspecialist reader, we have employed throughout the book a simplified version of the system used by the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Accordingly, in Arabic words, case endings and diacriticals, except the ‘ayn, have been omitted. The prefix “al-” is used when a person’s full name is mentioned, but dropped when only the last name appears. Common English spellings are used for familiar names and places, such as Mecca or Jerusalem. In Turkish words, the ‘ayn has also been omitted.

As a rule we have used Turkish transliteration when the terms and names refer to the central government’s point of view (mostly in the first section of the book), and Arabic transliteration when they refer to the point of view of the provinces or classical Islamic concepts (sections 2-4). This created duplicity in some limited cases such as pasa/pasha, hilafe/khilafa and their like.
Introduction

Itzchak Weismann and Fruma Zachs

... [S]ince the late 1850s we witness two political and ideological trends in the Muslim community in Istanbul and other cities of the Empire. The first which enjoyed popular support, was the Sunni-Orthodox trend. This trend upheld the ideals of the Islamic state in which the shari'a was held supreme and formed the fundamental law of the land, and in which the Muslims were the ruling community and the non-Muslims were ‘dhimmis’ who suffered from certain disadvantages. In such a state the ruler gained legitimacy by implementing the shari'a. The second trend upheld the idea of the supremacy of the state in the sense of an all-powerful and corporate body which had the privilege of making laws. This latter trend, moreover, stood for a state in which all its citizens enjoyed equal civil and political rights and were bound together by the bonds of patriotism.

– Butrus Abu-Manneh, Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century (1826-1876).

As the matrix of the modern Middle East,¹ the ‘long nineteenth century’ of Ottoman History, from the seminal treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 to the demise of the empire in 1918, has received ample scholarly attention. Similar to what occurred in studies of other regions of the world, this research underwent a substantial shift from the traditional/modern dichotomist presentation typical of theories of ‘modernization’, to a more nuanced understanding of the continuum between them.² By this process, the earlier emphasis on the influence exerted by a progressive and dynamic West on basically static and backward non-Western societies such as the Ottoman³ gave way to a more perceptive analysis of the inner processes of change undertaken by this admittedly dynamic and complex society in the face of the modern challenge. More recently, the focus on the political and legal history of the empire has been supplemented by new perspectives such as economic and social history,⁴ gender and popular culture,⁵
symbolism and ceremonies of legitimacy,\textsuperscript{6} and, last but not least, national identity formation\textsuperscript{7} and Islamic reformulations.\textsuperscript{8}

The present volume seeks to make a contribution to this ongoing research on the late Ottoman period from two complementary aspects. One is the evolution of Ottoman state reforms as it was perceived from various perspectives, ranging from those of the capital, Istanbul, to those of the Arab provinces of Syria, including Ottoman Palestine. The other aspect is that of Islamic regeneration, derived from the interaction between the Ottoman centre and the periphery. The twelve articles contained in this volume, each from its own perspective, points to the close relationship between the symbolic and actual measures undertaken by the Ottoman state from 1774 on, especially from the era of the Tanzimat (1839-76), and the role of Islam as its foundational ethos and as the religion of the majority of the population. This is true even in the case of the articles dealing with the external European impact and the Christian minorities, where Islam still looms large as a point of reference.

Through the various articles, the book also reveals the extent of the changes that the Ottoman Empire underwent throughout the period, from the epicentre of the Ottoman dynasty and court to the remotest towns of Safad or the ‘invented’ Beersheba on the fringes. It ventures beyond its borders too, to Chechnya and Daghestan. For all that, in most of the articles the continuity underlying much of the change proves to be not far below the surface. This is amply evident in the articles on the concept of Caliphate and the rules of succession, as well as in those on the tribal and semi-tribal systems among the Druzes in the Hawran and the Sufi families in Kurdistan. Continuities are no less apparent in the more focused pieces on the Sufi sympathies of a prominent reformist jurist in Damascus or the anti-Wahhabi worldview of a Hanbali scholar in the Hijaz. By its sheer range and diversity, the collection helps to displace the simplistic traditional/modern dichotomy in favour of a more sophisticated picture of a state and a society building on their political-administrative and the concomitant cultural-religious traditions to constantly adapt to modern realities.

Still, at least from the Islamic point of view an important distinction must be made concerning the Ottoman policies of reform during the nineteenth century, dividing them into two parts. These may be characterized respectively as the policies of modernization and the policies of Westernization. The turning point was the \textit{Hatt-i Humayun} of 1856 which, for the first time, traded the hallowed religious
principle of the supremacy of the Muslim subjects for the European principle of equality of citizens. It resulted in a cleavage that rent Ottoman society, at the centre and the periphery alike, pitting the Sultan-Caliph and the conservative men of religion who supported him against the Porte and a new middle class of Western-inspired merchants and intellectuals. In the Arab provinces, the new ideologies were cemented first in the Christian-dominated renaissance (nabīla) of the late Tanzimat, and subsequently in the Islamic reformism of the Salafiyya, which emerged as an opposition to the autocratic regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II. The antagonism between the authoritarian state and, on the one hand, an increasingly militant Islamism and on the other occasional liberal intellectuals, which had had its origins in the Tanzimat reforms and came to the forefront during the First World War, was one of the principal legacies bequeathed by the Ottoman Empire to its successors in the Arab Middle East. It has remained a prevalent feature of most countries of the region to this day.

*  *  *

The structure of the present collection was determined to a large extent by our major concern with the centre-periphery and state-Islam cleavages during the ‘long nineteenth century’ of Ottoman attempts at regeneration and reform. Accordingly, the book is divided into four sections dealing with the Ottoman central government, its interaction with Islamic traditions, and the impact of the reforms it initiated on the Syrian at large, and on Palestine.

The first two articles focus on the Ottoman dynasty and the symbolic and actual practices that reigning Sultans adopted in the face of various external and domestic challenges of modernization. Tufan Büzpinar takes a broad look at the evolution of the institution of Caliphate in what appears to be its last phase. His point of departure is the Russian-Ottoman treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774, in which the concept was invoked to save face for the Sultan after losing Muslim-inhabited territories in the Crimea. A century later, it became the cornerstone of the domestic and international Pan-Islamic policies of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909), and consequently also an important tool for rival claimants to the position of caliph, principally the Sharif of Mecca and the khedive of Egypt, or opponents to his autocratic rule such as Blunt and Kawakibi. Reviewing the old and new religious principles upon which the Ottoman concept of Caliphate rested throughout the period, Büzpinar demonstrates how, despite their
weakness, by using religious symbolism Sultans were still able to mobilize popular support among Muslims in the Ottoman domains and beyond.

Hakan Karateke examines the complementary question of the Ottoman Sultans’ attempts during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to change the rule of succession or, in some instances, to install another dynasty in their place. His major argument is that such attempts, which began with Sultan Abdülmecid in the 1850s, were fostered by the desire to bring the Ottoman monarchy closer to contemporary European models. But he also notes that their preference for primogeniture, namely filial succession from father to eldest son, over the prevailing principle of succession by the oldest male member in the family, was actually a return to the original practice of the early Ottoman dynasts. Karateke shows how, although generally unsuccessful, the proposed changes triggered factionalism in the Ottoman capital, as well as the rise of various rival claims. Moreover, following the demise of the empire in 1918, the contested process of succession made it easier to deal the Ottoman dynasty the final blow.

In the concluding paper of Part I, Moshe Gammer explores the influence of the Ottoman process of reform in both Istanbul and the provincial capital of Cairo on the reform policies (nizam) of Shaykh Shamil in the eastern Caucasus regions of Chechnya and Daghestan. Gammer dwells on the religious character of Shamil’s state, owing to his affiliation to the emphatically orthodox and activist Khalidi branch of the Naqshbandiyya brotherhood. Such religiosity, however, by no means prevented him from adopting innovative legal and military measures such as the ruler’s regulations (qanun). Here again, the connection between Islam and politics is plainly evident. Not only were relations with the Ottoman Empire enhanced through the Khalidi nexus, and the Sultan held in high regard as the caliph of the Muslims, but also many of the actual reformers were hajjis who served Muhammad ‘Ali for a period of time.

In Part II we move to the Islamic aspect of the Ottoman era of reforms. The three case studies here on one hand help to refute still-prevalent notions such as the incompatibility of Sufism and ‘orthodox’ Islam, or the essential Puritanism of the Hanbali creed. On the other hand they deepen our understanding of the ambivalent relationship between the Ottoman state and the ‘ulama and Sufi brotherhoods. The articles are chronologically arranged, relating respectively to the
periods of the initiation of the reforms, their middle course, and their culmination.

Itzchak Weismann sets out to examine the inner relationship between reformist legal scholarship and reformist Sufism in the early nineteenth century through the eyes of the prominent Damscene Hanafi jurist, Ibn ‘Abidin. Living through a period of growing disorder, Ibn ‘Abidin developed an ambivalent attitude towards both the Ottoman state and Syrian society. He supported the Ottomans against the Wahhabi threat, but did not hesitate to criticize their maladroit administration; and he sought redress for the grievances of the local population, but also reproached the people for their deviation from the precepts of the law. As Weismann demonstrates, a similar ambivalence characterized Ibn ‘Abidin’s attitude toward Sufism. Although he denounced Sufi practices that contravened the shari’a, he was attracted by the orthodox brand of reformist Sufism. Moreover, when the founder of the Khalidiyya, Shaykh Khalid al-Baghdadi, established himself in Damascus in the latter part of Ibn ‘Abidin’s life, the jurist enthusiastically joined his Sufi movement in the belief that, due to its combination of emphatic orthodoxy and organized activism, it constituted the best means of curing the socio-political and religious malaise of his time.

Similarly, David Commins takes a fresh look at the participation of what he calls traditional Hanbalis on the Ottoman side of the anti-Wahhabi polemic. For that purpose, he employs the practically unnoticed biographical dictionary of Muhammad Ibn Humayd, Hanbali imam and mufti of Mecca in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Through a careful examination of the Hanbali entries in this compilation, Commins discredits the common assumption that by the early nineteenth century Najd was already converted to Wahhabism; he moreover maintains that the anti-Wahhabi brand of Hanbalism at large remained viable throughout the century and that toward its end it merged with the rising anti-Salafi trend. The biographical dictionary of the Hanbali Ibn Humayd must thus be seen as part of the wider anti-Wahhabi discourse of the late Ottoman ‘ulama, who aimed at placing the Wahhabis outside the Hanbali fold.

In the last contribution to the Islamic section, Gökhan Çetinsaya presents a detailed examination of the Islamic and especially Sufi policies of Sultan Abdülhamid II as these are reflected through the prism of the north Iraqi province of Mosul. More particularly, the article focuses on the incessant infighting that raged at the time
between two major rival Sufi Qadiri families of the area, the Barzinjis dominating Sulaymaniyya and the Talabanis who were paramount in Kirkuk. The roots of struggle lay in the weakening of Ottoman central authority in the aftermath of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-8, resulting in tribal disorders that plagued the entire province for decades. The Ottoman officials were fully aware of the implication of both the Barzinjis and the Talabanis in the disorders, and repeatedly recommended taking measures against them. Yet as clearly shown by Çetinsaya, Abdülhamid II intervened every time to prevent action against families with such religious credentials.

The remaining two parts of the book take a closer look at various aspects of the Ottoman process of reform as it was experienced by different elements in the region of Greater Syria. These include traditional Sunni elites, the newly empowered Christian minorities, and historically marginalized populations such as the Bedouin and the Druzes. The main conclusion to be drawn from the diverse cases studied here seems to be that rather than merely responding to superior forces, local elements in the Syrian and Palestinian populations were engaged in a creative adaptation to, and at times even manipulation of, the new circumstances to their own advantage. While practically all the contributions examine the situation at the level of the state or the elite, some of them also attempt to delve into lower rungs of society.

The first two contributions in Part III deal with the Christian-dominated Arab renaissance in Syria, the nabda, from two complementary aspects. Fruma Zachs and Basilius Bawardi examine continuity and change in the political and social outlook of Christian Arab intellectuals in Beirut during the first decade of Sultan Abdülhamid II’s rule. Focusing primarily on Salim al-Bustani, son of the celebrated Butrus al-Bustani and a prominent intellectual of the second-generation nabda, they use the two genres of the journalistic essay and the novel, which he employed in his periodical al-Jinan, to trace the evolution of his ideas on Ottomanism and Syrianism. Zachs and Bawardi demonstrate that, in continuation to the Tanzimat era, Christian Arab intellectuals still espoused the essential compatibility between these two political concepts, while increasingly criticizing the lack of minority equality inherent in them. They also show that, faced with the intensification of the Hamidian censorship after 1880, Salim and his colleagues explored new ways to express their socio-political critique of the Ottoman state as well as their love of the Syrian homeland.
Ami Ayalon, for his part, suggests new methods for exploring the spread of the *nahda* outside its core areas of Beirut and Mount Lebanon, and beyond the prominent figures who led it. Noting the surge of literary creation in the Syrian cities in the wake of the Young Turk revolution of 1908, Ayalon examines the pre-1908 press and other literary products for clues to the extent of involvement of peripheral elites in the activities of the *nahda*. He finds them in the lists of local agents for foreign journals; in the correspondence sections of journals (here he uses a sample from the two well-known Egyptian periodicals *al-Muqtataf* and *al-Hilal*); and the list of subscribers to the Encyclopedia started by Butrus al-Bustani. Shifting the focus from the production to the consumption of the written word, Ayalon in his findings clearly indicates the emergence of an educated stratum, mostly among the Christian populations, in the cities and towns of Syria.

With Kais Firro we turn to another Syrian minority, that of the Druzes in Jabal Hawran. Firro identifies two major processes that together shaped the political and social structure of the region following the Lebanese civil war and the consequent Druze influx into the Hawran in 1860. One was the endeavour of the central Ottoman government to integrate this peripheral area into the Syrian province, mainly through conscription and taxation; the other was the consolidation of a new feudal system, the *mashyakhat Jabal al-Duruz*, under the leadership of the Atrash family. Throughout his exposition, Firro demonstrates that rather than imposing its will on the Druze leadership the Ottoman government was forced to adapt to the actual power structure of the Hawran. Thereby it helped the Atrash to consolidate their paramount position in the region at the expense of both other Druze feudal families and the peasants.

Two contributions in Part IV are dedicated to district towns in Ottoman Palestine, the Upper Galilee town of Safad in the north and the Negev town of Beersheba in the south. Each writer, however, employs a different research angle in his analysis. One follows Hourani’s paradigm of ‘the politics of notables’, the other uses the methods of cultural geography as well as the Gramscian notion of hegemony.

In his study of late Ottoman Safad and its Arab community, Mustafa Abbasi focuses on the interrelationship between the Tanzimat reforms, particularly the Land Law of 1858 and the Provincial Law of 1864, and the fortunes of the town’s notables. Beginning with the deplorable state of Safad in the wake of the devastating earthquake of 1837, Abbasi traces the administrative elaboration, demographic growth, and
economic prosperity of the elite that came about following the inauguration of the Tanzimat and lasted right up to the departure of the Ottomans in 1918. This historical exploration is augmented by a prosopographic analysis of the major notable families and persons of Safad, both Muslim and Christian. On the basis of these two interconnected examinations, Abbasi concludes that even in a distant and interior town such as Safad the Ottoman reforms were applied without much delay and their impact was decisive.

Nimrod Luz characterizes the establishment of Beersheba as a sub-district centre in south Palestine during the Hamidian period as part of an Ottoman imperial project to control the Bedouin tribes on the Egyptian border. In reference to Gramsci’s thought, he further argues that not unlike the Europeans, the Ottomans should be regarded as an hegemonic power bent upon manipulating both the space and the mind of its subjects. Noting the natural advantages of Beersheba, Luz goes on to examine the development of the town under a succession of Ottoman governors at the turn of the twentieth century, and then analyses the allegedly Western style of the city plan and its main public buildings. The modern urban landscape thus created a colonial situation in which the hegemonic approach of the Ottomans was readily absorbed by the nomadic population.

The concluding article in this collection, by Thomas Philipp, takes us to the First World War and the demise of the Ottoman Empire at its end. Philipp examines the Arab attitude toward the Great War as reflected in three leading Arab journals of the time: the Christian-progressive *al-Hilal* and *al-Muqtafat* and the Islamic *al-Manar*. Though appearing in Egypt, all three journals were owned and edited by Syro-Lebanese immigrants who had fled the Hamidian censorship. The major questions Philipp tackles relate to whom the Arabs regarded as their allies; their appreciation of the impact of the war on the Middle East, and the future of the Arab provinces should the Ottomans lose the war; and the extent to which they continued to take Europe as their model. Obvious differences between the journals notwithstanding, Philipp’s major conclusion is that, rather than the barbarity of the war itself, it was disappointment with the post-war imperialist arrangements in the Middle East that turned Arab intellectuals away from the European model and precipitated the rise of a radicalized form of Arab nationalism.

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The studies in this volume are presented to Professor Butrus Abu-Manneh on the occasion of his retirement. They encapsulate the topics that formed the focus of Abu-Manneh’s scholarly research for the last thirty-five years at the University of Haifa, and that continue to occupy him today. These are the inner political evolution of the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century; the intricate relationship between the Ottoman reform process and the reviverist Islamic tradition; the impact of both state and religious reform efforts on the Arab provinces in general, and on Syria and Palestine in particular. Through a series of articles dedicated to key turning points in nineteenth-century Ottoman history, Abu-Manneh established himself as one of the most influential scholars of this formative period of the modern Middle East. He thereby proved himself a worthy heir of his foremost teacher, the eminent Albert Hourani.

Butrus Abu-Manneh’s intertwined interest in the Ottoman, Muslim, and Arab history of the nineteenth century has been evident since the appearance of the first article he published following his graduation from Oxford University in 1971. In ‘Sultan Abdülhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca (1880-1900),’ he set out to demonstrate how the Sultan’s policy toward the Hijaz was motivated above all by his fear that as prestigious descendants of the Prophet, the Sharifs posed a challenge to his own claim to the religious title of caliph. Another piece, ‘A Note on the Keys of the Ka‘ba’, goes back to the beginnings of Ottoman rule over the Hijaz in the early sixteenth century. In it Abu-Manneh exposes the patent falsity of the story according to which the Sharifs gave the Ottomans such keys, and relates the tale to the similarly invented story that the last ‘Abbasid caliph handed his right to the post to Selim the Conqueror. Both stories, he notes, came into vogue in the late eighteenth century, namely around the time of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca.

Many of Butrus Abu-Manneh’s subsequent articles dwell on this close relationship between Ottoman state reform and Islam, especially its Sufi component. These articles were recently republished in book form under the title Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century (1826-1876), and are supplemented by the seminal article ‘Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda al-Sayyadi’. Beginning with the shattered nişan-i jadid (‘new order’) of Selim III in the late eighteenth century, Abu-Manneh traced the major turning points of the destruction of the Janissaries by Mahmud II in 1826; the promulgation by Abdülmecid of the Hatt-i sharif-i Gülhane which inaugurated the Tanzimat in 1839; the ascendency of the Sublime
Porte under the leadership of ‘Ali and Fu’ad Pasas after 1855; the return of the conservatives under the grand vizierate of Mahmud Nedim Pasa in 1871; and finally the Hamidian regime. At each phase the pivotal role played by religion in the unfolding of events is clearly demonstrated, either in support of the political elite’s quest to modernize the state or in opposition, suggesting an alternative course.

Undoubtedly, one of the most significant achievements in this ongoing research was the identification of Sufism in general, and the Khalidi branch of the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya brotherhood in particular, as the leading element of Islamic revivalism in the Ottoman polity of the time. Expanding upon the discovery of Shaykh Khalid by Hourani, Abu-Manneh patiently revealed the perceptible fingerprints of the orthodox principles of the Khalidiyya in the reform measures adopted by Mahmud II and the statesmen of the early Tanzimat. After mid-century, as political ascendancy passed to the Westernising reformers of the Porte, Khalidi traces were to be found in the opposition movement of the Young Ottomans. For most of the nineteenth century the principal rival to the Ottoman Naqshbandiyya was the heterodox Bektashi brotherhood, which had been outlawed in 1826 but was allowed to revive its activity under ‘Ali and Fu’ad. Under Abdülhamid II, both were largely superseded by more popular brotherhoods, foremost among them the Rifa‘iyya, which better served the Islamic policies of the Sultan-Caliph. Interest in the Naqshbandiyya occasionally drew Abu-Manneh away from the Ottoman Empire, for example in his examination of the Turkish editions of the canonical biography of the great fifteenth-century Naqshbandi master of central Asia, ‘Ubaydullah Ahrar, in ‘Rashahat ‘Ain al-Hayah’ in the 19th Century,’ and of the role of the earliest Khalidi deputy in the Caucasus, in ‘Shaikh Ismail al-Shirwani and his Role in the Naqshbandi-Khalidi Order.’

On the other hand, as his early article on the Sharifs of Mecca has shown, Butrus Abu-Manneh was far from oblivious to the impact of the Ottoman reforms on the Arab provinces of the empire. His studies in this direction were motivated by both the imperial and the Islamic points of view. Abu-Manneh’s identity as a Palestinian and as a Christian Arab must have also played its part. On the Islamic side, his research has focused on the provinces of Iraq, in which the Khalidiiyya had originated. Thus, in his most recent article, ‘Salafiyya and the Rise of the Khalidiiyya in Baghdad in the Early Nineteenth Century,’ Abu-Manneh suggests that the rise of the Khalidiiyya in that quarter in the 1810s was basically a reaction to the spread of Salafi ideas out of the
antecedents of the Wāhhabiyya. In a slightly earlier work, ‘The Wali Nejib Pasha and the Qadiri Order in Iraq,’ Abu-Manneh moved three decades forward to show us how this early Tanzimat official promoted the Sufi brotherhoods, a course that would be later adopted for the empire at large by Sultan Abdülhamid.

On the political side, Abu-Manneh’s focus has been on the Syrian provinces, including the southern regions that would become known as Palestine. Here, in another seminal article entitled ‘The Christians between Ottomanism and Syrian Nationalism: The Ideas of Butrus al-Bustani,’ Abu-Manneh argued that the Arab cultural revival (nahdía) inaugurated by Bustani and his colleagues in Beirut after the Hatt-i Humayun of 1856 was designed to inculcate in the local population a feeling of Syrian patriotism within rather than against the larger Ottoman entity, and that Bustani regarded the secular idea of Ottomanism as a guarantee of civil rights. In ‘The Establishment and Dismantling of the Province of Syria’ Abu-Manneh shows how this unique province had been created in 1864 by the Tanzimat statesmen in order to enhance such local patriotism, and later on was sundered apart by Sultan Abdülhamid II for the exactly opposite object of suppressing it. In between, in his ‘The Genesis of Midhat Pasha’s Governorship in Syria 1878-1880,’ Abu-Manneh turns his attention to the Syrian agitation against direct centralized Ottoman rule, claiming that it was ultimately delayed by two decades by Abdülhamid’s Islamic policies.

Similarly, in the case of Palestine Butrus Abu-Manneh has devoted much attention to the impact of the Tanzimat and Hamidian regimes on local administration and society. In his ‘Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period: The New Ottoman Administration and the Notables’ Abu-Manneh describes the emergence of the city as an important political and administrative centre, as well as the rise of its stratum of notables at the expense of the rural leaders of the countryside, in the wake of the reforms and increased Christian interest in Palestine. In ‘The Rise of the Sanjak of Jerusalem in the Late 19th Century,’ he goes on to explain the constitution of Jerusalem as an independent district (sanjak) directly subject to Istanbul as a means of reinforcing Ottoman rule in the areas bordering autonomous Egypt. The separate existence of the Sanjak of Jerusalem, Abu-Manneh concluded, contributed much to the emergence of Palestinian nationalism under the Husaynis, the leaders of the faction that supported Sultan Abdülhamid II.
Publications by Prof. Butrus Abu-Manneh


Articles:

14. ‘The Roots of the Ascendancy of Ali and Fu’ad Pasas at the Porte


Notes
1 See the seminal article by Albert Hourani, ‘The Ottoman Background of the Modern Middle East,’ in Kemal E. Karpat (ed.), *The Ottoman State and its Place in World History* (Leiden, 1974), pp. 61-78.
4 Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (eds.), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (2 vols., Cambridge, 1994, 1997); and also Donald Quataert (ed.), *Consumption Studies and the History of the Ottoman Empire* (New-York, 2000).
8 See for example, David Dean Commins, *Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria* (Oxford, 1990); Itzchak Weismann, *Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus* (Leiden, 2001).
10 The full references of Abu-Manneh’s works, in chronological order, are to be found at the end of the Introduction.
The Question of Caliphate under the Last Ottoman Sultans

S. Tufan Buzpinar

The question of the Ottoman institution of the Caliphate requires careful examination from both the historical and Islamic standpoints, in the latter case especially through the disciplines of theology and jurisprudence. Despite its centrality, no comprehensive study exists on the topic. The history of the Ottoman Caliphate may be roughly divided into two periods, with the fateful Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774 as the watershed. This article attempts to shed light on its evolution in the second period, from that treaty to the deposition of Sultan Abdülhamid II in 1909. I particularly address the issues of the emergence of the question of the modern Caliphate, the internal and external developments that shaped the Ottoman Sultans’ concepts about it, and how this institution was used by the various Sultans during the period under review. Particular emphasis will be given to the reign of Abdülhamid II, who appears to have used the institution of the Caliphate most effectively in both his domestic and foreign policies.

The Ottoman Concept of Caliphate

The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774 provides clear indications as to how the Ottoman concept of Caliphate was formulated at the time. As is well known, the treaty required the Ottomans to acknowledge their loss of political authority over the Crimea, the first Muslim-populated territory to be detached from the Ottoman state. The Ottoman delegates agreed to the political separation of the Crimea, on condition that the Crimean Muslims accept the Sultan’s authority as Caliph. Article three of the treaty states that:

As the Tatars profess the same faith as the Mahometans, they shall regulate themselves, with respect to His Highness, in his capacity of Grand Caliph of Mahometanism, according to the
precepts prescribed to them by their law, without compromising the stability of their political and civil liberty.¹

In the Turkish version of the same article, the religious position of the Sultan was given stronger emphasis by stressing his titles of imamü’l-müminin (commander of the faithful) and hilafetü’l-muvahhidin (Caliph of the unitarians).² In a subsequent letter of clarification it was stated that since the shari’a precludes the existence of two Caliphs, the freely elected Tatar Crimean Khans must receive the recognition of the padisah-i Âl-i Osman who is badimmü’l-baremeyni’-s-serifeyn (servitor of the two holy places) and imamü’l-müslimin. The Ottoman Sultan, by virtue of his embodiment of hilafetü’l-uzma (The Great Caliphate), is to send the document of official recognition of the new Khan to the Crimea without delay (ta’lil ve ta’vük). The letter also specified that the name of the Caliph should be mentioned in the Friday and religious festival sermons (hutbe), and that the qadis of the Crimea would be chosen from among the local ‘ulama but have to be recognized by the chief qadi in Istanbul.³ These points were reiterated in the Aynalikavak Agreement of 1779 between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.⁴

The notion of the Great Caliphate (hilafetü’l-uzma) which appears in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca was not a new invention. Apparently, from the time of Süleyman I (1520-66) the Ottoman Sultans claimed the titles of halife and imam ex officio, implying supreme religious leadership of the entire Islamic world.⁵ But its usage with such an emphasis in an international treaty was new, motivated by the loss of the Muslim populated territory of the Crimea. A heavy blow to their prestige, the Ottomans dreamed of retaking it for decades to follow. Beyond religious considerations, by inserting an article stipulating maintenance of religious ties between the Crimean Muslims and the Sultan-Caliph, the Ottomans might have hoped to create a pretext for future interference, even for a war, to recapture the Crimea.⁶ Equally revealing were the Ottoman references to the danger of the rise of a rival Caliph (iclim-i halifeteyn), especially in bordering Muslim territories. The particular emphasis put in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca on forestalling the possibility of two reigning Caliphs seems to reveal the Ottoman concerns over the political intentions of the Crimean Khans. Even in Istanbul influential circles at times entertained the idea of replacing the Ottoman dynasty (Âl-i Osman) with that of the Tatars (Âl-i Cengiz) in the Crimea. Rumours of the possibility of such a replacement persisted until the first quarter of the nineteenth century.⁷
Thus, in more than one respect, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca proved to be a turning point in relation to the question of the Ottoman Caliphate. First of all, it was the first international treaty in which the notions of Caliphate were explicitly stated. Secondly, it demonstrated the Ottomans’ readiness to use the Caliphate as a political instrument against their enemies. Finally, and most important for future developments, this was the first agreement to uphold a separation between the political and religious authority of the Sultan. The Sultan conceded that he would have no say in Crimean affairs, while as Caliph he undertook to recognize anyone who was elected for the leadership of the country.  

The arrangement in the Crimea in 1774 set the example for other Muslim-populated territories that were separated from the Ottoman Empire during its last century. For example, the introduction to a set of instructions concerning the religious matters of the Muslim populations in Greece, Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro prepared by the office of the Seyhülislam in Istanbul in 1884, states that wherever they lived Muslims had to be completely loyal to the Great Caliph.  

Another injunction dwell on the hadith that ‘whoever dies not having known the imam of his time, dies the death of the days of ignorance (jahiliyya)’, to convey the message that every Muslim bore a personal responsibility to know the Caliph of his time. Likewise, the Ottomans managed to include an article in the agreement about their former territories of Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Greece and Tripoli, stating that the name of the Sultan-Caliph should be mentioned in the *hutbes* of Friday and religious holidays.  

The separation of the Sultan-Caliph’s religious from his political authority reached its climax in November 1922, when the Turkish Grand National Assembly abolished the Ottoman Sultanate and elected a new member of the Ottoman dynasty as a Caliph, totally devoid of political/temporal power. This spirit of separation was already present during the Tanzimat period (1839–76) in the idea of Ottomanism. This meant in effect that the Sultan signified political power for all Ottomans irrespective of their religion, while at the same time he held the position of Caliphate for Muslim subjects. This formula acquired legal form in the first Ottoman Constitution of 1876. Article four stated that ‘the Padisah, by virtue of the Caliphate, is the protector of the religion of Islam and the ruler and Emperor of all Ottoman subjects’.  

Interestingly, opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate during the last quarter of the nineteenth century also tried to capitalise on the idea of
the spiritual Caliphate. The idea was first expressed in these circles by W. S. Blunt, an ex-diplomat and self-appointed British agent in the Middle East, and was later spread by the Aleppine ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi. Blunt wrote in 1882 that ‘the Caliph of the future, in whatever city he may fix his abode, will be chiefly a spiritual and not a temporal king and will be limited in the exercise of his authority by few conditions of the existing material kind’. A more elaborate and detailed idea of a spiritual Caliphate was promulgated in the late 1890s by al-Kawakibi, who believed that the Ottoman Empire was unable to effect a regeneration of Islam, but only the Arabs and an Arab Caliph. The latter would serve as the spiritual head of all Muslims with no political powers.

**Principles of the Ottoman Caliphate**

In the period under discussion, the Ottoman Sultans’ claims to the Great Caliphate were essentially based on the principles of allegiance (*bey'at*), divine will, inheritance, and actual power, all traditionally recognised justifications. Following the accession of each Sultan, ‘the men of loosing and binding’ (*ehlü'l-hal ve'l-akd*) composed of leading administrative, military and religious officials, came together before the throne in the Palace and pledged their allegiance to the new Sultan, confirming his new position as Caliph of the Muslims. This ceremony fulfilled one of the requirements of the Caliphate in Sunni theology, namely *bey'at*. For instance, in the *ferman* announcing the accession of the first Sultan-Caliph of the Tanzimat period, Abdülmecid (1839-61), the act of allegiance of the men of binding and loosing was expressed as: ‘*ittifak-i ârâ’-yi viçelâ ve viçerâ’-yi izâm ve içmâ-i ‘ulemâ-‘yi a’lam*’ (consensus of the leading ministers and chief ‘ulama).

Justification by divine will was also age-old, having been created by the Umayyads. They named themselves the Caliphs of God (*khulafa’ Allah*) in contrast to their predecessors the Rightly Guided Caliphs (*al-khulafa’ al-rashidun*), who regarded themselves merely as successors of the Prophet (*khulafa’ rasul Allah*). As for the Ottomans, apparently from the time of Suleyman I the Ottoman Sultan was deemed to occupy the Caliphal position by divine right and God had bestowed upon him the vicegerency on Earth. In his *ferman* of investiture Abdülmecid accordingly declared, ‘God has appointed me *emirü'l-mü’minin* and *halife-i ruy-i zemini*. This notion was apparently based on the reference to the *khalîfa* in the Qur’an ‘*inna ja’alnâkum khalîfa ji al-ard*’ (We did indeed make thee a vicegerent on earth). Hence the
Sultans also used the title \textit{zill Allah fi al-ard} (the shadow or representative of God in the world).\textsuperscript{21}

The Ottoman Sultans also used hereditary rights to claim the Caliphate. By the late eighteenth century it had become a well-established practice that every new Sultan automatically assumed the Caliphate, implying that this right belonged to the Ottoman dynasty as a whole. This concept was expressed by the phrase ‘\textit{bi’l-irs ve’l-istihkak}’ (by inheritance and as a right), a phrase which was always used with the title Caliph in \textit{fermans} announcing the Sultans’ ascent to the throne and in the official \textit{salnames}, the yearbooks published by the government.\textsuperscript{22}

Similar phrases were ‘\textit{varis-i mesru}’ (legitimate inheritor) and ‘\textit{bi’l-istihkak}’ (as a right).\textsuperscript{23}

Equally long established was justification by actual power. The view that any Muslim ruler who held power and the capacity to protect Muslims could claim the Caliphate appears to have originated with the tenth century Ilkhwan al-Safa’.\textsuperscript{24} It subsequently gained the support of thinkers and jurists like Ibn Khaldun and Jalal al-Din al-Dawwani, two fifteenth-century scholars who profoundly influenced Ottoman thought.\textsuperscript{25} Such scholars regarded the protection of Islam and the administration of the worldly affairs of the Muslims as the principal duties of the Caliph. They also believed that the Caliph’s functions could be assumed by the rulers of widely distant countries.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover, by extending their rule to the holy places in the Hijaz following their conquest of Syria and Egypt from the Mamluks in the early sixteenth century, the Ottomans acquired an additional highly symbolic boost to their claim to the Caliphate. This fact was not lost upon Sultan Selim I (1512-20) who in 1516 assumed the title of ‘servitor of the two Holy Sanctuaries’ (\textit{hadimii’l-Haremeyni’s-Serifeyn}). Selim I also transferred the holy relics from Mecca to Istanbul.\textsuperscript{27} A story that probably began circulating after Küçük Kaynarca had it that the ‘Abbasid Caliph al-Mutawakkil who lived under the last Mamluk Sultan had officially transferred his rights to the Caliphate to Sultan Selim and to his heirs.\textsuperscript{28} By the nineteenth century this story was accepted by Ottoman Muslims and non-Muslims alike, irrespective of its historical truth.

With the promulgation of the Constitution in December 1876, the Sultan’s position as Caliph gained yet another basis for legitimacy. The third and fourth articles of the Constitution stated that ‘the Exalted Ottoman Sultanate incorporates the Great Islamic Caliphate, which is held by the eldest member of the Ottoman Dynasty in accordance with ancient practice... His Imperial Majesty the Padisah, by virtue of the Caliphate, is the protector of the religion of Islam...’\textsuperscript{29} The two Sultans
of the Second Constitutional period, Mehmed Resad (1909-18) and Vahideddin (1918-22), referred to this point when expounding the basis for their ascent to the Ottoman throne. The *ferman* of Mehmed Resad dated 15 Rebiyûlahir 1327/ 6 May 1909, states that he had ascended to the throne of his ancestors ‘with divine will and (as a right granted by the) articles of our constitution and with the general consensus and wish of the Ottoman nation’. In a similar vein, Vahideddin declared that his ascent to the throne of the Caliphate and Sultanate was ‘based on the rights granted by the Ottoman Constitution and the act of allegiance of the men of binding and loosing’.

**The Caliphate in the Era of Reform**

During the period covered by this study, the question of Caliphate was not related to Ottoman political and religious thought alone. It seems to have emerged and been shaped in response to internal and external pressures. The loss of the Crimea was indeed only one of the serious challenges that the Ottoman Empire faced almost on all fronts. From the 1770s the Russians in particular gained the upper hand in their relations with the Ottomans, and their influence in both the Crimea and the Caucasus increased immensely. Frequent wars with Russia and Austria during the second half of the eighteenth century imposed extra burdens on the already weakened Ottoman economy and financial situation, while the reform programs of Selim III at the end of the century further increased the state’s dependence on internal and external support.

At this juncture two important developments influenced the question of the Caliphate. On the one hand, several Muslim rulers, especially on the Indian subcontinent, who appealed to the Ottoman Sultans for help against foreign encroachment, addressed them as ‘Caliph of Muslims’. To counter them, the British government likewise referred to the Ottoman Sultans as Caliphs on several occasions when it asked them to send letters to the Indian Muslims advising them not to fight against the British. On the other hand, the Ottoman Sultans, who in general tended to emphasize their religious standing during this period, stressed their position as Caliphs in their dealings with independent Muslim rulers such as the Sultans of Morocco, the Khans of Azerbaijan, and other leaders in the Caucasus. The use of the titles of *hilafet, imam-i Müslimin, hadimi’l-Haremeyni’s-Serifeyn, khalife-i a’zam,*
On the internal front, Selim III and Mahmud II (1808-39) felt the need for support from religious circles and ‘ulama to successfully implement their reform programs. Abu-Manneh has suggested that there was a link between the expansion of Orthodox Sufi orders, particularly the Naqshbandiya-Mujaddidiyya, in the Ottoman capital in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and the establishment of the Nizam-i Jedid (‘New Order’). Although the orthodox Sunni influence suffered a setback in 1807, when Selim III was deposed and several leading figures from the above-mentioned Sufi orders were killed by the insurgents, they soon recovered and took part in the abolition of the Janissary corps and their allies, the heterodox Bektashi order, in 1826.

Simultaneously, these Ottoman Sultans also faced serious setbacks to their position as the Great Caliph and as hadimü'l-Haremeyni’s-Serifeyn. The first blow was the French occupation of Egypt in 1798, which seriously damaged the Sultan’s prestige as the protector of Muslim lands. It was followed in the first decade of the nineteenth century by the even more serious debacle of the Wahhabi capture of Mecca and Medina. As the Wahhabis hindered other Muslims from performing the hajj, they demonstrated to all that the Sultan-Caliph was unable to fulfil his responsibilities as hadimü'l-Haremeyn. More alarming still was the intelligence brought to the Sultan’s ears that the Saudis had claimed the Caliphate and Sultanate in the Hijaz. Selim III failed to bring the Wahhabi presence in the Hijaz to an end, while his successor, Mahmud II, managed to do so only through the services of Muhammad ‘Ali Pasa, the new governor of Egypt.

From the late 1820s the domestic Janissary threat, Muhammad ‘Ali’s defiance, and the mixed reactions to state reforms seem to have led Mahmud II to introduce new methods to enhance his authority. The present literature suggests that Mahmud secured considerable support from the ‘ulama and the upper echelons of Ottoman society for his civil and military reforms. But there were also a considerable number of opponents who blamed the Sultan and his supporters for the defeat by Russia in 1829, and for failing to prevent Greek independence. Moreover, in different parts of the empire the remnants of the Janissary Corps, sometimes with the support of low-ranking ‘ulama and local notables, continued their anti-reform propaganda. Hatred of Mahmud II reached such a degree that once a person stopped and shouted at him, ‘Infidel Sultan…you are destroying Islam and drawing down upon us the curse of the Prophet’. Seyhülislam
Abdulwehhab Effendi was likewise cursed and accused of directing the Sultan to adopt false rites. 39

It was against this background that the Sultan asked the Seyhülislam to compose a treatise on the duty to obey the Sultan-Caliph. Khulasat al-burban fi ita‘at al-Sultan (The Essence of the Proof Concerning Obedience to the Sultan) was the first work of its kind during the period of reforms. 40 Written initially in Arabic, it was translated into Turkish and published in both languages, a clear indication that the Sultan was anxious to win the support of his Arab as well as his Turkish subjects. 41 It would subsequently be used as a reference by supporters of Sultan Abdülhamid II. 42

In Khulasat al-burban the Sultan’s position as Caliph was strongly emphasised, and with it the argument that unconditional obedience to the Sultan-Caliph was a religious duty explicitly stated in the Qur’an and hadith. Abdulwehhab Effendi further claims that the phrase ‘ulu al-amr’ in the Qur’anic verse (4/59) ‘Obey God, and obey the Apostle, and those charged with authority (ulu al-amr) among you’ refers to the ‘Padisah-i Islam’, namely Mahmud II. In addition, he cited twenty-five hadiths in order to demonstrate that the Sultan was the Caliph and as such deserved recognition and obedience by all Muslims. Titles such as Sultan-i Islam, padisah-i Islam, Sultan-i a‘zam, and imami‘l-Müslimin were used in the text interchangeably with that of Caliph. 44 Two points deserve special attention regarding the cited hadiths. First, the emphasis on the words of the Prophet that even if the Caliph is a ‘black’ or a ‘disabled Abyssinian slave’ it is incumbent upon Muslims to submit and obey him, which serves to defy the view that the Caliphate must belong to the tribe of Quraysh. Second, against those who consider the Sultan as unjust it is repeatedly asserted that even a tyrant and oppressor Sultan is entitled to his subjects’ obedience and forbearance. 45

Mahmud II was determined to use every means to justify his personal autocratic rule; in the words of Abu-Manneh, ‘for him, absolute sultanic power was and should remain supreme throughout the land.’ 46 The above-examined treatise was designed to serve this purpose. The succeeding period of the Tanzimat was shaped in part as a reaction to Mahmud II’s style of rule. In the wake of the inaugurating Gülhane Rescript in November 1839, in which the power of the Sultan-Caliph was limited, 47 the centre of power gradually moved from the Palace to the Porte. Such a move had already been attempted by Alemdar Mustafa Pasa, the first Grand Vizier of Mahmud II, who in October 1808 brought state authorities and notables (a‘yan) together in Istanbul
to sign the ‘Sened-i Ittifak’ (Deed of Agreement). Article four of the deed states that ‘all orders and prohibitions will come down from the Grand Vizier. These shall be accepted as the Sultan’s orders.’ The Grand Viziers of the Tanzimat followed the same line. In theory, the Sultan-Caliph still had the final say in government affairs, but in practice it was the Pasas, whether Mustafa Resid, Ali or Fuad, who held effective power. Though the tradition of mentioning the Sultan’s position as Caliph in the fermands of investiture and in the hutbe continued, the Caliphate was de-emphasized. Developments in the field of political thought further contributed to the limitations put on the power of the Sultan-Caliph, particularly the Young Ottomans’ promotion of the ideas of mesveret (consultation) and a constitutional regime, culminating in the proclamation of the first Ottoman Constitution in 1876.

**The Caliphate during Abdülhamid II’s Reign**

Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) ascended the throne amid fierce debates concerning the religious validity of a constitutional government. Opponents of the constitution argued that it limited the power and authority granted to the Sultan-Caliph by the shari’a. Still, the constitutionalist group was able to overrule such objections, and the first Ottoman Constitution was promulgated in December 1876. It is striking that despite widespread recognition of the Ottoman Caliphate by Muslims outside the Ottoman domains, the constitution referred to Islam rather than to the Muslims, stating that ‘the padisah by virtue of the Caliphate is the protector of the religion of Islam.’ This may have been due to Ottoman concern about arousing French and British anxieties, given their large Muslim colonies and the delicate state of international relations.

Throughout his reign Abdülhamid II stressed the Islamic character of the Ottoman state and his own position as the Caliph. Considering the series of crises in the Balkans in the mid-1870s, followed by the disastrous war with Russia in 1877-8 and the Constitutional experiment, the Sultan became convinced that the most fundamental problem of the empire was lack of unity, and that the only practical basis for unity was Islam. Therefore, in 1878 he suspended the Parliament and established an autocratic rule with increased emphasis on Islam and Muslim unity. His Islamic policy intensified as the position of the Muslims in the Ottoman state considerably strengthened following the loss of Balkan territories which had
substantial non-Muslim populations. As Abdülhamid pointed out, ‘Giving priority to the majority subjects is an unavoidable necessity in any state.... The religion of the Sublime Ottoman State is the religion of Islam and the Muslims are in majority among its subjects.’

If religion was the basis of unity and solidarity, it was also the basis of obedience and loyalty. Here, the traditional Ottoman claim to the Caliphate offered Abdülhamid II a means of appealing directly to his Muslim subjects’ religious allegiance: ‘as [the Sultan] is the Caliph of Islam, to be in his service means to be in the service of all Muslims.’ Islam was the political force supporting the Ottoman State, and the Caliphate, in the person of Abdülhamid, was the focus upon which that force should be concentrated. In addition to his being a Caliph, in May 1877, after a minor Ottoman victory in the war against Russia, the title ghāzi was conferred on Abdülhamid by a fatwa in which his position as ‘emirü'l-mü'minin’ and ‘halife-i ruy-i zemir’ stood out.

The importance of this title came from its religious connotations. A ghāzi is not only a courageous and able fighter but, even more importantly, a fighter for the faith. ‘The notion of the Sultan as a ghāzi,’ writes Imber, ‘was particularly effective as a legitimizing device... (and) by adopting ‘Ghazi’ as a title, the Sultans could appeal to a wide spectrum of their Muslim followers.’ The personal devotion of Abdülhamid and his fulfilment of his public duties as Caliph, along with the constant use of titles such as emirü'l-mü'minin and zill Allah fi'l-arz were employed to present him as the ideal leader of his time and, as such, as deserving of unconditional obedience. Externally too, the reign of Abdülhamid II witnessed growing acceptance of his claim to the Caliphate among Muslims outside the Ottoman Empire, particularly in India, who came to regard him as the last independent Muslim opposing European colonialism.

This is not to say that Abdülhamid II’s position as Caliph went unchallenged. On the contrary, from the very start to the very end of his reign, the Caliphate question was hotly debated. More than twenty treatises devoted to the subject in Turkish, Arabic, Urdu, and English were published between 1877 and 1909, in addition to countless articles in newspapers and magazines in countries such as England, France, India, and Egypt.

Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate in England was triggered by the veneration and enthusiastic support for the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph by the Indian Muslims. Here opinions were divided on whether the Ottoman Sultans had any right to assume the Caliphate and whether it was time to transfer the title to the Arabs. Opponents of the Ottoman
Caliphate were almost exclusively retired civil servants of the British government in India. For example, George Birdwood suggested that the Caliphate be transferred to the Amir of Mecca. In an article in the *Times* he stated, ‘it is a great pity that we do not get the Muhammedans of India to look up to the Sharif of Mecca as the Caliph of Islam for he lives by the side of our road to India and would be as completely in our power as the Suez Canal.’\(^{58}\) In another article Birdwood observes ruefully that the Ottoman Caliphate was ‘universally admitted by the Sunni Muhammedans of India’, but suggested that ‘Muhammedans should begin their regeneration by electing the Sharif of Mecca – the tribe of the Qureish – Caliph of Islam.’ He further notes that ‘The nobility of the tribe of Qureish is not simply a great ethnological and historical fact but an article of faith.’\(^{59}\)

James Redhouse, a distinguished nineteenth-century British Orientalist,\(^{60}\) on the other hand, dismisses any criticism of the Ottoman Caliphate as ‘erroneous, futile, and impolitic.’ It is erroneous because, firstly, the Sultan’s title was not new and had been ‘accepted and adopted by the whole orthodox world of Islam,’ and secondly, because the view that the Caliph must have descended from the Quraysh tribe had been disputed already by the early Islamic jurists, who concluded that ‘there never was a prophetic injunction to the effect that the Caliph must be of the Arab tribe of Quraysh’.\(^{61}\) The criticism was futile because even if the legal arguments were solid, after three and a half centuries of possession it was too late for anyone to question the Ottomans’ right to the Caliphate. Finally, it was also impolitic because forty million Muslims were subjects of the British Crown and the vast majority of them recognised the Sultan ‘as the vicegerent of the Prophet, and the recognised religious head.’\(^{62}\)

Redhouse’s approach was supported by another distinguished Orientalist, George P. Badger, whose article of September 1877 was partly a response to Birdwood’s assertions. After giving a detailed etymological analysis of the terms ‘Caliphate’ and ‘Imamate’ and a brief history of the Arab Caliphs, Badger argued that the Caliphate of Islam was ‘inseparable from the suffrages of and the sovereignty over the greater portion of the Muslim community’ and that ‘the Ottoman Sultan has as much right to the dignity as any other pretender; nay more, considering the large body of Muslims who acknowledge his claim.... [Therefore] the Ottoman Sultan is the legitimate successor to Muhammad with those who recognise him as such.’\(^{63}\) Badger refuted the suggestion that the Caliphs should be chosen from among the Sharifs of Mecca simply because they were members of the Quraysh.
He argued that the Sharifs had nothing to substantiate their claims but supposed membership of the Quraysh tribe and certain privileges in connection with the Ka‘ba. From the beginning of Ottoman rule in the Hijaz, the Amir of Mecca had been a ‘mere creature of the Porte, removable at the pleasure of the Sultan. Besides, he has no influence whatever, political or spiritual, beyond his own assigned district.’

Still, British opponents of the Ottoman Caliphate continued to reject it on the grounds that it belonged to the tribe of Quraysh and that the Ottoman claim to it had no legal basis. Blunt wrote in 1882, ‘it was a maxim with all schools of theology of all ages that descent from the Koreysh was the first title to the Caliphate.’ Others expressed their opinions more vigorously. Among them was Reverend Malcolm McColl, an outspoken critic of the Ottomans since the 1870s, who spoke out again in 1906, declaring that an article of the creed of Islam reserved the Caliphate to the Quraysh, the Prophet’s tribe.

Ottoman opponents to Abdülhamid II’s rule sometimes used the same hadiths. Recent studies have underlined the role of ‘ulama and the Sufi brotherhoods in the opposition movement from the mid-1890s on, as well as the use of religious arguments by the opposition despite its secular identity. However, reference to the Quraysh hadith was not so common in these circles. As far as is known, an anonymous treatise entitled Imamet ve hilafet risalesi dated 1315/1897 is the first Turkish treatise published during the reign of Abdülhamid II arguing that the Caliphate was reserved for the tribe of the Quraysh. At about the same time al-Kawakibi emerged as a prominent opponent of Abdülhamid II’s Caliphate, being the first Arab writer to call for an Arab Caliphate and to cite the Quraysh hadith as a support.

As pointed out by Redhouse and other scholars, the hadith that reserved the Caliphate to the Prophet’s tribe -- ‘the Caliphs (Imams) are from the Quraysh’ -- appears to be of doubtful origin. In fact, long before Abdülhamid II’s reign, in the 1550s, serious debate erupted on this question among the Ottoman esraf. Pointing to the inclusion of this hadith in the works of the highly esteemed theologians Nasafi (d. 1141) and Taftazani (d.1389), they wondered whether the titles of imam and halife could be appropriated by non-Qurayshi leaders. In response, Lutfi Rasa (d. 1563) wrote the first Ottoman treatise on the Caliphate under the title Halas al-umma fi ma‘rifat al-a’imma. In it he concluded that whoever possessed the necessary conditions of power, justice, implementing the principle of commanding right and forbidding wrong and general leadership, had the right to claim the Caliphate. Since Suleyman I met all these
conditions, and others, he was rightly called \textit{imam} and \textit{halife} of all Muslims.\textsuperscript{72}

More elaborate was Pirizâde Mehmed Sahib (1674-1749), translator of Ibn Khaldun’s \textit{Muqaddima} into Ottoman Turkish. Pirizâde asserts that he studied the disputed question of the Qurayshi condition for the Caliphate in the Hanafi-Maturidi school and came to the conclusion that by his time that condition was no longer valid. For this interpretation he referred to the hadith in which the Prophet is claimed to have said, ‘after me the Caliphate will endure for thirty years, thereafter will come the rule of kings’. Pirizâde argued that the requirement that the Caliph must be a Qurayshi was valid only for the first four Rightly Guided Caliphs, and that later Muslim rulers could rightly assume the titles of the Caliphate virtually by fulfilling the functions of Caliph. In his words, \textit{‘hilafet-i nübüvvet} [\textit{hilafet-i kamila} (perfect Caliphate)] was completed with the Caliphate of ‘Ali, and conditions of the \textit{hilafet-i nübüvvet} were no longer required for those who claimed \textit{imamet} and Caliphate after them’.\textsuperscript{73}

Ibn Khaldun’s views justify Ottoman claims to the Caliphate, too. According to him, in the late ‘Abbasid period the Quraysh lost power and were unable to fulfil the post, so many ‘ulama concurred that the condition of Quraysh was no longer operative for the later Caliphs.\textsuperscript{74}

Ibn Khaldun’s position carried special weight because of the profound influence that his work exerted on nineteenth-century Ottoman thinkers such as Cevdet Pasa and other officials in Abdülhamid II’s regime. A distinguished jurist and historian who served as a minister and close adviser to the Sultan on Islamic and Arab matters, Cevdet completed Pirizâde’s translation of the \textit{Muqaddima} and was much influenced by Ibn Khaldun. Accordingly, he held the view that submission and obedience (\textit{inkiyad ve ita’at}) to whomever possessed greatness and power (\textit{sevket ve kudret}) was an Islamic requirement, and that ‘In our time the Ottoman state is the only protector of Islam on earth.... Therefore, since the Caliphate of the Ottoman dynasty is legitimate (\textit{mesrû}), those who oppose it are doubtless rebels and sinners (\textit{asi ve bagi}).’\textsuperscript{75}

Other defenders of Sultan Abdülhamid II’s Caliphate followed suit. One such figure was Hasan Bey Husni al-Tuyrani, whose \textit{Ijmal al-kalam ‘ala masa’il al-khilafa bayna ahl al-Islam} (A summary of the debates on the Caliphate among Muslims) was a response to Blunt’s \textit{The Future of Islam}.\textsuperscript{76} He vigorously defended the Ottoman Caliphate and questioned the authenticity of the Quraysh hadith. Another defender objecting to the Quraysh hadith was Mawlawi Hafiz ‘Abd al-Jamil in \textit{al-Zafar al-}
hamidiyya fi ithbat al-khalifa (The praiseworthy victory in affirming the Caliphate), which was designed to refute the views expressed by the Orientalist William Muir.

Such justifications for the Ottoman Caliphate aside, Abdülhamid II remained preoccupied throughout his reign with the opposition to his Caliphate. Thus, British involvement in the issue of an Arab Caliph, which coincided with Britain’s increasing influence in the Arab lands, led to misgivings about its designs for the Ottoman Arabs. As the Sultan explained to the journalist Ahmed Midhat Effendi, ‘England’s aim is to transfer the Great Caliphate from Istanbul to Jedda in Arabia or to a place in Egypt and, by keeping the Caliphate under her control, to manage all the Muslims as she wishes.’

Cevdet Pasa, as well as Abu al-Huda al-Sayyadi, the leading Sufi Shaykh in the empire, tried to convince the Sultan that the Arabs were well aware of their obligation of obedience to the Caliph and therefore would always uphold his authority in the Arab provinces. Nevertheless Abdülhamid II’s fear of a possible Arab pretender to the Caliphate prevailed. Secret instructions were sent periodically to the governors of Aleppo, Baghdad, Beirut, Syria, the Hijaz, and Yemen, directing them to be vigilant so as to pre-empt the seditious British and Egyptian designs to separate ‘the sacred Islamic Caliphate from the Ottoman Sultanate.’

Conclusion

The material used for this paper supports the view that from the 1770s on the Ottoman Sultans increasingly employed the institution of the Caliphate for political purposes. The underlying reasons for this tendency were related to the developments within the empire as well as in the international arena. Internally, the Ottomans embarked on a new reform program which would eventually change the state’s administrative structure at almost every level. All means to gain support for the new course had to be utilised, and the institution of the Caliphate was one of the most significant. Political developments outside the Ottoman Empire also increased the importance of the Caliphate. For once, Muslim leaders in colonised territories, particularly India, attached increasing importance to the institution of the Caliphate as their protector against foreign rule. Retired civil servants of the British government of India were well-aware of this development and opposed the Ottoman claim to the Caliphate.

Traditional principles such as divine will, bay’a, inheritance, and actual power were employed by the Sultans to justify their claims to the
Caliphate. While all four principles were in use after 1774, the raising of the issue of Quraysh descent in the late nineteenth century led to an increase in weight of the principle of actual power. The nineteenth century also witnessed ever-increasing circulation of a most probably fabricated story that the last ‘Abbasid Caliph had transferred all rights to the Caliphate to Sultan Selim and his heirs. The Ottoman Constitution of 1876 added a final principle of justification by inserting an article to the effect that the Ottoman Sultanate comprised the ‘Great Islamic Caliphate.’ Hence, clear references to the constitution appeared in the *ferman* of investiture of the last two Sultans, Mehmed Resad and Vahideddin.

The institution of the Caliphate became most visible under the reign of Abdülhamid II. The Sultan regarded Islam as the basis of unity and solidarity among his subjects, and the Caliphate as the major symbol of this unity. Hence, from the late 1870s an abundance of publications supported the Sultan’s position as Caliph. This claim did not go unchallenged, as the opposition turned to religious arguments to refute it. Most potentially influential was the argument first aired by British writers that the Caliphate was reserved for the tribe of Quraysh and could not be held by the Ottomans. Opposing this claim, Abdülhamid II could reiterate long established opinions that this injunction was long obsolete, though this could not shield him from fear of the establishment of a rival British-backed Arab Caliphate.

**Notes**

6. Evidently, the underlying psychological reason for the Ottoman-Russian War of 1787 was that the Ottomans could not endure the loss of Crimea. Shortly after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca there was talk in some quarters about a new war against Russia to retake the Crimea. Even during the reign of Selim III (1789-1807) reports submitted to the Sultan contained expressions such as ‘until the Crimea is re-conquered’ (*Kırım fetbi miyessar aluntaşa degen*), which show Ottoman feelings concerning the Crimea. For an example, see Ergin Çağman, ‘III. Selim’e Sunulan Bir Islahat Raporu: Mehmet Serif Efendi Layihası’, *Divan* 7 (1999), p. 225.
Talimattir (Istanbul, 1302/1884-5). I am indebted to Ilhami Yurdakul for supplying me with a copy of this document.

10 Mesthat: Yunanistan ve Romanya, p. 2.
17 On the origins of this title, see Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam (Cambridge, 1986).
21 This title was not an Ottoman invention. Evidently, it had been coined during the Abbasid period; see D. Sourdel, Khalifa, EI 2, vol. 2, p. 938. Among the Ottoman Sultans, and especially Abdülhamid II, it was used frequently in domestic correspondence and reports submitted to the Palace.
22 For examples see Âsim, Tarih ([Istanbul], n.d), vol. 2, p. 61; BOA, Sadaret Defterleri, no. 365, p. 92; Hicaz Vilayeti Sahnamesi (1309), p. 81. The same expression occurs in a speech delivered by the leader of the Upper Chamber at the opening ceremony of the parliament in 1877. Hakki Tarik Us, Medis-i Mebusan Zabit Ceridesi (Istanbul, 1939), vol. 1, p. 3.
23 See for example in the correspondence announcing the ascent of Abdülaziz in BOA, AMKT. UM., 480/59; 480/97 and 481/24, Evahir-i Zilhicce 1277/ early July 1861.
27 Apparently there is no contemporary evidence to support the view that the holy relics included the keys of the Ka’ba; see Butrus Abu-Manneh, ‘A Note on the Keys of the Ka’ba’, The Islamic Quarterly 18/3-4 (1974), pp. 71-4.
28 BOA, Yildiz Perakende Askeri Maruzat Evraki (Y.PRK.ASK), 234/15; Cevdet Pasa, Tezükir, Cavid Baysun, ed. (Ankara, 1986), p. 149; Abdurrahman Seref, Tarbi-i Devletî

29 For the full text of the Ottoman Constitution, see Kili: Türk Anayasa Metinleri, pp. 43ff.

30 Kili: Türk Anayasa Metinleri, p. 82.

31 For the full text of Vahideddin’s manifesto written while he was in Mecca in 1923, see Hüseyin Kazim Kadri, Mesrutiyetten Cumhuriyete Hatıralarım (Istanbul, 2000), pp. 293-300; a French translation in Jean-Louis Bacque-Grammont and Hasseine Mammeri, ‘Sur le Pelerinage et quelques Proclamations de Mehmed VI en Exil’, Turcica 14 (1982), pp. 237-42.

32 See Azmi Özcan, Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924) (Leiden, 1997), pp. 10-21.


37 BOA, Hatt-i Hümayun, no. 3839-B, ‘Sam-i Serif Kadisinin Ilimidir’, 7 Receb 1222/11 September 1807. See also the correspondences between the Ottoman government and the wali of Damascus, Hatt-i Hümayun, nos. 3839, 3839-A, 3 Cemazıyeleveland 1222/9 July 1807; 3839-C, 15 Receb 1222/19 September 1807; and 3839-D, 10 Receb 1222/14 September 1807. For a typical Ottoman perception of the Wahhabi threat, see Eyüp Sabri Pasa, Tarih-i Vehhabiyan (Istanbul, 1296/1878-9).


41 Abu al-Thana’ al-Alusi (1802-1854), the mufti of Baghdad in the mid-1830s, wrote a commentary entitled Sharh al-burhan fî ita’at al-Sultan on this treatise emphasising the legitimacy of the Ottoman Sultanate and the duty of all Muslims to obey the Sultan; see Basheer M. Nafi, ‘Abu al-Thana’ al-Alusi: An Alim, Ottoman Mufti, and Exegete of the Quran’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 34 (2002), p. 477. At about the same time another work was written in Arabic in support of the military reforms of Mahmud II. The author, Ibn al-‘Annabi (1775-1850), was an Algerian who moved to Egypt in 1829 and was later appointed mufti of Alexandria. Annabi’s al-Sa’y al-mahmud fî nizam al-jumn remained unpublished. Manuscripts are extant in the Süleymaniye Library and in the library of al-Azhar. For a review, see İhsan Fazlıoğlu, ‘İbnu’l-‘Annabi ve es-Sa’yu’l-Mahmûd fî Nizâmi’l-Cünûd Adli Eseri’, Divan 1 (1996), pp. 165-74.
For example, Nazif Sururi in the introduction to his treatise entitled *Hilafet-i Muazzama-i İslamiye* (Istanbul, 1315/1897), p. 4, states that he follows Abdulwahhab Effendi.

Yasini Zadah: *Khulasat al-burhan*, p. 27. See also Ersahin: *The Ulema and the Reforms*, pp. 36-54.

These titles were frequently used in *Taksim-i Vekayi*, the first official newspaper published from 1831 on; see nos. 20 (1247/1831), 50 (1248/1832), and 102 (1251/1835).


Abu-Manneh: *Studies on Islam*, p. 79.

For the Gülhane Rescript and its Islamic roots, see Abu-Manneh: *Studies on Islam*, pp. 73-97.


These discussions continued even after the establishment of the constitutional regime. As is well known, despite the suspension of the parliament by Abdülhamid II toward the end of the war with Russia, the constitution remained theoretically in force throughout his reign. When the Sultan inclined to reconvene the parliament in 1880, anti-constitutionalists again raised their voices. Ahmed Midhat Effendi (1844-1912), one of his trusted advisors, wrote a long report, dated 8 May 1880, in which he argued that both the shari’a and the constitution protect the rights of the Sultan-Caliph and that therefore he should not listen to the voices of anti-constitutionalists. The first section of the report is entitled ‘The question of caliphate according to the shari’a’; BOA, Yıldız Esas Evraki (YEE) 71/31, 8 May 1880. A transliteration of the report is published in Ismail Kara (ed.), *Hilafet Risaleleri* (2 vols., Istanbul, 2002), vol. 1, pp. 111-38. This is a collection of twenty-four treatises written during Abdülhamid II’s reign.

BOA, YEE 11/1325/120/5, October 1896, quoted in Engin D. Akarlı, ‘Abdulhamid II’s Attempts to Integrate Arabs into the Ottoman System’, in David Kushner (ed.), *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period* (Leiden, 1986), p. 76.

Atilla Çetin and Ramazan Yıldız, *Sultan İkinci Abdülhamid Han: Devlet ve Memleket Görüşlerinin* (Istanbul, 1976), p. 199. This is a collection of Abdülhamid’s memoranda, transliterated and published in modern Turkish. The originals are in Basbakanlik Osmanlı Arsivi, Yıldız Esas Evraki section.


Imber: *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 120.


George Birdwood, *The Times*, 12 June 1877.

George Birdwood, *The Times*, 9 July 1877.
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62 Redhouse: *A Vindication*, p. 5.

63 G. P. Badger, ‘The Precedents and Usages Regulating the Muslim Khalifate’, *The Nineteenth Century* 2 (1877), pp. 274-82. See also Badger’s article in *The Times*, 12 October 1877.


68 Kara: *Hilafet Risaleleri*, vol. 2, pp. 63-5.

69 Al-Kawakibi, *Umm al-qura*, pp. 234ff.

70 Hatipoglu argues that early Islamic sources do not support the view that Abu Bakr cited the hadith ‘the imams are from the Quraysh’ during his election as the first Caliph and that it was probably fabricated during the Umayyad period, especially against the Khawarij; see Mehmed S. Hatipoglu, ‘Islamda İlkmîyle Kayımıçılık: Hilafetin Kureysîlîlîği’, *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 23 (1978), pp. 121-213.

71 The hadith is cited in numerous classical works such as Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855), *Musnad* (Beirut, 1985), vol. 2, pp. 129, 183; Jalal al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Suyuti (d.1505), *Tarihî al-khulafa*’ (Cairo, 1969), pp. 9ff; Sa’d al-Din al-Taftazani (d.1389), *Sharh al-’Aqa'id*, translated into modern Turkish and published with the original text by Süleyman Uludag, *Taftazanî, Kelam İlimi ve Islam Akâidi: Serhu’l-Akâid* (Istanbul, 1982), p. 329, p. 70 in the original text; Ibn Khaldun: *Maqaddima*, vol. 1, p. 345. Taftazani was commonly used as a theological textbook in Ottoman madrasas while the *Maqaddima* was very influential among the learned.


75 Cevdet Pasa: *Tezâkîr*, pp. 148-9. Cevdet’s private papers in the Atatürk Kitaplığı and various reports in the Yıldız Collection testify to his special interest in the issue. He
took notes on the subject from al-Suyuti and Ibn Khaldun; particularly revealing is the argument taken from the latter that the Caliph be a Qurayshi is no longer required; see BOA, YEE 32/41, and Cevdet Pasa Evraki in Atatürk Kitaplığı, no. 55.


79 Considering the views of Zohrab, the British Consul in Jedda in 1880, on the possibility of declaring the Sharif of Mecca as Caliph with British assistance and protection, Abdülhamid’s concern was not baseless; see Butrus Abu-Manneh, ‘Sultan Abdülhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca (1880-1900)’, *Asian and African Studies* 9 (1973), pp. 5-6.


81 Considering the views of Zohrab, the British Consul in Jedda in 1880, on the possibility of declaring the Sharif of Mecca as Caliph with British assistance and protection, Abdülhamid’s concern was not baseless; see Butrus Abu-Manneh, ‘Sultan Abdülhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca (1880-1900)’, *Asian and African Studies* 9 (1973), pp. 5-6.

82 For Cevdet’s views, see BOA, YEE, 18/553-210/93/35, written while governor of Syria in 1878, and YEE 38/67, most probably in the early years of Abdülhamid II. For Abu al-Huda’s article, see *Tercüman-I Hakikat*, no. 1016 (10 Tesrinisani/ November 1881), p. 2. Abu-Manneh suggests that Abu al-Huda’s first treatise on the Caliphate, *Da‘l al-nushad li-sabil al-itthād wa‘l-inqiyad*, was primarily intended for Syrian Muslim Arabs; Abu-Manneh: ‘Sultan Abdülhamid II’, p. 143. Abu al-Huda wrote a second treatise in defence of the Ottoman Caliphate, apparently in the 1890s, *al-Nafa‘ha al-nabawiyya fi khidmat al-khilafa al-hamidiyya al-‘uthmaniyya*, which was not published but was kept in the Yıldız Library; Istanbul University Library, Turkish manuscripts (TY), 4704 (n.d.), 91 pp. For a Turkish transliteration, see Kara: *Hilafet*, vol. 1, pp. 203-51.

83 Such views are recorded in numerous documents in the Yıldız collection of the Ottoman archives. See in particular BOA, Yıldız Perakende Umum Vilayetler Tahrirati (Y.PRK.UM), 34/50, 10 and 13 Subat 1311/ February 1896; Yıldız Perakende Mabeyn Baskıtabeti (Y.PRK.BSK) 58/63, 25 Ramazan 1316/ January 1899; Y.PRK.BSK, 63/77, 14 Kanun-i Evvel 1316/ 1901; Y.PRK.BSK, 63/93, 23 Kanun-i Sani 1316/ 1901; Yıldız Perakende Hariciye Nezareti Maruzatı (Y.PRK.HR), 19/59, 12 August 1895; and Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Maruzatı Evraki (Y.A.HUS), 509/59, 13 Muharrem 1325/ February 1907).
Who is the Next Ottoman Sultan?
Attempts to Change the Rule of Succession during the Nineteenth Century

Hakan T. Karateke

The ridiculous custom of Venetians is that kingship is not by hereditary right, but they become doge by accidental merit. (Mustafa Na’ima).¹

The Unbearable Responsibility of Being Ottoman

Fu’ad Pasa, Minister of the Exterior during the 1850s and one of the prominent proponents of Westernization in the Ottoman bureaucracy, told Sir Stratford Canning, the British Ambassador to Istanbul, that one of the four pillars of the Ottoman state was the Ottoman dynasty.² Having ruled the Ottoman lands for over 600 years, it was the definitive feature of the state and critical for its subjects’ sense of identity. As Philip Mansel remarks, the fact that the Ottoman subjects were referred to as ‘Osmanlı’ (Ottoman) was ipso facto an indication of this intertwined relationship.³ We do not refer to eighteenth-century Austrian subjects as ‘Habsburgs’ or ‘Habsburgians’, or to nineteenth-century Russians as ‘Romanovs’ or ‘Romanovians’!

Fu’ad Pasa’s words, although possibly expressing a certain strategy, emphasise an important fact. The Ottoman state and the Ottoman dynasty were very much interdependent. If one were to perish, the other would as well. David Urquhart, a British diplomat in Istanbul, observed astutely in 1830s, at a time when European travelers’ Hellenophile sentiments were at their peak, and many wished, as did Stratford Canning, that ‘the Sultan were driven bag and baggage into the heart of Asia’,⁴ that,

Whoever has opened the history of the Ottoman Empire, must have been struck by the fact of the supremacy of a single
family through thirty generations, and during six centuries. We will not venture to trace the cause of this fact, but we may be permitted to infer from it, first, the great probability of breaking up the empire by displacing this family; and secondly, the deep demoralization that must ensue from destroying throughout a whole people, a principle which is not only their sole political bond, but which is so interwoven with their habits, their feelings of duty and religion, that it cannot be separated from them.\(^5\)

Despite this fundamental identity of dynasty and state, there is no doubt that both Ottoman political thought and the popular perception of the political authority were influenced by the process of secularization and the developing political awareness of nineteenth-century Europe. Kings ruling by divine right, as well as monarchical regimes in general, along with all kinds of magical elements in the government, were gradually losing their prestige. The Ottoman dynasty steadily lost its ‘sacred’ prestige during the course of the nineteenth century. Fu‘ad Pasa’s politically intelligent statement thus reflected a habitual thought that could not easily be discarded. Even if we know today that a change of dynasty was not going to happen, many candidates for the throne in Istanbul had in fact already lined up.

This article explores the attempts to change the rule of Ottoman succession in the nineteenth century, as well as the efforts made to replace the Ottoman dynasty altogether. I believe, as Friedrich Giese argued in 1927, that initial attempts to change the rule of succession undertaken by Abdülmecid can be seen as a part of his greater project of bringing the Ottoman monarchy closer to that of the European monarchies.\(^6\) None of the Sultans after him kept to the modernization program with the same scope and vision. On the other hand, a belief that the cause of many problems and general disorderliness was the passing of power to the oldest member of the dynasty became popular during this particular period. The idea that such type of power transfer was an obstacle to modernization became widespread, especially among the Westernizing literati. Ahmed Sa‘ib, for example, an opposition member in exile, wrote at the turn of the twentieth century that he desired a rule of succession that was in accordance with ‘the modern times, the shari‘a, and reason’.\(^7\) Although the attempts to change the dynasty and transfer the Caliphate to another family may appear to be a slightly different story, as we shall see they are clearly connected to the change in mentality described above. That the
Ottoman dynasty was losing its prestige was a fact that the Sultans had to cope with. Many of the occurrences narrated here were the direct results of this confrontation.

A Short History of Succession until the Nineteenth Century

In the first centuries of Ottoman rule, until 1617, succession to the Ottoman throne was maintained through filial descent, that is, from father to son. Although the practice seems to have favoured the oldest son alive (or not captive, as in the case of Murad II’s son Orhan), there are so many exceptions that, as Giese argued, it is difficult to speak of concrete rules such as primogeniture. After 1617 the rule of seniority was truly adopted: the oldest male member of the dynasty became the legitimate heir apparent. When Ahmed I died, his brother Mustafa I ascended the throne as the oldest member of the House of Osman. Mustafa, however, was dethroned after three months because of his mental instability, and Ahmed’s son, Osman II, was made the Sultan. Nevertheless, the new rule of succession was established without notice being taken of this early drawback. Now princes were no longer murdered, but kept in seclusion until it was time for them to ascend the throne. This practice, although not codified, became a strong tradition that endured until the nineteenth century. Only in that final century of the empire did some of the Sultans attempt to change the rule of succession once again, to that of a son following the father.

Murad Instead of Abdülaziz?

The first endeavours to change the rule of succession in the nineteenth century can be traced to Abdülmeclid’s reign. During that time articles on the modes of succession in the European monarchies began to appear in the semi-official newspapers. Abdülmeclid intended to have his eldest son Murad succeed to the throne instead of his brother, Abdülaziz, the official heir according to custom. The Sultan’s complaints to Dr. Siegmund Spitzer, the Viennese imperial physician in Istanbul, about his concerns that Abdülaziz might not treat his sons properly if he were to succeed the throne, and his taking Murad along on a trip to Iráklion contrary to protocol, are only some of the indications that he was preparing the ground for this change. According to Ahmed Cevdet, he even wanted to keep Abdülaziz away from Istanbul by appointing him governor of Tripoli, though this was never realized. Moreover, Abdülmeclid openly told Sir Stratford
Canning about his plans, as he wanted to ascertain how the European powers would react to such a modification. Sir Stratford intimated that Britain would not support such a change, asserting that other princes who would lose their right to the Ottoman throne would not give up their claims, and that would cause chaos. Receiving this response, Ahmed Cevdet informs us, Abdülmeclid temporarily suspended his plans. The French Ambassador, with whom the Sultan was on better terms, supported the change in the rule of succession.

Rumours that the rule of succession would be modified in favour of the Sultan’s son became widespread at the time. It was said that Abdülaziz ate nothing except what his mother prepared for him and did not leave his room in the Palace for fear of possible assassination. Sultan Abdülmeclid’s early and sudden death left his plan unrealized. However, the rumours were so pervasive that by the time of the enthronement of the new Sultan, uncertainty arose among the bureaucrats as to whether the rule of succession had been changed or not. Consequently, tension arose between two groups, one led by the Minister of War Riza Pasa, who supported Murad’s accession to the throne, and the other by the Grand Vizier, Qibrislı Mehmed Pasa, and the Grand Admiral Mehmed ‘Ali Pasa.

The conflict was reflected in the official invitations sent out by the Office of Ceremonies: the place where the name of the new Sultan was to be written on the invitation to the ceremony of allegiance was initially left blank. The other ministers also felt uncertain. The Grand Vizier pressured in favour of Abdülaziz and lobbied among some ‘ulema who came to perform the funeral prayer for Abdülmecid. With their insistence on Abdülaziz, whose world view was known to be closer to theirs than that of Murad, who had been raised like a European prince, the blanks in the invitations were filled in with Abdülaziz’s name. Similarly, the first official correspondence after Abdülmecid’s death did not include the new Sultan’s name; the blank was again subsequently filled in. As soon as he came to power Abdülaziz understandably dismissed his principal opponent, the long-standing Minister of War, Riza Pasa. In consequence of his uncle’s restrictions on him, Murad is said to have secretly sought protection from the French government in the first years of Abdülaziz’s reign. Outrey, the premier dragoman of the French embassy in Istanbul, informed Emperor Napoléon of the precarious nature of the situation when in Paris in late 1864. The Emperor instructed Outrey on his return to Istanbul to offer official protection to the Prince — should it become necessary.
… Or Yusuf Izzeddin instead of Six Other Princes?

With Abdülaziz’s ascent to power Murad became the legitimate heir to the throne. Once in power, and with the issue already on the political agenda, Abdülaziz sought to capitalize on it and began considering changing the rule of succession in favour of his son, Yusuf Izzeddin. Alas, six princes older than Yusuf were eligible as successors ahead of him (Fig. 1), so that opposition was very likely to develop. Abdülaziz acted judiciously, and before openly proposing a modification of the rule he set out to mollify different pressure groups and have his son gain popularity among them. First of all, to have the military people get used to the anticipated heir, Yusuf Izzeddin, then a child of six, was enlisted in the army and quickly promoted. At the age of nine, he was screaming commands to his battalion in his child’s voice during a parade at Pangaltı when Prince Karl von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen visited Istanbul in October 1866. That same year a fountain was constructed in Tophane in his name. The next year, aged ten, Yusuf received the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and the Sultan took him along on a trip to the European capitals. Later rumours spread that contrary to the rules of protocol Abdülaziz had arranged Yusuf Izzeddin’s reception in Paris and London before the official heir Murad, then aged twenty-seven, had been presented.

A new propaganda strategy was employed as pictures of Yusuf Izzeddin appeared in the weekly journal Ayine-i Vatan (The Mirror of the Fatherland) in 1867, some of the first pictures to be printed in the Ottoman press. It was rumoured that Mehmed ‘Arif, the editor, received a huge grant in return for his beau geste. Unsurprisingly, in one of these pictures the ten-year-old prince was shown wearing a military uniform. At the age of fourteen, Izzeddin was made commander of the Fourth Army (Anatolian Army) with the rank of marshal, and soon after was appointed commander of the First Army, the Imperial Army. Yusuf spent most of his teenage in barracks, and many high ranking military men and higher level bureaucrats were given gifts in return for their support for this situation.

When the conservative Mahmud Nedim Pasa became Grand Vizier in September 1871 he lent his support to Abdülaziz’s plans. A whispering campaign was generated in the first months of 1872 to the effect that the Sultan had obtained the verbal approval of the Seyhülislam and that the latter would give a fetva in favour of filial succession. By now many were expecting a change by fait accompli at
any time. Although the Palace denied the rumours, and Mahmud Nedim Pasa asserted to the ambassadors that such a change was not on the agenda, Yusuf Izzeddin was still being favoured in the protocol. An order sent by Vittorio Emanuele, the King of Italy, to the official heir of the Ottoman throne was presented to Yusuf Izzeddin. In 1874 his portrait and biography appeared on the front page of L’Orient illustré, a French-language weekly published in Istanbul. Heretofore, only the portrait of the reigning Sultan had been published by that journal. The prince was only seventeen when he appeared with the Sultan right after the Grand Vizier, the Seyhülislam, and the ministers, at the awards ceremonies for graduates of the imperial, medical, and military schools. Yusuf delivered the congratulatory speech to the graduates.

**Opposition to Abdülaziz Grows**

Abdülaziz’s plans to modify the rule of succession did not go unchallenged. On 30 September 1868 about sixty people were arrested, among them officials who had worked in Abdülmecid’s Palace, and accused of plotting to assassinate the Sultan. The group, which had met regularly at Madame Theresa’s house in Pera to escape attention, wanted nothing less than to have Murad ascend the throne. In the 1870s, as rumours about the Sultan’s plans became widespread, opposition voices were reported from the Anatolian provinces. Couched in religious terms, the major argument was that a change in the rule of succession would be ‘against the principles of the Qur’an’. The British Ambassador, Sir Henry Elliot, reported to London that he had not met anyone who supported the anticipated change. Severely critical articles also appeared in newspapers printed outside Ottoman lands, such as Inkilab (Revolution), which had been founded in Geneve in 1870 by the activists Hüseyin Vasfi and Mehmed Bey. Brunswik’s La Succession au trône de la Turquie, which was harshly critical of Abdülaziz, went into a second printing only a couple of months after being banned by the Ottoman authorities. The book was translated into Turkish shortly after its publication, and was circulated among the Ottoman literati in manuscript form.

One could argue that plots in support of Murad only increased Abdülaziz’s resolve, or at least considerably narrowed his options concerning the planned change in favour of his own son. From this point of view, promoting Yusuf Izzeddin to the position of official heir would not only avert the threats of deposition against Abdülaziz,
but also leave no legal ground to Murad’s supporters were he de-throned. On the other hand, bypassing six princes eligible for the post of Sultan was bound to generate dismay among them. But the most important obstacle holding Abdülaziz back was undoubtedly the opposition he met from influential officials, especially the leading Tanzimat statesmen Ali Pasa and Fu‘ad Pasa. On this issue they were confronted by Es‘ad Pasa, the Minister of War, who backed Abdülaziz.

The Sultan’s intention to change the rule of succession triggered a political struggle among the ambassadors as well, each seeking to enhance his country’s influence with the Ottoman government. For example, Britain and Austria originally tended to confirm Abdülaziz’s scheme in order to get closer to him. They changed their minds upon learning that the most ardent supporter of the Sultan was Russia, which employed Mahmud Nedim Pasa as a liaison. Around that time an American delegation, which included the son of President Ulysses S. Grant, visited the Sultan. The interpreter for the delegation made a speech in favour of the Sultan’s plans to change the rule of succession, but it was later understood that the speech did not reflect the opinion of the delegation and that the interpreter had been enticed into the intrigue at the instigation of the Russian Embassy. Mr. Brown was interrogated on the issue, but died soon after. It was said that his heart could not bear the tension. Yet, according to another version, he committed suicide by taking poison.

To further legitimize his plans, Abdülaziz tactically supported a change to primogeniture in the Khedival dynasty of Egypt. Occupied since 1841 by the progeny of Muhammad ‘Ali, the governorship of Egypt had been handed on in the same manner as the Sultanate in Istanbul, from father to the oldest male member of the family. Abdülaziz and Isma‘il Pasa of Egypt must have agreed on a common policy during the Sultan’s visit to Cairo in 1863, as he initiated a highly concentrated form of propaganda on the issue after his return. A ferman allowing primogeniture was promulgated on 27 May 1866, though it was never seriously implemented in Egypt and was abrogated after two successions. But by granting primogeniture to Isma‘il, Abdülaziz was clearly seeking to create a positive climate of opinion about a change in favour of his own son. Significantly, at this time the newspapers reported that a ship very much like the one owned by the Khedive was to be constructed for Yusuf Izzeddin.

Fuelled by the disputes surrounding the Ottoman throne, the opposition to Abdülaziz steadily grew. Particularly vociferous were the New Ottomans, an opposition group of intellectuals and bureaucrats
in exile who vigorously supported Murad as the only candidate capable of fulfilling the ideal of a modern European monarch. Not surprisingly, they were financed by Mustafa Fazıl, brother of Isma'il Pasa, who was bypassed as heir in Egypt as a result of Abdülaziz’s ferman. On 1 April 1873 the throng emerging from the first performance of the play *Vatan* (Fatherland) by the New Ottomans’ ideologue Namik Kemal shouted ‘Allah *murad*imizi versin’, ‘God grant us our desire’ - *murad* (desire) standing for the prince’s name. The play was banned and Kemal was exiled. In another play by Namik Kemal published in 1875, entitled *Gülnihal* (the name of one of the characters), a certain Kaplan Pasa is characterized as causing quarrels in the family, even killing his relatives, through his despotic rule. He is also depicted as trying to usurp the right to rule from Muhtar, the hero of the play. The choice of the name Muhtar, meaning ‘chosen, elected’, was certainly not fortuitous. According to contemporary observers, Kaplan Pasa was easily identified by readers with the ruling Sultan.

Two letters written by Ziya Bey, another ideologue of the New Ottomans, which explicitly criticized the plans to change the rule of succession, had been formerly published as a pamphlet. Abdülaziz was overthrown in 1876 before he could realize his scheme, but the vast amounts of propaganda in favour of Yusuf Izzeddin made its impact. As Murad V was known to favour Western manners, rumours circulated even during his short three-month reign that religious bigots were conspiring to have Yusuf Izzeddin ascend the throne, even though he was not the legitimate heir. Subsequently, during the reign of Abdülhamid II, secret reports were submitted to the Palace about factions working to ensure Yusuf Izzeddin’s ascent to the Ottoman throne. Finally, as the closing episode in this string of events, gossip began to circulate after 1905 to the effect that Abdülhamid II intended to leave the throne to his son Burhaneddin, talk that caused a fresh round of opposition.

The rule of seniority was finally codified with the third article of the Constitution in 1876. It read: ‘The exalted Ottoman Sultanate, along with the supreme Islamic Caliphate, belongs by way of ancient custom to the oldest son of the Ottoman dynasty.’ The codification of seniority can in fact be viewed as directly related to the spread of ideas in the nineteenth century suggesting that a ruler who was not from the Ottoman dynasty could assume power in Istanbul. A glance at the succession of rulers in Ottoman history shows that many Sultans had been deposed in Istanbul, some in particularly brutal ways, but only to ensure that other members of the same dynasty would succeed them.
Such an end was regarded as a possible fate that each Sultan had to reckon with, one way or another. However, opinions stating that a person who was not a member of Osman’s line could ascend the throne in Istanbul found considerable acceptance only in the nineteenth century. Adolphus Slade, a British naval officer who travelled in Turkey from 1829 to 1831, made the following remarkable observation: ‘Ten years ago, the idea even of another than the house of Othman reigning over Turkey would have been heresy: the question is now openly broached.’

**And How about another Dynasty instead of the Ottomans?**

When Mahmud II had his brother Mustafa IV murdered during the turmoil of 1808 in order to remain the only surviving member of the dynasty, a very unusual buzz is said to have arisen from the Janissaries, who did not want to see him on the throne. The chronically fractious military corps is believed to have shouted, ‘Is the Sultan also not only a human being? Anyone would do! The shaykh in Konya (i.e. the Mevlevi çelebi) shall become the Sultan!’ Presumably, if such words were really uttered, it was at a moment of tumult. Even so, the increase in the number of non-dynastic contenders for the office of Caliph and even of Sultan in the following decades implies that such ideas gained popularity at the beginning of the nineteenth century, if not earlier. MacFarlane reports with great astonishment his observations in the late 1820s concerning the widespread conviction that the çelebi possessed a legitimate right to the Ottoman throne:

> [O]n my arrival at Constantinople, I was much surprised to hear asserted by many (Osmanlis as well as rayahs) that this priest-king [i.e. the çelebi] descended like the reigning dynasty from Osman, that it was a collateral branch of the same family, and that its members were legitimately eligible to the throne. … All the Turks from whom I had inquiries made (and they were many, and among them some pretenders to literature and historical erudition), agreed on the brilliant origin of the family of this mollah, and even on the rights that it had to the throne.

The çelebis had never claimed the right to the Ottoman throne, but rumours were widespread that Midhat Pasa, twice a short-term Grand Vizier in 1872 and 1876, conspired to seize the Ottoman throne. According to these rumours Midhat went so far as to ask: ‘If there is
an Ottoman dynasty, why would there not be a Midhat dynasty? Even if meant seriously, this intention seems hardly realizable. On the other hand, the Pasa’s alternative plan, to overthrow the Ottomans and proclaim a republic, was probably more feasible. On one of the days following Murad’s accession in 1876, talking openly about his ideas of a republic, he had locked and sealed the chamber of the Topkapi Ottoman family were kept. According to a document in the Ottoman Archives, when Midhat Pasa came to the Palace with the ministers at his side, he turned, pointing at the objects in the chamber, and said to them, “These were all acquired with the taxpayers’ money. They all should be confiscated.” These words of Midhat can well be regarded as foreshadowing the laws that were to be enacted in 1922 regarding the Ottoman dynasty. Abdülhamid’s reign represented a backlash against opposition to the Ottoman family, or to a monarchical regime in general, which had swollen throughout the nineteenth century.

Other attempts were made to dethrone the Ottomans. One widely circulated plot was to dispossess the Ottomans of the office of the Caliph and to appoint Sharif ‘Abd al-Muttalib, the former Amir of Mecca and a descendent of the Prophet, to it. This conspiracy was uncovered when a letter was found in the wardrobe of ‘Ali Nazmi, a cadet at the military academy and a follower of Namik Kemal. During the 1870s, the British too proved supportive of such a plot. At that time British officials who had served in India published articles stating that the Indian Muslims were closely attached to the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph and that England, in her own interests, should support a Caliph with whom easier collaboration could be maintained.

The Muhammad ‘Ali dynasty in Egypt, though no more qualified than the Ottoman for the Caliphate, also regarded itself as a candidate for the office, and even for the throne in Istanbul. It is no secret that during the 1830s both Britain and France had weighed the candidacy of Muhammad ‘Ali himself to that throne. After all, he had provided aid to people going on the pilgrimage and assisted tribal chiefs and the provincial notables. People were so impressed by his success in crushing the Wahhabi uprising that some started to believe that he was the only person who could save Crimea from the Russians. Nor did the rivalry between Istanbul and Cairo fade following Muhammad ‘Ali’s death. His successors attained almost exclusive rights to Egypt with the ferman of Succession of 1873, and it was almost only natural to think about acquiring the throne in Istanbul next.

Among the pieces of information that Sultan Abdülhamid II
obtained through his wide intelligence network was that young ‘Abbas Hilmi Pasa, who became the Khedive of Egypt in 1892, considered himself a likely candidate for the office of the Caliph, undoubtedly counting on England’s assistance with this move. At the Sultan’s request, the Russian Ambassador, Neilidov, tried to confirm this information by sounding out the Khedive himself sometime during the first months of 1895. The Khedive found encouragement from among the New Ottomans, some of whom were living in exile in Egypt, where they published articles against Abdülhamid and the Ottoman Caliphate. As another manoeuvre in the power game, the Khedive endeavoured to bring the ‘ulama of al-Azhar to his side and to have the Sultan’s name omitted from the Friday sermons. Cairo was becoming a difficult place for the officials appointed by Istanbul. ‘Abbas Hilmi intended to make a trip to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Crimea in 1900 to gain the sympathy and support of the Muslims living there. Eventually, the trip had to be cancelled because of the Sultan’s opposition. While the Khedive was employing these tactics to realize his plans, pamphlets against him were being distributed on the streets of Istanbul – an act obviously impossible without Abdülhamid’s knowledge. Petitions were also submitted to the Yildiz Palace by Muslims from the Arab provinces, asserting that they would prefer an ‘Ottoman’ governor in Egypt to one from the Muhammad ‘Ali dynasty.

Threats on the lives of members of the Ottoman dynasty spread in reaction to the power of the Palace and the ruling elite during this time. The opposition to Abdülhamid’s autocratic regime tried to injure his reputation through a propaganda campaign in which it was claimed that his mother was an Armenian concubine. This tactic was partially effective at a time when the Ottoman state was experiencing problems with its Armenian population. Numerous contemporary authors, Ottomans and others, who were not particularly sympathetic to the Sultan, mention in their works how much Abdülhamid looked like an Armenian. To counteract this, the Sultan had the memorandum written by his father at his birth (veladet hatti) inserted into the first pages of the State’s official almanacs (Salname), right after the list of the previous Ottoman Sultans. He wished to prove thereby that he was the legitimate heir to the throne, both by heredity and by merit (bi’l-irs ve’l-istihbak). During the last years of Abdülhamid’s reign soldiers too openly dared to reject the Ottoman dynasty. The following words, taken from a secret report written by a Palace official visiting Edirne demonstrate the extent to which the Ottoman dynasty was losing the
support of its subjects: ‘From now on’, said one soldier, ‘it will be bad for [the heir apparent] Resad Efendi and all the members of the dynasty. As there will emerge no good from this family anymore, we are going to let a white dove fly and elect the one on whose head the bird chooses to land.’

Other rumours are known to have circulated about transferring the Caliphate from the Ottomans to the Sharifs of Mecca, to Amir ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza’iri, and even to Jamaladdin ‘Afghani’. The loss of the Caliphate would have certainly brought the Ottoman dynasty to an end at the same time. Rumours of plots to depose the dynasty in favour of the Crimean Khans or the offspring of what came to be known as the Ibrahim Han line (Ibrahim Han-zade) were also heard. Ibrahim Han was the son of Princess Ismihan, daughter of Sultan Selim II (d. 1574) and Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasa. The sons of princesses were traditionally not considered legitimate heirs to the Ottoman throne.

Why Did all this Happen in the Nineteenth Century?

On many occasions, the Ottoman throne found its incumbent through bloody events, during which political tensions reached their peak. One could theoretically expect that such times of turmoil might cause instabilities in the system of the transfer of power and make the dynasty and the system vulnerable to change. But the decisive factor influencing change was without doubt the extent to which political rule found acceptance among the people, that is, how legitimate the rulers were perceived to be.

That all candidates for the office of Caliph during the nineteenth century, and their supporters, found the courage to pursue their plans and actions, was indicative of the weakening of Ottoman dynasty’s authority and how questionable its legitimacy had become. Doubts grew around the indisputability and unchanging nature of the Ottoman dynasty. The debates about changing the rule of succession unveiled existing sentiments against the Ottoman dynasty, a natural outcome of the process of secularization in the Ottoman world. Even though the fifth article of the 1876 Constitution stated that the personality of the Sultan was ‘sacred’ (mukaddes) and ‘not to be questioned’ (gayr-i mes’ul), that is, he was not answerable to any higher authority, the Ottoman dynasty had already begun to sustain criticism. Once the door was opened it was easy for many to enter. The weakening of the Ottoman dynasty, and the proportionally rising number of challengers for the office they occupied, should be seen in this context.
On the other hand, periods in which political authorities strive unrelentingly to acquire or fortify their legitimacy are precisely those in which their positions are most challenged or abundant alternatives are proposed. Conversely, their actions may be seen as a reaction to the challenges. Threats from various sides to the Ottoman dynasty must have accelerated the codification of established practice regarding the succession of the oldest male member of the dynasty to the Sultanate. As we have seen, however firmly a custom may have been established, it could also be bypassed. The inherently unstable and contested process of succession made it always the most likely moment for the final blow to the Ottoman dynasty, and a likely occasion for such a blow might have been when another dispute erupted.

Following the restoration of the Constitution in 1909 additional measures were taken to prevent potential disputes concerning the succession. The heir apparent was given a more privileged place in the protocol, and Grand Viziers were required to call upon him when they assumed office. Furthermore, a protocol title for the ‘second heir’ was created and photo albums arranged according to the ranks of the members of the dynasty were prepared. Mass media were also used to influence opinion among the populace about the princes who might ascend the throne in the future. Such measures were designed to avoid potential problems concerning the successions, although the princes continued to distrust each other, probably as a centuries-old heritage of disagreements observed during successions.

Friedrich Giese regarded Abdülmecid’s desire to bring the Ottoman monarchy closer to the European models as the principal reason for the popularity of primogeniture during his reign. This was in keeping with his other modernizing projects. Abdülmecid’s standpoint certainly initiated a discussion concerning the established rule. The subsequent endeavours of Abdülaziz and the Royal Mother to change the rule in favour of their own offspring kept the issue on the political agenda. Concomitantly, the rule of seniority came to be regarded as an obstacle to modernization, as it made it likely that rather elderly members of the dynasty would become Sultans. This was yet another incompatibility between the progressive program of the Young Turks and a monarchic tradition that favoured elders. Khedive Isma'il Pasa managed to change the rule of succession in Egypt after his two predecessors, ‘Abbas Pasa and Sa'id Pasa, had both striven to receive the Sultan’s ferman permitting primogeniture.

The fact that Istanbul’s close rival in the modernization contest struggled to achieve the same changes in the succession arrangement may be regarded as part of the same grand
picture.

The rule of seniority usually prevented the possibility of a youngster coming to the throne. At the same time, it was the cause of many intrigues by the ruler against his heirs, and vice versa. We know that brothers and cousins within the Ottoman family were not particularly fond of each other, and conflict was not uncommon among the scions of different lines within the family. Still, a Sultan and father is scarcely acting contrary to human nature when he envisions passing his rule on to his own son.

(1) Mahmud II (r. 1808-39)

(2) Abdülmecid (r. 1839-61)  (3) Abdülaziz (r. 1861-76)

(4) Murad V (b. 1840; r. 1876)  Yusuf Izzeddin (b. 1857; heir: 1909-16)

(5) Abdülhamid II (b. 1842; r. 1876-1909)

(6) Mehmed Resad (b. 1844; r. 1909-18)

   Ahmed Kemaleddin (b. 1848; d. 1905)

   Mehmed Burhaneddin (b. 1849; d. 1876)

   Nureddin (b. 1852; d. 1885)

(7) Vahideddin (b. 1861; r. 1918-22)

Figure 1: Abdülaziz’s plans to change the rule of succession in favour of his son Yusuf Izzeddin would have deprived six princes older than Yusuf and eligible for the position of Sultan ahead of him. The numbers in parenthesis before the names show the order of the Sultans.

Notes
2 Quoted in Ahmed Cevdet, *Tezakir 1-12*, Cavid Baysun, ed. (Ankara, 1986), p. 85. Cevdet himself made the same statement, see Basbakanlık Osmanlı Arsivi, Istanbul (hereafter BOA), YEE 1858/18/93/39. The other three pillars were ‘Turkish’ government, the religion of Islam, and the capital of Istanbul.
7 Ahmed Sa’ib, *Rehnüma-yi İnkilab* (Cairo, 1318/1900-1), pp. 51 ff.
Who is the Next Ottoman Sultan?

8 Ottoman terms for primogeniture: bekuriyyet, umhust-zadi, ‘amud-i nezehi.
9 Ottoman term: ekberiyyet.
11 Ceride-i Havadis 35 (1 Ramazan 1257/ 22 May 1841); Ceride-i Havadis 38 (22 Rebi‘ül-ahir 1257/ 12 June 1841).
13 Cevdet: Tezakir 13-20, p. 133.
16 Cevdet: Tezakir 13-20, pp. 140-1.
20 BOA, A.MKT.MHM, no. 365/71 (13 Cemaziye’l-ahir 1283/ 22 October 1866).
21 BOA, A.MKT.MHM, no. 390/44 (5 Cemaziye’l-evvel 1284/ 4 September 1867).
23 Ayine-i Vatan, no. 1 (8 Ramazan 1283/ 14 January 1867).
25 PRO, FO 78/2215, Horace Rumbolt to Earl Granville (3 February 1872).
27 L’Orient Illustré, no. 86 (10 October 1874). I thank Professor Edhem Eldem for drawing my attention to this journal.
28 Ceride-i Havadis, no. 2521 (2 Cemaziye’l-ahir 1291/ 16 July 1874); see also nos. 2530 and 2531.
29 The Times, no. 26259 (19 October 1868); no. 26247 (5 October 1868); and no. 26249 (7 October 1868).
31 PRO, FO 78/2217, Henry Elliot to Earl Granville (16 May 1872).
33 Benoît Brunswik, La Succession au Trône de la Turquie (Paris, 1872), Preface to the second printing.
34 PRO, FO 78/2217, Henry Elliot to Earl Granville (8 June 1872); FO 78/2218, Henry Elliot to Earl Granville (18 July 1872).
37 For a complete record of Ismail’s efforts leading to the ferman, see Georges Douin, Histoire du Règne du Khédive Ismaïl (3 vols., Rome and Cairo, 1934-6), vol. 1, pp. 205ff; for the text of the ferman, see pp. 218ff.
38 Mecmu’a-i Ma’arif, no. 167 (6 Receb 1285/ 22 October 1868).
40 To Muhtar’s question ‘What have I done that someone would want to kill me?’ Gülnihal Kalfa, a servant and one of the main characters of the play, answers: ‘What have you done? Your father ruled the country before. And you can rule it from now on. The people want you! Why would the Pasha not want to kill you?’ Namik Kemal, Gülnihal, Kenan Akyüz, ed. (Ankara, 1960), pp. 15-16.
43 Djemaleddin Bey, Sultan Murad V, p. 103.
46 Sülûm-i Dejdet-i ‘Alîyye-i Osmaniyye (1294/1876), p. 4. After the proclamation of the 1909 Constitution, an amendment about the Sultan’s obligation to take an oath in parliament was made to this article, see Sülûm-i Dejdet-i ‘Alîyye-i Osmaniyye (1327/1909), p. 16.
48 İlber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı (Istanbul, 1987), pp. 18-19. Unfortunately no contemporary reference is given for this incident.
50 BOA, YEE no. 141/60 (n.d., from ’Abdülhamid II’s reigning period).
52 J. W. Redhouse, A Vindication of Ottoman Sultan’s Title of ’Caliph’; Shewing its Antiquity, Validity, and Universal Acceptance (London, 1877), p. 1; see further Neil Baillie, Is the Sultan of the Turks the Caliph of the Mussulmans and Successor of the Prophet? (London, 1877). See also the contribution of Tufan Buzpinar in this volume.
53 Urquhart: The Sultan Mahmoud, pp. 41, 45.
55 For the text, see Douin, *Khédive Ismaïl*, vol. 2, pp. 723ff.
57 According to one document, the Sultan’s name was not read in the sermons for a few Fridays, see: BOA, YEE, 123/19 (7 Safer 1317/ 15 June 1899); but according to another this did not happen, see BOA, YEE, 15/28 (27 Kanun-i sani 1319/ 9 February 1904).
58 BOA, YEE, 123/19 (7 Safer 1317/ 15 June 1899).
61 BOA, YEE 14-1265 (n.d.; ca. 1908).
66 As the constant pawn in the succession rule scenarios, Yusuf Izzeddin suffered grievously from this obviously stressful role and lived his later years in a kind of paranoia, until he committed suicide in 1916. See Türkgeldi: *Görüp Isittıklerim*, pp. 132-3: ‘Because of his surmises that he was going to be dropped as heir, Yusuf Izzeddin demanded that everyone, and even the Sultan Mehmed V, swear to God that he would not be removed from the position. The Sultan, due to his compassionate character, wrote a note with his very own hand assuring him that he was still the heir. But the effect of assurances in this matter was momentary; his suspicions returned after a couple of hours again’.
68 Douin: *Khédive Ismaïl*, vol. 1, p. 205.
The Ottoman Reforms and Shaykh Shamil

Moshe Gammer

The military and civil reforms in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century were of crucial importance in the history of the Middle East and the Islamic world at large. Their weight is attested by the enduring study of their origins and aims, their implementation and impact, on both the centre and in the various provinces of the empire. Furthermore, the creation by Selim III (1789-1808), Mahmud II (1808-39), and Muhammad ‘Ali, the Pasha of Egypt (1805-49), of an army modelled after the Western ones, the nizam-i cedid, and the series of civil reforms introduced between 1839 and 1876, known as the Tanzimat, were of great interest in the Muslim world, where they had significant impact and were used as examples. This paper deals with one such case, namely, the influence of the Ottoman reforms on Chechnya and Daghestan.

Daghestan (literally ‘mountain land’) occupies the easternmost part of the northern Caucasus. By the beginning of the Russian conquest in the 1780s the country was divided into a few small principalities on its northern and eastern fringes and several dozen polities known as jama‘as in its inner, mountainous parts. Each of these was a community of several villages, usually confined within natural boundaries and free of any external rule. Each jama‘a was headed by an elected qadi, who chaired the council of the elders. The most vital matters, however, were decided by a general assembly in which all men, whether noble, uzdens (free men), or jankas (descendants of noble fathers and common mothers) were equal members.

Chechnya lies to the west of Daghestan and, unlike its multi-ethnic neighbour, is inhabited by a single national group, the Chechens. Since the sixteenth century at least the Chechens formed a society divided into clans and based on the equality of uzdens. Each community/clan was run by a council (khel) of its elders and all-Chechen matters were discussed and decided in the Mehk Khel, ‘the Council of the Land’. Despite its distinct character, Islamic sources
sometimes included Chechnya in Daghestan. The Russian encroachment united the two in a single Muslim resistance.

Islam reached Daghestan in the first century AH/seventh-eighth century AD; by the fifteenth century all its residents had been converted to Sunni Islam of the Shafi’i legal school. More importantly, Daghestan developed into a major centre of Islamic scholarship and furnished religious leadership for the entire Sunni population of the Caucasus. The Chechens were Islamized later, in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, and accepted Daghestani religious leadership. It was only natural that the Chechens accepted the leadership of the three Daghestani Imams, all disciples of the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya-Khalidiyya, who for thirty years (1829-59) led the resistance against Russia. Thus, Chechnya is taken as included in this article’s analysis of the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Daghestan, and the Ottoman reforms’ effect on the latter.

The Naqshbandiyya brotherhood, named after Shaykh Baha’ al-Din Naqshband (1318-89), is one of the most widespread Sufi tariqas in Islam. ‘Strictly orthodox’ from its beginning, the Naqshbandiyya spread from its area of origin in Central Asia to India where, in the sixteenth century, Shaykh Ahmad Faruqi Sirhindi (1563-1624), known to his followers as ‘mujaddid-i alf-i than’ (renewer of the second millenium), transformed it into ‘the vanguard of renascent Islamic orthodoxy.’ From India, its ‘militant revivalism’ spread to other parts of the Muslim world and influenced both resistance to foreign encroachment and conquest and so-called ‘fundamentalist’ Islamic movements.

The revivalist, post-Sirhindi, Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya believed that the crisis which the Muslim world underwent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was due to the fact that the Muslim community (ummah) had gone astray. Furthermore, the Mujaddidis considered it to be their duty to restore Sunni Islam to the right path, which was strict observance of the Muslim religious law and the effort to imitate as fully as possible the behaviour of the Prophet in daily life. Only when the shari’ā was re-established and the Muslims returned to the right path, would they become virtuous and strong again, able to wage jihad to liberate themselves from foreign threat or occupation.

The Khalidi State in Chechnya and Daghestan

The Khalidi branch of the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya is named after its founder, Mawlana Diya’ al-Din Khalīd al-Shahrazuri (also known as
al-Kurdi and al-Baghdadi, 1776-1827). Operating under a sense of urgency, Khalid stressed the enforcement of the shari’a even more, and took energetic steps to spread his sub-order in and outside the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, he sent one of his deputies (sing. khalifa), Isma’il al-Kurdamiri, better known as al-Shirwani (1783–1848), to introduce the Khalidiyya into the Caucasus. Although his activity in Shirwan was short-lived – he was persecuted by the Russian authorities and fled to the Ottoman Empire – al-Kurdamiri managed to ordain disciples in Daghestan. There, the Khalidiyya took root at amazing speed, due to the collapse of the political, social, economic, and moral structures of local society under pressure of the Russian onslaught.

By 1829 the Khalidi leadership in Daghestan felt that in view of this collapse it had no choice but to lead the resistance against Russia. Thus started the thirty-year jihad led by three successive Imams: Ghazi Muhammad (1829-32), Hamza Bek (1832-4), and Shamil (Shamuyil; 1834-59). Of these, Shamil was the most successful. Constantly engaged in fighting and dealing many painful blows to the Russian forces, Shamil simultaneously built a state with an administration, a treasury (bayt al-mal), orderly taxation, and a regular army.

As befits a disciple of the Khalidiyya, Shamil’s state was based on and promoted Muslim law. An effort was made to show that all the actions of the state and its leader followed the shari’a. This was especially true of taxation and expenditures, which conformed, as far as possible under the circumstances, to the stipulations of the religious law. A religious administration was established to enforce observance of the commandments of Islam, to judge the people exclusively according to the shari’a, and to teach them the basics of Islam and make them ‘good Muslims’. The ‘ulama were consulted on all major decisions and a privy council (diwan), in which both ‘ulama and Sufi shaykhs were members, assisted the Imam. Furthermore, Shamil conducted his personal life scrupulously according to the commandments of the Muhammadan law. In two spheres, however, Shamil appears to have introduced innovations:

One was what Russian sources referred to as Shamil’s ‘secular legislation’ which went beyond the limits of the shari’a. The Imam, on his part, claimed that these regulations, known as nizam, were not legislation but merely interpretations of the holy law, or at most an expansion of its limits. Although in principle the shari’a covers all spheres of human life and activity, in practice with many areas it does not deal. Such cases are supplemented by the ruler’s right to issue his
own statutes, usually known as *qanun*. Shamil’s *nizam* was, or at least some parts of it were, such a *qanun*. The *nizam* can be divided into five categories:

1) Military and administrative regulations. These comprised the large majority of the *nizam*.

2) Other regulations of a general, non-religious character, such as the prohibition against contacts with the Russians.

3) Regulations emphasising *shari’i* stipulations or validating specific interpretations of them. These concerned, *inter alia*, marriage, dowry, divorce, inheritance, etc.

4) Reinterpretation, or rather changes of *shari’i* stipulations. One example is the changes the Imam introduced in the *hudud* (*Qura’anic* punishments).

5) Regulations extending *shari’i* precepts in accordance with the principle of *a minori ad majus*. An example is the prohibition against the sale of grapes to people who knew how to produce wine.

The other sphere in which Shamil introduced innovations was the establishment of a modern army. In the early 1840s the Imam created a regular Western-style infantry battalion, which he called *nizam*; an artillery unit, which received high marks from the Russians; an engineering corps, which erected fortifications, paved roads for his artillery, destroyed roads the Russians might use, and engaged the Russian engineers in counter-mining; and finally, field hospitals. Furthermore, Shamil built a foundry to cast his own cannons and two factories to produce gunpowder and ammunition.

Russian sources, both Tsarist and Soviet, take it for granted that these deeds were in imitation of the Russian military and administration. They have pointed out that several hundred deserters and captives turned deserters from the Russian army served Shamil. These staffed his artillery and factories; translated newspapers and documents, and obviously must have influenced him directly and indirectly. Some sources even attribute his ‘medals’ and other marks of distinction and of shame to Russian influence.

Without trying to fully repudiate this explanation, this paper intends to offer an alternative. It argues that in introducing all these changes or innovations, Shamil was – or at least claimed to be – influenced by Ottoman reforms, most particularly those of Mahmud II and Muhammad ‘Ali. The name *nizam* given to both Shamil’s regular infantry unit and his ‘secular’, extra-*shari’i* ‘legislation’ more than hints at an Ottoman source. After all, the new, Western-modelled Ottoman infantry had been officially designated *nizam-i cedid* from the time when
Sultan Selim III had first created it, while the reforms known as Tanzimat expanded the old concept of the qanun to include new legislation.\textsuperscript{21}

To demonstrate that this suggestion is plausible, this paper will show that (1) the Imam and his people were in close contact with the Ottoman Empire; (2) that the Ottoman Empire and its ruler were held by Shamil and his compatriots in high esteem and were a source for imitation and legitimization; and (3) that agents transmitting such influences can be identified.

**Contacts with the Ottoman Empire**

Since the dawn of history the Caucasus has been the focus of contest among three neighbouring powers: in the south-east these have been the successive powers centred on Iran; in the south-west, those of Anatolia; and in the north, the various nomadic empires replaced in modern times by Russia. Geography alone could dictate the traditional attitudes and alliances of the various polities in Dagestan and Chechnya: the powers based on Anatolia were the remotest and therefore the least menacing. They were, consequently, the natural allies against the other two, which time and again tried to conquer the country.

From the sixteenth century on, these three powers were the Shi‘ite Qizilbash Safawids and later the Qajars in the south-east, the Christian Muscovites and later Imperial Russia in the north, and the Ottomans in the south-west. Until the mid-eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire was by far the strongest of the three, which added geopolitical logic to the Dagestanis’ and Chechens’ preference for an alliance with Istanbul. No less important, a religious factor was added to geography and geopolitics when the Sunni Dagestanis and Chechens associated with the Ottomans. Furthermore, Dagestan had been a major centre of Shafi‘i scholarship since the eleventh century, and the Dagestani ‘ulama had for centuries been in close contact with the major centres of Shafi‘i learning, namely Egypt, Syria, and the Yemen. From the sixteenth century these were all within the domain of the hunkar (the Ottoman Sultan),\textsuperscript{22} as were the Holy Sanctuaries in the Hijaz (al-Haramayn), so that the hajj was to and across Ottoman territory.\textsuperscript{23}

All this means that Dagestan had strong and intense ties with the Ottoman world long before the Khalidiyya arrived on the scene. But this Sufi brotherhood added yet another dimension to the relationship with the Ottomans via the contacts its leaders maintained with Khalidi
and other Naqshbandi shaykhs in the Ottoman Empire and beyond, especially in Kurdistan. These connections were greatly curtailed by the war with Russia and the blockade which Russia imposed, but the links were not severed. The available sources provide abundant evidence of contacts with official and non-official Ottoman personages by Shamil and his confidants. The Imam communicated with the Sultan and other officials in Istanbul, as well as with the Pasa of Egypt and the Sharif of Mecca. Furthermore, in addition to the ‘Khalidi connection’ with Kurdistan, the Imam's messengers were active in the north-eastern provinces of the empire.

Esteem of the Ottoman Sultan

The Ottoman Empire was not merely a natural ally because of geopolitics and religion; it was the largest and strongest Muslim Power. Consequently its Sultan, the most powerful Sunni ruler, was regarded as the head of the umma by many if not all Sunnis; this was axiomatic for the Sunnis in the Caucasus. Furthermore, in the case of Shamil and his comrades-in-arms, esteem for the Ottoman Empire and ruler were part of their Khalidi creed. Mawlana Khalid ordered his followers to ‘pray for the survival of the exalted Ottoman state upon which Islam depends, and for its victory over the enemies of religion, the cursed Christians and the despicable Persians.’ Shamil was speaking as both a Daghestani and a Khalidi when he asked a Georgian prince who, as a Russian officer, was among the Imam's prisoners: ‘How can you call your ruler padisah? There is only one God in heaven and one padisah on earth – the hunkar in Istanbul.

No wonder that Shamil used his contacts with the Ottoman authorities to legitimize his rule and justified various moves as imitating the hunkar. For example, in 1853, after the peace treaty of Paris had been signed, the Imam defended a peace overture to the Russians in the following words: ‘If the Sultan Abdülmecid, [who] has made peace [with Russia], suggests to us to do the same, I shall have no right to reject it.’ Only once, and then for a short while, in the early 1840s, was the Sultan’s prestige eclipsed by the glory of Muhammad ‘Ali, the governor of Egypt, who, the people believed, ‘conquered an entire kingdom from him [the Sultan], became the supreme ruler of the Muslims, and subdued infidel nations such as the English (Ingliz) and the French (Ifranj). But then, to all intents and purposes Muhammad ‘Ali was part of the Ottoman world.
Agents of Transmission

Thus, a steady stream of emissaries, travellers, pilgrims, and so on kept the Imam informed of developments in the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim world at large. There can be little doubt that through these various connections Shamil was apprised of the reforms in the Ottoman Empire. More importantly, he was aware of the Khalidiyya’s support of both the reforms initiated by Mahmud II and those promoted during the first stage of the Tanzimat (1839 to early 1840s). As convincingly shown by Abu Manneh, the reforms of both periods aimed at modernization but not Westernization, and were therefore fully compatible with the shari’a. Therefore they were strongly supported, and in the case of Abdülmecid probably initiated, by the Naqshbandiyya in general and the Khalidiyya in particular. During the second stage of the Tanzimat, when the reforms shifted to Westernization, the Khalidiyya opposed them. It is probably not a coincidence that Shamil’s envoy in Ajara (then the north-easternmost province of the Ottoman Empire, presently an autonomous republic within Georgia) joined local notables opposed to the Tanzimat during the mid-1840s.

Whatever Shamil’s information about the Ottoman reforms, there was a group of people with more detailed knowledge and direct experience of these reforms, which helped him carry out his own. These were usually (though not always) natives of the Caucasus who had left for the hajj and stayed for a period of time in the service of Muhammad ‘Ali, where they acquired military-technical skills and a general knowledge of Western technology. These people had a (if not the) major share in setting up Shamil’s regular units – infantry and artillery – as well as in their operations and logistics, up to and including producing their weapons and ammunition. They were to a great extent those who laid the network of roads for the use of Shamil’s artillery, destroyed roads and bridges that could be used by the Russians, and erected forts which proved to be serious obstacles to the enemy. They also effected the establishment of field hospitals by the Imam. In non-military spheres they undoubtedly exerted an influence on fiscal and administrative affairs as well.

The most prominent among these people were: Hajj Yahya al-Chirkawi, who organized and commanded Shamil’s artillery; Ja’far, a Crimean Tatar by origin, who established and managed one of Shamil’s gunpowder mills; and Hajj Jabra’il al-Unsukulawi, who built and managed the gun foundry and another gunpowder mill. The most
important position of all was attained by Hajj Yusuf Safarzade or Safaroglu (Safarov in Russian sources). A Chechen from Aldi (now a suburb of Grozny), Hajj Yusuf served the Imam as a military commander, administrator, engineer, political and legal adviser, and cartographer. As an ex-officer in Muhammad ‘Ali’s nizam-i cedid, he helped to build the nizam, Shamil’s regular infantry. In his capacity as an engineer, he was in charge of many fortifications. According to some sources, Yusuf was behind Shamil’s ‘secular’ legislation, the nizam, as well. In 1854 he was sent by Shamil into (internal) exile because of unauthorized contacts with the Russians (according to another source with the Ottomans). After two years he escaped to the Russians, only to die a short while afterwards. Yusuf’s last project was to draw a map of Shamil’s domains for the Russians.33

**Conclusion**

All the evidence indicates that Shamil made very serious attempts to enforce the shari’a in his state. To do so he consulted the numerous Shafi’i legal opinions and other books in his rich library in an effort to either find shari’i solutions to new needs and/or to legitimize new measures, practices, and institutions.34 When he was unable to find a precedent in the shari’a he imitated the Ottoman experience or used it to legitimize his own solutions, whether original or borrowed from the Russians.

This course is most clearly seen in his regular military units. From the above and other evidence it is quite certain that these were moulded after the new Western-style Ottoman military units, especially those of Muhammad ‘Ali. After all, ex-officers in the army of the Pasa of Egypt played a (if not the) major role in setting up these units. Furthermore, they might have actually suggested to the Imam the idea of regular Western-style military formations in the first place. Yet, this does not rule out the role of deserters from the Russian army in the establishment and especially the operation of these forces. The case for Ottoman influence on Shamil’s extra-shari’a ‘legislation’ (the nizam) is weaker and more obscure, though here too circumstantial evidence and common sense point to its existence. Three of the categories included in the nizam (nos. 3, 4 and 5 in the above list of categories) dealt directly with the interpretation and reinterpretation of the shari’a. As such, they needed no special legitimization since Shamil was himself an ‘alim and a Khalidi shaykh, and all this ‘legislation’ was
approved by the religious authorities. The major and numerically greater part of the nizam (nos. 1 and 2), however, was ‘secular’.

The lion’s share of this, in fact of the entire nizam, consisted of military and administrative regulations (no. 1). Actually, these regulations seem to have been the only elements included in the original nizam, before Shamil expanded it to include the other categories. As such, it was not at all a transgression of the shariʿa. Rather, it was within the traditional privileges of the Muslim ruler as recognised by the holy law. In practice, Shamil’s nizam served the same function as did the qanun in the classical sense in the Ottoman Empire and other Muslim states. The reason Shamil decided to call it nizam rather than qanun might actually have been his deference to the Ottoman Empire and the wish to avoid offending the Sublime Porte by showing any semblance of sovereignty.

The connection of the other ‘secular’ category (no. 2) with Muslim law is more tenuous, although it might have been explained (and indeed originated) in the principle of maslaha (interest). As such, it was within the authority of the Muslim ruler. Indeed, all the regulations in this category were intended to promote the security of the realm. Yet even here Ottoman influence might have been at work. During the Tanzimat period Shamil might have adopted the Ottoman practice of expanding the sphere of the qanun into ‘civil’, that is, non-military and non-administrative domains, as well.

The origins of both of Shamil’s nizams, the military and the ‘legislative’, are more than a trifling historical episode. The fact that they are described as such is symptomatic of the way historiography – Imperial Russian, Soviet, and the very few works written in the West – treated Daghestan and Chechnya. The history of these and other countries was for a good while studied in isolation from the rest of the Islamic world. Local sources, mainly in Arabic, were inaccessible, and any attempt to investigate the long process of Islamization, the rich Islamic heritage, and the centuries-long close ties between Daghestan and Chechnya and the rest of the Islamic world was discouraged. Only in recent years have scholars, mainly Daghestani, started to study these issues. This paper, therefore, also means to draw the attention of Western scholars to Daghestan’s and Chechnya’s place in the Muslim world, to their Islamic past and literature, to the abundant local sources now open for study, and to the importance of this subject. A thorough study of it will not only put the history of the area into a proper perspective, it will also enhance our knowledge of Islamic civilization and history in general.
Notes


2 Although Selim failed to push his reform through, and was deposed and later decapitated, his new units formed a base for those created by his cousin and successor, Mahmud II.


5 The native population of Daghestan is nowadays divided into more than thirty ethnic groups ranging in size from a few thousand to half a million.


10 Lewis: *The Middle East*, p. 97.

11 For Mawlana Khalid and his activities, see Butrus Abu-Manneh, ‘The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th Century’, *Die Welt des Islams* 12 (1982), pp. 1-36 (reprinted as *The Rise and Expansion of the Naqshbandi-
19 One of the best Soviet studies, written in the 1930s but published only recently, is N. I. Pokrovskii, Kavkazskie Voiny i Imamat Shamilia (The Caucasus Wars and Shamil’s Imamate) (Moscow, 2000).
20 Shamil introduced marks of both honour and shame. The former were medals or swords, daggers and other weapons engraved with praises. The latter were marks for cowardice or any other misconduct in the battlefield. These were worn on the back and their owner could be redeemed only by distinctive conduct under fire.
21 Thus, the reformers promoted as qanun European civil and criminal codes to replace shar’i jurisdiction in these spheres. The final outcome was that shar’i jurisdiction was limited to personal and family matters only.
22 One of the official titles of the Ottoman ruler, and the most commonly used in the Caucasus.
23 A preliminary study of Daghestan’s ties with the Yemen is I. Iu. Krachkovskii, ‘Dagestan i Iemen (Daghestan and the Yemen)’, in idem, Izbrannye Sochineniia (Selected Works) (Moscow and Leningrad, 1960), vol. 6, pp. 574-84. Only recently have scholars started to study Daghestan’s rich literary heritage (mainly in Arabic) and the country’s connections with the rest of the Muslim world. The first in an intended series of such studies is Moshe Gammer and David J. Wasserstein (eds.), Daghestan in the World of Islam (Helsinki, forthcoming). In that volume, see especially Harun Ibrahimov, ‘Daghestan and the Near East Before Islam’; Vladimir Bobrovnikov, ‘Abu Muslim in Islamic History and Mythology of the Northern Caucasus’; Amri Shikhsaidov, ‘The Political History of Daghestan in the Tenth to Fifteenth Centuries’, where the most recent studies (mainly in Russian) are quoted.
For one such example, see Pertev Boratav, ‘La Russie dans les Archives Ottomans. un Dossier Ottoman sur l’Imam Chamil’, *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* 10 (1969), pp. 524-35.


31 See the works by Abu-Manneh quoted in note 1 above, especially ‘The Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi and the Bektashi Orders in 1826’ and ‘The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Receipt’.

32 Boratav: ‘La Russie dans les Archives Ottomans’.


34 A reconstruction of the contents of Shamîl’s library has almost been completed. For a partial description, see Natal’ia Tahirova, ‘Imam Shamîl’s Manuscripts in the Collections of Princeton University (From the History of Daghestan’s Book Culture in the 19th Century)’, *Central Asian Survey* 21 (2002), pp. 325-32.


37 See note 21.

38 The first Western study of these sources is Michael Kemper, ‘Einige Notizien zur Arabischsprachigen Literatur der Gihad-Bewegung in Dagestan und Tschetschenien in der Ersten Hälfte des XIX. Jahrhunderts’, in Anka von Kugelgen, Michel Kemper and Allen J. Frank (eds.), *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries*, vol. 2: *Inter-Regional and Inter-Ethnic Relations* (Berlin, 1998), pp. 63-99.
Part Two

Islamic Perspectives
One of the consequences of the Ottoman reform thrust of the nineteenth century (the Tanzimat), and of the concomitant integration of the Ottoman lands into the Western-dominated world market, was the emergence of new reformist trends among its men of religion. This was particularly evident in the Arab provinces, where by the beginning of the twentieth century, under the autocratic-populist rule of the ‘Pan-Islamic’ Sultan Abdülhamid II, the major reformist religious trend became known as the Salafiyya. In the face of the double challenge of the empowered State and Western penetration, the modern Salafi creed posited the rationality of Islam as it was practised by the forefathers (al-salaf) and the fundamental unity of the faith. These were accompanied by a growing critique of what the Salafis constructed as the static and divisive discourses and customs of the ‘Islamic tradition’. Their criticism, generally couched in the concepts of taqlid - blind imitation of recent authorities - and bid’a - unlawful innovation that has no precedent in the Prophet’s authoritative sayings or practices, was primarily aimed at the two major pillars of latter-day Islam: jurisprudence and Sufism.

This paper questions the validity of the Salafis’ view of their recent predecessors, a view whose vestiges are still keenly felt in Western scholarship, through an analysis of the life and work of one prominent pre-Tanzimat man of religion, the Syrian Ibn ‘Abidin. The principal purpose of my analysis, however, is not merely to demonstrate that ‘traditional’ jurisprudence and ‘traditional’ Sufism embodied dynamic discursive fields and rational practices, a task already accomplished by numerous scholars of these two subjects. It is rather to show that on the eve of the Ottoman reform era, spiritually attentive jurists joined hand with shari‘a-minded Sufis in an attempt to shape the Muslim government and society of their troubled times in conformity with what they regarded as the forefathers’ model, namely as this model was
interpreted and implemented throughout the ages by their worthy successors (al-khalaf), the Sufi ‘ulama.

Muhammad Amin ‘Abidin, better known as Ibn ‘Abidin, was apparently the most outstanding religious scholar in Damascus and in the Syrian lands at large during the early decades of the nineteenth century. In the scholarly literature he is generally referred to as the last major traditional jurist in the Hanafi School. This reputation rests primarily on his comprehensive legal compendium, Radd al-muhtar ‘ala al-durr al-mukhtar, which Ibn ‘Abidin compiled as a super-commentary (hashiya) on a previous commentary by the seventeenth-century Damascene jurist Muhammad ‘Ala’ al-Din al-Haskafi, which came to be regarded as the principal source of authority at the time. The ‘Hashiya’, completed by his son ‘Ala’ al-Din ‘Abidin (1828-89), has remained a major reference book for Hanafi rulings to this day. In addition to this compendium, Ibn ‘Abidin produced a vast collection of legal opinions (fatawa), which likewise was superimposed on a previous widely-circulated work by the eighteenth-century Damascene mufti Hamid al-‘Imadi. He was also the author of numerous epistles on various legal questions which, by the beginning of the twentieth century, was already extant in four different editions.

Ibn ‘Abidin and his juristic work have drawn considerable scholarly attention during the past decade. Interest in him has been part of the burgeoning endeavor to dislodge the once-prevalent paradigm according to which, after its formative period, Islamic law became increasingly rigid, to be resuscitated by the impact of the modern West. As indicated above, this paradigm had its roots in the Salafi trend of the late nineteenth century. For the critiques of this paradigm, which is epitomized in the famous dictum about ‘the closing of the gate of ijtihad’, Ibn ‘Abidin came to figure as a major representative of the apparent continuity between traditional and modern legal scholarship. As the centrepiece of his innovative activity they identified the principle of custom (‘urf), along with the supporting devices of necessity (darura) and the deterioration of time (fasad al-zaman). Wael Hallaq, who is undoubtedly one of the leaders of the new approach, argues in the most recent article on the subject that Ibn ‘Abidin succeeded in elevating custom to the status of a legal source, capable of overriding the effects of other sources, not excluding much of the Qur’an and the Sunna. Thereby, he in effect sacrificed the entire structure of law and legal methodology, despite his expressed loyalty to the accepted hierarchy of his school, and paved the way to modern legal reform. In a slightly earlier study which took a broader look at
law as a cultural product, Haim Gerber calls Ibn ‘Abidin’s treatment of ‘urf ‘the practical secularization of Islamic law’. According to Gerber, the great jurist departed in an unprecedented manner from the most fundamental postulate of the law, namely its attribution to revelation. Ibn ‘Abidin openly claimed that the founders of the legal schools (madhahib) established many of their rulings on personal opinion according to the custom of their time, and that therefore, with the change of circumstances, these rulings may also be changed. Still, with the exception of Tilman Nagel in his pioneering overview article, these writers generally fail to mention that along with his scholarly occupation Ibn ‘Abidin had been a no less ardent Sufi. To correct this imbalance I expand in the following on the Sufi aspect of his thought, and more particularly on the place that Sufism came to hold within his overall program of legal reform. The analysis of Ibn ‘Abidin’s writings naturally takes into consideration the larger historical context within which they were formulated and to which his combination of jurisprudence and Sufism was ultimately designed to respond.

Ibn ‘Abidin and His Time

Muhammad Amin ibn ‘Abidin was born in 1784 in Damascus into a wealthy scholarly merchant family, whose economic interests extended to as far as India. After completing his Qur’an reading he pursued his religious studies under Shakir al-‘Aqqad, a prominent teacher in the city, who convinced him to pass from the local Shafi‘i to the officially sponsored Hanafi school. Assuming a teaching position after Aqqad’s death in 1808, Ibn ‘Abidin’s erudition soon attracted the attention of Husayn al-Muradi, the Hanafi mufti, who made him his assistant (amin al-fatwa). Subsequently, Ibn ‘Abidin distinguished himself as the source of authority in legal matters (marji’) in Damascus and the neighbouring provinces, his reputation reaching Baghdad and even Istanbul. He is nonetheless said to have always avoided official employment, and to have supported himself from a shop run by a partner. It was ‘Aqqad who also introduced Ibn ‘Abidin to the science of Sufism, and moreover ordained him into the Qadiriyya brotherhood. At a later stage Ibn ‘Abidin became a close associate of the great reformist Naqshbandi Shaykh Khalid al-Baghdadi (1776-1827), who arrived in Damascus in 1823 and brought about a conspicuous religious revival in the city. At that time deputies of the Khalidiyya were gaining influence among the high officials of the
Ottoman capital in support of Sultan Mahmud II’s (1808-39) quest to revitalize his empire. Ibn ‘Abidin became the disciple of Shaykh Khalid in the sciences of theology and hadith, as well as in the Naqshbandi path while Khalid, for his part, expressed great appreciation for Ibn ‘Abidin’s erudition and referred to him as ‘unique in his generation’. Ibn ‘Abidin lived through a period of growing public disorder in Damascus, and in the Syrian provinces at large, caused by the decline of the ‘Azm dynasty of governors in the late eighteenth century and the concomitant rise of unruly local contenders for power. There is no doubt that Ibn ‘Abidin was highly critical of the malpractices of the Ottoman administration. In particular he detested the exploitation of the peasants by the governors and the tax farmers alike, which also undermined the prosperity of the merchant class to which he belonged. But he was even more concerned by the threat that some forces challenging the Ottoman State posed to the supremacy of orthodox Islam. For him the most disturbing of these was probably the militant Wahhabi movement, which in 1805 had taken over the Holy Places in the Hijaz and by 1810 was raiding the Damascus province itself. In the chapter on rebels in the ‘Hashiya’, Ibn ‘Abidin defines the Wahhabis as dissenters (khawarij) and praises God for ‘breaking their sway, devastating their country, and giving the victory to the Muslim armies’. Writing in the 1830s, Ibn ‘Abidin refrained from mentioning that it was Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha’s army which had actually gained this victory, since he was opposed to the Egyptian occupation of Syria, not least because it discontinued the discriminating rules against non-Muslims (ahl al-dhimma). In the last part of the ‘Hashiya’ he thus complains that in exploiting these circumstances Jews and Christians had become powerful and dared to defy the Muslims. Ibn ‘Abidin died in 1836, in the middle of the Egyptian occupation and three years before the inauguration of the Tanzimat reforms.

Legal and Sufi Deviations

At the root of Ibn ‘Abidin’s world view lay a deep conviction of the pre-eminence of the religious sciences and of the religious scholars in the life of the community. The phrase uli al-amr – those in authority - in the famous Divine command ‘O believers, obey God, and obey the messenger, and those in authority among you’ is thus interpreted by him as referring to the ‘ulama. He also likes to mention Imam al-
Ghazali’s oft-repeated saying that ‘nothing is more precious than knowledge; the kings rule the people, but the ‘ulama rule the kings’. This lofty esteem for the men of religion did not prevent Ibn ‘Abidin from observing an overall degeneration in the religious sciences in his day. His criticism was naturally the most pronounced in the sphere of jurisprudence, which attracted most of his scholarly energies. In an epistle dedicated to the rules that govern the office of *ifta*, Ibn ‘Abidin denounces contemporary legal scholars for issuing unreliable rulings on the basis of summaries and abridgements, which are replete with obscure expressions and outright mistakes. A similar ambivalence informs Ibn ‘Abidin’s attitude toward other branches of Islamic learning, and even more so toward the mystics.

One of the practices prevailing in the Damascene society of his day that greatly disturbed Ibn ‘Abidin concerned the attitude it showed toward the Qur’an. Relying on the principle of *urf*, Ibn ‘Abidin was ready to approve the tendency of latter-day jurists to override the rulings arrived at by the founders of their schools and to allow remuneration for teaching the Qur’an. But he could not accept their permission to ask for remuneration also for its recitation, or for merely uttering the formula of *tahlil*, ‘there is no god but God’. Apparently, this practice epitomized for Ibn ‘Abidin both the religious and the social malaise of his time. Apprehensive of the reaction of the ‘ulama, and still more of the common people, he nevertheless decided to devote a treatise to the subject in 1813 when, in the course of a severe epidemic, it became fashionable to settle a certain sum for such recitations in one’s will. Basing himself as usual on a previous work, in this case an epistle by the sixteenth-century Turkish puritan Mehmed Bergewi, Ibn ‘Abidin set out to demonstrate that Qur’an recitation for the sake of profit was compatible with neither the principles of the Hanafi school, which considers asking payment for fulfilling a commandment to be illegal, nor with the rulings of the other legal schools, which declare reciting for a worldly reward to be invalid and sinful. Even more important for him were the actual implications of the practice which, in his view, were detrimental to the sincerity of the believers. By granting priority to the allocation of money for this purpose over obligatory commandments, it also precipitated the social disintegration of the community:

Many of them [Ibn ‘Abidin writes] do not spend a single dinar or dirham on alms. They do not perform the pilgrimage to the sacred house of Allah [the Ka’ba] although they are capable of
Ibn ‘Abidin explains the causes for this socio-religious deterioration in the general tendency of the people to overlook the commandments of the shari’ā. ‘The reason for this problem and for the spread of this plight,’ he wrote, ‘might be the fact that most of our wealth, or all of it, is attained through unlawful ways... They are often generated by hatred toward the heirs and relatives, with all the concomitant evils such as the plunder of the money of helpless orphans and of poor and needy heirs.’

In Ibn ‘Abidin’s view, a similar practice underlay the parallel degeneration in the mystic life of the Damascene Muslim community. This referred to the habit adopted by many Sufi shaykhs to demand remuneration for conducting the *dhikr* ceremony. In this way many of them acquired unlawful wealth and caused no less damage to society. Moreover, Ibn ‘Abidin believed that the degeneration of Sufism was even graver than that of most other sciences, since it resulted in the outright transgression of the religious law. In this case, he singles out for his strictures the mystic audition (*sama’*), with which he deals in the *fatāwa* collection under the category of unlawful legal innovations (*bi’dah*). This practice includes, according to the description of Ibn ‘Abidin, ‘music, cursing, dancing and going wild, the meeting with handsome lads and forbidden singing that stimulate the passions of the young’. Those who lead such ceremonies, he exclaims, are vulgar people and accursed offenders, who turn the *dhikr* sessions into a net to capture this inferior world and to satisfy their wicked and base desires.

The Attraction of Shari’ā-Minded Sufism

The degeneracy of such Sufi shaykhs in no way led Ibn ‘Abidin to denounce Sufism as such. On the contrary, in the same breath with his denunciation of those Sufis who deviate from the shari’ā, Ibn ‘Abidin expresses his admiration for the sincere Sufi masters. He also praises, in apparent allusion to his own disposition, those who take an example...
from them, taste their experiences, and find in their hearts that desire for God. Ibn ‘Abidin’s attraction to the orthodox type of Sufism is clearly discernible throughout his writings. His earliest reference to the subject is a short epistle he compiled in 1809, a year after his master’s death, concerning the hierarchy of Sufi saints. Though devoid of his usual innovative bent, this work nevertheless demonstrates to what extent Ibn ‘Abidin was steeped in the science of Islamic mysticism, which had been greatly promoted in Damascus during the eighteenth century through the work of ‘Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi. The epistle begins with a description, which is primarily based on the teachings of Ibn ‘Arabi, of the various saintly grades, culminating in that of the qutb, the pole of the time. It then proceeds to enumerate the hadith reports supporting the reality of these grades, and concludes with a discussion of miracles (karamat). These are defined, in the orthodox manner, as the occurrence of a supernatural feat at the hands of the righteous servant of God who follows the prophets, the correct beliefs, and the right deeds. For Ibn ‘Abidin, as for most other religious scholars of his day, there was no inner discrepancy between the teachings of al-Shaykh al-Akbar and the precepts of the shari’a. Although not numerous, Ibn ‘Abidin’s references to Sufism in the ‘Hashiya’, with which he was occupied in the latter part of his life, seem to imply that by that time the mystic quest had become no less important for him than the legal sciences. More prudent about the dangers inherent in Ibn ‘Arabi’s complex formulations, Ibn ‘Abidin now subscribed to the opinion that one should believe in his sainthood but avoid studying his books, since those who are unfamiliar with the Sufi terminology might be driven to unbelief. Though relying more heavily on Ghazali in the ‘Hashiya’, he still defends Ibn ‘Arabi and counsels those who doubt to refer to the works of his later interpreters and popularizers, notably Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti and the above mentioned al-Nabulusi. Like all of them, Ibn ‘Abidin can thus define his mature attitude towards Sufism and its place in Islam. He declares that the haqiqa, the mystic truth, is the heart of the shari’a, and that ahl al-haqiqa, the people of truth, are those who combine the shari’a with the tariqa, the mystic path. The relation between these elements is elucidated in the introduction to the ‘Hashiya’:

The tariqa and the shari’a necessitate each other, since the path to God consists of an external aspect and an internal aspect. Its externality is the shari’a and the tariqa, and its internality is the haqiqa. The internality of the haqiqa in the shari’a and the
tariqa is like the internality of butter in milk. It is impossible to reveal the butter in the milk without churning it. The aim of the three – the shari'a, the tariqa, and the haqiqa – is to realize the state of servitude to God (‘ubudiyya).

On the practical level, Ibn ‘Abidin asserts that there is no fault in visiting saints’ tombs (ziyarat al-qubur), and that this is indeed a commendable act (mandub). This stand not only echoed the consensus among the ‘ulama of Damascus, and of Syria at large, in his day, but also seems to be intended to defy the Wahhabis’ stringent ruling against this practice. Contrary to them, Ibn ‘Abidin gives sanction to the custom of setting out to visit distant tombs, such as those of the Patriarchs in Hebron or of Ahmad al-Badawi in Tanta, Egypt, a custom that in the footsteps of the medieval puritan Ahmad ibn Taymiyya, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab specifically condemned. In this case the Damascene jurist adopts the opinion of Ibn Hajar al-Haytami, the celebrated sixteenth-century jurist and ardent defender of Ibn ‘Arabi, who writes in his collection of fatawa that one should not avoid visiting tombs just because of the improper and corrupt deeds that are perpetrated there. He must visit the holy tomb and condemn those deviations and, if he is able, also remove them.

In the Fold of the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya

The enhanced status of Sufism in the later thought of Ibn ‘Abidin seems to have derived from his close association with Shaykh Khalid al-Baghdadi. In pursuance of his erstwhile Sufi thought, Ibn ‘Abidin came to believe that Khalid’s personal accomplishments on the mystical path and his great success in spreading his branch of the Naqshbandiyya throughout the Ottoman lands entitled him to the status of the pole (qutb) of the time. The concomitant achievements of the Sufi master in promoting the shari’a and in providing the Sultan-Caliph with religious and moral support in his struggle against the internal and external enemies of the empire seems to have further convinced Ibn ‘Abidin that orthodox mysticism was not merely a complement to the legal reform he had suggested through the practice of ‘urf; it was indeed the very condition for its implementation. It was in connection with the great Naqshbandi master that Ibn ‘Abidin composed his last treatise touching upon Sufi beliefs and practices. This was an epistle defending Khalid against the slandering of ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Susi, a deputy who had been expelled from the
brotherhood because he refused to accept the innovative mystical practices of his master,\textsuperscript{46} practices which were designed to give the Khalidiyya a more centralized organizational structure and thereby increase its social and political impact.\textsuperscript{47} In reaction to the expulsion, Susi tried to vilify Khalid by maintaining that he was served by demons (\textit{jinns}) and wicked spirits, about whom he claimed to have hidden knowledge, and that therefore he should be regarded as a sorcerer rather than as a saint.\textsuperscript{48}

Ibn ‘Abidin’s response to Susi’s \textit{fatwa}-like epistle begins with a denial of the very validity of his claims on the grounds that they are based on the testimony of legally unacceptable hostile witnesses. He likewise rejects the argument that one’s denunciation (\textit{jarh}) should be preferred to his exoneration (\textit{ta’dil}). Ibn ‘Abidin, though, does not rule out the presence of \textit{jinns} in Khalid’s spiritual sessions, nor his use of wicked spirits. He reiterates the orthodox postulate that he expounded already in his earliest Sufi epistle, namely that the nature of the supernatural deed depends on the person under whose hands it occurs. Then he argues that since there is a consensus that Khalid upholds the Sunna and follows the shari’a, these acts should be regarded as miraculous feats (\textit{karama}) rather than evil magic (\textit{sihr}). Moreover, Ibn ‘Abidin employs the same procedure that he elaborated to justify the use of ‘\textit{urf} in the legal sphere. He asserts that although in the Hanafi textbooks one who claims to have knowledge of the unseen is considered an unbeliever, the truth is that in certain cases prophets, and even saints, may have a share in such knowledge.\textsuperscript{49}

Ibn ‘Abidin’s treatise in defence of Shaykh Khalid reflects the traditional atmosphere in which Damascene men of religion were still steeped on the eve of the Ottoman reform. This, however, was a dynamic form of tradition, which approved of, and indeed called for change. In a sense it may be said that the chance of history brought together the last major pre-modern Hanafi jurist and the last major pre-modern Sufi master. Along with the other references in the ‘\textit{Hashiya}’, this treatise also demonstrates that under the impact of the great Naqshbandi master our jurist realized the potential inherent in the reformist type of Sufism to effect the changes he so desired in the polity and society of his day. These changes marked the readiness of both to tread the path of modernization. Like Khalid, however, Ibn ‘Abidin could not foresee the adverse course that the reforms he had sanctioned were to take after him. It was the empowerment of the Ottoman State through the Tanzimat, and especially the rise of the Salafiyya in opposition to the autocratic regime of Sultan Abdülhamid
II, that victimized jurisprudence and Sufism alike by redefining them as the pillars of a static and divisive tradition that must be overcome in the name of ‘modernity’.

Notes

1 On the emergence of the Salafi trend in the later part of the nineteenth century, see David D. Commins, *Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria* (Oxford, 1990), pp. 65-78.

2 An early exposition of this tendency, which gained currency as the twentieth century wore on, was the Wahhabi-type epistle of ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi, *al-Fiqh waʾl-tasawwuf* (Cairo, 1319/1901). For a general discussion, see Elizabeth Sirriyeh, *Sufi and Anti-Sufi: The Defence, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in the Modern World* (Richmond, Surrey, 1999), esp. ch. 4.

3 For Sufism, see especially Nehemia Levitzion and John O. Voll (eds.), *Eighteenth Century Renewal and Reform Movements in Islam* (Syracuse, 1987). For jurisprudence, see below.


9 For the evaluation of *ʿurf* in classical Islamic law, see Schacht, p. 62.

10 For these legal practices, see Schacht, p. 84.


14 The principal biography, which summarizes most of the information on him in the biographical dictionaries of the nineteenth century, is Muhammad Mutʿī al-Ḥafīz, *Faqīh al-hanāfiyya Muhammad Amin ʿAbīdīn baytubuhu wa-atharuhu* (Damascus and Beirut, 1994).


17 For the practice of changing to the Hanafi school at the time and its implications, see Abdul-Karim Rafeq, ‘Relations between the Syrian ʿUlamaʾ and the Ottoman State in the Eighteenth Century’, *Oriente Moderno* 18 (1999), pp. 67-95.

18 On the Muradi family, see Karl K. Barbir, ‘All in the Family: The Muradis of Damascus’, in Heath W. Lowry and Ralph S. Hattex (eds.), *Congress on the Social and

19 On Shaykh Khalid and his work, see Butrus Abu-Manneh, Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century (1826-1876) (Istanbul, 2001), chs. 1-3.


26 Qur’an, 4, 59.


28 Muhammad Amin ‘Abidin, ‘Sharh al-manzuma al-musammah bi-‘uqad rasm al-mufiq’, in idem: rasu’îl, vol. 1, pp. 5-6. This is one of the main epistles that Hallaq used in his analysis of the innovative elements in the legal thought of Ibn ‘Abidin.


5

Traditional Anti-Wahhabi Hanbalism in Nineteenth-Century Arabia

David Commins

Wahhabism is without question one of the major movements of Islamic renewal in modern times. Among its controversial positions was the assertion that Ottoman rule was illegitimate. It was therefore natural for the Ottomans to dispute Wahhabi teachings and for a prolonged polemical controversy to unfold. One of the unexamined dimensions of that controversy is the participation of a handful of Arabian Hanbalis on the Ottoman side of the controversy. To shed light on what I call here the traditional Hanbalis, who bore the brunt of the Wahhabis’ criticisms, I examine a nineteenth-century biographical dictionary by Muhammad ibn ‘Abdallah ibn Humayd (1820-78).

At first glance, it may seem odd to use a biographical dictionary to study religious controversy, but the work of George Makdisi and Michael Cooperson on the genre in earlier centuries led me to read Ibn Humayd’s work for its polemical dimensions. Makdisi suggested that the biographical dictionary, or tabaqat, represents a claim to ‘authority and competence’ by sketching a line of ‘apostolic succession’ reaching back to the Prophet and his Companions. Cooperson proposed broadening the application of this idea (he uses the term heirship instead of apostolic succession) to ‘the Arabic biographical tradition’ in general, of which the tabaqat is one manifestation. In the tabaqat, knowledge is the possession handed from one generation to the next. Cooperson attributed several functions to the heirship metaphor. In the present instance, the most fitting is that of ‘a vehicle for asserting the legitimacy of one’s own tradition of authority.’ It seems to me that the corollary of such an assertion may be the denial of a rival tradition’s claim to authority; in the present instance, the authority of Wahhabs to claim the mantle of the Hanbali legal school is challenged. Ibn Humayd’s biographical dictionary opens a window into the struggle to establish rival claims to embody the Hanbali tradition and it
reveals a strand of Arabia’s Hanbali tradition now largely effaced by the triumph of Wahhabism.

The main works on Saudi Arabian history assume that by the early nineteenth century, central Arabia’s (Najd) towns had converted to Wahhabism, but this anti-Wahhabi biographical dictionary by a man from the Saudi heartland dispels that notion. Furthermore, it reinforces the revisionist history of Hanbalism set forth by John Voll and George Makdisi. The standard version held that the Hanbali legal school was the most rigid and puritanical of the four Sunni legal schools, a notion that Makdisi attributes to the work of Ignaz Goldziher. That version was reinforced by a common but mistaken tendency to view Wahhabism as representing the Hanbali tradition in general rather than a particular strand within it. Voll corrected that idea by demonstrating that Hanbali ‘ulama from Damascus, Nablus, and Baalbek comfortably fit into an urban milieu of Sunni pluralism. These Hanbalis commonly studied with scholars of other legal schools, participated in Sufi orders, and engaged in such popular religious practices as making amulets and visiting saints’ graves. Voll placed these men in a tradition that he termed a ‘milder form of Hanbalism’ in contrast to the ‘harsher’ tradition represented by the fourteenth-century scholar Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya. Makdisi’s studies show that the ‘milder form’ Voll uncovered in Damascus has deep historical roots and that Western scholars have been wrong to ascribe to Hanbalis a deep-seated antipathy toward Sufism. In fact, Makdisi established the Sufi affiliation of the supposedly anti-Sufi Ibn Taymiyya, as well as other Hanbalis. Saudi scholars have demonstrated that the Syrian Hanbalis, and to a lesser extent some Egyptians, put their stamp on the legal school’s ‘ulama in central Arabia long before the Wahhabi movement arose.

Ibn Humayd's Background

When Ibn Humayd was born in 1820, the first Saudi amirate (1744-1818) had recently collapsed under the onslaught of Muhammad ‘Ali’s Ottoman-Egyptian army. The early 1820s saw that army’s evacuation and then a scramble for power that led to the consolidation of a truncated Saudi principality under Amir Turki (r. 1824-34). Muhammad ‘Ali’s armies reinvaded Najd in 1837, but again withdrew after a brief span, leaving the field open to Turki’s son Faysal to re-establish Saudi authority in 1843, this time for a quarter century of relative stability. Amir Faysal’s attenuated restoration was based on a
pragmatic accommodation with neighboring powers marked by declarations of loyalty and occasional payments of tribute to the Ottoman Sultan. In political terms, the Saudi enterprise had been tamed, but dogmatic enmity between Wahhabi and Ottoman ‘ulama persisted.

Muhammad ibn Humayd was born in ‘Unayza, the major town in al-Qasim, one of the sub-regions of Najd. His maternal lineage, Al Turki, was of some local renown for its religious scholars, including two men who opposed the Wahhabis. One of them, ‘Abd al-Wahhab ibn Muhammad (d. ca. 1840) authored a chronicle of Najd where he expressed antipathy toward the Wahhabis. For example, his entry for the hijri year 1150 (1737/8) notes that Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab appeared in ‘Urayna, located in ‘wadi Musaylima.’ The allusion to Musaylima, the false prophet who contested the Prophet Muhammad’s claims, was intended to suggest that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab himself was a false prophet. According to the ‘Unayzan chronicler, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab declared Muhammad’s community to be infidels on the basis of a misguided reading of Quranic passages and Prophetic traditions pertaining to infidels and Jews. His whim led him to declare as infidels all pious scholars who did not agree with his deviant innovation. In contrast to this family tradition of hostility to the Wahhabi mission, Ibn Humayd's early education included extensive attendance at the lessons of two Wahhabi shaykhs, both of whom he praised in his biographical dictionary. Ibn Humayd then travelled to Damascus and Mecca, where he attended the lessons of men known for strong anti-Wahhabi convictions. At some point he became embroiled in a controversy with Wahhabi scholars over the religious legality of certain verses in Al-Burda, a famous Sufi devotional poem to Muhammad. Ibn Humayd's learning and the compatibility of his religious outlook with Ottoman hostility toward Wahhabism made him suitable for the post of Hanbali imam and mufti in Mecca, and thus a member of the empire’s religious officialdom. It is noteworthy that his intellectual background is similar to that of other nineteenth-century ‘Unayzan dissidents. First, they had kinship or scholastic connections to the town’s eighteenth-century scholars, many of whom rejected the Wahhabi movement. Second, they pursued learning outside of Najd in Iraq, Syria, or Hijaz, where they studied under Hanbalis and other shaykhs hostile to the Wahhabis. This dissident tradition left few traces on the historical record, and that makes Ibn Humayd’s biographical dictionary all the more valuable to historians.
Ibn Humayd’s Biographical Dictionary

Muhammad ibn Humayd’s biographical dictionary adds to a rich Hanbali tradition in that genre dating to the tenth century. He composed his work to supplement Ibn Rajab’s biographical dictionary, which itself supplemented Ibn Abi Ya’la’s. Ibn Humayd’s work has 843 entries covering over five-hundred years (750-1291/1349-1874). Instead of following the customary practice of listing scholars in the chronological order of their deaths, he placed his subjects in alphabetical order. The overwhelming majority of his work consists of verbatim or nearly verbatim renderings from a handful of sources whose authors lived and wrote in Egypt and Syria, so most of the men in Ibn Humayd’s collection come from those regions, with a mere handful from parts of Arabia. Najdi Hanbalism thus appears as a peripheral offshoot, the religious pupils and ‘ulama of which regarded the Syrian and Egyptian schools as the wellsprings of learning. Arabian pupils and ‘ulama travelled north to acquire advanced learning; we find no instances of traffic in the opposite direction. Ibn Humayd gives a polemical slant to his work by seamlessly blending this traditional Hanbali tradition with a clear bias against Wahhabis. For the middle to later parts of the eighteenth century, Ibn Humayd included twenty-four Arabian Hanbalis, all of them either indifferent or bitterly opposed to Wahhabi doctrine. For that portion of the nineteenth century covered in his work, he composed entries on twenty-one men, roughly half of them from al-Zubayr, located in southern Iraq, but culturally part of Najd, and a gathering place for anti-Wahhabi scholars.

One way to put Ibn Humayd’s bias into sharper focus is to compare a list of his Arabian Hanbalis with those found in the chronicle of his contemporary, the Saudi partisan ‘Uthman ibn Bishr. Ibn Bishr identified Wahhabi ‘ulama when he named the qadis under each Saudi ruler to 1850, and he wrote obituaries on the most prominent Wahhabi ‘ulama. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, naturally one of the central personalities in Ibn Bishr’s chronicle, does not have a separate entry in Ibn Humayd but is mentioned as a heretic or innovator. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s sons and grandsons, known in Wahhabi circles as Al al-Shaykh, appear as spiritual guides, qadis, scholars, and teachers in Ibn Bishr’s narrative, but are completely omitted from Ibn Humayd’s compilation because he regarded them as deviants from the historical Hanbali tradition. From the opposite perspective of Wahhabi Hanbalis Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Al al-Shaykh, and a handful
of their most prominent disciples are the authoritative formulators, defenders, and propagators of correct belief in a world that has forgotten the essential truths of Muhammad's message.\(^30\)

Only two men appear in both Ibn Humayd's and Ibn Bishr's works. One of them, 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd al-Rahman Abu Butayn, was a major figure in the second Saudi amirate. Ibn Humayd crafts his biography into an occasion to disparage the Wahhabis, calling him ‘indisputably the foremost jurist of Najd of the thirteenth \([hijri]\) century.’\(^31\) This complimentary phrase may be a deliberate slight of the leading Wahhabi shaykh in the first decades of the second emirate, ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan Al al-Shaykh, a grandson of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Ibn Humayd says very little about Abu Butayn's study with Wahhabi 'ulama or his official positions in the first amirate. In Ibn Humayd's telling, Abu Butayn's main teacher was Muhammad ibn Tirad al-Dawsari, who had studied with Damascene Hanbalis, but apparently not with any Wahhabi scholars. His next teacher was 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Husayyin, a Wahhabi scholar and Saudi qadi on whose Wahhabi affiliation Ibn Humayd is silent. Moreover, he cast doubt on al-Husayyin's qualifications to be qadi by claiming that his pupil, Abu Butayn, possessed deeper learning in jurisprudence, and therefore al-Husayyin often referred matters to him for rulings.

Ibn Humayd not only minimized Abu Butayn’s connection to the Wahhabis, he also slanted it in ways to smear them. For instance, he wrote that the people of Ta’if praised Abu Butayn for his conduct when he was qadi under the first Saudi amirate because he did not violate anyone's life, honor, or property even though it was a time when foxes acted like lions,\(^32\) implying that other Saudi appointees plundered and killed their unfortunate subjects. During the second Saudi amirate, Amir Turki appointed Abu Butayn qadi of ‘Unayza and all of Qasim. Ibn Humayd asserted that this act represented an appalling innovation that the Saudis had borrowed from the Ottomans. The ‘Unayzans hated this practice, and they feared that Abu Butayn would behave like previous Saudi qadis,\(^33\) but he won them over with his knowledge, fairness, and excellence as a teacher. Abu Butayn left after a fairly brief sojourn, but following Amir Turki’s assassination in 1834 the ‘Unayzans decided to invite him back, without even consulting Riyadh. This lack of consultation appears to have been a barb directed against Saudi and Wahhabi authority.\(^34\)
Traditional Hanbali Scholars

In Ibn Humayd’s biographical dictionary, the Hanbali tradition accepts Sufi practices and miraculous feats (karamat), matters the Wahhabis regarded as illegitimate violations of God’s unity. A brief entry on the earliest known Najdi scholar, Ahmad ibn Yahya ibn ‘Atwa (d. 948/1542), mentions his study with prominent Hanbali scholars in Damascus and his mystical attainments. Ibn Humayd cited a document that referred to Ibn ‘Atwa as a man through whose manifest spiritual blessings and dazzling signs Allah unlocks hearts and clears up vexing woes. Ibn Humayd noted that this early exemplar of Najd’s Hanbali tradition was buried next to the grave of Muhammad’s Companion Zayd ibn al-Khattab. By including this detail, Ibn Humayd may have intended a critical allusion to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s destruction of the tomb at Zayd’s grave because of his belief that Islam forbids edifices over graves. Ibn Humayd wrote that Medinans told him about karamat in the life of his own ancestor Humaydan ibn Turki. According to one such tale, when Shaykh Humaydan became ill, he told his son to summon men to wash his corpse even though he appeared to be in fine health. His son complied, and Shaykh Humaydan gave them instructions on how to prepare his corpse. He then brought them dates to eat and announced that the time (of his death) was near. His son, however, saw nothing to indicate that, so he told the corpse washers to leave and he too departed. When he came back, he found that his father had died.

Unlike plainly polemical treatises that defended the permissibility of mystical practices, the biographical dictionary validates them by embedding them in a cosmopolitan Hanbali tradition anchored in Damascus and Cairo. Several Arabian figures in the collection either studied in those towns under authoritative scholars or attended the lessons of Najdi shaykhs residing there. Hanbalis of Zubayr and Basra, most of them men with Najdi origins, also traveled to Damascus. One of the conspicuous differences between the traditional Hanbalis and the Wahhabis is their rival views of Arabia’s most important eighteenth-century scholars. For Wahhabis, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab marked a break with a doctrinally deficient and inexcusably lax scholasticism. However, a reading of Ibn Humayd’s entries on Arabian Hanbalis would lead one to conclude that the central figure of the eighteenth century was Muhammad ibn ‘Abdallah ibn Muhammad ibn Fayruz al-Tamimi al-Ahsa’i (1729/30-
Ibn Humayd achieves this effect by depicting Ibn Fayruz as the fount of a generation of ‘ulama who rejected Wahhabi doctrine. The dramatic elements in his biography include a foreshadowing of his auspicious scholarly future, his overcoming a physical handicap, showing bravery against a treacherous opponent, performing a lifesaving miracle, exodus, and triumph in his new setting. The auspicious episode occurred when a prominent scholar, Muhammad ibn ‘Afālīq, passed through ‘Unayza to perform the pilgrimage, accompanied by a number of pupils, including Ibn Fayruz. He showed great regard for Ibn Fayruz and this surprised the ‘Unayzans, so they asked why he favoured the blind youth. Ibn ‘Afālīq replied that he had intuited something special about him and that Allah would make him a blessing for his generation. Ibn Fayruz eventually became the most renowned teacher in al-Ahsa, attracting students from Bahrāyn, Basra, Zubayr, and Najd. When Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab began his mission, he sent envoys to various parts of Arabia to exhort ‘ulama like Ibn Fayruz to accept it, but the latter publicly repudiated Wahhabi teachings. The Wahhabis came to view him as one of their worst enemies and an exemplar of idolatry. According to Ibn Humayd, the Saudis offered a reward for his murder, and a group of would-be assassins went to his home one night only to be defeated by a miraculous intervention. As the Saudis grew more powerful, Ibn Fayruz wrote to Sultan Abdülhamid I to request Ottoman assistance against what he termed the ‘seditious Kharijīs’ of Najd, but Ottoman military expeditions launched from Iraq failed. It became clear that the Saudis would conquer al-Ahsa, so Ibn Fayruz and his entourage moved to Basra. The refugees travelled by land and sea in great fear, and upon reaching Basra, its governor honoured Ibn Fayruz by inviting him to give a public recitation from al-Bukhari’s canonical collection of the Prophet’s traditions.

Muhammad ibn Fayruz attracted large numbers of religious students, some of whom became eminent in their own right. The two most influential figures to emerge from his circle were Muhammad ibn Sallum and Ibrahim ibn Jadid. Ibn Sallum authored commentaries that even Wahhabi scholars acknowledged as outstanding samples of erudition but they considered him a pernicious influence because of his opposition to their revivalist mission. Ibrahim ibn Jadid appears to have been a pivotal figure connecting the legacy of Ibn Fayruz to ‘ulama of the middle to later nineteenth century. His pupils included the two men Ibn Humayd considered his own most important shaykhs.
The relocation of Ibn Fayruz and his disciples to southern Iraq did not spell the demise of traditional Arabian Hanbalism because they were able to project their influence back into central Arabia through itinerant religious students. Ibn Humayd’s two most influential teachers studied with traditional Hanbalis in Zubayr and then resettled in Mecca and Medina. From there, traditional Hanbali teachers influenced some Najdi religious students. ‘Abdallah ibn Fa’iz ibn Mansur Aba al-Khayl (c. 1785-1835) represents the persistence of traditional Hanbalism in Najd and its connections to anti-Wahhabi ‘ulama scattered around the periphery of central Arabia. The son of a small town amir, he studied in ‘Unayza, and then, around the time of the Ottoman-Egyptian invasion, he went to Mecca for further study. His teachers there included men who later taught Ibn Humayd, and the latter’s paternal uncle was one of Aba al-Khayl’s study companions. When he returned to ‘Unayza the townspeople made him the imam and preacher at the congregational mosque, but the supporters of Saudi ruler Amir Turki spread rumors against him to the effect that Aba al-Khayl disapproved of the Wahhabi mission. Furthermore, his foes reported that when he wished to set a sundial, he wrote to the traditional Hanbali Muhammad ibn Sallum for guidance because he deemed Wahhabi ‘ulama incapable of performing this task properly. The charge that Wahhabi ‘ulama were deficient in learning was common among traditional Hanbalis. In this instance, it led to Aba al-Khayl’s dismissal and reprimand by local Wahhabis. He then went to Mecca, where he fell ill with tuberculosis. Soon after, Amir Turki was assassinated, and, in Ibn Humayd’s account, ‘Unayza’s people became independent of Riyadh, so they again asked Aba al-Khayl to be imam and preacher, but his illness prevented him from assuming those duties. Aba al-Khayl’s nephew, Muhammad ibn Ibrahim ibn Muhammad ibn Uraykan (fl. 1820-60), is the last representative of traditional Hanbalism in Ibn Humayd’s collection. His uncle raised him and taught him, and he then traveled to southern Iraq, where he studied under Ibn Sallum. During his studies in Mecca, he met and became a close disciple of the famous Sufi Muhammad al-Sanusi.

Wahhabis in al-Suhub al-Wabila

In addition to sketching a laudatory collective portrait of traditional Hanbalis, the biographical dictionary presents the Wahhabis in a negative light. The picture of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his
movement that emerges from Ibn Humayd’s collection has three components. First, members of the reformer’s own illustrious lineage i.e. his father, brother and grandson, all rejected his teachings. Second, he resorted to assassination of his enemies. Third, sincere Wahhabis lacked the ability and perspicacity for sensitive diplomatic missions and polemical works.

Ibn Humayd expressed his enmity toward the Wahhabi mission in his entries on Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s kinsmen from Al Musharraf, one of the leading ‘ulama clans in Najd during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Saudi historian ‘Abdallah al-Mutawa has identified ten ‘ulama from Al Musharraf in the period before Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab.52 They were active in Ushayqir and al-’Uyayna, the region’s main centres of religious learning before Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab turned al-Dir‘iyya into the hub of a new scholastic tradition. Ibn Humayd wrote that Al Musharraf was a learned and virtuous family and that learning passed among its progeny from generation to generation.53 He described Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s grandfather, Sulayman ibn ‘Ali (d. 1668/9) as the foremost scholar of Najd in his time, the author of an important treatise on pilgrimage rites, and an authority on Hanbali jurisprudence.54

Ibn Humayd’s attacks on Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab appear in two biographies: one on the reformer’s own father, ‘Abd al-Wahhab ibn Sulayman (d. 1740), the other on a distant kinsman.55 According to Ibn Humayd, the reformer’s father disapproved of his son’s unwillingness to specialize in jurisprudence as his ancestors had done, disagreed with his views on doctrine, and declared that he would be the cause of wickedness. In the same entry, Ibn Humayd included accounts of the opposition Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab faced from his own brother, Sulayman, the author of one of the earliest treatises refuting Wahhabi doctrine.56 The disagreement between the two brothers served as an occasion for Ibn Humayd to relate a scurrilous anecdote about the reformer. He wrote that if somebody disputed Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings and he could not kill his critic openly, he would send an assassin to dispose of his adversary in bed or in the marketplace under cover of darkness. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab considered anyone who disagreed with him an unbeliever, and therefore it was legitimate to shed that person’s blood. Ibn Humayd reported that there was a madman who used to go about town striking whomever he met. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab ordered that this madman be given a sword and sent to his brother Sulayman while he was alone in a mosque. But when the madman saw Sulayman, he was
overcome with fear and dropped the sword (a sort of divine blessing or *baraka* for Sulayman).  

Ibn Humayd included another ‘treachery’ story in the entry on an early member of Al Musharraf. This man’s descendant, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Hamad ibn Ibrahim, a prominent shaykh in the later years of the first Saudi amirate, disagreed with Wahhabi doctrine even though Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was his maternal grandfather. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Hamad’s attitude stemmed from the fate of his stepfather, Shaykh ‘Abdallah ibn Gharib. This man feigned agreement with the Wahhabis and composed epistles to refute a polemic penned by a Baghdadi scholar, whose arguments the Wahhabis were unable to effectively rebut. Ibn Gharib eventually made the mistake of confiding his true opinions to a Persian shaykh, stating that the Saudis had committed excesses in excommunicating, plundering, and killing fellow Muslims. The Persian shaykh then exposed him, and the Saudis arrested him. His intelligence and familiarity with their secrets meant that he could expose the Wahhabi doctrine’s flaws and the Saudis’ misdeeds. Because Ibn Gharib posed a danger to the mission, they executed him. Ibn Gharib’s fate caused ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Hamad to resent the Wahhabi mission, but he went along with it for fear of being killed. He became an influential shaykh and gained the trust of Saudi rulers so that he handled sensitive diplomatic missions, such as being sent by the ruler to Cairo in 1815 to arrange a truce.

One last example of Ibn Humayd’s bias concerns Ahmad ibn Hasan ibn Rashid al-Ahsa‘i, a scholar who enjoyed the admiration of all Arabian Hanbalis, both traditional and Wahhabi. According to Wahhabi sources, he embraced their doctrine, but Ibn Humayd, as we might expect, placed him in the traditional Hanbali camp. He wrote that Ibn Rashid was raised by Muhammad ibn Fayruz and became one of his outstanding pupils. When the Saudis were poised to conquer al-Ahsa, Ibn Fayruz urged Ibn Rashid to accompany him to Basra, but Ibn Rashid chose to move to Medina instead. His shaykh warned him that if he went to Medina, he should beware of the danger posed by the Saudis. Some years later, Ibn Rashid urged Sultan Abdülhamid to reinforce the holy cities against the Saudi threat, and when that had no effect, he wrote to ‘ulama in Syria and Turkey, again to no avail. When the Saudis conquered Medina, he cooperated with them and pretended to agree with their views, in the hope that he could use his standing to protect the terrified townsfolk. According to Ibn Humayd, the Saudis honoured him and sought his counsel because they needed somebody with his deep knowledge, familiarity with the *salafi* way, and expertise...
in Hanbali jurisprudence. Ibn Humayd interjected that the Saudis claimed to follow the Hanbali school, but in reality called for *ijtihad* (legal reasoning not restricted to a particular legal school) and hence did not follow any legal school. Furthermore, the Saudis needed somebody with Ibn Rashid’s talent for polemical debate, because the Wahhabi ‘ulama were deficient in that respect. Ibn Humayd did not dispute the Wahhabi claim that Ibn Rashid taught their texts to his pupils, but claimed that the latter did so only to stay in the good graces of the Saudis and to prevent them from harming the people of Medina. Ibn Rashid is reported to have said, ‘God knows this is all I intend by dealing with them.’ A variation on this account occurs in another entry, where one of Ibn Rashid’s pupils is reported to have told Ibn Humayd that he had been attending Ibn Rashid’s lessons in Medina at the time of the Saudi takeover. This informant told Ibn Humayd that he stopped going to Ibn Rashid’s lessons when he saw that the shaykh was cooperating with the Saudis. ‘He chided me, and I told him that they would make him read their epistles wherein they call Muslims unbelievers. And I reminded him of Ibn Fayruz’s advice, ‘Be careful of exposing yourself to destruction by the people of al-‘Arid (the district of Riyadh).’ Then Shaykh Ahmad swore that he only appeased the Saudis to protect himself and his friends, not from conviction.

Al-Suhub al-Wabila, Anti-Unitarian Polemics, and the Tabaqat Genre

Ibn Humayd’s biographical dictionary forms part of the anti-Wahhabi discourse conducted by Ottoman ‘ulama. His Meccan teacher, Ahmad ibn Zayni Dahlan (1817-86), wrote an anti-Wahhabi treatise, the bulk of which consists of arguments and proofs from the Sunna to uphold the validity of various practices the Wahhabs considered idolatrous: Visiting the tomb of the Prophet; seeking the intercession of saints; venerating the Prophet; and obtaining the blessings of saints. Dahlan’s treatise also contains themes found in Ibn Humayd’s work. He recalled how Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s father perceived his son’s false belief, blamed him, and warned people about him. He relates that Sulayman ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab feared that his brother would plot his murder and therefore moved to Medina, where he composed his refutation of his brother’s teachings. We also find in Dahlan the accusation that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab did not adhere to the Hanbali school and that he was deficient in learning. Essays like
Dahlan’s are the most obvious place to find attempts to place the Wahhabis outside the historical mainstream. Ibn Humayd’s *tabaqat* represents an alternative rhetorical strategy to discredit Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and to establish that he and his followers do not belong to the Hanbali fold.

**Notes**

1. I wish to thank Itzchak Weismann and Steven Weinberger for reading earlier drafts and offering useful suggestions.
10. Michael Cook’s chapter on Damascus Hanbalis in *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 145-64, has little bearing on the specific issues that Voll and Makdisi address, but he does mention the Sufi affiliation of a fifteenth-century scholar, Zayn al-Din al-Salihi; see pp. 160-3. More broadly, Cook’s chapters on Hanbalis in Baghdad, Damascus, and Najd demonstrate the diversity of views within the school on the question of how to interpret the religious duty to command right and forbid wrong. In doing so, he broadens the revisionist approach to the Hanbalis, see pp. 114-92.
12. Humaydan ibn Turki was a contemporary of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab; see Ibn Humayd: *Suhub*, vol. 1, pp. 380-3. The sources tell us nothing about Ibn Humayd’s paternal lineage apart from an uncle, ‘Uthman (d. 1835), who was a religious student, Ibn Humayd: *Suhub*, vol. 2, p. 642. Another member of Al Turki, Ibn Humayd’s maternal uncle, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abdallah ibn Turki, appears to have studied under ‘ulama but himself fell short of attaining the standing of a scholar.
Nonetheless, he had a hand in shaping his nephew’s outlook; see Ibn Humayd: *Subuh*, vol. 1, p. 20.


18 He became the Hanbali imam in 1848 and the Hanbali mufti some time around 1866. *Ibn Humayd: Subuh*, vol. 1, pp. 46, 48.


20 Ibn Humayd also wrote a gloss on a commentary on a Hanbali *fiqh* treatise, Mansur al-Bahuti’s *Sharh al-Muntaha* (Ibn Humayd: *Subuh*, vol. 1, pp. 85-6), and an abbreviation of a biographical dictionary of grammarians by al-Suyuti (Ibn Humayd: *Subuh*, vol. 1, pp. 64-5).


22 Preface to *Ibn Humayd: Subuh*, vol. 1, p. 78.


24 In the eighteenth century, all the traffic was to Syria because the Hanbali school had just about disappeared in Cairo by then. On the scarcity of Hanbali ‘ulama in Cairo around 1740, see Moshe Perlmann, ‘Shaykh al-Damanhuri against the Churches of Cairo (1739)’, *Actas IV Congreso de Estudos Arabes e Islamicos* (Leiden, 1971), p. 29n. 3.

25 Ibn Humayd’s *Subuh* has entries on just four Arabian ‘ulama for the period before the Wahhabi mission.


33 Although Ibn Humayd did not describe the previous Saudi qadis, the implication is clearly not in their favour.


38 This deed is mentioned in a letter that one of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s opponents sent to Najdi ‘ulama as an example of the reformer’s objectionable actions. ‘Abdallah al-Salih al-Uthaymin, ‘Mawqif Sulayman ibn Sa‘id min da‘wat al-Shaykh Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’, *Buhuth wa ta‘liqat fi tarikh al-mamlaka al-arabiyya al-sa‘udiyya* (Riyadh, 1984), p. 96.


41 Ibrahim ibn Jadid (d. 1816/17) of Zubayr studied under Ahmad al-Ba‘li at the Muradiyya madrasa in Damascus, Ibn Humayd: *Subuh*, vol. 1, pp. 71-6. Ibrahim Jadid’s disciple ‘Abd al-Jabar al-Basi (d. 1868/9), one of Ibn Humayd’s main teachers, studied at the same madrasa, Ibn Humayd: *Subuh*, vol. 2, pp. 443-51. One of al-Basi’s
teachers was a Zubayri immigrant who had settled in Damascus, Ghannam ibn Muhammad (d. 1824/5), Ibn Humayd: *Suhub*, vol. 2, pp. 811-12.


50 Muhammad al-Hudaybi and Isa ibn Muhammad al-Zubayri.


58 ‘Abd al-Wahhab ibn ‘Abdallah ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’, Ibn Humayd: *Suhub*, vol. 2, pp. 686-94. In this one instance, Ibn Humayd departed from the alphabetical order of his collection to include two of this man’s much later descendants.

59 Ibn Humayd: *Suhub*, vol. 2, pp. 689-94. Ibn Humayd obtained his information about ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Hamad from his uncles, who attended Ibn Hamad’s lessons in Unayza, where he moved after the fall of al-Dir‘iya to Ottoman-Egyptian forces in 1818.

60 In ‘Abd al-Bassam’s recent biographical dictionary, he is named Muhammad ibn ‘Ali ibn Gharib, *Ulama Najd kibli ta‘limiyat qurun* (6 vols., Riyadh, 1996/7), vol. 6, p. 312. The editors of *Suhub* note that the vocalization of his name is not known. It could be Gharib or Ghurayyib, vol. 2, p. 691n. 1.

61 In Cairo, Ibn Hamad met the famous Egyptian chronicler, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti. Ibn Humayd cites al-Jabarti’s chronicle wherein the Egyptian expressed respect


64 *Salaf* refers to the first generation of Muslims who presumably practiced pure Islam. The Wahhabis themselves claimed to have revived Islam in its pristine ‘salafi’ form, so Ibn Humayd’s claim here is a bold one.


67 A broad overview of themes in Ottoman-Wahhabi polemics can be found in al-‘Abd al-Latif, *Da’awa al-munawi’in*.


The Caliph and the Shaykhs: Abdülhamid II’s Policy towards the Qadiriyya of Mosul

Gökhan Çetinsaya

A major feature of Sultan Abdülhamid II’s regime (1878-1908) was his renewed emphasis upon Islam and Muslim solidarity, and upon his own position as Caliph as well as Sultan. Abdülhamid’s Islamic policy had two main aspects: first, the Sultan saw Muslim solidarity through a common loyalty to the Caliphate as crucial to the empire’s efforts to resist European penetration and the separatist aspirations of his non-Muslim subjects. This perception was expressed in much outward official deference to Islam in general, and to Sufi leaders in particular; it also included an officially-sponsored ‘Pan-Islamic’ religious propaganda campaign appealing to the solidarity of Muslims outside the Ottoman Empire’s confines. But a second aspect of Abdülhamid’s concern in emphasizing Islam was an underlying current of doubt about the loyalty of his Muslim subjects, in particular non-Turkish Muslims such as the Albanians, the Arabs, and the Kurds.1 This article examines Abdülhamid II’s approach to the shaykhly families of the Qadiriyya brotherhood in the province (vîleyet) of Mosul within the general context of his Islamic policy. It thus may serve as a case study of Hamidian Islamic policy as viewed from both the central and the provincial perspectives. The study is based principally on Ottoman and British archival sources. My aim is to reinforce the arguments put forward by Butrus Abu-Manneh in his seminal articles on Abdülhamid II’s Islamic policy on the one hand, and the history of the Qadiriyya in Iraq on the other.2

Historical Background and Social Composition

Iraq was conquered in stages by the Ottomans in the first half of the sixteenth century; Mosul was taken in c.1516. In the regions of Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyya to its north, Kurdish families were appointed as local governors or tax-collectors in return for protecting the frontier with Iran; they governed under the supervision of an Ottoman governor-
general (Beylerbeyi) at Mosul. However, the province of Mosul at times lost territory to Diyarbakir and Sehrizor. By the eighteenth century, central authority in northern Iraq, as in the Fertile Crescent at large, perceptibly weakened. In Mosul, the power vacuum was filled by the Jalilis, a local family loyal to Istanbul, which took control in 1726. Concomitantly, in Sulaymaniyya power was seized by the Kurdish Baban family, and other Kurdish districts likewise fell under the control of local amirs. Not until the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-39) did the central government set out to restore its authority over the provinces and create a reformed and centralized system of provincial administration. This process was gradual, Mosul's turn coming in 1834. The subordination of the Kurdish amirates around Diyarbakir and Rawanduz took several more years, the Babans of Sulaymaniyya holding out until 1850. The Tanzimat reforms were initiated in Mosul in 1848. By 1851 the central government had come to the conclusion that Iraq's problems would be better dealt with under a single administration. Mosul was consequently reduced to the status of a district (sancaq) of Baghdad and remained so until 1878.

The population of the Mosul district was predominantly tribal. The tribal element was divided into nomadic, settled, and semi-settled groups, the latter two forming the great majority. In the Kurdish areas of the north and north-east the basis of tribal solidarity was common ties with the land rather than the extended family, as was the case among Arabs. Three forms of socio-political organization were identifiable among the Kurds: classic tribal groups sharing common descent under an agha; tribes that submitted to chiefs of different descent; and tribes whose religious chiefs combined secular and religious authority. The economic and social basis of the Kurdish tribes was the village, not the agricultural estate (muqata'a), as was the case in the Arab regions. The nomadic tribes had their own grazing grounds, while the village lands were either in the hands of the tribal aghas who dominated the peasants or, at least theoretically, were held in perpetuity in the case of the reigning Kurdish families.

Following the destruction of the big Kurdish amirates after 1831, power devolved to local magnates (begs and aghas) and leaders of the Sufi brotherhoods (tariqas). With the application of the Land Law of 1858, the bulk of registered lands (tapu) passed into their hands as well. As a result, agrarian relations remained much the same as in the period before the tapu system was introduced, with those who had previously acquired wealth and authority as tax farmers and money lenders now acquiring it as landowners. Since the Ottoman government was unable to collect
taxes directly from the cultivators, tax farming continued to provide an important power base for the notables. The result was a constant political and economic power struggle among the leading families of shaykhs, baghs, and aghas, which further intensified with the development of commercial agriculture and regional trade. The population in the district of Mosul was also divided along ethnic and religious lines. It comprised Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans, and Persians, as well as Assyrians, Armenians, Chaldeans, Jews, Yezidis, and Sabeans. The Sunni Kurds were the second largest group after the Sunni Arabs.

Another important aspect of the Kurdish society of Mosul in the period under study was the widespread influence of the tariqas. The two main Sufi brotherhoods in the region were the Naqshbandiya and the Qadiriyya. The Kurdish tribes were under the influence of religious shaykhly families belonging to these two brotherhoods. Both the Qadiriyya and the Naqshbandiya took advantage of the destruction of the semi-independent Kurdish amirates by Mahmud II in the 1830s and from that time on expanded their influence over the local tribes. The structure of tribal leadership gradually became intertwined with Sufism, so that shaykhly families came to exercise both religious and worldly power on a hereditary basis. The Qadiriyya remained the dominant tariqa in Mosul, despite the formidable challenge that the Naqshbandiya-Khalidiyya posed on its religious authority since its founder, Shaykh Khalid had introduced it into the region in the 1810s. Fierce rivalry between the two tariqas foraged through most of the nineteenth century.

The region of Sulaymaniyya in the south-east of the Mosul vilayet was under the influence of the Barzinji sayyids (descendants of the Prophet), who belonged to the Qadiri brotherhood. They controlled all the Kurdish tribes of the area except the Jaf tribe. The family’s dominance continued during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz (1861-76) and reached its peak during Abdülhamid II’s reign. Under the saintly Kak Ahmad, and then under his grandson Shaykh Sa’id (d. 1909), the Barzinjis gained considerable power and wealth in the region. Sa’id travelled several times to Istanbul and gained the favour of Sultan Abdülhamid, as well as of Haci ‘Ali Pasa, the Principal Palace Chamberlain, and of the Arab ‘Izzat al-‘Abid, the influential Second Palace Secretary. But in his home territory Sa’id faced several rivals. Among them were the merchants of Sulaymaniyya, who were engaged in the local agricultural production and in trading with Iran, and other branches of the Barzinji family under the leadership of Sayyid Muhammad Sa’id Barzinji. The most formidable opponents, however, were the Talabanis, a rival shaykhly family of the
Qadiriyya brotherhood which had considerable influence over the tribes of Kirkuk. Through their religious influence over tribes and villagers alike, the Talabanis had managed to acquire great amounts of land, considerable wealth, and local power. Like the Barzinjis, the Talabanis were divided into several branches. While some of them, like the celebrated poet Shaykh Rida, established close contacts with the Ottoman government and enjoyed its favours, others were involved in raids and brigandage which caused trouble to the authorities.8

**In the Aftermath of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-8**

The two major Kurdish tribes in the Kirkuk-Sulaymaniyya region were the Jaf and the Hamawand: The disastrous Russo-Öttoman war of 1877-8 left a power vacuum in the vilayet of Mosul. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the Hamawand took advantage of the weakening of central authority to increase its brigandage in the region.10 In 1886 the district authorities faced a further outbreak of serious tribal disorders, again involving the Hamawand.11 The Porte’s investigations revealed that these had their roots in the outbreak of fighting between the Barzinji and Talabani families, provoked by the murder of a member of the latter. According to Shaykh Mar’uf al-Talabani, although their leader Shaykh Sa’id and his accomplices had been arrested by the authorities, the Barzinjis continued their attacks upon his family. While Sa’id and his men were trying to obtain their own release, another member of the family, Shaykh Hasan, with five-hundred men, launched an attack upon Mar’uf’s hospice (Turk. tekke, Ar. zāwiyā) in Kirkuk. Shaykh Ma’ruf asked for immediate help.12 The Hamawand and other tribes of Mosul and Baghdad had taken advantage of this situation to attack and rob villages in the area.13

Sultan Abdülhamid II and his advisers were disposed to take a serious view of the situation. Given the long history of insubordination, they recognized that it was not enough to resolve the immediate conflict between the Barzinjis and the Talabanis and that something must be done about the local tribes, especially the Hamawand.14 To deal with the problem, Abdülhamid II decided to send to Mosul as a special commissioner Ismail Hakki Pasa, a veteran of tribal wars.15 The Sultan also made it plain that he was reluctant to take harsh measures against the religiously influential Barzinji and Talabani families. He asserted that ‘by reason of the fact that the Barzinjis are a family of Sayyids (süley-i tābirā), those [officials] are to be advised to take great attention and care to treat them with complete justice and fairness.’ By contrast, Sultan Abdülhamid
indicated that he was prepared to authorize strong measures against the Hamawand tribe.\textsuperscript{16}

By the time Ismail Hakki Pasa was ready to set out for Mosul towards the end of 1886, local reports indicated that the conflict between the Barzinjis and the Talabanis had been settled and that security was restored.\textsuperscript{17} When trouble appears to have flared up again in January 1887, Abdülhamid II ordered Ismail Hakki to proceed to Mosul at once and try the culprits according to the principles of ‘justice and equity’. Accordingly, in a court martial chaired by the special commissioner, nine people from both families were condemned to hard labour and exiled for three years. This punishment was approved by the Sultan.\textsuperscript{18} Meanwhile, military measures were taken against the Hamawand, with every appearance of success.\textsuperscript{19} Ismail Hakki Pasa’s mission seemed to be completed, and towards the end of 1887 he returned to Istanbul.\textsuperscript{20}

 Barely a year later, in late 1888, new disturbances erupted in the Mosul region, this time involving the Jaf tribe and its chief, Mahmud Pasa.\textsuperscript{21} He had obeyed the summons to come to Istanbul, but although he was offered a salary of 5,000 kurus and a house in Besiktas, in proximity to the Sultan’s palace, he insisted that he wanted to go back to his own region and tribe.\textsuperscript{22} Finally, in August 1891, he suddenly disappeared from Istanbul and made his way back to Mosul. This was an open challenge to the authorities, who issued several orders for his arrest.\textsuperscript{23} On this occasion Abdülhamid II’s policy of avoiding harsh measures against the Barzinji and Talabani Shaykhs paid off, for Shaykh Hamid al-Talabani of Kirkuk offered his services as a mediator to persuade Mahmud Pasa to surrender.\textsuperscript{24} Thanks to his efforts, Mahmud Pasa came out of hiding and was taken to Istanbul by Hamid al-Talabani in 1892.\textsuperscript{25}

**Tribal and Religious Infighting in the 1890s**

The province of Mosul enjoyed a brief respite until late 1894, when a miscalculation of the central government provoked a fresh round of conflict with the Jaf begs and the Barzinji shaykhs. Feeling that the situation in the region had calmed down, the authorities allowed the two ‘honorary detainees’, Sayyid Muhammad Effendi of the Barzinji family and Mahmud Pasa of the Jaf tribe, to leave Istanbul and return to their homes. Written assurances were obtained from both men, but trouble started as soon as they arrived in Mosul. For once, the return of Sayyid Muhammad touched off a power struggle between two branches of the Barzinji family, led on the one side by Shaykh Sa’id Effendi, the grandson of Kak Ahmad, and on the other by Muhammad himself.\textsuperscript{26} This inter-
family feud lasted for over a decade and resulted in several clashes between the two branches and their dependent tribesmen, as well as in a fierce competition for hegemony over the local population. Before long, the Jaf and the Hamawand also began to create problems for the government.

Thus, as soon as Sayyid Muhammad Effendi al-Barzinji reached Sulaymaniyya, his followers began to attack Shaykh Sa‘id’s villages. Local officials attempted to mediate, as did the Commander of the Sixth Army, Receb Pasa, but to no avail. Only under the threat of arrest and trial did Muhammad consider a reconciliation. He twice telegraphed the Palace in Istanbul, complaining that he was the victim of ‘misconceptions’ and a ‘plot’ and begging for imperial pardon. This was promptly granted by Abdülhamid, who moreover instructed the Grand Vizier and the governor of Mosul to handle the matter in good will without annoying or insulting the Sayyids. The rival Barzinji shaykhs were then summoned to Mosul, where they solemnly performed the reconciliation ceremony. These measures, however, failed to produce the desired effect. Therefore, in early July 1895 the Porte decided to send another special commission to Mosul under General Ibrahim Pasa, a member of the Military Inspection Commission, to mediate between the Barzinji shaykhs. Ibrahim Pasa worked out an agreement, but peace lasted barely ten days. Having rejected the option of the Barzinjis’ exile, Abdülhamid ordered General Abdullah Pasa of his entourage to proceed immediately to Mosul. Staying in the region for six months, Abdullah achieved considerable success in subduing the outlaw tribes, but not in appeasing the Barzinjis. Consequently, in 1897 they were arrested by local officials and then taken to Diyarbakir for trial. However, as on previous cases, Sultan Abdülhamid II intervened and granted them pardon.

Mahmud Pasa’s return from Istanbul at once provoked a fresh outbreak of trouble with his Jaf tribe. Not unlike Sayyid Muhammad Effendi al-Barzinji, as soon as he got back Mahmud started a campaign of agitation against his brother, Osman Pasa, who had replaced him as the recognized leader of the tribe. Osman complained to the Porte, as did Shaykh Sa‘id Barzinji, who posed as his ally. Mahmud Pasa, for his part, sent a telegram directly to the Palace, claiming that all accusations against him were false. In reaction, Abdülhamid ordered a full investigation before taking any action against Mahmud Pasa. As the situation deteriorated and taxes could no longer be collected because of this inner-tribal conflict, the Grand Vizier Rifat Pasa demanded in February 1896 severe punishment. A few months later, in June 1896, the Ottoman Council of Ministers proposed even more radical measures, namely to exile all
known troublemakers in the Mosul region, including the leaders of the Barzinji and Talabani families, and of the Jaf tribe. Yet again Abdülhamid declined to pay heed to his ministers’ advice. He remained reluctant to alienate the shaykhs and aghas, now also in view of the serious Armenian disturbances which had been raging in eastern Anatolia since 1894. The Sultan appears to have suspected that the charges against the local Muslim leaders had been fabricated by the Armenians and their alleged foreign supporters as a means to weaken the Muslim element in the population, and he more than once emphasized his determination to protect these leaders. In the words of Ebubekir Hazim Bey, the governor of Mosul in 1899-1901:

I could in no way explain the [position of] brigand shaykhs to the Sultan. Whenever [I] attempted to take measures against them, he [the Sultan] did not give permission, on the grounds that ‘it is not right to punish Muslim shaykhs and men of importance on account of the Armenians’ slanders. I got the following telegram, in cipher, from Kamil Bey, the cipher clerk [at the Palace]: ‘there is a strong possibility that these unjust accusations about some Muslim notables arose from an intrigue by Armenians and foreigners....’

Conciliation during Sultan Abdülhamid II’s Final Years

The period 1897-1902 enjoyed relative calm in the affairs of the Kirkuk-Sulaymaniyya region. Visiting Istanbul at the invitation of the Sultan in 1901, Shaykh Sa’id al-Barzinji stayed at the house of the Palace Chamberlain Haci ‘Ali Pasa, who was a follower of the Qadiri brotherhood. Sa’id is reported to have persuaded Abdülhamid II on this visit to grant a general pardon to the outlaws of the Kurdish region, including the influential Naqshbandi shaykh Nur Muhammad of Dihok. But, as ever, peace proved elusive and in 1904 a new conflict broke out between the two branches of the Barzinji family. The Council of Ministers again proposed severe punishment, but Abdülhamid refused, drawing the Grand Vizier’s attention to reports that the Barzinjis were subjected to oppressive and insulting treatment by the local authorities, causing some of them to migrate. He clarified that, ‘that kind of treatment towards them is entirely against the imperial will.’ The Sultan then ordered two special commissioners to proceed to Sulaymaniyya and investigate the case.
The Sultan gave a further demonstration of his attitude in early June 1905, in response to reports that Sa' id al-Barzinji and his followers were attacking villages of the Hamawand. Local officials asked for permission to use force against Sa'id. It was granted by the Council of Ministers and forwarded to the Sultan for approval. In his reply, Abdülhamid ruled out any possibility of using force against the Barzinjis: ‘As this kind of treatment is by no means in accordance with the imperial will, cancel the unauthorized orders, if any, for the employment of arms at once, and ensure security and good administration through wise advice to those concerned.’ Three months later members of the Barzinji family were arrested and brought to trial, but as might have been expected they were all pardoned by the Sultan. He would not depart from his policy of conciliation. The local authorities continued to pursue certain Barzinjis who had been convicted in absentia, but in February 1906 Abdülhamid ordered that the pursuit cease. A little earlier, in December 1905, Mustafa Yumni Bey, the new governor of Mosul and brother of 'Izzat Pasa al-'Abid, dismissed the Barzinji naqib al-ashraf (doyen of the Prophet's descendants) of Sulaymaniyya together with the town's entire Administrative Council because of the persistent disturbances involving murder between their faction and the followers of Shaykh Sa'id. The governor of Sulaymaniyah and Sa'id al-Barzinji were then summoned to Mosul to coordinate measures to conciliate the tribes in their region. The vali, it was said, rather favoured Shaykh Sa'id, and this gave offence to the naqib and the members of the Administrative Council.

The Barzinji feud was still going on when the Young Turk Revolution put an end to Abdülhamid II’s rule in July 1908. Sensing his vulnerability, Sa'id al-Barzinji began a campaign of opposition to the new government, provoking the Hamawand into open revolt. Partly owing to his backing, and partly because of the power vacuum in the region, the Hamawand escalated its raids to an unbearable level. All trade and transport came to a standstill, as the roads between Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyya, and Baghdad were eventually blocked. Realizing its inability to employ effectively its troops, the government at last induced Shaykh Sa'id and other members of the Barzinji family to come to Mosul, where he was murdered in January 1909 in a public riot.

Conclusion

The present study confirms current assumptions about the nature of Sultan Abdülhamid II’s Islamic policy from the angle of the vilayet of Mosul and especially its Kurdish areas. It demonstrates how religion was
deliberately employed as a means for linking Ottoman society to its ruler and how Sufi shaykhs and tariqas in particular came to be regarded as an important socio-political mainstay of Abdülhamid’s rule. In the vilayet of Mosul, shaykhly families such as the Barzinjis and the Talabanis enjoyed considerable privileges, as well as influence among the local population. Under the Hamidian regime their status was further enhanced, some of them even obtaining direct links with the Palace. Sultan Abdülhamid was anxious to conciliate, not alienate, the tariqa leaders. He declined to use armed force against religious notables and was generally reluctant to pursue radical measures that might offend them. The shaykhly families exploited the Sultan’s leniency towards them to their own advantage. Losing official favor in the early stages of the Young Turk regime, they reacted by joining the opposition.

Notes

3 For the history of Ottoman Mosul, see Stephen H. Longrigg, Four Centuries of Modern Iraq (Oxford, 1925); Dina Rizk Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540-1834 (Cambridge, 1997).
4 For the tribal, ethnic, and religious characteristics of Mosul in the nineteenth century, see Sarah D. Shields, Mosul Before Iraq (New York, 2000); Sinan Marufoglu, Osmanlı Döneminde Kuzey Irak, 1831-1914 (Istanbul, 1998).
8 On the Talabanis, see Edmonds: Kurds, pp. 269-71, 290-5; van Bruinessen: Mullahs, pp. 220-3; Sadik Viedani, Tarikatler ve Silsilerleri (Istanbul, 1995), pp. 135-43. For Shaykh Rida (d. 1908) and other figures of the family, see Ibnülemin Mahmut Kemal Inal, Son Asir Türk Sairleri (Istanbul, 1969), pp. 1477-82.
10 J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia (Calcutta, 1908-1915), I/1B, p. 1500.

BOA, Y.A.Res. 35/10 (5), 2 Safer 1304/1886.

For details see BOA, Y.A.Res. 35/10 (5); Y.A.Res. 35/14, 10 Safer 1304/1886; Ismail Hakki Paşa's (1818-1896) official biography is given in Idris Bostan, 'Zor Sancagi'ınin İmam ve İslahi ile Alakali Üç Layhi', Osmanlı Arastirmalari 6 (1986), 210ff. He spent his career either in border posts or in tribal areas. He was nicknamed 'the wolf' by the people of the provinces he governed due to the tactics he used against the tribes.

BOA, Y.A.Res. 35/14 (3), the minute dated 11 Safer 1304/1886. See also Y.A.Res. 35/23, 19 Safer 1304/1886.

See, for example, BOA, Y.A.Hus. 196/21, 7 Safer 1304/1886.

BOA, Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları, 15/56, 13 Rebiyülâhir 1304/1887; Y.E.E. 36/139/81, 14 Saban 1304/1887.

For the Barzinjis' family tree, see Edmonds: Kurds, p. 69. See also pp. 74-6, especially the paragraph about Sultan Abdülhamid II. The reason for Sayyid Muhammad Effendi's sojourn in Istanbul is unknown.

BOA, Y.A.Hus. 376/89, 20 Rebiyülâhir 1315/1897, enclosing the Sayyids' telegrams of appreciation.

For Shaykh Barzinji's telegram, see enclosure (2), dated 29 Tesrin-i sâni 1311/1894. See also, Y.A.Res. 74/17, 19 Recep 1311/1894; Y.A.Husus, no. 17, 6 Ramazan 1312/1895.
38 BOA, Y.A.Res. 87/1 (5), 18 Zilhicce 1313/1896; Y.A.Res. 79/60, 18 Zilhicce 1313/1896.
39 See for example, BOA, Y.A.Res. 87/1 (1), Gurre-i Muharrem 1315/1897.
41 Public Record Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 195/2096, Mosul newsletter no. 11, 4 June 1901. When the shaykh left Sulaymaniyya, the notables and officials accompanied him for a distance of three hours wishing him Godspeed. Ironically, on their return they were attacked by a party of the Hamawands, who stole their horses and robbed them. They returned home on foot.
43 BOA, Y.A.Res. 126/61, 8 Rebiyulâhir 1322/1904.
44 BOA, Irade-Hususi, no. 120, 26 Rebiyülâhir 1322/1904: ‘Seyh Kal Said Efendi ile Ailesinin ve Sâdât-i Berzenciyanın Tazyćik Olunmakta ve Haklarında Hakaretkârane Muamele Edilmekte Olmasından Dolayi Sâdâthin Hicrete Basladikları’.
45 BOA, Irade-Hususi, no. 20, 7 Cemaziyelevvel 1322/1904. The selected commissioners were Major-General Riza Pasa of the Military Inspection Commission and Vehbi Bey of the Ministry of the Interior.
46 BOA, Y.A.Res. 130/87, 23 Rebiyülevvel 1323/1905.
47 BOA, Irade-Hususi, no. 77, 27 Rebiyülevvel 1323/1905.
48 BOA, Y.A.Res. 133/7 (1), 5 Saban 1323/1905. The Council of Ministers also discussed whether pardon should be extended to the aghas of outlaw tribes who had collaborated with the Barzinji shaykhs; see enclosure (2).
49 BOA, Irade-Hususi no. 12, 11 Zilhicce 1323/1906.
50 PRO, FO 424/210, no. 3, enclosure, Baghdad, no. 1009/97, 21 December 1905. For Mustafa Yumni Bey, see FO 424/212, no. 11, Barclay to Grey, no. 24, Constantinople, 11 January 1907; FO 195/2242, Newsletter no. 13, 4 April 1907; FO 424/213, no. 150, O’Connor to Grey, no. 720, Pera, 26 November 1907.
52 Soane: *Mesopotamia*, pp. 191-2; McDowall: *History of the Kurds*, p. 97; PRO, War Office (WO) 106/920, p. 42: ‘The Turks tried several times to break the power of the family; their efforts culminated in the murder of Shaykh Said. This action induced in the family and adherent tribes a violent hatred of the Ottoman government’.
Part Three

The Syrian Provinces
The idea underlying the Ottoman late Tanzimat reforms heralded by the *Hatt-i Humayun* of 1856 was to establish equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. This was part of the Sublime Porte’s effort to reorganize communal relations in the empire and promote a collective civil identity among its subjects-citizens, an idea that came to be known as Ottomanism (*Osmanlilik*). This concept clearly differed from the Islamic notion according to which the rights, status, and duties of the individual derived from his or her belonging to a religious community. The new perception was Western and civil in its approach, in that the citizen’s rights and status stemmed from his or her very citizenship in the empire and loyalty to its government. Such an attitude consciously paved the way to better integration of non-Muslims within the empire in general and of Christian Arabs in the Syrian region in particular. Henceforth they could become politically more active and more open in expressing their views on their place within the Ottoman Empire.

A seminal article on the attitude of Christian Arab intellectuals to the Tanzimat reforms and Ottomanism was written in 1980 by Butrus Abu-Manneh, focusing on one of the leading intellectuals among the Christian Arabs in Beirut, Butrus al-Bustani (1819-83). Abu-Manneh emphasized Bustani’s loyalty to the idea of Ottomanism along with his encouragement of a local territorial identity, namely Syrian patriotism, which he believed could only develop under the Tanzimat reforms. According to him, the region of Syria was one territorial entity and a homeland for all its inhabitants, whom he conceived as Syrians with an Arab culture. It was a secular and cultural concept which, like the idea of Ottomanism, was designed to blur the multi-sectarian and communal identities that prevailed in the region of Greater Syria.

Abu-Manneh showed that in Butrus al-Bustani’s thought there was no real contradiction between the ideas of Ottomanism and Syrian
patriotism. Bustani truly believed that without the protection of the empire, which on the one hand combated foreign intervention and on the other religious particularism, Syrian patriotism could not be sustained. In his vision, as in those of other Christian intellectuals (and Ottoman reformers as well), he saw the Ottoman Empire as a decentralized, multi-national state founded on a federal system capable of accepting rapid modernization and civil society. Butrus al-Bustani imagined the empire as one fatherland composed of many ‘sub-fatherlands’. Syria, of course, was one of them. Each fatherland could have an autonomous (but not independent) status under the political umbrella of the empire.

The purpose of the present article is to examine continuity and change in the political and social outlook of the second generation of Christian Arab intellectuals in Beirut, the principal seaport of the province of Syria, between the late Tanzimat era and the first years of Hamidian rule. Our main source is the periodical al-Jinan (published 1870-86) and, more particularly, the writings of Salim al-Bustani (1846-84), son of Butrus al-Bustani, as well as other intellectuals of his circle. Like his father, Salim became a prominent writer and a leading intellectual voice in the region of Syria.

The article traces the ideas of Ottomanism and Syrian patriotism of these intellectuals through their literary texts and political articles (jumla siyasiyya). From the literary point of view it shows that they were influenced by extra-textual events also bearing upon their content and style; from the political standpoint it illustrates how Christian intellectuals continued to regard the ideas of Ottomanism and Syrian patriotism as complementary. The self-evidence and dominance of the former ideas ebbed and flowed periodically, while the latter continued in subterranean form and became adjusted in new and indirect ways.

In the Wake of the Constitution (1876-80)

Much like his father, Salim al-Bustani believed in the late Tanzimat reforms inaugurated by the Sublime Porte’s statesmen ‘Ali Pasha and Fu’ad Pasha, and strongly supported their idea of Ottomanism. This concept provided him, as a non-Muslim, with the opportunity to be an equal citizen of the Ottoman Empire while maintaining his own local Syrian identity.

Still, by 1876, two decades after the beginning of the late Tanzimat reforms, Salim and other Christian Arab intellectuals felt that much remained to be done. In that year Sultan Murad V (1840-1904)
ascended the Ottoman throne with the help of the reformist party under the leadership of Midhat Pasha, one of the architects of the Tanzimat reforms. This circumstance led Salim to believe that the reforms would continue. As editor of the highly respected and widely circulated periodical al-Jinan he assured his readers that ‘the empire (al-dawla al-‘aliyya) is striding towards a new era (al-'asr al-jadid),’ and urged them to have faith in the future reforms. To stress his point, Salim mentioned the process of reforms in Western countries such as France and Italy, noting that to achieve reform one must fight enemies both internally (implying the forces which undermined the unity of Muslims and non-Muslims) and externally.

Later on, in an article dedicated to the anticipated reforms of Murad, Salim declared his belief that the Sultan would institute reforms that the people needed. This hope was not realized, however, since the young Sultan was deposed after three months owing to his mental illness, and Sultan Abdülhamid II was enthroned in his place. The liberal reformers, who were few at first, had increased in number during the Tanzimat era, as Western ideas and concepts permeated the empire, and as more and more Ottomans ventured beyond the borders of their own country. Comparing their empire with Europe, the liberals were led to consider its problematic state and strove to bring about change. In fact, they came to believe that the very existence of the empire was in danger and that the solution lay in a fundamental reshaping of its governmental structure. Accordingly, they endeavoured to end or at least limit the absolute rule of the Sultan and to substitute it with a constitutional form of government and a parliamentary regime. Still, as Devereux stated,

Although they viewed non-Muslim co-operation and participation as an essential element of the new regime, they were by no means advocates of abandonment of Turkish-Muslim supremacy. They appear to have been constitutionalists not because they desired a constitution as an end in itself but because they saw in a constitution the best hope for the regeneration of the Empire.

In light of these ideas, the liberal reformists under the leadership of Midhat Pasha formulated the ‘Ottoman Basic Laws’ (nizamat asasiyya, al-qanun al-asasi), better known as ‘The Ottoman Constitution of 1876’, which were initially approved by the new Sultan, Abdülhamid II. The Constitution was influenced by Western models and was meant to
apply for all the populations of the empire. It therefore intensified the
Christian Arabs’ aspirations to greater equality, especially in view of
Midhat’s project of an empire in which there would be ‘neither Muslim
nor non-Muslim but only Ottomans’. In this situation Salim al-
Bulstani and other intellectuals felt confident to express openly their
political outlook, as they had under Rashid Pasha, the liberal vali of the
province of Syria from 1866 to 1871.

Yet already from 1876, along with the Arab Christians’ enthusiasm
for the implementation of the Constitution, criticism is also noticeable,
especially in ‘complaints’ about the absence of a constitution in the
time empire until that time. This can be found in several articles in *al-Jinan*
analysing the Constitution. In parallel, in 1877 Salim published in his
periodical an Arabic rendering of the laws of *nizamat asasiyya* based
mainly on the French translation of the Ottoman source. Some of the
laws were quoted from the official Arabic translation published by the
Porte. The fact that Salim published these articles and translations
points to the significance of the Constitution in his eyes. On the micro
level it protected him as a member of a minority group against the
tyran of unjust *vali*; on the macro level he came to see the
Constitution as an essential condition for the development of
civilization (*tamaddun*) in the empire and for its preservation.

In general, Salim’s point of departure was that in the Ottoman
Empire basic rights for the people are entirely absent. Salim wrote
that before 1876 the Ottoman state had no ‘basic laws’, and that the
people (*ra’aya*) were not aware that they existed. In the East people
were concerned about two issues: the customary blind obedience to
the ruler and the latter’s penchant for despotism. This was the reason
why Salim felt, in the first place, the need to explain and analyse the
significance of ‘basic laws’, repeatedly emphasizing that the nation
(*umma*) should understand the essence of these laws since that was the
only way that they would be implemented. Perhaps this is one of the
rare examples of overt analysis by local intellectuals of the
Constitution.

Conspicuous in Salim’s writing is that when dealing with the new
‘basic laws’ he reduces, and sometimes even ignores, the role of the
earlier Tanzimat process. Thus he let his audience feel his
disappointment with the measures of that period. Being the second
generation under these reforms, and in contrast to the enthusiasm of
his father and his generation, Salim understood that these reforms, as
affected until 1876, fell short of achieving the goal of an Ottoman
society comprising equal subjects/citizens. And true enough, that the
Tanzimat process had already existed for some time did not mean that all reforms were by now fully implemented. For Salim, the importance of the Constitution lay not merely in preserving all the parameters of the Tanzimat reforms, or even in adding new parameters, but above all in creating a legal framework to ensure their implementation. For example, Salim believed that the election process (mainly of *majlis al-mab’uthin*, which may be defined as ‘Senate’, and *majlis al-a’yan*, which may be defined as ‘Parliament’) decreed in the Constitution created a dynamic process ensuring the continuity of the Tanzimat reforms.

The significance of the Tanzimat reforms thus lay in their establishment of a new order and a system of preliminary laws that set in motion the creation of robust administrative institutions. Still, no supervisory body existed to balance and oversee the powers of these institutions. Salim was convinced that this situation will be amended with the implementation of the Constitution, bringing about a more just and equal society. Subsequently, he constantly emphasized the importance of preserving the empire under the principle of Ottomanism and believed that the new laws were the surest way to realize it.  

Ottomanism had been at the forefront of Salim’s thought already before 1876; but now, as it was presented by its creators as the essence of the Constitution, he hoped that the reforms and the idea of Ottomanism would be more than just ‘ink on a sheet of paper’. This was one of the reasons why during these years the principle of Ottomanism received even more emphasis in the writing of Salim and other intellectuals, even at the expense of their own local Syrian identity. They did not give up their local patriotism, but continued to uphold it through their vision of Ottomanism.

Salim’s articles on the Constitution allowed him to re-explain to his readers the meaning of Ottomanism. For example, article eight of part two of the Constitution stated that the term ‘Ottoman’ included all the subjects of the Ottoman Empire without any exceptions on account of religion or sect. Salim maintained that this article was bound up with Ottoman history. He stressed that prior to this law the Muslim Turks enjoyed special privileges and status, but that when it will be implemented the existing discrimination, and the roles of ‘conqueror’ and ‘occupied’ will cease to exist. For Salim, protecting the status of equality of the non-Muslim population was one of the important issues that would help preserve the Ottoman Empire.

Referring to part two - article nine, which also reinforced the idea of equality, hence of Ottomanism, Salim explains in detail the significance
of the term ‘freedom’ as an essential value in the constitution. In this context he divides this term into several sub-meanings, such as natural freedom, political freedom, civil freedom, religious freedom, freedom of assembly, a free press, and free speech. Whenever Salim writes about ‘freedom’ he really means ‘equality’ and Ottomanism. In this way he also diminishes the preferential treatment accorded to the Turks.

Despite Salim’s enthusiasm for the Constitution, he knew that some articles did not fall into line with his own beliefs, which were mostly influenced by the Western model. For example, even though he praised the freedoms that are included in the Constitution he was aware that he still remained subject to the power of the Sultan. In his understanding and interpretation of the Constitution, Salim states that his affiliation (not subordination) in the empire is to the Sultan. He was similarly aware that even though the Constitution was influenced by Western models it was ultimately designed to fit the Ottoman realities. Thus the statues of religion in the modern Western state could not coincide with the Sultan’s interests or suit religious conditions in the empire. When clarifying article three of part one of the Constitution, which states that the Sultan is the protector of Islam while respecting the religion of the non-Muslim subjects of the empire, Salim compares the circumstances of the empire with those of Western countries. He levels implicit criticism by stating that most of the latter have gradually detached themselves from the authority of religion and have become more dependent on political activity. He is aware that in the West the state enjoys the highest value while in the East it is the Sultan and the Sultanate. These differences in approach and his own reservations are intimated in his writing.

When in March 1878 Abdülhamid II suspended the Constitution (though he did not cancel it), Salim and other local intellectuals still believed that it will be reinstated. Salim assumed that the main reason for the suspension was the outbreak of the war with Russia. He was encouraged by the fact that at that year Midhat Pasha was nominated as vali of Syria. However, from the beginning of the 1880s, when Midhat was exiled from the province and the Constitution remained in suspension, Salim and his colleagues softened the call for reforms and the idea of Ottomanism. This was the outcome of the policy of Sultan Abdülhamid II, who continued the process of modernization while concentrating all power in his own hands as an absolute ruler, a situation in which the Constitution could not be realized.
Facing the Hamidian Censorship (1880-85)

As Abdülhamid II was increasingly stressing his role as Caliph, the ideas of Ottomanism and Syrian patriotism voiced by the Christian Arab intellectuals became less pronounced, although they by no means disappeared. In the face of the ever stricter Hamidian censorship, Salim sought alternative ways to express his distaste with the status quo. Since the Russian-Ottoman war of 1877-8 Khalil al-Khuri, a Beiruti intellectual and the appointed censor of the Vilayet of Syria, had begun organizing a systematic censorship administration. Still, initially for the the Beiruti journalists he remained a respected colleague rather than an adversary, as they continued to enjoy almost complete freedom until Midhat Pasha left the province in 1880. Thereafter, during the governorship of Ahmet Hamdi Pasha (1880-5), Khuri’s censorship intensified and he issued warnings as well as suspensions. Yet even at its most stringent, his measures did not seriously limit the freedom of Beirut’s journalists. This could partly explain how Salim managed to express his views, as we shall see, even in so hard a time as that of Hamdi Pasha. Writing less on domestic political issues in the Ottoman Empire, he nonetheless continued to indirectly criticize it. The political situation compelled him to find sophisticated methods to express his ideas.

One such way was to allude to the issues he wanted to promote by describing the political changes in the West, or by stressing the Western model. Beginning in the 1870s, Salim often wrote about European history, especially French and American events. In some of these articles he described several characteristics of Western civilization, and most frequently dwelt upon those having to do with the attitude they prescribe to minorities. He calls for the adoption and implementation of these principles in the East as a means to achieve advancement and progress. Salim especially emphasizes confederate systems such as those of the United States and Switzerland as the most suitable government for the Ottoman Empire. At the same time he criticizes the West’s attitude of superiority towards the ‘Eastern’ nations. Salim’s criticism of the Ottoman Empire can also be traced on other routes: the Egyptian model and through literature.

A. The Egyptian Model

In the 1880s Salim devoted many of his articles to the political, social, and economic situation in Egypt. He frequently exposed his audience
to what in his mind was apparently a successful model, which also served to articulate his desired objectives. The comparison Salim often makes between the status quo in the Ottoman Empire and what he sees as the ‘advanced’ situation of Egypt allows him to demonstrate how dreadful the circumstances are at home and how necessary change and reforms are. It also represents his unfulfilled ambitions in respect to the Ottoman Empire, Syria, and the East. His writing on topics relating to Egypt, which gradually turned into a section on news from that country, was also connected with the fact that many local intellectuals had by this time emigrated to Egypt and had become an important market segment for his periodical.

Salim admired what he referred to as the ‘new era’ in Egypt mainly in three fields: education, the economy, and politics. In the educational field, which Salim believed was an important parameter in accomplishing success and *tamaddun*, he praises the Egyptian school system, albeit without much elaboration. For him, public education allowed people to develop a critical view toward their government. In the political sphere Salim stresses mainly the wisdom and patriotism (*hubb al-watan*) of the Egyptian ruler at the time, Khedive Tawfiq. He directs attention to the Egyptians’ proper administration, a people who give priority to the good of their country over achieving their private interests. Salim also sees in Egypt a successful model that lets the people of the East (Sharqiyyun) and the Arabs save face. In more than one article he admires it for proving to the West that those who speak Arabic (*al-umma al-natiqa bi-lughatina al-sharifa*) can put aside their individual interests and dedicate themselves to public interests.

The scathing criticism of the Ottoman Empire is not far below the surface in these articles. In one of his most caustic articles, published in 1880, Salim attacks a fictitious tyrannical ruler who apparently represents the Sultan by contrasting him with Khedive Tawfiq. The Khedive is described as a just ruler, who upholds the basic laws (*nizamat asasiyya*) and in this way achieves both the happiness and the satisfaction of his nation (*umma*) and the support of Europe, which in Salim’s mind is essential for progress. Salim stresses that in contrast to him, the oppressive ruler receives only ‘false sympathy from his people,’ which is driven by fear, and he has lost the support of Europe. These lines seems to indicate to Salim’s personal criticism of Sultan Abdülhamid II, who suspended the constitution and curtailed the activity of a ‘consultative body’ (*mashuriyya*), thereby causing the East to regress. Further stressing this point, Salim draws an example from the former Arab kings (*muluk al-'Arab*): when they were devoted
to the shari’a (shar’ and mashura) they could overcome numerous enemies and promote civilization (badara); but when they neglected the commandments and opted for tyranny, they brought their society to its nadir.  

In various articles Salim assesses the Egyptian model as appropriate for the nature of the East. Time and again he compares Egypt with the East, and also with the Arabs and Arabic, undoubtedly in an effort to bring to relief the common dominators between Egypt and Syria. In fact, he writes that since the two societies have cultural, commercial and financial bonds, Egypt’s progress will ensure the welfare of the Syrian people and will open doors to employ those of them who leave their region.

Salim’s views on Egypt as they appeared in al-Jinan probably influenced and reflected the thoughts of his fellow local Christian Arab intellectuals from the second generation. These migrated to Egypt in growing numbers, preferring it to the Hamidian regime. They felt that Egypt had a more open atmosphere and held opportunities for them. This tendency increased after 1882, when Egypt was occupied by the British and new economic opportunities suggested themselves. Despite this, these same intellectuals continued to criticize the West.

B. Syrian Patriotism and Criticism in Disguise: Political Ideas through Literature

Another avenue followed by Salim al-Bustani during the 1880s to express his criticism of the Ottoman Empire was literature. In their novels Salim and his colleagues came to de-emphasize their idea of Ottomanism while indirectly continuing to refer to Syrian patriotism, which they still saw as a feasible goal.

Salim used literature as a tool to mirror the political, social, and economic situation of the empire in general and of Syria in particular. His novels in Arabic, or the novels he translated into this language, were serialized in his periodical, and this allowed him to keep up to date with the events of the day both locally and internationally. In his novels readers might observe many indications of daily life and the vicissitudes of the hour. This type of writing was affected by external (non-textual) influences, meaning that the dynamic of these novels – characters, plot, personalities – did not function in purely textual interactions but were exposed to the political and social reality that Salim experienced. The texts cannot be properly understood unless examined in light of the diachronic interactions between the literary level and the extra-literary system. This system – in our context the
variable socio-political events that took place during the Hamidian rule – apparently exerted an effect on the literary product and created changes in its contents, notions, and even writing style. Analysing these texts on the synchronic level, and considering them autonomous literary networks, might impair the reader’s ability to grasp their deeper levels. Yet these textual elements themselves influenced the construction of self-identity in their readers.

Furthermore, some critics believe that Salim’s novels belong to the didactic genre, especially because of his direct interference as a non-neutral narrator.\textsuperscript{33} Certainly, his main purpose in his novels was to convey his ideological beliefs rather than achieve any aesthetic or artistic goal. Using the literary text (narrative fiction) to disseminate his ideas relieves him from the task of proving historical and political facts. Nonetheless, not all of Salim’s interferences should be conceived as didactic acts; many of them were the result of extra-textual influences of his time, which eventually affected his own style.

At the beginning of the 1870s, under the Tanzimat reforms, most of Salim’s novels stressed the local uniqueness of Syria with its Arab culture; this stemmed from his Syrian Arab identity, of course within the larger idea of Ottomanism. In addition, he deals with social and educational issues and openly calls for an essential change in Syrian Arab society.\textsuperscript{34} But from the 1880s we can observe in his literary work, like in his political articles, an obvious change in his attitude to Ottomanism and in the way he presents his Syrian patriotism.

During this period the motifs of love still dominate Salim’s literary work. However, his patriotic love becomes more modest in its representation. We believe that his Syrian identity, which was expressed palpably in the 1870s, continued to exist but in such a way that the reader is obliged to infer these patriotic leanings. Salim’s social and civic criticism, which deals mainly with the reforms and the Constitution, also continues, but again only in an implied manner.

Between 1882 and 1884 Salim wrote his longest and last novel, titled \textit{Samya}.\textsuperscript{35} Throughout it he systematically expresses penetrating social and political criticism of the empire while trying to preserve his Syrian patriotism. This tendency can be illustrated particularly at the beginning of chapter five, where Salim himself (and not the narrator of the novel) states:

The readers of this novel can see that we did not mention the place where it occurred, and they should not surmise the nationality and homeland (\textit{watan}) of those through whose
stories the novel came to be. These are names that we have adopted to indicate in the pages of the novel those whose acts we mention and the particulars of their morals. We want it to be suitable to describe the country (bilad) in such a way that will make the reader conclude from it the country’s name, in a situation wherein it cannot be spoken, [and] considering issues that a novelist must take in account in circumstances like ours. […]

All people are nothing but the servants of God and he is the owner of the worlds. If people complied with these principles the world would be relieved of a thousand destructions. […] These [principles] are the basis of politics in these times, and the nations that still do not consider them will do so sooner or later. Humanity’s disasters will increase unless we consider all their aspects, and enact laws more powerful than the existing ones, [this in order] to proliferate well-being. 36

The first of the two passages above demonstrates the complex political circumstances of Salim and his fellow intellectuals of the Syrian region under the governorship of Hamdi Pasha. Even though the novel contains many geographical names, Salim avoided mentioning any specific location, explaining to his readers that it was only because of the political situation, not changes in his perception. It is obvious, however, that the un-stated place was Syria. The omission of the name was seemingly due to various restrictions set by the Hamidian censor, especially after 1882. Still, it is unclear if the censor forbade the use of the term ‘Syria’ or if its absence is an indication of Abdülhamid II’s growing fear from the strengthening of Syrian Arab political identity, which Salim was probably aware of. 37 Apparently Abdülhamid, at least in the early years of his rule, did not oppose the development of a local cultural Syrian-Arab identity. Later on, in the 1880s, he did undermine the development of a Syrian identity as a political idea.

A mind-set similar to that of Salim al-Bustani is noticeable in the writing of a contemporary intellectual from Damascus, Nu’man Qasatili (1854-1920). In 1882, in his novel Anis, which was published by al-Jinan, 38 Qasatili does not mention the name ‘Syria’ even though he manages to describe this region through one of the novel’s leading figures, Fahima, especially in a scene in which she takes her foreign friends on an archaeological tour. The description clearly brings to
mind the Syrian landscape. Through Fahima’s explanation Qasatili emphasizes the profound importance of the local archaeological sites as indications of the magnificent past of the pre-Greek and pre-Islamic periods. Again, as in the case of Salim and in order to show the difference between the past and the present, Qasatili points out that the dire straits may be changed by re-uniting with the glory of the past. He believes that pride in one’s past provides a solid basis in the present and promotes progress. This attitude reminds us of the writing of the first generation of intellectuals in the Tanzimat period of the 1860s and 1870s. They mainly emphasized the pre-Islamic period as the heritage of the Syrian region, but in a more open way than Qasatili did.

The second passage we quoted reveals Salim’s social and political beliefs. He postulates that all people are equal and that the only true ruler is God Almighty. The failure to implement this principle of equality is the reason, according to him, for the degeneration of the Ottoman Empire. His assertion that the only true ruler is God is not merely a religious but also a political assertion intended to criticize the Sultan. Salim thought that the existing legal system did not provide the people with a peaceful life or a proper education.

Salim’s novel Samya contains another example of how he delivers his political and social criticism in a roundabout way, this time by recruiting the villain. Being part of the middle stratum in Beirut which supported a laissez-faire policy, in this novel Salim attacks the ideology of socialism (ishtirakiyya) which is represented by Fa’iz, one of the novel’s main characters. Symbolizing the dark but sophisticated side of life, Fa’iz sees socialism as the only way to change civil society. For that reason he is willing to sacrifice his money and life. He heads a secret organization that calls for absolute equality and justice. Evidently Salim conceived Fa’iz as an extremist, especially since the latter justifies anarchism in order to achieve his goals. Salim utilized the speeches of this negative character to criticize the present state of affairs in his region, and thus managed to circumvent the censor. We argue that by reading a speech that represents a negative character the reader is usually called on to dismiss its ideas. But in this context it is obvious that even though Salim disapproved of the idea of socialism, he agreed with Fa’iz’s criticism of the unsatisfactory condition that prevailed in the Ottoman Empire in general, and in the Syrian region in particular. Indeed, in many places throughout the text the criticism which is revealed in Fa’iz’s speeches is similar to Salim’s observations on the empire.
We may conclude that from the 1880s Salim’s discontent mounted because the ideas embodied in the Constitution were not implemented, while his ideology of Ottomanism waned. One the other hand, his Syrian patriotism and his criticism of the government continued to exist, despite the Hamidian censorship, and was articulated through his literature, perhaps more forcefully than might have been expected.

Conclusion

From 1880 it became harder and sometimes nearly impossible for intellectuals in general and Christian Arabs in particular to publicly disclose their thoughts. Nevertheless, through *al-Jinan*, Salim al-Bustani and his literary circle remained active in promoting many ideas that had first appeared a generation earlier. In the face of the Hamidian censorship these intellectuals managed to find ways to express their political and social criticism, and particularly to preserve their Syrian patriotism, albeit in a less intensive form.

Such critique notwithstanding, in the early 1880s many Syrian intellectuals still apparently believed that the best way to secure their position was to remain under the political umbrella of the empire, at least as long as it pursued the course of modernization. Yet as we saw, with the passage of time Ottomanism became less of an option.  

Further research on other local journals and related material is needed to substantiate our findings about the attitude of local Syrian intellectuals toward the ideas of Ottomanism and Syrian patriotism during the Hamidian period. Some of these intellectuals, particularly among those who emigrated to the United States, Brazil, and Egypt, continued to cherish Syrian patriotism well into the 20th century.

Notes

3 For more details see Zachs: *The Making of a Syrian Identity*, Chapter 3.
4 The present paper centres on articles published from the ascent of Abdülhamid in 1876 until 1885, when *al-Jinan* closed down. Note, as Abu-Manneh suggests, that ‘in the first twenty-one months [of *al-Jinan*], as long as Rashid Pasha was governor [of the Vilayet of Syria], Bustani enjoyed freedom to write. In editorials signed by his son
Salim, but which obviously contained his own views, he expounded, simply and clearly, the theme of government and subject, the need for internal unity, and the separation of the religious from the civil realms'. Abu-Manneh: ‘The Christians between Ottomanism’, p. 295. This is one of the reasons why the present article analyses the latter years of the periodical, which probably reveal the development of Salim’s own political outlook.

5 Salim belonged to an intellectual circle which included figures such as Salim Shahada, Yusuf Shalfun, Nu'man Qasatili, Ya'qub Nawfal, Salim As'ad, and others. Some of them expressed their liberal thoughts on the condition of the Empire and the Syrian province in the pages of al-Jinan.


10 Devereux: The First Ottoman Constitutional Period, p. 30.


12 Later, in 1883-4, the constitution was translated from Turkish into Arabic by Nawfal Ni'amatallah Nawfal in two volumes. For more details see Sayyar al-Jamil, Al-'Arab wal-Atrak: al-inbi'ath wal-tahdith min al-'athmana ila al-'almana (Beirut, 1997), p. 65, note 40.


14 By the term ‘East’ Salim refers to the Arab provinces and Egypt.


28 See, for example, Salim al-Bustani: ‘Jumla siyasiyya’, 11 (1880), pp. 193, 322.


32 The literary dynamic in the synchronic category can be seen ‘as autonomous networks of relationships and as interacting literary networks on various levels’, while the diachronic category deals with ‘interactions that obtain between this literary system and various other literary as well as extra-literary systems’. Reuven Snir, Modern Arabic Literature: A Functional Dynamic Model (Toronto, 2001), pp. 3, 49. For more details on the terms ‘diachronic’ and ‘synchronic’ in modern Arabic literature see Reuven Snir, ‘Synchronic and Diachronic Dynamics in Modern Arabic Literature’, in S. Ballas and R. Snir (eds.), Studies in Canonical and Popular Arabic Literature (Toronto, 1998), pp. 87-121.

33 For more on the writing of Salim al-Bustani, see Moosa Matti, The Origins of Modern Arabic Fiction (Boulder, 1997), pp. 157-83.

34 For more details on Salim’s novels in this period, see Zachs: The Making of a Syrian Identity, chapter 5.

35 The entire novel was published in al-Jinan 13 (1882); 14 (1883), and 15 (1884). The novel concentrates on Fa’iz and his belief in socialism. It also includes a love story which describes how Fa’iz competes for the love of Samya with his so called friends Wasif and Fu’ad. Wasif is a businessman who believes that with money he can acquire anything in the world, including Samya’s love. The conflict in the novel occurs through Fa’iz’s crafty scheme to win Samya’s heart. Samya is described as beautiful and an intellectual, who adores generosity and respect. Her brother Zahir, described as a shallow person, helps Fa’iz fulfil his dark plans. Another love story in the novel is that of Zahir and Sayyida, an attractive, wise, and devious woman. In the end Fa’iz murders Fu’ad and is sent to prison. Samya and Sayyida dedicate themselves to contributing to their society by devoting their lives to charity.


37 The omission of the term may also reflect literary intentions such as a decisive will to grant the text a non-specific geographic location. See for example, Salim al-Bustani, ‘Asma’, al-Jinan 4 (1873), p. 30; Salim al-Bustani, ‘Salma’, al-Jinan 9 (1878), p. 30.

38 Nu’man Qasatili, ‘Anis’, al-Jinan 13 (1882). This novel, like many of Salim’s, sets forth two love stories, one between Anis and Anisa and the other between Adib and Fahima. These stories have a happy ending after a series of hardships and separations. The foreigners in this novel are represented by Jul (Jules) and his wife Luwiz (Louise) who help the two couples to make their dreams come true and are generally shown in a positive light. Through them we see the conflict between the West and East, mainly as a comparison of the two cultures. This comparison, of course, serves Qasatili to criticize the situation in his own province.


40 The word equality (musawa) is not mentioned in the text, but it is obvious that Salim implied it.

41 Al-Bustani: ‘Samya’, 14 (1883), pp. 523-5. Salim published in the Mulah (funny things) section some poetry or bikma (fable) that might indicate love of the homeland without mention of its location. In most cases it was the Ottoman Empire, the Sharq, or Syria. ‘Malah’, al-Jinan 13 (1883), p. 96.

42 There are still some instances in 1882 of strong support for Ottomanism among the intellectuals. For example, that year Amin al-Bustani wrote ‘faya watani wala akhussu iqliman waya muwatini wala u’ayinnu fi’atan’ (Oh, my homeland, and I am not referring to
It is generally agreed that the non-Lebanese parts of Syria, like most other parts of the Fertile Crescent, remained on the sidelines of the literary renaissance (nahda) that evolved in the region during the second half of the nineteenth century. The active centres of this exciting awakening were elsewhere: in the Mount Lebanon-Beirut area, led by missionaries and local Christians;¹ in Egypt, at the government’s inducement, enhanced by the influx of Lebanese immigrants; and, to a lesser extent, in the Ottoman capital, the beating heart of the empire. The first of these places – Lebanon – witnessed by far the most intense activity. There, inspired by foreign ideas that had been percolating through numerous channels since early in the century, a small educated elite was initiating new cultural projects, modifying and eventually transforming the old landscape. They founded printing presses and published books and encyclopedias; issued literary journals and newspapers; set up scientific societies; opened bookstores and public reading rooms; founded theatres, and modernized their language. Perhaps most important, they upgraded the quality and scope of education, thereby enlarging the potential public for these novel products.² Egypt and Istanbul followed suit somewhat later in the century. The luminaries of this revival, whose names are known to us – among them many of the heroes of Albert Hourani’s classic *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age* and of countless subsequent dissertations – came predominantly from these three centres, or gained renown once they moved there. Other places seem to have been left in the dark until the twentieth century. They may have been illuminated to some extent by the light radiating from the hubs of activity, but had little to do with generating that light. Illiteracy continued to prevail in these other places; it would not be too risky to assume that the rate of the literate was measured in single-digit figures (‘al-nadra al-nadira’, the rarified rarity, in the words of one author).³ Likewise, until the end of
the century most of these places had no printing shops, no publishing industry and no periodical press (save for some lifeless official bulletins). Book dealerships were few and poor, public libraries rare, literary societies non-existent. This reality would begin to change after 1908 and, more dynamically, after World War I. Until then, however, literary and cultural endeavour on the periphery of the *nahda* was minimal and limited to activities of a traditional kind.

Nevertheless, immediately following the 1908 Revolution, places that had seemingly been infertile suddenly responded with a vigorous outburst of literary action. For example, in the field of journalism, during the six years before World War I, hundreds of newspapers appeared throughout the Fertile Crescent, where nearly none had previously existed. Cities in Syria: Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Tripoli and Latakia together produced as many as eighty-two newspapers and sixteen other periodicals during this short period. Such an impressive blossoming, unthinkable in an utterly sterile land, would suggest that the terrain had formerly not been as barren as one might think. More likely, under the silent surface a local socio-cultural elite was active, whose members had received an education of good quality. They might have been exposed to the modern messages coming in from the neighbourhood and beyond, might have held dialogues with colleagues abroad, and might have quietly immersed themselves in the appealing venture of the *nahda*.

What was the scope of such exposure and immersion? And how can we find out? As always, we know quite a bit about leading figures of the main literary trends, their thoughts and activities, since they left behind a written legacy that was once a source of inspiration to their compatriots. We know less about lesser luminaries – casual essayists, ephemeral publicists, owners of secondary journals – who had a more limited impact on their times and left us a scantier record. The farther we move from that enlightened circle, the less we learn about cultural realities. And as written evidence diminishes, our exploration gives way to conjecture. Consumers of the written products, that is, readers of whose impressions we have little or no account, are usually located within that largely hard-to-explore outer circle. All this is true of both the Egyptian and Lebanese centres, where the evidence is relatively plentiful, and of the other places for which written evidence is so scarce.

However, scarce evidence does not mean its complete absence. A creative probe into available clues might yield enough pieces of the puzzle to allow us a partial reconstruction of the cultural scene and
improve our conjecture about its other parts. The picture can thus be rendered somewhat less murky than it has been to date. The purpose of this study is to identify some sources of such clues with a potential to enlighten us on the pre-1908 involvement of peripheral elites in the activities of the *nahda*. Elsewhere I have tried to trace such sources for late-Ottoman Palestine. Here I wish to focus on Syrian cities beyond the Lebanese epicentre, specifically Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Tripoli, and Latakia. Certain obvious natives of these places come to mind in association with the cultural revival: Rizqallah Hassun, Fransis Marrash, Jibra’il Dallal, and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi from Aleppo, Tahir al-Jaza’iri and Muhammad Kurd ‘Ali from Damascus, and Rashid Rida and Farah Antun from Tripoli, most of whom won eminence only after moving away from their birthplaces. Beyond these prominent names, however, we know little about the identity of the educated class, still less its cultural activities. In the pages below I try to shed some light on this class and its consumption of written texts. As we shall see, the scene here was more dynamic than we often tend to think.

**Local Agents of Foreign Journals**

To a Westerner’s eye, Syrian cities constituted a disheartening cultural arena prior to the mid-nineteenth century. Back in 1838, John Bowring reported that ‘the demand for books is so small in Syria that I could not find a bookseller in Damascus or Aleppo. I was told no scribe could now get his living in copying mss. for sale.’ The state of education was another facet of this situation: ‘There are no elementary books of any kind for the instruction of Mussulman youth, and they chiefly learn by repeating altogether what the teacher reads to them.’ Bowring’s European yardstick may not have been the best for appraising a system that had its own merits and seems to have served society’s needs satisfactorily for generations. However, not too long after he wrote his report leaders of the local community began to feel the need to change the old system, given palpable shifts in the region’s realities. Beginning after mid-century, the change would unfold slowly and tardily, especially when compared to that which was taking place in nearby Lebanon. Yet it was quite tangible if viewed against the local recent past. Government and missionary initiatives brought better-organized schooling into the country’s towns. State and private printing shops began to pop up, a few public libraries were opened, and during the last quarter of the century rudimentary attempts were
made to publish private journals, four in Damascus and three in Aleppo. These developments marked an as yet modest but unmistakable nascent demand for literary products of a modern kind.

The appetite for locally made modern publications was preceded by consumption of products printed elsewhere. In the Syrian cities, as in other parts of the region, members of the thin layer of educated elite began to show interest in the literary fruits of the *nahda* soon after they first bloomed. There is evidence that Syrian intellectuals acquired printed works from abroad, read them, and sometimes engaged in correspondence with their authors. Muhammad Kurd ‘Ali, who after World War I would become minister of education of Syria, relates in his memoirs how back in the 1880s, while still a teenager in Damascus, he used to read two Lebanese newspapers, the semi-weekly *Lisan al-Hal* (launched in 1877) and the weekly *Bayrut* (from 1886 onward). The young Kurd ‘Ali also read Istanbul-based journals which he does not name, but remarks that they were ‘especially the literary and historical ones’. He also subscribed to a French weekly, *L’ami de la Campagne*. Kurd ‘Ali’s testimony, unfortunately, is an isolated instance of its kind (although it suffices to establish that Syrians were attentive to voices originating abroad, even under the tough Hamidian censorship). But we do not have to settle for such casual affirmations. The publications centred in Egypt and Lebanon carry the fingerprints of their customers from all over the region, including Syria.

One kind of clue may be found in lists of agents (*wukala’*) that journals customarily published in the early decades of the Arab press, normally on their front page (or, in periodicals, on the back cover). We know little about the role of such representatives, beyond the fact that their task was to promote circulation and collect fees. Nor does the appearance of an agent’s name in a journal teach us much about that journal’s readership in a particular location. However, the considerable number of such representatives acting on behalf of many papers would seem to indicate lively activity. We may cautiously assume that at least the agent himself, but most likely others as well, were among the paper’s customers. The first solid private Arabic newspaper, the Beirut weekly *Hadiqat al-Akhbar* (1858 onward), appointed agents in Damascus and Aleppo from the very start. Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq’s popular weekly *al-Jawa’ib* (1861) began with one in Tripoli, and before long found people to represent it in Damascus, Aleppo, and Latakia. Similarly, Butrus al-Bustani’s biweekly *al-Jinan* and Salim al-Bustani’s semi-weekly *al-Janna* (both from 1870) had agents acting for them in
most of the Syrian towns. So had the Egyptian al-Ahram (1876) and al-Iskandariyya (1879), as well as other papers from all three centres.

A cursory check conducted for this study yielded thirty-five different names of newspaper agents in the six Syrian cities during the four decades from 1858 to 1897. They appear in Appendix 1. Of these, twenty were found in publications from the 1870s alone. Some of the names appear in the same papers continuously for many years. Unsurprisingly, the biggest concentrations of agents were in Damascus and Aleppo. In the items examined here, little overlap was found among agents of different papers (except for those owned by the same publisher, e.g., the Bustani journals). In other words, each paper had its own network of agents, a fact affirming the impression of a sizeable body of people involved in the trade. Far from pretending to be exhaustive, the list is offered here as an illustration of the potential of this source. Searched more thoroughly, it should turn out to be a bulkier record, allowing us to identify some of the Syrian consumers of nahda products, not just by location but also individually.

Correspondence across Provincial Lines

Publications originating abroad provide another type of evidence. With local papers being so few in number and unattractive, Syrian readers turned to the far better Lebanese and Egyptian journals for enlightenment and dialogue. Egyptian journals in particular, operating within a much freer environment during the Hamidian era, served as channels for brisk exchanges among the educated across the region. Syrian readers addressed queries to the editors of journals abroad, commented on items they had read in them and contributed their literary pieces to them. Often indicating the identity and place of residence of such active readers, Egyptian papers thus constitute a remarkable corpus of details relating to cultural life in the Arab provinces during the nahda, which hitherto have been largely overlooked. Needless to say, this is a highly problematic source: not only do we not know the extent to which such active customers represented the readership as a whole; the perennial problem of authenticity, especially of letters to the editor, also exists. At best, then, such data can shed some light on an unknown segment of the consuming audience. Still, exploring the data is well worth our while: used with suitable caution, such an examination will enrich our view with shades unattainable otherwise.
To illustrate this potential, I have chosen two of the many periodicals that made their pages available for such exchanges, *al-Muqtataf* and *al-Hilal*. The former, a scientific-cultural quarterly, was founded in Beirut in 1876 by Ya‘qub Sarruf and Faris Nimr. They moved with it to Cairo in 1884, where it continued to appear regularly until 1951. *Al-Hilal*, a biweekly/monthly journal with a historical-literary orientation, was launched in Cairo in 1892 by Jurji Zaydan, likewise a Christian-Lebanese immigrant, and has persisted uninterrupted into the twenty-first century. For the present study, I have examined a nearly complete set of volumes of the two journals that appeared prior to the summer of 1908, namely, thirty-two years of *al-Muqtataf* and sixteen of *al-Hilal*.

The liveliest channel through which *al-Muqtataf* conducted a dialogue with its readers was the ‘queries section’ (*bab al-masa’il*), launched from the very first volume. Readers would write to inquire about matters within the journal’s field of expertise (e.g., the casting of gold, operating a photolithograph), or on more general matters (e.g., the origin of the name ‘Jesus’, ways to eliminate sweat from under the armpits), and the editors would respond. Very often readers would send several different questions at a time, and some used to write repeatedly, sometimes for years. Until its eighth year (1883) *al-Muqtataf* indicated only the place of origin of the inquirers without their names. Thereafter names were mentioned too. Of the many thousands of queries handled between 1876 and 1908, in 2,612 instances writers were identified at least by their place of residence (readers who sent recurrent queries were counted only once). As one would expect, the great bulk of questions came from locations in Lebanon and Egypt, the weight shifting from the former to the latter over time. But queries also originated in many other places, from Marrakesh to Baghdad, as well as in farther lands and continents. During these thirty-two years, in 209 instances queries arrived from the six Syrian cities probed here, eighty-one of them from Damascus alone (by comparison, eighty-six came from different towns in Palestine and forty-three from Baghdad and Mosul during that period). Of the Syrians, sixty-four different writers were identified by name or initials. In addition, people conducted exchanges of other kinds with the journal. Some wrote essays, stories, or poetry, published in a section entitled *al-munazara wa’l-murasala* (debate and correspondence). Others sent verbal riddles to a section called *laghz* (riddle), or presented mathematical problems (or solutions to those of their fellow letter-writers) in the *riyadiyyat* (mathematics) section. Altogether, fifty residents of Syrian cities were identified by name in these other parts of the journal during the
period. The names of the 114 identified Syrian writers appear in Appendix 2. Others remained nameless, disguised as *ahad al-mushtarikin* (a subscriber), *ahad al-‘uthmaniyyin* (an Ottoman [subject]) or similar appellations. These, along with inquirers who employed initials, apparently did so as a measure of caution in the face of the ruthless censor, at least in some of the cases. Among the Syrian readers writing to *al-Muqtataf* were at least three women, two of them identified by name.\(^{13}\)

*Al-Hilal* too held lively exchanges with its readers. Like *al-Muqtataf*, it responded to readers’ queries in a section entitled *bab al-su’al wa’l-iqtirah* (questions and suggestions), begun in the journal’s second year; it published their comments, essays, and poems in a section called *bab al-murasalat* (correspondence). During the first few years the journal ran rhyming contests (*tashtir*) in which readers participated. Those who sent their correspondence were identified in *al-Hilal* by name from the very beginning. During the sixteen years from 1892 to 1908 the journal handled a total of 1,212 queries from all over the region and beyond. Of these, a modest twenty-nine were from nineteen different readers in Syria (compared with forty-three queries from twenty-six readers in Palestine and only one query from Baghdad). In addition, twenty-five people from Syrian cities wrote one or more times to the journal’s other sections. The names of all forty-four Syrians, among them at least two women,\(^{14}\) are listed in Appendix 2 along with readers of *al-Muqtataf*. Altogether the list contains 151 names, including seven who wrote to both journals.

**More Imports**

The third source to be examined here may be depicted as unusual, even unique. It is a reservoir of data in Butrus al-Bustani’s biweekly journal *al-Jinan* (1870-86), referring to members of the region’s educated elite who showed interest in another publication which Bustani and his relatives issued in Beirut. Bustani’s *Da’irat al-Ma’arif*, the multi-volume universal encyclopedia published between 1876 and 1900, was a remarkable literary and intellectual achievement by any standard.\(^{15}\) Before launching the project, Bustani promoted it in his journal, calling on readers to subscribe to it. The price was one Ottoman Pound (*lira majidhya*) per volume, a fairly large sum that made the encyclopedia affordable only to the affluent. Readers were invited to commit themselves to a subscription, paying in advance for every new volume once they had received the previous one. To encourage
people to participate, Bustani made public the names of those who had applied, beginning in July 1874 and continuing subsequently. For the next twelve years, until it ceased publication, *al-Jinan* regularly published lists of new subscribers and of old ones from all over the region and beyond, including details of their payments. These lists make up a substantial pool of data on the educated Arabic-reading elite of the time, especially, of course, its better-off segment that could afford to purchase such an expensive and prestigious commodity.

The *al-Jinan* lists that have come down to us, about 90 per cent of all those originally published, comprise 1,022 names of potential subscribers from around the region and elsewhere. Potential subscribers, since not all of those who first showed interest in the project were eventually prepared to buy it, as we can see from the lists of payments. For us, however, the expression of interest is what counts; if nothing else, it attests to these applicants’ access to *al-Jinan*. About 80 percent of all the names appeared during the first two years of the promotional campaign, in 1874 and 1875. Expectedly, again, the great majority were from Lebanon and Egypt. But there were several hundred applications from other places, among them 179 from the six Syrian cities: eighty-seven from Damascus; thirty from Aleppo; thirty from Tripoli; twenty-seven from Latakia; three from Homs, and two from Hama. By comparison, once more, Palestine was represented in these lists with 115 names and the Iraqi cities of Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra with forty-nine. Some of the Syrians who registered were senior functionaries; of the Syrians, thirty-one were identified as officials of different ranks, from the wali and mayor of Damascus to members of local administrative councils. Another fourteen were senior religious functionaries, such as the Mufti of Damascus and archbishops of the various denominations. A handful of foreigners representing other states in different capacities also registered their intent. Notably, however, the majority of subscribers - a total of 123 people - belonged to neither of these categories and were ordinary Ottoman subjects. Sometimes they were mentioned with their trade: school headmaster, banker, physician, foreign consulate employee, and the like. More often they were identified by name only. All applicants were men; given the financial commitment involved, it could hardly have been otherwise. Their names appear in Appendix 3.

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Taken together, the data culled from the sources examined amounts to a list of 357 different names. These were residents of the six Syrian cities who were involved in the literary \textit{nahda} as consumers. The sources span half a century, but the great majority of names in them, 320 in all, actually date to the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Given that the search was both partial and casual, this is a remarkable number. The list would undoubtedly have been longer, perhaps much longer, had the search been more thorough. Furthermore, in the four sources explored here (two journals, the encyclopedia, and the agent lists) a very limited measure of overlapping among names was noted: only fifteen of them, slightly over 4 per cent of the total, appeared in more than one source.\textsuperscript{17} This last fact likewise seems to suggest that the sample presented here is perhaps the tip of a small iceberg. This impression is further reinforced by the low rate of overlapping of the names traced in this search with those of people who established newspapers and journals in the same Syrian cities after 1908. One would expect that those who read imported publications before the Young Turk Revolution would subsequently be prominently represented among the initiators of the Syrian press. Yet, of the ninety-five people involved in the journalistic upsurge in Syria as owners and editors between 1908 and 1914,\textsuperscript{18} only eight (8.5 per cent) could be identified in the lists of pre-1908 consumers. This again suggests that the overall number of Syrian residents exposed to the fruits of the literary awakening was markedly greater than those presented here.

The findings displayed above are clearly far from adequate for any quantitative assessment; they may not even indicate a rough scale. They do, however, suffice for affirming one important fact: that between the sparse layer of familiar intellectual luminaries and the mass of a largely uninterested public, there existed another, somewhat thicker stratum of consumers of cultural products. In late nineteenth-century Syria, this stratum comprised hundreds of educated readers, who avidly drank from the fresh waters of the \textit{nahda} that flowed in from across the provincial boundaries. The findings also reflect some of the characteristics of that group. They show that its members were overwhelmingly men, with only a handful of women mentioned as readers; that with very few exceptions they were townsmen; and that they were predominantly Christian, as their names unmistakably indicate. This last fact is attributable to the higher level of education among Christians in nineteenth-century Syria (and elsewhere in the region); moreover, the literary projects themselves originated in a Christian milieu and were written by Christian authors who largely
addressed them to their co-religionists. Another feature typical of active readers is the participation of multiple members of the same family, obviously with the same kind of education and intellectual interests. Such were the Shamiyyas and ‘Anhuris of Damascus, the Tajirs of Aleppo, the Yanis and Katsiflises of Tripoli, the Witalis and Jurjis of Latakia, the Khuris of Homs, and others. We may never know how ‘thick’ was the layer of culture consumers underlying the lean crust of famous writers, either at the centres of activity or on the periphery. But, as we have seen from the random illustrations above, we do have at our disposal sufficient indications for documenting the very existence of such a class and for casting some light on it even in places where no local publications appeared at the time.
Appendix 1: Newspaper agents in Syria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Paper</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>(Date of issue)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Damascus</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Antun and Fransis al-Rahiba</td>
<td>Hadiqat al-Akhbar</td>
<td>10.5.1858</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Niquula Musadaba</td>
<td>Hadiqat al-Akhbar</td>
<td>5.1.1865</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Butrus al-Dabbas</td>
<td>al-Jawa‘ib</td>
<td>22.3.1871</td>
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<td>Ibrahim Mun‘im</td>
<td>al-Jawa‘ib</td>
<td>4.4.1871</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Muhammad Rashid al-Jallad</td>
<td>Thamarat al-Funnun</td>
<td>20.4.1875</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Yusuf Mutran</td>
<td>al-Abram</td>
<td>5.8.1876</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mikha‘il Qasatli</td>
<td>al-Jinan</td>
<td>5.11.1877</td>
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<td>Dawud Abu Shi‘r</td>
<td>al-Iskandariyya</td>
<td>13.3.1879</td>
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<td>Nu‘man Qasatli</td>
<td>al-Janna</td>
<td>25.8.1880</td>
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<td>Mikha‘il Istanbuliyya</td>
<td>al-Bayyan</td>
<td>16.11.1897</td>
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<td><strong>Aleppo</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Shukrallah Nasrallah Khuri</td>
<td>Hadiqat al-Akhbar</td>
<td>10.5.1858</td>
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<td>Shukrallah Tajir</td>
<td>Hadiqat al-Akhbar</td>
<td>14.2.1861</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Shukri Tajir</td>
<td>al-Jawa‘ib</td>
<td>6.4.1869</td>
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<td>Nasri Dallal</td>
<td>al-Jawa‘ib</td>
<td>22.3.1871</td>
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<td>Jirjis Iliyas Kubaba</td>
<td>al-Abram</td>
<td>5.8.1876</td>
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<td></td>
<td>‘Abdallah Ghazala</td>
<td>al-Jinan</td>
<td>5.11.1877</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Habib Qustantin Ghazala</td>
<td>al-Janna</td>
<td>25.8.1880</td>
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‘Abd al-Rahman al-Tarabishi 1897 Other H/5/464
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*Queries*: readers’ queries handled in the ‘queries and answers’ section; **Corr.**: correspondence (articles, essays, poetry, etc, contributed to the journal); **Other**: readers’ participation in such sections as *riyādīyyāt* (offering or resolving mathematical riddles) and *tābṭīr* (rhyming contests).


**Appendix 3: Syrian subscribers to Bustani’s Encyclopedia, 1874-1886**

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Butrus al-Tiyan  
member, court of appeals  1880
Hamza Zadeh Muhammad al-Husayni  
mufti of Damascus  1881
Salim Abu Hamad  1881
Yusuf Da’ud  
Syrian-Catholic Bishop, Damascus  1881
Muhammad al-‘Ajlan  1881
Ahmad Sham’a  1881
Kaylani Zadeh  
Muhammad Sa’id  1881
Muhammad Hasan al-Barudi  1881
Muhammad al-Hasani al-Jaza’iri  1881
Musa Karam  
patriarchal delegate to the Maronites  1881
Qustantin Hasbani  1881
Mikha’il ‘Issa  
financial official  1884
Da’ud Sulayman Abu Shi’r  1884
‘Aziz ‘Azm  1884

Aleppo
Qustaki Yusuf Humsi  1874
Rizqallah Nasrallah Tajir  1874
Mikha’il Mazlum  
priest  1874
Mikha’il Hakim Jadd  
physician  1874
Ni’matallah Habib Khuri Ilyas  
physician  1874
Bulus Hatim  
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Aleppo  1874
Habib Yusuf Kaldani  1874
Habib ‘Abdallah Burnuti  1874
Dyunisius Jirjis Shalha  
Patriarch of Syrian-Catholic church  1874
Fransis Ni’matallah Shashati  1874
Mikha’il Tawtal  1874
Jurji Antaki  1875
Malaki Suyufji  1875
Ni’matallah Qahwati  1875
‘Abdallah Tuma  1875
Jurji Iliyas Kubaba  1875
Ni’matallah Sajati  1875
Fathallah Jirmanus Hanna Haddad  1876
Rafa’il Ribbat  
priest  1876
Mikha’il Hanna Khuri  1876
Basiliyus Sha’rawi  
priest  1876
Fathallah Rizq Bardakhji  1877
### The Syrian Educated Elite and the Literary Nahda

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<td>Rizqallah Asyun</td>
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<td>Yusuf Butrus Diyab</td>
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#### Tripoli

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### Latakia

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<td>Ya’qub Iliyas</td>
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<td>Dr. Ya’qub Maylakun</td>
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<td>Iliyas Sawaya</td>
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<td>Muhammad al-Usta</td>
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### Homs

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<td>Jurji Farah Kubba</td>
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<td>Archbishop, Homs and Hama</td>
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### Hama

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Notes


In nearby Jerusalem the Khalidiyya Library opened in 1900. This library was made up of stocks of books gathered for many decades by members of the Khalidi family and included numerous volumes of periodicals published in Beirut, Cairo, Alexandria and Istanbul, as well as in Europe, from the 1870s onward. There were also hundreds of books by Western scholars in various European languages. This vividly attests to the interest of the Palestinian educated class in the literary output of colleagues in the region and beyond. See Ayalon: 'Modern texts', pp. 20-1.

Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, *al-Mudhakkirat* (4 vols., Damascus, 1948-9), vol. 1, p. 50. He writes: 'I read it deliberately, not leisurely, sometimes reading an issue twice or more before the next number arrived.'

In 1891 'Afifa Mardu, a 'student of the domestic girls' school in Damascus,' sent in a solution to a mathematics problem (vol. 15, 1890-91, p. 481). Sura Dammar, likewise from Damascus, sent a query to the editor in 1904 (vol. 29, p. 183). The third (or maybe one of the former two), who remained nameless, presented herself as 'one of the [female] readers (\textit{ihda qari'at} of al-Muqtataf). She sent a query to the editor in 1896 (vol. 20, p. 549). There might have been other women who identified themselves just by their initials.

These are Istikh Khuri and Maryana Khuri from Tripoli. More women may have used initials.

The encyclopedia was edited by Butrus himself until his death in 1883, and then by his relatives Sulayman, Najib, and Nassib al-Bustani. It was never completed, reaching the letter \textit{ayn} in eleven volumes. See Albert Hourani, 'Bustani's Encyclopaedia', *Journal*
of Islamic Studies 1 (1990), pp. 111-19. For further discussion of this reservoir of names see Ayalon: ‘Modern texts’, pp. 23-6.
16 The lists usually appeared on the inside of the journal’s cover. Two sets of volumes that were bound together with covers are extant in the British Library and the library of Princeton University, each of them somewhat incomplete but largely complementing each other. Microfilm sets in other collections do not contain the covers.
17 Not counting names in initials.
18 See reference and page numbers in note no. 4 above.
19 The overriding presence of Christians in this educated group is clearly underscored by the available, mostly Christian-authored, sources. Muslim-produced publications presumably had larger Muslim constituencies. Such publications, however, were markedly fewer, and furthermore seldom carried readers’ letters sections that would serve as avenues for public exchanges. It is quite possible that the number of Muslim readers was larger – perhaps considerably so – than is reflected by the sources at our disposal. Still, it seems unlikely that they were as numerous as the Christians.
This contribution deals with the impact of Ottoman state reforms on Jabal Hawran from 1860, when it emerged as the new political centre of the Druzes of Syria (and became known as Jabal al-Duruz), until the break of the First World War. Two major interrelated processes took place in the region during the period. One centred on the attempts by the Ottoman governors of Damascus to integrate the peripheral area of the Hawran into the administrative, political, and military reforms of the Syrian province so as to tighten its control over the area. The Ottoman government experienced severe difficulties in this endeavour because of the other process taking place at the time, namely the great influx into the region of Druze immigrants from Mt. Lebanon and anti-Lebanon. The two parallel processes reshaped the politics and society of Jabal al-Duruz, adding new feudal elements to its socio-political structure. This sort of feudality was named mashyakhat Jabal al-Duruz. The present article analyses the relationship between the mashyakha system and the Ottoman reforms. More specifically, my main question is this: to what extent did the process of state reform succeed in overcoming the mashyakha system as it became consolidated in the Hawran, and to what extent was it compelled to compromise with it?

Historical Background

Most sources dealing with the history of Jabal Hawran in (present-day) southern Syria suggest that the Druze settlement of the area had begun at the end of the seventeenth or the beginning of the eighteenth century. Still, until the mid-nineteenth century the Druzes constituted a small community in the Hawran, concentrated in the northern part of the region and living in actual independence vis-à-vis the Ottoman administration. This independence constantly attracted new Druze
immigrants from Lebanon, anti-Lebanon, and northern Syria. The first occasion for renewed Ottoman intervention in the Hawran took place at the beginning of 1850s, when Druzes from Lebanon and anti-Lebanon joined their Hawranese brethren to take up arms against the authorities. The revolt erupted early in 1852 when the Ottoman government issued an order (firman) for a general conscription of all Druzes aged twenty to twenty-five. To suppress the revolt Ottoman troops penetrated into the northern part of the Hawran, but they suffered successive defeats there. They then agreed to negotiate with the Druzes through the mediation of the British consul and of Sa'id Junblat, the Lebanese Druze leader, who managed to bring hostilities to an end early in 1853.¹

The evident success in averting conscription encouraged Druzes from other localities more vulnerable to Ottoman intervention to immigrate in greater numbers to Jabal Hawran. Consequently, between 1854 and 1859 the Druze settlement expanded into the south and east of the region, though travellers who visited the area before 1860 observed that Jabal Hawran had the capacity to absorb additional newcomers even in districts that were already settled. Turning into a haven for Druze fugitives from Lebanon and other Druze localities after 1860, the Hawran had virtually become ‘a Druze Mountain’, and indeed came to be known as Jabal al-Duruz.²

This new wave of immigration was related to the civil war that erupted in 1860 in Mt. Lebanon. Over the course of the two bloody months of May and June that year, the Druzes brought the entire area of the southern districts of the mountain under their control. Victorious, they assumed that their struggle to restore their ancient predominance in these districts was complete. The Druzes could rely on their belief in the peace proposal presented by the Ottomans on 5 July, which was based on the principle of mada ma mada (the past is forgotten).³

While the European powers were pressuring the Ottomans to take the situation in hand and restore peace, on 9 July Muslims in Damascus suddenly fell upon the Christian population, killing many and looting their homes. Eight days later Fu’ad Pasha, the foreign minister of the Porte, arrived in Beirut and then went on to Damascus to deal with the situation. On 16 August the French military ‘rescue mission’ landed on the Lebanese coast and Ottoman troops were sent to Sidon. These developments alarmed the Druzes, propelling many of them to flee towards Jabal Hawran. As the Druze chronicler Abu Shaqra describes it, ‘The spread of the news about the arrival of the
two fleets [Ottoman and French] provoked panic among the Druzes [of Mt. Lebanon] who began to consider what they should do. They collected their movable properties… and reached Jabal al-Duruz [in Hawran].

From October 1860 until June 1861 a commission composed of representatives of the five European Powers and the Sublime Porte completed a proposal for the autonomy of Mt. Lebanon, (the mutasarriyya). It established a political entity governed by a Christian and an administrative council based on sectarian representation in which the Druzes were deprived of their leading role in local politics. The process of decline of Druze power in Lebanon, which had begun in the early eighteenth century, was thus completed. In its stead Jabal Hawran emerged as the Druzes’ new political centre.

The Mashyakha System in the Hawran

From the time of their arrival in Jabal Hawran, the Druzes had developed a socio-economic and political structure called the mashyakha system (a form of feudalism), based on the power of leading families or clans (hamulas). Since the Druzes of the Hawran lived in a Bedouin environment divided into tribes (’asha'irs), the term ‘asha’ir came to replace among them that of the hamula. Apparently, until the beginning of the nineteenth century two families, Hamdan and Abu Fakhr, led the Druze community in Jabal Hawran; by 1860 eight leading families composed the stratum of mashyakhat al-Jabal. These families, or ‘asha’irs, were: al-Qal’ani, ‘Amir, Abu Fakhr, ‘Azzam, Hunaydi, Abu ‘Assaf, Hamdan, and al-Atrash, each ruling several villages as landlords.

The events of 1860-2, accompanied by large-scale immigration from Lebanon and anti-Lebanon, which further intensified in 1866-7, reshaped the mashyakha. Some of the eight aforementioned families strengthened their authority in the area while others, like Hamdan, Abu Fakhr, and Abu ‘Assaf, declined, their place being taken by newcomers or by the Atrash family. In 1862 about thirteen villages that had been settled in the 1850s and 1860s were outside the rule of the eight families. By 1867 some of these villages had submitted to their rule; other villages produced new leading families, such as Abu Ras, Sharaf al-Din, and Halabi, generally allied with the Atrash family. The rise of the last-named family under the leadership of Isma’il put an end to the paramount position of the Hamdan, which by now was seen as dependent on the ‘Amir.
The origins of the Atrash and the circumstances of their arrival in the Hawran are obscure. The first clear evidence of their rise to a position of prominence dates to the 1840s, when Isma’il, who lived in al-Qraya in the southern Hawran, came to the aid of his Lebanese brethren following the collapse of the Shihabi amirate. In the early 1850s he found himself competing for supremacy with the powerful shaykh Wakid al-Hamdan, a conflict which resulted in the splitting of Jabal Hawran into two factions. Evidently, Isma’il’s victory was completed in the following decade, as the newcomers from Lebanon supported his cause. His active role in the Lebanese civil war of 1860, following which Isma’il al-Atrash was lionized for his military skills and bravery, gave him the power to bargain with the authorities in Damascus, to create alliances with the local Bedouins, and to extend his domination over the former estates of the Hamdan and the newly founded villages. Until 1860 the Atrash mashyakha comprised only three villages, but by 1867 they controlled eight. Another four villages were ruled by families under their influence.  

The Struggle over Jabal al-Duruz (1860-1862)

The growing numbers of Lebanese Druze refugees streaming into Jabal al-Hawran in 1860 and 1861 worked against the efforts of Fu’ad Pasha and the governor of Damascus to introduce reforms into that part of Syria’s countryside. The Ottoman authorities directed their initial efforts to three principal issues: the ordinary tax; the penal tax imposed on the Lebanese Druzes as an indemnity for the Christians adversely affected by the events of 1860; and conscription. Ottoman interference in the Hawran became intense after Isma’il al-Atrash, the above-mentioned local Druze leader, succeeded in convening most of the Druze and Bedouin chiefs to discuss means of resistance. In September, Ottoman troops proceeded to the plain of Hawran. In reaction, al-Atrash concluded an alliance with the Slut tribe of the Laja. Until the departure of Fu’ad Pasha for Istanbul at the end of 1861, the issue of conscription in Jabal al-Duruz had not been high on the agenda of the Ottomans, who were otherwise successful in extending conscription throughout Syria. Regarding taxes, there was a difference of opinion among the Druze mashyakh. The ‘Amir and Hamdan clans declared their readiness to pay, while Isma’il al-Atrash, supported by most of the other leading shaykhs, conditioned any such payment on the grant of amnesty to all the Druze leaders who had been involved in the civil war of 1860. Fu’ad Pasha had no intention of pardoning
these leaders, who found asylum in the fastnesses of Jabal Hawran, though he was reluctant to use force against them. However, early in 1862, the Druzes of the Hawran, including the Lebanese refugees, intensified their raids on the trade routes leading to Damascus. Consequently, in March the provincial governor, Halim Pasha, decided to address the problem despite the obstacles posed by the Druzes’ alliance with the Bedouins and the Sunni inhabitants of the Hawran plain.

Eventually, Halim Pasha heeded the advice of Ahmad Agha al-Yusuf, a prominent notable of Damascus and commander of the annual pilgrimage caravan (amir al-hajj), who owned lands and livestock in the Hawran plain. This was to use a policy of ‘divide and conquer’ in order to break up al-Atrash’s coalition with the Bedouins and the Sunnis. Successful in his endeavour, Halim Pasha now demanded that the Druzes pay the arrears of the penal tax for their part in the events of 1860. Isma’il al-Atrash rejected the demand out of hand and planned to surprise the Ottoman troops in the plain before they reached the mountain. In July 1862, following Ahmad Agha al-Yusuf’s success in forming a counter-alliance composed of Sunnis from the plain and the Rwala tribe under Faysal al-Sha’lan, Halim Pasha proceeded with his plans. To counter them, Isma’il al-Atrash established contacts with Muhammad al-Dukhi, leader of the Wild ‘Ali tribe, and other traditional opponents of the Rwala.

At this point the British agents in Damascus and Beirut tried, to no avail, to mediate between the Druzes and the government in order to find a peaceful solution. Confident that al-Yusuf’s counter-alliance would yield results, Halim Pasha insisted on re-establishing order and on introducing the Ottoman reforms in the Hawran. Therefore, in addition to the aforementioned regular and extraordinary taxes, he now demanded another tax, the *badal ‘askari* (equivalent of conscription). On 22 July the Ottoman troops, led by Mustafa Pasha, chose to attack Muhammad al-Dukhi, Isma’il al-Atrash’s ally. The speedy defeat of al-Dukhi compelled al-Atrash to negotiate with the central Ottoman government. Nevertheless, Mustafa Pasha decided to attack ‘Ira, the village of the Druze leader, who for his part succeeded in surprising the Ottoman troops by night. Realizing that the Druzes were assembling in the Laja area in preparation for war, Mustafa Pasha sent them a message calling on them to prevent hostilities by paying their overdue taxes. Al-Atrash again stated his readiness to comply, on condition that Mustafa Pasha withdraws his troops. Agreement was reached by the end of July, but when the Druzes became aware that
Mustafa Pasha was sending reinforcements into the Hawran they stopped paying the taxes. As Ottoman artillery started firing into the Laja, Druze guns were quick to respond. Druzes from Lebanon hastened to join their co-religionists in the Hawran, while al-Atrash continued to insist on Ottoman withdrawal. Neither the Druzes nor the Ottomans were willing to yield. As the war was turning into a matter of honour, al-Atrash responded to the Pasha’s demand for submission in the following words: ‘I am a rebel, I do not want to send you either products or money, I desire nothing but war…. This is my single response, I have no other.’

Unwilling to back down from his insistence on Druze compliance with Ottoman regulations, Mustafa Pasha marched on Mazra’a, a place located between Isam’il al-Atrash’s headquarters and the Laja, where many Druze militants from Lebanon had taken refuge. On the mountaintops the Druzes lit beacons, the well known signal calling for war, and they initially succeeded in inflicting a large number of casualties on the Ottoman army. Mustafa Pasha quickly reinforced his troops and captured Mazra’a, compelling al-Atrash to negotiate another agreement in October 1862. Al-Atrash now consented to collect all the taxes in arrears from the Druzes and the Bedouins of Hawran, including the penal tax and the badal ‘askari in lieu of conscription.

This agreement may be considered the turning point in the relations between Jabal al-Duruz and the administration of Damascus, to the benefit of both parties. The Ottomans achieved their goal of establishing direct rule over the countryside, while the Atrash family increased its prestige and power as intermediaries between Damascus and the Druze community.

The Consolidation of the Atrash (1862-1878)

Relations between Isma’il al-Atrash and the Ottoman authorities thus began to improve in 1862. Four year later Isma’il, as well as other Druze chiefs who were involved in the civil war of Lebanon, were pardoned. In November 1866 the new governor of Damascus, Rashid Pasha, invited al-Atrash to visit the city. Subsequently he was appointed governor (mudir) of Jabal al-Duruz. This act was no more than the de jure recognition of the supremacy of al-Atrash among the leading families of the Hawran mashyakha. The appointment was opposed by an alliance of the shaykhs of the ‘Amir and Hamdan families. To avoid hostilities between the two factions the Ottomans
adopted an administrative formula dividing the region into five districts. According to this scheme the Atrash and their allies were granted the rule of eighteen villages, the Hunaydi, Abu Fakhr, and Abu ‘Assaf fifteen villages, the ‘Amir and the ‘Azzam twelve villages each, and the Hamdan a mere five villages.  

Although the new arrangements further extended Ottoman control over the Hawran and temporarily resolved the dispute over the leadership within the mashyakha, they failed to put an end to the conflict among the shaykhs. To avert further trouble Rashid Pasha devised a new plan for the administration of Jabal Hawran, which included the institution of a council (majlis) consisting of appointed shaykhs and presided over by a qa’immaqam. The plan was put into effect by the beginning of 1868 and Jabal Hawran was redefined as a district (qada’), with four sub-districts (nahiya) in keeping with the division of the mashyakhas. In March 1869 an agreement was signed between the Ottoman authorities in Damascus and the Druze leaders, approving the new arrangement and stipulating the obligations of every Druze governor toward the authorities. On the Ottoman side the agreement implied acceptance of the existing social order in Jabal Hawran. The general thrust of the Ottoman administration since the Tanzimat reforms was to foster the stratum of the local notables (a’yan). In Jabal al-Duruz, by contrast, the emergence of leading families (‘asha’ir) was mainly the result of an internal process of stratification. The rise and fall of this stratum continued largely to be predicated on the shifts in the internal balance of forces within Druze society of the Jabal.

The events of 1867-9 thus resulted in yet another turning point in the relations between the Ottomans and Jabal al-Duruz. Their outcome was that the Ottomans for the first time could introduce administrative reforms in the Druze area, while the Atrash clan received official recognition of its rising power. Consequently, following the death of Isma’il al-Atrash in November 1869, his eldest son and heir Ibrahim captured by force al-Suwayda, the capital of the Hamdans. This act not only extended the mashyakha of the Atrash, it also consolidated Ibrahim’s supremacy over all other shaykhs. Thereafter relative tranquillity prevailed, obviating any interference by the authorities in the internal life of the Jabal. The Ottoman administration did not affect the semi-independence of the Druze mashyakha, despite the fact that an Ottoman governor (qa’immaqam) formally ruled the area. In 1877 the French consul in Damascus had the impression that ‘the sovereignty of the Porte in it [Jabal al-Duruz] is so precarious that one
can say that it does not exist but for the name’. 29 This was approximately the view of Jago, the British vice-consul, two years later: “The mountain is nominally governed by a resident Turkish Kaimakam, but in reality [it is governed] by the feudal Druze chieftains.” 30

**Ottoman Intervention and Inner-Druze Tension (1878-1888)**

The relative independence of the *mashyakha* system in Jabal Hawran ran counter to the reformist spirit of Midhat Pasha, who was nominated governor of Damascus in 1878. Soon after his arrival the new governor proclaimed his intention to extend direct rule to Jabal al-Duruz. Midhat exploited two incidents of clashes between the Druzes and their neighbours in the plain to impose his authority. He planned to send a large force of troops into the Hawran to compel the shaykhs to negotiate on his terms, though the instructions from Istanbul were to deal with them patiently. 31 In the event, at the end of October 1879 Midhat Pasha replaced the Ottoman governor with a Lebanese Druze *qa'immaqam*, shaykh Sa'id Talhuq, who was directly subordinate to the Damascus governor. A Druze gendarmerie detachment was formed, and a new administrative *majlis*, as well as a court of First Appeal, were established. 32 In addition to these administrative reforms Midhat also demanded that the Jabal pay 10,000 Turkish Lira to cover the expenses of the Ottoman expedition to the Hawran. Also, he required the shaykhs to agree to the construction of a road through the Laja to al-Suwayda, where he planned to station an Ottoman garrison. 33

The Druze shaykhs obviously rejected both demands. Eager to achieve at least some of his objectives, Midhat Pasha did not press these issues and emanated satisfaction with the implementation of his administrative proposals. Soon, however, the Druze leaders began to compete among themselves over the posts of *mudir*, which the *qa'immaqam* was entitled to appoint. Even more significantly, Ibrahim al-Atrash was opposed to the nomination of Sa'id Talhuq, an outsider Druze from Lebanon, as *qa'immaqam*. The Atrash and their allies felt humiliated by the 1879 arrangements. The Druze leaders held several meetings to deal with the new constellation of forces, and intensified their visits to the British and French consulates in an effort to reverse them. 34

At the end of 1880, three Druzes were killed by the Sunni villagers of al-Karak on the Hawran plain. In retaliation the Druzes killed 104 men and a woman. 35 The new governor, Hamdi Pasha, who had succeeded Midhat in August 1880, received orders from Istanbul to dispatch a
special commission to investigate the causes of the conflict. Apprehensive, the Druze chiefs deliberated over the measures they should take in case of an Ottoman attack and over the position that should be adopted on the anticipated commission. Withdrawing to the Laja and renewing their alliances with the Bedouin tribes of the Slut and the Ruala to forestall the first possibility, they also demanded that the commission be composed of European representatives.

In an attempt to put pressure on the Druze leaders, Ottoman forces were assembled in early February 1881 at the edge of Jabal al-Duruz. Some weeks later, on 24 March, a commission headed by a high military officer, (mushir) Husayn Fawzi, arrived on the scene. The Druze leaders were ready to accede to a joint commission with foreign guarantees, but this was not to be. Husayn Fawzi carried out his investigation, at the end of which the Druzes were required to accept collective responsibility for the incident and pay blood money (diyya), while the villagers of al-Karak were blamed for instigating the conflict and warned to leave the Druzes alone. In the aftermath of the al-Karak incident the Ottomans established a garrison near al-Suwayda, while appeasing the Atrash shayks through a new series of appointments. Ibrahim was appointed mudir in al-Suwayda, his brother Shibli in ‘Ira, Muhammad al-Atrash in Salkhad, and their long-time partisan Hazima Hunaydi in Majdal. The governor Hamdi Pasha gave further legitimacy to the Atrash family’s paramount place in the mashyakha of Jabal al-Duruz when in January 1883 Ibrahim al-Atrash was nominated qa’immaqam. Hence, the years 1881-3 completed the double process that had begun in Jabal al-Duruz in October 1862: the strengthening of the mashyakha system on one hand and the extension of Ottoman central control on the other.

Thus, concomitant with the appointment of Ibrahim al-Atrash as qa’immaqam of Jabal al-Duruz, Husayn Fawzi Pasha advanced his garrisons into the mountain. A dual structure was established in the region: the mashyakha with its indigenous rules on the one hand, and the Ottoman administration, which sought gradually to incorporate the Jabal into the province of Damascus, on the other. This dualism was detrimental to the internal unity of the Druze chiefs. Opposition to Ibrahim al-Atrash slowly mounted among landholders and peasants alike, mainly over the new system of taxation. Backed by Ottoman troops, Ibrahim exerted his authority to collect whatever taxes he could.

Encouraged by Husayn Fawzi’s gains, Nashid Pasha, his successor as governor of Damascus since September 1885, intensified the efforts to
place Jabal al-Duruz under direct Ottoman rule. In accordance with this line Nashid ordered in April 1886 a census and land registration in the Hawran.\textsuperscript{44} However, in view of the Druzes’ adamant resistance he had to drop his plans.\textsuperscript{45} By the end of 1887 the Druzes were fully aware that Ottoman policies and Ibrahim al-Atrash’s cooperation were meant to bring about their full subjugation to Damascus. Such feelings intensified following a bloody conflict that had erupted at the end of 1887 between Druzes and Bedouins in the Laja. Bedouin of the Slut tribe asked the Ottoman troops stationed in the Hawran to intervene, and these opened fire on the Druzes, killing more than twenty.\textsuperscript{46} Dickson, the British consul in Damascus who reported on the incident, put the figure at eighty-five dead, and predicted that the Druzes would find themselves ‘gradually surrounded by the troops … [and] will be compelled either to make a desperate struggle for their independence or submit entirely to the authority of the government’.\textsuperscript{47} Encouraged by the Ottomans, six months later the Slut attacked a camel caravan of the Druzes, killing two men and stealing sixty camels. The intervention of the Ottoman troops, the attacks of the Slut, and Ibrahim’s impotence all revived the anger of the Druzes, who now demanded the expulsion of the Slut from the Laja. According to the French consul, the Ottoman attitude was part of the divide-and-conquer policy instituted by Husayn Fawzi. Referring to Druze feelings toward Ibrahim al-Atrash, the consul wrote: ‘The [Druze] population would summon … Ibrahim al-Atrash to demonstrate whether he had become an Ottoman or continued to be a Druze, by declaring that they could not endure the existing situation for any length of time.’\textsuperscript{48}

Exploiting the evident disunity among the Druzes, Damascene authorities summoned their principal leaders in 1888 to find a solution to the Laja problem. The meeting resulted in an agreement which made the Druzes even more dependent on Damascus. The chiefs agreed (1) to close all French schools established in the Hawran since 1883; (2) to open five schools under Ottoman direction; (3) to forbid the chiefs of the villages to intervene in affairs pertaining to the authorities; (4) to pay arrears in taxes; (5) to deliver up criminals who sought refuge in the Jabal; (6) to impede Bedouin raids against inhabitants of the Hawran plain; (7) to form a Druze gendarmerie under the command of Ibrahim al-Atrash’s son.\textsuperscript{49}
Revolt and Compromise (1889-1914)

From the time of Ibrahim al-Atrash’s nomination as qa’immaqam of Jabal al-Duruz in 1883, the peasants under his jurisdiction became increasingly restive. They felt that in the wake of the subordination of the mashyakha system to Ottoman authority their economic situation was steadily deteriorating. By 1889 dissatisfaction had developed into a full-blown uprising. The first clashes between peasants and Ibrahim’s forces erupted in June in the southern Hawran, rapidly spreading from there to other parts of the region. The Ottoman government in Damascus dispatched forces to the foot of the Jabal, waiting for an invitation from one of the belligerent parties. In November, the Atrash were defeated and had to flee to Damascus, where they solicited help from the governor. The peasants, for their part, addressed a petition to the governor demanding Ibrahim’s dismissal.

This conflict gave the Ottoman government the opportunity it needed to complete the incorporation of Jabal al-Duruz into the province of Damascus. At this point, the Ottomans contemplated appointing a Turkish military official as qa’immaqam instead of Ibrahim, and preparations were made to dispatch troops with the objective of putting an end to ‘Druze autonomy’ once and for all. By the beginning of June, the troops were pouring into the Hawran. The Ottoman army lost 400 soldiers and sustained a great number of injured, but the Druzes eventually stopped fighting because of the need to harvest their crops. Thus, the Ottoman government succeeded in imposing most of its conditions upon the Druzes.

The Atrash shaykhs were restored to their estates in Jabal al-Duruz, but under a new agrarian regime which allowed them to collect one-eighth rather than one-fourth of the yield, while the peasants were to be considered as proprietors of the plots they cultivated. Ottoman intervention thus saved the mashyakha system, albeit at the cost of meeting some of the peasants’ demands. Following the death of Ibrahim al-Atrash in July 1893 the governor of Damascus seized the opportunity to appoint a Damascene Sunni, Mahmud al-Ghazzi, as acting qa’immaqam of the Hawran, soon to be replaced by Yusuf Diya’ al-Khalidi from Jerusalem. These appointments, which reflected the changed Ottoman attitude toward the mashyakha, incited the Druze chiefs under the leadership of Ibrahim’s successor, Shibli al-Atrash. Exploiting the intervention of Ottoman troops in 1894 in a new conflict that had erupted between the Druzes and the Bedouin tribe of Rwala, Shibli resorted to a guerrilla campaign against the Ottoman
army. Several skirmishes and hit-and-run attacks left a number of casualties among the troops, to the embarrassment of the authorities. To contain the situation, the Ottoman authorities invited Shibli to Damascus and appointed him qa'immaqam. 56

A year later the Ottoman government decided to go on with its plans of conscription of the Druzes. For that purpose it organized a military expedition to the Jabal under the command of Adham Pasha, who in his preparations made use of the Beirut-Damascus-Mazrib railroad which had opened in July-August 1895. 57 Capturing al-Suwayda after fierce fighting, Adham Pasha was able to inform the governor of Damascus that ‘peace was restored’ and that direct administration could be introduced into the Jabal. The expedition resulted in the arrest of a thousand Druzes, including Shibli al-Atrash; forty-three shaykhs accompanied by their families were sent into exile. 58 Druze officials were replaced by Ottomans who, under the protective umbrella of the troops, conducted a cadastre (public register of lands) and population census, and imposed conscription. A Circassian commander of the provincial gendarmerie, Khursev Pasha, was nominated acting qa'immaqam of Jabal al-Duruz. 59

The success of the Ottoman expedition was viewed by the British consul as a general capitulation of the Druzes. He believed that it was facilitated by the surrender of Shibli al-Atrash without consulting other chiefs. Shibli, the consul wrote, ‘was a traitor to his co-religionists and to the government. Had he declared openly for the government, there would probably have been no fighting, and had he declared for resistance, the troops would have found [the Jabal] a far harder nut to crack’. 60 Many Druze leaders were appalled by Shibli’s act. With some two thousand rebels, they took refuge in the Safa region, east of Jabal al-Duruz, and in the Laja, to prepare for the next stage of resistance. 61 On 16 June 1896 an Ottoman force that had come to register the lands in the southern village of ‘Urman was greeted with gunshots that killed the Ottoman mudir of the area. Druzes from neighbouring villages then surrounded the force, and in the merciless fighting that ensued almost all the soldiers perished (about 600 dead); the Druzes suffered 200 casualties. 62 The events in ‘Urman stirred a general insurrection in the Hawran. 63 The Ottoman army, which now encountered fierce resistance in eventually every village, was afflicted by fatigue and sickness, and the provincial treasury was also badly drained. Searching for a compromise, the Ottoman government appointed a commission to investigate the ‘Druze crisis’. Despite its report that peace and order had been restored, many Druze rebels continued their attacks on the
troops and raided the plain to recover the flocks that had been plundered during the Ottoman military expedition. The commission left on 15 September with the recommendation to continue the census and the cadastre.64

Nevertheless, to forestall another insurrection, the Ottoman authorities decided not to press the issue. Through a combined policy of force and reconciliation, the government managed to achieve relative pacification of the turbulent Jabal between 1900 and 1905. The Druze mashyakha, it seemed, could after all withstand any Ottoman attempt to curb the ‘free spirit’ described by the traveller Gertrud Bell: ‘[The Druze chiefs] have returned to exercise semi-independence almost as they did before.’65 In 1908 the Young Turks renewed attempts to place the Jabal under direct Ottoman rule, with similar results. In the wake of the military expedition of Sami Pasha Faruqi in 1910, the Jabal seemed to be again subdued, but as soon as the troops pulled out it returned to its semi-autonomous state. The permanent presence of garrisons in the Hawran from the 1880s on, and the construction of roads to support them, yielded a modus vivendi between the Ottoman authorities and the Druze shaykhs, based on mutual recognition. Thus, the mashyakha system continued to exert great influence on the relationship of Jabal al-Duruz with Damascus until the independence of Syria.

Conclusion

Between 1860 and 1914 the mashyakha system in Jabal Hawran posed a serious challenge to the centralizing efforts of the Ottoman government in general, and to its endeavor to control the Syrian countryside in particular. The civil war in Lebanon and Druze immigration to the Hawran in 1860-2 allowed the Sublime Porte to tighten its grip over the mountain on the one hand, and consolidated the pre-eminent position of the Atrash family at the head of the mashyakha on the other. This arrangement set the course of events in the region for the following decades. The Ottomans persisted in their quest to introduce reforms into the Jabal, particularly through land registration and conscription, while lending their support to the Atrash family against both rival Druze chiefs and the peasants, and granting them official status as representatives of the Ottoman administration. Concomitantly, the constant presence of Ottoman troops in the Hawran constrained the autonomy of the Druze mashyaskha and
compelled its leaders to seek accommodation with the Damascus governors.

One of the first measures taken by the French authorities following the establishment of the Mandate regime in 1920 was to divide Syria and Lebanon into five distinct political entities: Greater Lebanon, the ‘Alawi state, the states of Damascus and of Aleppo, and finally the autonomous Jabal al-Duruz, which was to be formally recognized a year later. The French administration’s aim was to preserve the ethnic and regional divisions of the country. Most French officials in Syria had previously served in Morocco, and eventually applied the so-called ‘Moroccan formula’ to Syria. This meant a system of indirect rule respecting local traditional institutions but also taking advantage of local rivalries. In Jabal al-Duruz this policy led to the adoption of the mashyakha system as an instrument for recruiting Druze support for the Mandate. The Jabal was accordingly granted autonomy under the rule of Salim al-Atrash, not unlike the appointment of Ibrahim al-Atrash as qa’immagam by the Ottomans in 1883. The draft outlining their autonomy program, which the Druze sheikhs drew up during their negotiations with the French government, was actually an adapted version of the mashyakha as it had developed in the Hawran since 1860. The French attempt to impose direct rule on Jabal al-Druze following the death of Salim al-Atrash in 1923, expressed in the declaration of the new French governor that he wanted to destroy ‘the Druze feudal system’ and transform the Jabal into a ‘modern colony’ did not go unheeded. Threatening to undo the whole mashyakha system, it drove the Druzes onto a collision course with the French authorities, which culminated in the Druze revolt of 1925.

Notes
6 For additional information on the mashyakha system, see Hanna Abu Rashid, Jabal al-Duruz (Sultan Pasha al-Atrash) (Cairo, 1925), p. 29; ‘Abdallah al-Najjar, Banu Ma’ruf fi Jabal Hawran (Damascus, 1924), pp. 129-36; Hasan al-Bu’ayni, Jabal al-‘Arab (Beirut, 1985), pp. 51-5.
8 Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE), Correspondance Politique Consulaire (CPC), Turquie-Damas, vol. 6, Outrey to Thouvenel, no. 111 (27 February 1861).
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9 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 6, Outrey to Thouvenel, no. 131 (24 September 1861).
10 Public Record Office, London (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 195/677, Rogers to Bulwer, no. 50 (6 December 1861).
11 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, no. 2 (21 April 1862); no. 6 (May 1862).
13 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, no. 8 (30 June 1862).
14 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, no. 9 (10 July 1862).
15 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, no. 10 (24 July 1862).
16 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, no. 14 (11 August, 1862).
17 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, no. 14 (11 August 1862).
18 PRO, FO, 195/40, Frazer to Bulwer, Beirut, no. 51 (8 September 1862).
20 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 9, Hecquard to Drouyn de Lhuys, no. 5 (11 January 1866).
21 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 9, Bertrand to Moustier, no. 2 (1 December 1866); PRO, FO 195/806, Rogers to Lyons, Damascus, no. 35 (24 November 1866).
22 PRO, FO 195/806, Rogers to Lyons, Damascus, no. 35 (24 November 1866).
23 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 9, Bertrand to Moustier, no. 3 (18 December 1866).
24 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 9, Rousseau to Moustier, no. 6 (16 June 1867).
26 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 9, Gay de Tunis to LaValette, no. 6 (30 January 1869); vol. 10, Rouston to LaValette, no. 6 (8 March 1869).
27 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 10, Rouston to LaValette, no. 6 (8 March 1869).
29 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 11, Guys to Decazes, no. 32 (20 June 1877).
30 PRO, FO 78/2985, Jago to Salisbury, Damascus, no. 12 (16 August 1879).
32 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 11, Gilbert to Waddington, no. 2 (30 January 1879).
33 PRO, FO 195/1264, Jago to Layard, Damascus, no. 28 (9 November 1879); no. 31 (22 November 1879).
34 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 11, Schmid to Freycinet, no. 7 (23 January 1881); PRO, FO 195/1369, Jago to St. John, Damascus, no. 4 (13 February 1881).
35 PRO, FO 195/1369, Jago to St. John, Damascus, no. 2 (30 January 1881).
36 PRO, FO 195/1369, Jago to Goschen, Damascus, no. 9 (30 April 1881).
37 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 12, Flesch to Saint-Hilaire, no. 13 (2 March 1881).
38 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 12, Flesch to Saint-Hilaire, no. 20 (5 April 1881); PRO, FO 195/1369, Jago to Goschen, Damascus, no. 4 (27 March 1881).
39 PRO, FO 195/1369, Jago to Goschen, Damascus, no. 9 (30 April 1881).
40 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 12, Flesch to Saint-Hilaire, no. 35 (8 July 1881).
41 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 12, Flesch to Saint-Hilaire, no. 35 (8 July 1881).
42 PRO, FO 195/1448, Dickson to Lyndham, Damascus, no. 3 (25 January 1883).
43 PRO, FO 195/1480, Dickson to Lyndham, Damascus, no. 44 (16 December 1884); MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 15, Guillois to Ribot, no. 13 (25 April 1890).
44 PRO, FO 195/1548, Dickson to Thornton, Damascus, no. 14 (14 April 1886).
45 PRO, FO 195/1548, Eldridge to Thornton, Beirut, no. 28 (16 April 1886).
46 PRO, FO 195/1583, Dickson to White, Damascus, no. 39 (25 November 1887).
47 PRO, FO 195/1583, Dickson to White, Damascus, no. 41 (8 December 1887).
49 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 14, Guillois to Goblet, no. 24 (23 August 1888).
50 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 15, Guillois to Spuller, no. 28 (21 July 1889).
51 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 15, Guillois to Ribot, no. 15 (7 May 1890); PRO, FO 195/1687, Dickson to White, Damascus, no. 16 (3 May 1890).
52 PRO, FO 195/1687, Dickson to White, Damascus, no. 18 (19 May 1890); MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 14, Guillois to Ribot, no. 18 (22 May 1890).
53 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 15, Geoffory to Ribot, no. 21 (7 July 1890); no. 22 (15 July 1890); PRO (London), FO 195/1687, Dickson to White, Damascus, no. 31 (15 July 1890); Damascus, no. 34 (21 July 1890); Damascus, no. 38 (18 August 1990).
55 PRO, FO 195/1801, Eyres to Ford, Damascus, no. 25 (4 November 1893).
56 PRO, FO 195/1839, Eyres to Nicolson, Damascus, no. 3 (3 February 1894); Meshaka to Currie, Damascus, no. 22 (18 October 1894).
58 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 17, Guillois to Bertholot, no. 52 (28 December 1895); vol. 18, no.1 (5 January 1896); no. 2 (12 January, 1896); no. 8 (12 February 1896); PRO, FO 195/1940, Eyres to Currie, Damascus, no. 6 (1 February 1896); no. 16 (29 May 1896).
59 PRO, FO 195/1940, Eyres to Currie, Damascus, no. 9 (24 February 1896); MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 18, Guillois to Bertholot, no. 7 (6 February 1896).
60 PRO, FO 195/1940, Eyres to Currie, Damascus, no. 11 (19 March 1896).
61 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 18, Guillois to Bertholot, no. 8 (12 February 1896).
62 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 18, Guillois to Hanotaux, no. 21 (19 June 1896); Abu Rashid: Jabal al-Duruz, pp. 64-6.
63 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 18, Guillois to Hanotaux, no. 24 (8 July 1896); no. 26 (15 July 1896); no. 27 (20 July 1896).
64 MAE, CPC, Turquie-Damas, vol. 18, Guillois to Hanotaux, no. 35 (12 August 1896); no. 36 (20 August 1896); no 41 (14 September, 1896); no. 45 (29 October 1896); no. 46 (13 November 1896).
Part Four

Ottoman Palestine and the First World War
The ‘Aristocracy’ of the Upper Galilee: Safad Notables and the Tanzimat Reforms

Mustafa Abbasi

A number of studies concerning regional towns under Ottoman rule have appeared in recent years, reflecting a growing interest in local matters such as social life, government institutions and their functions, the relationships between the authorities and society, economic structure, and other aspects of daily life. Urban society in district centres and in regional towns is generally studied today by utilizing a new paradigm that relies on local and provincial sources. These present Ottoman history from a local perspective, unlike sources found in government archives, which generally represent the official establishment, the central government, and the higher strata of society connected with them.¹

The urban and social history of Ottoman Palestine has received its share in this ongoing research.² A review of these studies covering different periods, however, reveals that they tended to focus on provincial centres or on developed harbour cities while neglecting smaller interior towns such as Safad. In fact, a number of articles and essays concerning the city of Safad during the Tanzimat period have been written, but most of them refer only to the Jewish community. The Arab community has never been the subject of any serious study, nor have any local chronicles about it come down to us.

This article examines the administrative, demographic, economic, and social changes that occurred within the Arab community of Safad during the Ottoman era of reform. Put differently, my purpose is to study the impact of the Tanzimat reforms on this interior rural town. The article shows that a new chapter was opened in the history of Safad in the mid-nineteenth century. Heavily hit by the earthquake of 1837, the town slowly began to recover, but real progress and important changes occurred only with the enactment of the reforms carried out by the Ottoman state, above all the Land Law of 1858 and the Provincial Law of 1864.
Safad presents historians with a special difficulty due to the absence of two important sources for its investigation: the registries of the shari'a courts – the *sijill*, which is so important for the study of the social history of cities like Jerusalem, Jaffa, Nablus, and Haifa, and municipal archives. On the other hand, other sources exist that have not yet been tapped. One of them is the *salnames* (yearbooks) of the provinces of Syria and Beirut, which incorporate detailed descriptions of the regional and urban administrations. Further information can be gleaned from Beiruti newspapers and periodicals of the period, as well as from the accounts by European travellers and from the legal documents still in the possession of some families originally from Safad.

**Administrative Structure and Government Institutions**

From the Ottoman conquest of Syria in 1516 until 1660, Safad was the centre of a *sanjaq* (district) in the province of Damascus. With the creation of the Province of Sidon, the town was separated from Damascus and placed under the *wali* (governor) of the new province. Subsequently, the administrative status of Safad was reduced to that of a sub-district (*qada*) centre belonging to the Acre district. This was a direct result of the latter’s strengthened position, especially after Dahir al-‘Umar came to power in 1745. The growth of Acre was further enhanced during the rule of the infamous governor Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar (1776-1804) and his successors, Sulayman Pasha and ‘Abdallah Pasha, who turned the port city into the political and administrative centre of the province. As a result, Acre attracted most of the economic activity of the area, whereas Safad was an unpretentious sub-district centre. Safad also suffered from severe natural disasters at the time, and it remained underdeveloped up to the years of the Tanzimat reforms. These reforms brought about several demographic and economic changes which led to a slow but steady revitalization.

One of the principal reforms of the late Tanzimat period was the promulgation of the Provincial Law, (*Vilayets Law*) in 1864, which led to an administrative reorganization of the Ottoman provinces and districts and to a reformulation of the duties of the governors. Accordingly, the Province of Sidon was integrated into the Province of Damascus, which was renamed the Syrian Province. Safad and its sub-district became part of this new province. In 1871 the sub-district of Safad included, besides the town itself, two *nabiyas*: (administrative subdivisions of a *qada*) Jirah and Jabal. The first consisted of the
villages near and around Safad, and the second included those near and around the Jarmak (Meron) Mountain. In December 1887 Sultan Abdüllatif II decided to sever the five districts of Latakia, Tripoli, Beirut, Acre, and Nablus from the Province of Syria and to create the Province of Beirut. The decision was applied a year later, making the district of Acre, with its sub-districts of Safad, Tiberias, Nazareth, Acre, and Haifa a part of the Province of Beirut. This structure remained in place until the demise of the Ottoman Empire in 1918.8

The Provincial Law created a centralized, orderly, and stable administrative structure in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and reinforced the district and sub-district towns. In Safad stability and centralization associated with economic and demographic growth enhanced the status and influence of the town in the Upper Galilee. The law was applied in Safad without delay by the authorities, and four governmental bodies were consequently created:

The Qa'immaqamia. The highest administrative body of the sub-district. It was headed by a qa'immaqam appointed by the Acre district governor with the approval of the wali and subordinate to him. The qa'immaqam handled administrative and financial affairs and was entrusted with internal matters. He was expected to implement government decrees conveyed by the district governor, as well as to collect the taxes and transfer them to the district co-ordinator in Acre.9

The Administrative Council. The sub-district council numbered seven to nine members, three elected and the rest ex officio: the na'il (shari'a judge), mufti (jurisconsult), chief treasurer, principal clerk, and spiritual leaders of the non-Muslim communities. To be eligible for election a candidate had to be an Ottoman subject, aged 30 or older, and pay taxes of at least 150 qurush a year. Thus, all members of the council were well-to-do people.10 The administrative council supervised administrative and civil matters such as inspecting revenues and expenditures, managing state property, assessing taxes, supervising public health, issuing government tenders, setting prices of agricultural products, and registering lands.12

The Municipal Council. The establishment of municipalities was dealt with in the Provincial Law and its amendment of 1871, which stipulated that a municipality be created in every town that functioned as a provincial, district, or sub-district centre. The first municipal
council was founded in Safad in 1878. It consisted of a mayor, his assistant, and six members chosen among the ‘ulama, merchants, and land and property owners. The municipality’s responsibilities included supervising the building trade, city development, water supply, sanitation, markets, and prices. Expenses were covered by the state and from levies paid by the population for the various services.

The Civil Court. A ‘first-instance’ civil court was established in Safad, to function along with the shari’a courts. It judged penal and administrative civil cases, while personal matters remained under the jurisdiction of the shari’a courts. Communal matters were submitted to the spiritual leadership of each community.

An additional important administrative body was the bureau of education, which was headed by the notables of the town.

Demographic Composition

During the Tanzimat period the Arab population of Safad generally outnumbered the other communities, reaching some 55 to 60 per cent of the total population. Its percentage steadily increased during the second half of the nineteenth century. During the First World War many Jews were forced to leave Safad, so Arab dominance in the city was further enhanced, continuing to grow also under the British Mandate.

A report issued by a delegation of the Protestant College of Malta in 1849 reveals that the entire population of Safad at that time was 5,000 people, of whom 1,500 to 2,000 were Jews, sixty Christians, and the rest Muslims. Nathan Shur notes that in 1850-5 the population of Safad grew to 7,000, including 2,500-3,000 Jews. Ben-Arie affirms that the overall population was 6,000 during the 1840s and 1850s and that Arabs were the majority, although he gives no definite figures. In 1871 the Ottomans carried out a general survey of the Province of Syria. It found that the total number of households (khaneš) in Safad was 2,595, with the following distribution: 1,395 Muslim, 1,197 Jewish, and three Christian households. Scholars differ in their estimates of the number of people per khane, but the commonly accepted figure is about five. According to this calculation, the population reached a total of 12,975, of whom 6,975 were Muslims (53.76 per cent), 5,985 Jews (46.13 per cent), and 15 Christians (0.11 per cent).

On the other hand, it may be assumed that the number of people per household in the Arab population was larger that in the Jewish population. One reason for this difference was the fact that most of
the Jews who lived in Safad at the time had immigrated there at an advanced age, without their families. Sherman Liber, who studied an earlier period (1800-39) in the development of the Jewish population of Safad, estimated that the average Jewish family numbered four persons. It may thus be concluded that the percentage of Arabs in the town was actually higher than the figure given above. Relying upon the *salname* of 1879, Alexander Schölch notes that the population of Safad at that time was 15,008 of whom 8,000 were Muslims and 7,008 non-Muslims. In 1914 the number of residents in Safad was estimated by Shmuel Avitzur at 14,000, among them 6,000-7,000 Jews and 7,000 Arabs.

Finally, Ottoman officials Muhammad Tamimi and Muhammad Bahjat issued a general report on the Province of Beirut in 1915, which indicates that the total population of Safad was 12,755 persons. Of these 7,077 were Muslims and 422 Arab Christians (most of them Catholics). Thus, together the Arabs numbered 7,499 and the Jews 5,256. By the end of World War I only 2,688 Jewish residents remained in Safad, as those who were citizens of enemy countries were forced to leave; illness, poverty, and starvation also took their toll. From that time onward, the Arabs formed a clear majority in Safad.

**The Muslim Community**

The Muslim community of Safad in the nineteenth century concentrated in three quarters: *Harat al-Akrad*, in the eastern part of the town, mostly a working-class neighbourhood inhabited by hired labourers; *Harat al-Sawawin*, in the centre near the Citadel, inhabited by mostly upper-class and merchant families; and *Harat al-Watah*, in the Western part of the town and close to the Jewish quarter, which housed a lower-class population of shopkeepers and small traders.

The Ottomans promoted Safad as an Islamic Sunni centre to counterbalance the religious minorities in the town and in the surrounding area, especially the Shi’ite concentration to the north. In the remoter past many of its inhabitants seem to have originated in Damascus. In fact, when Sultan Zahir Baybars defeated the Crusaders in the area and took Safad on 21 July 1266, he brought inhabitants from Damascus with him and settled them in the town. For centuries the residents of Safad spoke Arabic with a Damascene accent and maintained cultural and social ties with it. The young people from Safad usually went to Damascus to pursue higher-level studies, particularly in the religious field. Masterman, who worked as a doctor
in Safad’s Missionary Hospital in 1893, accordingly reported that the Muslim population of the town originated in Damascus, although some of them came from Transjordan and others from surrounding villages.27

Apparently, the settling of Algerian exiles in Safad and its vicinity in the late 1860s and of Circassian exiles later on, in 1878, served the same goal, namely to reinforce the Islamic character of the Upper Galilee and strengthen the Muslim community of Safad.28 The Algerians emigrated from their country following the failure of the resistance movement against the French occupation under the leadership of Amir ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza’iri. The amir landed in Damascus in 1855 and thousands of refugees followed in his footsteps. Some of them settled in the Safad region, where they founded five villages: Marus, Deishum, and ‘Ammukah in the eastern Upper Galilee and Husayniyya and Tulil in the Hula Valley. Some sources maintain that a great number of Safad Muslims were of Algerian origin.29 No precise information is available since the census takers at that time did not consider them a separate group. Yet we know for certain that two Safad families were of Algerian origin: the ‘Arabi and the Dilsi, but these formed only a tiny percentage of the total population.

The Muslims of Safad were normally described as both vigorous and conservative.30 Masterman characterized them as an active group, and observed that they dressed well and moved about more than did people from southern Palestine.31 An earlier report by Edward Robinson gives a similar description. According to him, the Muslims dwelt in stone houses that looked more solid than did those of the Jewish quarter. The people Robinson met were, he reported, more active and courageous than those from the south.32

During the period of the Tanzimat the Muslims of Safad usually led quiet and peaceful lives. They were not affected even by the bloody disturbances that erupted in Mount Lebanon and in Damascus in 1860, although an atmosphere of fear prevailed among the Jewish and Christian communities. The Jews of Safad turned for help to the Muslim youth leader (Shaykh al-Shabab), while the chief rabbi organized a banquet for forty young Muslims to gain their protection.33 Later the Muslim residents of Safad showed solidarity with Ahmad ‘Urabi, who led a popular uprising in Egypt in 1882. The Austrian consular agent Miklasiewicz stated that the people of Safad showed hostility toward the British and the French, ‘while on the other hand, they are even idolizing the name of ‘Arabi Pasha and writing various triumphal poems in his praise’.34
Economically, Safad served as the hub of the eastern Upper Galilee, the Hula Valley, the Golan Heights, and southern Lebanon. The inhabitants of the villages in this region were connected with Safad by a network of commercial relations, as well as by the organization of a variety of services. They came to the town to buy and sell, especially at the weekly Friday market. There they bought the finished products they needed such as tools, utensils, clothing, footwear, and textiles, and there they sold their agricultural produce: fruits, vegetables, grain, dairy products, and wool. According to the *salname* of 1871, Safad had 227 shops, fifteen mills, fourteen bakeries, and four oil factories. The large number of mills and oil factories indicates the type of services rendered by the town of Safad. In addition to local commerce and the provision of services to the nearby villages, the merchants of the town also dealt with regional commerce, mostly in grain. This was transported from Safad to Acre port and shipped thence to Europe.

The Arab merchants of Safad acted thus as middlemen between the peasants of the sub-district and traders in Acre. They bought the agricultural products from the villages and then sold them in the port town. Eilboim, who was a rabbi resident in Safad, describes this process as follows: ‘Almost all the gentiles from Safad and its surroundings come every day to Acre. One brings wheat for sale, another brings some sort of poultry, and yet another brings fruit, since this is the capital of the Galilee.’ Further evidence of the lively traffic between Safad and Acre is given by Yehiel Pines, who visited the area in 1885. He notes that part of the produce was destined for export. Commercial ties also existed with Tyre and its region, caravans of camels carrying goods from Safad to that city. Masterman believed that most of the trade of Safad had formerly been in the hands of the Jews but was recently transferred to the Muslims, especially that in goods consumed by the Arab peasants. He explained that Muslims gave more credit to the *fallabin* and could solicit the help of the authorities for the payment of debts. From his account it may be inferred that the rise in importance of the Muslim merchants and their participation in the town’s trade took place in the second half of the nineteenth century, concurrently with the enhancement of their social status as a result of the Tanzimat reforms.

This analysis of the changes that took place in the composition of the commercial stratum of Safad is substantiated by Michael Asaf, who quotes the following report from the Hebrew newspaper *Hamelitz*
The number of Arab merchants is growing... Their trade is developing out of the ruins of Jewish commerce. Rich persons are found among them... The abundance comes principally from the environment and flows into their hands. All negotiations with the fallahin, the purchase of the crops, the items needed for food and clothing – they all are in the hands of Arab merchants. This trade was previously conducted by Jewish merchants, but with the cultural development of the Arab residents in the town, the Arab merchants began to push the Jewish traders away and took over the trading business. The Jews did not oppose; they withdrew from negotiations with the gentiles. However, the Arab merchants started to compete also in the field of Jewish commerce. They did not buy at fixed interest but with cash payment, their needs were lesser, and they were satisfied with small gains, and Jews began eagerly to purchase Arab merchandise.  

Avitzur asserts that from the start of the twentieth century there was no increase in the Jewish population of Safad and that the number of births and of young immigrants could not balance the number of deaths or of people emigrating. Such a decrease in the size of the community and the changes in its composition negatively affected its economic capacity. Bahjat and Tamimi also noted this phenomenon. They wrote that most of the Muslims and Christians of Safad were capable merchants and had a propensity to accumulate wealth. They estimated between twenty and thirty merchants in the town had 2,000 to 3,000 Liras at their disposal, and all of them also owned property of similar value. According to Bahjat and Tamimi, the merchants were able to increase their wealth and influence by being appointed to administrative positions or by evading the payment of taxes.

Seeking to enhance this economic development, the Ottomans founded in Safad in 1897 a branch of the Agricultural Bank. The bank offered the peasants loans and financial assistance for the improvement of their agricultural capacity. Board members of the bank were all local Arab residents, and the most influential among them were Husayn 'Abd al-Rahim Effendi, Hajj Ahmad al-Asadi, 'Abd al-Latif, al-Hajj Sa'id, and As'ad Khoury. The merchants, for their part, consolidated their power in 1900 by founding a Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture. This was headed by 'Abd al-Latif Effendi al-Hajj Sa'id and consisted of the most prominent merchants of the town.
In sum, during the latter half of the nineteenth century the Muslim merchants of Safad gained prominence, their wealth increased, and their business relations were enhanced. This development was largely associated with the general rise of their social and political status as a result of the Tanzimat reforms. Some of the Muslim notable families took advantage of the new legal system, especially of the 1858 Land Law, and invested part of their capital in the purchase of large tracts of land, a step that further consolidated their position.

The Muslim Notable Families

The social and political behaviour of elite (\textit{a’yan}) families within the Ottoman State has received ample attention from scholars since Albert Hourani’s influential formulation of the ‘politics of notables’ paradigm. Among these scholars we find Philip Khoury, Linda Schatkowski-Schilcher, Moshe Maoz, Ruth Roded, and many others. Naturally, there are differences of opinion regarding the definition and exact significance of the notables phenomenon, though it is generally agreed that the term refers to the leading urban families. The \textit{a’yan} attained their status thanks to their intermediary position between the authorities, which depended on their services, and the local society, in which they enjoyed prestige and influence. Hourani claimed that the class of \textit{a’yan} developed out of three major groups with different power bases and social backgrounds: the ‘ulama who, in addition to their religious duties and control of religious endowments (\textit{awqaf}), frequently engaged in business and at times served as spokesmen of the public before the authorities; secular \textit{a’yan}, including amirs, whose status derived from their positions as commanders of local forces; and commanders of imperial corps, particularly the Janissaries, who were integrated into the urban elite. Under the centralizing thrust of the Ottoman reforms, the notables became increasingly attached to the state at the expense of the local population.

In Ottoman Safad there were traditionally two groups of notable families. One was the ‘ulama, including the Nahawis, Qadis, Muftis, and Sa’dis; the other was the landlords, led by the Qaddura, Soubeh, and Murad families. Towards the end of the Ottoman era, as a result of the social changes brought about by the Tanzimat, a third group of notables consisting of government officials, administrators, and businessmen was consolidated in Safad. Within this mixed Muslim-Christian group were the families of Hajj Sa’id, Asadi, Khuli, Besht,
Khoury, and Sabbagh. The remainder of the article is a survey of these notable families.

‘Ulama Families
As noted above, the Ottomans developed Safad as the Sunni Islamic centre of the Upper Galilee. Accordingly, from the earliest days of Ottoman rule, they supported leading Muslim families and men of religion in establishing their authority in the town. In time, several well-known ‘ulama families achieved prominence, turning Safad into the principal religious centre between Nablus in the south and Damascus in the north. The ‘ulama families were in control of the three most important religious functions as muftis, na‘ibs (assistant judges), and naqib al-asbras (doysens of the Prophet’s descendants). They also managed waqf properties and lands. These positions were usually filled by members of a few select families.

The Nahawis – One of Safad’s foremost families; they lived in the al-Akrad quarter. Between the middle of the sixteenth and the end of the nineteenth century the Nahawis held prominent religious positions, in addition to teaching religious topics in the school (madrasa) which they established in the courtyard of their home. Family documents indicate that it originated in the Hijaz and immigrated to the small town of Adhra in the Hawran before arriving in Safad in the mid-sixteenth century. The then head of the family, Shaykh Ahmad Shihab al-Din, was welcomed by the governor, who helped him settle in the town and gave him a farm on Mt. Canaan. Shaykh Ahmad was an ardent follower of the Rifa‘i Sufi brotherhood, and thanks to his efforts this became the most widespread brotherhood in Safad and its vicinity.

During the Tanzimat period, four members of this family stood out. ‘Abd-al-Ghani al-Nahawi held the post of na‘ib in Safad from the Egyptian occupation in 1831 until his exile together with other notables to Egypt following the uprising of 1834; Muhammad al-Nahawi was na‘ib in 1881-2 and ex officio member of the administrative council; later on, Sa‘id Effendi became na‘ib of Sidon and Ajlun; finally, Hasan al-Nahawi headed the Safad municipality from 1878 to 1886 and again from 1900 to 1904, and then served as mufti from 1904 to 1908. At the turn of the twentieth century the religious status of the Nahawis declined as they lost ground to the Mufti and Qadi families. The younger generation became inclined to modern studies, which gave them access to more coveted civil and administrative functions, as well as to the liberal professions. Secularization of the family intensified during the British Mandate,
when some of its members chose to be lawyers, the major exception being Ahmad al-Nahawi who worked as qadi. Most prominent during this period was ‘Ali Rida al-Nahawi, leader of the pro-Husayni Palestinian faction, who was elected head of the Safad municipality in 1929 and held the post until 1934. Other members also joined the nationalist movement.

The Qadis – a relatively small family that lived in the al-Watah quarter. The head of the family, Shaykh ‘Abd-al-Karim Mahmud al-Qadi, attained high religious status and filled the post of mufti and was ex officio a member of Safad’s administrative council from 1876 to 1886. His son, Taha, followed in his father’s footsteps, being described as a great ‘alim with high competence in religious law. He was preacher and imam of the central al-Ahmar mosque, and controller of its awqaf. Members of the family continued to administer the mosque, despite their diminishing status under the British Mandate.

The Muftis – an ‘ulama family that lived in the al-Sawawin quarter. They gained prominence in the late nineteenth century at the expense of the Nahawi, with whom they were connected by marriage. The head of the family, Salim al-Mufti, was mufti of Safad in 1893-1900, and ex officio a member of the town’s administrative council, as well as member of the bureau of education. His son, Mustafa, was equally well known. He was qadi of Irbid and Amman in Transjordan, a position he held until his death in 1946. Other members of the family were engaged in education, both religious and general; the chairman of Safad’s teachers’ association also belonged to this family.

The Sa’dis – an ashraf family that traditionally held the position of niqabat al-ashraf. At the end of the Ottoman era and during the first years of the Mandate its occupant was Mustafa Sa’ad al-Din. He was succeeded by ‘Ali al-Sa’di who remained naqib al-ashraf for most of the Mandate period. Along with him, Sulayman al-Sa’di was qadi of Beisan and later on of Hebron, while his brother served as chief secretary and deputy to the qadi of Safad.

Landowning Families
With the promulgation of the Land Law in 1858, private owners were allowed to buy state lands and register them under their own names. As many regarded land purchase a profitable investment and a means to preserve or enhance their social status, the value of lands duly increased. In the process, notable families in Safad, as in other
Ottoman cities and towns, were able to amass large tracts of land in the surrounding villages and to become big landowners.

The Qadduras – one of the largest and most powerful families in Safad and northern Palestine in general; they lived in the al-Sawawin quarter. The Qadduras claimed descent from the Prophet’s companion Khalid Ibn al-Walid and were said to be related to the Khalidis of Jerusalem. Their leaders bore the title of agha, perhaps an indication to their origin in the military auxiliary forces or in the sipahi order. The Qadduras became a dominant factor in the city of Safad, and owners of the largest estate in the region, during the Tanzimat era. By the final years of Ottoman rule, they owned about 50,000 dunums of land, including eight villages over whose peasants they exercised political control.66 Due to their power and wealth, the heads of the family were also prominent members of the Ottoman administrative establishment in Safad.

The first member of the family to emerge as a person of distinction in this period was Hajj Yasin Agha, who sat on the administrative council from 1868 to 1886. In the salnames his name is always augmented by honorary titles attesting to his status and influence. His successor at the head of the family, Hajj Yusuf Qaddura, was made a member of the administrative council in 1900.67 The latter’s son, Muhammad Effendi engaged in the cereal and pelt trade, and for many years was member of the judicial court.68 A son of Muhammad, As’ad Qaddura, was the first in the family to move to the religious sphere after completing his studies at al-Azhar in 1906. He was appointed mufti of Safad in 1914,69 a position he held throughout the Mandate period. His brother Zaki was the mayor of Safad from 1934 to 1948. As the major rivals of the pro-Husayni Nahawi family, the Qaddura enjoyed the support of the British Mandatory government.

The Soubehs – a highly regarded family which, like the Qadduras, bore the title of agha. The head of the family during the 1830s, Muhammad Soubeh, was among the Safad notables exiled by Ibrahim Pasha to Egypt in 1834.70 His grandson, Hajj Muhammad, was listed among the prominent a’yan of Safad, being member of the civil court from 1880 to 1885 and in 1885 also of the bureau of education. By 1893-4 he was head of the municipality, having succeeded Hasan al-Nahawi who had long occupied the post.71 Later, in 1920, Talib Agha Soubeh would occupy the same position.72 Talib was evidently the last prominent member of the family. During the late Ottoman period the Soubehs owned a total of 6,521 dunums of land in the villages of Jahula, Bowezia, and Meirun.73
The Murads – another landholding family, who owned 14,810 dunums in the tribal region of al-Shamalna, north of Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee). Like their counterparts, the Murads too held prominent positions in the local Ottoman administration. Muhammad Effendi Murad sat on the administrative council from 1882 to 1886, while Hasan Effendi Murad was member of the municipal council from 1883 to 1894 and later on member of the bureau of education. Under the Mandate, Ibrahim Murad was member of the municipality in the late 1920s, and Sa‘id Murad engaged in agriculture. By that time, however, the status of the family was in decline, owing mainly to a serious conflict with the ‘Arab al-Shamalna who lived on their lands.

Administrative and Commercial Families

The process of state reforms inaugurated by the Ottoman government resulted in significant changes in Safad’s urban structure. Not least among them was the incorporation of new families into the notable stratum. These were families that were fit to assume important functions in the administration owing to their modern disposition or that had accumulated sufficient wealth by taking advantage of the incorporation of the region into the world market during the second half of the nineteenth century.

The al-Hajj Sa‘ids (‘Abd al-Rahims) – a merchant family that lived, like most other traders of Safad, in the al-Sawawin quarter. The founder of the family, Hajj Sa‘id, was a wholesaler that was elected president of the Safad municipality when it was established in 1878. Officiating for a year, he continued afterwards as member of the municipal council. Hajj Sa‘id’s three sons followed in his footsteps. One, Ahmad Effendi, sat on the municipal council in 1881-2 and was member of the judicial court in 1893-4; another, Hasan Effendi, was a municipal councillor in 1893 and 1894; and the third son, ‘Abd al-Latif Effendi, engaged in commerce, being elected chairman of the chamber of commerce in 1901 and holding the position until 1908. Next came Hussein ‘Abd al-Rahim Hajj Sa‘id, who served as a municipal councillor from 1893 to 1900, and was elected chairman of the Safad chamber of commerce in 1908. Under the early Mandate, the family continued to enjoy a prominent position as their leader, Muhammad Hasan ‘Abd al-Rahim, was named head of the Safad municipality in 1926, and elected mayor until 1929. Thereafter the Hajj Sa‘ids lost their administrative prominence to the Qadduras and their allies, though their fortune remained intact.
The Asadis – the largest family in Safad, lived in the al-Akrad quarter. Its leader, Hajj Muhammad Abu Dhiab al-Asadi, who traded in building materials, was a member of the Safad municipality in 1884. He was followed by Hajj Ahmad Effendi al-Asadi, who held the same position in 1893-4. Towards the end of Ottoman rule members of the family opened a quarry on Mt. Cana’an, and some of them moved to luxurious houses in the al-Sawawin quarter. Following the establishment of the Mandate they founded a bus company and controlled the transportation of the entire region, while holding administrative and civil positions. The Asadis were known as staunch supporters of the Nahawi family.

The Khulis – a well-to-do merchant family whose head, Tawfiq al-Khuli, was active in the last years of the Ottoman period and the beginning of the Mandate. Tawfiq represented the merchants in various official delegations. Later Hajj Fu’ad al-Khuli became one of the richest people in Safad. A wholesale trader, he controlled a large portion of the commercial traffic between Safad and Haifa, investing part of his fortune in the construction of office buildings and in land.

The Christian community

The Christian community of Safad was small, but it too seems to have prospered since the late Tanzimat period. During the nineteenth century Christian civil servants and merchants from Lebanon were still immigrating to the town. The members of this community lived in the southern part of the al-Sawawin quarter, in proximity to the residences of the Qaddura family, with whom they maintained friendly relations.

Under Egyptian rule the Christian community of Safad remained unified and consisted of members of the Greek Catholic Church. Its leaders approached Ibrahim Pasha for permission to build a church, but apparently this request was not granted; we learn from the report mentioned earlier of the Malta Protestant College delegation that visited the town in 1849 that only sixty Christians lived there, with neither church nor priest. Victor Guérin, who visited Safad in 1875, reported that the number of Christians living there did not exceed 150, and that most of them were Greek Catholics. He added, however, that in 1864 they built a small church and had their own priest. Guérin noted that besides these local Christians there were also a number of Protestants in Safad, mostly from the English Mission. Masterman informs us that in 1914 four-hundred Greek-Catholics, two Greek-Orthodox families, and a few Protestants lived in the town.
October 1917 the Maronite priest Ibrahim Harfoush visited Safad in the company of the Bishop of Tyre. Pointing out that the Christians lived in good circumstances and were represented in the administrative council, he also noted the presence of some Maronites from Sidon who held high-level positions in the administration.  

Most of the Christians living in Safad were engaged in trade, commerce, or administration; some of them owned lands in the vicinity. The postmaster was also Christian. Bahjat and Tamimi describe the Christians of Safad as men of science, graduates of modern schools, and merchants. According to these authors, half of the Christian population immigrated to America during the last decades of Ottoman rule and their number declined.

**Christian Notable Families**

The Beshts – a family of administrators and civil servants; the first among the Christians to reach a position of power in Safad. Its head, ‘Id Besht, was member of the administrative council from 1880 to 1900, as well as of the board of the Ottoman Agricultural Bank. In 1883 he also joined the town council and in 1900 was elected to the chamber of commerce and agriculture. Besides him, Jubran Besht sat on the town council from 1884 to 1900. After the turn of the century the place of the Beshts was taken by the rising Khoury family.

The Khourys – a well-to-do family that engaged in the fishing trade on the Tiberias and Hula lakes. In addition, they owned several estates totalling some 2,000 dunums in the Hula Valley. The Khourys became the dominant family among the Christians of Safad and their uncontested leaders around the turn of the twentieth century. Their head, As’ad Effendi Khoury, was member of the Safad civil court in 1893-4 and of the administrative council in 1904. His sons, Tawfiq and Shahada, further developed the family businesses and became agents for the Shell [petroleum] company in their town. The Khourys were closely allied with the Qaddura family, and accordingly opposed the Husayni faction.

The Sabbaghs – a family of civil servants and administrators, who claimed descent from Ibrahim al-Sabbagh, the senior aide to Shaykh Dahir al-'Umar. Towards the end of the nineteenth century the head of the family, Habib al-Sabbagh, served as the French consular agent in Safad. He was followed by Tuma al-Sabbagh, who was the representative of the French consul in both Safad and Beirut. Other members of the family were engaged in commerce and worked in the civil service.
Conclusion

This article has surveyed changes that occurred in Safad in the wake of the Tanzimat period through to the end of the Ottoman Empire. It shows that even in a remote interior town the Ottoman state reforms were applied without much delay. The reforms aimed at consolidating the administrative system on the one hand, and at reinforcing the central administration on the other. The creation of an administrative council, a municipality, a civil court, and different offices and chambers resulted in significant changes in the social structure of Safad.

More particularly, the article suggests that the notable families of late Ottoman Safad, both old and new and including some Christian families as well, were integrated into the new administrative system and thus were able to improve their social standing. Members of these families filled most positions in the newly created official bodies, along with either traditional religious and lay functions or innovative commercial activities. Both groups were able to further consolidate their wealth by exploiting the Land Law to purchase large tracts of land and dominate the peasants.

These processes have been examined and substantiated here by a detailed examination of the Arab elite families of Safad, about which little has hitherto been written. Part of the larger stratum of a’yan in late Ottoman Palestine, the notables of the district town of Safad carried out important tasks and contributed to the socio-economic and political life of their town and of northern and north-eastern Galilee at large.

Notes

1 For major studies of Ottoman urban history, see Haim Gerber, Economy and Society in an Ottoman City: Bursa, 1600-1700 (Jerusalem, 1988); Abraham Marcus, The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1989); Dina Rizk Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540-1834 (Cambridge, 1997).

2 See especially Dror Zeevi, Ha-me'a ba-Ottomanit: mehoz Yerushalayim ba-me'a ba-shva esre (Jerusalem, 1997) (in Hebrew); Beshara Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700-1900 (Berkeley, 1995); Mahmud Yazbak, Haifa in the Late Ottoman Period, 1864-1914: A Muslim Town in Transition (Leiden, 1998).


4 Amnon Cohen, Palestine in the 18th Century (Jerusalem, 1973), p. 120.

5 Cohen: Palestine, p. 130.
6 Amitai Preiss, ‘Safad’, *EF*, vol. 8, p. 758.
10 *al-Dustur*, vol. 1, p. 389.
15 *Salname-i Vilayet-i Beirut*, p. 183; *al-Dustur*, vol. 1, p. 390.
26 *Thamarat al-Funun*, 3 December 1900, p. 6; 3 June 1901, p. 6.


*Thamarat al-Funun*, 3 April 1888, pp. 6-7.


*Thamarat al-Funun*, 12 September 1904, p. 5.


al-Karmil, 22 January 1921, p. 2.

Archives of the Waqf Office (Safad), no. 6: 10, 45, 50 (17April 1937).

60 **al-Difa’** (Jaffa), 26 May 1937, p. 3.  
62 Haganah Archives (Tel Aviv), no. 226/105, ‘Report from 10 January 1940 to 15 May 1941’.  
64 **Filastin**, 17 August 1943, p. 2.  
66 Haganah Archives, no. 96/105, certificate dated 12 January 1942.  
68 **Salname-i Vilayet-i Surîye** (1300/1882), p. 216; (1304/1886), p. 159.  
69 **Mir'at al-Sharq** (Jerusalem), 24 November 1927, p. 8.  
73 Israel State Archives (Jerusalem), no. 481/2684, certificate dated 14 October 1941. See also no. F/379/2673.  
74 **Thamrat al-Funun**, 10 December 1900, p. 7.  
75 **al-Karmil**, 22 January 1921, p. 2.  
80 **Filastin**, 21 December 1929, p. 3.  
81 **Salname-i Vilayet-i Surîye** (1302/1884), p. 159.  
83 **al-Karmil**, 22 January 1921, p. 2.  
85 Deputation Sent to the East, part II, p. 455.  
94 **Salname-i Vilayet-i Beirut** (1322/1904), p. 191.  
11

The Re-making of Beersheba: Winds of Modernization in the Late Ottoman Sultanate

Nimrod Luz

Thus, a small town grew up in the middle of the desert, which is a shining example of religious piety and a glory for Islam. It would seem that as a direct result of the Sultan’s personal cultivation and care, this town would be transformed into a city. And this city will gradually become, along with all its townships and villages, a big county and a glorious example of Arab culture.¹

…the beginning of the 20th century the Bedouin threat was gone. The establishment of Beersheba meant more than just that: it was a deep intrusion into the nomads’ way of life.²

Micro-scale planning and social and economic restructuring were important elements of late nineteenth-century imperialism and led to a radical alteration of space and place in the colonial world. The hegemonic approach to colonial space extended well beyond the physical manipulation of space. Various powers (mainly European) were engaged in the manipulation of the human use of space and indeed the manipulation of the mind.³ In this paper I aim to portray the Ottomans as an imperialistic force that worked, through a myriad of agents and agencies, to tighten its grip and consolidate its hegemonic position in the Arab provinces, in particular the Bedouin tribes of the southern Jerusalem district (mutasarriflik).

The establishment of the new township of Beersheba as a centre for the new sub-district of the same name will serve as the point of departure for the current discussion and as its main case study. I argue that the development of Beersheba as a modern town and the implementation, indeed the enforcement, of an allegedly Western-style city plan should be understood in the context of core-periphery relations and as part of an Ottoman imperialistic project. Further, this
project was connected to and influenced by radical changes and social processes that occurred in Istanbul throughout the nineteenth century, and mainly during the reign of Abdülhamid II. Indeed, the title of this paper is borrowed from Zeynep Çelik’s work on transformations of the urban layout and components of nineteenth-century Istanbul. By analysing the city plan, its major components, and the symbolism invested in the city landscape, this paper suggests that the creation of Beersheba was yet another sign of the winds of modernization that swept through and engulfed the late Ottoman Empire. Moreover, it was another indication of the colonialist-hegemonic approach and policy of the Ottoman Sultanate towards its provinces.

The Setting

From 1838 to 1908 the Ottoman Empire underwent an intense phase of economic and socio-political transformation aimed at modernizing the old system. The trend to modernization continued along the lines established in 1839 well into Abdülhamid II’s reign. At the time of his ascent to the throne the attempts by the Tanzimat statements to fuse various ethnic and religious communities in Ottoman lands into one people (a nationalization project in a sense) had come to be deemed impractical by a majority of the Ottoman ruling elite. Instead, a re-emphasis on the Islamic foundation of the empire was advocated as a viable basis for social and political solidarity. Renewed concern for Islam combined with the desire to compensate for territorial losses directed the Sultan’s attention to the Arab provinces. Following this logic, he carried on with reforms, but unlike his predecessors he opposed the liberal and constitutional approaches. His reign was characterized by an autocratic administration and a return to Islamic ideas on the one hand, and a continuation of change and reform based on Western models on the other. The Sultan’s interest in his Arab subjects was, therefore, integral to his attempts to re-strengthen the Islamic foundation of the empire. He hoped to generate a viable basis of social support, considered essential for the survival of his empire. During Abdülhamid II’s reign, most of the Arab provinces began to be considered first-rank. Special attention was paid to the provinces in the Hijaz and Syria. A random list (certainly not exhaustive) of projects initiated by the Ottomans during his reign includes: development of the port of Beirut, construction of clock towers in several cities (Jaffa, Jerusalem, Haifa, and Tripoli, to name but a few), re-organization of the Transjordan area (e.g., Irbid, Jarash, Amman), establishment of the
Hijazi railway line, and the settlement of the Bedouin tribes in the vicinity of Gaza and the western part of the Negev.

The southern part of Syria (the Israeli Negev today) presented the Ottomans with difficult administrative problems. To begin with, it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that Ottoman rule resumed its authoritative place among the local tribes. Muhammad ‘Ali’s revolt and his intrusion into the area in the 1830s left its mark, contributing to instability in the region and the continued insubordination of the leaders of Bedouin tribes. Ongoing feuds, tribal rivalry, and outbursts of intertribal wars were a recurrent theme in the region during the second half of the nineteenth century. The Ottoman officials took measures to increase security and stability, among them the settlement of local tribes in the western Gaza region and the establishment of a police force stationed at fixed points in the area. Reorganization of the army, conscription of local people to official forces, the creation of a regional police force, in addition to improvements in the road and communication systems, were all part of a joint and serious effort to reduce the violence and instability so characteristic of this region prior to the 1900s. The Ottoman Empire began to extend and exercise its power through strengthening the infrastructure and utilizing various modern state agencies and mechanisms which, by consent or coercion, managed to check and organize the local nomadic population.

A leading factor in the growing instability of the region in the late nineteenth century was the British presence in Egypt after 1882. Ever since Muhammad ‘Ali’s revolt it was clear that special attention had to be paid to the border between the two opposing powers. The formation of an independent and British-oriented Egypt contributed to the volatility of southern Syria and the Hijaz, as so vividly demonstrated by the Aqaba crisis. Armed conflict with British forces along the Turko-Egyptian border was a realistic scenario and therefore had to be dealt with. To achieve and maintain supremacy over the British Empire along this border, the Ottomans had to control the Negev. This could not be done efficiently without the agreement and cooperation of the nomadic population. Hence the strategy adopted by the Ottomans which, like so many empires in the past, concentrated on disciplining the nomadic population in tandem with several administrative adjustments, such as separating the counties of Gaza and Hebron. Following the same logic, a new sub-district was created in the Jerusalem mutasarriflik and a new town was constructed to serve as its capital – Beersheba. The governor of the Beersheba sub-district was to be second-in-command only to the governor of Jerusalem.
Various suggestions have been made concerning the reasons for the construction of a new town, among them the need to discipline and control the Bedouins, combined with an understanding that a more efficient administrative apparatus was required. Before going into further detail regarding the plan of the new city and its urban components, let me briefly describe the geographical setting of the town and its environs.

Beersheba: Its Site and Location

The history of human occupancy of Beersheba goes back some 5,500 years. However, for most of this time the settlement was no more then a local meeting place, a seasonal market, or at best an agricultural settlement of meagre proportions. Apparently, after the Islamic conquest during the seventh century, Beersheba was deserted and later forgotten. Tellingly, during the Crusader period, in which Biblical sites were cultivated and commemorated, the common identification of Beersheba was at Bayt Jibrin, more than sixty km due north of the former Biblical-Byzantine site. Nevertheless, after nearly 1,250 years of decay, the Ottomans chose the site to serve as the capital of the new sub-district. A new town was constructed on an old site, an act best described as the re-making of Beersheba.

Four main geographical factors contributed to the location of the new town in the vicinity of the old site:

a. The relative abundance of water: The site is part of a low area within the Beersheba valley, where a substantial quantity of rainfall from the Hebron Basin is collected and retained. The water table is relatively high at this point (some 20-30m deep) and therefore suitable for digging wells. This is aptly demonstrated in the Biblical story of the quarrel between Abraham and Abimelech and their meeting by the well of the oath. Ben Arieh and Sapir are of the opinion that this was the crucial geographic factor for the site’s history as a place of rich human activity in this otherwise arid part of the Negev.

b. A junction of tribal territories: The wells of Beersheba became a border point for three tribes: The Tarabin, whose territory lies mostly west of Beersheba, the Azazme who were mainly located south of the future town, and the Tiyah, who roamed the area east and north of the town. Evidently, the existence of water and wells was an important factor in making the site a regional meeting point and a seasonal market for the surrounding tribes. The Muhammadin, a faction of the
Azazme confederation, were recognized as the legal owners of the wells and of the land of the future city.\textsuperscript{16}

c. A regional and local crossroads: Beersheba is located at an important crossroads. From the north, it is connected to Hebron; due west one may reach Gaza and the Mediterranean shore; due south it is on the road to Egypt and Sinai via Bir Asluj and Nitzana; and due east it is an important stop on the way to Transjordan and the Gulf of Aqaba.

d. Accessibility: Though located on a plain, due to the local geomorphologic conditions, the area is bisected and scarred by ravines, gorges, and valleys that delay transportation and prevent easy access. The site of Beersheba is located at a crossing point of Wadi al-Sab', the central stream (and major obstacle to movement) in the region.\textsuperscript{17} This is indeed a micro-scale factor, but highly important for local pre-modern transportation.

The existence of water, the local geopolitics, the high accessibility on both a local and regional scale, all led the Ottomans to choose the old deserted Byzantine settlement as the site for the administrative centre of the new sub-district (\textit{kada'}) in the Jerusalem \textit{mutasarfalik}.

The Establishment of the Town

According to local Bedouin tradition, the area of Beersheba was the site of a lingering feud between the Azazme and the Tarabin confederations during the late nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{18} To prevent the loss of the copious wells of Beersheba, Shaykh al-Maltaa, head of the Muhammadin faction of the Azazme confederation, appealed to the Ottoman authorities to intervene and protect his tribe and territory. Apparently, already in 1896 al-Maltaa pitched his tent at the site of the future Ottoman \textit{saraya} (government house).\textsuperscript{19} The first governor of Beersheba, Ismail Kemal Bey, is said to have used this tent as his office and meeting place with local chieftains until the first official building was completed. According to the same tradition, the Ottomans dug and regularly maintained twelve wells as early as 1898. In addition, they initiated the construction of a caravanserai in proximity to the wells. A local Bedouin tradition also narrates that the Ottoman officials initiated a feast and a meeting with prominent leaders in the tent of Shaykh al-Maltaa.\textsuperscript{20} There and then they received the blessing and consent of the shaykhs for the construction of the new town. So if we are to believe local narratives it was the nomadic population that initiated the first steps that eventually led to the construction of the new town. Be that as it may, it is rather doubtful that the Ottoman
authorities would be dragged willy-nilly into this costly project just because the local tribes so desired. That the Bedouins of the Negev ‘saw the light’, and came to the realization that what they needed to solve their problems was an administrative centre that would not only help the Ottoman officials control them but also pave the way to regular and easier tax collection and conscription into the Ottoman army, defies belief. The accepted narrative among Bedouins, namely that the construction of Beersheba (which ultimately meant their greater submission to the Sultan) was a local initiative, is a clear indication that the subordinate group fully adopted and acceded to the Ottoman hegemonic discourse. The skilful way in which the first governors of Beersheba managed to co-opt the Bedouin leaders seems to have contributed to this approach. Various tactics were applied to accomplish this goal. First, the leaders were incorporated into the municipal and regional councils. Maintenance of the Bedouin leaders’ support was accomplished by establishing good rapport with them and offering lucrative benefits such as special education for their sons at the hub of the empire, Istanbul.

The first governor of the new sub-district, Ismail Kemal Bey, was appointed on 7 April 1900. This date may be accepted as marking the establishment of the new town. During Kemal Bey’s short term in office not much was accomplished in respect of the new town project. The wells were regularly cleaned, and two new ones were dug, but save for constructing some tents for the qaymmaqam and his troops, little else was done. However, it should be noted that the important agencies characteristic of the central government were already present: a governor, a police force and the gendarmerie, and a qadi. The second governor, Muhammad Jar-Allah, appointed in 1901, should be regarded as the true constructor and consolidator of the town. During his term of office, the government purchased 2,000 dunums from the Muhammadin of the Azazme. This land was bestowed on the municipal council to be sold to anyone who wished to purchase portions of it. Special provisions were made to ensure the free gift of one dunum per family for every Bedouin (‘Arab’ in the minutes of the Ottoman council) who wanted to live in the city. A city plan was designed, the pattern of streets was established, and the first buildings were constructed, including a saraya and barracks for the troops. Jar-Allah founded two councils, one for the sub-district and another that functioned as a municipal council. To obtain full cooperation from the local population, leading Bedouin leaders were made members of both committees.
A new phase in the development of the town took place during the tenure of Asaf Bey as governor (qaymmâqâm) from 1904 to 1908. Asaf Bey initiated the construction of a town hall (later it became the qaymmâqâm’s residence), a flour mill, and a school. He also took measures to ensure a permanent water supply to the town. Asaf Bey was also responsible for installing a post office and a telegraph station. He initiated the establishment of the famous Bedouin market of Beersheba, which should be seen as a clear indication of the economic and commercial role assigned to the town by the Ottomans. The zenith of his endeavours was the construction of a monumental mosque. The minaret of this mosque was considered to be an architectural gem and struck awe among the locals.27

By the eve of the First World War Beersheba was a lively town, not just an arbitrary administrative whim of the Ottomans. It contained all that was needed for it to function as the administrative and economic centre of its sub-district. What seems to have captivated onlookers was the orderly fashion in which it was constructed, the abundance of water, and the fact that there was running water in every house, as well as the existence of gardens and fountains. Beersheba is described as a garden city in the desert and a prosperous commercial centre.28 Its function as a governmental instrument to educate and check the local nomadic population, the better to control the district, is usually omitted in these narrations. This more intangible feature of the town is dealt with next at length.

Town Plan and Components

According to local historian ‘Arif al-‘Arif, Beersheba was planned by two local Arab architects, Sa‘id and Raghib Nashashibi.29 As the original blueprint of the new town has never been found, we have to be content with maps, aerial photos, and the physical components of the Ottoman town still in place as our main sources for analysing the city plan.

City Plan – Re-Introducing the Grid Pattern

The site of the new town lay between an easy crossing point of Wadi al-Sab‘ and a small hill north-west of it. Evidently, the wells located in the wadi were the major factor determining the exact location. The plan followed a common enough feature of planned cities in the region, the grid pattern.30 Some ten longitudinal streets crossed at right angles by nine transverse streets served as the main framework of the
town. Thus, a network of sixty identical parcels measuring sixty by sixty meters (sixty square meters or four Turkish dunums) was formed. Each square (insulae as they were called in Roman town planning) was further divided into four equal parts. Therefore, the basic plot was equivalent to one Turkish dunum. The general width of a street was 15 meters. The main axis (i.e. the main street) connected the road from Gaza and the highest point of the slope to the area of the wells in the wadi. The road was twenty metres wide, hence the name commonly used at the time, 'Twenty Meters Road'.

Before we analyse the plan and its symbolic meaning, here is a brief description of the public buildings and institutions constructed by Ottoman officials.

**Public and administrative components**

1. **Government House (Saraya)** - the first and most important building to be constructed in Ottoman Beersheba. The building is located at the highest point of the town and is at odds with the street network. Unlike all other buildings it was deliberately constructed without regard to the grid plan and exceeded the building parcels. The building was two storeys tall with a red-tiled roof, which not only
commanded the entire town but also conveyed a clear message of what the dominant force was and where power was concentrated. The building cut an impressive and aesthetic figure in the town’s landscape. Its entrance faced north-west, which on one hand could be understood to contribute to better control of the main road coming from Gaza (see map of the governmental centre of town). On the other hand it could be interpreted as turning a blind eye to the rest of the town while maintaining a dialogue with the other government institutions (mainly the mosque and the governor’s house). This impression is enhanced when one looks at the saraya from the direction of the town and sees the wide blind side of the building and an impressive square and park (maydan). The building was constructed with finely carved and shaped stones; its broad windows and elaborate façade enriched the local landscape with a taste of contemporary European architecture, a common effect not only in the Ottoman capital but also in Jerusalem of the late nineteenth century. During its first years the building housed the governor’s office, the police station, the court, and later the tribal court. Thus, it served as the most concentrated and meaningful icon and symbol of the sultanate and sultan in the Beersheba landscape.

2. The governor’s house: constructed opposite the saraya, it was originally designated to serve as the town hall. An impressive two-storey building, it was also roofed with red tiles, which became the mark of most of the official buildings in town.

3. The Mosque: built next to and west of the governor’s house. Again, one finds that the building is not congruent with the street pattern. Built at an angle to the grid pattern, what dictated the layout and direction of the building was apparently the need to locate the qibla wall in its traditional way facing Mecca. However, this deviation could apparently have been easily overcome if the architect wanted to convey the message that the building was part and parcel of the entire town. As it is, the building is yet another symbol of the Sultan’s intrusion and the constant presence of Sultanic agencies in the new town. The building bears the sultan’s monogram (tugra) on its ornamented entrance. Some of its features hark back to Mamluk architecture, as suggested by the conic dome. Other features, like the inner courtyard, are borrowed from classic Ottoman mosque styles in Istanbul. The main windows are horseshoe shaped, as found in another quotidian example, the Hasan Bey mosque in Jaffa, and commonly found in interior decorations of houses in nineteenth-century Istanbul as well. The minaret is a highly conspicuous edifice of fine craftsmanship, which became the sign of the new town and the omnipresence of the
sultan and his regime in the region shortly after its construction. The building materials came mostly from the ruins of Halisa, a nearby Byzantine site. The building’s symbolic message was clear enough to the local population, which regarded it as an architectonic achievement and admired its highly advanced building craftsmanship.\(^4\), \(^5\), \(^6\).

4, 5, 6. Police station, post office, and telegraph station: these three buildings represent three more agencies of the Ottoman sultanate and were aptly built behind the saraya. Architecturally, the buildings are rather plain, functional constructions. However, they add stature to the governmental and Sultanic acropolis of Beersheba.

7. Government school: another fine two-storey building constructed in the same fashion as the government house that preceded it. The building is roofed with red tiles and has large windows on all four sides. The entrance, facing the main street, is accentuated by three arches protruding about two metre from the building’s façade. The school shares its Liwan structure with the two other principal official buildings (the saraya and town hall), that is, it has a central hall from which doors open to the classrooms on both sides.\(^7\)

8. Jamal Pasha park: apparently, from the early days of the town, attention was paid to parks, tree planting and channelling water to residential houses and public facilities. The main park is to be found juxtaposed to the saraya, and opposite the governor’s house. Initial work began in 1901.\(^8\) By the First World War it was already a rather impressive park, especially considering this arid region. It was then named after the Ottoman governor of Syria, who oversaw the area at the time.

On 29 October 1915 another symbol of Ottoman power reached and literally entered Beersheba: the railway line. It was part of the Egyptian section of the Hijaz railway. A train fully decorated with Ottoman signs and flags and with many dignitaries (including Jamal Pasha) on board, entered Beersheba for the inauguration ceremony. The train station was located less than two hundred metres from the other governmental buildings of the town, thus enhancing Ottoman control and presence in the landscape. The railway station was to be the last edifice constructed by the Ottomans in Beersheba; the town surrendered to British forces towards the end of the war.

**Analysis of Town Plan and Landscape**

Modern Beersheba was designed in accordance with a well-established planning school and a familiar pattern of the classical world, the grid
pattern. The Ottomans introduced, or more precisely re-introduced, a formula that had served many former regimes and authoritarian powers. Beersheba is not a singular example of the use of such a plan for new towns and suburbs in the Ottoman Empire at that time. What seems to be exceptional is that the town was truly and solely the result of Ottoman initiative and concerted effort. By a quirk of history, Beersheba shares many features with the only other city in the area built by a Muslim regime until then: the Umayyad al-Ramla. Like its younger sister, al-Ramla was constructed as a regional centre and capital, and planned in the classical Roman style, a somewhat similar though more advanced pattern than the basic grid used by the Ottomans.37

One may ask why the grid pattern rather than other possible patterns then in use throughout the Ottoman Empire was utilized. The simple and rather blunt answer would be that no other plans existed. Cities in the region developed organically. They were notoriously named ‘traditional’ Middle Eastern cities or, in Orientalist jargon, Islamic cities, a common euphemism for run-down, dilapidated, and mostly chaotic cities with maze-like street patterns and ethnic and religious segregation.38 Like many other colonial or centralized powers in the past, the Ottomans exploited the most concise and compact plan in order to arrange the city in a logical and efficient manner and to convey a clear message regarding the identity and nature of the hegemonic power. In the Roman colonies, Umayyad new towns (al-Ramla, Anjar), and Fatimid Cairo; in new Spanish settlements in South America and British Rangoon, Mombassa, or New Delhi, to name but a few examples, the grid was often selected by empires or other centralized regimes when they set about constructing new centres of power. Gradus supplies us with the main reasons that dictated Ottoman planning policy in Beersheba.39

1. Simplicity of planning and execution of the plan.
2. Dependence of the local population on the central government.
3. Enhanced control and supervision of the urban space.
4. Establishment of physical and economic infrastructure for future Ottoman army bases.

As noted, the implementation of an allegedly Western, modern grid plan was ironically nothing more than the re-introduction of a well-known urban plan of the classical world. The novelty, if there was one, of the Ottomans’ use of this plan was the prevailing discourse among the Ottoman elite concerning their perception of what actually constituted a city and what it should consist of. Ottoman officials saw
fit to plan Beersheba as a ‘modern’ town along the lines of the re-emerging grid and contemporary European notions of the garden city.\(^{40}\) Thus, a grid was superimposed on the slopes of the hill facing Wadi al-Sab’. All the government and most important public buildings were constructed at its highest point. Together, these buildings constituted a governmental enclave within the town or, to borrow another classical device, an acropolis. The enclave was separated from the rest of the town not by actual walls and gates, but by a landscape that conveyed a clear message of authority, religious piety, and, to a certain extent, separation from the rest of the town.

Landscape, particularly the landscape of a built-up environment, is never just there, or a thing to be reified, quantified, or better yet, understood completely. Such a landscape is complex and multifaceted, the work of people and societies. Therefore, it is invested with significance, desires, cultural attributes, and political agendas. Landscape is a system that societies utilize to represent themselves and to ensure social production in accordance with their needs and ideologies.\(^{41}\) One should realize that full understanding of a landscape cannot be achieved by simply looking at and experiencing it. Reading the landscape is always a hermeneutic endeavour. Fully understanding and interpreting the works, aims, and ideologies of others, as manifested in this complicated and (usually) elusive concept, is not always possible. Notwithstanding this caveat, I will analyse the symbols and meanings invested by the Ottomans in Beersheba as the new town landscape unfolded.

At the outset, it is important to remember that the entire project of the new town was an Ottoman one. The establishment of the town met their geopolitical needs and was the outcome of the sultan’s policy better to consolidate the empire.\(^{42}\) This rationale set the tone for the entire project as one imposed on the area and not an organic growth or a voluntary act. The intervention of an external and hegemonic power may be deduced from the exploitation of the grid system. A grid cannot be fully implemented unless a central power is involved and the land parcels are state-owned. Hence, like other authoritarian powers, the Ottomans enforced and dictated the plan in complete disregard of the population’s needs and of local topography.\(^{43}\) The very nature of the plan is one of rigidity that ignores all aspects and needs except those of the hegemonic power. As part of the Sultan’s efforts to subjugate nomadic forces and consolidate the empire, the Ottomans were intent on bringing the Bedouins closer to the urban lifestyle. To lure the Bedouins into town, they were offered land parcels at
extremely low cost. The ramifications of these acts were, among others, the settling of the Bedouins of the Beersheba region. The shape of the new town, its very landscape, must be seen as a vivid indication and manifestation of the needs, wills, and perceptions of the ruling power.

An aerial photo of Beersheba in 1918 clearly conveys the extent to which the grid was fully and minutely executed throughout the new town.\textsuperscript{44}

The few discrepancies are to be found within the governmental enclave, as noted above. The \textit{saraya} was purposely constructed on the main road in such a way that it forced incoming transportation to
The mosque was built at an angle to the rest of the town buildings; those adjacent to the saraya (police station, post office, and telegraph station) did not conform to the road system. These features seem to indicate that the town planners made an effort to differentiate between the governmental enclave and the rest of the town. This impression is reinforced when the plan, style, and material of the governmental buildings are considered. The four most important buildings in the city – the saraya, mosque, governor's house, and school – were built by the Ottoman governors and were conspicuously different from the rest of the town's buildings. The differences were not only the common ones distinguishing private-vernacular architecture from the design of public buildings; in this case, a clash of styles is evident. Private houses were usually built in local-traditional style, while the public buildings were built according to the styles and fashions that were common in the Ottoman centres such as Istanbul and Jerusalem. They were constructed from the finest materials available, and according to the Liwan house design (except for the mosque), considered the latest and most advanced fashion of the time. The use of red tiles instead of the local flat roof and the incorporation of wide square windows are but two examples of the imported and foreign style in which these buildings were constructed. As in late nineteenth-century Jerusalem, these buildings are the messengers, indeed the ambassadors, of the cultural changes that were engulfing the empire at the time. They reflect their builders' cognition, demonstrating what was considered advanced, fashionable, and worthy of imitation and cultural assimilation. Set against the local background, these buildings carry a true sense of novelty and a distinct taste for modern, cosmopolitan views, that is, for European visions. In fact, the buildings are a tangible manifestation of the typically Ottoman blend of reforms (Tanzimat), namely of a desire to move forward (or at least closer to Europe) and the realization that ties with the traditional past could not be entirely severed. The very use of the Liwan type of building is a typical outcome of these trends and of the ongoing conflict between aspirations to modernity (or to what was considered modern) and the lingering taste for past traditions. The Liwan reflects conformity with the Islamic code of practices on the one hand, and the use of modern and European materials and styles on the other. Moreover, the use of the Liwan type for the secular buildings is indeed a true sign of modernism, while the mosque clearly represents the notion of historicism so common to the nineteenth century. That is, the past was drawn upon and traditional concepts and styles were used
in contemporary buildings. The plan of the mosque and the style of its inner and external decorations demonstrate this historical, traditional school of architecture.

By creating the landscape according to their own choosing, the Ottoman authorities were actually engaging in transforming the consciousness of the local nomadic population regarding the empire and its hegemonic power and abilities. Authoritarian messages (again somewhat alienating) were encoded in the town’s landscape. However, the local population evidently absorbed, adored, and wilfully accepted them. This fact in itself need not change the way we read the landscape, but rather correlates with the way hegemonic power actually works. The nature of hegemony is such that if the dominant bloc is successful, the social order, and in this case the new geographical order, appears as common sense to the ordinary majority of people. Nonetheless, hegemony is never fully accepted and is always a dialogue of coercion and consent between the dominant and subordinate parts of society. As argued by Gramsci, this combination of consensus and force indicates both dominating power and consensual persuasion. 49 The analysis of the Beersheba landscape presents the Ottomans as a colonial force that usually managed to obtain the consent and willing subjugation of the nomads. The nature of this colonialism, indeed eastern imperialism, the connection between core and periphery (i.e., Istanbul and Beersheba), and the ways hegemony worked in the creation of Beersheba will end our discussion.

City and Empire or Empire in the City

The minutes of the state council in Istanbul highlight two main reasons for the establishment of the new town and sub-district. The first was to direct the Arabs to the path of civilization and the second to lure them into settling in the region. 50 Clearly, the external political reasons for this project were not omitted; but they are immaterial to this discussion. The attitude of the Ottomans to the Arabs and particularly to the nomadic tribes was one of suspicion and mistrust. The Ottomans perceived the nomads as ignorant and uncivilized. To be changed, moulded, and modified in accordance with the Sultan’s plans, the Bedouins had to be settled on the land so as to cultivate it. 51 The following quotations from a speech of the governor of Jerusalem, Ekrem Bey, to the Bedouin leaders of the Beersheba region in 1908 reflect how these aims were set in motion and how they were actuated
in daily life. They also reflect the ways hegemony works by using both consent and coercion.

Arab elders and citizens! … Listen to me; I am your governor, your father, your brother… The Lord has revealed himself to you through his blessings, compassion, and favours. And why? Because you are perfect and the light of Islam shines on your foreheads… you are happy because the Lord has granted you to live in this climate… and your land is vast… and with the most minute effort you may cultivate blessed wheat that will suffice not just for you alone but for Jerusalem and the entire population of Syria… and you are happy, and why? Because you are living under the mercies and grace of his highness our lord… king of the believers and head of the Muslims… Listen to me, elders of the Arabs… I am here to explain to you the new orders of Beersheba and with it the grants and favours that you have gained… A big school for the study of agriculture is about to be built in Beersheba, because although you are hardworking people your lack of knowledge of land cultivation will render your efforts to work your land impossible… And in this school, your children will learn sowing and harvesting… There your children will learn to read the holy book of the Qur'an and the law of the shar'ia and how to worship our Lord…. Indeed, I will erect in Beersheba a clock and a tower so you will know the time for prayer and for work…. Further, you will learn how to present the signs of your slavery to the stool of our Sultan’s feet because he was kind to you…. Elders and Arabs, you are all farmers and the work of the land is in your nature…. and our lord the sultan has ordered that you be shown his grace and that you be dressed in these fine garments… and our lord and sultan has ordered me to present you each with the Qur’an… and kiss this holy book with a holy feeling coming from the bottom of your hearts and pray with a blessed intention, from a pure Bedouin heart, for the well-being of our lord the sultan.

Ekrem Bey’s speech is twofold in nature. He explains how the sultan has agreed to bestow his kindness and wealth upon the region; but at the same time he makes it crystal clear that nothing is acceptable other than total submission to the sultan. True to form, Ekrem Bey works within the concepts the empire wishes to promote, namely centralizing
the state’s authority. This is achieved by ‘solving’ the nomadic problem, and through the promotion of the sultan’s role as the traditional caliph, that is, both head of state and the most important religious figure. He tries to win his listeners’ support by appealing to their common sense and making them realize where their true interests lie. However, he does not conceal from his audience that they are servants, indeed slaves, of the sultan, and should act accordingly. What is somewhat obscured in his speech is plainly evident in one of Ekrem Bey’s letters to the secretariat in Istanbul. In this letter he addresses the issue of the settlement of the Bedouins in the Beersheba region. He recalls that the area was considered a desert and the population savages until the reign of Abdülhamid II. The sub-district and the town were constructed, as he depicts it, under the direct order of the sultan. It is apparent, says Ekrem Bey, that the Bedouins must be detached from their nomadic lifestyle. However, he assures the secretary that because of their natural wisdom they will come to appreciate the advantages of the civilized world as against their current situation. Ekrem Bey recommends, and this is the main issue of this letter, that the settlement of the Bedouins be accompanied by registration of the land and official acknowledgement of ownership. ‘In my last discussions with the shaykhs’, writes Ekrem Bey, ‘I tried to persuade them that the forthcoming land registration will be of great benefit to them. I have given them ample reasons, but so far they have declined to register their land. It would seem that they are afraid of it, as they feel it would increase the amount of taxes they would have to pay, and lead to mandatory recruitment.’ The letter’s closing paragraphs offer advice on how to go through the process that will ultimately transform the nomads into farmers, city dwellers, and taxpayers.

Ekrem Bey’s attitude towards the nomads, though highly empathic is clearly that of a true agent of the sultan. He believes that the empire is within its rights when it forcibly attempts to change the nomads’ way of life and radically alters their cultural, political, and economic life. Moreover, he is convinced that by this the nomads truly benefit, as they are brought into the sphere of true and modern civilization as a result of the benevolent acts of the empire and the sultan. His conduct towards the nomads and the centre in Istanbul sheds light on how hegemonic discourse progresses and establishes itself, in this case through promised benefits and concealed sanctions.

The following picture, which was taken in Beersheba in 1907, shows Ekrem Bey awarding a medal of honour to Shaykh Ibn Salama of the
Azazme. The setting is the central square of the town, that formed between the governor’s house and the big mosque, creating a certain geography of power and domination that sets the tone for the meeting. That is, the meeting takes place in the sultan’s realm and under conditions dictated by the hegemonic government. The two personalities face each other, illustrating the relations between the empire and the nomads. Ekrem Bey is formally dressed in his Western-style official uniform, while Shaykh Ibn Salama is clad in his traditional garments. Ekrem Bey puts his white-gloved hands upon Ibn Salama in a paternal and domineering fashion. His face is apparently full of glee and contentment at the occasion, while the shaykh seems to accept the scene in which he finds himself in a quiet and subdued manner, as if saying, ‘I will play along just because there is nothing much else I can do’. Even if my last comment can be contested for lack of sufficient evidence, the location of the scene and the event itself are signs of the dominant-versus-subordinate nature of the meeting. On the one hand, the agent of the empire stands in the precincts of the new landscape (indeed reality) that he and other agents and agencies have created on former Bedouin land; on the other hand, the shaykh stands as the embodiment of the old traditional ways that are about to become
extinct.

Put bluntly, the picture is a true representation of the power relations between the empire and the nomadic populations in the provinces. This scene reveals the nature and aspirations of Ottoman imperialism. As suggested by Makdisi, it was a set of imperial practices and discourses, premised on the need forcibly to induct recalcitrant populations living on the periphery of the empire, into an age of modernity. The will of Ottoman reformers to reshape and discipline the Arab provinces was then an integral part of the imperial project of renewal and modernization. The vision of modernity held by the Ottoman elite and reformers followed the model of contemporary European powers. Europe represented the peak of modernity, whose tangible manifestations were advanced technologies and well-organized cities. This was indeed the case of Istanbul during the nineteenth century. The efforts to re-plan, rejuvenate, and embellish the city followed European planning principles and contemporary theoretical debates. In the Istanbul town plan these all may be summed up under regularization and transportation. Thus, the new plans for the development of the city mainly dealt with imposing the grid where possible, and creating modern arteries adapted to the new types of transportation arriving in the city. These newly adopted concepts were fully implemented in Beersheba’s streetscape. There, as in Istanbul, the main street was relatively wide compared with the secondary arteries. The most conspicuous town element was indeed the Twenty Metres Road, clearly echoing the Byzantine messe in the old city of Istanbul during the second half of the nineteenth century. In the re-making of Beersheba, the use of a grid pattern and the construction of official modern buildings were all the direct influence of the winds of modernity that had reached the centre of the empire (from Europe) and blew easterly towards the Arab provinces. I concur with Hansen, Philip and Weber that we are dealing here with a type of Ottoman imperialism that had no colonies, but that generated, in certain places and at certain times, colonial situations.

Conclusion

The hegemonic Ottoman approach extended well beyond the physical manipulation of space, namely the creation of Beersheba. It was indeed a case of space and mind being altered through micro and macro planning. The intrusion into the nomadic way of life through the creation of Beersheba was a concerted effort by several agents of the
empire. By analysing the town’s physical and symbolic landscape, this paper has identified the means and tactics through which hegemony worked in order to change and manipulate the perceptions and ways of life of the empire’s subjects. As already put forward by Lewis Mumford, the mind takes form in the city and in turn the urban form conditions the mind.62 This manipulation of the Bedouin’s mind through the construction of a specific landscape, followed by all the authoritative agencies of the realm, is one of the most important reasons for the entire Beersheba project. The establishment of Beersheba demonstrated manipulation in action and how hegemony in its Gramscian fashion works: moving and operating between coercion and consent, between granting favours and sanctioning the subordinate in a continuing and complex process. The Ottomans, as the hegemonic power, implemented their notions of modernity in the provinces in what I termed a project of imperialism. The very nature of this imperialism, as discussed here, was the creation, sometimes without the existence of colonies, of a colonial situation. In this case, the empire, through its agents, brought the savage, the unruly, and the undisciplined under its wing by altering the landscape and re-structuring the local population’s economy. Thus, the reshaping, indeed the re-making of Beersheba, and the guiding of the Bedouins onto the path of civilization, harmonize with Deringil’s notion of the ‘Ottoman self-portrait’; the very same portrait that in the Chicago 1893 World Fair depicts the Arab, as inferior and backward.63

Notes
7 Engin D. Akarlı, ‘Abdüllahim II’s Attempts to Integrate Arabs into the Ottoman System’, in Kushner: Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period, p. 77.


Genesis, chapter 26. Oath (in Hebrew) – shevu’a, might be the etymological origin for the place name Be’er Sheva’, Well of Oath.


Al-‘Arif: Tarikh B’ir al-Sab’, p. 31.


Galper: ‘Beersheba and the Bedouins’, p. 270; Ben Arieh and Sapir: ‘Beginning of Beersheba’, p. 57. This may well be a typical case of the invention of a local tradition that helped in building up the role of the Bedouin population as the initiators of the new town.


‘Arif al-‘Arif, one of the reliable sources for the history of modern Beersheba and once mayor of the town, clearly assigns the whole project, as well as its initial steps, solely to the Ottoman officials; al-‘Arif: Tarikh B’ir al-Sab’, p. 234.

al-‘Arif: Tarikh B’ir al-Sab’, p. 236.


There seems to be a discrepancy in al-‘Arif’s memoirs, as he distinctly narrates that 1,000 dunums were already purchased in 1900 and given to the municipal council to be freely distributed to the local population. Still, according to him, later on during Jar-Allah’s term of office, 2,000 dunums more were bought from the Bedouins. As the council was only established during the second governor’s tenure, it would have been difficult to allocate any land through this non-existent agency; al-‘Arif: Tarikh B’ir al-Sab’, p. 235. Furthermore, the future plans of the town would have been hindered if the land turned out to be already owned privately. I follow the description of the town’s construction of Galper and Sanar-Gönen.

This is echoed in the letter of Ekrem ‘Ali Bey (quoted above in note 1) addressed to the Sublime Porte and referring to the religious role of Beersheba.


Al-‘Arif: *Tarikh B’ir al-Sab’, p. 235. Berman suggests, and others often repeat, that two European architects, a Swiss and a German, assisted in formulating the plan. Berman: ‘Evolution of Beersheba’, p. 315. See also, Hila Tal, *The Planning and Development of Beersheba, 1900-1965*, (unpublished MA thesis, Ben Gurion University, Beersheba, 1978), p. 21n. 1, in which she stresses that the German architects were dominant in the planning. I wish to thank her for supplying me with a copy of her work.

Early examples of the grid pattern are some 4,000 years old; see Anthony Edwin James Morris, *History of Urban Form before the Industrial Revolution* (Harlow, Essex, 1994), pp. 15ff.


Building numbers in this section correspond to the numbers on the map of the centre of the city. See map no. 1.


For the notion of a garden city in its European context see, Ebenezer Howard, *Garden Cities of To-morrow* (Cambridge, MA, 1965).


The plan is definitely incongruent with local topography - a slope facing the main stream in the area. See, Gradus and Stern: *Beersheba*, pp. 180-1.

This photo was taken by British forces during the First World War. This copy was obtained through the courtesy of the David Toviyau Archives of the Negev.

46 This is a theme often dealt with by Çelik: *The Remaking of Istanbul*.


48 I wish to thank Dr. Ron Fuchs for discussing these issues with me. I am also indebted to him for referring me to Yenisehirlioglu’s paper.


50 Sanar Gönen: ‘Ottoman Beer Sheva’, p. 22.

51 Rogan: ‘Asiret Mektebi’, p. 84.

52 Excerpts from Ekrem Bey’s speech, translated from Kushner: *A Governor in Jerusalem*, pp. 240-3.


54 Kushner: *A Governor in Jerusalem*, p. 111.

55 Courtesy of the David Toviyahu archives, Ben Gurion University.

56 This scene is not altogether different from other colonialists’ encounters with the colonized people, for example, European settlers and the indigenous people in the Americas.


59 Çelik: *The Remaking of Istanbul*, pp. 49-81. In this chapter, Çelik discusses mainly development plans following the key terms of regularization.

60 See for example Von Moltke’s plan of 1839, where he suggests four wide main routes crossing the old city, in Çelik: *The Remaking of Istanbul*, pp. 104-7.

61 Hanssen et al.: *The Empire in the City*, pp. 8-9.


The Young Turks, rulers of the Ottoman Empire on the eve of the First World War, decided somewhat hesitantly and haphazardly to join the Axis powers. Considerable Ottoman territories were already under the control of the Allies: all of North Africa had been lost to the French and Italians; Egypt was under the firm rule of the British, who also controlled a number of footholds in the Red Sea and Gulf regions; France had nursed imperial ambitions towards Lebanon and Syria for two generations. The hope of the Young Turks had been to re-establish control over these lost territories, while the Allies assumed from the beginning of the war that the Germans would be defeated, bringing about the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Already in 1915 they began to develop various schemes and agreements as to how to divide the empire among themselves, once it was defeated. The importance of the Middle East during the First World War lay in its strategic position and as a staging ground for military operations, always tying up large numbers of enemy troops in the region. However, apart from an initial, intensive but unsuccessful assault by the British on the Dardanelles, the Eastern Mediterranean regions experienced only rather sporadic warfare, limited in its location and duration. Desperate trench warfare, murderous artillery bombardments, nerve gas attacks, hundreds of thousands of dead and injured soldiers, all characteristic of the war in Europe, did not define the war in the Middle East. Secondary manifestations of war, such as famine in Syria, forced labour in Egypt, and the deportation and the killing of civil populations in Anatolia played a greater role in the experience of the society than did actual fighting.

Still, the impact of the war in changing the political and social order was as profound in the Middle East as it was in Europe. Four centuries of Ottoman political order were coming to an end. New (and old) elites had to find new ways to legitimate their political power. Loyalties
and identities had to be reconstructed or rather, newly invented. Although the societies of the Eastern Mediterranean were not exposed to the destructive forces of war as European societies were, it soon became obvious to them that the long-lasting political order and social organization of the region as they knew it were approaching a violent end. The termination of a historical period was as profoundly felt by the Arab intellectuals as by their German, French, and English counterparts.

While the intellectual in general has a wide variety of ways to express himself or herself – letters, diaries, novels, newspapers, and memoirs are the typical modes of articulating opinions and insights – for the Arab intellectuals of the time it was the press, particularly the monthly magazine, which was the most important and popular vehicle for intellectual discourse. Most of the intellectuals had founded, written for, edited, owned, or gone bankrupt with magazines at one time or another in their lives. A few magazines acquired greater permanence and had a lasting impact on the Arab renaissance (nahda).

In this article, I aim to trace and analyse the role that was ascribed to the First World War, and the evolution of the awareness of the profound changes it was causing, by examining relevant articles in three journals: al-Hilal, al-Muqtataf, and al-Manar. These were the most important and stable journals written in Arabic at the time. All were published in Egypt, and continued to appear throughout the war, while comparable magazines in Syria such as al-Mashriq and al-'Irfan were shut down for the duration of hostilities.¹

Typical of the Egyptian press of the period, all three magazines were published and owned by Syro-Lebanese immigrants. This circumstance also explains why the discussions about the war were never limited to its impact on Egypt. The fate of the Arab East, especially Syria, and of the Ottoman Empire in its entirety was of greatest interest to the owners of the journals and the contributors. All the magazines served an ever-widening readership as encyclopedic sources of information on Europe, their own history, modern science, and so on. Nonetheless, together with the great similarities among these three journals, some clear differences can also be recognized. Al-Muqtataf, established in 1876 by two Christian Beirutis, Ya'qub Sarruf and Faris Nimr, was the most enthusiastic in accepting modern Europe as a model for Arab society; it was also uninhibitedly pro-British.² Al-Hilal, established in 1892 under the editorship of Jurji Zaydan, also from Beirut, was similarly supportive of the ideas of modern civilization. The journal’s sympathies for Great Britain, though, were much lower-key; a genuine
concern for the fate of the Ottoman Empire, in particular its Syrian provinces, was apparent. The only one of the three journals that was owned and published by a Muslim was Rashid Rida’s *al-Manar*, established in 1897. Rida, a native of Tripoli, was as preoccupied as the others were with the dominant role of modern Europe, but his systematic attempt to formulate a modernist, viable version of Islam helped him maintain a critical distance and often an original perspective on events in Europe.

Reading the materials pertaining to the First World War in these journals, three major questions very quickly present themselves: First, whose side were they on? As a German in the Middle East, my personal experience in the early 1960s was that one encountered friendship for all the wrong reasons, as we felt then; such friendships seemed to be based on the old saying ‘My enemy’s enemy is my friend’. Was the mood similar during the First World War? The second question is what were the views concerning the impact that the First World War would have on developments in the Middle East? And third, what were the views of Europe as the force of progress? Did the First World War damage this image, so cherished in the pre-war period?

**The Arabs’ Allies**

The answer to the first question - whose side they were on - is simple and complex at the same time. The Europeans were not the enemy. At least at the beginning of the war the fervent belief in progress and in the general improvement of mankind was as unshakeable as the assumption that Europe was the bearer of this progress. That one should, to a large degree, emulate the Europeans, was a consensus shared even by Rashid Rida, the editor of *al-Manar*, though he would put a very different emphasis on this concept than would Emile Zaydan of *al-Hilal* or Ya'qub Sarruf and Faris Nimr of *al-Muqtataf*.

Familiarity with the different European nations, though, varied greatly. Such familiarity depended on exposure to them: the European countries’ physical and political presence, as well as their missionary activities and educational efforts in the Middle East. The advantage here lay with the French and the British, while Russian and German cultures and societies were only dimly perceived. It might therefore not come as a surprise to find that a journal like *al-Muqtataf* took a passionately pro-British stand. After all, Nimr and Sarruf had studied at the Syrian Protestant College, later the American University of
Beirut, spoke English, and were known Anglophiles. Almost from the outbreak of the war the discussion in *al-Muqtataf* regarding who was to be blamed for starting the war pointed to the Germans: their militarism, their despotic government, their international lawlessness all helped argue the case. The outrage at the ‘Rape of Belgium’ by the Germans fills pages in *al-Muqtataf*.

And yet, the whole discussion has a somewhat unreal aura. When I first came across the term ‘ahl al-tutun’ or ‘jins al-tutun’ on these pages, I thought fleetingly of enthusiasts of tobacco smoking. What was meant, of course, was the ‘Teutonic race’. This terminology, in a sense, is a give-away. We are not dealing here with an indigenous discussion of the war by Arab intellectuals. The ‘Teutonic race’ was not a thought or concept of the Arab *nahda*. Rather, the pages of *al-Muqtataf* and *al-Hilal* were made available to articles and speeches first published for the European press, and later translated into Arabic and published in the above magazines. Given the editors’ language knowledge and educational background, that meant turning to the Anglo-American press and therewith also adopting anti-German terminology. The editors did what they always considered to be one of their major tasks: they reproduced or summarized European developments and ideas in Arabic for the Arab reader. Thus, the journals were a major vehicle for the popularization of European thought.

The sources for this material were – again because of language knowledge – journals in English: *The American Scientific Journal, Popular Science, Strand Magazine, London Magazine, London Times* and *The Nineteenth Century (and After)*. The last mentioned was certainly the most quoted and translated. Typically, authors and journals were indicated when direct translations were published, but often extensive summaries were provided without such indications. This was true not only of the endless reports on technological innovations that the war produced or of the statistics on the armament, manpower, etc. of the various warring factions; it also held for the political discussions of the war. However, it was really the discussion as conducted in the British and American press that was reproduced in *al-Muqtataf* and *al-Hilal*. No doubt the admiration for all things English was considerable, but as the alien terminology of ‘jins al-tutun’ shows, this was not really a discussion by Arab intellectuals.

*Al-Manar* also relied on the foreign press for all aspects related to the war, as did *al-Hilal* and *al-Muqtataf*. To my knowledge, however, Rashid Rida did not know English, which would explain why he usually quoted from Arabic translations of foreign articles published in *al-
Ahram, al-Muqattam, al-Muqtataf and their like. But Rida also displayed a more independent and sophisticated argumentation on the pages of al-Manar. He dealt much more openly than did his colleagues with the consequences of the war for the people in the Middle East. During the war years the question of loyalty to the Ottoman Empire became one of almost personal importance to him as a Muslim and an Arab. His view of the French and the British was much more critical, recognizing their own imperialist ambitions; hence he retained a lingering sense that the Ottoman Empire was the last bulwark against such ambitions and therefore should be supported. However, as the war progressed it became clear to him that the Ottoman Empire was, against its own will, hostage to the Young Turks who in turn were in the thrall of the German imperialists. In their imperialist designs, the Germans did not differ from the other European powers and had to be resisted just as their allies, the Young Turks, had to be. For instance, Rashid Rida attacked in great detail the German plan of the Baghdad railway and the concomitant demand for a swath of land twenty km wide along the line of the railway.

How delicate the question of loyalty to the Ottoman Empire was for the Syrian émigrés in British-occupied Egypt is illustrated first and foremost by its near absence from the pages of the Egyptian press, which limited itself to rather oblique references to the subject. For example, al-Hilal reacted to the terrible state of the Armenian refugees who arrived in Port Said in 1915 in the typical way by giving the historical background to the persecution. But the paper added, “We will not touch upon today’s situation, which is incomparably worse than what happened before. Let history remove the veil from the events which Germany (emphasis mine) and its allies would rather keep in a dark corner”. What is remarkable is the ease with which Germany is blamed, and the unwillingness to directly accuse and name the main protagonist in this tragedy.

The Impact of the War on the Middle East

The question of loyalty to the Ottoman Empire was part of the more general question of the impact that this war would have on the Middle East and its political formation. Again, al-Muqtataf distinguished itself by avoiding the question. Following the Anglo-Saxon lead, the editors opined fairly early that Germany would lose the war. That the Ottomans had joined the Germans was noted with some regret, but the obvious question, ‘What will happen to the Ottoman Empire if
Germany loses the war? was never posed. *Al-Hilal*, somewhat less acerbic about the Germans, made a reasonable argument about why Germany and the Ottoman Empire had become partners.\(^{13}\) Commenting on the British declaration of a protectorate over Egypt, Emile Zaydan, son and successor of Jurji as editor of *Al-Hilal*, explained that the Ottoman Empire would lose ever more parts of its territory because it was in the iron grip of the Germans.\(^{14}\)

The discussion of the future of the Ottoman Arab provinces\(^{15}\) began in earnest with the declaration of independence by Sharif Husayn in the Hijaz in the summer of 1916. Already in connection with the Armenian tragedy, *Al-Hilal* had spoken of the ‘liver-crushing oppression by the Turks’ (*zulm al-atrak yufattitu al-kibd*). Now that the Sharif of Mecca had thrown off the ‘yoke of the Turks’,\(^{16}\) *Al-Hilal* goes on to explain that the Bedouins had always been courageous fighters who constantly harboured a strong desire for independence and freedom (*istiqlal wa-hurriyya*).

However, it quickly became evident that the concern of *Al-Hilal*, like that of *Al-Manar*, was with the fate of Syria, *Bilad al-Sham*, not of the Hijaz. The first reports on starvation in Syria were published in the fall of 1916. From December 1916 until July 1917 a history of the ‘Ottoman Rule in Lebanon and Syria’ was serialized. The series is interesting since it presents perfectly one of the basic myths of Arab nationalism. That is, the all-determining myth that four-hundred years of Ottoman rule meant four-hundred years of Turkish oppression of the Arabs. This period was deemed the nadir of Arab history, one which should be forgotten rather than remembered. A deleterious effect on modern Arab historiography resulted; historians writing of Arab history flatly refused to deal with this era. Even in the 1970s, four centuries of Ottoman rule were considered to be irrelevant to national Arab historiography: ‘without either differentiation or specification, nearly four hundred years are lumped together quite indiscriminately as a period of decay (*inhitat*) and therefore not worthy of serious historical consideration.’\(^{17}\) Only thanks to the work of scholars like Butrus Abu-Manneh during the last generation has this situation changed and the Ottoman period become a legitimate topic of research for Arab historians.

The myth of Ottoman rule, which was invented with the collapse of the empire, equated French and British colonialism to Ottoman rule over the Arabs. The Ottoman period became a continuation of the Mamluk rule of oppression, humiliation, and impoverishment. According to the myth, initially the Ottomans tried to do better but it
was simply not in their character, and Syria quickly sank back into despotism. As al-Hilal puts it: ‘Looking at the history of Bilad al-Sham at this time is like looking at the earliest history of mankind. The Turks have degraded and plundered the country’. The anonymous author continued that the Syrians had deep down always maintained a drive for independence, which reasserted itself under Ottoman occupation on a local level of autonomy. (Here the author dealt only with Lebanon). Now, in July 1917, the real fear, in his opinion, is that the Ottomans will do to the Syrians what they did to the Armenians. This is why it was urgent to free this land from the noose of Turkish oppression.

During the last year of the war al-Hilal reprinted several speeches published in al-Ittihad al-Lubnani. In these speeches the talk is of biladuna (our country) and al-watan (homeland) which always meant Lebanon, while Bilad al-Sham receded somewhat to the background. The unhesitating and complete break with the Ottoman Empire by al-Hilal also reflects the new editorship. In contrast to Emile, his father Jurji Zaydan had been profoundly attached to the idea of saving the Ottoman Empire despite his Arab cultural nationalism. Here his position was much closer to that of his compatriot Rashid Rida than to that of his son.

Rida’s disengagement from the Ottoman Empire was more complex. He had always opposed the Young Turks, insisting that they were not the empire and that every Muslim owed loyalty only to the Ottoman sultan and caliph. Early in the war he appealed to the Syrians to remain true to the Ottoman Empire and, in a shift of emphasis reflecting his own transition and ambivalent use of different paradigms, he added an appeal to the Muslims of Syria not to attack Syrian Christians. All are ‘abna al-watan’ (people of the homeland); precisely at such a time of crisis the Arab nahda had to be saved.

The declaration of independence by Sharif Husayn forced Rashid Rida to take a more clear-cut position, but doing so was not easy for him. He first tackled the issue in the form of a lengthy conversation between himself and a ‘learned Egyptian’. Rida’s major line of argument was that the act represented genuine independence for the Arabs. He argued that the declaration was a reaction to the Turkish intention to do in the Hijaz what had been done in Syria and Iraq, namely, kill the elite and deport the younger generation through conscription. Even if the Ottoman-German alliance should win the war, Rida went on, the Ottoman Empire would not be independent but a colony of Germany in everything but name. After all, imperialist
competition was the underlying cause of the war. Sharif Husayn, he finally assured his readers, had declared independence in defence of Islam and all Arabs should support him.

A year later Rashid Rida published an article on the ‘Arab Question’, which opened with an impassioned statement about himself: *innani arabi Muslim aw Muslim ‘arabi* (verily, I am an Arab Muslim and a Muslim Arab) - his very predicament!! He firmly rejected all suggestions that Arabs wanted independence, not because, God forbid, they were weaker than the Greeks, but because they knew the Europeans would exploit a weakened and divided empire. Arab solidarity (*asabiyya*), he claimed, had only arisen lately in reaction to Turkish fanaticism. Only with the Balkan wars had the question of what would happen to Arab lands if the Ottoman Empire fell apart come up. Hijazi independence would not cause the disintegration of the empire; the general course of the war would determine that. Besides, he argued, the Allies had reacted to the Hijazi declaration by affirming the general principle of the independence of all nations. If this principle were applied after the termination of the war it would produce the best result of all. Still somewhat defensively, Rashid Rida finally came to the conclusion that the Ottoman Empire could not be saved and that a political order of nation-state should take its place.

**The European Model of Progress**

The last question to be dealt with is whether the war affected the faith in progress and the role of Europe as its bearer. It has often been observed that the experience of the war, the killings, the suffering of the population, and so on led to a heightened cultural pessimism in Europe. Remarque’s *All Quiet at the Western Front* was as symptomatic of this pessimism as was Spengler’s *The Decline of the Occident*. In the Arab Middle East, the only comparable experience of destruction was perhaps the famine and the executions in Syria. But even that was a somewhat remote experience for Egyptians, and anyway had nothing to do with Europe but with the ‘barbaric’ Turks. Hardly anyone from the Middle East, certainly not intellectuals, had direct experience of the trench warfare that took place in Europe, with such literary exceptions, of course, as Edward Said’s father and Mikha’il Nu’ayma. Both had become American citizens and Said’s father volunteered because he was told they ‘would be sent to fight the Turks in Palestine’. Nu’ayma, the Lebanese poet, never quite knew what had hit him and described his thoughts when pinned down in the trenches by German
artillery: ‘doubt pervaded me whether I was I. No, no, the one on this hilltop could not be the same kid born in Biskanta, thriving in Shakhrub and later Seattle’.24

All three journals agreed that the dimensions of this war surpassed in every aspect anything known in human history: the number of soldiers involved, the numbers of wounded and killed, the resources used, the extent of destruction, the costs, etc.25 Al-Harb al-Uzma or al-Kubra (The Great War) quickly became the standard name to denote it. Despite this awareness, we may observe in al-Muqtataf and al-Hilal unbroken faith in the progress of the human race. The countless articles on technical developments from tanks to gas warfare to submarines and aeroplanes basically reflect the fascination with technological development, which, so the repeated assumption had it, would be put to wonderful use once the war was over.26 An early article in al-Muqtataf about the horrors of the war was quite misleading:

We had expected to see civilization move from good to better and to find human feeling, swept up by progress, overcoming barbaric inclinations, especially in Europe; until this war broke out, in which (we observe) varieties of savagery that shame mankind.27

But again, following the Anglo-Saxon lead, the article quickly makes it clear that all the savagery is German, not European, and that faith in progress need not be questioned. The war had become one between democracy and despotism, and would lead to the final triumph of democracy.

What drove expectations for a better world after the First World War was the idea of a new international world order. This thought was not so much expressed in the translations of English articles in Arabic journals, as it was discussed by Arab intellectuals themselves. Early in 1915 Niqula Haddad published an article in al-Hilal on the ‘Tatawwur al-umam’ (evolution of the nations) and the future of Europe. Here he listed all the essential elements a new world order would entail: sovereignty of each nation, spreading of the democratic order, strengthening of international arbitration. His own concern, that in the event of a split the nations of the East and the West would part ways ‘because of their different cultures’, he assuaged with his conviction that the people of the East would try very hard to reach the level of progress of Europe.28 On another occasion, Niqula Haddad perceived that the requirements of the war economy forced more egalitarian and
participatory patterns on the European societies, which would lead to more advanced societies after the war. Though he spoke of socialism, in fact he was talking about greater interference in society by the state.  

The American president Woodrow Wilson proposed the idea of a post-war League of Nations for the first time in early 1917. Echoing articles in American journals, from 1917 onward the three Arab journals began increasingly to discuss concepts such as barlaman amm (general parliament) or jam'iyyat al-umam (league of nations). Wilson’s Fourteen Points address of 8 January 1918 heightened expectations and hopes for a better world. Much space in the journals was devoted to Wilson’s speeches and thoughts; even the editor of al-Manar waxed enthusiastic. Independence for even the small nations and an equitable league of nations seemed to promise peace in a better world. Certainly the pages of al-Muqtataf and al-Hilal reflect an unbroken belief in the progress of mankind under the leadership of Western Europe and, most recently, America.

Not surprisingly, al-Manar’s position was again more complex. To begin with, this war was never called by Rashid Rida the ‘Great War’. He preferred ‘al-Harb al-Madaniyya (the war of civilization) which, not to be confounded with the ‘war of civilizations’, meant the war between the civilized nations of Europe. Rida made it repeatedly clear that the civilization he was talking about was the materialist European civilization (al-madaniyya al-maddiyya), a civilization which lacked the guidance of religion. The differentiation between the ‘progressive allies’ and the ‘barbaric Teutons’ was less essential for him, though occasionally he would repeat this Anglo-Saxon argument in the pages of al-Manar.

In early 1915, Rashid Rida made his point of view clear in an article entitled ‘The war of the European civilization and the comparison between it and the Islamic civilization and the Arab conquests’. The so-called countries of science and civilization, he argued, had proved that the very science which should be a source of justice, compassion, and happiness had become the source of tyranny and brutality. This descent into bestiality and deviation could never have happened during the Arab conquests (futubat al-’arab). On this point Rida cites Gustave Le Bon as confirmation for his opinion. Muslims would never have behaved like the Germans in Belgium; although, he adds astutely, given the chance the Belgians would have treated the Germans as they did the people in the Congo before the First World War. Civilization without the underpinnings of religion leads to the simple formula of
‘might is right’. A year later he commented: ‘Those who are infatuated with materialist views have been disproved now.’ Drawing the old divide through the Mediterranean, Rida spoke of the ‘people of the north-west’ competing with each other over the exploitation of the people of the south-east. In four years, he averred, they killed more people than in the preceding centuries. But even Rida was swept away by the moment of enthusiasm that proclaimed independence for all nations and a league of nations; Wilson’s speeches were reproduced in full in his journal.

However, with the ending of the war Rashid Rida became suspicious about the true aims of the Allies. He reported warily about the discreet offers for ‘guidance’ made by France to the Syrians en route to independence. Rida repeatedly emphasized that the Syrians were in no need of any kind of help to run their country. It was in the context of the negotiations over Syria, which al-Manar reported in great detail, that he observed how all the promises for the post-war New Order had unravelled. In the spring of 1919 Rida came to the bitter conclusion that ‘liberation was not intended for non-European nations’. In April 1920 he observed gloomily that it was not economic strength, democratic government, or profounder science that let England vanquish Germany, but greater political skill, meaning here the greater political deviousness, that led the British to victory. Their greatest success, according to Rashid Rida, was to drag the United States into the war on their side by promising Palestine to the Jews and at the same time convincing Sharif Husayn to conquer Palestine for them.

Conclusion

During the spring of 1920 the Allies agreed on modifications in the original Sykes-Picot agreement and on the division of the region among themselves in the form of Mandates. In March, the General Syrian Congress tried to challenge these arrangements by proclaiming Syria, including Palestine, Transjordan, and Lebanon, an independent kingdom with Amir Faysal at its head. By the summer the French army had occupied Syria and chased Faysal out of the country. Rashid Rida, who covered all these events closely in his journal, concluded with deep pessimism that the peace treaty was worse than all the horrors of the war because the rich, the strong, and the imperialists, who were the cause of this war, had reasserted their hold over other nations and people.
It was not the barbarity of the war itself, from which the Middle East was relatively insulated, the people in Egypt more so than the Syrians. It was the brutal disappointment of all hopes and the breaking of all promises regarding freedom for the nations of the Middle East after the war that initiated the first turning away from Europe as the model and triggered the radicalization of the Arab nationalist movements.

Notes
3 On Jurji Zaydan and his magazine, see Thomas Philipp, *Gorgi Zaydan: His Life and Thought* (Beirut, 1979).
6 ‘al-Hurriyya ‘inda al-tutun’, *al-Hilal* 24 (1915-16), p. 283. ‘jins al-tutun’, tutun being the word for tobacco, it is not even found in the dictionary though it is clearly a translation of the Teutonic race. It also appears in *al-Muqtataf*.
7 Rashid Rida describes the Baghdad railway plan, the installation of which would have meant German colonization – in contrast to the expected British colonization. ‘Al-Dawla wa’l-alman’, *al-Manar* 18 (1915), p. 472.
8 For a call for loyalty to the Ottoman Empire in Syria, see Muhammad Rashid Rida, ‘Ilā ikhwān al-karam’, *al-Manar* 17 (1914), p. 956.
15 Egypt is never mentioned in this context: clearly these journals were not inclined to offend the sensibilities of the British who ruled the country and were, in the last analysis, in control of the press.
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35 Al-Manar 22 (1920-1), pp. 33-6, 95.
38 For a good discussion of these negotiations, see David Fromkin, A Peace to End all Peace (London, 1989); Malcolm Yapp, The Near East since World War I (London, 1991).
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