Southeast Asian Muslims in the Era of Globalization

Edited by

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Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-1-137-43680-1

First published 2015 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

ISBN 978-1-349-49362-3 ISBN 978-1-137-43681-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137436818

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Southeast Asian Muslims in the era of globalization / Ken Miichi, Omar Farouk.
pages cm
Summary: "Islam and Muslims in Southeast Asia have often been described using two sets of very contradictory terms. On the one hand, they are imagined as being Sufistic, syncretistic and localized, as opposed to their counterparts in the Middle East who are considered to be orthodox and 'fanatical'. On the other, after the 9/11 attacks and especially after the October 2002 Bali bombing in Indonesia, the danger of radical Islam has been emphasized with Southeast Asia suddenly becoming a new location in the War on Terror. This volume seeks to bridge the gap between these opposing perceptions and demonstrate the appropriate position of Islam in Southeast Asia by looking at the Muslim responses to globalization and processes of negotiation. Foreign ideas, goods and texts are creatively adapted and re-contextualized in local situations, acquiring a localized cultural meaning. However, globalization aptly adapts to local conditions, penetrating deep inside territories. The contributors examine how Southeast Asian Muslims respond to globalization in their particular regional, national settings, and suggest global solutions for key local and local issues" — Provided by publisher.
1. Muslims—Southeast Asia—Ethnic identity. 2. Islam and politics—Southeast Asia. 3. Globalization—Religious aspects—Islam. I. Miichi, Ken, 1973– II. Farouk, Omar, 1947–
DS523.4.M87S68 2014
305.6′970959—dc23 2014029414

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Foreword

This book is the culmination of the findings of a project organized by the Japan International Cooperation Agency Research Institute (JICA-RI). The project was headed by Dr. Ken Miichi and Dr. Omar Farouk, and comprised a group of experts on Islam from Japan and abroad. The research – and consequently this book – looked at the changes in the societies of contemporary Southeast Asian countries, focusing on the ways in which Muslims in the region are responding to a broad range of social and economic changes – a phenomenon termed generally as 'globalization'. While literature on Islam in Southeast Asia abounds, relatively few studies have looked at Islam and Muslims specifically from the perspective of development and international cooperation. I hope this book will be read widely and help us fill that knowledge void.

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1
Introduction

Ken Miichi and Omar Farouk

Islam and Muslims in Southeast Asia have often been described using two sets of very contradictory terms. On the one hand, Islam in the region is imagined as being Sufistic, syncretistic and localized, and Southeast Asian Muslims are thought to be very different from their counterparts in the Middle East, who are considered to be orthodox and 'fanatical'. On the other hand, after the 9/11 attacks and especially after the October 2002 Bali bombing in Indonesia, the danger of radical Islam was emphasized and Southeast Asia suddenly became the 'second front' in the global 'war on terrorism' (Conboy 2006).[1] Some Muslims in Southeast Asia themselves shared this concern and even warned of the influences of 'transnational' Islamic movements.

This volume has been conceptualized and undertaken in order to correct this gap in perception and demonstrate the appropriate position of Islam. It represents a collection of ten articles written by scholars, both Muslims and non-Muslims, who are regional specialists possessing exceptional knowledge and understanding of the complexities of the situation on the ground in Southeast Asia, and especially in the respective countries of their specialization. Some of these scholars have been doing research on the theme of Islam in the different countries of Southeast Asia for decades and are internationally recognized for their expertise in the subject, while others who have just ventured into the field have been equally passionate about it. The line-up of the contributors to this volume is also multinational as well as representing different generations. In addition to this unique contributor profile, this volume also incorporates original findings and analyses of an opinion poll professionally conducted in four Southeast Asian nations, two of which have a Muslim majority population, namely Indonesia and Malaysia, and the other two of which have a Muslim minority, namely Thailand and the Philippines.

The survey, focusing on Islam and globalization, was conducted in early 2010. Subsequently, two international conferences addressing the theme were also organized and hosted by the Japan International Cooperation Agency Research Institute (JICA-RI) in Tokyo and Singapore in November 2009 and July 2010 respectively, to explore preliminary ideas related to the broad theme of this book. Through these meetings it was unanimously agreed that understanding the Muslim responses to globalization and their processes of 'negotiation' were crucial in order to locate and contextualize contemporary Islam and Muslims in Southeast Asia. The local negotiations that take place suggest that foreign ideas, goods and texts have been creatively adopted, adapted and recontextualized in local situations and differently interpreted to give them a local cultural meaning (Iwabuchi 2002, p. 40). On the other hand, globalization adapts to local conditions and penetrates deep inside territories.

At the outset, there is a need to clarify what globalization is and how it is related to Islam and Muslims in Southeast Asia. The term 'globalization' became a buzzword in the 1990s, indicating both change and dynamism brought by global flows and influences of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and power as well as environmentally and biologically relevant substances (such as acid rain or pathogens). Globalization refers to the increase in a state of the world involving networks (multiple relations, not simply single linkages) of interdependence at multi-continental distances, linked through global flows and influences (Osterhammel and Petersson 2005, pp. vi–vii; Keohane and Nye 2011, p. 225). What we have called globalization in recent years received its first real attention in the social sciences after the 1980s following the disintegration of the USSR, the crisis of the welfare state, the liberalization of international exchanges, advances in communication and data processing technology, the emergence of electronic media and the intensification of institutional integration around the world (Osterhammel and Petersson 2005, pp. 141–145).

Earlier discussions on globalization left a simplistic impression that it was an inevitable process of homogenization and the universalizing of Western civilization battling the parochial forces of nationalism, localism and tribalism (Steger 2003, p. 1). Muslim society in particular has been often treated as an obstruction to Western or American-led globalization, as described in Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations* and Benjamin Barber's *Jihad Versus McWorld* (Huntington 1993; Barber 1995). The 9/11 attacks and the American-led war on terrorism seemed to strengthen this influential assumption. However, there has been a widespread 'search for fundamentals' which is not limited to

Muslims and cannot be explained from the religious framework alone. The 'search' has proceeded in various parts of the world and within various societies in terms of globally diffused ideas concerning tradition, identity, home, indigenity, locality, community and so on (Robertson 1992, p. 166). While globalization has the potential to homogenize cultures, it also has an even greater potential to nourish diversity to a degree that the world has never seen (Friedman 2006, p. 478).

The world did not turn global overnight; 'globality' has a history reaching far back before modern times. Islam itself has been global for a long time. Founded in the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century, Islam expanded and penetrated multi-continental distances all across Asia and Africa for more than 14 centuries. Islamic and Muslim networks of connections are not simply characterized by bilateral relationships such as those between the Arabian Peninsula and other regions but rather through multiple interactions.

What makes the recent globalization different from that of the past is that it goes 'farther, faster, cheaper and deeper' (Friedman 1999, pp. 7–8). Trends in Islamic thought and political ideologies easily move beyond continents. Muslims travel across national and regional boundaries and ideas and information are translated and transferred much faster and on a greater scale than in the past. European countries, for instance, cannot ignore their Muslim citizens any longer with regard to the problems of their integration into their societies and nations. People's demonstrations and protests against the dictatorship in Tunisia in early 2011, which were broadcast live by Al-Jazeera, attracted more people through social networking services such as Facebook and Twitter. Enthusiasm not only spread to neighbouring countries but went beyond religious groups and geographical territories. The Chinese government, too, became worried about the spread of Tunisia's so-called Jasmine Revolution and was busy blocking related keywords on the Internet.

A few years before the 'Jasmine Revolution' in Tunisia, the journalist Robin Wright had observed that a 'quiet and profound revolution' was taking place in the Muslim world, led by bloggers, rappers, fashion designers, televangelists, human rights activists and self-styled Islamic gurus and thinkers of all stripes (Nasr 2009, p. 176; Wright 2009). It marked the rise of Islamic capitalism, characterized by an emerging middle class with 'modern but also Islamic' consumption preferences (Nasr 2009, p. 197). The recent globalization has created a new global Islamic market. The emerging Islamic financial market has accommodated itself well with the existing 'Western-made' international financial system. The centres of Islamic financial markets are now located in

London, Bahrain and Kuala Lumpur. The halal food industry particularly flourishes in Southeast Asia where different religions and cultures coexist. Some of the Southeast Asian countries including Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines where the Muslim populations are minorities have their own halal certification authorities aiming at the global food market. Malaysian halal certification in particular is applied by many European and non-Muslim Asian countries.

This volume examines how Southeast Asian Muslims respond to globalization in their particular regional, national and local settings. At the same time, global solutions for local issues are pursued. What Keohane and Nye call social and cultural globalization, which involves movements of ideas, information and images, and of people, including the movements of religions or diffusion of scientific knowledge, is particularly examined. Social and cultural globalization often follows military and economic globalization. Ideas, information and people follow armies and economic flows, and in so doing, transform societies and markets. At its most profound level, social globalization affects the consciousness of individuals and their attitudes towards culture, politics and personal identity.[2] This volume focuses on social, cultural and religious globalization rather than the economic and military flows which set the conditions.

There are several distinct settings which differentiate Southeast Asia from other regions that need to be appreciated. First, religious pluralism is a significant and vital characteristic of the region. Politically and economically, harmony and coexistence in Muslim majority and Muslim minority countries are important. Even in Indonesia, which contains the largest Muslim population in the world, religious minorities have been acknowledged as an integral part of the nation from the very beginning of the republic. Regional integration through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been consolidated but at the same time the role of individual states and the differences among them have also expanded. ASEAN itself is indifferent to religious divisions. An agreement was reached in 2010 to form a free trade area where initially six member countries would abolish tariffs for regional trade to further intensify regional integration. As a political entity ASEAN negotiates with the United States, China, Japan and other global players. On the other hand, solidarity among Muslim communities (the *ummah*) has both diplomatic and domestic importance within ASEAN. For example, the mediation of the Mindanao peace talks by Indonesia and Malaysia is important not only for their Philippines counterpart, but also for the political legitimacy of the two governments at home.

Closer and faster communications with the outside world have intensified religious and cultural conversions. A second characteristic of Southeast Asia is that as it is a 'periphery' of Islam, transnational relationships and networks are important. It is important to note that these relationships are not just one-way, with only the Middle East having influence over Southeast Asia. There have also been local academic and religious centres within the region which mediate and localize influences from the Middle East. Moreover, especially in recent years, Islamic scholarship in general has never been isolated from the West. Some contemporary Southeast Asian Muslim intellectuals prefer to study in Canberra, Montreal or Leiden rather than in Cairo, Mecca or Damascus. Furthermore, there are now a large number of students from the Middle East, in the thousands, studying in Malaysian universities and colleges. The process of negotiation between the global and the regional and local traditions is the key to understanding Muslims and Islam in Southeast Asia.

The processes of globalization take place deep inside territories and institutional domains that have largely been constructed in national terms (Sassen 2006, p. 3). The relationships between the 'global' and the 'regional', 'national' or 'local' may be asymmetric but are invariably mutually and intricately structured. Local culture cannot be separated from the global context. On the other hand, globalization on its own cannot easily influence and unify others but would always have to negotiate in particular regional, national or local settings (Iwabuchi 2002). The processes and consequences of globalization cannot be generalized. We need to scrutinize the regional, national or local setting as the stage of negotiations where capital and goods, information and ideas, and people and power freely flow.

Chapters 2–3 of this volume focus on Islamic education in the historical context and in terms of the state–society relationship in Southeast Asia. Chapters 4–5 examine trans-regional changes and dynamics within Islam and the responses to them by Muslims in Indonesia and Malaysia. Chapters 6–7 focus on the institutional changes that have come about as a consequence of economic and political globalization and the Muslim responses to them in three countries. Chapters 8–9 examine the role of global norms and the involvement of the international community in the ongoing conflicts and peace talks in the southern Philippines and Thailand. Chapter 11 concentrates on the analysis of the four-country opinion survey.

In Chapter 2, Ahmad Fauzi describes how Islamic education in Southeast Asia has adapted itself to modern conditions. He traces the history

of Islamic education and how it has been institutionalized in colonial and post-colonial Southeast Asia. Fauzi is highly critical of both the recent global war on terrorism led by the United States and the Islamist movements that pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic state by political means. This chapter gives a good overview of the relationship between the nation-state and Islam in Southeast Asia.

In Chapter 3, Yoriko Tatsumi explores the significance of overseas Islamic education, concentrating on a particular society in Southeast Asia. Tatsumi analyses those among the Maranaos in the Philippines who study Islam in Cairo. Using ethnographic data on the Maranaos' journey to Cairo, she argues that Islamic and Arabic language studies not only function to improve religious education at home but also serve as cultural and economic safeguards for the people at the periphery of mainstream society in the post-colonial Philippines.

Globalization occurs within Islamic learning and religious practices. It cannot simply be understood in terms of bilateral relations between the Middle East and Southeast Asia; the role of networks including those in the West and other regions and the dynamics within regions should also be considered. In Chapter 4, Martin van Bruinessen analyses the concept of *ghazwul fikri* (invasion of ideas), which originally referred to Western cultural invasion in the Middle East. In Indonesia, this concept was transformed into criticism directed towards the Arabic cultural and religious invasion. Van Bruinessen's historical review reflects and reorganizes what Ahmad Fauzi has described about Islamic education. He points out that Indonesian political elites with a modern education learned Islam through Western literature during the colonial period. In the later part of the chapter, the impact of conflicts in the Middle East and the influences of contemporary transnational Islamic movements are examined in both the national and local settings. At the same time, he denies simplified dichotomies such as Arab versus the West and carefully observes the complex and rich variation of cultural flows.

In Chapter 5, Yuki Shiozaki stresses both the intra- and trans-regional importance of the *ulama* network. His discussion on the *ulama* network in Malaysia and its impact on the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) demonstrates that it started from historical roots which extended far beyond national borders. As van Bruinessen points out in his discussion of Indonesia, influences from contemporary transnational Islamic movements and particularly the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood have been definitive in the case of Malaysia. Shiozaki rightly points out the vital

importance of the national context and how transnational influences have been infused in the Malaysian political arena.

Chapters 6–7 focus on institutional changes that have taken place because of economic and political globalization and how Muslims in the Philippines, Indonesia and Cambodia have responded to them. In Chapter 6, Carmen Abu Bakar discusses the various dimensions of globalization facing the Moros of the Southern Philippines. She gives an overview of the economic and military dimensions of globalization which have brought about cultural and religious changes. Economic globalization including the development of the halal industry has been significant in Southeast Asian countries and labour migration has been particularly important for the Philippines. The global war on terrorism certainly had a deep impact on Moro society. Abu Bakar points out that the Moros respond to globalization on the one hand through cultural resistance and on the other in a positive and pragmatic manner.

In Chapter 7, Ken Miichi analyses the changes in Islamic politics in the new democracy in Indonesia. He argues that, despite the apparent Islamization of society in Indonesia, Islamic political parties have failed. Using the results of the opinion survey, Miichi relocates Islamic organizations and conventional analytical concepts of Muslims in Indonesia such as modernists/traditionalists and *santri*/*abangan*. He argues that the Islamization that comes along with urbanization in Indonesia might standardize the political parties, ideologically narrowing the differences between the nationalist and Islamic parties.

The development of Islam in Cambodia, which is so little known, is the subject of the discussion by Omar Farouk in Chapter 8. He argues that it was the pacification of Cambodia and its reconstruction that set the stage and created the circumstances for the rehabilitation of Islam and Muslims in the kingdom to take place. Although they are numerically small and have yet to fully recover from the trauma of the genocidal years of the Pol Pot era, Muslims in Cambodia have emerged as some of the principal beneficiaries of the tide of globalization in Cambodia.

Chapters 9–10 are a 'must read' for those who are involved and interested in peacemaking in Southeast Asia and also in other regions. Datu Michael O. Mastura critically examines the peace process in Mindanao in Chapter 9. Referring to a copious number of cases in Sri Lanka and other places, he contextualizes the Mindanao case in the global justice framework. Mastura suggests that there are contradictions in the justice

framework associated with the views of the post-colonial nation-state system and the current global war on terrorism, which Ahmad Fauzi also pointed out in an earlier chapter. Drawing on his own experiences as a lawyer in the peace process, Mastura argues for the recognition of the role of the international community and the non-state armed groups.

In Chapter 10, Chaiwat Satha-Anand raises the issue of violence that violates sacred space. It is becoming an ominous global trend but has rarely been addressed. Analysing two important violent incidents at two mosques in the context of southern violence in Thailand during the past seven years – Kru-ze mosque, Pattani, in April 2004 and Al-Furqan mosque, Narathiwat, in June 2009 – he argues that the menace of violence against sacred space is making conflicts that involve different ethnic groups deadlier, and making them much more difficult to deal with because the traditional cultural boundary that serves as a limiting force on violence has been violated. The transformation of sacred topography as new sites of violence, from what used to be a sanctuary from violence, to a violent confrontation space, to a killing space, is critically analysed by Satha-Anand in terms of the effect of violence on sacred space. Using data on violent incidents against sacred space in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, he briefly discusses the globality of such phenomena and underscores the need to cultivate a global policy for the protection of sacred spaces.

In Chapter 11, Satoru Mikami analyses the results of the four-country opinion survey conducted by JICA Research Institute in January–March 2010. There were several international opinion surveys on globalization in the past but this one is the first serious opinion survey on globalization which makes comparisons among Southeast Asian countries, especially in relation to Islam and Muslims. Mikami analyses selected questionnaires on religious practices, democracy and foreign relations. He finds similarities and differences among the respondents of the four countries surveyed which are not always caused by religion but rather by regional characteristics and other social variables.

The Conclusion recapitulates some perspectives on the challenges and prospects, particularly for Muslims in Southeast Asia, which can help academics, practitioners, policymakers and members of the public better appreciate the role of Islam and Muslims in one of the most dynamic regions of the world. Although there have been a raft of works related to this topic, this volume is unique in its own right, especially in casting new perspectives on the subject (Nathan and Kamali 2005; Alatas 2007). It is to this volume's credit that the articles included try to analyse Islam and the Muslims in Southeast Asia in more specific contexts than

had been attempted in any other earlier work. The findings of the four-country opinion survey, too, no doubt present new data that should help enhance and refine our understanding of a fascinating subject. Hopefully this volume will also stimulate further interest and research on the themes and the issues it has raised.

Notes

1. See Singh (2007) for a recent typical alarmist view which pays attention to the radicalization of Southeast Asian Muslims caused by external influences.
2. Keohane and Nye distinguish 'globalization' from 'globalism'. Globalism means a condition or state of the world that can increase (globalization) and decrease (de-globalization) (Keohane and Nye 2011, p. 228). We agree with their wording but choose to use only the term 'globalization' here in order to avoid confusion.

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2
Globalization of Islamic Education in Southeast Asia

Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid

Introduction

On 11 September 2001, terrorist attacks devastated the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States – an event referred to hereafter as 9/11. The United States consequently embarked on a global war on terrorism (GWOT), which has since been reproved by analysts for being over-militaristic, neglecting ideological warfare and uncritically aggregating disparate trends of terrorism (Cf. Kilcullen 2005; Desker and Acharya 2006). Unfortunately, the United States' vigorous pursuit of the GWOT has cast a dark shadow on the prospects for intercultural and interreligious understanding between the Western and Muslim worlds.

Towards the end of George W. Bush's presidency (2001–2009), more informed policy advisors began to recognize the necessity of winning the 'battle of ideas' as a pivotal strategy towards accomplishing the GWOT mission (Amr and Singer 2008). Focus among the policymaking community has shifted to the role of Islamic religious schools in spreading Islamist ideology and maintaining nexuses of radicalism. Although the purported links between formal Islamic instruction and violence-prone religious extremism has been far from established by empirical studies of terrorists' educational backgrounds, Southeast Asia's Islamic educational landscape has not been immune from such and similar insinuations (Cf. Yunanto and Hidayat 2005; Bergen and Pandey 2006; Magouirk and Atran 2008). A study commissioned by the US Air Force, for example, in noting the Malaysian government's concern that 'Islamic schools have become a breeding ground for militant Islam', urged the United States, other concerned countries and international institutions to advocate 'reform of religious schools to ensure that these schools are able to provide a broad modern education'; such reform is

believed to be the 'key to breaking the cycle of radicalized *madrassas* [*sic*] producing cannon fodder for radical and terrorist groups' (Rabasa 2004, p. 62). The International Crisis Group's (ICG) reports on southern Thailand and Indonesia also appear to substantiate the proposition that secondary-level Islamic schools serve as a mainstay for militant Islamists (ICG 2009a, 2009b). Therefore, in the long term, victory in the education battleground has emerged as an indispensable plank of the United States' patronage of programmes to foster democratic development, ethno-cultural tolerance, religious pluralism and respect for human rights in the Muslim world.

The present chapter is a modest attempt to redress the jaundiced perspectives found in writings that deal with Islamic education in Southeast Asia in the GWOT era. In arriving at a conceptual understanding of Islamic education, the author utilizes paradigms deemed endemic to the Islamic epistemological tradition and autochthonous to Muslims of Southeast Asia. As will be seen, Islamic education in Southeast Asia presents a more nuanced picture in both theory and practice than what we normally conjecture from outside the region.

Globalization and contemporary Southeast Asian Islam

In the 1990s, the term 'globalization' gained wide currency as a description of the centripetal shrinking of national borders into a 'global village' where technologically driven processes of homogenizing economic, social, cultural, political and even intellectual resources take place wittingly or unwittingly. Globalization can thus be perceived as a standardizing mechanism at multiple levels of analytical units, with each level reaching uniformity at different stages. Liberal-capitalist ideologues attach deterministic qualities to globalization, often relating it to the concurrent processes of modernization and secularization. The emergence of Islam as a salient mobilizing factor in world politics in the 1970s and 1980s, emanating mainly from the Middle East, was theoretically problematic as the influence of religion was thought to be inversely related to the latter processes. The declining importance of primordial factors such as ethnicity and religion was held to be a fait accompli in sync with modernization, and later globalization (Pasha and Samatar 1996, pp. 191–192; Fox 2001, pp. 53–59).

Notwithstanding the many facets of globalization of which one may conceive, its economic dimension, as predicated on the market-driven capitalism of hegemonic Western entities, has received the widest prominence in both policymaking and academic circles (Pasha and

Samatar 1996, pp. 189–191). Muslims' bitter experiences with earlier phases of globalization, such as the encounters with medieval crusades and colonialism, have elicited widespread concern that globalization results in nothing less than a perpetuation of the humiliation of the *ummah* (global Muslim community) at the hands of Western powers (Moten 2005, pp. 236–246). The wide gulf between the prosperous West and the downtrodden *ummah*, as measured by tangible economic indicators, drags the *ummah* into a vicious circle of urban poverty, deprivation of education and alienation among Muslim youths, who are consequently driven to extremist interpretations of Islam (Johnston 2001).[1] In their search for solutions, Muslim elites and intellectuals in their newly independent nation states have unleashed a distinct but parallel process of globalization, emphasizing Islam's universal ideals. As the argument goes, with the prevalence of transnational economic structures spelling the practical end of the nation-state, the ummatic character of Islamic unity offers for Muslims the best interface in their unavoidable engagement with the foreign-imposed quagmire of the liberal-capitalist 'global village' (Pasha and Samatar 1996, p. 196; Moten 2005, p. 249). One manifestation of such Islamic globalization, or rather counter-globalization, is the increasing significance attached to the role of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC; in 2011 its name was changed to 'Organization of Islamic Cooperation') in charting the course of recent Muslim states' foreign policies (Haynes 2001, pp. 152–156). As a rapidly developing region, Southeast Asia is susceptible to the two distinct – yet similarly, even if unequally, powerful – forces of globalization (Adeney-Risakotta 2005, p. 331; Meuleman 2005, p. 35). Both have influenced the recent upsurge of political Islam in the region, with Southeast Asia conventionally being considered to be at the receiving end of both global concentrations of power. In both sets of relationships, the wealth of characteristics that have marked out Southeast Asian Islam as *sui generis* have often been overlooked or given perfunctory mention.

Yet if we were to map the driving factors behind contemporary political Islam in Southeast Asia, it would be difficult to draw a clear line separating global and local factors. More often than not, global and local factors have interacted in such a way that regional variables acquire dynamics of their own. While this has been the case in all Southeast Asian states, it is arguably more pronounced in the Muslim-majority states of Malaysia and Indonesia. Both countries were affected by the wave of Islamism that reached Southeast Asia in the 1980s, not only from the Middle East but also from Islamist diasporas in the West (van

Bruinessen 1999, pp. 169–170; Azra 2003, p. 44). Whereas the Malaysian state responded accommodatively, Indonesia resorted to repression of political Islamists, thus leading to Islamist elements being more receptive to the radical tendencies which dominated the socio-political scene in the first few years following the downfall of Suharto's New Order regime in 1998 (Sukma 2003, pp. 344–350; Hasan 2005, pp. 305–308). Turning to the plight of aggrieved Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia, scholars have emphasized their 'fundamental grievances' such as prolonged socio-economic dislocation and the systematic denial of indigenous identities as underlying causes of dissatisfaction that eventually erupted into sporadic insurrection (Cf. Tan 2003, pp. 134–135). Without discounting international religious solidarity as a contributory factor in the rebellions of Muslim minorities in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines, national political considerations have been more important in conditioning the nature and extent of political Islam in both territories (May 1992, pp. 409–411). As far as links with international militant Islamist networks are concerned, they simply tap into these root causes, supplying the necessary training and infrastructural know-how in order to instigate terrorist feats. The much-touted Al Qaeda network, rather than being the focus of the allegiance of Southeast Asian Islamist militants, was more likely a source of inspiration whose foray into Southeast Asia utilized local insurgents with domestic agendas and concerns that preceded and outweighed those of global pan-Islamism (Desker 2003, p. 421).

Islamic education: Its concept and early history

'Islamic education' in this chapter refers to an integrated process of imparting Islamic knowledge such that its recipients become equipped spiritually, intellectually and physically in order to execute their twin God-ordained roles, as His servants and vicegerents on earth (Hassan 1986, p. 40; Ahmad 1994, pp. 13–34). While the Arabic term *tarbiyyah* has been most commonly used to denote 'education', other terms such as *ta'lim* and *ta'dib* have also gained popularity within Muslim educational circles (Cf. El-Muhammady 1987, pp. 123–124; Roald 1994, p. 14; Ishak 1995, pp. 5–8; Ahmad 2002, pp. 27–29; Halstead 2004, p. 522). *Ta'lim*, from the root word *'allama* (to teach), refers primarily to the teaching and learning process. *Tarbiyyah* connotes the processes of 'bringing out', 'developing', 'nurturing', 'fostering', 'nourishing', 'rearing' and 'cherishing' as applied to objects in one's possession. By virtue of its generic attributes, assert Syed Naquib Al-Attas, *tarbiyyah* is less

preferable than *ta'dib* in elucidating an Islamic concept of education. To Al-Attas, education is 'the instilling and inculcation of *adab* in man', with *adab* essentially indicating disciplining of the mind and soul, acquisition of good qualities of the mind and soul, performance of correct as opposed to erroneous and of right as opposed to wrong action, and preservation from disgrace (Al-Attas 1979b, pp. 36–37). *Ta'dib*, therefore, reflects a moralistic outlook on life within a hierarchical structure of authority which recognizes the sublime position of God as 'the Fountain of all true knowledge', to be emulated by legitimate men of 'intelligence, spiritual knowledge and virtue' (Al-Attas 1979a, p. 3). *Tarbiyyah* can be generalized to cover minerals, plants and animals, with the end of *tarbiyyah* being measurable in material and quantitative terms. *Ta'dib*, however, is particular to human beings, whose spiritual nature, being made up of one's individual soul (*nafs*) and intellect (*aql*), results in one being accountable for one's actions in fulfilling or neglecting one's individual covenant with God (Al-Attas 1979b, pp. 24–25; Al-Attas 1991, pp. 29–32). It follows that accountability is valid throughout one's adult life for so long as one is intellectually sound and physically mature. In essence, Islamic education is a lifelong process, both formally and informally (Mohd. Yusuf Ahmad 2002, p. 34).

Knowledge (Arabic: *'ilm*) is a sacred concept derived from God, its ultimate giver. Knowledge is epistemologically defined as 'the arrival . . . of meaning in and by the soul' of a thing or an object of knowledge; 'meaning' (Arabic: *ma'na*) here referring to its authentic or correct version as 'determined by the Islamic vision of reality and truth as projected by the Quranic conceptual system' (Al-Attas 1991, pp. 17–18). Hence, the Islamic worldview perceives the end of knowledge to necessarily be 'the recognition of the proper place of God in the order of being and existence' (Al-Attas 1991, p. 19). Hence at the heart of the educational process is the act of seeking knowledge, which serves the purpose of producing 'a good man'. 'Good' here refers to the 'justice' (Arabic: *'adl*) one accords oneself in acknowledging God as one's 'Possessor, Creator, Sustainer, Cherisher, Provider' (Al-Attas 1991, p. 23). Al-Attas identifies 'confusion and error in knowledge' as the 'chief cause' of variegated dilemmas engulfing the *ummah*, giving rise to a leadership crisis in all Muslim nations (Al-Attas 1979a, pp. 2–3; Al-Attas 1991, pp. 34–35). 'Knowledge' needs to be differentiated from 'information', which is incapable of raising its seeker to the level of a 'good' man who benefits the rest of mankind due to its limits in not being predicated on divinely determined truth (Wan Mohd. Nor Wan Daud 1989, pp. 3–4). Western-induced secularization has reorientated the purpose

of education towards the mere production of 'good citizens' for the Muslims' respective nation states (Al-Attas 1979b, pp. 32–33).

Islamic education began from informal transmission of material from the Quran, Islam's holy book, and *hadith*[2] collections, which together constitute revealed knowledge. It gradually expanded to encompass formal instruction of Quran- and *hadith*-derived branches of knowledge such as *tawhid* (unitarian theology), *fiqh* (jurisprudence), *tasawwuf* (Sufism or spirituality), *tafsir* (Quranic exegesis), *mustalah al-hadith* (*hadith* methodology), *tajwid* (science of Quranic recitation) and different aspects of Arabic grammar such as *nahu*, *saraf* and *balaghah*. These subjects constitute the traditional Islamic sciences, with *tawhid*, *fiqh* and *tasawwuf* forming a tripartite *fard 'ain*[3] syllabus. As the body of knowledge further expanded, Muslim scholars mastered the worldly sciences, and religious instruction was broadened to incorporate *fard kifayah*[4] subjects such as *al-hisab* (mathematics), *al-handasah* (geometry), *mantiq* (logic), *al-tib* (medicine), *al-jighrafia* (geography), *al-badi'* (metaphor) and *al-bayan* (rhetoric). The classification of knowledge above is generally credited to the Persian scholar Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (d. 1111), whose intellectual legacy remains powerful in Southeast Asia. The medieval sociologist Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) classified knowledge into *'ulum naqlyyiah* (revealed sciences) and *'ulum aqliyyah* (rational sciences), corresponding to the 'perennial knowledge' and 'acquired knowledge' categories proposed by Indonesian educationist Hasan Langgulung (d. 2008). Ibn Khaldun included *ilmu kalam* (theology), *fiqh*, the Quran and *hadith* as *'ulum naqliyyah*, to which Langgulung adds *tasawwuf*, and subsumed mathematics, logic and language under *'ulum aqliyyah*, to which Langgulung adds engineering, medicine, agriculture and other disciplines that we identify today as modern sciences (Abdullah Ishak 1995, p. 45). Among Muslim scholars, there is broad consensus that in any educational system which professes to be Islamic, *fard 'ain* and *'ulum naqliyyah* knowledge should be accorded priority as the core of the curriculum (Al-Attas 1979b, pp. 40–42; Al-Attas 1991, pp. 40–42; Abdullah Ishak 1995, pp. 47–48).

From 610 AD, the Prophet received divine revelations, which were relayed via informal channels to a close circle of relatives and companions in the holy city of Mecca and later spread to the whole Arabian Peninsula through trade networks. The Prophet utilized the methods of lecturing (*kulliyyah*), memorization, discussion (*muhadathah*), dialogue, debating (*mujadalah*), experiencing, travelling (*rihlah*) and study circles (*halaqah*) in imparting his teachings (Mohd. Yusuf Ahmad 2002, p. 68). As the Prophet was *ummiy* (unlettered), he conducted oral lessons of

verses, which were later compiled into the Quran. He operated first from his home, later moving to the house of Al-Arqam ibn Al-Arqam, and upon his migration to Medina in 622 he set up the Masjid Nabawi (Mosque of the Prophet) as his educational base. At this mosque, an adjacent verandah known as al-Suffah became the venue to host formal lessons for visiting delegations from the rest of the Arabian Peninsula (Abdullah Ishak 1995, pp. 26–27; Mohd. Yusuf Ahmad 2002, pp. 54–55). Instructors and scribes were appointed from among the Prophet's companions to disseminate his message of truth. The first primary schools of Quranic teaching by the name of *kuttab* or *maktab* emerged after the Prophet's demise. Interestingly, Christians and Jews formed a high percentage of staff of the schools. Most early *kuttabs* were built next to mosques, but upon expansion of the number of pupils, *kuttabs* were relocated to the houses of teachers and later even to palaces of caliphs and homes of ministers. Having completed *kuttab*-based lessons, students proceeded to the mosque for secondary education (Rauf 1965, p. 14; Mohd. Yusuf Ahmad 2002, pp. 56–62). The prototype madrasah (school) emerged only during Seljuk rule in Baghdad (1055–1194), built by the vizier Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092). Under the rule of Saladin (d. 1193), conqueror of the Fatimids who had founded the renowned Al-Azhar mosque-cum-university in 975, Egypt experienced a proliferation of madrasahs. In time, madrasahs assumed the form of complete educational complexes consisting of mosques, libraries, hostels, lecture theatres and housing quarters for teachers and staff (Rauf 1965, p. 15; Abdullah Ishak 1995, pp. 33–34). Formal Islamic education had thus begun to take shape. Among the distinctive features of the madrasah system is the full subsidization of students, who at the end of their courses were each granted *ijazah*: a certificate attesting to one's proficiency in a discipline of knowledge. In much the same way that the medieval European college can be regarded as having been modelled on the madrasah, the *ijazah* is essentially the forerunner of the degrees awarded by the tertiary-level modern university, whose origins are unmistakably founded in the Islamic *jami'ah* (university) (Al-Attas 1979b, p. 38; Alatas 2008, pp. 28–32).

Globalization of Islamic education in pre-colonial and colonial Southeast Asia

As a faith with an inherent missionary impulse transcending ethnocultural and national considerations, Islam's vitality as a globalizing force has always been beyond doubt. Ever since Islam established a

foothold in Southeast Asia in the thirteenth century via the efforts of Sufi missionaries (Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid 2002, p. 469), the region's Muslims have maintained transnational contacts with peoples of Middle Eastern, Chinese, Indian and European origins. One of the earliest centres of Islamic education in Southeast Asia was the Malay Sultanate of Malacca (1414–1511). Its ruler Parameswara's conversion to Islam, upon his marriage to the daughter of the Sultan of Pasai in 1414, unleashed enthusiasm for Islamic learning among all sections of Malaccan society (Abdullah Ishak 1995, pp. 122, 127). Sultans Mansur Syah (reigned 1456–1477) and Mahmud Syah (reigned 1488–1511) were known to have developed a penchant for Sufi theosophy and great respect for the *ulama* (religious scholars: sing. *'alim*), whom they frequently consulted either through envoys or direct visits to their homes (Abdullah Ishak 1995, pp. 128–129). Malacca's transnational significance is foregrounded by the impression that the subsequent conversion of Java was foreordained in Malacca. Two of the illustrious *Wali Songo* (Nine Saints) deemed responsible for Islamizing Java, Sunan Bonang and Sunan Giri were educated in Malacca under the tutelage of the Jeddah-born Sheikh Wali Lanang (Osman Bakar 1991, pp. 266–267). Both saints studied at the Pulau Upih institution, widely regarded as the precursor of the *pondok*[5] boarding schools that were to sprout up across the archipelago in the coming centuries, as identified by various appellations such as the Persian-derived *langgar*, *pesantren* in Java, *penjentren* in Madura, *surau* in Minangkabau and *meunasah*, *rangkang* and *balee* in Acheh. Following the Portuguese conquest of Malacca in 1511, the kingdom of Acheh (1496–1650) succeeded Malacca as the regional centre of Islamic education, until it fell to the Dutch in the early nineteenth century. Notwithstanding increasing foreign encroachment on its politics and society, colonial Southeast Asia witnessed a resurgence of *pondok* schools through the efforts of *ulama* from Patani in southern Thailand. Links with northern Sumatra, though, were never severed (Abdullah Ishak 1994, pp. 159–160; Abdullah Ishak 1995, pp. 189–191; Roff 2004, pp. 6–7).

The *pondok* or *pesantren* became the standard-bearer of Islamic education in Southeast Asia up till the Second World War. Similarities between *pondoks* were discernible even though the master, or *tok guru*, generally had carte blanche over his particular *pondok*. *Pondok* schools were funded by the surrounding community and imposed no fees, but many developed self-sufficiency out of the students' vocational and agricultural activities. Their length of stay varied according to the number of *kitabs* (religious books) they were learning at the hands of the *tok guru*, assisted

by mature students known as *kepala tala'ah* (perusal heads/tutors). Some students moved from *pondok* to *pondok*, depending on the list of *kitabs* on offer on a particular *pondok*'s syllabus and the fame of a *tok guru*. The duration of their education might therefore extend to over ten years for the committed ones. The teaching and learning process was practically an all-day affair, with intermittent recesses devoted to co-curricular training such as farming and calligraphy. The pedagogy employed by *pondoks* was the *tadah kitab* or *buka kitab* (opening the book) method, wherein a *tok guru* would sit at the centre of a semi-circle *halaqah* formed by his students when delivering lessons, all of them referring simultaneously to the same *kitab*. Memorization of lessons was a regular feature of *pondok* education. The overall system was *umumi* (unstructured/general), meaning that students were neither divided according to age group nor monitored through examinations. Rather, students were graduated by their respective *tok gurus* by way of a simple testimonial of mastery of a subject. Famous *pondoks* in Malaya and Patani in southern Thailand attracted students from as far away as Sumatra and Cambodia.[6]

For *pondok* graduates who wished to pursue higher education in furtherance of their ambitions to become *ulama*, Mecca was their natural destination. Nineteenth-century Mecca was home to a thriving Malay Muslim diaspora known as the Jawi community, boasting prolific scholars such as Daud Abdullah Al-Fatani (d. 1847), Nawawi Al-Bantani (d. 1897), Wan Ahmad Muhammad Zain Mustafa Al-Fatani (d. 1908), Muhammad Arshad Al-Banjari (d. 1912) and Ahmad Khatib Abdul Latif Al-Minangkabawi (d. 1916), the first non-Arab to be appointed imam (prayer leader) at the Masjid al-Haram (Grand Mosque) on behalf of the Shafi'e school of *fiqh*. At the Masjid al-Haram, teaching was conducted via the same *halaqah* system as in *pondoks*. So close was the relationship between Mecca and Southeast Asia that contemporary travel accounts unofficially designated Acheh and Kelantan as *Serambi Makkah* (the forecourt of Mecca). Many of these prominent Meccan-based *ulama* played the dual role of teachers of conventional religious sciences and Sufi sheikhs (spiritual mentors). They bequeathed the *ijazah* (right) to teach their particular *tariqahs* (Sufi orders) to favoured Jawi students, who would then spread such spiritual teachings in Southeast Asia in their simultaneous capacities as *khalifah* (vicegerents) of *tariqah* and *ulama* who founded *pondoks*, which functioned also as Sufi *zawwiyyahs* or *khanqahs* (hospices/hermitages) (Mohammad Redzuan Othman 1998, pp. 146–157; Md. Sidin Ahmad Ishak and Mohammad Redzuan Othman 2000, chapters 1–2; Johns 1993, pp. 53–59; Madmarn 2005, pp. 232–235). As suggested by contemporary colonial-based

documents, both the British and Dutch colonial governments were perturbed by the subversive implications of excessive contacts between the Malay Muslims and their Middle Eastern brethren through the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.[7]

In the 1920s, the flow of Malay students shifted in large numbers to Al-Azhar University in Cairo. Two developments may be cited to explain this shift. First, the advent of the steamship plying the Suez Canal route eased transcontinental transportation. Second, the Wahhabi ascendancy in Mecca following its capture by Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud in 1924 and its subsequent absorption into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932 generated uncertainties.[8] Although Saudi dominion was generally received with composure, the militant excesses displayed by Wahhabi warriors in endeavouring to purify the Islamic faith, for example by levelling the gravestones of the Prophet Muhammad's family members and companions, alienated a significant component of the staunchly Sunni Malay Indonesian community in Hijaz.[9] Al-Azhar went on to play a leading role in Malay Indonesian students' political socialization and informal education, to such an extent that Malay rulers expressed worries over the students' exposure to radical nationalist ideas disseminated by colleagues of other nationalities (Roff 1970, pp. 74–75, fn. 5). Malay and Indonesian students never saw themselves as belonging to separate ethnic nationalities, and organized themselves into a single association (Roff 1970, p. 73; Md. Sidin Ahmad Ishak and Mohammad Redzuan Othman 2000, pp. 48–49). Collaborating with Indonesian anti-colonial activists such as Djanan Thaib, Muchtar Lutfi, Iljas Ja'kub and Mahmud Junus, Malayan students launched two politically aggressive journals, *Seruan Azhar* (Call of Al-Azhar) (1925–1928) and *Pilehan Timor* (Choice of the East) (1927–1928). Free from censorship regulations, these periodicals freely indulged in topics that were taboo back home, focusing on pan-Islamism, pan-Malayism and anti-colonial nationalism (Soenarno 1960, pp. 8–10; Roff 1967, pp. 87–89). Despite recurrent financial constraints, both *Seruan Azhar* and *Pilehan Timor* enjoyed wide subscriptions and unrestricted circulation throughout Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies (Md. Sidin Ahmad Ishak and Mohammad Redzuan Othman 2000, pp. 64–66). The famous remark of a contemporary student, 'In Mecca one could study religion only; in Cairo, politics as well', summarized the prevailing religio-intellectual climate in Egypt.[10]

Upon returning to Southeast Asia, this new generation of Middle Eastern graduates collaborated with the *Kaum Muda* (Young Faction) movement helmed by the Arab-Malay community. Through intermarriage, business enterprises, charitable deeds and the command

of Arabic and religious knowledge, these Arabs had gained entrance into and won admiration from Malay Muslim society (Roff 1967, pp. 40–43). Together with the Jawi Peranakan (locally born Indian Muslims), they started a flurry of publications that highlighted the material backwardness of the indigenous Muslims. Common religious affiliation enabled these Arabs and the Jawi Peranakan to write as Malays and identify themselves with Malay problems (Roff 1967, pp. 47–49; Khoo Kay Kim 1981, pp. 95–96). Operating mainly from the Straits Settlements of Penang and Singapore, their journalistic works escaped the censorship imposed in the Malay states by the Islamic officialdom operating under the auspices of the colonial governments. Four *Kaum Muda* leaders were especially prominent: Sayyid Sheikh Ahmad Al-Hadi (d. 1934), Sheikh Mohd. Tahir Jalaluddin Al-Azhari (d. 1956), Haji Abbas Mohd. Taha (d. 1946) and Sheikh Mohd. Salim Al-Kalali (Roff 1967, pp. 59–65). All had been influenced by, and were in close contact with, the *Al-Manar* (The Beacon) circle in Cairo,[11] and they disseminated their ideas through the periodical *Al-Imam* (1906–1908), which was modelled on the Arabic newspapers *Al-Manar* and *Al-Urwat al-Wuthqa* (The Indissoluble Link) (Milner 1995, pp. 137–145; Azra 1999, pp. 82–92). The *Kaum Muda* refrained from calling for a political overthrow of the colonial government. As panacea to the debilitating effects of colonialism, the *Kaum Muda* prescribed modern education in the form of a madrasah system which would combine the fundamentals of Islamic and Western educational methods and technology (Roff 1967, pp. 75–77). As a largely urban phenomenon, the *Kaum Muda* suffered from a lack of appeal among the rural Malay masses. Constantly pressured from circumscription imposed by the *Kaum Tua* (Old Faction)-controlled religious bureaucracy, the *Kaum Muda* movement had become politically moribund by the 1940s (Roff 1967, pp. 79–81).

Despite its short-lived and relatively minor political impact, the *Kaum Muda* left a perennial legacy in the sphere of education. Its exposé of the woes engulfing the Malay Muslims awakened the society's elites to the urgency of reform if they were not to be surpassed economically and politically in their own homeland. Under the new leaderships of returning graduates from the Middle East, *pondoks* responded to the new reformist wave by converting their *umumi* institutions into madrasahs which adopted the *nizami* (structured) system, whereby students were divided according to proper classrooms based on age groups, taught curricula which incorporated modern sciences alongside the traditional revealed sciences and subjected to written examinations (Abdullah Ishak 1995, p. 196; Roff 2004, pp. 10–13). Beginning with the pioneering

move of Madrasah Al-Ma'arif, founded in Singapore in 1936 by the Sufi-oriented yet reformist-inclined Sheikh Muhammad Fadhlullah Suhaimi (d. 1964), to open enrolment to female students (Ni'mah bt Hj Ismail Umar 1998, p. 62; AlJunied and Hussin 2005, p. 253), madrasahs gradually assumed co-educational status. Fiercely defensive of their independence, many of these reformist madrasahs became the alma mater of many anti-colonial fighters in whom we can detect a peculiar intertwining of Islamic, leftist and Malay Indonesian nationalist ideals. In fact, the first stirrings of Malay Indonesian nationalism were born out of pan-Islamist sentiments whose political ideals revolved around the ideals of Greater Malayan (*Melayu-Raya*) and Greater Indonesian (*Indonesia-Raya*) conceptions of nationhood (Soenarno 1960, pp. 8–10; Roff 1967, pp. 87–89).

Globalization of Islamic education in post-colonial Southeast Asia: Comparing Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia

Post-Second World War decolonization and independence brought new dilemmas for Southeast Asian Muslims, especially with reference to the implementation of Islam in their daily lives, of which education was a cardinal part. Generally, Muslims found themselves at the crossroads between loyalty to the nation-state and allegiance to ideals of Islam, which had figured among the significant forces driving the fight towards political independence. On one side of the coin, some Muslims found themselves in a minority position, with recognition of their political and legal rights being denied, which thus fuelled irredentist demands and separatist movements. They have not only gained sympathy from the *ummah* but have also been at the receiving end of assimilationist policies and repression perpetrated by their own governments. The most prominent cases have been the struggles of the Malay Muslims of Thailand's southernmost provinces, Patani, Yala and Narathiwat, and the Moro Muslims of the southern Philippines. In addition, Singaporean Muslims were instantly transformed from being members of a numerical majority to being a minority when Singapore left the Federation of Malaysia on 9 August 1965. In all three countries, Muslims have been involved in a perennial tussle with their sovereign governments in their efforts to preserve the independence and integrity of a genuine Islamic education. The task has been made especially difficult due to the stigma attached to independent Islamic schools and colleges as being dens of potential insurrectionists – allegedly indoctrinated,

through divisive curricula and stringent educational methods, to fight their infidel governments. The example of Thailand demonstrates how Islamic education has been globalized within a Muslim-minority political milieu.

In southern Thailand, education has been a long-standing bone of contention between the central government in Bangkok and Malay Muslims who have persistently resisted attempts to dilute their Islamicity, which they deem to be inextricably tied to their Malay identity. Since the 1930s, successive Thai governments have endeavoured to coerce the Malay Muslims into dropping Malay and Arabic in favour of the Thai language as their medium of education, and to absorb *pondoks* into the national education system by transforming them into private Islamic schools, which would be eligible for state funding and manpower support but at the expense of stricter regulation. In 1970–1971, legal registration of *pondoks* was enforced and no new ones were allowed to open. In 1982, officially registered *pondoks* legally acquired the status of private Islamic schools, with a discernible change in curriculum content meant to inculcate 'Thainess' as part of the Muslims' national identity (Madmarn 2005, pp. 237–238; ICG 2009b, pp. 2–3). Within Thailand's assimilationist model of national integration, dual ethnonational identities were not recognized. Education became a major tool of the Thai state to effect the transformation of Patani Malay Muslims into 'Thai Muslims', with a corresponding shift in their focus of loyalty from the historic Malay sultanate of Patani to the present Thai state and monarchy (Jory 2007, pp. 260–263, 275).

Nonetheless, Thailand's coercive educational policies merely globalized the practitioners of Islamic education by driving them to pursue higher studies abroad. Ironically, policies designed to stem domestic insurgency had the unintended long-term consequence of introducing Thai Muslim youth to variegated and perhaps even radical strands of Islamic activism imported from South Asia and the Middle East, their two most favoured destinations for Islamic qualifications (Liow 2004a, p. 2; ICG 2009b, p. 2). Alumni linkages led to informal memoranda of understanding and the founding of sister institutions or branch campuses in Thailand. Hence the terrain of Islamic education in Thailand today has been complicated by not only the official private Islamic schools, but also by the stubborn presence of unregistered *pondoks* and the establishment of schools affiliated with foreign-based Islamist movements and NGOs, such as the Jamaat Tabligh from South Asia, the Sufi-inclined Darul Arqam from Malaysia and, most recently, the Muhammadiyah from Indonesia (Horstmann 2006, pp. 73–74; World

Bulletin 2007; Liow 2009, p. 197). At the official level, Wahhabi-Salafi reformism has penetrated Thailand's Islamic educational sphere through the efforts of Dr Ismail Lutfi Japakiya, an alumnus of the Al-Imam Mohammad Ibn Saud University who has successfully brought his wide-ranging Middle Eastern contacts to bear on supporting the founding of the state-approved Yala Islamic University. Amid rumours that Dr Ismail was involved in spreading Jemaah Islamiah (JI: Islamic Congregation) wings in Thailand, plus financial difficulties arising from the post-9/11 moratorium placed on Saudi Arabia-derived funds, he has dexterously aligned himself with state-sanctioned Islamic causes, which included stints in the National Reconciliation Commission and the senate, and as advisor to the *Chularatmontri* or *Sheikh al-Islam* (Liow 2009, pp. 200–204).

The fixation in policymaking circles on the idea that there must have been foreign hands involved in the new cycle of violence since January 2004, which has displayed unprecedented levels of sophistication and coordination (Liow 2004b, p. 536), probably influenced the state's hardline policies, which have seen *pondoks* and their teachers becoming favoured targets for unwarranted searches, interrogation and even abduction (Liow 2004a, p. 2). This only aggravated the situation by setting off Muslim retaliatory incursions that featured daring arson attacks against state schools – the most potent symbol of persecution of Muslims in Thailand (Liow 2004a, p. 531). In actual fact, there is sparse evidence to implicate the global outreach of Islamic educational schemes in southern Thailand in the drastic escalation of religious violence there (Liow 2006, pp. 95–97). The violence has incurred the displeasure of international Muslim NGOs and dented Thailand's image within the *ummah* (Cf. Habibu 2009). The more accommodating policies of governments following the ouster of Thaksin Shinawatra in September 2006 have sought to locate Islamic education as a solution rather than the crux of the southern Thailand problem. For example, in 2007, exchange visits took place between delegations of the education ministries of Thailand and Malaysia in an effort to come up with proposals to reform Islamic education in southern Thailand (Ministry of Education of Malaysia 2009, pp. 81–82, 134). This was a rare acknowledgement of the pivotal role played by Islamic developments in Malaysia in determining the path undertaken by its Malay Muslim brethren in Thailand (Cf. Jory 2007, pp. 263–268). Paradoxically, even if such reforms were undertaken, this would not necessarily be a harbinger of peace, because recruitment of insurgents in southern Thailand schools works through informal educational channels rather

than resulting from skewed interpretations of materials in the formal curricula (ICG 2009b, pp. 6–10).

On other side of the coin, the Muslim-majority countries of Indonesia and Malaysia took distinct paths towards the globalization of Islamic education. The 1945 Indonesian Constitution is essentially a secular document that paves the way for the republic to be governed without recourse to the principles of any religion. Embedded in the preamble of the Constitution are the Five Principles (*Pancasila*) which form the philosophical foundation of the Indonesian nation-state: belief in the one and only God, a just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives, and social justice for the whole population of Indonesia (Hooker 2004, p. 203). In the face of opposition from non-Muslim leaders and secular nationalists, Islamists had to drop the original 'seven words' of the *Piagam Jakarta* (Jakarta Charter), which would have added the obligation 'to implement the *shari'ah*' among Muslims' as part of the government's constitutional responsibilities. In 1959, calls to implement the *Piagam Jakarta* were finally suppressed by Sukarno's presidential decree. However, following the downfall of President Suharto, who had systematically depoliticized Islam and enforced *Pancasila* as the sole ideological basis of lawful organizations, a handful of Islamist parties have resurrected demands for the *Piagam Jakarta* (Azra 2004, pp. 137–140, 145–146).

Ironically, the long-time divorce between Islam and the state throughout both Sukarno and Suharto's protracted administrations (1945–1965, 1967–1998) allowed Islamic education in Indonesia to flourish in the hands of independent civic organizations such as the modernist Muhammadiyah and the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU: Renaissance of *Ulama*), founded in 1912 and 1926, respectively. Throughout this lengthy period of time, the progress of Islamic education was overseen by the Departemen Agama (Department of Religion) rather than the Ministry of Education. However, outright intervention in the affairs of *pesantrens* and madrasahs was precluded by government self-restraint, ever mindful of the longer history and greater hold on society possessed by the civic organizations. Early attempts in 1950–1951 to lower religious content in their curricula failed, as *pesantren* masters were reluctant to accept reforms imposed from a government seen to have come under communist influence (Noor 2008). An ardent admirer of Turkish-imported Kemalist secularism and an exemplar of the inclination among post-colonial Muslim leaders towards ideological hybridism, President Sukarno proudly professed a simultaneous

devotion to non-institutionalized religion and Marxism, seeing no contradiction between the former's theism and the latter's atheism (Geertz 1968, pp. 85–87).

In 1972, Suharto issued a presidential decree to unite the non-religious and religious educational streams under the Ministry of Education, but this proved futile. Only with the inauguration of the Departemen Agama-backed Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAINs: State Institutes of Islamic Studies), which offered an avenue to thousands of *pesantren* graduates to pursue tertiary education and gain qualifications comparable to those obtained by their state school counterparts, did the *pesantrens* warm to the government's integrative efforts. The creation of IAINs was bolstered by several crucial appointments of *pesantren* graduates who had successfully ascended the modern educational ladder, in particular that of Professors A. Mukti Ali and Munawir Sjadzali to the position of Minister of Religious Affairs in 1971 and 1983, respectively (Noor 2008, pp. 17, 20). What emerged from the appointment of scholars to ministerial portfolios responsible for Islam was a research-based emphasis in Islamic education, as amply demonstrated by the less than dogmatic approach adopted by many IAINs which later were elevated to the status of Universitas Islam Negeri (UINs: State Islamic Universities). UINs have proved to be bastions against Islamist radicalism, which elicits more support from Muslim students who underwent modern education at so-called 'secular' universities (Noor 2008, pp. 23–24, 27–30).

In the 1980s, the Indonesian government began sponsoring state *pesantrens* and madrasahs whose curriculum content emphasized modern rather than traditional religious subjects. This move could have been a precursor to the next failed attempt to absorb all religious schools under the Ministry of Education, via a Revised Draft Law on National Education tabled in 1988. Overwhelmed by protests from independent Islamic groups, the final outcome, Law No. 2/1989, upheld non-state operators' rights to provide Islamic education (Noor 2008, p. 21). As a result of the dominance of the 'civic religion' form of Islamic discourse in the Suharto era, Islam became a very important driver for socio-educational change without being overtly political. As confirmed by the results of opinion surveys and general elections, enthusiasm for Islam has not translated into an outburst of support for Islamist political parties, whose scripturalist projection of Islam as necessarily involving imposition of *shari'ah* (Islamic law) is not necessarily attuned to the general understanding of Islam as being primarily a socio-cultural and educational phenomenon (Azra 2004, p. 143; Mujani and Liddle 2004, pp. 110–123). Globalization of Islamic education took the form of

engendering innovative thought and practice, which have made their mark in the *ummah*, albeit amid controversies. Within Southeast Asia, the position of Indonesia as a beehive of novel Islamic thought is undisputed. The hope Bassam Tibi gives to 'Southeast Asian Muslims' to ease 'the desperate situation of Islamic civilization', is especially pertinent to Indonesian intellectuals (Tibi 1998, p. xiv). With reference to the quality of neo-modernist Islamic thought and scholarship as developed by Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid in Indonesia, Greg Barton is firm that 'Indonesia can no longer objectively be said to be of peripheral importance to the Islamic world' (Barton 1997, p. 323). Indeed, Nurcholish's ideas not only influenced Suharto, who eventually made overtures to Islamic civic activism in 1990 through his patronage of the Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI: Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia), but also had a profound impact on Malaysia's Islamist icon Anwar Ibrahim, as embodied in his own concoction of Islam Madani (Civil Islam) which he propagated during his tenure as Deputy Prime Minister (1994–1998) (Barton 1997, pp. 331, 340–341; Noor 2008, p. 22).

In the post-Suharto era, despite rising concern over the global terrorist threat, the 14,000 or so *pesantrens* have largely maintained their independence. The National Education Act No. 20/2003 recognizes three outlets through which Islamic education may be legally transmitted: the formal, non-formal and informal channels; with the latter two, *pesantren* and madrasah education are thereby subsumed into the national education system. Only about 20% of privately educated Muslim *santris* (religious stream students) study using a fully government-instituted curriculum (Yunanto, Hidayat, Wasik and Nuryanti 2005, pp. 40–41). However, research on different varieties of independent *pesantrens* conducted by Jakarta-based RIDEP (Research Institute for Education and Peace) field researchers in 2005, covering West Java, Central Java, East Java and Makassar, reveals that a large number of established independent *pesantrens* had willingly accepted curricula offered by the Departemen Agama and the Ministry of National Education. Although such accommodation may have been piecemeal and ambivalent, the urge among *pesantren* masters to adopt modernizing reforms in management, pedagogy and acquisition of worldly knowledge among *santris* is encouraging (Harun 2005, pp. 59–82; Hidayat and Wasik 2005, pp. 83–108; Nuryanti and Effendi 2005, pp. 109–136). *Pesantrens* are not hotbeds of militancy, dogmatism and educational backwardness, as is often assumed by their detractors. Staggeringly, such observations are even applied to the so-called 'movement *pesantrens*', whose roots can be traced back to S.M. Kartosuwirjo's Darul Islam rebellion against

Sukarno's secular state. As for the surmise that many of them supply foot soldiers for the array of post-Suharto radical Islamist groups that has emerged (Cf. Abuza 2004, pp. 25–41), this is possible only when taking into account the *pesantrens*' informal curricula and alumni networks, which are not necessarily intertwined with those of their official authorities (Yunanto 2005, pp. 137–160).

Lastly, we turn to Malaysia, which enjoys the reputation of being a bright spot amid the generally dismal portrayal of educational levels of the *ummah*. Singer, for example, mentions Malaysia's exceptional success 'in embracing globalization' (Singer 2006, pp. 415–422), and US President Obama acknowledges Kuala Lumpur's 'astonishing progress' (Obama 2009). Nonetheless, Malaysia's embrace of modernization and an open economy is said to have also opened the floodgates to the importation of transnational Islamist personnel and ideologies, including the radical variety. Cause for concern has been found in the fact that Malaysians figure among the most wanted terrorists in Southeast Asia,[12] and that the Malaysian state's weak security controls have rendered it susceptible to exploitation by terrorist networks as a host for radical Islamist websites and front companies, a haven for regional terrorist suspects and a conduit for illegal trafficking of terrorist accoutrements (Abuza 2003, pp. 135–143; Gunaratna 2003, pp. 125–128; Ramakrishna 2005, pp. 349–354, 358–359). For example, a hue and cry has been raised over the role of two private religious schools, Al Tarbiyah Luqmanul Hakiem in Johore and Sekolah Menengah Arab Darul Anuar in Kelantan, both of which have been closed down, in serving as recruitment hubs for the JI network and its alleged Malaysian proxy, the clandestine Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM: Mujahidin Group of Malaysia) (Abuza 2003, pp. 136–137; Rabasa 2005, pp. 103, 105). The KMM, in turn, allegedly harbours furtive connections with certain leaders of Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS: Islamic Party of Malaysia) (Kamarulnizam Abdullah 2005, pp. 39–42), a mainstream opposition party which has helmed state governments of Kelantan (since 1990) and Kedah (2008–2013), and holds executive and religious council positions in Selangor and Penang, respectively through participation in the Pakatan Rakyat (PR: People's Pact) coalition. Both KMM and PAS boast notable transnational connections of their own (Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid 2009, pp. 150–153, 161–162).

In Malaysia, the position of Islamic education is arguably safeguarded by Article 3(1) of the constitution, which states that 'Islam is the religion of the Federation, but other religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation' (Malaysia 1998, p. 1).[13]

Although education is placed under federal jurisdiction in its Ninth Schedule, the technical administration of Islam falls under the jurisdiction of the various states that make up the Federation of Malaysia (Malaysia 1998, pp. 156–157). As such, states have traditionally wielded considerable authority and autonomy over Islamic education, as manifested most clearly in the running of religious schools. However, over the years, this clout has been significantly reduced as the central government tightens its grip over Islamic affairs. The Education Act of 1961 set off a process of absorbing Islamic education into the national educational system. Islamic religious lessons were made a core part of the syllabi in both government primary and secondary schools (Zainal Abidin Abdul Kadir 1994, p. 106). State governments and the Ministry of Education were assigned responsibilities for recruiting the teachers in primary schools and secondary schools, respectively (Abdullah Ishak 1995, pp. 155–157). Thereafter, both state and private Islamic schools registered parallel declines in enrolment (Nelson 2008, p. 209). The time allocation for revealed religious sciences was reduced to make way for more slots for rational sciences, often termed 'secular' subjects. The Malay language replaced Arabic as the medium of instruction in all subjects except Arabic itself. Despite the widening of the madrasahs' syllabi, their constrained budgets meant they were on the losing side vis-à-vis government schools in terms of attracting highly qualified teachers and providing instructional facilities (Che Noraini Hashim and Langgulung 2008, pp. 11–12).

In 1974, the transfer of authority over primary Islamic education from state governments to the federal government was virtually completed (Abdul Halim Hj. Mat Diah 1989, p. 11). The Ministry of Education subsequently established a Textbook Bureau, which controlled the content and discourse of Islamic education by ensuring that schools use only specially approved textbooks written by Ministry-commissioned authors (Abdullah Ishak 1995, p. 179). The founding of an Islamic teacher training college (MPI: Maktab Perguruan Islam) in 1977 launched the drive to fully absorb religious teachers into the federal administrative scheme, culminating in the passage of the 1991 Education Act, which legitimized the transfer of religious educators hitherto regulated by various states' religious councils (Majlis Agama Islam) (Abdul Hamid bin Othman 1993, pp. 60–62). Following the Cabinet Committee Report on Educational Policy of 1979, which criticized the lack of practical aspects in the delivery of Islamic lessons and the methodological weaknesses of Islamic educators (Zainal Abidin Abdul Kadir 1994, pp. 107–108), an Integrated Secondary School Curriculum (KBSM: Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah

Menengah) was launched. Seeking to combine theoretical knowledge with practical skills and moral values, KBSM was purportedly guided by resolutions of the First World Conference on Muslim Education held in Mecca in 1977 (Che Noraini Hashim and Langgulung 2008, p. 13). Since the 1980s, additional core subjects have been introduced to bolster secondary-level Islamic education as a whole. Four of these (all introduced in 1992) also serve as electives for students in the two non-religious streams: higher Arabic language, *Tasawwur* Islam, Al-Quran and Al-Sunnah education and Islamic *shari'ah* education (Ministry of Education of Malaysia 2009, p. 51).

The death knell of independent Islamic education in Malaysia was sounded by the Malaysian government's decision in late 2002 to withdraw automatic per capita grants to private Sekolahs Agama Rakyat (SARs: Community Religious Schools), the successors of the *pondok* tradition. Not a few from among opposition party leaders and scholars related the move to post-9/11 pressure exerted by the United States, Malaysia's largest trading partner (Harakah 2002; Wan Abdul Rahman Wan Ab. Latiff and Kamaruzzaman Yusoff 2004, pp. 3–5). Statistics indicate that when then Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad launched his campaign against SARs, student enrolment in SARs reached an all-time high of 126,000 in 2003 (Muhammad Syukri Salleh and Nailul Murad Mohd Nor 2003, p. 204; Singh 2007, p. 7). Capitulating to grassroots Muslims' protests, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Prime Minister from 2003 to 2009, partially reversed the denial of grants to SARs, and instead sought to woo Muslims back into the mainstream educational system by strengthening the Islamic curriculum of national schools (Singh 2007, p. 13). The most comprehensive effort to date in this direction has been the introduction of the J-QAF programme in primary schools. An acronym for 'Jawi, Quran, Arabic, and *Fard 'ain*', J-QAF employs five teaching models in order to achieve the target of fundamental mastery of these four subjects by the end of a Muslim pupil's primary education (Farid Mat Zain and Ibrahim Abu Bakar 2007, pp. 113–119). Under intense financial pressure, many SARs have effectively foregone their independence in exchange for the status of fully aided government religious schools (SABK: Sekolah Agama Bantuan Kerajaan) (*Utusan Malaysia* 2007, 2008).

The changeover of the stewardship of government from the Islamic-educated Abdullah Badawi to the Western-educated Najib Razak in April 2009 has given no signal that the centripetal drive of officially defined Islamic education would recede. In fact, in a meeting between Deputy Prime Minister-cum-Education Minister Muhyiddin

Yassin, Higher Education Minister Mohamed Khaled Nordin, Minister in the Prime Minister's Department Jamil Khir Baharom and officials from the Department of Advancement of Islam of Malaysia (JAKIM: Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia), it was decided that 'a special committee with representatives from several agencies would be set up to streamline Islamic studies and review several areas, including its curriculum, teachers and their qualifications' (*The Star* 2009). Within the context of state-managed Islamic education in Malaysia, the possibility of an authentic Islamic curriculum[14] taking shape remains remote. Whatever form of globalization emerges with respect to Islamic education in Malaysia, its expression will continually be mediated by the state. The outcome in terms of enforcement of a homogenized form of Islamic orthodoxy, deviance from which is criminalized by states' religious laws, is all too obvious in Malaysia.

Islamic education in Malaysia has lost much of its globalizing potential by making its point of reference the Malaysian nation-state rather than the *ummah*. Policies pertaining to Islamic education were undertaken based upon political expediency. Without breaking the stranglehold that PAS has over SARs in Kelantan, which it ruled in 1959–1978 and has been controlling since 1990, developed through many decades of networking between the PAS *ulama* and the rural masses, it is virtually impossible for the ruling National Front (BN: Barisan Nasional) government to wrest the state from PAS. State-imposed Islamic education has been tailored towards producing compliant *ulama* and religious officials who would fill in positions in the burgeoning Islamic bureaucracy and institutions. The creation of colleges and university faculties offering tertiary Islamic education served as these students' channels to obtain the necessary qualifications so as to be 'eligible for appointments in the public service' (Rauf 1964, p. 99). The establishment of the Islamic Academy at the University of Malaya in 1981 and the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM) in 1983[15] were landmarks in spurring on the production of new cohorts of *shari'ah*-based lawyers, consultants, economists, judges and religious functionaries to fill vacancies in the expanding structure of Islamic administration and the widening network of state-sanctioned Islamic financial institutions (Roff 1998, pp. 221–224). The IIUM, in being jointly sponsored by Muslim countries and using English and Arabic as official languages of instruction, was of course an accomplishment of sorts by the government in the area of globalization.

In 1999, the Malaysian government founded its second fully fledged Islamic tertiary educational institution, the Islamic University College of

Malaysia (KUIM: Kolej Universiti Islam Malaysia), which has since been upgraded to the Islamic Science University of Malaysia (USIM: Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia) in Nilai, Negeri Sembilan. Global recognition for providing a novel form of Islamic education 'not just confined to subjects that are typically associated with Islamic studies' has been identified as one of USIM's achievements in its first decade. USIM prides itself on the fact that 40% of its postgraduate students are foreign nationals, a significant number of whom are native speakers of Arabic hailing from Middle Eastern countries (Najua Ismail 2009, pp. 7–11). In fact, since 9/11, many more of such cohorts of students have chosen Malaysia as their destination for higher studies not only in religious sciences but also in scientific, technological and other professional disciplines (Morshidi Sirat 2008). In its promotion of Malaysia as an international education hub,[16] the Malaysian government has contributed towards reversing the historical anomalies, developed through centuries of inequitable interaction and exacerbated by the dearth of research institutes in the Middle East devoted to the study of Asia and Asians, of a centre–periphery relationship in which Islam in Southeast Asia was viewed condescendingly as being laden with popular indigenous accretions, in contrast with the scriptural and supposedly 'authentic' Islam of the Arabs (Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid 2001, pp. 33–38; Abaza 2007).

Concluding remarks

Global interest in Islamic education has risen tremendously since the launching of the United States-sponsored GWOT, but for probably all the wrong reasons. Attention has inevitably centred on movement-based educational institutions that claim to provide or are portrayed as providing some form of Islamic education, without proper scrutiny as to whether or not the guiding ethos and practices of these institutions conform to the genuine foundations of Islamic education as found in its lengthy and glittering history. In many unfortunate instances, Islamic education has been confused with Islamist education, with 'Islamist' here being adjectival to 'Islamism' rather than 'Islam'. Whereas Islam refers to a religious faith or comprehensive way of life in which a Muslim submits to God spiritually, intellectually and physically as both an individual and a social being, 'Islamism' is ideologically slanted towards tendentious political designs to establish Islam as the supreme creed of a polity and social order (Cf. Norani Othman 2008, p. 265). The ultimate aim of Islam is *mardatillah* (God's pleasure), which would secure salvation for a soul in the hereafter and encourage moral goodness towards fellow humans on earth, whereas the path of Islamism

is overwhelmingly defined by its professed goal of an 'Islamic state' on earth. For the Islamist, it has not been uncommon for the Machiavellian principle of 'the ends justify the means' to take precedence over 'ummatic' pandemonium, which is treated as a necessary evil and temporary sacrifice towards securing the worldly target of a *shari'ah*-based rulership on earth. An Islamist's object of adulation becomes the *dawlah* (state): essentially a nomocracy whose frame of reference is the *shari'ah* – perceived to be immutable, rather than God and the people (Kamali 1993, pp. 21–22). In this, unwittingly or not, the Islamist has secularized the Islamic faith, whose paramount concern lies in the welfare of the *ummah*. The difference between the two categories often escapes the Islamist: while the *ummah* is 'centred on unity in moral values and faith', the so-called 'Islamic state' negotiates its political and legal dimensions through contestations in matters of territoriality, citizenry and governance (Kamali 1993, p. 8). In the history of human civilization, gross injustice and violence have been erroneously justified on the basis of selfish interests related to such political categories.

Islamists have misrepresented Islam by overemphasizing its political and governmental aspects and concomitantly marginalizing the more cardinal aspects of individual and moral regeneration that constitute the true essence of Islamic education (Kamali 2005, p. 292). In its authentic form, Islamic education is necessarily God-centric and *ummah*-centric, and will definitely disavow unjust actions and methods undertaken in the name of Islam. Yet, regardless of the ummatic enthusiasm for the establishment of Islamic schools, colleges and universities, such endeavours rarely involve a bold revamping of the modern educational system to address its epistemological and philosophical shortcomings. On the contrary, they are rather forlorn attempts to preserve Islamic or Muslim identities, even if in only in patches and rudimentary form (Halstead 2004, pp. 519–520). Restructuring educational systems of Muslim nation states is a tall order, necessitating ummatic participation from Muslim scholars, politicians, community leaders, economists and social activists without their being bound by national intricacies and categories. The complexity of this task is borne out by the myriad ways and patterns in which the globalization of Islamic education has been attempted and experienced by Muslim individuals, organizations and governments in Southeast Asia.

Notes

1. In a recent interview with *TIME* magazine, Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono identified 'lack of education, poverty, marginalization

and pockets of radicalism' as some of the roots and causes of terrorism in Indonesia; see Yudhoyono (2009).

2. A *hadith* refers to a saying or action of the Prophet Muhammad as reported by any of his Companions or wives, and passed through successive Muslim generations until ultimately compiled by specialist scholars called *muhaddithin*. In orthodox Sunni Islam, the most authoritative books of *hadith* are the compilations of Bukhari (d. 870) and Muslim (d. 875), followed by those of Abu Dawud (d. 888), Tirmidhi (d. 888), Nasa'i (d. 913) and Ibn Majah (d. 886). The *Sunnah*, a more wide-ranging term literally meaning 'the Prophet's trodden path', is made up of the *hadith*, the Prophet's practice emulated by his Companions and the Prophet's approval of the Companions' deeds.
3. *Fard 'ain* refers to doctrinal and ritual obligations which must be testified to and practised by every adult Muslim, male and female, in order to legitimize his or her Islamic faith.
4. *Fard kifayah* refers to collective obligations; that is, duties that must be observed by at least one unit of a group of believers so as to exempt the others.
5. Derived from the Arabic *funduq*, meaning 'a place of temporary residence'. In the Malay language, *pondok* literally means 'hut'. Traditional *pondok* schools conventionally had student boarding houses resembling huts built around or near the residence of the *tuan guru* or *tok guru*, as the master is known. See Roff (2004, p. 7).
6. For details on the *pondok* educational system and its global outreach, see Abdullah Alwi Haji Hassan (1980, pp. 192–194); Abdullah (1986, pp. 80–107), Abdullah Ishak (1994, pp. 161–167); Abdullah Ishak (1995, pp. 197–218); Roff (2004, pp. 7–9); Madmarn (2005, pp. 225–237).
7. Cf. Roff (1967 pp. 40–43), Reid (1967, pp. 270–271); Abdul Kadir Haji Din (1982, pp. 60–63); Roff (1984, p. 239); von der Mehden (1993, pp. 4, 10, 15).
8. Wahhabism originated from the puritanical teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), who forged a strategic alliance with a tribal leader, Muhammad ibn Saud (d. 1765), in 1744. It is notorious for its *la mazhabi* (anti-sectarian) doctrine enjoining repudiation of the four Sunni schools of *fiqh*, viz. Shafi'e, Maliki, Hanafi and Hanbali, for its excommunication of heretical Muslims and for its zealous combat against purportedly idolatrous and innovative practices that had beset Muslims, many of whom were believed to have come under the undesirable influence of popular Sufism. See Mortimer (1982, pp. 159–169); Sirajuddin Abbas (1978, pp. 309–332).
9. Literally meaning 'the barrier', Hijaz encompasses the vast and lengthy region on the western coast of the Arabian Peninsula stretching south from the Gulf of Aqaba, separated from the African continent by the Red Sea. Its major cities are Mecca, Medina, Jeddah and Taif. Its forcible merger with Nejd by Ibn Saud in 1926 paved the way for the inauguration of the Saudi Arabian state. On the Malay reaction to the triumph of Wahhabism, see Md. Sidin Ahmad Ishak and Mohammad Redzuan Othman (2000, pp. 6, 48).
10. Quoted in Roff (1970, p. 74).
11. The Egyptian Al-Manar circle was led by Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), former Rector of Al-Azhar University and Grand Mufti of Egypt, and his disciple Rashid Rida (d. 1935), both of whom were deeply influenced by the pan-Islamic ideals of Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (d. 1897). While Abduh is widely

regarded as the father of Islamic modernism, Rashid Rida's synthesis of Abduh's thoughts heralded the *salafi* school of Islamic reform which stresses emulating the practices of pious predecessors within the first three centuries of the Prophet Muhammad's demise. In Malaya, the *Al-Manar* strand was to have the greatest and longest-lasting impact among contemporary reformist impulses; see von der Mehden (1993, pp. 13–14); Azyumardi Azra (1999, pp. 79–81).

12. A Malaysian, Noordin Mohammed Top, was responsible for a string of high-profile terrorist stunts including the July 2009 Jakarta hotel bombings before being gunned down in Solo in September 2009. His fellow Malaysian comrade, bomb maker Dr Azahari Husin, was slain during a shootout with Indonesian security forces in East Java in November 2005. Both were linked to the regional JI network.
13. For such an argument relating Article 3(1) to the protection of Islamic education, see Abdul Halim Hj. Mat Diah (1989, pp. 5–7).
14. As conceived, for example, by Professor Syed Naguib Al-Attas; see Al-Attas (1979b, pp. 41–45); Al-Attas (1991, pp. 42–45).
15. Abdul Halim Hj. Mat Diah 1989, p. 22; Muhammad Syukri Salleh and Nailul Murad Mohd Nor 2003, pp. 207, 210.
16. As outlined in the Ministry of Higher Education of Malaysia (2007, pp. 25, 35).

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3

Muslim Travellers in a Time of Globalization: Studying Islam in Cairo Among the Maranaos in the Philippines

Yoriko Tatsumi

Introduction

Let us start with a modest review of how the characteristics of globalization are experienced in the Muslim community in the Philippines. The first factor is the shrinking world. The improvement of communications technology, the emergence of trans-border political actors and easier movement between countries have allowed people to transcend time and space more easily than ever before. Such a development of rapid, close communication is also experienced by the Muslims in the Philippines. For example, in the case of Lanao del Sur province in Mindanao, the site of this author's field survey, the tools for obtaining information have diversified: wireless communication, the permeation of mobile phones, radio and cable TV and so forth. An expansion in networks of supranational entities is also observed on a global scale, such as NGOs, with aid from the United States and Gulf countries reaching (or at least targeting) even the rural villages. Nevertheless, the reach does not necessarily mean that the people can enjoy the fruits of globalization. For example, the Philippine Human Development Report of 2008 shows that all provinces of Autonomous Regions of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) rank bottom in the 2006 Human Development Indices (Human Development Network 2009, p. 10).

Secondly, let us look at the political influence of the global war on terror. Otsuka distinguishes globalization and globalism, and points out that globalization spread pro-American 'globalism', which became a target of a counter movement (anti-America, anti-globalism), and thus for terrorism committed by Islamic radicals, which he calls the paradox

of globalization (Otsuka 2002). In the Philippines, government participation in the global war on terror since 2001 has been regarded as catering to globalism and has provoked pushback from the Muslim community. Disagreement with pro-American diplomacy is nothing new to the Philippines, and this pushback against globalism could have been shared by people across religious lines. However, it was not the case this time, probably because the Muslim population in the Philippines, as a minority, were easily identified as the (potential) anti-globalism force and Muslims had to act against this. Consequently, prejudice against Muslims, and the Islamic faith, has remained a big problem. A survey on social interaction by Human Development Research Report reveals that 33–39% Filipinos are biased against Muslims while only about 14% have had direct dealings with them (Human Development Network 2005, p. 58).

As Abubakar discusses in Chapter 5, in the ARMM region, with the backing of the American military, the Filipino government has effected extensive military control in a rather disorganized manner, changing their course with every administration, and sometimes even during the same administration, resulting in the production of a large number of internally displaced people, particularly in 2003 and 2008. The labelling of Filipino Muslims as a (potential) anti-globalism force has facilitated US intervention, which resulted in a slow but steady militarization despite the common will of the people of the Philippines in the ARMM area.

The diversity of stakeholders and opposing forces that the region contains has intensified militarization. People understand that ARMM governance, which was supposed to deliver equity and hope for peace to the Muslim community, has been a massive failure. There are divisions opening up between ethno-linguistic groups – for example, the identification 'Moro', which was supposed to indicate the people of Mindanao including non-Muslims, is now perceived by young Muslims in particular as a failed coinage attempted by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) – and this is most evident in the dysfunctional autonomy wherein ethno-linguistic groups contest for a bigger share of political posts. Given the disputes that have come to light between the influential members of the various clans, the general public's dissatisfaction and anxiety are variously directed, not only at the government or globalism, but also at the corruption within ARMM and violence within the group.

Thus far, I have highlighted two points, namely the unequal fruits of a smaller world and the political effects and reactions arising from the

global war on terror, as influential elements of globalization affecting the Filipino Muslim community. Based on these social and political factors, let us now consider how the Islamic faith of the people could be formed in a time of globalization by focusing on ways of learning in Islam.

As the war against terrorism intensified in the Philippines, students who studied Islam in madrasah (Islamic and Arabic school) came under suspicion in the eyes of the government and public in the Philippines. As madrasahs in the Philippines are not accredited in the Philippine school system, studying in madrasah is considered unpatriotic and is supposed to be anti-globalism. However, for ordinary Muslims in the Philippines today, it is quite common, at least in childhood, to study there for a few years of elementary education, and among students who are fluent in Arabic, the motivation for studying abroad in Middle Eastern countries is prevalent. Then, what characterizes 'studying Islam' in a time of globalization?

Eickelman and Piscatori pose 'objectification' as a characteristic of Muslims' perception of Islam since the late 1980s (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996, p. 38). Objectification is said to arise in the course of acknowledging Islam as a system that exists in parallel with other religions. This is related to changes in ways of knowing and learning Islam: previously it was learned from the leaders of the community, whereas now it is also learned from the new media such as small leaflets, pamphlets, books, radio, TV and the Internet. In Chapter 10, Mikami points out that 'the absolute levels of trust in religious leaders are low' in the cases of the Philippines and Thailand. Higher education regards Islam as one of many subjects of study. This results in recognition of Islam as an object, and Eickelman and Piscatori also suggest that the objectified way of conceiving of Islam develops a new public space where people acknowledge other religions as equals of Islam.

Objectification is an important aspect to consider in analysing understanding of Islam among Muslim students studying abroad. However, as this study focuses on the Philippine case, I must quickly add certain points. First of all, as Filipino Muslims are a religious minority, objectification is not a new conception. Filipino Muslims have always been placed in the middle of interactions between the colonial powers and the Christian majority, where there was always a vector for objectification. This was a key vehicle for making the community functional while maintaining a distance from the colonial settlers and the national majority. In other words, to discuss the objectification of Islam, a post-colonial (neo-colonial) perspective is required; the process of colonization from the colonial period to the present must be considered.

Secondly, what is more important is the impact of globalization. Does globalization foster objectification of Islam? Apparently yes. In fact, however, the revolt against globalism and ultimately the assertions of aspiration to join together with the *Dar-al-Islam* can magnify Islam's impact through the permeation of media. Instead of perceiving Islam as one of the social systems as Eickelman and Piscatori do, it is possible to see Islam's strong orientation towards universalization as being intensified. It can also be conceived that when it is stigmatized as a potential anti-globalism force, the revulsion that then develops may cause a more moderate force to become radical. Some of the radicals in the Philippines who are regarded as being related to the Jama'a Islamia are no exception.

Also, Islam's orientation towards universalization is manifested by many different groups. Salafism accommodates a strong Saudi Arabian influence, and it has come closer to Filipino Muslims via booklets, TV and migration for both religious and non-religious reasons, and its reception has accelerated, as it is linked with the aspiration to become more Islamic. On the other hand, idealization of the Arabs and Arabic Islam – that is, Arabization – is also progressing. As such, analysis of objectification of Islam in the Muslim community on a micro level requires post-colonial (neo-colonial) analysis, and also has to take into account different orientations towards universalization.

This study first reviews the post-colonial (neo-colonial) situation surrounding secular/Islamic education in the Filipino Muslim community and the progression of Arabization. Following this review, the study then discusses what it means for ordinary Muslims of today to learn Arabic and study Islam. Although the problems above concern all Muslims in the Philippines, due to the limitations of the data from this point on I will focus my argument on the case of the Maranaos, one of the main ethno-linguistic groups composing the Muslim population in the Philippines. In 2000, the Maranao population was around 1,036,000 (Human Development Network 2005, p. 15). Maranaos share a common language (Maranao) and their geographical origins are around Lake Lanao, now in the province of Lanao del Sur on the western part of Mindanao Island in the Philippines.

Ulama in Maranao society

In Maranao society, *ulama* or Islamic intellectuals were the people in the community who had knowledge of *taritib* and *igma* and helped the governing Datu, and were given honorific titles such as *kali* (judge), *wakil* (judge's assistant), *imam*, *tuan* (mosque manager) and *katib* (imam's assistant). *Guro* were also present in the community as teachers of the

Quran and Arabic language. These *ulama* belonged to the Datu class and had inherited their status through a specific ancestry including the title Datu. Some also had the title *sharif*, or *sarip*, indicating a genealogical relationship with Prophet Muhammad (Kawashima 2004, p. 232).

In the Philippines, over the centuries, Arabic education had been provided mainly at the houses of *guro* or a mosque, and these classrooms were called *maktab*. *Mulid* (boy and girl students aged six to ten) learned reading and writing of the Arabic language and how to recite the Quran at the houses of *guro*, as elders who were known for their godliness and knowledge of the Quran (Boransing, Magdalena and Lacar 1987, p. 9). At *maktab*, correctly reciting the Quran was emphasized rather than understanding the content. When *mulid* successfully learned to read one *juz'* of the Quran, their parents gave gifts to the *guro*. Memorization of all 30 *juz'* was recognized as graduation from the *maktab*, which was supposed to require one to three years.

Kitab, the Islamic textbook written in Malay, was used for Islamic education centring around *guro*. The *kitab* was brought back by Maranao who were engaged in trading. Maranao merchants joined in the pilgrimage to Mecca, learned Malay when they berthed their ships at Johor or Singapore for a long period of time and acquired Islamic learning. They were influenced by the Malays' unique Islamic knowledge and society, and brought back commentaries on the Quran and *hadith* to their region (Kawashima 2004, p. 234).

Malay texts, however, are not used today in madrasahs. Starting around the latter part of twentieth century, Maranaos reformed Islamic education and built madrasahs with grades, where Arabic and local languages are used as the medium of instruction. After one Maranao studied Islam and came back from Mecca, on his return he built a new school with instruction in the Arabic and Maranao languages. He had a connection with a sheikh in Saudi Arabia, and after he returned to his community, more Maranaos became willing to study Islam in Saudi Arabia.

Studying abroad

A programme for sending Philippine Muslims to Egypt was officially started around the 1960s. A Maranao politician attending the first Asia-Africa Conference, which was held in 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia, struck up a close friendship with Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Not long after that, the first students from the Philippines were sent to study in Egypt, and teachers of Islamic studies and Arabic were

dispatched from Egypt to the Philippines. In 1962, Cultural Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United Arab Republic followed, and 10–15 Filipino students were dispatched to study in Egypt.

In Maranao society, a student who has returned after their studies in the Middle East has since then been differentiated from the *pandita, kali* and *guro,* who are the traditional Islamic scholars, and is called an *alim/a* (*ulama* in plural). These new scholars have worked actively, by delivering sermons at mosques and teaching in madrasahs, or Islamic schools, to make the local practice of the faith conform as closely as possible to the tenets of Islam. In 1983 there was a total of 987 madrasahs and 3,095 religious teachers with 1,32,811 pupils in the 13 provinces of the autonomous regions.[1] According to Hassoubah's research, 72% of the madrasahs opened before 1980 were established from 1972 to 1978 (Hassoubah 1980).

Facing ethnic and religious clashes at the end of 1960s to the 1970s, some of the students-turned-*ulama* became active in social and political reform. Their political stances were various: from those joining the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, such as the late Chairman Hashim Salamat, to those who were founding members of the *ulama* political party and joined national politics. Motilan, one of the most famous *ulama* among the Maranaos, was inspired by how the Christian minority was treated in Egypt, where he finished his Ph.D., and upon his return he advocated for the necessity of political reform initiated by *ulama* (Kawashima 1999).

After foreign-bred *ulama* increased in number, locally educated religious leaders eventually started to be pushed into the shadows. When the foreign-educated teachers came back and built their own madrasahs from the end of the 1960s, many of the students who had been studying at the former madrasahs left for the new ones. Part of the attraction was the more institutionalized education they offered, following curricula taught in the Middle East. Some of the students had even received donations from organizations in the countries where they had studied, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Libya, to found large madrasahs in their local communities.

For some locals, these changes in the society are proof that they, at the periphery of the Muslim world, have been connected to the centre. They proudly refer to this phenomenon as an Islamic resurgence in Maranao society. For others, however, this is nothing but one-sided Arabization. Some NGOs react against this and call for modest approaches to Islamic practices. They claim that some of the *ulama* are careless in distinguishing Arabization from Islamic reform.

Today, although some participate in politics and administration, the majority of the foreign-educated *ulama* teach at madrasahs, deliver sermons at mosques, give advice in accordance with Islamic law and local values, and work as consultants on the daily concerns of the people. As far as Muslim youth are concerned, it is quite common for them to study in madrasahs for at least a few years of elementary education in childhood. As madrasahs in the Philippines are not accredited in the Philippine school system, students who wish to study in both secular and Islamic institutions study in madrasahs during holidays when the secular schools are closed. Meeting people's needs for combining Islamic and secular educational systems, some private schools advocate a combined curriculum. Those schools are called back-to-back schools, which means they provide classes to meet both the secular and Islamic curriculum.

One characteristic of Arabic students who study abroad today is that many of them are not born into families of *katib* or *ulama*. Instead, those who do well in Arabic language or Islamic studies in madrasah are motivated to study abroad in Arab countries. Some madrasahs in Marawi City today have agreements with the al-Azhar Institute and madrasahs send good students to study there who meet the requirements. In such cases, the students today can enrol in al-Azhar without prior language training in Cairo.

Another characteristic of the students is that many of them are also educated in secular schools, and some in higher education. In fact, the students today pursue higher levels of Arabic and Islamic studies and at the same time receive higher education at secular schools in the Philippines. While few of the Filipino students at al-Azhar who started their studies between the end of the 1950s and the middle of the 1960s received secular education in the Philippines (Kawashima 2006, p. 189), among the 16 students from whom I collected life histories during my research in 2000, 2001 and 2006 there were four bachelor's degree holders at secular universities, while only one stopped secular education at elementary school. Not a few students studying in Egypt today came from back-to-back schools.

In the sections below, based on my fieldwork, I would like to introduce some of the experiences of the students. The names appearing here have all been changed to preserve anonymity. I carried out field research in Cairo from August to September in 2000, January to March in 2001, February in 2006. My research includes collecting life histories and participant observation of the daily activities of the students. In 2000, 399 students belonged to the Philippine Student Association in Cairo and

the majority of them were Maranos. Among these, 26 are master's, 290 undergraduates, 27 high school, 26 primary and 11 elementary school students. Among university students, the majority are al-Azhar students, many of whom study at Islamic Law or Theology departments. Many of the students are around the twenties in age, graduates of madrasahs in the Philippines established by *ulama* who returned from study in Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Among around 400 Filipino students, I have collected life histories of 16 students. In addition to the research in Cairo, this study also relies on my research in Manila and in Lanao del Sur province, mainly in the capital city of Marawi, where I have also collected life histories of 31 students and former students and participant observation of their daily activities.

Departure

For many Maranao students, studying Islam abroad in Egypt is a journey to becoming a different person called an *alim/a*; this is the first and last trip that will shape their entire life. For a new traveller, the moment of departure is filled with anxiety and passion. There are often problems in arranging visas and passports; in the case of one male Maranao student named Sohaily, for example, after he was recommended from the madrasah and was accepted to enrol in al-Azhar it took three years before he was actually able to travel. In the three years that he was waiting for his visa in Manila, he had decided that if he could not get to Egypt, he would try to go to Malaysia instead. The International Islamic University is in Malaysia, where students can study English, Arabic and Islamic studies; however, most Filipino students understand that al-Azhar has a history, with a top-class graduate school for Shafii law. Also, for many Maranao students, it is most prestigious to study at the al-Azhar University, as it has produced many well-known Filipino *ulama*. For this reason, Egypt has a special significance as a destination. Just as Sohaily was at his wits' end and half considering giving up, the visa was finally ready and he was soon able to leave; a few days later he departed for Cairo. For many madrasah students, studying at al-Azhar is itself a dream come true.

Living in Cairo

Maranao students keep in close contact with each other, and marriage is common among them. Relatives and villages of origin count, and upon arriving in Cairo, while most female students stay in the dormitory, male

students stay with relatives or with people from the same village, and later on start to rent small rooms themselves.

There are many cases of financial hardship among them. Students live off a scholarship from al-Azhar University, but it is usually paid late. At the time of my research in 2000, approximately E£70 of their E£165 stipend was paid to the dormitory, and the female students smilingly confessed that there was little left over at the end of the month and so they would prefer to stay on the premises. In this situation, some Filipino students used to make money by going to Saudi Arabia on short pilgrimages, where they sold cheap clothes and everyday goods to the Filipinos there and then shoes and gold to the Christian Filipino workers in Egypt; but this still would not provide enough money. Even if they inform the university of their hardships, they think that the chances of anything being done about it are slim, and so the Filipino students instead choose to stay in close contact and help each other out.

Studying Islam

Life is hard for students abroad but they enjoy the feeling that they are now in an environment dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge. The religious texts that they must read seem endless: the amount of reading materials related to Islamic law is huge, and they explained that they have to read more in one term than the entire collection of the madrasah library back home. Due to the lack of teachers in their country, many students had already started to teach after completing the primary school level in madrasah. Students now feel that they would be able to teach in a completely different way after studying abroad.

However, due to the complexity of al-Azhar University's administration and differences in education style, many students expressed their dissatisfaction with the classes. Some complained that the teachers were not very attentive, announcing requirements just before the exams, or the required books are so expensive that they could not afford them. There is the pressure that if they fail exams, the university may cut their scholarship.

Students in this situation try to take full advantage of their position of being far away from their home country. According to Abaza, the Indonesian students at al-Azhar University believed that 'In the end we did not come for the Shahada (B.A. certificate) but to seek *ilm*, and *ilm* need not be restricted to the university' (Abaza 1994, p. 130), which is true for the Maranao students as well. Students enjoy reading small books and pamphlets circulated in the Islamic world, available at

downtown Cairo. Their favourites include books on politics written by political scientists and philosophers in Qatar or Pakistan. Male students join seminars to share insights on current world issues. Books written in English are also circulated among the Maranaos, which include Philippine history books and small leaflets discussing differences and commonalities of Christianity and Islam, among others.

Also, in the case of today's Marano male students, they consider that spending their time travelling away from Cairo is equally important as studying in class. Their travels are not just pilgrimages, but extend as far as other Middle Eastern and European countries, and it also includes part-time or temporary work as professionals such as bilingual (English-Arabic) translators at Philippine embassies in Arab countries.

Some students admitted that they chose to come to Cairo not just to sit in classes but to build networks starting from Cairo. Some students create a network composed of individuals as well as with Islamic organizations in various countries. This happens when they meet graduates of al-Azhar University (Azharis) or just happen to come to know donor organizations while travelling. Students are proud to be 'Azhar products', which underpins their life as intellectuals.

Returning home

For many Maranao students, it is difficult to decide when they should go home to the Philippines. Those who have married during their stay in Cairo have to wait for their partners to finish their studies. For other students too, it takes time to decide when to return home because they would like to make sure that they are all ready for their new lives as foreign-educated *ulama*. This is especially true for the male students. Many male students reported that they did not want to go back home right after the graduation. They feel they need time or even postpone their time for graduation because their expectations of becoming *ulama* include the struggle to raise their social and economic status. Some try to earn a little money before they finally return home because, according to them, '*ulama* cannot help people at home without some capital in hand'. This makes their stays abroad even longer, their travels even more extensive.

Travel starting from Cairo brings about not only financial but other opportunities as well. Here, I would like to introduce one example of a student named Alaudin, whose student life abroad involved plenty of travelling. He went to live in Cairo in 1982 at the age of 16. His family had wanted him to study in Egypt since he was a child, and he

himself longed to be with his uncle, a respected *alim*. He had heard that an Egyptian Arabic teacher in his madrasah was returning home, and he asked if the teacher would be able to take him along. He could only speak minimal Arabic, but although he was not able to properly communicate with this Egyptian teacher, he managed to make his way to Cairo.

After that, Alaudin's life in Cairo involved a great deal of travel using his Arabic skills, while he maintained his connections with the Egyptian and Filipino governments. The first time that he left Cairo was in 1985, when he attended a meeting of foreign students in Alexandria. In 1989, he was chosen by the government as one of four people from Africa and two people from Asia who were paid to make a pilgrimage. In 1994 and 1995 he made presentations at a United Nations (UN) Conference of Muslim students and in 1997 he stayed in Saudi Arabia on an *umrah* (pilgrimage) visa. As an *umrah* visa allows a longer stay than a hajj one, he stayed for some time with his relatives who had made their fortune working for over 20 years in Saudi Arabia. In 1997, he was selected once again by the Egyptian government and travelled to a UN Conference of Muslims in Turkey, where he made a presentation as the representative of the Asian Muslims' team. In 1997 he worked for two weeks as the interpreter for ex-President Fidel Ramos' visit to Oman. In 1998, this led to a two-year commission as an interpreter for the Philippine embassy in Oman, and he was making approximately US$600 per month at the time.

Even though it was either part-time or irregular work, Alaudin gained plenty of work experience at the embassy during his travels. Through 20 years of life abroad, his first priority was to excel in the Arabic language and Islamic knowledge. For him, becoming *ulama* required studying in Arab countries around Egypt. However, in his view an *ulama*'s knowledge must extend not only to Arabic and Islamic studies but to other academic fields, which includes a good command of English, knowledge of politics in general and also Philippine law. Thus he actively participated in journeys so that he could have a good command of Arabic and English, and could also gain experience with speeches, presentations and translation. He said that he spoke Arabic language to his children, hoping that they would study in Arab countries in such academic fields as medicine or law.

This is not uncommon, and there are many students who gain work experience; it is commonly considered that is part of the study experience. Also, the students create a network of individuals as well as Islamic organizations in various countries. Upon returning home, some

ulama end up receiving funding for their madrasahs back home from various Middle Eastern charitable organizations and NGOs. This happens via contacts among the students at al-Azhar University, or when they just happen to have contacts with donor organizations during their travels.

Students are all well informed that sooner or later they will have to go home at least once. A significant event for them before their departure is buying lots of Islamic books in bookstores in central Cairo. They all are waiting for the right time for this final ritual.

Seeking knowledge in a time of globalization

Sociological studies on journeys explain that, in a globalized world, a journey is accompanied by a sense of déjà vu, becoming an act of tracing something already experienced through the Internet or guidebooks or pioneers' how-tos. Travellers who seek for authenticity are usually unsuccessful because the spaces are already set up in accordance with the tourist gaze. Further, Urry mentions that there are some tourists who even enjoy the lack of authenticity; he calls them 'post-tourists' (Urry 1995, p. 140). In the Islamic world, Mecca, Medina and, later, Cairo have been deemed to be the centres of Islamic knowledge by Muslims from far away, such as those from Southeast Asia. Yet, students today can study the Arabic language or Islamic studies in the United States or in Western countries. Some university classes are available on the Internet as well. Then, what is the significance of travel seeking for knowledge: the act of moving to the place where classes are actually offered? In a globalized world, is the 'déjà vu of a novel encounter' present among the students learning Islam?

The travel of the students of Islam is not a packaged or collective tour with information from guidebooks and the Internet, and for many students who had never even travelled to Manila, it is truly a once in a lifetime experience. However, they are very conscious and well informed of the procedures of the journey, and what needs to be done to progress as an *alim/a*. There is a gender difference to this procedure, as many female students usually do not consider options other than returning home as soon as they complete their study. For male students, as many of them have studied for quite a long time back home, and some have even been madrasah teachers, they all know studying in Cairo is just a preliminary to being an *alim*. This is quite different from the students of a former generation who themselves enjoyed the privilege of being pioneers in their communities as 'foreign-educated'.

The real quest for Maranao male students today rather starts from Cairo. As in the cases described above, for some students finishing one degree indicates that they are already on the way to their next life phase, in which students travel, work and study. For community members at home, too, as far as I have observed, repeated travel with work experience is not a condition for one to become a religious leader, but it does not hinder one from becoming a religious intellectual. Back home, some senior *ulama* may lament that boys today are fond of roaming around. Generally, however, people think that one cannot be a good religious leader until he has gone through lots of hardships in life to reach a certain stage. Study-and-travel is one of the criteria whereby people recognize their community leaders after they return home. The students as travellers are, therefore, very much meeting the expectations of the community.

One important point is that, even in a time of globalization, the authenticity of the Arabic language is important for non-Arabic Muslims like the Maranaos. For the Maranaos, the al-Azhar Institute has long been the hub of Islamic learning. Obtaining a degree in Islamic studies there is considered equivalent to attaining the pinnacle of knowledge in the Shafii school of law. This is why the youth of Maranao society prefer to go to study in the Middle East rather than in Indonesia, Malaysia or another nearby Islamic country. A significant reason for the orthodoxy accorded to the world of Middle Eastern Islam, aside from the name value of schools like al-Azhar, is that it lies within the Arabic-speaking sphere. Maranao students often sigh, saying the language in the Quran is written in 'too deep an Arabic'; the multiple connotations its words contain trouble learners. For those who live outside the Arabic-speaking spheres, going to study abroad in Egypt or Saudi Arabia is a chance both to study Islam and to learn the sacred language of Arabic in the best way possible. Thus the *ulama* who have attained the pinnacle of Islamic knowledge represent dreams come true.

Also, it is important to note that for the Muslim students from the Philippines, being an Azhari functions as a passport to the wider Islamic world. Compared with Indonesian Azhari students who are considerably larger in number, students from the Philippines today form an ignorable minority for the al-Azhar University itself. However, it is different for the students. As the case of Alaodin stated above, some Filipino students try to make the most use of the cultural and political opportunities of being an Azhari. Studying in Egypt enabled some of the Maranao students to become representatives of a Muslim minority of a Christian nation, and in a sense, to be representatives of the Philippines.

Appadurai classified modern globalization as a complex series of many interwoven flows. According to his work, contemporary urban space is an imaginary space consisting of five 'scapes' (ethnoscape, mediascape, technoscape, financescape, and ideoscape) (Appadurai 1996, pp. 33–37). Considering the Middle East and the Philippines, the biggest flow has been that of overseas workers. Since the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was established in 1974 to encourage working abroad, the Middle East is one of the largest receiving regions for both Muslims and Christians (Wadi 1999, p. 15). In 2008, for example, 51.1% of all the new hires and rehires of overseas Filipino workers were in the Middle East.[2] The travel of students to Cairo does not itself correspond to this particular labour flow, but remittances from the workers helped construct mosques and madrasahs, and helped Moro movements from the 1970s onward. During my research, not a few students told me that they would meet relatives working in Saudi Arabia during their visit. The geographical proximity to, and the language use of, the labour-receiving countries influence how the students design their lives after their studies.

A Maranao once explained the rationale of studying Arabic, saying 'we cannot compete in English, so we learn Arabic instead'. English has been, to the Muslims in the Philippines, the language of the colonizers. To this day Maranaos proudly announce that they fiercely resisted secular and English education imposed by the US colonial government, and studying the Arabic language and Islam is, to them, a way of safeguarding their traditions and religion.

Today, Maranaos value both secular and English education highly. As stated above, many of the students who study Arabic and Islam in Cairo today are educated at secular schools as well. However, the colonial situation still persists in that the Muslim areas lag farthest behind in terms of educational and social development. For example, even Mindanao State University, situated in the capital of Lanao del Sur province, and founded amid much fanfare about the unity of the people through Muslim education, admits relatively few Maranaos. The armed struggle for independence that has been ongoing since the 1970s resulted not only in many victims, but also in a low rate of development and education. This has forced the Maranaos into a position of competitive inferiority vis-à-vis their Christian counterparts.

Job opportunities after graduation always affect a student's choices of which schools to attend and what to study. Among the young students in the Philippines, schools providing a high level of vocational training in a particular field or an advanced degree are popular, and

the demand for vocational schools providing instruction in childcare and nursing care for the elderly is enormous, as is the demand for technical schools and colleges specializing in computer science and other technical fields. Many such schools in the Philippines have cooperative agreements with similar educational institutions in other parts of the world, and these attract a considerable number of students, who are assured that the degrees they earn in the Philippines will be recognized by schools abroad. At least part of the Philippine educational industry thus wins the support of Filipinos by depending on the global labour market.

All this shows the characteristics of Arabic learning in the Philippines. Learning Arabic instead of English itself means both accommodation and resistance to the neo-colonial situation built on English-based education supported by global labour markets. For Maranaos, learning Arabic itself does not ensure a better life, but studying Arabic is one of the means of creating their own comfortable space that fulfils the sacred and secular needs of their lives.

Conclusion

This study has focused on the Islamic faith of ordinary people involved in globalization, particularly their aspirations to learn Arabic and Islam. It brought to light a facet of the Islamic intelligentsia that differs from the traditional image, wherein the public that receives Islamic knowledge is at one end of the spectrum and the elites who are engrossed in Islamic knowledge are at the other. It is impossible to assume an ignorant public and lopsidedly resourceful elites in a globalized age. *Ulama* today cannot design their careers without comparing themselves with their former classmates in secular schools who proceed to study at universities in the United States, for example. In this sense, the Arab world as the centre of knowledge is objectified even before they actually start on their journey. However, for some students, studying Arabic language and Islamic knowledge in Cairo is attractive because the 'centre' of the knowledge still very much works to fulfil their academic zeal, to meet their responsibilities as bright students and to bring them hope for a better future.

What requires attention here is the fact that people today have quite significant aspirations for migration, on a scale that is much greater than can be accommodated by 'studying at Cairo'. Also, we must look to the reality that journeys in pursuit of knowledge are carried out beyond institutionalized education abroad. For example, although they

are small in number, there are Muslims who travel to madrasahs in Pakistan. This journey is clearly different in nature from the objectified kinds of journeys mentioned above. How would this kind of journey reconstruct Muslim awareness? In addition, the increasing number of participants in the Tablighi Jama'at owes much to the fact that this movement casts short-term travel as a key constituent of its activities. The 'religious' journeys in this movement clearly reflect people's travel aspirations, but this may require a different explanation.

Thus far I have argued that studying Arabic and Islam may provide Muslim youth with realistic tactics for both living in accordance with Islam and becoming economically autonomous persons. Even though repeated journeys may provide male Muslim students with some networks, it does not alter the fact that they are marginalized players in a capitalized society. However, from here, we can see a picture of people who are not mere passive recipients, despite being embroiled in globalization. The people are not submissively accepting globalization, nor are they blindly calling for anti-globalism, but they are trying to modify it to make it accessible to them. They do not simply accept and respond to globalization, but give it a different meaning. Therefore, if we look closely, we can see the first seeds of globalization growing from one of the margins of the world.

Notes

1. Ministry of Muslim Affairs, 1983, quoted by Che Man (1990, p. 58).
2. Statistics available on official website of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (http://www.poea.gov.ph/stats/2008_stats.pdf).

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4

Ghazwul Fikri or Arabization? Indonesian Muslim Responses to Globalization

Martin van Bruinessen

Globalization perceived as a threat: *ghazwul fikri* or Arabization?

In the 1990s, discussions in circles of committed Muslims in Indonesia were enriched with the concept of *ghazwul fikri* (*al-ghazw al-fikri*, invasion of ideas), which became a catch-all term to refer to various forms of Western cultural invasion: the impact of American movies, popular music, dance and dress styles on Indonesian popular culture, the emergence of middle-class lifestyles with 'Westernized' consumption preferences, and above all certain styles of religious thought and attitudes towards religion that the speakers disapproved of, notably secularism, liberalism and the idea of religious pluralism.

Critics were quick to point out that this concept was itself a symptom of another kind of cultural invasion. The term *ghazwul fikri* was part of a much larger complex of ideas, an entire *Weltanschauung*, that was adopted lock, stock and barrel from Middle Eastern Islamist sources and propagated by certain local actors backed up by lavish funding from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries.[1] Many Indonesian Muslims were much concerned at what they perceived as a concerted effort to Arabize Indonesian Islam and wipe out local practices and liberal interpretations that had been influential among wide segments of the population. Against a perceived Arab-style 'political Islam', prominent intellectuals pleaded for what they called 'cultural Islam': the expression of Islamic values in Indonesian cultural forms.

Both the proponents of the *ghazwul fikri* thesis and the opponents of Arabization appeared to share the perception that Indonesian Islam was

under threat of being subverted by foreign influences and the assumption that local cultures are largely passive recipients of global flows. In their call for resistance, however, they implicitly conceded the possibility of rejection or selective adoption of 'foreign' ideas and practices. In fact, Indonesia's highly distinctive cultures are not the product of relative isolation from foreign influences, but came about precisely because of centuries and millennia of active interaction with powerful cultural flows that reached the archipelago from across the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.[2] Cultural borrowing was a creative process, in which the 'foreign' elements were soon incorporated into a distinctively local synthesis.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the dominant global flows impacting on Indonesia, each supported by communities of settlers, hailed from three powerful centres: the West, the world of Islam and China. As a nation, Indonesia was shaped by Dutch colonialism and Islam-inspired resistance to foreign domination. Colonial rule, gradually expanding during this period, integrated the various regions of insular Southeast Asia under a single administration and introduced new ideas and practices in law, education and associational life. Islam had come to Indonesia from various parts of Asia and in many different forms, but in the nineteenth century it was Arab traders from Hadramaut and hajis, local men who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca, who were the most important cultural brokers. Like the colonial administration, networks of Muslim learning and trade transcended ethnic boundaries; for both, moreover, the Malay language, with its numerous Arabic loanwords, was the preferred medium of communication.[3] The Malay language, and other cultural expressions associated with it (poetry, song, music), came to constitute the core of Indonesia's national identity.

Muslims have always looked towards Mecca and Medina as the prestigious heartland, and many travelled there not only to fulfil a religious obligation but to gain spiritual power and prestige. Upon their return, they often attempted to reform local religious practices and bring them more in line with what they had witnessed in Arabia. The history of Islam in Indonesia is one of wave upon wave of reform, brought about by these returning pilgrims, after which the reformed practices and beliefs were soon accommodated in new local adaptations or gave rise to anti-reformist protests (Ricklefs 1979, 2007; van Bruinessen 1999).

The regular communications with Arabia were not the only 'foreign' factor impinging on Indonesian Islam, however. The leading nationalists of the early twentieth century had received their education in Dutch schools and had no access to Arabic texts. Those among them who were committed to Islam and considered Islam to be part of Indonesia's

national identity in many cases depended on Dutch scholarship on Islam and a Dutch translation of the Quran. The first association of such Muslim intellectuals, Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB, Young Muslims' League, established in 1925), published its journal, *Het Licht* (The Light), in Dutch rather than Malay. The discussions in the association also indicated a quite Westernized approach to Islamic issues (Saidi 1989). Around the same time, the Ahmadiyah[4] also began to gain influence in the same circles, due to its English-language publications and the English-speaking missionaries it had sent from British India to Indonesia. Yet another significant European contribution to the distinctive character of Indonesian Islam concerned its associational life. The major Muslim associations, such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, were established according to Dutch Indies legislation and followed the model of Dutch Christian religious associations, also in terms of the type of activities they engaged in.

In a much earlier period, there had also been a distinctive Chinese component in Indonesian Islam, still recognizable in the architecture of certain mosques and saints' shrines.[5] The role of Chinese Muslims in the conversion to Islam of Java's north coast remains a highly controversial subject, but in the past decade, recent Chinese converts to Islam have made an effort to highlight and revive the relations between China's Muslim communities and those of Indonesia.[6] Similarly, there are clear traces of Muslim influences hailing from various coastal regions of India in the early phases of Islamization, and in the twentieth century we find that various South Asian reform movements also made incursions in Indonesia.[7]

In summing up, we may state that the global flows impacting on, or interacting with, Indonesian Islam have been highly diverse and have originated from different cultural regions. 'The Middle East' and 'the West', which both include distinct sub-regions, have been the dominant and to some extent competing sources of the flow of ideas, with minor and less immediately visible roles being played by China and South Asia. Indonesian actors, both individuals and associations, had much more agency in this process than the discourse of 'cultural invasion' or 'Arabization' suggests, as the following sections will show.

Studying Islam in the West: The New Order and its favoured Muslim discourses

Indonesians who wished to increase their knowledge and understanding of Islam had traditionally spent periods under the guidance of prominent scholars in Mecca or at the Azhar in Cairo. Leading religious

authorities of Indonesia's main Muslim associations, the 'Traditionalist' Nahdlatul Ulama and the 'Reformist' Muhammadiyah, owed their legitimacy at least in part to their studies in the Arab Middle East. The major centres of Islamic learning in South Asia, which exercised some influence in Malaysia, never attracted many Indonesian students.[8] In the final three decades of the twentieth century, however, Western universities emerged as alternative sites to learn about Islam.

The first Indonesians to pursue Islamic studies in Western academia, as early as the late 1950s and 1960s, were a handful of young men affiliated with the Reformist Muslim party Masyumi (which in those years was the main pro-Western party). They received scholarships to study at the Institute of Islamic Studies at Canada's McGill University, which W. Cantwell Smith had recently established as a centre for interreligious encounter. Mukti Ali and Harun Nasution, who were to exert a major influence on later generations of Muslim students, were the best known among this first cohort.[9] Mukti Ali wrote his M.A. thesis on the Muhammadiyah movement and developed a strong interest in comparative religion. He was to be the New Order's first Minister of Religious Affairs (1973–1978) and later served long as the rector of Yogyakarta's State Institute of Islamic Studies. Nasution wrote his Ph.D. thesis on Muhammad Abduh and became Indonesia's most prominent defender of Mu'tazila rationalism and a long-time rector of Jakarta's IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri: State Institute of Islamic Studies). Both men had an enormous influence on younger generations of students and Muslim intellectuals (Muzani 1994; Munhanif 1996).

The first IAINs had already been established in the final days of the Sukarno period. The NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) politician Saifuddin Zuhri, who was Sukarno's last Minister of Religious Affairs, is usually credited with the furthering of these institutes as a channel of educational mobility for students of *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) background, who had no access to other higher education. Under the New Order their number rapidly expanded until every province had one. The government relied on these institutes to create a class of enlightened religious officials, willing to function in a de facto secular environment and to accept the principle of more or less equal relations between the five officially recognized religions. From the mid-1980s onwards, perceiving the radicalizing tendency among recent graduates from Middle Eastern countries, the Ministry of Religious Affairs intensified academic cooperation with Western countries and sent increasing numbers of IAIN graduates to Canada, the Netherlands, Australia and Germany for postgraduate studies. Foreign scholars were invited to teach

at IAINs. All in all, this was probably one of the few programmes of 'religious engineering' anywhere in the world that were really successful. IAIN graduates in the religious bureaucracy, in the religious courts and in education have proven to be a force of moderation and reason in the conflict-ridden years following the fall of the Suharto regime.

The most famous and influential of the American graduates was Nurcholish Madjid. He had been the chairman of the 'Modernist' Muslim student association HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Islamic Students' Association) for two periods in the early New Order period, was singled out as a potential leader and received exceptional treatment, completing his studies with a dissertation at the University of Chicago supervised by Fazlur Rahman. In the 1980s, when HMI alumni of his and later generations began filling the middle and higher ranks of the bureaucracy, universities, the media and the business world, Nurcholish's discourse of renewal of Islamic thought gained dominance. Moderation, interreligious understanding, bourgeois-liberal values, contextual interpretation of the Islamic sources and respect for local tradition are some of the core elements of this discourse. In the 1990s, corresponding with the changing global conditions, democratic values and human rights, as well as a tendency towards Perennialist and Sufi thought became increasingly salient. Nurcholish himself, though remaining personally modest, became Indonesia's Islamic superstar, loved by the rich and powerful, but also accepting invitations to appear in much less glamorous surroundings. His popularity and influence were much resented by those Muslims who were convinced that Islam and secularism do not go together and who thought that he betrayed the ideals of the struggle to make Indonesia a more Islamic society and state.

The New Order's subaltern Muslims: The DDII, campus Islam, the radical underground and their transnational connections

Masyumi, the Reformist Muslim party, had been a pro-Western party under Sukarno, and some of its leading members took part in the CIA-sponsored regional rebellion PRRI (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) in 1958, which was the main reason why the party was banned. Masyumi leader Mohamad Natsir had been jailed under Sukarno and was released from prison soon after Suharto took over. He and other prominent Masyumi leaders were, however, not allowed to play a role in formal politics again, and the party remained banned. In this context, in 1967 Natsir and his closest collaborators

established the Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII) as a vehicle to continue the old political struggle by new means: Islamizing society from below by a concerted effort of *da'wa* (predication). Internationally, the DDII oriented itself not towards the West but towards the Arab Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia. Natsir himself was a member of the Founding Committee of the Muslim World League (Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami, or Rabita for short), and it was to play an important role in anchoring parts of the Indonesian *ummah* in another global network of education, communication and action.

The Rabita had been established five years previously under Saudi sponsorship and was initially meant as a vehicle for supporting the conservative Saudi regime against Nasser's revolutionary Arab nationalism. Its leading members were not exclusively Salafi-oriented but included Islamist thinkers such as Maulana Maududi in Pakistan as well as several Sufis. Natsir and the DDII were not the only Indonesian contacts of the Rabita. A prominent conservative in NU, Kiai Haji Ahmad Sjaichu, was the Rabita's interface with Traditionalist Islam in Indonesia. Another favoured counterpart was Kiai Haji Zarkasji of the 'modern' *pesantren* of Gontor, which occupied the middle ground between the Traditionalist and Reformist streams.[10] The youth organization affiliated with the Rabita, WAMY (World Association of Muslim Youth), involved some Muslim activists in Indonesia, too, but never became as influential there as in Malaysia, where the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, ABIM) was closely connected with it and where WAMY opened its regional offices.

The Rabita provided the DDII – or rather, Natsir personally, as well as some of the other contact persons; all relations were personalized – with funds for building mosques and training preachers. More importantly, it made numerous grants available for study in Saudi Arabia. Recipients of these grants were to play leading parts in the Islamist and Salafi movements that flourished in semi-legality in the 1990s and came to the surface after 1998. In the 1970s and 1980s (and continuing through the 1990s), the DDII and related publishing houses brought out translations of contemporary Islamist works. Initially, most of this literature was by authors affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood or Pakistan's Jama'at-i Islami – Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and his brother Muhammad Qutb, Yusuf Qaradawi, Abu'l A'la Maududi – perhaps reflecting the fact that the Saudi *ulama* were not themselves producing books deemed to be appealing. Several leaders of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood then lived and taught in Saudi Arabia, and the Saudi regime endorsed the

dissemination of their works abroad. (Only from the 1990s onwards was there a significant shift to the dissemination of more strictly apolitical, Salafi literature.) In the mid-1980s, Saudi-inspired publishing became strongly focused on the struggle against Shi'a influence, and there appeared a huge amount of anti-Shi'i literature (alongside polemics against other undesirables such as the Ahmadiyah, the Baha'i faith, the Jews, the Freemasons and the Lions Club).

On university campuses and among mosque-affiliated youth groups elsewhere, the Muslim Brotherhood literature fell upon willing ears. More overtly political (and generally left-leaning) student movements had been successfully repressed in the late 1970s, and strict new regulations prevented most organized student activity on campus, but the government allowed, and perhaps even encouraged, the cultivation of religious piety through study circles (known as *halqah* or *daurah*). Most of these were at some time connected with the DDII and modelled themselves to some extent on the Muslim Brotherhood or the Hizb ut-Tahrir, the other major transnational Islamist movement.

A more elusive network of radical Muslim groups that hoped to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state persisted underground and made its existence known by occasional acts of symbolic violence. The Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) movement had its origins in the Darul Islam uprising that from the late 1940s until its final suppression in the early 1960s had constituted a considerable force in several regions. This was a largely home-grown Islamist movement, but like the student movement of the 1980s and 1990s, it also adopted ideas and methods of disciplining from the Muslim Brotherhood. It remained very much an Indonesian movement, however, with Indonesian concerns and objectives restricted to Indonesia.[11]

Around 1990, a major shift in the New Order's policies towards Islam became apparent. Suharto co-opted many of his former Islamist critics through a number of symbolic pro-Islamic gestures, and within the armed forces a faction emerged that patronized Islamist groups. Besides the still dominant liberal Muslim voices, Islamist and fundamentalist voices were empowered and became entrenched in various institutions.[12] This shift occurred, not coincidentally, at a time when human rights discourse and the strengthening of civil society were becoming core elements of American (and more generally, Western) foreign policy. Anti-liberal and anti-Western Muslim discourses were welcomed and patronized by the elements in the regime that were for various reasons opposed to liberalization and to Western political and cultural domination. In a departure from previous government policy,

street demonstrations by radical Muslim groups were allowed, especially when protesting distant issues such as Israeli policies in occupied Palestine. The Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the World of Islam (KISDI, about which more below), established by DDII activists, became increasingly visible in Jakarta's streets during the 1990s; it was the precursor of the various vigilante groups that emerged after the fall of Suharto.

The 'Islamic turn' of Suharto's last decade provided the necessary conditions for an increasing orientation of large segments of the Muslim *ummah* towards the Middle East. The groundwork had been laid by organizations such as the DDII, and further developed by the various networks of study circles, both on and off campus. Two other factors, however, were probably crucial: the rapid development of modern electronic communications media and their widespread availability among Indonesia's middle classes, and the significantly increased numbers of Indonesians pursuing studies in the Middle East.

Arabization, *ghazwul fikri* and authenticity

Young graduates returning from the Azhar and from Saudi universities were having a noticeable impact on public discourse by the early 1990s, making efforts to 'correct' established local practices (as earlier generations of returnees from Arabia had done) and especially criticizing the ideas of 'liberal' and 'progressive' Muslim thinkers such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Nurcholish Madjid and their circles. Madjid had studied in the West and was frequently accused of having betrayed his origins; Wahid, who led the Traditionalist association Nahdlatul Ulama from 1984 to 1999, had extensive contacts with the world of international (that is, Western) NGOs and their interventionist agendas. Both, moreover, were vocal defenders of the specifically Indonesian expressions of Islam and the rights of religious minorities. In their view, and that of many mainstream Muslims, one should distinguish between Islam as a religion and Arab culture; a person could very well be a pious Muslim without adopting Arab culture. Their critics, on the other hand, tended to strongly reject all local Muslim practices as *bid'a*, 'innovation', that is, as deviations from authentic Islam. The liberal and tolerant attitudes displayed by the likes of Wahid and Madjid were decried as threats to genuine Islam, the unfortunate effects of globalization, an invasion of dangerous alien ideas: *ghazwul fikri*.

Like the battle cries of the anti-globalization movement, the term *ghazwul fikri* is itself a symptom of globalization. The Indonesians

who adopted the term and the accompanying worldview borrowed them lock, stock and barrel from Arab, and more specifically Egyptian, authors. The increasing popularity of the term reflects increasing communication with the Arab Middle East. It was first adopted by Indonesian circles that were sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood or were in contact with the Rabita. In the Middle East, the concept of *al-ghazw al-fikri* appears to have gained currency following the Arab defeat in the Israeli-Arab war of 1967, and to be closely associated with the search for Arab authenticity.

In his celebrated book *The Arab Predicament*, the Lebanese liberal intellectual Fouad Ajami discusses various responses to that demoralizing defeat, one of which he calls 'radical Fundamentalist'. The iconic representative of this particular response, the prolific journalist Muhammad Jalal Kishk, wrote no less than four books with *al-ghazw al-fikri* in the title.[13] One of these, *Al-Naksa wa-l-Ghazw al-Fikri* (The Setback and Cultural Invasion), was Kishk's analysis of the causes of the Arab defeat. Kishk, in Ajami's rendering, develops a view of history as a struggle for dominance between competing civilizations. Notions of cosmopolitanism and so-called universal values are not neutral and supra-civilizational, but they are the weapons used by one of the civilizations in its effort to dominate the others. The Arab people are facing a new crusade from the West, different from the earlier two. The first wave was that of medieval crusaders, with the cross and the sword, who were ultimately repelled. The second wave, which began with Napoleon's conquest of Egypt and the expansion of colonial empires, destroyed the self-confidence of the Muslim world, but was finally ended with decolonization. The current third crusade, unlike the earlier ones, is not military in nature and accepts the Arab states' political independence; its aim is to penetrate the minds of Muslims to make them accept the supremacy of the West. The Arabs lost the war with Israel because they had become alienated from their Muslim roots and had been seduced by the 'false doctrines of universalism', whether liberal or Marxist. The Arabs can only win the struggle for survival as a civilization when they hold on to the authentic core of that civilization, namely Islam, and do not allow their minds to be invaded by alien ideas and foreign ideologies.

Ajami places the discourse of *al-ghazw al-fikri* in the context of Arab soul-searching after the defeat of 1967, and increasing disappointment with socialism, liberalism and the various forms of nationalism that had dominated Arab political and intellectual life the 1950s and 1960s. Though himself a liberal, Ajami stresses that Kishk and people like

him do not simply hark back to a pre-modern past; he recognizes the modernity of Kishk's quest for authenticity. More than a decade before Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington popularized the notion of a clash of civilizations, Ajami distilled this notion from Kishk's writings. In his analysis, Kishk's refusal of 'universal' values did not stem from a visceral rejection of modernity but from his keen awareness of the rise and fall of civilizations in a Darwinian struggle for hegemony.[14]

Indonesian Muslims and the quest for authenticity

Once it was transmitted to Indonesia, the notion of *ghazwul fikri* and the quest for authenticity inevitably gained new connotations. As some critics were quick to point out, the very notion of *ghazwul fikri* also represented a cultural invasion, though not from the West, and they questioned why authenticity should be sought in an Arabian version of Islam. Many Indonesians were keenly aware of the history of colonialism and modern imperialism, and of the role Islam had played in uniting the nation during the centuries of colonial rule, but rejected the notion that one could only be a good Muslim by adopting Arab customs.

Let me open a parenthesis here, and relate my own first encounter with debates on authenticity, soon after I had arrived in Bandung for an extensive period of fieldwork there in 1983. In the first weeks, when still trying to get my bearings in the new environment, I frequently met with a friendly elderly gentleman, who happened to live next to the guesthouse where I was staying, and who was very knowledgeable about Javanese and Sundanese culture and the spirit beliefs in which I took a special interest. Pak Dody had grown up in the early years of Indonesian Independence and belonged to the last generation that had benefited from a Dutch school education. As a senior official of the Indonesian Red Cross, he had seen much of the world, was familiar with various foreign cultures and found it easy to socialize with Westerners. After retirement, he had given in to his interest in the Javanese spiritual tradition and started practising meditation. He told me proudly about his son, who studied at the famous Agricultural Institute of Bogor and who was a very serious young man. The son often expressed his concern with all the things he thought were wrong in their country, its loss of moral strength, pride and confidence, and its surrender to foreign cultural domination. He urged upon his father the idea that

as Indonesians they should be more conscious of their own, authentic values and find strength in their own traditions. I first thought that the son meant local knowledge and cultural practices and, like his father, wanted to reconnect with his Javanese roots, but Pak Dody explained his son meant a different set of authentic values and kept urging him to turn to (Reformist) Islam.

Pak Dody spoke with some bewilderment of his son's turn to Islam but refrained from expressing any explicit judgment. Perhaps some criticism was implied when he narrated his experiences in Saudi Arabia, where the Red Cross, because of its very name and flag, perpetually ran into problems and was accused of Christian proselytism. Pak Dody found the Saudis backward, and he was proud that many Indonesians of his generation were more cosmopolitan and had embraced what he considered universal values, but he was resigned to his son's adopting a different worldview altogether.

Many young men and women from families that were either Westernized or strongly committed to specifically Indonesian varieties of spirituality have gone through conversions similar to that of Pak Dody's son. The turn to Islam has, in a sense, widened their intellectual and geographical horizons; their concern with political and social issues elsewhere in the Muslim world is a form of cosmopolitanism – although the cosmos they inhabit and its universal values are not those of the Muslim liberals. This shifting orientation in self-identity occurred under the influence of both internal and external factors. To some extent, at least, it was an expression of cultural protest against Suharto's New Order and its cultivation of an invented national culture and national ideology, Pancasila. The protest might not have taken this particular form, however, and would certainly not have been as massive as it became, if it had not been for active efforts by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to spread their brand of Islam through scholarship programmes and active efforts at proselytization by various transnational Islamic movements. Awareness of conflicts in the Middle East – the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Iranian–Saudi rivalries, the Afghan jihad and its aftermath – spread as more students returned from study in the Gulf or Egypt. The communications revolution due to the new electronic media – video cassettes and VCDs (Video Compact Disks), satellite television, Internet and mobile telephony – enabled Indonesians to be eyewitnesses to important events in other parts of the Muslim world and to identify more strongly with Muslim struggles across the globe.

Middle East conflicts and their impact in Indonesia

Indonesia never recognized the state of Israel. This was initially, I gather, a gesture of Third World solidarity in support of Arab nationalism. In the 1950s, Sukarno and Nasser, along with India's Nehru, came to lead a bloc of non-aligned nations in a coalition against the imperialism of the former colonial powers. However, as the definition of the conflict gradually changed – the ethnic conflict between Jews and Arabs became a national one pitting Palestinians against Israelis, and ultimately one between Muslim and Judeo-Christian civilization – Palestinian Arabs increasingly came to be seen as fellow Muslims, and anti-colonial solidarity was reframed as religious solidarity.

In the aftermath of the Israeli-Arab war of 1967, Mohamad Natsir, the former chairman of the Masyumi party, visited Palestinian refugee camps, and upon his return to Indonesia told his countrymen how ashamed he had felt at seeing relief arriving from India and many other countries but not from Indonesia (Latief 2009). The *da'wa* organization DDII, which Natsir founded the same year, was not only to train numerous preachers but also made a considerable effort to inform Indonesian Muslims about political developments in the wider Muslim world, with special attention to Palestine. After the 1973 war, people affiliated with the DDII established a Muslim solidarity committee and called upon Indonesian Muslims to donate blood for Palestine. This resulted in the embarrassing amount of 45 litres of blood being sent to Lebanon as Indonesia's expression of Muslim solidarity (Latief 2009).

It was only by the late 1980s that the issue of Palestine and the struggle against Zionism could mobilize significant numbers of Indonesians. The first intifada (1987–1993) marked a turning point, no doubt in part due to the availability and impact of televised images. A number of political activists affiliated with the DDII established an organization named KISDI (Committee for Solidarity with the World of Islam), which specialized in political rallies and demonstrations, in protest against Israeli policies and in support of Palestinian rights. In the 1990s, KISDI took up other international 'Islamic' issues as well, such as the conflicts in Kashmir and Bosnia, and it demonstrated aggressively against 'biased' reporting in the Indonesian press (especially the Christian-owned media) (Hefner 2000, pp. 109–110; cf. van Bruinessen 2002).

The Russian occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989) and the (American and Saudi-sponsored) jihad against the occupiers had from the early 1980s on drawn the attention of limited circles of highly

motivated radical Muslims in Indonesia. Whereas there had never been, in spite of all anti-Zionist rhetoric, a call for Indonesian Muslims to join a jihad against the occupation of Palestine, the Afghan war – as mentioned above – attracted small groups of Indonesian would-be warriors, who travelled to Pakistan to receive training and do jihad. Some were recruited for the jihad while they were studying or working in Saudi Arabia, whereas others belonged to radical underground groups in Indonesia that were preparing for a violent Islamic revolution. Once they returned to Indonesia, the veterans spread information about the conflict by word of mouth and through semi-legal print publications.

Another significant event in the Middle East, the Iranian revolution of 1978–1979, initially made a much greater impression on students, although it took some time for its intellectual impact to be felt.[15] The first translations of Ali Shari'ati's works appeared only from 1982 onwards (based on the English translations, which Indonesian students in the United States had brought back), and were followed by those of other Iranian thinkers. A small group of young intellectuals, Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Haidar Bagir, Agus Abu Bakar and the Islamic scholar Husein al-Habsyi, led a movement of self-conversion to Shi'ism that attracted tens of thousands of recruits (Zainuddin and Basyar 2000; Zulkifli 2009).

In the long run, the impact of the Iranian revolution was overshadowed by the Saudi reaction to it. Feeling threatened by the Iranian revolutionaries' questioning of its legitimacy, the Saudi regime opened a counter-offensive in order to gain a hold on the hearts and minds of Muslims all over the world. In Indonesia, the DDII was the Saudis' closest collaborator, and it published numerous tracts and books purporting to prove that the Shi'a constituted a dangerous deviation from Islam proper. From the mid-1980s onwards, Saudi Arabia made great efforts to achieve discursive hegemony for its own brand of Islamic discourse, Salafism (usually dubbed Wahhabism by its opponents), and to delegitimize not only Shi'ism and various heterodox sects but also the moderate, accommodating discourses favoured by the New Order regime. As early as 1981, Saudi Arabia established an Institute of Arabic Studies, later revamped as the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies (LIPIA), in Jakarta; this was allegedly the first foreign-owned educational institution officially recognized by the Indonesian government. LIPIA became a major vehicle for the spread of the Salafi *da'wa* in Indonesia, although in the first decades of its existence it also helped many students, who later turned out to be 'liberals' or progressives, to gain fluency in Arabic and acquaintance with modern, non-Salafi Arabic works.[16]

The Internet and improved telephonic communication enabled frequent contact between Indonesians living abroad and their friends at home. Events and discussions taking place in Cairo were relayed to Indonesia by students at al-Azhar. In the 2000s, Salafis in Indonesia regularly requested fatwas from *ulama* based in Saudi Arabia or Yemen by telephoning friends studying there, who would then ask the question in person and phone back the answer.[17]

Reformasi and after: The consolidation of new transnational Islamic movements

The last decade of the New Order had allowed Islamist voices a certain freedom of expression, although the moderate voices of Nurcholish and his circle continued to be endorsed by the state and received most press coverage. After Suharto's resignation and the gradual unravelling of the New Order, radical Islamist groups came out from (semi-) clandestinity and their media, now published legally, for a few years enjoyed enormous circulation figures. In sheer volume and impact, Islamist discourse now dwarfed the liberal, pluralist discourse that had been almost hegemonic during the New Order.[18]

The most significant new movements that moved into the limelight were: an Indonesian version of the Muslim Brotherhood, that transformed itself into a political party, the Partai Keadilan (PK) and later the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS); an Indonesian wing of the Hizb ut-Tahrir; and a more diffuse Salafi movement (of which one wing became notorious as Laskar Jihad). All three are the Indonesian branches of well-established transnational movements and owe allegiance to a leadership abroad (PKS less so than the other two). In this sense they are significantly different from all earlier Indonesian Muslim organizations. It is precisely this transnational connection that provides them with a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of many ordinary Muslims. The PKS not only maintains connections with the Middle East but has also been careful to cultivate relations with Indonesian students abroad, in the West as well as the Arab world.

The former two movements sprang from student groups at several of the better Indonesian secular universities; a high proportion of their members and cadres are graduates from institutes of higher education in non-religious subjects. Relatively few of the cadre members of the PKS, but a larger proportion in the central leadership, have been educated in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere in the Arab world. Prior to the 2009 elections, an apparent split between 'pragmatists' and 'idealists' emerged in

the party; this coincided to some extent with the line between professionals educated in non-religious subjects and *ustad*s (religious teachers and preachers) with an Arab education. The Salafi movement, on the other hand, is almost exclusively Arab-educated and its major wing depends on significant funding from a foundation based in Kuwait. All wings of the Salafi movements appear to be connected with specific Salafi *ulama* in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or Yemen (Hasan 2006; Wahid 2014).

Some of the other new movements are purely Indonesian, but do take a great interest in Muslim struggles elsewhere in the world. The Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) was established in 2000 as a legal front for various groups that strive for an Islamic state (including sections of Darul Islam as well as Jama'ah Islamiyah). It has adopted some of the international *jihadi* Salafi discourse, but in practice it remains focused on the struggle for an Islamic state in Indonesia and an ideological war against all groups and movements that stand in the way of this ideal. The Hidayatullah movement, originating in the *pesantren* Hidayatullah in East Kalimantan, known for its historical connections with the Darul Islam movement, but now present throughout the archipelago, has religious teachings, developed by its founder Abdullah Said, that reflect a very Indonesian approach to Islam. Politically, however, the movement is a strong supporter of the jihads of oppressed Muslims (Ridwan 2008; van Bruinessen 2008).

Mainstream Muslim discourse has been much influenced by the discourse of these radical movements, as a series of surveys in the early 2000s suggested, although the violent activism of the most radical fringes was firmly rejected, and the acceptance of parts of Islamist discourse was never translated into a stronger vote for political parties that advocated the *shari'ah* (Mujani 2003). In their 2004 and 2005 congresses, the large associations NU and Muhammadiyah experienced a shift to Islamism and a purge of 'liberal' Muslims from their committees, partly under the influence of recent graduates from the Middle East. As these organizations have discovered that they were to some extent losing control of their constituencies – some mosques and schools were taken over by Hizb ut-Tahrir or PKS activists – they have begun making efforts to consolidate themselves and defend their turf against further takeovers. The two mainstream organizations have made it clear that they consider these transnational movements to be threats to their existence, and there are the beginnings of more assertive action in defence of the existing local forms of Islam.[19]

Local responses to globalizing Islam: Cultural resistance in Cirebon

In this final section, I shall take a look at how globalization, especially in its 'Arabizing' form, has impacted at the local level in a somewhat peripheral region in Indonesia, and at various forms of cultural resistance that this has brought about. Cirebon is a rice-producing region on Java's north coast that has been bypassed by many developments in core areas of Java. The once flourishing harbour of the capital city is a sleepy affair, as trade has been diverted away from the region. There is no modern industry worth mentioning; the most significant productive sector is the rattan industry, which processes raw rattan from Kalimantan into furniture for export. Recently enacted trade liberalization policies, affecting the export of unprocessed rattan, have dealt this industry a serious blow.

Cirebon is known for its distinctive and rich traditions in music, dance, batik and other art forms, as well as its colourful local adaptations of Islamic practices and the wide range of syncretistic mystical movements that emerged here. This heritage is commonly ascribed to the sultanate of Cirebon, which merged Chinese, Indian and Arab influences with Javanese and Sundanese traditions into a new synthesis. The sultanate, divided into four rival courts, was never patronized by Indonesia's republican government (as some of the other sultanates were) and is much in decline, but is still seen as the source of spiritual power that holds this vernacular civilization together (Siddique 1977; Muhaimin A.G. 1996). Orthodox Islam (as opposed to syncretistic Javanism) has long been dominated here by four large *pesantrens*, located around (and at some distance from) the city of Cirebon, which remain very influential in the cultural and political life of the region. The city has several modern universities, but none of these can compete with those of the big cities.

This is not a region where one would expect the above-mentioned transnational Islamic movements to find a natural following. To my surprise, however, I found that all the new Islamist movements are well represented in Cirebon and have a considerable measure of local support.[20] Their typical mode of expansion was through university students originating from Cirebon who studied in places like Bogor, Jakarta or Bandung and were inducted into these movements there. Returning home on the weekends, they set up religious study groups at the secondary schools from which they themselves had graduated. Locally recruited activists then attempted to establish groups of sympathizers in

neighbourhoods. PKS activists established a number of schools that provide cheap and good education, besides solid discipline; a Salafi group established a large, well-funded madrasah that successfully targets the local Muslim middle class.

As elsewhere, in Cirebon these new movements have had some success in converting *abangan*, nominal Muslims adhering to syncretistic beliefs and practices, to their worldview. In fact, they may even have been more successful in recruiting former *abangan* to their ranks than youth with a prior religious education in Muhammadiyah or NU circles (but the latter are definitely represented as well). This is perhaps not as surprising as it seems at first sight. *Abangan* beliefs and rituals are focused on local shrines and local spirits, whose powers are geographically circumscribed. As has been observed elsewhere, once people break out of their geographical isolation and by trade and travel start interacting more intensively with more distant communities, the old local spirits are of little help to them and supernatural support of a more universal scope has a strong appeal.[21] When *abangan* decide to send their children to a *pesantren* or a Muhammadiyah school – a process that characterized the New Order period – this represents not only a gradual conversion to a more orthodox form of Islam but also mental migration from the village or urban neighbourhood community into the Indonesian nation-state. In Cirebon, such conversions have been taking place but never on a massive scale; relations between the large *pesantren* and the surrounding *abangan* environment have long been characterized by mutual hostility and distrust. The arrival of transnational Islamic movements in the region made it possible for *abangan* to skip the stage of the established national organizations and become part of a global community. It is one of the few available options for cosmopolitanism and a deliberate jump into modernity, however anti-modernist the movement as such may be.

In the post-Suharto period, a number of global Islamic issues were imported into the local political arena, as a direct result of increased transnational contacts. Debates on the compatibility or otherwise of Islam and liberal democracy were one such issue, capable of mobilizing many, on which the PK(S) was strongly affirmative, while several other movements, including Hizb ut-Tahrir and the MMI, rejected liberal democracy on principle.[22]

One imported global issue that gave rise to local-level conflict was anti-Ahmadiyah agitation. This was not entirely new: the Muslim World League has been spreading anti-Ahmadiyah materials and agitating for a worldwide ban of the Ahmadiyah almost since it was established.

As early as 1980, Indonesia's Council of Ulama had issued a fatwa declaring the Ahmadiyah to be a deviant sect outside the bond of Islam, but this had had a negligible impact on the Ahmadis religious freedom. The situation changed dramatically around 2004, when in various parts of the country violent mobs, incited by self-appointed guardians of orthodoxy, attacked Ahmadi institutions and residences, while the police, reluctant to appear insufficiently sympathetic to radical Islam, did not dare to intervene.[23]

Not far from Cirebon lies a village that is almost entirely Ahmadiyah. Never before had these people experienced any serious problems; there are several villages in the neighbourhood that adhere to a number of different heterodox sects or minor religions, and traditionally mutual tolerance had reigned.[24] The first major attack on this village occurred in 2004; a coalition of local Islamist groups, reinforced by activists from Jakarta, stormed the village and attempted to destroy the main Ahmadiyah mosque. Since then, more raids have followed and the local authorities, feeling under pressure, closed down the Ahmadi mosques and forbade the Ahmadis to congregate for worship. The government has done little or nothing to protect the religious freedom of these citizens and instead made gestures to accommodate radical Muslim demands; in fact, in 2008 a joint ministerial decree practically proscribed all Ahmadiyah activities.[25]

There was, however, also some mobilization of local support for the beleaguered Ahmadiyah. An NGO in Cirebon affiliated with the NU, Fahmina, sent activists to the village to form a protective ring around the mosque and give moral support to the villagers. They advocated the Ahmadiyah's right to their different beliefs, and they managed to have the local press publish a strong statement by a leading NU scholar, who endorsed their pluralist views. In these actions, Fahmina activists operated cautiously in order not to alienate the major *pesantrens*, as NGO activists elsewhere had done. They made clear that their support for the basic rights of the Ahmadiyah did not mean acceptance, or even just tolerance, of Ahmadi doctrines but rather the defence of an earlier status quo in which different faith communities left each other in peace.

Fahmina is a rather small NGO but it derives strength from its good connections with the major *pesantrens* of the region. Fahmina itself is dwarfed by the numbers that the radical Islamist groups in Cirebon can mobilize, but as long as it maintains its connections with the *pesantrens*, it will remain able to call upon the support of the much larger masses that are loyal to the *kiais* and the NU. In opposing the 'Arabizing' influences brought into the region by the Islamists, Fahmina activists and a loose network of locally rooted allies have made an effort to revive

local cultural traditions as a resource. Some younger *kiais* also take an active role in this effort, such as Kiai Maman Imanulhaq of the *pesantren* Al-Mizan in Jatiwangi, where traditional arts have become part of the curriculum.

Several senior *kiais* appear independently to have come to the conclusion that 'traditional' Islam needed to be salvaged from the homogenizing and purist influence of the new transnational movements. Their concern was primarily with the *pesantren* subculture, which in fact also reflected Arab and Indian Ocean influences in its expressions of devotion for the Prophet and the high prestige accorded to his descendants, as well as in the use of religious song and recitation and percussion instruments in popular performances. Some deliberate invention of tradition was going on during my fieldwork period: an obscure old grave under a tree was being developed into a new pilgrimage site, where colourful new rituals (based on popular *mawlid*s, celebrations of the birth of the Prophet) were periodically performed. One of the *ulama* involved told me that his ideal was to develop the site of this sacred grave into a centre of local culture. Interestingly, the arts performances I witnessed here, though by local artists, were of Egyptian-style popular music and of songs in praise of the Prophet accompanied by Arab percussion: the sort of cultural practices that Salafis as well as Muslim Brothers strongly object to but that are patronized by the region's Javanized *sayyids* (descendants of the prophet Muhammad).

Some final observations

Those Indonesian Muslims who perceive dangerous trends of either Westernization or Arabization in the religious views and practices of their Muslim compatriots, as alternative (or perhaps concomitant) consequences of globalization, will have no difficulty pointing out developments that seem to confirm their analysis. Both underestimate, however, the extent to which the borrowing of ideas from the West or from the contemporary Middle East is a process of active and selective appropriation and adaptation, just as Indonesian cultures have always appropriated elements of foreign cultures and incorporated them into a synthesis that has remained uniquely Indonesian. The same is, mutatis mutandis, true of other cultures: they have always changed and incorporated whatever foreign ideas and artefacts appeared to fit in. The rate of borrowing has increased, but cultures have never been passive recipients of what other cultures had to offer.

It is true that both Western and Middle Eastern states have had deliberate policies of influencing Indonesian Muslims' worldviews and

attitudes, through scholarship programmes and other sponsored travel, the sponsoring of publications and support of educational institutions. The effects of such programmes are seldom exactly as hoped; and in fact, they may in some cases have the reverse effect. Though some students may return from US universities as confirmed liberals and some graduates from Saudi universities may actively propagate a puritan, Salafi version of Islam, there are more than a few exceptions. It has been remarked before that many Muslim students became radicalized while studying at American universities. The writings of the ideologists of the Iranian revolution, as observed above, reached Indonesia by way of the United States. Similarly, not all Indonesians studying in Saudi Arabia or at the Saudi-funded institute LIPIA in Jakarta became converted to Salafi views; among the graduates we find several of the most vocal liberal and progressive thinkers.

The talk of Arabization versus Westernization implicitly assumes an essentialized, homogenized Arab world, or an equally monolithic West, impinging upon a vulnerable and malleable Indonesian *ummah*. It is undoubtedly true that the numbers of Indonesians travelling abroad have dramatically increased during the past few decades and that the flows of goods and ideas from the Middle East as well as the West (and from other regions) towards Indonesia have accelerated and become more massive. However, these cultural flows have been highly complex and richly varied, and so has their impact. Muslims across the spectrum, from secular-minded liberals and progressives to Islamists and Salafis, have in various ways incorporated some influences of Western origin (or mediated by actors in the West) as well as influences traceable to the Middle East, alongside yet other influences. The adoption of foreign ideas and practices has always been selective, and made in accordance with perceived local needs.

The responses to the 'Westernizing' and 'Arabizing' varieties of globalization have often taken the form of appeals to Islamic or Indonesian authenticity and the invention of traditions. It strikes me as significant that the efforts to strengthen local culture to resist the influx of 'Arabian' puritan Islam in Cirebon involved cultural traditions reflecting an earlier synthesis of Arab and Javanese cultures.

Notes

1. The earliest Indonesian book on the subject that I have found is a straightforward translation from the Arabic: Marzuq (1990). A year earlier, a similar text was published in Singapore: Mahmud (1989). A perusal of relevant journals

may yet show up earlier usage of the term in the late 1980s, but these are the books one finds often quoted by later Indonesian authors. The term occurs with increasing frequency in Islamic magazines and journals through the 1990s, and its continuing occurrence in the 2000s can easily be attested with a Google search (25,300 hits when last accessed on 14 December 2010, most of them magazine articles from the previous five years).

2. This was brought out, for a much earlier period, in the important studies on Southeast Asian early states by Coedès (1948).
3. There were in fact a number of different forms of Malay, ranging from *kitab* Malay, the idiom of religious texts translated from, and often maintaining the syntactic structures of, Arabic, to the 'civilized' standard Malay sponsored by the colonial administration in the last decades of Dutch rule. On the latter see Jedamski (1992). So-called *Pasar* Malay, the language of the market, used between Chinese middlemen and their indigenous customers, was quite different again and showed much less Arabic influence.
4. The Ahmadiyah was a Muslim religious movement founded in late 19th-century British India by the charismatic Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, which soon split into two rival sections, of which the larger, with headquarters in Qadian, considered the founder as a prophet and the smaller, based in Lahore, defined him as a reformer and renewer of Islam (mujaddid). Both sent envoys to the Netherlands Indies, leading to a lasting presence of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. It was the Lahore missionaries who made a significant impact on Muslim reformism in Indonesia. The Qadiani claim of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's prophethood has been the ostensible reason for world-wide anti-Ahmadi campaigns and violent attacks against Ahmadi communities, including in Indonesia. See Beck 2005, Burhani 2014.
5. Lombard and Salmon (1985); cf. the observations on the pervasive Chinese influence on Javanese culture in general in: Lombard (1990).
6. Two respected Dutch scholars lent their prestige to a fascinating but unreliable Malay text claiming that most of the saints of Java's north coast were of Chinese origin: de Graaf and Pigeaud (1984). On the recent efforts to re-establish a connection with China's Muslim (Hue) minority, see Chiou (2007).
7. This concerns notably the Ahmadiyah, arriving in the 1920s, and the Tablighi Jama'at, active in Indonesia since the 1980s. See Zulkarnain (2005); Noor (2010, 2012).
8. The incorporation into the British Empire gave Malaya an orientation towards India that was to endure long after independence. The famous madrasah of Deoband, and later the Maududi Institute in Lahore, have attracted significant numbers of Malaysian students and made a lasting impact on Muslim discourses in Malaysia; see the contributions by Noor (2008).
9. Others of the same generation included Anton Timur Jaylani and Kafrawi Ridwan (who were both to serve as high officials in the Ministry of Religious Affairs). McGill continued to train Indonesian Muslim scholars in the following decades. See Jabali and Jamhari (2003); Steenbrink (2003).
10. On the *pesantren* of Gontor and its remarkable influence within institutionalized Islam in Indonesia, see Castles (1966); van Bruinessen (2006).

11. The Jamaah Islamiyah, which carried out the most spectacular terrorist acts of the 2000s, emerged from a split in the NII. On the Darul Islam movement and its later transformations, see Temby (2010).
12. Various analyses of the process are given by: Liddle (1996); Hefner (2000); van Bruinessen (1996).
13. Ajami (1981). Kishk's books that Ajami discusses are, in chronological order: *Al-Marksiyya wa-l-Ghazw al-Fikri* (Marxism and Cultural Invasion, Cairo, 1965); *Al-Ghazw al-Fikri* (Kuwait, 1967); *Al-Naksa wa-l-Ghazw al-Fikri* (The Setback and Cultural Invasion, Beirut, 1969); and *Al-Qawmiyya wa-l-Ghazw al-Fikri* (Nationalism and Cultural Invasion, Beirut, 1970).
14. 'Kishk's writings belie the notion that Muslim fundamentalists are reactionaries fixated on the image of a theocratic past that has to be restored. In Kishk's world view, cultures clash for preeminence: Some rise and conquer, and others surrender and are subjugated' (Ajami 1981, p. 52). Lewis (1990) presented his analysis of the Middle Eastern conflict as a 'clash of civilizations' in a much-quoted article, and Huntington (1993) drew on this view for his 'The clash of civilizations?'. It is not unlikely that Lewis took the 'clash of civilizations' idea from Ajami's book without formal acknowledgement.
15. Nasir Tamara, a young Indonesian journalist who flew from Paris to Tehran on Khomeini's plane, wrote a book on the revolution that was widely read: Tamara (1980).
16. On LIPIA and the development of the Salafi *da'wa* in Indonesia in general, see Hasan 2006, Chapter 2. Among LIPIA's graduates one famously finds not only prominent Salafi activists but also liberals and NU intellectuals such as Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, Ahmad Baso and Mujiburrahman.
17. This included some crucial fatwas legitimating actions to be carried out by Laskar Jihad. See the discussion in Hasan 2006, Chapter 4.
18. This also happened in spite of significant injections of Western funds into the NGO world, subsidies for book printing and active support of anti-fundamentalist groups such as Jaringan Islam Liberal, the Liberal Islam Network.
19. See the contributions by Najib Burhani and Martin van Bruinessen in: van Bruinessen (2013).
20. The following paragraphs are based on my observations during a two-month period of field research in early 2009 and a number of shorter visits in the preceding years.
21. This reasoning is the core of an interesting theory explaining the spread of Islam and Christianity in Africa, at the expense of local religions: Horton (1971). Robert Hefner adapted Horton's idea to an explanation of the ongoing Islamization of East Java: Hefner (1987).
22. In the 2009 elections, however, these movements allowed their followers to vote, on condition that they would vote for a party that supported the *shari'ah*.
23. The main organization behind the anti-Ahmadiyah agitation is a small, apparently Middle East-funded group calling itself LPPI (Lembaga Pengkajian dan Penelitian Islam, 'Institute of Islamic Studies and Research'). In 2002, LPPI organized a seminar in Jakarta's Istiqlal Mosque to denounce the Ahmadiyah; in 2005 it organized a major mob attack on the Qadiani

Ahmadiyah's main community centre in Parung near Bogor, and it has remained at the forefront of agitation since.

24. For a description of this village from more peaceful days, see Effendi (1990).
25. This joint decree was signed by the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Attorney General and the Minister of the Interior on 9 June 2008. The decree stopped short of actually banning the Ahmadiyah, as had been demanded by the Council of Ulama and various radical groups.

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5

The *Ulama* Network as Conveyor of Islamic World Trends: Connecting Malaysian Politics to the Muslim *Ummah* Through the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS)

Yuki Shiozaki

Introduction: Trans-regional Islamic networks and the nationalization of Islamic activities in the twentieth century

Islam is trans-regional by nature. Historically, Muslims travelled around the world for the requirements of Islam. Muslims moved from one region to another not only for business purposes, but also for pilgrimages (the hajj and the *umrah*), marriage and missionary work, and to seek knowledge. Especially for the purpose of seeking Islamic knowledge or *'ulum shari'iyah*, millions of Muslims have travelled around the world. *Ulama*, or Islamic scholars, are products of such itinerancy for learning. Many of them even migrated to other regions and cultivated juniors, and *ulama* thus formed a trans-regional network for Islamic learning. As a result of the large-scale movement of Muslims between regions, not only Islamic knowledge but also trends such as lifestyles and political thought were exchanged. When we discuss the international movement of Muslims and their interactions in the contemporary age of globalization, it is meaningful to focus on the fact that the movement of Muslims to seek Islamic knowledge is still significant, and the scale of this movement is increasing dramatically. Without studying the historical movement of Muslims between regions, it is difficult to understand the interactions of Muslims in the world today. This article discusses the network of Islamic learning formed by *ulama* from the Malay Peninsula and its impact on the political arena in Malaysia through the Islamic

Party of Malaysia (Parti Islam SeMalaysia: PAS). PAS is a significant case for studying the relationship between the trans-regional *ulama* network and domestic politics in Southeast Asia.

This chapter focuses on the role of the international *ulama* network in the formation of PAS's political principles. In the section 'Historical background of the *ulama* network in Malaysia', the historical background of the *ulama* network in the Malay Peninsula is described. *Ulama* from Patani in Southern Thailand laid the foundations of Islamic learning in the Middle East in the nineteenth century. Patani *ulama* who immigrated to the states of the northern Malay Peninsula activated Islamic learning there. Later, the northern Malay states became the base for PAS, because PAS could gain support from *ulama* there. In the section 'Pan-Malay nationalism and the trans-regional Islamic network around the 1950s', the process of the birth of PAS and the Pan-Malay network is described. Pan-Malay nationalism, which appealed for solidarity with Indonesia, was one of the main items on the agenda of early PAS activists. *Ulama* in PAS cultivated the Pan-Malay network through Islamic learning in the Middle East. In the section 'To be an al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun type political party and establish *ulama* leadership', the *ulama* network in the Middle East, especially in Egypt, is described. PAS leaders learned the political thought of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun when they studied in the Middle East. In the 1980s *ulama* in PAS gained hegemony over the party and implemented the dogma of al-Ikhwan.

PAS started as a party of *ulama* in the 1950s. Although many PAS leaders were not *ulama*, and there were many 'professionals' or people educated in the Western manner in the party,[1] PAS is still the only party that has a Dewan Ulama (*Ulama* Division) as its most important wing, and a Majlis Syura Ulama (*Ulama* Council) as its supreme decision-making organ; the Mursyidul Am (Supreme Leader) is the Chairman of the Majlis Syura Ulama.[2]

It has been often noted that PAS stands out in Malaysian politics because of its Islamic discourse and confrontational stance against the Malaysian government led by its arch-rival, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO).[3] Some researchers have attributed PAS's stance to the Islamic thought shared by PAS members. Chin emphasized the significance of Islamic thought on reformism and Islamic governance in the decision-making of PAS (陳中和 2006). Amrita Malhi considered the difference in stances on Islam and modernity to be the cause of the conflict between UMNO and PAS in the 1990s (Amrita Malhi 2003). Hamayotsu pointed out the importance of the struggle for 'Islamic business' interests with the government in a study on the institution

of *zakat* collection (Hamayotsu 2004, pp. 229–252). It is clear that the 'Islamic factor' in politics is diverse. The 'Islamic factor' consists of many aspects including teaching, thought, discourse, publications, activities, education, organizations, institutions and economic interests. Players concerned with 'Islamic factors' in Malaysian politics are not only UMNO and PAS, but also administrative organs, Islamic NGOs, educational institutions and so forth. In addition, it is not easy to verify how influential Islam is on the domestic politics of a Muslim country. Although it is easy to highlight policies and slogans or political parties named 'Islamic' and that contain other Islamic terms, they are often Islamic in name only and in substance they are involved in socio-economic interests or nationalism in many cases. This study clarifies that a large proportion of the 'Islamic factor' in PAS originated in international exchanges.

Like other political parties in Malaysia, PAS is also a party for domestic politics. PAS provides *Negara Islam* (an Islamic state) and *Siyasah Shari'ah* (administration based on Islamic law) as the main objectives of their struggle (Parti Islam Semalaysia 2010, Fasal 5). The political objectives of PAS remain in the domestic political arena. However, the distinguishing characteristics of PAS among Malaysian political parties are its international connections and emphasis on international solidarity with the global Muslim community or *ummah*. Scott described PAS as representative of the poor peasant class in rural areas (Scott 1985). It is appropriate to draw attention to some domestic factors including class, localism (especially in Kelantan), the urban-rural gap, the generation gap and the ethnic composition of electoral constituencies as factors in PAS's decision-making. In addition to these, this study presents evidence that the *ulama* international network is also a main factor for PAS. Development of the *ulama* network conveyed Islamic world trends to the Malay Peninsula and stimulated the development of PAS. The sections below discuss the relationship between the *ulama* network and PAS's policy in each period of the twentieth century.

Historical background of the *ulama* network in Malaysia

Ulama are traditionally certified by their *silsilah*, or chain of Islamic knowledge transmission. Being links in a chain connected to classic *ulama* and prophets makes *ulama* 'successors of prophets'. The inheritance of *silsilah* distinguishes *ulama* from self-educated Islamists and Islamic studies specialists educated in Western universities. To become *silsilah* successors, Islamic learners have travelled all over the world

throughout the history of Islam. Especially in Southeast Asian history, it was the role of *ulama* to travel to the Middle East and convey knowledge to their homeland. Even today this role is sustained, although there have been some changes, and *silsilah* successors in the strict sense of the word have become rare. Large-scale travelling and learning practiced by *ulama* constructed a global network of Islamic learners. This network has been exploited even in political movements. In other words, many political movements were set up on top of this existing network, which is interregional and international by nature. Studies on the *ulama* network and its influence on politics in Southeast Asia are still limited (Khoo Kay Kim 1991; Mohamad Abu Bakar 1991; Mohamad Abu Bakar 1997). On the historical *ulama* network in Southeast Asia, there is a prominent work by Azyumardi Azra (2004). There are also studies on the significant role of *ulama* in the politics of other Muslim countries (Muhammad Qasim Zaman 2002).

In the history of the Malay Peninsula learned *ulama* were influential figures as *mufti*, *qadi* (judges) and *tok guru* of *pondok* (mentors of boarding learning centres). The *ulama* activity factor is appropriate to explain the uneven distribution of PAS's strongholds in the Malay Peninsula. PAS's strongholds correspond to concentrated areas of *ulama* activity, such as Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Perak. Factors such as economic gaps and the urban–rural gap are not enough to explain this phenomenon. In places where *ulama* have been active, PAS has been successful in politics. *Ulama* in PAS tried to plant international Islamic trends in Malaysian soil through political activity.

The influence of *ulama* activity in the northern Malay Peninsula is clear even today. According to the opinion survey on Islam in Southeast Asia conducted by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Research Institute in Malaysia in April 2010, a clear difference was found between northern states and other states.[4] Among 1,157 Muslim respondents, the strongest agreement with the contention '*Ulama* should actively participate in politics' was seen in Kelantan and Terengganu. While the total for those who 'strongly agree' and 'somewhat agree' with this statement was 47.91% in the other 11 states and Kuala Lumpur, the total of the two attitudes was 60.79% in Kelantan and Terengganu. Kelantan and Terengganu are renowned for their rich tradition of *pondok* learning and *ulama* activities. Reliance on *ulama* as social leaders is assumed to be high in these two states.

Responses to another statement, 'Islam requires that a country with a majority of Muslims be governed by men of Islamic learning (*ulama*)', also showed different attitudes between Kelantan and Terengganu and

other states. Strong agreement was large in Kelantan (42.06%) and particularly high in Terengganu (50.72%). Another east coast state, Pahang, also showed a high 'strongly agree' proportion (47.37%). The total of 'strongly agree' and 'somewhat agree' responses to this statement was 60.45% in the other 11 states and Kuala Lumpur, and the total of the two attitudes was 60.79% in Kelantan and Terengganu. In Kelantan and Terengganu PAS has the predominant political machinery, and has been the preponderant force in elections since the general election of 1959. In these two states more than 90% of the residents are Muslims, and therefore Muslim votes are sufficiently decisive in elections. In other states PAS cannot win elections without non-Muslim votes, even if PAS has strong support among Muslim voters.

The origin of PAS's strength in the northern Malay states can be traced back to the downfall of the Patani *Kerajaan* (Sultanate) in Southern Thailand, which was the centre of Islamic learning in the Malay Peninsula until the nineteenth century. Following its failure in a rebellion against Bangkok from 1831 to 1832, many *ulama* migrated from Patani to Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Makkah (Ibrahim Syukri 1985, pp. 62–64). In the rebellion, the rulers in Patani were allied to the rulers of these *Kerajaan*. The downfall of Patani led to a rise in Islamic activities in other areas of the Malay Peninsula, especially in Kelantan, Kedah and Terengganu. Many *pondok*, or boarding learning centres, were established by *ulama* diasporas that evacuated from Patani to the three other states. The *Kerajaan* of Patani was finally totally merged into the administration of Thailand in 1908. When the Federation of Malaya declared independence in 1957, Patani was not included in the new Muslim state.

Those who migrated to the Middle East played an important role in the development of Islamic activities in Southeast Asia. *Ulama* such as Ahmad Muhammad Zain al-Fatani and Daud Abdullah al-Fatani lived in Makkah and taught many learners from Southeast Asia (Kraus 2008, pp. 42–43). Their disciples such as Muhammad Yusuf Ahmad (known as Tok Kenali) from Kelantan played crucial roles in their homeland (Ismail Che Daud 2001, pp. 157–162). Ahmad al-Fatani (1856–1908) is conjectured to have been the first Malay student at al-Azhar in Cairo, Egypt. After his acceptance to al-Azhar in the early 1870s, Malay students were attracted to that institution (Wan Mohd. Shaghir Abdullah 1990, p. 36; Md. Sidin Ahmad Ishak and Mohammad Redzuan Othman 2000, pp. 46–47). Another crucial achievement of Ahmad al-Fatani was his publication project. In collaboration with the Uthman government, he established the printing centre Matba'ah al-Turki Majdiyah

al-'Uthmaniyah in Makkah. He also established his own private publication enterprise Maktab Fataniah. He edited and published Islamic books in both Malay and Arabic, classic manuscripts, and contemporary writings including his own and Daud Abdullah al-Fatani's works. Printed matter was imported to the Malay Peninsula and used as textbooks in *pondoks*. Although Singapore and Penang also became Islamic publication centres later on, Makkah was the main and almost sole supplier of printed Islamic texts in Malay (*kitab jawi*) until the early twentieth century (Md. Sidin Ahmad Ishak and Mohammad Redzuan Othman 2000, pp. 60–63). The downfall of Patani brought with it the two foundations of flourishing Islamic activities in the Malay Peninsula in the twentieth century: (1) activation of *pondoks* and Islamic activities in the Malay Peninsula, especially in Kelantan, Terengganu and Kedah; and (2) preparation for Islamic learning in the Middle East. PAS was established on these foundations in the middle of the twentieth century.

Pan-Malay nationalism and the trans-regional Islamic network around the 1950s

PAS was formed by *ulama* involved in international Islamic activities, especially education. They had different tendencies from those of UMNO-linked Malay nationalists who urged centralization of Islamic activities under the ruling authority.

The main origin of PAS is an Islamic school, Maahad il Ihya Assyariff, in Gunung Semanggol, Perak, located on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. Maahad il Ihya Assyariff was established in 1934 as a modernist and *salafi*-oriented educational institute for Islamic subjects (worldly subjects including history, art, music and literature were introduced later).[5] The first principal of the Maahad, Abu Bakar al-Baqir, was educated in Madrasah Dairatul Ma'arif Wataniah in Kepala Batas, Pulau Pinang. In Kepala Batas, Abu Bakar learned under the influential *alim* Abdullah Fahim (who later became the first chief of PAS's Dewan Ulama). Abu Bakar became a teacher in Madrasah Idrisiah in Kuala Kangsar, Perak from 1931 to 1933. Madrasah Idrisiah was a madrasah established by the Sultan of Perak in 1922. Because Abu Bakar was not satisfied with the atmosphere of Madrasah Idrisiah, sponsored by the sultan, he returned to his hometown and established his own school. Abu Bakar provided his school for Malay Muslim activists who were not loyal to the sultans. Over the years Madrasah il Ihya Assyariff became a centre of the non-royalist Malay Muslim political movement. Among the teachers at Madrasah il Ihya Assyariff there were prominent

leaders of non-royalist Malay nationalism such as Zulkifli Muhammad (who later became Deputy President of PAS) and Mohammad Asri Muda (President of PAS from 1969 to 1982) (Khairul Nizam Zainal Badri 2008, pp. 47–49).

One of the main differences between sultan-royalist Malay nationalists and non-royalist Malay nationalists were their different policies on Indonesia, although both of them strove for independence from Britain. Sultan-royalist Malay nationalists were mobilized under UMNO after action in 1946 to oppose the Malayan Union, which was proposed by the British administration to grant equal rights to all citizens in the Malay Peninsula. In that year, UMNO was officially established to champion the Malay nationalism of royalists.[6] Whereas the main objective of the royalists was to retain the supremacy and privileges of sultans and Malays in the Malay Peninsula, the non-royalist 'Malay nationalism' meant solidarity among the people of a wider region of Southeast Asia including Indonesia, Borneo, Southern Thailand and even the Philippines (Burhanuddin Helmy 2000, pp. 67–120).

In Perak there were large populations of Indonesian descendant, especially from Java, who mainly immigrated as plantation workers. Abu Bakar himself was the grandson of an *alim* who immigrated from Central Java to the Malay Peninsula. Madrasah il Ihya Assyariff had strong cooperation with Muhammadiah and some of its teachers were deployed from Indonesia. Among non-royalist Malay Muslim activists in Perak, the principle of solidarity with Indonesia became firm, when the Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM) or Malay Nationalist Party was established in this state in 1945. The second President of PKMM, Burhanuddin Helmi, insisted on the realization of *Melayu Raya* or Greater Malaya, which meant unification of Malaya and Indonesia.

In March 1948 the Muslim-based political party Hizbul Muslimin was established in Gunung Semanggol. This party called for administration based on *shari'ah* as their main objective. Abu Bakar al-Baqir was the first President of the party and associates of Madrasah il Ihya Assyariff formed the core of the newly established party. The main policies of Hizbul Muslimin were as follows:

1) Independence of Malay Land (*Tanah Melayu*) as a sovereign state;
2) Creating a society based on Islam; and
3) Transforming *Tanah Melayu* into *Darul Islam* (Abode of Islam) (Hizbul Muslimin 1948).

The term *Tanah Melayu* did not refer only to the Malay Peninsula, but also to Indonesia, Borneo and Southern Thailand. In the

convention to form the party in March 1948, leaders of PKMM including Burhanuddin Helmi and a delegation from Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi) also attended. Hizbul Muslimin imitated many aspects of Masyumi. The British administration considered Masyumi to be the real mastermind behind Hizbul Muslimin. In a report by the British security service, it was expressed as follows:

The development of this movement should be very closely watched, for it preaches Nationalism as the religious duty of all the Believers, and Islam has always been a militant creed. There can be no doubt that its propaganda is made to appeal to the young Malay intellectuals and progressives, since it strives to give scriptural authority to their efforts to modernize their society and economy, and to their undoubted aspirations towards National Independence. In the present relatively lethargic state of UMNO, it may draw away many of the younger and more progressive minds. Its promoters have had bad political records, and it may well be that in the current crisis any extensions of its activities will force the government to consider the question of outlawing the party.

Whether Hizbul Muslimin moves to the Right or to the Left in step with its true parent, the Masjoemi, it remains a menace to the British authority (Malayan Security Service 1948).

The British administration considered Hizbul Muslimin to be a threat to security. UMNO also regarded Hizbul Muslimin as a threat to their hegemony among Malays. The appeal to merge into Indonesia was a serious challenge to UMNO's royalist version of Malay nationalism. Three months after the establishment of Hizbul Muslimin, the British authorities disbanded the party, and in June 1948 they declared a state of national emergency. Although the main target was the Malayan Communist Party (PKM), Abu Bakar and other leaders of Hizbul Muslimin were detained along with PKMM leaders. PKMM was also disbanded in the same month.

Hizbul Muslimin intended to transform the whole *Tanah Melayu* into *Darul Islam* and failed. Their main motivation was Greater Malay nationalism, similar to that of their ally PKMM. However, their version of Malay nationalism was formed through Islamic activities. Roff has described the activities of the Djama'ah al-Chairiah al-Talabijja al-Azhariah al-Djawiah (Welfare Association of Jawi Students at al-Azhar University) and wrote of the germination of Malay nationalism in Cairo in the 1920s (Roff 2009, pp. 133–147). In this period, Southeast Asian (*Jawi*) Muslim students in Cairo organized their activities together. Although the influence of *Jawi* students' activities in Cairo was much less in peninsular Malaya than in Indonesia, as Roff pointed out, several Malay nationalist movements connected with them played

a formative role (Roff 2009, p. 142). Magazines published by *Jawi* students in Cairo, *Seruan Azhar* (Call of Azhar) and *Pilihan Timur* (Choice of the East) were circulated in Maahad il Ihya Assyariff and cultivated Pan-Malay nationalism combined with Islamic reformism (Nabir Abdullah 1976, p. 31).

After the disbanding of Hizbul Muslimin, some of its activists joined UMNO. In August 1951, UMNO organized the Persatuan Alim Ulama SeMalaya (All-Malayan *Ulama* Organization) to gain support from *ulama*. In November 1951 the organization decided to change the name to Persatuan Islam SeMalaya (Pan-Malaya Islamic Organization). From 1951 to 1955 Persatuan Islam SeMalaya consisted of UMNO members, ex-Hizubul Muslimin members and other neutral *ulama* like Abdullah Fahim. In 1953 prominent UMNO members lost the race for power in the caucus of Persatuan Islam SeMalaya, and they were expelled from the party. In 1955 the organization was registered as a new political party: the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) or Parti Islam SeMalaya (PAS). In 1956 Burhanuddin Helmi, the ex-President of PKMM, was elected as President of PAS. Burhanuddin served as President until 1969.

In the first Federal election in Malaya, in 1955, PAS was able to win one of the 52 seats it contested. The other 51 seats were won by the Alliance, a coalition of UMNO and the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA). The only seat won by PAS was a constituency in Kerian, Perak. Until this period PAS was a party based in Perak. Later, a former Hizbul Muslimin activist, Mohamad Asri Muda, joined Persatuan Islam SeMalaya and succeeded in recruiting *ulama* in his home state, Kelantan. After 1955 the stronghold of PAS moved from Perak to Kelantan. In the general election in 1959 PAS won 13 parliamentary seats (nine from Kelantan and four from Terengganu). PAS also won 42 state assembly seats in Kelantan and Terengganu. As a result, PAS took control of the state governments in two states. Leaders of PAS including Burhanuddin and Deputy President Zulkifli Muhammad contested elections in Terengganu and Kelantan, although their home state was Perak. The success of PAS in the 1959 general election was due to party organs composed of *ulama* in Kelantan and Terengganu (Noor 2004, pp. 153–155). After the exodus of Patani *ulama* began in the 1930s, the social influence of *ulama* in the northern states had been strengthened, especially in Kelantan, Terengganu and Kedah.

The most important figure in setting up party organs in Kelantan and Terengganu was Asri Muda. Asri was appointed as the Chief Minister of Kelantan after the general election in 1964 (Noor 2004, pp. 217–222).

In 1965 PAS President Burhanuddin was detained under the Internal Security Act on a charge of pro-Indonesian collaboration. The formation of Malaysia in 1963, consisting of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak, made joining with Indonesia an impossible agenda. Asri was elected as PAS President in 1970. Under his leadership unity with Indonesia disappeared from the agenda of PAS, although he was positive in supporting Malay Muslim separatist movements in Patani, Southern Thailand (Noor 2004, pp. 223–226).

Under the leadership of Asri Muda, PAS participated in the ruling coalition Barisan Nasional (National Front: BN) from 1974 to 1977. The main reason for PAS's participation in BN was the ethnic conflict after the 1969 general election and pressure from UMNO to join the newly established BN. In this period, the differences between the two parties were the smallest in the history of the UMNO–PAS relationship. However, dissatisfaction mounted among *ulama*, the backbone of the party, and *ulama* regained the initiative in PAS in the 1980s.

To be an al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun type political party and establish *ulama* leadership: The *ulama* network connected with the Middle East

The main reason for PAS's withdrawal from BN in 1977 was a quarrel with UMNO over the Chief Minister position in Kelantan. As a result of the quarrel with UMNO, PAS lost control of Kelantan state government until they recovered it in 1990 under the leadership of Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat.

After the withdrawal from BN and a disastrous loss in the 1982 general election, Asri lost hegemony in the party. In the *Muktamar* (Annual Assembly) of 1982 discontented *ulama* aligned with the PAS Youth forced Asri and his followers to resign from the party leadership. This group of so-called 'Young Turks' who led the party coup consisted of Arab-trained *ulama* and Malay-educated professionals, and many of them were former members of Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Muslim Youth Movement Malaysia: ABIM). They became, and remain, significant leaders of PAS. Among them were *ulama* such as Yusof Rawa (President from 1982 to 1989, Mursyidul Am from 1987 to 1993), Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat (Mursyidul Am since 1993), Fadzil Noor (former Deputy President of ABIM, President of PAS from 1989 to 2002), Abdul Hadi Awang (former ABIM executive, President since 2003) and Nakhaie Ahmad (former ABIM executive, Vice President of PAS and later Information Chief of UMNO) (Noor 2004, pp. 324–327). The revolt of *ulama* and

young professionals was prepared through Islamic activities, especially learning in the Middle East.

In 1983 the *Muktamar* of PAS elected as the new President Yusof Rawa (1922–2000), who had been the Acting President since Asri resigned from his post in 1982. After learning in Makkah from 1938 to 1946, Yusof Rawa managed a publication company supplying religious books and magazines in Penang. He became active in PAS and was elected as the Commissioner of Pulau Penang in 1959. While PAS was in the Barisan Nasional government, he served as Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Primary Industry (1973–1975). After that he was designated as Ambassador to Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey, and resided in Tehran. In 1981 he was elected as the Deputy President of PAS.[7]

Makkah still functioned as the centre of learning for Shafi'i School Muslims even after exiled *ulama* from Patani passed away, and even after the occupation by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1924. Even in the 1950s there was a PAS branch transmitting the latest Islamic thought in Makkah, especially the concept of *hakimiya* (governance) based on *shari'ah*, to the Malay Peninsula (Abdul Qadir Muttalib al-Indonesi al-Mandili 1954, pp. 35–36). However, after the Islamic University of Madinah was established in 1961, the new university became another destination for Malay students intending to study in Saudi Arabia. Another important change was the rise of al-Azhar as the largest centre of Islamic learning for Southeast Asian students (Roff 2009, p. 133).

Since the first acceptance of Malay students to al-Azhar in the 1870s, the number of Malay students at al-Azhar had increased slowly. Dodge noted that in 1902 there were seven *Jawi* students among 645 foreign students at al-Azhar (Dodge 1961, pp. 164–165). According to Roff, in 1919 there were 'fifty or sixty students in Cairo from Indonesia (mostly West Sumatra), with perhaps an additional twenty from Peninsula Malaya and Southern Thailand'. Roff also reported that by 1925 there were at least 200 Southeast Asian students in Cairo. Roff supposed that the main cause of this rise in numbers was improvement in rubber prices and parental cash incomes towards the middle of the decade (Roff 2009, pp. 133).

By the early twentieth century Cairo had also become a centre of Islamic book publication in Malay. Among the Malay language publishers in Cairo, Ahmad al-Fatani established a publishing venture in Cairo after he moved from Makkah to Egypt. The most influential reformist magazine in the Muslim world, *al-Manar*, published by Rashid Rida, had a huge impact on Southeast Asia, too. Azhar-educated *ulama* Muhammad Tahir Jalaluddin and others published the pioneer magazine *al-Imam* from 1906 to 1908 and propagated reformist thought

in Southeast Asia. *Al-Imam* was a widely circulated journal, with the highest circulation (about 5,000 copies) attained by a Malay journal before the Second World War. Many of the articles in *al-Imam* were either elaborations or translations of articles taken from *al-Manar*. The reformist thought of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida was widely accepted in Southeast Asia (Mohammad Redzuan Othman 2005, pp. 1–18).

By the middle of the twentieth century, Cairo had come to be considered as a centre of reformism based on *salafi* methodology and Muslim modernism. More and more Malay students were attracted to Cairo, although the sultans expressed concern about 'views which are not desirable from the point of view of the Government' spreading from Egypt.[8]

Malay nationalists such as PAS President Burhanuddin Helmi considered Egypt in Gamal Abdel Nasser's days as the model of 'Islamic nationalism against international imperialism'.[9] However, the biggest Egyptian influence on PAS was from al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood). The earliest case of PAS leaders' contact with al-Ikhwan was seen in the 1940s. While Zulkifuli Muhammad (Deputy President of PAS from 1956 to 1964) studied at al-Azhar from 1947 to 1952, he attended lectures organized by al-Ikhwan. In lectures titled *Hadith al-Thulatha* (Tuesday Lecture), started in 1948, the lecturer was Hassan al-Banna, the Mursyidul Am of al-Ikhwan. After the assassination of Hassan al-Banna, the lectures were continued by Sayyid Qutb, a very influential ideologue in the twentieth-century Muslim world, including in Southeast Asia. Yusof Rawa also had exchanges with exiled al-Ikhwan activists in Saudi Arabia in the 1940s (Mohamad Fauzi Zakaria 2007, p. 126).

Zulkifli Muhammad was responsible for establishing PAS's contact with other movements in Indonesia and the Arab world (Noor 2004, p. 129). For this purpose, he sent Yusof Rawa to Middle Eastern countries in 1963. In Egypt Yusof Rawa was advised to visit Iraq by Ikhwan-linked *alim* Muhammad Ghazali, because Iraqi President Abdul Salam Arif was considered to be sympathetic to al-Ikhwan. The Iraqi government offered scholarships for ten exchange students to go to Iraq. In 1964, ten students including Hassan Shukri (Deputy President of PAS from 2003 to 2005) were dispatched to Iraq (Mohamad Fauzi Zakaria 2007, pp. 127–128).

During the 'Islamisation policy'[10] period following the 1970s, the number of Malaysian students at al-Azhar increased explosively. The nationalization of Islamic activities promoted study at al-Azhar, because the expansion of Islamic administration and bureaucratization of *ulama*

assured employment for Azhari graduates. In the 1950s al-Azhar was transformed into a modern university providing degrees to graduates. As a result of the bureaucratization of Islamic administration in Malaysia, possessing a degree certification became indispensable for government employment. By the end of the 1970s there were over 3,000 Malaysian students at al-Azhar. Until this period there was only one dormitory (*riwaq*) for *Jawi* students and they resided together (Dodge 1961, p. 202). After this period, each Malaysian state established dormitories for its own students in Cairo.

Although the increase in the number of Malay students was due to the administrative demands of the Malaysian government, study at al-Azhar brought political influence favourable for the opposition. Malay student associations were consistently under the strong influence of PAS. Zulkifli Muhammad was President of the Persatuan Melayu Mesir (Malay Association in Egypt) from 1950 to 1951 (Kamaruddin Jaffar 2001, p. 9). Fadzil Noor was the Secretary General and Deputy President of Persekutuan Melayu Republik Arab Mesir (Federation of Malays in the Arab Republic of Egypt) in the late 1960s (Wan Senik 2007, p. 16). While Abdul Hadi Awang studied at the Islamic University of Madinah from 1969 to 1973, he was Secretary General of the Southeast Asian Students' Union in Madinah. He was acquainted with activists of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun such as Said Hawa from Syria. He was also active in Ikhwan activities in Cairo while he studied at al-Azhar as a master's student from 1974 to 1975 (Noor 2003, p. 233). Around 1980, among the 3,000 Malaysian students in Cairo, there were only about ten students who dared to participate in Ikhwan activities, because of the danger of being arrested by the Egyptian police. However, it was common for Malay students to read Ikhwan ideologues' books, to acquaint themselves with Ikhwan activists in university classes and to listen to Ikhwan preachers in mosques.[11] According to the Ministry of Higher Education of Malaysia, there were 6,912 Malaysian students in Egypt in 2008 (Bahagian Perancangan dan Penyelidikan Kementerian Pengajian Tinggi Malaysia 2008, p. 74).

The revolt against Asri Muda by *ulama* and young professionals in 1982 was prepared through studies in the Middle East. Immediately after seizing hegemony over the party, the new PAS leadership implemented the organizational methodology and ideologies of al-Ikhwan in PAS, and appealed to international issues in the Muslim world as their main agenda. In the general policy speech of the PAS *Muktamar* in 1983 the new President, Yusof Rawa, referred to issues such as the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1978, the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the Iranian revolution in the

same year.[12] The new leadership of PAS accused the New Economic Policy and the 'Islamisation policy' based on Malay nationalism of being *asabiyyah* (tribalism) and demanded international solidarity of the *ummah*.[13] PAS defined itself as an 'Islamic movement in the same front with Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin, Jama'ah Islami (in Pakistan), and Hizbul Rifah (in Turkey)'.[14] PAS broadened exchanges with al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun in Arab countries and other counterparts such as Jama'ah Islami, the Rifah Party and the Islamic National Front in Sudan (Abu Bakr Chik 1999, pp. 54–55).

In 1982 PAS set up the Lujnah Tarbiah (Education Committee) for training party activists. In *usrah* (study groups in PAS branches) organized by the committee, writings by Ikhwan leaders such as *Al-Aqidah Al-Islamiah* (Hassan al-Banna), *Fiqh Sirah* (Said Ramadan al-Buti and Muhammad al-Ghazali), *Al-Adalah Al-Ijtima'iah* (Syed Qutb) and *Amal Islami dan Jundullah* (Said Hawa) became their texts. Malay translations of these books were published by PAS (Riduan Mohd Nor 2004, p. 88).

Since the 1970s ABIM has also implemented the ideology of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun in its movement (Mohamad Fauzi Zakaria 2007, pp. 137–148). In the 1980s it became common in Muslim student associations in Malaysian local universities to use the texts of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun in their programmes (Riduan Mohd Nor 2004, pp. 74–75). In addition to the Middle East, another place for Malaysian students to become acquainted with members of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun and other counterpart organizations was in Western countries, and especially the United Kingdom. Through participation in umbrella organizations for Muslim students, such as the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) in the United Kingdom and the Muslim Islamic Society of North America (MISNA), student associations in their respective universities and local mosques, Malaysian students had opportunities to organize activities with Arab and South Asian Muslim students. Malaysian students formed organizations like Hizbul Islami (HIZBI, linked to PAS), the Islamic Representative Council (IRC, later renamed as Jamaah Islah Malaysia) and ABIM-MISG (a combination of ABIM and another group in Britain, the Malaysian Islamic Study Group) (Zainah Anwar 1987, pp. 25–31; Badrulamin Bahron 2002, pp. 14–19; Riduan Mohd Nor 2004, p. 75). Many students joined PAS after they came back to Malaysia.

In the 1980s PAS was influenced by the very fast-changing situation in the Muslim world including the revitalization of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun in Egypt, the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan from 1970 to 1989 and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The largest impact was from the Iranian revolution in 1979. The new PAS leadership mainly consisted

of Arab-educated *ulama*. Their leadership was institutionalized as the supreme decision-making organ of the party, the Majlis Syura Ulama, established in 1987 (Parti Islam SeMalaysia 1987, Fasal 7). The idea of *Kepimpinan Ulama* (Leadership of *Ulama*), a principle retained in PAS to this day, appeared from enthusiastic sympathy in the PAS Youth with the Iranian revolution and the concept of *Wilayat-e Faqih* (Guardianship of the Jurist) advocated by Ruhollah Khomeini.[15] The PAS Youth sent delegates to Iran in 1981 to study the Iranian revolution, and trusted the success of that country's *ulama* guidance system. The central committee of the PAS Youth proposed the principle of *Kepimpinan Ulama* and establishment of the Majlis Syura Ulama in the PAS *Muktamar* in 1982 (Dewan Ulamak PAS Pusat 2009, p. 61). Their proposals were finally realized in 1987. *Kepimpinan Ulama* is a rare principle among Sunni movements in the Muslim world. The 1980s marked the peak of internationalization in PAS, while the government pressed its 'Islamisation policy' on a large scale.

Conclusion: Internationalization and nationalization of Islamic activities after the 1990s

In the Malay Peninsula, the twentieth century was the age of the nationalization of Islamic activities (institutionalization and bureaucratization by the government). At the same time it was the age of the internationalization of Islamic activities (study in the Middle East and inflows of Islamic thought). Both nationalization and internationalization have been developing from the early twentieth century until the present day. Both accelerated in the 1970s: the period of 'Islamisation policy'.

Although trans-regional Islamic learning based on the *ulama* network has been sustained continuously from the pre-modern era until the present, the *ulama* network could not be unaffected by world affairs. Incidents such as the world wars and economic crises were highly influential on Muslim movements. Probably the largest impacts on the *ulama* network in the modern era were those of colonization and the establishment of modern states. Colonization and independent modern Muslim states tried to control Islamic activities and absorb them into government administration. Many *ulama* were forced out by political oppression. Phenomena in the contemporary age of globalization such as economic fluctuations, technological innovation in communications and transportation, and conflicts have also affected the *ulama* network. Even after the establishment of modern states by Muslims in the twentieth century, the trans-regional nature of Islamic activities

has been sustained. Transnational Islamic activities developed in the twentieth century through information, transportation and publication technologies.

It was clear that international activities by *ulama*, especially learning in the Middle East, were deeply concerned with the nationalization and internationalization of Islamic activities in the Malay Peninsula. In the twentieth century the standard of Islamic knowledge in the Malay Peninsula improved by leaps and bounds, as a result of the international activities of *ulama*. Their activities were based on the network of *ulama* in the Malay Peninsula and *ulama* from Patani, Indonesia, South Asia and the Arab world. The international activities of *ulama* are also indebted to technological breakthroughs in transportation, communication and printing, and to international economic conditions such as the rubber industry market. Since the 1990s, globalization has been promoting international exchanges between Muslims through worldwide capital movement and technological innovation. The Internet has particularly facilitated interactions between Muslims in remote regions. As JAKIM (Department of Islamic Development Malaysia) Director General Wan Mohamad Sheikh Abdul Aziz has noted, today Muslims in Malaysia can ask for fatwa from *ulama* in the Middle East or Europe via the Internet (Wan Mohamad Sheikh Abdul Aziz 2010, pp. 32–47). Easy access to websites such as Islam Online has made the thought of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun more familiar to curious Muslims in Malaysia.

The transition of PAS was based on nationalization and the internationalization of Islamic activities. *Ulama* educated in the Middle East contributed to improving standards of Islamic knowledge in the Malay Peninsula throughout the twentieth century. They also brought back political thought from the Middle East, especially from Egypt. As a party of *ulama*, today PAS is grounded in the Islamic thought of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun. Through the political activities of PAS, the *ulama* network has succeeded in infusing Islamic world trends into the Malaysian political arena.

Appendix: Question wording

- Question: For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each?
    - '*Ulama* should actively participate in politics.'
    - 'Islam requires that a country with a majority of Muslims be governed by men of Islamic learning (*ulama*).'

- Response: Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neutral; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree; Not applicable (for non-Muslims); Don't know; No response.

Notes

1. Many professionals have participated in the party since the 1980s, especially after the downfall of the former *Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia* (Muslim Youth Movement Malaysia: ABIM) President and former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998.
2. On the history of PAS see Noor (2004); Nasharudin Mat Isa (2001). On the ideology and organizational structure of PAS see Azahar Yaakub (2007).
3. On the conflict between PAS and UMNO, see Funston (1980); Kamarulnizam Abdullah (2003); Gomez (2007).
4. See Appendix.
5. On Maahad il Ihya Assyariff, see Nabir (1976).
6. In the process of the independence movement in Malaya after the Second World War, Malays in UMNO rationalized their special privilege based on the existence of Malay rulers. When the constitution of the Federation of Malaya was promulgated in 1957, Islam was provided as 'the religion of the Federation' in Article 3 (1). In Article 3 (2) a position called 'Head of the Religion of Islam' was provided for rulers in each *Kerajaan* and Yang di-Pertuan Agong (Head of Federation) for states without rulers such as Malacca and Penang (and later, Sabah, Sarawak and the Federal Territories). In the independent Federation of Malaya, the rulers' supreme authority in Islam was reconfirmed. UMNO supporters achieved an independent state preserving Malay privileges represented by *kerajaans* of Malay rulers, Malay as the official language and Islam as 'the religion of the Federation'.
7. On the career of Yusof Rawa, see Kamaruddin Jaffar ed. (2000); Mujahid Yusof Rawa (2001).
8. See Roff (2009, pp. 134–143). In the Conference of Rulers in 1927 the Sultan of Selangor expressed disapproval of sending young Malays to Egypt, because the political thought there and mixing with other Southeast Asian students such as Sumatrans and Javanese could invite undesirable influences to the Malay Peninsula. The sultan proposed setting up of a local college of higher Islamic education as a solution. In 1955 the first 'college of higher Islamic education' Kolej Islam Malaya was established. In 1982 International Islamic University Malaysia was established as a part of 'Islamisation policy'. Following these universities, other 'Islamic universities and colleges' such as Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia (Islamic Science University established in 1998) were set up by the Federal government and state governments. Faculties of Islamic studies were also opened in other national universities. While local universities provided places for Islamic learning, thousands of Malaysian students studied in the Middle East. Local universities could not be alternatives to Middle Eastern universities because of their insufficient level of development.
9. Burhanuddin Helmi's acceptance speech after the presidential election in the 1956 PAS *Muktamar*.

10. In 1969 the Rulers' Conference decided to establish the *Majlis Kebangsaan Bagi Hal-ehwal Agama Islam* (National Islamic Religious Council). The objective of the council was to standardize and strengthen Islamic administration under each state. The Federal government initiated standardization and intensification of Islamic administration all over Malaysia. This policy was accelerated during the Mahatir regime (1981–2003).
11. Interview with Badrulamin Baharon (former student at al-Azhar and Kent University in the United Kingdom, ABIM executive committee member) on 18 May 2010.
12. *Ke Arah Pembebasan Ummah*, Ucapan Dasar Muktamar Tahunan PAS 1983.
13. *Mengempur Pemikiran 'Asabiyyah'*, Ucapan Dasar Muktamar Tahunan PAS 1984.
14. *Bertekad Membulatkan Jama'ah*, Ucapan Dasar Muktamar Tahunan PAS 1988.
15. Interview with Nakhaie Ahmad on 8 June 2009.

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6

Globalization: Issues, Challenges and Responses Among the Moros of the Southern Philippines

Carmen Abu Bakar

Introduction

Globalization can be both negative and positive. In the Philippines, the goal of attaining sustainable development has been a primary consideration; therefore, global forces are often intended to achieve, and directed towards achieving this purpose. However, these efforts do not always mean that different communities are able to participate at the same level or even benefit from these endeavours. This is the case for indigenous communities like the Moros in the southern Philippines, who are facing many issues regarding globalization.

Issues relevant to globalization

Globalization of trade and industries

Mindanao has been a magnet for international trade since even before the colonial period because of its geographical location and rich natural resources. Before the colonialists arrived in the islands now called the Philippines, a brisk trade was going on between Moro traders, particularly from Sulu, and the Indo-Malay peninsula and China. Sulu even became known as a famous pearl market (Munap 2002).

This lively and profitable trade was soon cut off by the arrival of the Spaniards, who began to identify these traders as pirates and enemies of the colonial state. Soon colonial policies began to levy crippling taxes and duties, such as the tariffs and customs duties introduced by the successor American colonial government, further decimating the commercial and trading advantages of the Moros. During the Spanish period

the pirates became smugglers. Turning Moros' economic activities into a criminalized act, a policy that was continued by the Philippine government, caused the maritime trading activities of the Moros to decline further. The entry of Western commerce and trading activities actually destroyed the competitive advantage enjoyed by the Moros, accompanied as it was by changes in their political status, from sovereign sultanates to marginalized minorities. This status was strongly resented and resisted.

Before the imposition of martial law in 1972, Sulu traders defied the government's sanctions, and trading (now called smuggling) went on between Sulu and Sabah. Cigarettes and other trade goods were sold openly in the market; but police raids and naval chases soon took a toll and this activity also began to decline. One might wonder why traders refused to pay the tariffs and avoid the consequences. Perhaps their defiance had to do with the fact that trading activities had been a free enterprise for the Moros. To find themselves subjected to duties, prosecutions and harassment by an alien government (which the Maranao of Lanao referred to as *gobierno as sarwang a tao*) was just too much for them, and defiance became a show of their resistance.

In 1973, a highly regulated barter trade was allowed by the government, regulated by the Southern Philippines Development Agency (SPDA), to give Moro traders the opportunity to buy and sell goods to and from Malaysia, notably to Labuan and Singapore, without tariffs and customs duties. This barter trade system was embodied in Presidential Decree (PD) No. 93 and spelled out the 'who, what, where, and how' for Moro traders to participate in the system (for more details, see Munap 2002). This was part of the government's peace concession efforts because of the conflict then raging in Mindanao. Barter trade worked for a while, but benefited only the urban centres and big capitalists, not the majority of the common people, especially those living in far-flung areas. Big capitalists from outside Mindanao soon took over the barter trade by means of huge capitalization, once again turning Moros out of the trading loop. In 1986, the barter trade system was officially declared to be over, although traders continued to sell goods from Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore in designated centres in Zamboanga and Jolo, paying regular tariffs and duties.

Today, the participation of Moros in global trade is minimal and concentrated only in selected areas. One is the pearl business, notably at the Greenhills Shopping Center (GSC) located in the city of San Juan in Metro Manila, where Maranao traders have established a near

monopoly. Similar stalls with the same goods can also be found in other areas of Metro Manila, but it is GSC that has become a popular site to visit. The pearls come from Hong Kong, Thailand and other places in Southeast Asia and are sold at reasonable and affordable prices to both local and foreign clients. In fact, the mall management considers the 'Pearl industry . . . as one of the strengths of GSC . . . that is known to the world' (Pena 2008). The Maranao traders have found a business niche that is appreciated by the management and which they have found to be profitable.

What makes the partnership between the management and the Maranao traders successful is that the latter conform to the rules and regulations of the management and the former provides incentives to show its appreciation. For example, the management has constructed an air-conditioned mosque with comfort rooms specially designed for ablutions and a halal restaurant, as a 'commitment to the Maranao merchants' (Pena 2008). The construction of the mosque itself was protested by some residents but the management pushed through with the project.

This symbiotic relationship between the mall management and the traders, or 'merchants' as they are referred to by management, appears dependent on the capability of the latter to avail themselves of the opportunity to do business in this area. Many of the merchants are well-educated and readily take advantage of the many seminars offered by management in order to improve their marketing advantages (for more details, see Pena 2008). However, although these Maranao traders enjoy business success, they remain on the level of micro-enterprises with capitalization of 3–5 million pesos or less.

The second area is still being developed: this is the halal industry, which the government is pushing through a new mandate given to the newly created National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCFM) through Republic Act No. 9997, approved 18 February 2010.

The halal industry is expected to grow to 500 billion pesos from its current level of 200 billion pesos, and is seen as being among the local drivers of growth in the economy. There are plans to establish a 2.2-billion-peso halal economic zone in Davao and an 840-million-peso model halal poultry farm complete with research laboratories and other modern facilities (*Sun Star Zamboanga*, 8 July 2010).

What is the participation of the Moro community in the halal industry? Apart from the office (NCMF) mandated to oversee its development, and the Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines (IDCP), which is the body authorized to issue halal certificates, very little participation

seems to come from the Moro community. Certainly, they benefit as consumers from being able to find halal items on supermarket shelves, but they are shut out as producers simply because they do not have the necessary infrastructure or the capital to participate significantly in the industry. This is also because the motivation for building this industry is to take advantage of the export market that will open up in Muslim areas like the Middle East. In this context, only the big corporations can afford to participate.

There are reasons why Moros are unable to enter global businesses, as revealed by a study on this topic. The findings show that Moro businesses are more involved in the domestic market, preferring the traditional sole proprietorship system of commerce, with just a few million pesos of capital, and are engaged in trading rather than manufacturing. The top ten factors that prevent businesses from going beyond this level include a lack of capital, peace and order, a lack of support from the government, a lack of opportunities for conducting business with foreign traders and investors, a lack of technical know-how, poor infrastructure facilities, the fact that the majority of the enterprises are small and informal, conflicts in cultural or religious beliefs, poor communication facilities and poor information systems (PIDS 2005).

It is worth noting that the study recommends the creation of an ad hoc committee that would study how Islamic banking and lending systems could be institutionalized in the Muslim areas. Unfortunately, the Amanah Bank, which was created for this purpose, never became operational as an Islamic bank but remained a conventional commercial bank, thereby failing to become the engine of economic development that was supposed to be its main role.

Finally, the study called for

> A more proactive development policy for Mindanao, translated into well-planned, well-targeted and executed programs that can fuel the growth and expansion in business in the region and open the doors for global trade and participation.
>
> (PIDS 2005, p. 13)

What about the participation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) on the national scene? Here the Strong Republic Nautical Highway (SRNH) and airport projects come to mind. Under the 'super regions' strategy of the Arroyo administration, ARMM is hardly mentioned at all. SRNH, which opened to the public in 2003, connected only the Mindanao provinces of Misamis Occidental, Misamis Oriental,

Lanao del Norte and Dapitan City to other areas in Luzon and Visayas (PIA 2010).

Still on the national scene, the Department of Agriculture (DA) committed at least 15 million pesos in assistance for the development of rubber industries in Zamboanga Sibugay province and other areas of western Mindanao. The plan does not include Basilan, which has a rubber industry, but which is part of ARMM rather than western Mindanao, although these are contiguous provinces.

On the regional level, the recent 6th BIMP-EAGA Summit, held in Cha' Am, Hua Hin, Thailand in November 2009, approved projects focused on transport and power construction projects that aim to boost trade, investment and tourism. For the Philippines, the projects approved were the expansion of Mindanao ports I and II, which specifically mentioned the Palawan Ports Development Programme, and Rehabilitation of the Davao-General Santos Road (*Minda News*, 1 November 2009).

As can be seen, ARMM appears marginally in both regional and national plans. ARMM's plans for economic development, if any, remain moribund; otherwise the level of poverty would be decreasing, not increasing.

Transnational corporations

Transnational corporations are part of global industry. However, they are often criticized for their exploitative and extractive character, especially in the oil and mining industries. In the Philippines, large-scale mining has been active in many areas and has been the object of protests from civil society and indigenous peoples' groups for its aggressive exploitative and extractive activities. This situation has not happened in Moro areas because of the Moros' continuing struggle within their territories, with the exception of the logging concessions given to former rebels or private individuals.

However, this situation may no longer hold true: recent reports of oil and gas exploration in the Sulu Sea motivated newly-elected Tupay Loong of Sulu to file House Resolution 30 directing the appropriate House committees to conduct an inquiry into the oil drilling explorations that have been conducted since October 2009 in the Sulu Sea by Exxon Mobil. Loong wanted to know 'what is the benefit out of this oil drilling exploration in our province?' He added that he has to 'speak for the rights of my people' (*Sun Star Network Online*, 23 July 2010). Regarding the matter of exploiting natural resources, such as

mining, as provided for in the Indigenous People's Rights Act (IPRA), Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of the communities is required before applications can be approved. Does the same requirement not apply here?

Expectations arising from the earning potential of this project, located off the coast of Mapon Island in Tawi-Tawi, have excited the possibility of giving a big boost to ARMM's economy (*Manila Bulletin,* 3 July 2010). Even the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has reminded Exxon Mobil of the rightful share of the Bangsamoro people. According to the aborted Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) deal in 2008, a 75–25 sharing of wealth including oil or gas production, in favour of the future Moro state, was being advanced. Wealth sharing is one of the outstanding issues contained in the larger political autonomy that the MILF is negotiating with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP).

Some caution and vigilance should be exercised in this regard. A case has been pending before the Supreme Court which will decide whether or not the province of Palawan would be able to get a 40% royalty share as mandated by the Local Government Code, or whether the national government is not legally obligated to partition the proceeds (inquirer.net, 19 February 2009). Palawan is the site of the Malampaya oil exploration project managed by Shell Philippines (45%), Chevron-Texaco (45%) and the Philippine National Oil Company Exploration Corporation (10%). According to the latest figures (Newsbreak 2009), the government share, as of January 2009, was $3,125,782.47, as per the summary of reported revenues and government shares from the Malampaya project (Gas and Condensate). While earnings from these types of industries are mind-boggling, sharing the wealth is another matter. In other words, ARMM should make sure of the guarantees of its share, and that if any share is forthcoming, it will be spent for the public good.

However, the discussion regarding oil exploration should not concentrate mainly on the financial aspects: environmental issues should also be a major concern. House Resolution No. 75, filed by Bayan Muna representatives Teodoro Casino and Neri Javier Colmenares, detailed several of the environmental effects such exploration will produce. They pointed to the ecological effect this will have on the Tubbataha Reef National Marine Park, which lies in the middle of the Sulu Sea, and also to the air and sea pollution that are the by-products of oil exploration, the potential hazards of oil spills and the loss or destruction of

livelihood of local fishermen. They requested that the Committee on Ecology conduct an investigation in aid of legislation into the impact of the entry of Exxon Mobil into the ecosystem of the Sulu Sea (House of Representatives 2010b).

One of the groups opposed to this ongoing oil exploration is the Suara Bangsamoro (Voice of the Bangsamoro). In a press statement, Bai Ali Indayla, National Secretary General of Suara Bangsamoro, besides pointing out the many negative effects of this venture, called on the government 'to safeguard the welfare of the people first before the interest of the foreign corporations'. She further asked, 'With their presence, is the Philippine economy developing? Did it change the impoverished lives of the Filipino people especially the Moros?' (*Al-Jazeerah*, 30 June 2008). These issues should certainly be at the centre of public discussions regarding this matter.

Global fishing companies have also invaded the Moro seas, to the extent that local fishermen have been displaced by bigger fishing vessels and fishing grounds have been destroyed by the use of seine fishing methods. Poaching of endangered species like marine turtles and turtle eggs has increased, but prosecutions of perpetrators, especially foreign ones, have languished in the courts. Pardons or light fines are usually handed down so as not to damage relations between countries. This seems to be the case in Tawi-Tawi, where 19 alleged foreign poachers were caught not only with 100 dead and butchered marine turtles but also live ones, together with an estimated 10,000 turtle eggs and two thresher sharks recently identified as 'vulnerable' by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. A case has been filed against the poachers before a court in Bongao for violating the Philippine Wildlife Resource Conservation and Protection Act (R.A.9147), but it has remained pending in court (*Philippine Star*, 12 September 2007). It goes without saying that an examination and a more stringent implementation of policies are necessary to protect the marine resources of the country.

Cultural and intellectual rights

Another effect of globalization is that it tends to increase the vulnerability of the indigenous cultural and territorial domains. Protection of indigenous knowledge and intellectual property rights are therefore important considerations in the growth of global industries like tourism and other related industries in the Philippines.

Intellectual rights are commonly protected by copyrights, patents, trademarks and trade secrets. These protections are embedded in

international laws such as the United Nations' Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), ILO 169 and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Nationally, protection of the intellectual rights of indigenous peoples is provided for in IPRA, Section 29.

However, it has been found that gaps exist between indigenous knowledge and the intellectual property regime due to the nature and character of the former. To bridge this gap, Sedfrey M. Candelaria proposed the following (Candelaria 2007):

(1) Adequate protection of the intellectual rights of the Indigenous Peoples may be established under the current legal regime through subordinate legislation and coordination between the NCIP (National Commission on Indigenous Peoples) and the IPO (Intellectual Property Office).
(2) Congress must develop a sui-generis (a class by itself) system of registration that penetrates the intellectual property regime.

These proposals become more urgent when cases of biopiracy take place. For example, banaba, a medicinal herb well known in the Cordillera and other parts of the Philippines, used to cure illnesses including diarrhoea and diabetes, has been patented by a foreign company for its anti-diabetic properties.

Moros have similar problems with respect to cultural materials that are being commercialized because these have not been copyrighted or patented. Many cultural items like the Tausug *ja* (native cookies), *pis* (male traditional headgear) and songs like the 'Pa Kiring' have been pirated and commercialized by others. Other sources of knowledge are vulnerable to being exploited and acquired without the knowledge of the culture bearers.

PD 1083, otherwise known as the Muslim Personal and Family Law, which operates in ARMM, does not cover intellectual property rights. This is mentioned in the Final Peace Agreement (RA 9054) as being within the function of the Regional Legislative Assembly under patents, trademarks and copyrights, but information on how these processes work is not well known. Because cultural materials are seldom copyrighted, there is no protection under these laws. The ARMM Regional Assembly has not been fully proactive on these issues.

Scholars like Charles Leadbeater refer to 'knowledge capitalism' as the 'drive to generate new ideas and turn them into commercial products and services which consumers want' and that this is now just as pervasive and powerful as the global finance system (Smith and Doyle 2002).

Indigenous communities are vulnerable to the commodification or commercialization of culture in the global search for 'new' knowledge and 'to reap large profits from licensing use of this "knowledge" to others', as noted earlier (Smith and Doyle 2002).

Exploiting indigenous cultural knowledge for commercial/industrial purposes should not be allowed if it is detrimental to these communities.

Globalization of labour

Overseas labour in the Philippines started in the 1970s and accelerated in the 1980s. Overseas remittances reached $1.62 billion in June 2010, which was 8.3% higher than the $1.5 billion in the same month the previous year (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 14 August 2010).

The early overseas workers were largely males but the growing participation of females soon led to what is known as the 'feminization of labour'. Thus, female participation, which started at 50% in 1992, ballooned to 72% in 2001 (Salindal 2007).

In the early stage of overseas labour, Moro participation was small and limited to a few professionals like medical doctors, nurses and engineers. When the market began to grow bigger, more and more Moros became overseas workers, including both skilled and non-skilled workers. Some became the victims of illegal recruiters or were subjected to excessive fees, which meant that their salaries for the first three months were taken by the recruiting agencies.

Many female Moro overseas workers are motivated by the desire to help their families out of poverty, and to provide education for their children or family members. This is indicated by the use of remittances, where family consumption and education rated first and second. The rest are distributed into purchases of jewellery, appliances, debt repayments, business investments, houses and land, transportation/vehicles, savings and dowries. Expenses for religious activities such as the hajj, alms to needy individuals and donations to *madaris* (Islamic schools) were also indicated (Salindal 2007, p. 14).

The amount of remittances sent home depends on the salaries received by the workers. Naturally, those better prepared professionally are able to earn more than those who are less skilled. It is not rare, however, for remittances to be used indiscriminately or mismanaged by the recipients so that the intended benefits are lost. This gives way to the 'never ending cycle' of rehires, or the return of the worker to the job, because the needs of the family have to be met.

Problems in this sector soon began to emerge, especially among vulnerable domestic helpers. Besides those problems already inherent in overseas work, problems relating to the culture, politics and economy of the host country also became apparent, such as language and cultural practices (Salindal 2007, p. 13). The top ten problems cited by Maguindanao women respondents were: (1) lack of sleep; (2) no rest day; (3) homesickness; (4) contract substitution; (5) no medical assistance; (6) misunderstandings with the employer; (7) unpaid/delayed salaries; (8) physical abuse; (9) verbal abuse; and (10) inhuman treatment (Salindal 2007, p. 82). Many of these problems have to do with the type of employer a domestic worker happens to have, so their experience varies from employer to employer. This means that a worker can have a good experience if he/she has a kind and generous employer. This is especially beneficial in terms of the workers' desire to perform hajj or *umrah*, which requires the consent and support of the employers.

In addition, there are also some unintended effects of working overseas that may negatively affect the family. Among these are the infidelity of a partner often leading to divorce, and disciplinary problems of children growing up without the presence or guidance of parents.

Many of these problems relate to labour laws and protections for overseas workers through the agencies of government like the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs. Thus, the more proactive these agencies are, the fewer problems there will be. In spite of these problems, overseas work is continuing to increase to such an extent that Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) are regarded as the country's *bagong bayani* or new heroes.

The downside of the globalization of labour is the accompanying 'brain drain', especially among the medical professions. Most graduates in the medical and allied professions want to work abroad for higher salaries. There is already a surfeit of nursing graduates who are unemployed and are waiting for the opportunity to go abroad. The number of Moro nursing graduates is also increasing but most are primed for work abroad in spite of the need for medical services in Moro communities.

On the other hand, the globalization of labour also brings about cultural exchanges that take place between the workers and the host country. Among Moro women, the most visible is the way they began to adopt the *hijab*, the *abaya* and even the *nikab*, which are common in the Middle East. In addition, *dawah* (predication) centres attract many Muslims to learn more about their religion, in addition to learning the

Arabic language. If assigned in Makkah or Medina, they get to perform the hajj, or *umrah*, and invite their parents and other siblings to do the same. In fact, the opportunity to perform the hajj remains one of the push factors for workers to prefer Saudi Arabia as a destination.

Global telecommunications/Information technologies

The connectivity of people provided by global telecommunications technology is an established fact, but its effect has been both positive and negative. Through these global communications technologies, Moro groups have been able to build networks with international support groups addressing common issues and problems. They are able to mobilize both local and international organizations to respond quickly to current issues. More importantly, they can access information easily through the Internet and participate in online discussions on issues that affect their communities. International support groups also provide help in capacity-building programmes. Many Moro organizations operate their own websites accessible to anyone interested in their campaigns to raise awareness on the issues that affect them. Ideas and events are accessed with the click of a mouse and cable channels bring news from all over the world on a 24-hour basis. In fact, cell phones have greatly reduced the problems of communicating with the far-flung islands of Mindanao; overseas workers who need to contact their families on a regular basis also benefit from this technology.

However, due to isolation and poverty, not everyone can take advantage of global communications technology. Also, not all are also happy at the way these new telecommunications technologies have been put to use.

For example, in urban centres where Internet cafes are accessible for the sum of 20 or even 15 pesos per hour, some concerns have been raised as to the content of some websites that users (especially young people) can access anytime. Social networking, chatting and texting have increased and intensified contacts among young people in such a way that close personal relationships are being formed without the knowledge of parents. This has challenged the traditional norms regarding interactions between men and women, which many parents find worrisome. The Moros fear that these new behaviour patterns among young people can lead to problems like STDs (sexually transmitted diseases), and even unwanted pregnancies.

Because global telecommunications also include other entertainment media that freely display sex, alcohol consumption, smoking and the use of illegal drugs, often in a highly provocative manner, the urban

environment becomes highly toxic for young people. Without a strong foundation and guidance provided by the family, they can easily succumb to the lure and seduction of the city.

However, this shows only half of the picture. According to Ashgar Ali Engineer, a scholar from India, the connectivity that modern telecommunications bring about also espouses a type of global lifestyle characterized by consumerism and materialism, and this tends to exert a homogenizing effect on other cultures. He puts it this way:

> This phase of globalization has bulldozed all native cultures homogenizing them in one sweep through various media channels. Also, this homogenization is being promoted through gross commercialization of culture. Commercialization has bulldozed all religious, cultural, and civilizational values, too.
>
> (Ashgar Ali Engineer 2008)

The homogenization of culture is more evident in the spread of popular culture, ranging over food, drinks, fashion attire, music, dance crazes, sports, digital devices and so on, which target the young people to such an extent that it is already difficult to distinguish them from one another. The drive to sell the latest product on the market, fuelled by aggressive global advertisements, looks at everybody simply as potential customers regardless of ethnicity or nationality. In this frenzied consumerist and materialistic lifestyle, many cultural traditions are thrown aside, to eventually be forgotten and become extinct.

Moros, like all indigenous groups, are vulnerable to these global forces, but in some cases, they are adapting pragmatically to the situation. Oral traditions like songs, for example, are being transformed into pop songs, and artists who perform in this genre do so just like those in other countries. At the same time, however, most of these songs are performed in the local languages, so these languages are growing as expressive forms instead of being replaced by English or Filipino, although the latter languages are also used in order to attain a wider audience across ethnic groups. Local musical instruments are sometimes used in combination with other non-traditional ones, instead of completely disappearing.

This phenomenon has led singers to compose original works and to produce their own CDs or DVDs for sale in the local markets. These artists or singers have their own fans and are featured on websites like YouTube, or group websites like that of the Tausugs (www.tausugnet.com). Another interesting fact is that many CDs are actually produced

in Sabah, Malaysia and sold in Sulu, but the volume produced is so small that they are sold only at sidewalk stalls. There are cassette tapes of more traditional types of songs available but most of the recordings are very rough.

In other words, even with the homogenization of culture due to popularized global products, some resistance and pragmatic adaptation is also taking place.

Global campaigns against terrorism

Another global phenomenon having a strong effect on the lives of Moros is that of the global campaign against terrorism. The Anti-Terrorism Bill, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007 (RA 9372) was the centre of furious debates both in and outside congress. Moros' fears and apprehensions were captured by the remarks of Lanao del Sur representative Benasing Macarambon, who said that the definition of terrorism in the bill actually described Muslims, always regarded as the 'usual suspects' (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 6 October 2010).

The anti-terror campaign produced a number of human rights violations through mechanisms like warrantless arrests, detentions, indiscriminate bombings of villages in pursuit of alleged criminals and raids on Islamic *dawah* centres and *madaris*. Being suspected of being a supporter, if not a member, of terrorist organizations like the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) or Jamaah Islamiya (JI) is sufficient justification for one to be picked up and detained. Some of those picked up are never seen again.

The anti-terror campaign brought in its wake the strengthening of the Visiting Forces Agreement resulting in the presence of US soldiers in Moro areas like Sulu and other parts of Mindanao. Suspicions of their participation in combat operations remain high due to actual sightings reported by residents. US soldiers in combat operations have been reported by the Moro Human Rights group Kawagib, who relayed that on 3 September 2008, Americans in full battle gear were seen with Filipino troops in the army camp at Datu Saudi, Ampatuan (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 10 September 2008). In 2009, two US soldiers were killed in a bomb explosion when their vehicle passed by a barangay in Indanan, Sulu (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 30 September 2009).

These claims are usually denied by the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) and the US Embassy. They point out that the soldiers are in the area to conduct humanitarian projects in coordination with the AFP and local government like that of Sulu. Some of these projects involve

artesian wells, school buildings and roads. In a recent handover ceremony for one of these projects, the governor of Sulu, Abdusakur Tan, showed his appreciation in his remarks:

> We will support efforts of the military, both from the Philippines and the United States, to bring about changes and hope for brighter future through humanitarian activities and infrastructure development projects across Sulu. With the cooperation of the people, we are sure Sulu will be one of the peaceful places in the southern Philippines.
>
> (*Zamboanga Times*, 30 August 2008)

Such investments in global peace also include participation in or support for the peace process, capacity-building of various Moro NGOs and other peace initiatives. Some Moros, however, look askance at these humanitarian projects from countries who are at the same time also conducting or supporting wars against Muslims, whether in this country or elsewhere.

Tuazon (2008), however, looks at the campaign against terrorism as part of a larger US project in terms of making Mindanao an open market for foreign trade and investments, control of strategic trade routes, injection of more military personnel into the area, construction of infrastructure for a permanent base and generally advancing US geopolitical and economic interests. As regards the establishment of a military base, he claims that the MILF spokesperson, Ed Kabalu, admitted in an interview with the *Asia Times* in October 2006 that 'his organization had been approached several times by US authorities about the possibility of establishing military bases in MILF-controlled territory as part of a final peace deal' (Tuazon 2008, p. 87).

Challenges

Discrimination

Globalization has increased the sense of identity of Moros as a faith community being the object of discrimination. This is because the global mass media has been relentless in identifying Muslims with terrorism, which many observers have attributed to the growing Islamophobia.

Bangsamoros faced discrimination in terms of being the subject of unjustified police operations related to alleged terrorist activities. In addition, they are shut out from employment and from renting or buying houses, are delayed or passed over in terms of promotions, face

restrictions in travel due to profiling and so on. Even getting a taxi is difficult for women wearing veils or for men wearing traditional attire. The Young Moro Professionals (YMP) organization has disclosed that employer stereotyping portrays Muslims as being less educated and difficult to employ if they wear Muslim dress or use Muslim names, which even leads some Muslims to change their names for employment purposes (*ABS CBN News*, 4 July 2009).

In terms of statistics, Pulse Asia's 2005 Ulat ng Bayan Survey showed that 33–44% of Filipino adults have an anti-Muslim bias although only 14% them had direct dealings with Muslims. Television is the main source of information for the majority of respondents (78%), followed by radio (44%) and newspapers (29%) (see HDN 2005, p. 55).

Recently, a gathering of some 1,000 Muslim residents of the City of General Santos tackled the subject of discrimination, and particularly the refusal of private companies to hire Muslim job applicants. In response, Rep. Pedro B. Acharon, Jr., the former mayor, pointed out that private companies have the discretion to refuse or accept any job applicant. The representative has obviously not heard about the constitutional right of individuals not to be discriminated against because of race or religion. Esmail Mutalib, chairman of the General Santos City Muslim Leaders (GSCMLF), who organized the event, noted: 'we feel that there is an "invisible wall" that divides the Muslims and Christians here' (*Minda News*, 14 July 2010).

Similarly, in a forum of the People's Management Association of the Philippines held in Baguio (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 28 September 2008), Cito Beltran, the moderator, asked why few Muslims get jobs the moment their religion is mentioned. Pilar Almira, Director of Manila General Hospital, answered that some company officials usually hire people who cause less friction in the workplace. This comment confirms the presence of stereotyping, bias and prejudices that dictate hiring policies.

A case of discrimination in the media reached the Supreme Court after the tabloid *Bulgar* published a story on 1 August 1992 stating that the reason Muslims do not eat pork is that they worship the animal pork comes from. Although the Supreme Court dismissed the petition of libel as lacking in specificity, Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio wrote a dissenting opinion saying that 'the article was published with the intent to humiliate and disparage Muslims and cast insult on Islam as a religion in this country'. Of course, the controversy regarding the publication of a cartoon of the Prophet in Europe justified under the principle of freedom of expression is just another example. Recently the United Nations

Human Rights Council (UNHCR) approved a resolution seeking to curb religious defamation by classifying it as a human rights violation. The text read: 'defamation of religions is a serious affront to human dignity leading to a restriction on the freedom of religion of their adherents and incitement to religious hatred and violence' (*ABS CBN News*, 4 July 2009).

Media corporate leaders are aware of this situation, as shown at their meeting that took place in Tagaytay City in August 2008 (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 26 August 2008). Among the observations made was that the media tend to focus on the bad or negative news about Mindanao because it sells. Another is that reporting is skewed in favour of Christian viewpoints, acknowledged by the participants as being due to the prejudices and biases not only of the reporters but also of the editors: biases and prejudices that are rooted in ignorance or lack of information. Some of the recommendations called for journalists to be given additional training, including on the history and culture of Mindanao, to diversify their sources in order to get a more holistic view of incidents such as the current conflict in Mindanao and to conduct research and analysis into historical contexts to give in-depth reports. These recommendations support the findings of a study conducted by the Asian Institute of Journalism and Communication (AIJC), titled 'Prejudice and Pride: News Media's Role in Promoting Tolerance'. This study not only identified biases against Muslims in news reports but also showed a growing perception that media give more attention to extremist views that do not represent the views of the majority of Muslims. Its recommendations include creating a comprehensive framework for media reportage and adopting a non-discriminatory approach to news reporting (Senate of the Philippines 2008).

Anti-Muslim biases have been addressed by the Senate and House of Representatives. For example, Senator Edgardo Angara filed Senate Bill 914, an act designed to prohibit the use of the word 'Muslim' or 'Islamic' in print, radio, television and other forms of broadcast media to refer to or describe any person convicted of any crime, or suspected of committing any unlawful act, and providing penalties for violations. *Aresto mayor* (imprisonment for a period from one to six months) or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 10,000 pesos or both would be imposed on any person found guilty of violating the act. The publishers and presidents of media outfits would be liable for not lower than 50,000 pesos. Cancellation of license or franchise may also be imposed (Senate of the Philippines 2008). Similar bills addressing the same concerns are

Senate Bill 710 authored by Sen. Ramon Revilla, Jr. and Senate Bill 2507 authored by Sen. Manny Villar.

A House version (House Bill 100) authored by Juan Angara, with Representatives Balindong, Go, Ilagan, Jikiri et al., was approved by the House on 5 February 2008 and transmitted to the Senate on 11 February 2008, where it is pending at the time of writing.

Congresswoman Faysah Dumarpa, Representative of Lanao del Sur, authored House Bill 948, an act prohibiting religious or social profiling against indigenous communities. The Bill seeks to penalize mimicking or imitating a person's way of speaking, particularly accent or diction. It also includes degrading or insulting behaviour by a person towards another, particularly one belonging to a cultural minority. Unjustified, illegal search because of manner of dress, religion, colour, creed or ethnic identity as well as discriminating against a person applying for a job, or preventing entry into establishments because of a person's name, religion or ethnic origin, are also included in this Bill. Violators are fined from 200 to 6,000 pesos or face terms of imprisonment of six months to six years (*Philippine Star*, 4 April 2008). House Bill 03012, an act prohibiting discrimination against persons on account of ethnic origin and/or religious belief, authored by party-list AMIN (Anak Mindanao) Representative Mujiv S. Hataman, is also pending in the Senate.

In addition, Rep. Mujiv S. Hataman also authored two bills, namely, House Bill 01805, an act providing for the mandatory study of Moro history, culture and identity in the curricula of all levels of schools in the country, and House Bill 01806, an act providing for the study of Lumad history, culture and identity in the curricula of all levels of schools in the country. Both bills were pending in the committee on Basic Education and Culture from 21 August 2007 (for all bills cited see House of Representatives 2010a).

These show the concern among some legislators with addressing pressing issues important to the welfare of Moros. That these bills are still pending in either the House of Representatives or the Senate shows that this concern is not widespread.

Peace and order

The recent conflict in Mindanao as a result of the aborted signing of the MOA-AD led to the displacement of over 500,000 civilians in over three months of fighting. Many of these Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have now returned home, but others have not, either because there are no homes to return to or they do not feel secure enough to return. According to Christoph Gillioz, head of the International Committee

of the Red Cross (ICRC), some people had lost everything during the war and 'simply have nothing to go back to' (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 17 August 2010).

The cost of war has always fallen hard on civilians, who are often callously dismissed as 'collateral damage'. Children are inevitably included as victims and counted among the 'casualties of war'.

Children remain vulnerable whenever there is an all-out war campaign, especially in ARMM. The Salinlahi Alliance for Children's Concern noted that 7% of the victims of extrajudicial killings recorded by human rights groups in ARMM from 2001 to 2007 were children (60 children). Five children were killed in 2007 who were branded as combatants but who were actually schoolchildren caught in the crossfire. Similar incidents were reported by the Department of Social Welfare and Development in Sulu, Indanan, where children aged four to 16 were arrested and tortured on 19 August 2007, and a 12-year-old died who was shot together with nine other people on 18 January 2007 (AITPN 2007).

As well as these situations, children are also recruited by armed groups, eventually to become combatants in wars as child soldiers. This means that the longer the peace negotiations are not settled, the more children will suffer the trauma of war. For this reason, President Benigno Aquino's speech during the Hariraya dinner he hosted to mark the end of Ramadan 2010 was welcome. He said: 'I am committed to ending decades of government neglect that has affected Muslim Filipinos'. This commitment includes, among other things, the resumption of peace talks with the MILF, and the support and strengthening of ARMM (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 14 September 2010).

Conclusions: Culture of resistance and pragmatic responses

In an article entitled 'Beyond Violence and Non-Violence: Resistance as a Culture', Ramzy Baroud references Edward Said's definition of culture as 'a way of fighting against extinction and obliteration'. Baroud goes on to say: 'if resistance is "the action of opposing something that you disapprove or disagree with", then a culture of resistance is what occurs when an entire culture reaches this collective decision to oppose that disagreeable element – often a foreign occupation' (Baroud 2010).

Today, globalization is like a 'foreign occupation' in the way it affects the behaviour and values of individuals and communities. During the colonial period, Moros collectively decided to oppose foreign occupation by arms in order to maintain their freedom and the integrity of their culture or their Islamic way of life. Today, they have had to

adopt pragmatic responses to globalization. For example, during colonial times, many refused to send their children to schools for fear that their children would be Christianized. Realization regarding the survival of the community soon led many parents to send their children to secular schools to get the necessary skills for employment and to protect them from further marginalization. Now, madrasah education (Islamic schools) exists side by side with secular schools.

Thus, where globalization is concerned, the core values of Islam operate as a filter through which Moros are able to reflect and ponder possible responses. Where participation is necessary, it is made in support of Islamic goals. Take those who join the global labour force. Moros prefer the Middle East as a likely destination because of its cultural familiarity. It also provides them with the opportunity to perform the hajj or *umrah*, visit the sacred places of Makkah and Medina, and learn more about Islam in the process through the many *dawah* centres. Not only does one get paid, but one also gains spiritual merit at the same time. Thinking about big business, they look for *shari'ah* compliant financial systems so as not to violate the injunction against interest and so on.

To survive in a minority environment, Moros have had to learn to be pragmatic. They have appropriated ideas, activities, goods and institutions that do not disagree with their core values and which enable them to coexist with others. In this way, they are able to retain their identities and maintain the integrity of their communities.

For Moros, then, the culture of resistance that Baroud talks about centres on the core values of Islam and the Islamic way of life. Moros have defended these core values and continue to do so on both the individual and collective levels. This resistance is also in the context of the homogenization of culture that Engineer speaks about. It is valid to say that in spite of the impact globalization has had on indigenous groups, in general, the Moro culture continues to remain vibrantly viable. But how long will this last?

Scholars like Kenneth E. Bauzon, for example, view the Bangsamoro struggle in the light of neoliberal globalization and point to the growing presence of such forces in the Philippines. Bauzon notes how these were used as counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism tools through the passage of policies and the creation of structures that promoted these principles, and makes this observation:

> The 1996 peace agreement between the GRP and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) is essentially a neoliberal formula designed to bring to an end the MNLF's more than two decades of insurgency.

> At the same time, the agreement provided legal cover for the entry of capital – both domestic and foreign, and both commercial and philanthropic – to facilitate the integration of an otherwise untapped region, the ARMM, into the global neoliberal world economic order.
>
> (Bauzon 2008, p. 77)

This locates the issues of globalization not only within the purview of national policies but also within its systems. Bauzon identifies the result of neoliberalism in the growth of poverty, extreme inequalities in income, exploitation of child labour, the feminization of the workforce, suppression of workers' rights, the degradation of the environment and the repression of political dissent (Bauzon 2008, p. 78). Some of the issues discussed in this paper are within these parameters and raise the important consideration of whether Moros, in their present state of autonomy, will be able to mitigate these harsh realities.

At this point in time, perhaps resistance and pragmatism are responses that belong to marginalized minorities. However, in the context of the Moros' struggle for the right to self-determination, in order to 'freely determine their political status, and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development' (The United Nations 1960), the issues of globalization and the Moros' responses might well have a different future. By then, it might be the case that their ability to protect and defend their culture and patrimony will have become stronger and more enduring by conforming to Islamic principles of social justice and the establishment of an egalitarian society: core values of Islam that are expected to have primacy in Muslim lives.

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7
Democratization and 'Failure' of Islamic Parties in Indonesia

Ken Miichi

'Failure' of Islamic political parties

Islamization as an aspect of globalization

Islamization in Indonesia has accompanied modernization and urbanization. Since the end of the nineteenth century, Islam has been taught in the modern school system and Islamic activities have been organized under modern organizations and political parties. As the end of the twentieth century approached, Islamization became more obvious. Tens of thousands of mosques, prayer places and religious schools were built, and more women wore the Islamic veil (called *jilbab* in Indonesia). More people greeted each other with the Arabic *Assalamu'alaikum* (Peace be upon you).

The exposure of Islamic symbols has particularly intensified in the past decade as the global market economy has penetrated Indonesia. *Jilbab* have become fashionable and many 'artists' on TV compete in wearing up-to-date styles. People greet each other with *Assalamu'alaikum* even when they answer a mobile phone. The mobile phone itself has been 'Islamized'. There are various Islamic ringtones, and applications that recite the holy Quran and indicate *qiblat* (prayer direction) and praying times. Symbolized by the fashionable veil and 'Islamic' mobile phones, both the commoditization of Islam and the Islamization of commodities have been significant phenomena. The novel and movie *Ayat-ayat Cinta* (Verses of Love), which was a love story involving a male Indonesian student and Egyptian and German women in Cairo, became a record hit in 2008. It is a global trend that Islamic commodities have been flourishing: Islamic finance and the halal food industry are typically prevalent. However, what kind of commodities are in fashion and how they are perceived depend on particular local settings (See Pink 2009).[1]

The spread and circulation of Islamic political movements is a typically 'glocal' phenomenon. While transnational influences, especially ideological ones, are apparent, domestic political circumstances are vitally important. In most Muslim-dominated countries, Islamic parties must compete in very restricted conditions under authoritarian regimes. In Indonesia, political parties have enjoyed freedom since 1998 when the Suharto regime collapsed after 40-odd years in power. The political freedom of Islamic parties cannot be expected easily in neighbouring Malaysia, and much less so in Brunei or Singapore. However, support for Islamic parties has been decreasing among their constituencies in Indonesia.

In the first general election in 1955, which was relatively free and fair, the Islamic parties Masyumi, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and other small parties accounted for nearly 45% of the vote. The five elections during the Suharto era were not considered to reflect Islamic aspirations because Masyumi was banned in 1960 and all Islamic parties were integrated as the United Development Party (PPP) in 1973. The ruling party, Golkar, maintained its dominant position and PPP was repeatedly subjected to intervention by the regime. The resignation of Suharto in 1998 and political liberation brought great hope for Islamic parties. Twenty Islamic parties entered the 1999 election and their share of the vote was 37.6%, which slightly increased to 38.3% in the 2004 election. However, votes for Islamic parties radically dropped to 28.9% in 2009. All Islamic parties except the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) saw their share of the vote decrease in the 2009 election.

Why did Islamic parties fail even though Islam itself seems to be flourishing in Indonesia? This chapter tries to answer this contradiction. First, I will analyse the result of the 2009 election. Several factors will be highlighted which reflect changing perceptions of Islam and politics, rather than a short-term analysis of the election results. Second, opinion polling conducted by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Research Institute in cooperation with the Indonesia Survey Institute (LSI, Lembaga Survei Indonesia) in January 2010 will be analysed. This analysis will reveal changing relations between Islam and politics in Indonesia. It will lead to further reconsideration of conventional frameworks on Islam in Indonesia.

What are Islamic parties?

An Islamic party can be defined as a party that is mainly supported by Islamic organizations and/or has a platform that seeks Islamization of

the society and state. There are three characteristic features of Islamic parties in Indonesia, which can coexist in a given party. First, some parties rely on support from particular mass Islamic organizations. NU has supported particular parties since it briefly joined the Masyumi party after the independence of the republic. NU supported the opposition PPP during Suharto's New Order when its own party was forced to integrate with PPP in 1973. Under pressure from the regime, NU withdrew its official support in 1985, but some of its members continued to vote for PPP. After the fall of Suharto in 1998, the main stream of NU established the National Awakening Party (PKB).[2] It should be noted that NU is not a cohesive organization but highly fragmented and decentralized. Some of its members continue to support PPP and some may turn to other parties. The National Mandate Party (PAN) was established by members of Muhammadiyah in 1998. Golkar is supported by many regional Islamic organizations, although it cannot be categorized as an Islamic party. Because it was the dominant catch-all ruling party during the Suharto era, Golkar has mobilized most kinds of regional organizations from the very conservative to the heretical. It is not an Islamic party because Islamic organizations are not the main source of its votes.

Second, some Islamic parties ideologically pursue an agenda of Islamization. Established as a party that aimed to inherit the legacy of Masyumi in the 1950s, the Moon and Star Party (PBB) demanded the adoption of *shari'ah* in the constitution of the republic. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) emerged after the fall of Suharto and quickly expanded without backing from any existing major mass organization such as NU or Muhammadiyah. Founded as the Justice Party (PK) in 1998, it originated in students' propagation/predication (*da'wa*) activities called *tarbiyah* ('education' in Arabic), and was virtually established as an Indonesian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. PKS is considered to be an Islamist party that aims to establish a political authority to replace the existing one. Thus PKS is often compared with other political movements that are considered to be Islamist, including very violent ones.[3] However, as discussed later, PKS has adopted rules of democratic competition and modified itself with careful observation of voters' preferences. If I may borrow a framework from Olivier Roy, PKS is an Islamist movement that opted for political normalization within the framework of the modern nation-state.[4]

Third, some Islamic parties try to promote an inclusive image and attract the urban middle class. PAN adopts this strategy because it needs votes from Muhammadiyah. Compared to those of NU,

Muhammadiyah schools are modernized and their teachers are not 'charismatic', and thus they are less loyal to the party supported by the organization. PAN was ironically called the 'National Artist Party' in the 2009 election because it included many artists as candidates. PKS has also tried to extend its support beyond its cadres. Of course this characteristic is not particularly unique to Islamic parties and therefore competition with nationalist parties has intensified, as I will discuss later.

How did Islamic parties lose in the 2009 election?

There are several reasons why Islamic parties lost support in their constituencies. First, in the shorter term, internal conflicts among Islamic parties and organizations negatively affected election results. The worst case of this was PKB: the legal status of a faction led by Abdurrahman Wahid, former president of the republic and the founder of PKB, was denied in court, and Wahid urged a boycott of the election. Furthermore, influential Islamic school (*pesantren*) leaders (*kyai*) in East Java established the National Ulama Awakening Party (PKNU), which attracted significant votes in several regions in East Java. However, these votes for PKNU were not recognized legally because PKNU could not get past the 2.5% electoral threshold that prevents too many small parties from participating in the national parliament.

Second, in the much longer term, it is important to note that differences between secular parties and Islamic parties became blurred. In the 1955 election, cleavage between secular (nationalist and communist) and Islamic parties was much clearer. During Suharto's New Order, Golkar took over most of Masyumi's support base. After democratization in 1998, many Islamic parties were established that were based on Islamic organizations or Islamic political ideology. However, the political setting had changed significantly during the 40 years of the Suharto era. PKB and PAN, established by NU and Muhammadiyah members, put 'nation' (*bangsa* and *nasional*, respectively) in their party names. Unlike these two new Islamic parties, PPP maintained the symbol of Islam as the party's foundation (*asas partai*) but its share of the vote has decreased in all three general elections since 1998.[5] PBB tried to attract supporters of the former Masyumi party and openly demanded the adoption of *shari'ah*, but it only obtained 1.79% of the vote in the 2009 election, and PBB vanished from the national parliament. On the other hand, 'secular' and nationalist parties realized the importance of Islam and started to promote their 'piousness'. For example, the Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (PDI-P), which is considered to be the most

secular among the major parties, established an Islamic body called Baitul Muslimin in 2004.

This tendency had been observed since the 2004 election, but it was intensified and differences between secular and Islamic parties further blurred in the recent election in April 2009. The Democratic Party's motto for the latter election was *Nasionalis-Religious* (Religious Nationalist). In contrast, PKS, which is perceived as the 'most Islamic' by voters, raised its flag with the slogan *Bersih Peduli Profesional* (Clean, Caring and Professional).[6] Although PKS has not always pushed an Islamization agenda, the changes of expression are obvious. In the 1999 election, the party claimed it was the *partai da'wah*, meaning 'propagation party', and women in its street demonstrations were symbolically covered in all-white *jilbab*.

Preparing for the 2009 election, PKS apparently turned to a more nationalist approach. A series of TV commercials made by PKS sold urban, young and casual images. Women appearing in the TV commercial clips seldom wore the veil, which used to be the symbol of the street demonstrations mobilized by PK or PKS. This strategy was successful in the 2004 election, but the result of the 2009 election disappointed party cadres. PKS only slightly increased its votes even though its electoral target was much higher. The party pushed for further political normalization after the election. It declared its intention to become a *partai terbuka*, that is, an open and inclusive party, in July 2010.

PKS leaders said they had been struck by the 'Tsunami of SBY [President Yudhoyono]'. Because the Democratic Party and President Yudhoyono himself had successfully sold clean and religious images, the significance of PKS disappeared. Yudhoyono had been carefully cultivating his religious image by, for instance, forming a *dhikr* organization, Majelis Dzikir SBY Nurussalam, which appeared preliminary to the 2009 general election.[7] At the same time, Yudhoyono tried to promote positive, moderate and democratic images of Islam inside and outside Indonesia. In his speech in the fasting month in 2009, Yudhoyono declared that 'Islamic values do not conflict with but harmonize with universal values such as democracy, rule of law, modernity, development of science and technology, world peace and security, and thus progress of the world' (28 August 2009, *Kompas*).

Finally, the political influence of traditional religious authority has been decreasing over the longer term. *Ulama* used to dominate religious knowledge and were highly respected in many regions. Their 'charisma' often went along with varieties of magical power. However, urbanization and modernization of education led to a relative decrease in the

religious, social and spiritual power of *ulama*. *Ulama* themselves are trained in the modern national curriculum. Some 'charismatic' *ulama*, called *kyai* in Java, maintained political influence in East Java. For example, it has been said that the radical exodus of votes from PKB to PPP in the 2004 election in Situbondo was because of one *kyai* who turned his support from PKB to PPP: he could move 100,000 votes. However, their influence is not universal. In the presidential election after the general election in 2009, some influential *kyai* supported Yusuf Kalla-Wiranto for the presidency, but they lost in all constituencies in East Java. Moreover, the nationally famous preacher Zainuddin MZ, who used to be called the 'cleric of a million followers', quickly lost his popularity after he established the Star of Reformation Party (PBR). Disassociated from PPP, PBR brought with it a sense of freshness and obtained 2.4% in the 2004 election, but this decreased to 1.2% in 2009 and it lost its seats in the national parliament. Zainuddin himself appeared less on TV, having been replaced by young, handsome and less political preachers.[8]

Findings from the opinion survey

Who are *santri*?

Analyses of Islam and politics in Indonesia rely on two sets of classifications: *santri* (pious Muslim) and *abangan* (nominal or Javanized Muslim), and modernist (or reformist) and traditionalist. According to Clifford Geertz, *abangan* are more influenced by the pre-Islamic Javanese tradition and worldview than Islam. Based on his field work in Java in the 1950s, Geertz (1960) divided nominal Muslims into *abangan* and *priyai* according to their social backgrounds. This classification, called *aliran* (literally meaning 'stream'), is highly problematic and has been challenged by many scholars. However, it is very influential, and has been used repeatedly both by scholars and in the mass media. Observing society-wide Islamization in Indonesia in the past few decades, some have argued that '*santri*-ization' has been occurring. Hefner (2011) rightly argues that the big losers under the New Order were *abangan* Muslims and today all major parties subscribe to a normatively standardized Sunni Islam.

Our opinion survey 'measured piousness' by asking respondents about five religious practices: praying five times a day (Q38); fasting in the month of *Ramadhan* (Q39); conducting non-obligatory prayers (*sunnah*) (Q40); attending communal prayers (*jamaah*) (Q41); and attending religious activities such as sermons or religious discussions and the like (Q42). We should be very cautious about 'measuring piousness' and acknowledge a potential for bias in self-reporting. I do not wish to argue

Table 7.1 Frequency of conducting religious practices and social background

Question	38	39	40	41	42
Education	0.0691984	0.0875508	0.029	0.010	–0.016
Age	0.187	0.051	0.235	0.185	0.207
Woman	0.1086	0.08506	–0.01563	–0.2186	0.03971
Java	0.1246	–0.01449	0.01966	0.008789	0.08013
Urban	–0.017	0.003	–0.021	–0.076	–0.020
Income	0.026	0.040	–0.002	–0.021	–0.014

Statistically significant at least at the 10% level.

Note: Reported are Spearman's rank correlations between the level of household income and each of the ordinal variables (38–42, 46–49, 54–58). P-values are in parentheses. Household income level was measured on a 5-point ordinal scale.

about how many *santri* and *abangan* there are in Indonesia. Pervasive displays of Islamic piety in contemporary Indonesia may make those of *abangan* persuasion hesitant to state their views.[9] Rather, we tried to measure how particular religious practices influence or are influenced by social and political background.

The great majority of Muslim respondents answered that they conduct daily prayers (86.4%) and fasting in the month of *Ramadhan* (95.4%) routinely or often, which are generally understood as religious obligations. At the least, we can say that it is not adequate to divide *santri* and *abangan* according to their religious practices. Answers on conducting non-obligatory prayers (48.5%), attending communal prayers (54.1%) and attending religious activities (57.0%) are divided. To each of these three questions, nearly half of respondents answered 'never' or 'seldom' and the other half answered 'often' and 'routine'.[10] According to regression analysis, all five results are positively related to age, which means that the older the respondents become, the more often they conduct religious practices. Higher education and being female are significant to the first two religious practices: daily prayers and fasting (Table 7.1). Attending communal prayer is negatively related to urban respondents. It can be assumed that religious practices are more personalized in urban areas and people are reluctant to attend collective religious activities.

Traditionalist and modernist

Clifford Geertz's influential *santri* notion is further divided into modernists and traditionalists. The dichotomy between modernists and traditionalists is closely related to another older dichotomy between *kaum muda* (the young generation) and *kaum tua* (the old

Table 7.2 Religious practices and social background

	46. Local culture should be banned	**47. *Tahlilan***	**48. *Ziarah kubur***	**49. *Maulid***
Education	0.075	–0.073	–0.044	0.043
Age	–0.016	0.007	0.013	–0.051
Woman	0.006	0.021	–0.001	0.007
Java	–0.142	–0.026	–0.024	–0.044
Urban	0.002	–0.209	–0.127	–0.097
Income	0.073	–0.043	–0.016	0.057
NU	–0.029	0.192	0.115	0.100
Muhammadiyah	–0.001	–0.133	–0.008	–0.003
Majelis Taklim	0.110	0.000	0.034	0.052

generation). Two major organizations, namely Muhammadiyah and NU, are considered to represent modernists and traditionalists in Indonesia respectively. Modernists (or reformists) consider traditionalists to be accommodative to local practices of non-Islamic origin. Traditionalists strongly object to this view. They emphasize that traditionalist *ulama* have played leading roles in the struggle against *adat* (local) practices that are in conflict with the *shari'ah* (van Bruinessen 1996).

In the opinion survey, we asked respondents about local practices that may be considered to conflict with Islam and/or to be of non-Islamic origin as follows: whether local culture/festivals which contradict Islam should be banned (Q46); whether in Islam, it is correct to do *tahlilan*, the recitation of *La illaha illa Allah* (Q47); whether *ziarah kubur*, the visiting of graves, is acceptable (Q48); and whether it is correct to celebrate *Maulid*, the Prophet Muhammad's birthday (Q49). The results reconfirmed that those who feel close to NU show a positive attitude towards the latter three practices. More highly educated, urban and higher income respondents tend to be intolerable with and/or avoid local culture and 'traditional' practices, but more highly educated and higher income respondents are comfortable with celebrating *Maulid*. *Maulid* must be understood in a different context from other 'traditions of traditionalists' such as *tahlilan* and *ziarah kabur* (Table 7.2).

Changing Islamic organizations and parties

As perceptions of religious practices have shifted, the map of religious organizations may have changed, too. Moreover, affiliation with a major

organization such as NU or Muhammadiyah does not necessarily ensure support for Islamic parties. The *da'wah* movements on campus, which have been active for a few decades, and the emerging Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) do not distinguish between modernists and traditionalists. Reportedly, new international and domestic organizations have expanded, too. Thus it is important to know people's affiliation with particular religious organizations before proceeding to analyse support for political parties.

Our survey revealed that the organizational map of Indonesian Muslims should be reconsidered. Among Muslim respondents, 30.0% answered that they are affiliated with NU, either actively or inactively. Those who belong to Muhammadiyah, one of the two so-called major Islamic organizations, account for only 4.6%. However, it is known among experts that there are fewer self-proclaimed Muhammadiyah members than is usually thought. An unpublished survey by LSI in 2003 shows similar results (Miichi 2004, p.102). The official information indicated that there were approximately 170,000 registered members of the Muhammadiyah in 2001.[11] On the other hand, the LSI survey conducted in 2001 showed that 19% of respondents answered that they 'feel close to' (*merasa dekat dengan*) Muhammadiyah.[12] Affiliation with religious organizations, especially existing mass organizations, is thus problematic. Most of those who are not actively involved in organizations feel close to NU or Muhammadiyah because of their particular religious traditions and practices.

The most significant feature of our recent survey was that its questionnaire included religious organizations that have never before come into view. Majelis Taklim, which is followed by 21.6% of respondents, and which consists of thousands of highly decentralized local religious groups all over Indonesia, has never been studied seriously.[13] Although it may not influence national politics as a cohesive entity, it could be very powerful and mobilize its followers in particular regions. The organizational map of Indonesian Muslims is far more complex than the way it is usually described.

International Muslim movements have probably penetrated more than expected. Jamaat Tabligh, or Tablighi Jama'at, established in India in the 1920s, has been observed widely in Southeast Asia. Jamaat Tabligh propagates basic teachings and is known for being politically quietist. As far as I know, this is the first time its actual number of members has been estimated using an opinion survey. About 2% of the Muslim population in Indonesia may mean that there are 4 million Jamaat Tabligh members in Indonesia. Members of Hizb

ut-Tahrir, another international but far more ideologically 'radical' political organization, account for 0.4% of the respondents. Hizb ut-Tahrir, founded in Jordan/Palestine in 1949, denies the nation-state and seeks to (re-)establish a caliphate that would represent Muslims in the world. In Indonesia, Hizb ut-Tahrir started its activities in the beginning of the 1980s. The centre of its *da'wah* was Bogor Agriculture University, and it has been expanding nationally. Hizb ut-Tahrir has been in severe competition on campus with the *tarbiyah* in which PKS was founded; however, it is still far behind its pragmatic rival.

Who supports Islamic parties?

In light of the setting outlined above, we return to the question from the beginning of the chapter: why Islamic parties failed. My hypotheses for the long term were twofold: blurring differences between 'secular' nationalist and Islamic parties, and the decay of traditional religious authority.

Chart 7.4 shows the significance of social background and 'piousness' in support for major political parties, both nationalist and Islamic. 'Piousness' and support for Islamic parties are mostly related. However, nationalist parties cannot be considered to be 'secular' except for PDI-P, support for which is negatively related to 'piousness'.

Relations between existing religious organizations and political parties are significant enough, but changes can be observed. PKB and PPP and affiliation with NU, and PAN and affiliation with Muhammadiyah, are positively related. On the other hand, affiliation with NU and support for Golkar and PDI-P are negatively related. It is interesting to note that affiliation with Majelis Taklim is related to support for PKS, PAN and PD (Partai Demokrat). Support for PD can be assumed to go beyond 'secular nationalists'.

Highly educated respondents showed support for PKS, PAN and PD. Respondents with higher income also positively related to PKS and PD. It can be concluded that the sociological backgrounds of PKS, PAN and PD supporters are very similar. On the other hand, PKB and PDI-P supporters share some features, such as positive relations to lower education levels and Javanese origins, and a negative relation to Majelis Taklim (Table 7.3).

What, then, are the issues that concern Indonesian people? According to the survey, corruption and the economy are two outstanding issues for respondents. On the other hand, not many people consider moral and religious issues to be priority matters.[14] Indonesian voters demand that both government and political parties deal with people's welfare.

Table 7.3 Party support

	PKS	PAN	PKB	Golkar	PPP	PDI-P	PD	Hanura	Gerindra
Education	0.092	0.057	–0.043	–0.036	–0.026	–0.087	0.084	0.018	–0.032
Woman	–0.03388	–0.082	–0.009589	–0.1	–0.0396	–0.08618	0.05223	–0.02498	–0.02498
Java	0.1261	–0.04536	0.2483	–0.2106	0.111	0.1657	–0.02405	–0.2717	–0.04354
NU	–0.06846	–0.2477	0.5103	–0.1654	0.2117	–0.08801	–0.01487	0.02322	–0.1297
Muhammadiyah	0.08214	0.5748	–0.2688	–0.04848	–0.1916	–0.02535	–0.1049	–0.020754	0.005442
Majelis Taklim	0.1215	0.1594	–0.1794	–0.01996	0.09854	–0.2003	0.1206	–0.04196	–0.02934
Piousness	0.05316	0.03861	0.06265	–0.02012	0.05555	–0.07623	0.02621	–0.007529	–0.00904
Income	0.053	0.023	–0.028	–0.029	–0.009	–0.083	0.078	–0.019	–0.002

Note: Reported are polyserial correlations between the level of household income and party support. Standard errors are in parentheses. Household income level was measured on a 5-point ordinal scale.

However, this does not mean that moral and religious matters are not matters of concern.

We asked two questions on the involvement of *ulama* in politics: whether *ulama* should actively participate in politics (Q54), and if Islam requires that a country with a majority of Muslims be governed by *ulama* (Q58). 34.1% of Muslim respondents agree or strongly agree with Q54 and 36.4% agree or strongly agree with Q58. Compared to other countries these results may be very high. However, this does not mean that Indonesian voters unconditionally support the involvement of *ulama* in politics: rather, we can observe decay in the authority of *ulama* authority in politics.

Reasonably enough, those who are affiliated with NU tend to have a positive attitude towards *ulama* participation in politics (Table 7.4). However, PKB and PPP supporters, most of them affiliated with NU, do not necessarily agree with *ulama* involvement in politics. PKB and PPP supporters and approval of *ulama* involvement in politics are not significantly related. On the other hand, they tend to think that a Muslim majority country should be governed by *ulama*. My reading of this contradiction is that PKB and PPP supporters distinguish between real politics and theology.

Highly educated and urban residents showed disagreement with *ulama* involvement in politics, and thus we can assume that urbanization and modernization of education weaken the political influence of *ulama*. As might be reasonably expected, those who support the most 'secular' parties PDI-P and Gerindra showed a negative attitude

Table 7.4 *Ulama* involvement in politics

Question	**54**	**58**
Education	–0.157	–0.186
Age	–0.010	0.021
Woman	0.114	0.021
Java	–0.022	–0.005
Urban	–0.079	–0.073
NU	0.060	0.090
Muhammadiyah	–0.009	0.023
Majelis Taklim	–0.075	0.033
PKB	0.008	0.073
PPP	0.041	0.069
PDI-P	–0.059	–0.047
Gerindra	–0.006	–0.057

towards *ulama* in politics. Differences between 'secular' nationalist and Islamic parties still exist, but we could not find a significant relationship between a negative attitude towards *ulama* involvement in politics and support for specifically non-Islamic parties aside from PDI-P and Gerindra.

Conclusion: What kind of Islamization is going on in Indonesia?

The way Islamic parties lost in the 2009 election reflects fundamental changes that occurred in the past few decades in Indonesia. Suharto's New Order regime carefully proceeded with a nation-building project in Indonesia. Golkar took over most of the regions where the Islamic Masyumi party had been popular in the 1955 election. At the same time, Islamic legal, educational and religious institutions were adopted by the government. Politically, Golkar brought community and regional leaders (*tokoh masyarakat*) including *ulama* (*kyai* in Java, *tuan guru* in South Kalimantan and so on) into the party, especially in outer Java. Although its votes have been decreasing, Golkar has remained the biggest party in some of these regions in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi even after three free elections. Those who support the 'nationalist' PD have similar social backgrounds to supporters of 'Islamic' PAN and PKS. Islamization alongside urbanization in Indonesia might standardize political parties ideologically.[15] This is the background to the 'nationalist' PD's victory, which took over from Islamic parties in the 2009 election. On the other hand, divisions between nationalist and Islamic parties remain. PDI-P and the newly-emerged Gerindra can be considered to be 'secular'.

More and more people have enjoyed modern and higher education, and *ulama* are not the sole learned class in the society. People can study religion at school or by reading books, and nowadays can search for fatwa (religious guidance) on the Internet. Moreover, even *ulama* themselves have been trained in modern educational institutions including state Islamic universities (IAINs), which have been expanded in the past few decades. These facts may erode the authority of *ulama*. Although *ulama* have maintained significant political influence on particular occasions, it seems to be more difficult for them to mobilize people politically. Modernization of education and urbanization have been demystifying traditional religious authority but not religion itself.

However, the consequences of this Islamization for Indonesian society are unknown. 'Secular' nationalism has lost its lustre, but the current

Islamization seems to be commercialized and personalized. Islam is unlikely to replace nationalism or bring a new collective identity. On the other hand, harmony among religions and ethnic groups is an inevitable question for Indonesia, and would be a common question and challenge for Muslims in Southeast Asia.

Appendix: Question wording

- 'Piousness' (for Muslims only)
  - ➢ Question: Do you routinely, often, seldom or never observe the following religious activities?
    - ✧ Pray five times a day
    - ✧ Fast in the month of Ramadhan
    - ✧ Conduct non-obligatory prayers (*sunnah*)
    - ✧ Attend communal prayers (*jamaah*)
    - ✧ Attend religious activities such as sermons or religious discussions.
  - ➢ Response: Routinely; Often; Seldom; Never; No response.
- Traditionalist vs. Modernist (for Muslims only)
  - ➢ Question: For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each?
    - ✧ 'Local culture/festivals that contradict Islam should be banned.'
    - ✧ 'In Islam, it is correct to do *tahlilan*, the recitation of *La illaha illa Allah*.'
    - ✧ 'In Islam, it is correct to do *ziarah kubur*, the visiting of graves'.
    - ✧ 'In Islam, it is correct to celebrate *Maulid*, the Prophet Muhammad's birthday.'
  - ➢ Response: Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree; Not applicable (for non-Muslims); Don't know; No response.
- Islamic Organization Membership (for Muslims only)
  - ➢ Question: I am going to read a list of Islamic organizations. For each, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?
    - ✧ NU

- ✧ Muhammadiyah
- ✧ PERSIS (Persatuan Islam)
- ✧ Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII)
- ✧ Al-Washliyah
- ✧ Dar al-Dakwah wal Irsyad (DDI)
- ✧ Nahdhatul Wathan (NW)
- ✧ PERTI (Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyyah)
- ✧ Jamaat Tabligh
- ✧ Majelis Taklim
- ✧ Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)
- ✧ LDII (Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia)
- ✧ Other; specify:.....

➢ Response: Active member; Inactive member; Not a member.

- Party support (for all respondents)

➢ Question: Which political party did you vote for?
➢ Response: Party name.

- Important national issues (for all respondents)

➢ Question: Please rank these national issues based on priority one to five, number one (one) being the most important issue while five (five) is the least important issue.

- ✧ Corruption
- ✧ Crime
- ✧ Law Enforcement
- ✧ Terrorism
- ✧ Environment
- ✧ Unemployment
- ✧ Economy
- ✧ Healthcare
- ✧ Education
- ✧ Gender, Religion, Race, Ethnicity- Based Discrimination
- ✧ Poverty
- ✧ Human Rights Violation
- ✧ Infrastructure Development
- ✧ Security
- ✧ Moral and Religion

➢ Response: Multiple choice; up to five, with ranks ranging from first to fifth.

- *Ulama* involvement in politics (for Muslims only)
  - ➢ Question: For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each?
    - ✧ '*Ulama* should actively participate in politics.'
    - ✧ 'Islam requires that a country with a majority of Muslims be governed by men of Islamic learning (*ulama*).'
- Response: Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neutral; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree; Not applicable (for non-Muslims); Don't know; No response.

Notes

1. Fealy and White (2008) collect various examples on commercializing Islam in Indonesia. Fischer (2008) describes Islamic consumption particularly in the Malaysian setting.
2. With analysis of abundant materials, Platzdash (2009) includes PPP among Islamist parties. I do not deny this, but PPP's constituency is not fundamentally different from that of PKB.
3. For example, Hilmy (2010) compares PKS with militant groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Front Pembelah Islam (Defenders of Islam), and describes PKS's pragmatic adaptation to the democratic system. Miichi (2006) has made a similar comparison.
4. Roy (1996, 2005) describes the thought of Islamist political movements as oscillating between two poles: a revolutionary pole, for whom the Islamization of the society occurs through state power; and a reformist pole, for whom social and political action aims primarily to re-Islamize the society from the bottom up, bringing about, ipso facto, the advent of an Islamic state. He argues that the Islamist revolutionary idea had failed by the end of the 1980s. Later ones either opt for political normalization within the framework of the modern nation-state, or evolve towards what he termed neo-fundamentalism, a closed, scripturalist and conservative view of Islam that rejects the national and statist dimension in favour of the *ummah*, the universal community of all Muslims, based on *shari'ah* (Islamic law).
5. During the Suharto era, every political and social organization was forced to adopt *Pancasila* (five principles for national integration) instead of Islam as the sole foundation (*asas tunggal*) of the organization. Therefore each party chose the party's foundation very intentionally after 1998. PAN and PKB chose *Pancasila* and PPP, PBB and PKS chose Islam. All nationalist parties naturally chose *Pancasila*. Thus there are many observers who divide Islamic parties between those that adopted *Pancasila* and those that adopted Islam; however, sociologically, there are no fundamental differences between PKB and PPP, for example.
6. This voter perception is drawn from an opinion survey conducted in September 2008 (Lembaga Survei Indonesia 2008).

7. *Dhikr* (remembrance, reminder, evocation) is a popular meditative practice commonly associated with Sufism. In the mid-2000s, several *dhikr* groups led by young and handsome *habib* started to expand their activities. They sometimes attract tens of thousands of followers and televisions broadcast them.
8. Zainuddin died in July 2011.
9. This sentence is quoted from Hefner (2011, p. 87) and is his response to analysis on opinion survey by Mujani and Liddle.
10. Opinion surveys in 2001 and 2002 conducted by LSI showed similar results. Mujani (2007, pp. 93–97).
11. This is based on an interview with Mitsuo Nakamura quoted in 'Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah not in "all-out" war', *Jakarta Post*, 8 January 2001.
12. LSI asked similar question in 2002 and 18% of respondents answered that they felt close to Muhammadiyah. 50% felt close to NU in 2001 and 46% in 2002 (Mujani 2007, p. 98).
13. The amount of dual membership involving Majelis Taklim and other religious groups was not significant.
14. LSI's survey in 2008 showed a similar tendency, which showed that fewer than 5% of respondents were concerned with moral and religious issues. The economy and people's welfare were the dominant concerns among the issues that government should handle (Lembaga Survei Indonesia 2008).
15. Sartori (1976) argues that shrinking ideological distance among parties leads to political stability. Mietzner (2008) applies this model to Indonesia and argues that the competition between parties in the contemporary democracy exhibits centripetal tendencies in Indonesia, stabilizing the political system as a whole. He does, however, emphasize that party ideological differences are still relevant in his latest book (Mietzner 2013). Our observations in this chapter confirm his arguments.

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8

Globalization and Its Impact on the Muslim Minority in Cambodia[1]

Omar Farouk

Introduction

Works on Southeast Asia tend to overlook or downplay the role of Muslim communities, especially those at the margins.[2] Hot topics like terrorism, militancy, radical Islam and Islamic violence dominate academic writings and media attention. Although these are legitimate subjects the tendency to simply focus on these issues at the expense of trying to understand the other, broader perspectives that characterize Islam in Southeast Asia can be misleading. The place of Muslim minorities in Mainland Southeast Asia too is usually disregarded or unrecognized and even when it is given attention, this is invariably to highlight an ongoing crisis like the conflict in the Muslim-dominated provinces of Southernmost Thailand or the Rohingya resistance in Myanmar. The tendency to portray particular problems affecting Muslim communities in specific contexts like the crisis in Southern Thailand as being directly linked to Islam also distorts realities. At the very least, it unfairly associates Islam with violence or presents it in a negative light. The Muslim minorities in Mainland Southeast Asia have been regarded as being problematic, controversial or undesirable.

Understanding the different contexts of Islam will inevitably help us understand Islam itself better. Not only is it necessary to view Muslim minorities in their respective contexts but the dynamics of minorities within minorities should also be accordingly recognized. The impact of external variables like the phenomenon of globalization and its multifarious manifestations encompassing economic liberalization, democratization, constitutionalism, associationalism and diversity,

which also affect the Muslim minorities, both positively and negatively, also needs to be identified, analysed and properly understood.

This paper takes the view that there is still much that we do not know about Islam and the Muslim minorities in the countries of Mainland Southeast Asia. We need to urgently correct this situation in order to be able to fully grasp the realities on the ground so as to develop a more balanced understanding of Islam. It is also impossible to appreciate the role of the Muslims without understanding the wider trans-religious contexts and external environmental factors that have shaped the nature of Muslim society.

This paper focuses on Cambodia. This is because it is one of the few countries in mainland Southeast Asia where so little is known about the Muslims and their role. Cambodia itself has re-emerged as a normal country after decades of civil war and an internecine conflict, following the peace process which was initiated and sustained by the international community through the United Nations and global civil society. The paper argues that it was the pacification of Cambodia and its subsequent reconstruction, which were attributable to globalization, that set the stage and created the circumstances for the rehabilitation of Islam and the Muslims in the kingdom to take place. Hence the nature of globalization in Cambodia itself needs to be appreciated in order to enable us to understand its significance for the country. Only then will we be able to critically evaluate the impact of globalization on the Muslims in Cambodia and its intended and unintended consequences. The paper will be divided into five parts. The first part will discuss the context within which the peace process, among other things, helped Cambodia transform itself into a viable and stable country. The second part will outline the background of the Muslims in Cambodia today. The third part highlights the return to visibility of Islam in present-day Cambodia. It will examine the ways in which the phenomenon of globalization has particularly affected the Muslims in Cambodia. The fourth part will assess the role of Muslim civil society as the principal beneficiary of the phenomenon of globalization. The recent reorganization of Cambodian Muslim society, which came about as a result of the activities of Muslim NGOs, domestic as well as international, will be particularly highlighted. The concluding part recapitulates the main arguments made on how globalization has brought about the rehabilitation and even revival of Islam in Cambodia and its unintended ramifications, which not only intensified pre-existing intra-religious, socio-cultural and linguistic tensions but also created new schisms within the Muslim minority community.

The context

There is no doubt that no other country in Southeast Asia has gone through the tragedy that Cambodia has experienced in such a short span of time following its independence. Not only was there enormous bloodshed, violence and destruction as a consequence of what seemed like an unending civil war, but even the structure of the state changed many times until constitutional monarchy was restored and parliamentary democracy re-established in 1993. For a country the size of Cambodia the loss of an estimated 1–2 million people during the two decades of its civil war, most of whom were killed by their fellow citizens, was indeed a major human tragedy (See also Ysa Osman 2002, p. 2). All the Cambodians suffered and the Muslims were no exception, but they probably suffered more because of their ethnicity and religion. In fact, the genocidal policies of Pol Pot against the Muslims and the wanton destruction of their homes, schools, mosques, properties and livelihood robbed them of their dignity and threatened to uproot their beliefs and traditional way of life. Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge wanted to exterminate the Muslims completely but were only partly successful. They were, however, able to kill a large number of Muslims and succeeded in eliminating almost a whole generation of Muslim *ulama*, and also destroyed many aspects of the Islamic religious tradition and heritage (See Omar Farouk 1998, p. 13). Islamic texts including the Quran and Jawi literature were destroyed and Islamic worship and learning prohibited.

The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia helped dislodge the Khmer Rouge regime but did not end the political conflict as groups opposed to Vietnam and its proxies in Phnom Penh staged an armed resistance to what they considered was an illegal occupation of their country. The Vietnamese-installed regime in Phnom Penh was in the unenviable position of having only a limited number of countries, mostly allies of Vietnam, recognizing its legitimacy while the United Nations, ASEAN and most of the Western countries backed the resistance movement and accorded it official recognition. Thus, while the Phnom Penh regime, with the support of the Vietnamese military was able to rule over a large part of the Cambodian territory, it had no control over the whole country and continued to face fierce armed resistance from its opponents. More significant still, it was the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), made up of the various factions of the resistance movement, that was given the United Nations' representation.

The continuing civil war and diplomatic tussle made it difficult for any decent form of rehabilitation of Islam to take place. On the whole, throughout the civil war, large numbers of Muslims were killed or wounded and many were also displaced and had to flee the country (See Kiernan 1997, pp. 252–288). The Cambodian Muslim refugees not only sought protection in the refugee camps which were set up along the border with Thailand but also used their traditional networks to seek refuge in Thailand, Laos and Malaysia.[3] It was this phenomenon that helped swell the ranks of the Cambodian Muslim diaspora.

It was only when the civil war ended following the Paris Peace Treaty of 1991 and the subsequent intervention of the United Nations through the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) from 1992 to 1993 that a new climate of normality was restored. The Peace Treaty was achieved through the efforts, commitment and support of many countries. UNTAC too could not have been established without the support of the international community in terms of not just providing funds but also the much needed human resources, military and police as well as bureaucratic, to help rebuild Cambodia. UNTAC made it possible for security personnel and bureaucrats from many Muslim countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt and Indonesia to serve in Cambodia in the first line of pacification which exposed them to the plight of Cambodian Muslims. They were among the first foreign Muslims who were able to offer assistance to their co-religionists in Cambodia.

It was also within the framework of the pacification process that the help of international NGOs was solicited to complement the tasks that UNTAC and foreign governments were undertaking to help achieve the reconstruction of Cambodia in all areas including physical infrastructure, legal reform, governance, education and training, relief assistance, humanitarian aid and the economy. It is obvious that in terms of benchmarking and modelling, all of the above represents globalization in one form or other. Although UNTAC had shortcomings it was able to bring about Cambodia's peaceful transition to constitutionalism and democracy, which in turn created the space for a whole range of other positive developments to take place. The Cambodian Muslims were able to rebuild and reorganize their lives and communities as a result of this new political and civil framework that was put in place for the country. Muslim refugees were not only able to return home to Cambodia but also found the political space to assert their presence electorally and politically. Muslims representing different political parties, especially FUNCINPEC and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP),

took part in the United Nations-supervised Constituent Assembly Election in 1993 and some were elected. It was during this period that a Muslim, Tol Lah, who was once the Secretary General of FUNCINPEC, was given the distinction of serving as the country's Deputy Prime Minister while also holding the Education Ministerial portfolio (See Omar Farouk 2002b, p. 9). A number of other Muslims were given prominent political appointments in several ministries. Apart from gaining representation in the Coalition Cabinet the 1993 election also demonstrated that the Muslims were a significant electoral constituency. In subsequent general elections which were held in 1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013 as well as the commune elections the support of Muslim voters was courted by all the major parties.

Constitutionalism was also a very important development in Cambodia following the 1993 election. The new Constituent Assembly promulgated a democratic constitution which restored the role of constitutional monarchy, prescribed multi-party democracy, institutionalized safeguards for human rights and guarantees of religious freedom and favoured a free-market economy, all of which directly and indirectly benefitted the Muslims. Although Cambodia was not free from the political tensions and difficulties that accompanied the fledgling democracy that was being developed, on balance the rule of law prevailed and the constitution remained functional. The consolidation of democracy, at least in terms of its formal aspects, also helped to ensure its sustainability. The emergence of the Cambodian People's Party under the leadership of Hun Sen as the dominant party operating within the democratic framework appeared to strengthen constitutionalism in Cambodia. The emergence of a strong opposition party in Sam Rainsy's CNRP (Cambodia National Rescue Party) also strengthened the foundation of democracy in Cambodia. Likewise it was in the spirit and framework of Cambodia's new constitution that the role of civil society was sanctioned.

This was the first time that international NGOs were given a major role to play in the physical and political reconstruction of a war-ravaged country in the post-conflict period. The new civil environment which emerged as part of the pacification process also enabled the Muslims in Cambodia to take advantage of the generous assistance extended by many international NGOs. The Cambodian Muslims themselves began to reorganize themselves through their own associations. The nationwide socio-religious reorganization of the Muslims in Cambodia through the Office of the Mufti or the Highest Council of Islamic Affairs in Cambodia was also a by-product of the above development (See Omar

Farouk 2008, pp. 77–80). A much more open political climate also made it possible for Cambodians, including Muslims, to travel, work and study abroad in Southeast Asia as well as the Middle East. The Cambodian Muslim diaspora on the other hand was also able to revive links with their own country, assuming a generally constructive role.

Cambodia also became a member of ASEAN in April 1999, demonstrating its embrace of regionalism. The intensified interactions between Cambodia and its ASEAN partners, especially Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, at all levels, government-to-government, people-to-people, NGO-to-NGO and private sector-to-private sector helped expose Cambodians to the dominant regional Muslim culture. Leaders of the CPP, for example, have been invited as special guests of UMNO (United Malays National Organization), Malaysia's largest Muslim party to its General Assembly. Cambodian workers, numbering over 25,000 have been employed in various sectors in Malaysia. Cambodian maids are now common in Malaysia. Educationally, as part of Malaysia's aspiration to emerge as a regional hub, Malaysian universities and colleges have begun accepting Cambodian students irrespective of their religious affiliation.[4] This is in addition to the traditional educational channels available to Muslim students pursuing religious studies. As part of its medical tourism programme Malaysia too has begun offering its private medical facilities to Cambodians. Since the mid-1990s during the time of Suharto's presidency scholarships have also been offered to Muslim students to study in Indonesian universities. In 2006 *Pesantren Minhaj Arrashidin Foundation*, which has a fairly wide international network, provided full financial support to 11 Cambodian Muslim students to study at its *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) in Indonesia and in 2008 supported 18 more, creating a new channel of communication between Cambodia and Indonesia.[5]

Finally, it was also the free-market policy of the Cambodian government in the post-conflict period that facilitated the entry of capital, investments and tourists from Muslim countries into Cambodia, helping to stimulate its economic growth. Malaysian companies in telecommunications, transportation, gaming, manufacturing, banking and the hospitality sector were among the first to enter Cambodia in the early period of its reconstruction. Malaysia emerged as one of the biggest investors in Cambodia and enjoyed excellent bilateral ties. When the Prime Minister of Malaysia visited Cambodia in 2010, one of the six agreements Malaysia entered into with Cambodia was in the area of joint halal-industry development.[6] The other areas of investment from Malaysia included sports infrastructure, hotels, education, banking and

fast food. The role of the budget carrier, Air Asia, in making travel to Cambodia convenient and cheap and in bringing Muslim tourists to the kingdom and facilitating the mobility of Cambodian Muslims is also a very significant development which hastened the effects of globalization in Cambodia. The attempt by Hun Sen to solicit FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) from the Middle East, which started in 2008 with the official visit to Cambodia of the Prime Minister of Kuwait and that he reciprocated in 2009, led to pledges of investments and soft loans of about US$700 million in the agricultural and energy sectors as well as the tourism sector by both Kuwait and Qatar. In addition to this, as a goodwill gesture Kuwait gave a grant of US$5 million to the Muslim community to help its development.[7]

From the above it can be concluded that it was the post-conflict development in Cambodia that gave the Muslim minority a platform to become visible, recognizable and significant again. The Muslims in Cambodia have emerged to become some of the principal beneficiaries of the changes that have taken place in the kingdom disproportionate to their numerical size.

Background of the Muslims

Although Buddhism is the official religion of Cambodia today, freedom of religion is constitutionally guaranteed. The place of Islam is constitutionally protected.[8] Statistically too the Muslims comprise a sizeable minority. Out of a population of approximately 14 million Cambodians today the Muslims are believed to constitute around 5%, which is approximately 700,000, making them the second largest religious community in Cambodia.[9] The Muslims are also spread all over the kingdom in practically every province, indicating that they are a national minority. There is also a very large contingent of Cambodian Muslim migrants overseas, especially in Malaysia.

Historically, the Muslims have been an integral part of the kingdom for a long time, often assuming an important role in its society, economy, trade, diplomacy and even politics. Islam has been in Cambodia for at least a few centuries and the country even had a Muslim king in the seventeenth century, at a time when the Muslims were a powerful elite group in the palace (See Omar Farouk 1998, pp. 21–22). For many centuries Cambodia also maintained good relations with the Muslim polities in the region.

Ethnically the Muslims in Cambodia today are characterized by diversity. Essentially they are represented by various categories of people

including Chams, Chveas, Khmers, Indians, Arabs and most recently, the Jerais.[10] The Chams are indeed the most important ethnic category because they are not only the most numerous but also are generally accepted as being synonymous with the Muslim community, constituting its backbone. But even the Chams are represented by two major groups, namely the Jahed or Cham Bani and the Cham Shariat (See Omar Farouk 1998, pp. 24–34). It is the Cham Shariat, however, which is the dominant group. The principal denominators of their identity are knowledge of the Cham language, continued practice of Cham culture, a common Cham ethnic ancestry and a strong sense of attachment to orthodox Islam. Their Islamic identity has become an inseparable part of their ethnic identity. All Chams in Cambodia are Muslims although not all Muslims are necessarily Cham.

The *Chvea* or *Jva* is another important ethnic group within the Muslim community in terms of numbers as well as role. The Khmers are also a very significant group within the national Muslim community because they constitute the natural link between Islam and indigenous Khmer culture. The Khmerization of Islam has taken place in a positive way in the last decade or so.[11]

There are now about 880 mosques, suraus and madrasahs spread over 440 Muslim villages throughout the kingdom in Cambodia and the number seems to be increasing.[12] The largest concentration of mosques is in Kg. Cham which has over 148 mosques. This also means that the largest concentration of Muslims occurs in Kg. Cham. The next largest concentration of Muslims is to be found in Kg. Chhnang, which has over 42 mosques, followed by Pursat, which has over 33 mosques and Kampot, which has 30 mosques. The capital city, Phnom Penh, has a total of 12 mosques. As a result of the phenomenon of internal migration Muslims can now be found in all of Cambodia.

Culturally, the Muslims can be fairly easily identified by their practice of Islam but linguistically, although the Cham language continues to be the principal medium of everyday communication among the Chams, most Chams can also speak some Khmer. Many Chams also learn Malay, which is still perceived as a medium of religious instruction although they may have only limited speaking ability. In the Chrang Chamres area of Phnom Penh there is a large concentration of Muslims, many of whom cannot speak Cham and only know Khmer and Malay. The Muslims of Kampot and Takeo too are basically Khmer-speakers. Language code-switching seems to be common among the Chams and other Muslims.

Politically, the Muslims seem to have positioned themselves well within the kingdom's democratic system. Although the Muslims are represented in many political parties across the board their alignment with the Cambodian People's Party and especially with the Prime Minister, Hun Sen, appears to have been closest. Many concessions have been given to the Muslims. For example, the Cambodian government has allowed Muslim girls to wear *hijab* in government schools and has set up Islamic prayer rooms or *musalla* at both the Pochentong International Airport in Phnom Penh and at the Siem Riep International Airport. Muslim schools are allowed to exist without any hindrance and Muslims can travel abroad freely. Muslims have been given political posts in practically every ministry. The appointment of an impressive line-up of young Muslim Secretaries and Under-Secretaries of State in the Cambodian government in early 2009 is evidence of the new recognition accorded to them.[13] There is also Muslim representation at the ambassadorial level. The present Deputy Governor of Kompong Cham Province, Sem Sokprey, is a Muslim. There are also Muslim parliamentarians and senators. At the moment there is an obvious political affinity between the Muslim leadership in Cambodia and the country's leadership in both the government and the ruling party. The Prime Minister, Hun Sen, is generally regarded by the Muslims as their patron.

In terms of religious orientation, although the overwhelming majority of the Muslims consider themselves to be Sunnis of the Shafiee school other streams of Islam also exist. Broadly they may be divided into five groups, namely, the Jaheds, the traditionalists, the reformists or Salafists, the secularists and the Ahmadiyyas. The following is a brief description of their respective profile.

The Jaheds

The Jaheds, also known as Cham Bani, represent a localized, syncretic and ancient form of Islam which is hardly separable from Cham culture and identity.[14] At present this group has a following of about 20,000 to 30,000 people and is confined to about 35 villages in Cambodia primarily in Kompong Chhnang, Kampot and Pursat. It has its own religious hierarchy headed by its own Mufti, also called *Imam San* or *Datu Kenoa*, whose status is officially recognized by the state. The Jaheds also have their own imams as well as unique customs, rites and practices which are distinctive from mainstream Islam. It is the '*Git*' which

is the book of guidance for the Cham Bani although Quranic verses are also selectively incorporated into it.[15] The Cham Bani also have their own religious texts which are written in the ancient Cham script, with their peculiar interpretations and understanding of Islam that go against mainstream Islamic ideas and conventions. For example, members of the group only pray once a week on Friday and are allowed to delegate others to pray on their behalf. Cham Bani mosques are closed most of the time and are generally inactive. Women assume a greater role in the conduct of ceremonies and communal worship. Their spiritual pilgrimage is not performed in Mecca but in Ou Dong, which is their holy site in Cambodia. Although in terms of customary attire they differ little from the other Chams and indeed they too appear to use Islamic/Arabic salutations in their everyday life, in their attitudes and observances of rituals they are different from their Muslim cousins. Principally, because of their perceived deviation from Islam by mainstream Muslims they have become the primary target of domestic as well as foreign proselytizing missions. The Jaheds have been subjected to systematic and concerted attempts to convince them to rid themselves of the so-called 'unIslamic accretions and influences'.

The traditionalists

The traditionalist school of Islam in Cambodia represents the orthodox stream of Islam which tries to localize Islam by balancing local culture with the universalism of Islam.[16] This is the biggest group of Muslims and is virtually an extension of the traditionalist school of Islam in the Malay world. In this school, Malay becomes the definitive language of Islamic instruction and learning, although the place of Arabic is not disregarded since it is still needed, at least in the performance of basic rituals like prayers. But essentially Islam is approached and presented as part of the local culture. Traces of pre-Islamic and syncretic practices are treated as being inseparable from local Muslim culture and are therefore tolerated for the most part in the name of preserving tradition. Praying at the graves of the deceased, holding public wedding ceremonies and reciting prayers without really understanding their words are observed as a part of their communal religious life. Likewise the holding of *Maulid* celebrations and *tahlil* recitations are common in the traditionalist school.

The traditionalists turn to the Malay world for inspiration and leadership. In their attempts to reorganize Islamic education, *Kitab Kuning* or the Jawi texts and other religious books published in Malaysia have been

used. Cambodian Muslim students go to Pattani (Thailand), Malaysia and more recently Indonesia for their religious education. Many religious schools in Cambodia, like *Madrasatul An-Nikmah Al-Islamiyah*, function almost like feeder institutions for the Malaysian religious school system. Even their curriculum is based on Malaysia's and their textbooks come from there. Malay is widely taught, not only in most Islamic schools in Cambodia but also in mosques and suraus. Alongside Malay, in Cham enclaves Cham too is taught especially at mosque schools. Most of the new generation of Islamic teachers in Cambodia have been trained in Malaysia or Pattani in South Thailand.

The Reformists

The Reformists or Modernists, who are also known as Salafists or Wahhabis, also represent orthodox Islam but that which is strongly rooted in the Middle East.[17] They are often associated with the *Samakhum* Kuwait or the Kuwait Association, which has been responsible for the establishment of landmark Musllim institutions in Cambodia such as schools, mosques and orphanages. The original reformist movement in Cambodia, though, is traceable to pre-Second World War years. The current wave of Islamic Reformism is essentially a by-product of the increased contacts with the Middle East that occurred in the post-conflict period in Cambodia. As more Cambodian students graduated from Mecca, Medina and other Islamic universities in the Arab countries, they began to question many of the traditional practices in their community which they considered *bidaah* or unacceptable innovations. The emergence of a new group of Arabic-speaking Cambodian Muslim scholars has generated some rivalry and competition between them and their locally or regionally trained counterparts of the traditionalist school.

At the same time, the flow of Arab funds into Cambodia, which had helped establish many faith-based Islamic NGOs, also contributed to strengthening their ties with the Islamic institutions in the Middle East, thereby helping to propagate their version of Islam, which tends to be more rigid and puritanical. The competency and credibility of the traditionalist teachers have invariably been questioned because they 'did not learn about Islam directly from the original Arabic sources!'

Notwithstanding the above differences, except for a few isolated cases of actual confrontation, generally the traditionalists and reformists try to coexist, often subtly concealing the underlying tensions between them. It has to be noted that the differences between them are not

necessarily solely due to theological differences but may also be due to practical reasons such as the competition for power, prestige and benefits.

The secularists

The secularists are an emerging group within the Muslim community in Cambodia although their influence is still limited.[18] The destruction of the Islamic educational infrastructure due to the civil war on the one hand, and the promotion of national education in Khmer by the state on the other has created a new generation of students and graduates who have been educated at secular institutions in a secular environment and manner. Often members of this group represent the Khmer-literate or Khmer-speaking who have very little, if any exposure to Islamic education save for *fardhu ain* or simply the basic tenets and rites. These people also tend to live either in urban centres or away from their ethnic or socio-religious enclaves. In appearance, attire and behaviour, outwardly it would be difficult to distinguish them from the other Khmers. In a sense Khmerization has also led to secularization. Intermarriages with Khmer Buddhists are also not uncommon. The secular Muslims may try to seek various kinds of social and political affiliations and connections with the other Muslims in the kingdom, but invariably these would be nominal and quite unrelated to Islam as faith per se. The practice of Islam within the secularist group tends to be lax and flexible. The secular Muslims may also not be immediately and easily identifiable as there would be considerable overlapping between them and the others resulting in either de-secularization or re-Islamization.

The Ahmadiyya

The Ahmadiyya movement is the most recent and most controversial Islamic phenomenon in Cambodia. Although the attempts by the Ahmadiyya missionaries to penetrate into Cambodian Muslim society started in the mid-1990s, they seem to have only been able to establish a foothold in Cambodia in 2001 when they built their first mosque there.[19] There are at present three Ahmadiyya mosques that have been built in the kingdom but interestingly these mosques are in the Jahed enclaves. The Ahmadiyya movement is considered heretical by mainstream Islam which is represented by the orthodox Mufti, but has still been able to be active in Cambodia because of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of belief as well as its considerable resources.

The Ahmadiyya have been trying very hard to extend their influence through educational activities. Especially after 11 September 2001, when Islam began to be viewed negatively, the Ahmadiyya movement, which strongly renounces violence, regained its confidence and credibility as a non-violent school of Islam. The Ahmadiyya missionaries tried to exploit the difficult situation facing the Muslims to their advantage. However, their claim that their founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, is a Messiah sent by God to bring peace to the world left them in permanent conflict with mainstream *ulama*. The Ahmadiyya sect is also called by the derogatory term 'Qadiyani'. Despite this controversy there are still Cambodian Muslims who have embraced the Ahmadiyya sect for the material benefits that they get without necessarily losing their ties with mainstream Muslims.

The return to visibility

Islam's return to visibility is very much a recent development shaped by a combination of factors which, among other things, include the development of constitutionalism, human rights safeguards and the rule of law, the protection of religious freedom, democratization, market liberalization, regionalism, associationalism, educational empowerment, the ICT revolution, pragmatic government policies and the global war on terror, which are all in one way or another connected to globalization, viewed in its most basic definition as increasing interconnectedness beyond conventional national frontiers.

The Muslims in Cambodia essentially regained their prominence following the pacification of the country, especially under UNTAC in 1992 and 1993. There were at least five ways in which they achieved this. First, the Cambodian Muslims had caught the attention of the Muslim soldiers serving in UNTAC, who sympathized with them for their suffering and deprivation and began extending various kinds of assistance. This was immediately followed by faith-based Islamic humanitarian and relief agencies which descended into Cambodia to provide help to the Muslims. At the same time Cambodian Muslim refugees in neighbouring countries such as Thailand and Malaysia began returning home under United Nations supervision and protection. The moral, material and financial support that they obtained from various sources helped restore their self-confidence and enabled them to rebuild their social and communal life. In Phnom Penh, for example, Muslim returnees began resettling in the Chrang Chamres area between Kilometre 7 and Kilometre 9, the Chruoy Chongwar area and the Phrek

Pra enclave. In the provinces, the Muslims also resettled in what were once Muslim-majority areas.

Second, as part of their rehabilitation, they began undertaking the physical reconstruction not just of their homes but more importantly, of their communal social space such as mosques, suraus and madrasahs that had been destroyed or were in a dilapidated state. Again foreign Muslim funding played a critical role in this. The 1990s witnessed an unprecedented phase of the rebuilding of Muslim religious institutions, especially mosques, suraus, schools and orphanages. Concomitant with this development there was a concerted effort to revive Islamic education at all levels. Many of the younger generation sought to further their education abroad in Malaysia, Thailand and the Middle East.

Third, the Muslims began mobilizing their political resources to assume a new political role. Many of the Muslim returnees aligned themselves with FUNCINPEC to contest in the 1993 Constituent Assembly Election while others, especially those that had enjoyed the patronage of the Vietnamese-backed regime supported the Cambodian People's Party. The participation of the Muslims in the 1993 election led to the appointment of some of their successful candidates into high political office, contributing to their increased visibility. The electoral significance of the Muslims was recognized by all the political parties.

The restoration of democratic politics in Cambodia in the immediate post-UNTAC era was good for the Muslims for many reasons. Apart from the fact that a Muslim, Tol Lah, became Deputy Prime Minister while also holding the Education Minister's portfolio, there was at the same time a new crop of Muslim politicians and parliamentarians, across the main political parties, who helped give the Muslims greater public visibility. The Muslims were also able to emerge as a significant lobby group both domestically and transnationally, especially when dealing with Muslim governments.

Fourth, the Islamic *dakwah* (predication) activities supported or undertaken by foreign Muslim individuals and organizations in collaboration with their local counterparts have been very significant in sustaining the revival of Islam in Cambodia. The Tabligh Jamaat movement, through its routine visits to Muslim enclaves and annual *ijtimak* or assembly which often draw huge crowds, has contributed to increasing the visibility of Islam in Cambodia although it has itself been a subject of criticism by some Muslims for its too-otherworldly orientation (See Omar Farouk 1998). Nevertheless, the Tabligh Jamaat is a recognized phenomenon in Cambodia, which serves as an important hub in its regional and global network.

Finally, the Muslims in Cambodia also came into the limelight as a result of the ongoing global war on terror and the perception of the potential threat they posed. The closure of the Ummul Qura School and its branch in Kampong. Chhnang Province by the Cambodian government in May 2003, weeks before the visit of Colin Powell, the then US Secretary of State, to Phnom Penh for a major conference created a major controversy which put the Muslims in the national and international spotlight. The school was closed because it was alleged by the Cambodian authorities to be part of the terror network with ties to Jamaah Islamiyah. All of its 28 expatriate teachers from various Muslim countries and their families were expelled from Cambodia on 72 hours' notice and detention orders were issued to two Thai Muslim nationals and an Egyptian who were accused of being the leaders of the terrorist outfit.[20] The Thais were held by the Cambodian authorities while the Egyptian, who was outside the country at the time, escaped arrest. The Prime Minister, Hun Sen, claimed in an interview, without producing any evidence, that foreigners had planted themselves in Cambodia for future terrorist attacks. The Thai Foreign Minister at the time of the controversy, Surakiat Sathirathai and even the Thai Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra downplayed the arrests. According to a Bangkok Post article the Thai authorities ran a check on the two Thai suspects and found them clean. The Cambodian police version, on the other hand, claimed that there was a telephone conversation in Phnom Penh between one of the suspects in the Riyadh suicide bombing of the housing complex for foreigners and the accused.

Six hundred of the students of Ummul Qura were immediately asked to leave the school.[21] This was a school which accommodated students from poor backgrounds, many of whom were hoping to study abroad on the school's sponsorship after their graduation. Before its closure the school was operating on a monthly budget of US$50,000. It had some of the best infrastructure and facilities for a secondary school in Cambodia with highly motivated students and fairly well-trained teachers. Following this event, intelligence and security analysts began speculating on the likelihood of Cambodia being used as a platform for Muslim terrorism.

Mr. Ahmad Yahaya, who was the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Commerce at that time, said he was convinced 100% that Cham Muslims would not resort to terrorism although he could not say the same for the foreign Muslims. Many Muslim leaders complained that the action of the government was reminiscent of the action taken by the Khmer Rouge to close Islamic schools. Many were also reminded of

the directive issued by H.E. Chea Savoeurn, to prevent the Muslims from congregating in public places including mosques immediately following the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York. Although this directive was later withdrawn the Muslims were reminded of their vulnerability in Cambodia.

The harsh action of the government, in fact, was extremely unpopular with the vast majority of the Muslims and created a serious crisis of confidence in the Muslim leadership at that time. Recognizing the gravity of the situation, following the representation of the Muslim leaders led by the Mufti and Othsman Hassan, to the Secretary of State for the Ministry of Labour on the need to respond urgently to the concerns of the Muslims in Cambodia and to neutralize the ire of the Muslims, the government decided to hand over the Ummul Qura school and its branches to the Highest Council for Islamic Religious Affairs for supervision. Later, in a letter dated 16 April 2004, signed by Sok An, the Senior Minister in the Office of the Council of Ministers, to the Mufti as Chairman of the Highest Council for Islamic Religious Affairs and Director of the Islamic Center of Cambodia, the Royal Government of Cambodia announced that it had decided to 'authorize the Highest Council for Islamic Religious Affairs Cambodia to continue to control and use the aforementioned locations to set up the Islamic Center of Cambodia with the following activities:[22]

1. To teach according to the national educational programmes;
2. To provide Islamic teachings in accordance with the teaching curriculum from certain Muslim countries in ASEAN;
3. To provide vocational training;
4. To conduct other activities which serve Islam and Cambodian society.

The Cambodian Islamic Centre (CIC) leadership under the Mufti tried to revive the school but has faced many problems basically relating to logistics and funding. It took a major controversy to highlight the significant presence of the Muslims in Cambodia. Due to the negative implications of this incident the US Embassy in Phnom Penh, in its attempts to repair the damage caused by this event, began making friendly overtures to the local Muslims to regain their trust and confidence.[23] Many local Muslim NGOs began receiving assistance from the Embassy in various forms. English camps for Muslim children have also been sponsored by the Embassy. The Embassy also began inviting Muslim leaders for *iftar*, the breaking of fast, during Ramadan, followed

by Maghreb prayer, as part of its goodwill exercise. This gesture has also brought the Cambodian Muslims into focus.

To summarize, we can identify at least nine factors that have contributed to the enhanced visibility of the Muslims in Cambodia. First was the political empowerment of the Muslims and their role in government. There was consistent Muslim participation in government. Second was the reorganization of the Muslim socio-religious bureaucracy led by the Office of the Mufti. Third, the Tabligh Jamaat movement based in Phum Treah, Kampong Cham, under the leadership of Haji Sulaiman, was not only able to withstand the criticisms and suspicions against it but also managed to consolidate its activities, especially the holding of the annual *ijtimak* which attracted followers by the thousands including participants from overseas. Fourth, the expanding contacts with the Cambodian Muslim diaspora especially in Malaysia have also re-energized the Muslims of Cambodia and given them a new sense of self-confidence. Fifth, foreign Muslim tourists to Cambodia, who have benefitted from the availability of budget airlines like Air Asia, have also helped to place the Muslims in the limelight. Sixth, the educational channels developed between the Muslim countries and the Cambodian Muslims have also reinforced the formal ties between them. Seventh, the educational empowerment of the Muslims through secular institutions like Norton University in Phnom Penh has created a new generation of secular-educated and competent Muslims for the Cambodian job market. Eighth, the introduction of Radio Sap Cham, with the support of the United States and the British Embassy, unprecedented in Cambodian history, has not only given the Muslims a modern and effective domestic communicational channel but also raised their public profile and international accessibility. Finally, the vibrancy of Muslim civil society has given the Muslims in Cambodia in particular a high public profile they had never enjoyed before.

Muslim civil society in Cambodia

The rehabilitation of Islam in Cambodia is a function of the vibrancy of Muslim civil society in Cambodia. It was the era of Muslim associationalism beginning in the early 1990s that gave birth to a reinvigorated Muslim society in Cambodia. International Muslim donors, sponsors and NGOs were initially quite happy to provide assistance to the Muslims in Cambodia directly through personal contacts but gradually began to recognize the wisdom of working with local NGOs to undertake this task. At the same time, as the Cambodian government

did not have a proper Islamic outfit to undertake the above function the responsibility to do so fell on the Muslims themselves. This occurred in at least two ways. The first was through the formation of Muslim Associations or NGOs which sought to represent the different interests and aspirations of the various Muslim constituencies. Hence many Muslim organizations such as the Cambodian Muslim Development (CMDF), Cambodian Islamic Women's Development Association (CIWODA), Cambodian Muslim Community Development (CMCD), Cambodian Islamic Association (CIA), Cambodian Muslim Student Association (CAMSA), Islamic Medical Association of Cambodia (IMAC), Cambodian Islamic Youth Association (CIYA), Islamic Local Development Organization (ILDO) and Cambodian Islamic Welfare Association (CIWA) were formed. Second, with the official recognition of the position of the Mufti as the spiritual leader of the Muslim community in Cambodia and the Head of the Highest Council of Islamic Affairs in the kingdom, under his initiative and leadership, and with the support of Muslim organizations especially the CMDF, the reorganization of Islamic administration and the Muslim community in Cambodia was also undertaken to standardize the practice of Islam as well as to unite the Muslims. It is obvious that the two-pronged attempts above, despite their limitations, have helped expose the Muslims, at the leadership as well as followership level, to all kinds of modern ideas about organizational methods, concepts, strategies and practices which have apparently enabled them to use their communal resources more effectively. Muslim associationalism in Cambodia has helped the Muslims to rationalize and modernize the way they conduct and organize themselves.

Historically, the cultural and religious autonomy of the Muslims has always been recognized by the Cambodian state except for the Pol Pot era. The Muslims have invariably been allowed to autonomously manage their own affairs as a socio-religious community without the interference of the authorities. The existence of the two main sects of Islam in Cambodia, the Cham Bani and the Cham Shariat, separately organized but equally recognized, is a function of this autonomy. The constitutional guarantees of religious freedom coupled with the restoration of democracy in Cambodia in 1993 reaffirmed the cultural and religious autonomy of the Muslims as a national minority. The Muslims always had the freedom to determine how to structure and regulate their communal life. Successive Cambodian governments since 1993 continued with this policy which in turn paved the way for the emergence of Muslim civil society in Cambodia. The reconstruction efforts in

the post-UNTAC era also created the opportunities for the Cambodian Muslim NGOs to play their part in the rebuilding of the country. Among other things, Muslim NGOs were active in informal diplomacy in their dealings with Muslim embassies and countries complementing the efforts of their government; they served as the intermediaries between the Muslims and the local authorities; they were directly involved in relief and humanitarian activities; they assumed the role of aid distributors; they undertook the physical reconstruction of Muslim physical landmarks like mosques, suraus, schools and orphanages; they helped rebuild the communal life of the Muslim community; they provided training and education to the general Muslim population; they recruited and trained new leaders; they negotiated interreligious relations and mobilized Muslim participation in the political system. The Muslim NGOs began using computers for documentation work, record-keeping and information-sourcing and circulation. The cellphone became the primary medium of communication for their members. Seminars, workshops and meetings were regularly held. Proper working offices were set up as the operational nerve centres of many of these NGOs. The facilities created at the headquarters of the CMDF in Phnom Penh resemble an operations centre of a modern business corporation complete with computer, communications and media facilities as well as seminar and meeting rooms. This place is also used by the Muslim political leaders comprising Secretaries and Under-Secretaries of State and Parliamentarians representing the CPP, for their regular brainstorming sessions and meetings.[24]

The House of Emirates Orphanage at Phrek Phra, set up by IMAC, not only has a modern hostel with a cafeteria, a mosque and a separate building housing the orphanage's administration but also an in-house clinic which provides medical care for its residents. Young Muslim leaders are now familiar with the culture and practice of record-keeping, public speaking, proposal-writing, MOUs (Memorandums of Understanding) negotiating and interfaith dialogues. The office of CMCD, another major Muslim NGO, is also a hive of activities as the studio of Radio Sap Cham is also located here and young Arabic-speaking Cham scholars gather almost daily to undertake the translation of the Quran into Cham and Khmer. The office of Muslim Unity for National Development (MUNADE), which will be described elsewhere in the following section, is also located here.

Perhaps the most significant recent development is the transformed manner in which the Office of the Mufti as Head of the Highest Council of Islamic Affairs in Cambodia has been undertaking the administration

of Islam in Cambodia. Modern technology is now part of the administrative system adopted by the Mufti's office for its information-sourcing, record-keeping and publication activities. Although paper communication is still practised through letters, minutes and notices circulated to its network of mosques throughout Cambodia, the cellphone has become the most important medium for immediate information circulation.

Equally important is the role of the Office of the Mufti and the Highest Council for Islamic Religious Affairs together with the CIC at the instigation and with the collaboration of the CMDF in undertaking activities meant to mobilize Muslim grassroots support in all of Cambodia. Thus regular seminars, workshops, meetings and training programmes have been held at various levels, national, provincial and local, to disseminate information and to standardize the new socio-religious bureaucracy that is being developed. A more cohesive national Muslim community seems to be emerging.

Similarly, as the Mufti's office is generally perceived to be the gateway to Islam in Cambodia by foreign governments as well as International Islamic NGOs, it also assumes a very important liaison function as the intermediary between the local Cambodian Muslims and the international community. Hence, whether it is the US Embassy or other Western embassies, foreign Muslim governments or individual Muslim philanthropists or NGOs, the Mufti's office is considered as the preferred channel of communication on matters relating to Cambodian Islam. Thus too, the Mufti's office or the Mufti himself has been directly involved in MOUs signed with foreign institutions and governments. For example, the Mufti is a party to the MOU signed with the Restu Foundation, a Malaysian NPO (Non-Profit Organization) which promotes Islamic calligraphy and the translation and publication of the Quran into vernacular languages.[25] Before this, the Mufti was also involved in other MOUs with JAKIM (Department of Islamic Development), Malaysia and RISEAP (Regional Islamic Dakwah Council for Southeast Asia and the Pacific), which offers assistance in the training of imams and Islamic officials. It is obvious that it is not just the content of the MOUs that matters but also its format as a modern planning instrument.

In more concrete terms, probably the dynamism of Muslim civil society can be illustrated in two major events that took place in Cambodia over the last couple of years. The first was the 2nd Congress of the Cambodian Muslim Development Foundation (CMDF), which was held on 7 August 2006.[26] This Congress brought together 1,685 participants

from almost every province in Cambodia comprising imams and Muslim community leaders. The Congress was opened by Prime Minister Hun Sen himself, who highlighted in his speech the cordial relations that existed between the government and the Muslims and the contribution of Muslim NGOs, especially the CMDF, towards national development. Hun Sen also praised the leadership of Othsman Hassan, the president of CMDF and his Advisor on Islamic Affairs. The Congress was also a statement of the success and influence of CMDF. By any account this was an impressive national gathering of Cambodian Muslim leaders demonstrating the capacity and reach of CMDF.

Another more recent major event was the national seminar on MUNADE which was held on 15 February 2009 in Phnom Pen.[27] The seminar was organized by the CMCD, which is under the leadership of Mr. Ahmad Yahaya, who was then the Secretary of State in the Ministry of Social Affairs. Mr. Ahmad Yahaya is also the Advisor to the Government on Islamic affairs. This seminar was attended by approximately 300 participants from diverse backgrounds including senators, members of the National Assembly, government officials, NGO directors, Islamic teachers, imams and former students of the universities in the Middle East. Unlike the 2nd Congress of CMDF, this seminar was officiated by the Minister of Cults and Religion. But compared to the CMDF Congress, this seminar, intended to bring together 'all the key players in different communities to work together and to prioritize the key issues to be addressed in each community', had specific objectives, which were:

1. To study the curriculum for the teaching of Arabic and English;
2. To translate the Holy Quran into the Khmer language;
3. To translate the Holy Quran into the Cham language;
4. To compile an Arabic-Khmer-Cham dictionary;
5. To formulate strategies for the socio-economic development of the Muslim community.[28]

The above illustrates that Muslim NGOs like CMDF and CMCD have the capacity to mobilize the Muslims in Cambodia. The way the mobilization has been attempted is very rational and conforms to normal practice in democratic countries. There is no doubt that globalization has played a major role not just in ushering in change in the way the Muslim minority conducts itself but also in sustaining it. Of course, it can be argued that there is a downside to the above development in that there may be a hidden political agenda underlying the motives of the above two major Muslim NGOs as well as other NGOs. This is not

only inevitable but probably also healthy. As long as the competition for recognition, acceptance and influence between the different Muslim groups takes place in a civil and peaceful manner within the bounds of the law complementing the participatory democratic system, it will be good for the Muslims and the country.

Conclusion

It is remarkable that in the space of slightly over a decade an impoverished, disempowered, vulnerable and marginalized Muslim community has been able to reorganize itself to acquire a new level of recognition and respectability. The physical landmarks of Muslim enclaves in Cambodia today have changed with more mosques, suraus and schools having been renovated or newly built. Many of the Muslim Associations established have also been located in new premises and buildings. There is also evidence of the economic empowerment of the Muslims although poverty is still a major problem. There are now quite a number of Muslim restaurants and business houses in Phnom Penh, Siem Riep and other towns. In addition, Muslims have gone into the cottage industry to export their products to markets abroad. The Cambodian Muslim diaspora has also played a very important role in channelling funds as well as goods and ideas back to Cambodia to help their community. The development of constitutionalism has definitely brought a measure of stability to Cambodia. The practice of democracy and the dictates of electoral politics have also made the Muslims an important constituency to be taken seriously by all parties. There is already some evidence of the success of Muslim Associations in helping create a Muslim civil society which is able to accommodate diversity within the minority community as well as support interreligious dialogue and tolerance. This is evidently also a by-product of the democratic transformation that has evolved in Cambodia.

The above developments could not have been possible without the benevolent impact of globalization. The turning point in the history of Cambodia came when the international community helped the country end its decades-old civil war. It was the resolve and commitment of the international community to help create a peaceful world in line with the aspirations of the United Nations Charter that led to the paradigmatic change taking place in Cambodia, transforming it from a zone of conflict to a zone of peace. The United Nations was directly involved in the pacification process through UNTAC in 1992 and 1993. Soldiers, security personnel and bureaucrats from many

countries were directly involved in peace-keeping and peace-building in Cambodia until the successful conduct of the Constituent Assembly elections which brought a democratically elected Cambodian government into office. The successful rehabilitation of Cambodian exiles and returnees was undertaken by the United Nations prior to the holding of the elections in accordance with the Paris Peace Treaty. It was during the transition period that soldiers and bureaucrats from Muslim countries were alerted to the plight of the Muslims as a displaced community in Cambodia and began making concerted efforts to assist them. The space that UNTAC created for the involvement of international NGOs in the peace-building and reconstruction efforts in Cambodia was extremely significant. But essentially it was the immediate dividends of peace enjoyed by Cambodia as a reconstructed nation that created the opportunity for its Muslim community to reinvent itself in a constructive way. All the other developments that followed, from constitutionalism to human rights, democracy, civil society, diversity management, interfaith dialogue and regionalism to economic liberalization were all either inspired by globalization or generated by it.

On all of the above issues too there exists a kind of global benchmarking and expectation which directly or indirectly impels nations to comply and Cambodia is no exception. It is within this global framework that the Muslim minority in Cambodia has emerged as its principal and direct beneficiary. The constitutional, legal and political safeguards that have been put in place for all Cambodians in post-conflict Cambodia favour the Muslims too. Cambodian Muslims can now move across national frontiers without any problem and the Cambodian Muslim diaspora can now freely opt to help their kinsfolk in Cambodia. The participation of the Muslims in the democratic politics of Cambodia has not only consolidated democracy itself but also earned them political rewards disproportionate to their numerical size. Muslim civil society in Cambodia is now helping shape and modernize Muslim society in an unprecedented way. Market liberalization in Cambodia has also opened up all kinds of opportunities for Cambodia as well as its Muslim population.

Cambodia's membership in ASEAN has also played an important role in facilitating greater diplomatic, educational, cultural and economic contacts between the peoples of the member countries. Cambodia became more familiar with the Islamic culture prevailing in the Muslim-majority countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. Malaysia, on the other hand, was receptive to the idea of obtaining Cambodian labour and of providing educational opportunities to Cambodian students

regardless of their religious affiliation. Malaysia has also invested heavily in Cambodia and among other things now also plans to jointly develop the trillion-dollar global halal industry with Cambodia. Muslim capital and investments from other countries in the Middle East are now finding their way into Cambodia. It is fairly obvious that one of the most benevolent features in the landscape of globalization has been the spread and sharing of positive values that contribute towards universal ideals such as the respect for human rights, justice, economic empowerment, political participation and human dignity. Globalization has brought about the empowerment of the Muslims in Cambodia in a whole range of ways which have in turn enabled them to reassert their commitment to their faith without forfeiting their sense of belonging to the modern polity of Cambodia, which is overwhelmingly Buddhist.

Notes

1. This paper is based on a series of fieldworks undertaken in Cambodia between 1995 and 2012. I am grateful to many people and institutions for their role in assisting me to undertake those field visits as well as funding them. It is not possible to name everyone who helped but I am particularly grateful to the following individuals in Cambodia who were forthcoming in giving me information as well as insights on their community, roles and associations. Mr. Zakaryya Adam, who was a former Deputy Minister, Member of Parliament and Islamic leader and presently Minister in the Prime Minister's Office, was my intellectual counterpart in Cambodia. Mr. Sos Kamry (Kamaruddin Yusof), the Chairman of the Highest Council for Islamic Religious Affairs in Cambodia or the Mufti of mainstream Islam, gave me access to his records on the Muslim community. Mr. Othsman Hassan, a former Member of Parliament, President of the Cambodian Muslim Development Foundation, who is currently a Minister in the Prime Minister's Department in Cambodia and Advisor to Hun Sen and his staff members, gave me all kinds of support on the ground for which I am grateful. Dr. Sos Mousine, Secretary of State in the Ministry of Religion and Cults and President of IMAC, gave much of his time and thought to help me frame my research and its outcome. Mr. Ahmad Yahya, a former Member of Parliament and Secretary of State of the Ministry of Commerce, Chairman of Cambodian Muslim Community Development and Advisor to the Government on Islamic Affairs, was another key informant on whom I was very dependent for this research. I was supported at different times by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Sciences (JSPS), Hiroshima City University, NIHU (National Institutes for Humanities) Program for Islamic Area Studies and JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) in the conduct of different aspects of this research. I am grateful to these institutions for their role in helping make my research successful.
2. Some of the more recent ones include Hussin Mutalib (2008); Liow and Hosen (2009); Nathan and Kamali (2005); Means (2009). Although all the

above-mentioned deal with various aspects of Islam in Cambodia their treatment of the subject is either superficial or insufficient, displaying their lack of familiarity with it. The existing gap in knowledge on Islam in Cambodia is telling.

3. Until today Malaysia, Laos and Thailand have permanent Cambodian Muslim communities which continue to provide some kind of communicational framework between them and Cambodia.
4. Malaysia adopted a policy of wanting to make the country a regional educational hub attracting students from all over the world, especially the ASEAN region. Cambodian students have taken advantage of this policy to pursue their higher education in Malaysia. The proliferation of private colleges as well as more liberal entry requirements for non-Malaysians into public universities have helped sustain this trend of drawing more foreign students to Malaysia including Cambodian students.
5. Interview with Muhammad Jumain Anto, representative of Jakarta-based Yayasan Pondok Pesantren Minhajur Rosyidin on 4 April 2009. This is a very important organization which is trying to introduce a non-*mazhab* approach to Islam. It has an international network and has been able to operate within that network effectively.
6. The attempt to develop the halal industry jointly between Malaysia and Cambodia created the opportunities for greater economic and political cooperation between the two countries, benefitting Cambodia's Muslim population.
7. Interview with Senator Van Math on 3 April 2009.
8. See the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia (1999), Article 43.
9. In terms of absolute numbers it is difficult to know how many Muslims there are in Cambodia. Nevertheless, in view of their visibility, it is not difficult to have a sense of their numerical and political presence.
10. The information on the Jerais was given to me by the Mufti, Sos Kamry. This seems to be the latest ethnic group being added to the list of Muslim communities.
11. On Khmerization please see my remarks in Omar Farouk (2008, p. 80).
12. The Mufti keeps a register of all the mosques in the kingdom of Cambodia. However, since not all mosques are registered at the Mufti's office, it is not easy to keep an exact record. I have been tracing the number of mosques in Cambodia since 1995 and I find that every time I make a trip to Cambodia the number of mosques seems to change. It also tends to grow bigger as more new mosques are built.
13. The appointment was made by Hun Sen after his trip to the Middle East. It was probably motivated by the desire to tap fully the resources that the Middle East had to offer Cambodia. The Muslim appointment led to a more visible presence of Muslims in practically every ministry. All the new Muslim political appointees would meet at the office of Mr. Othsman Hassan to work under his guidance and leadership.
14. For a thorough description of the Jaheds, see Collins (2009, pp. 62–70).
15. I was given a copy of the '*Git*' by Imam San (Datuk Kenoa) or Mufti of Cham Jahed.
16. The traditionalist approach to Islam is invariably supported by the dominance of local culture. It is the local culture that defines the character of Islam which goes beyond religion.

17. The content of Reformism or Modernism is rarely explored but it is always assumed that its source must be the Middle East, associating it with the Salafism of Saudi Arabia.
18. I am introducing this categorization for purposes of analysis. In reality there are overlapping identities among the Muslims. The rise of secularization is a function of modern/national education in Cambodia.
19. Interview with Mr. Zakaryya Adam on 3 April 2009.
20. The Thai Muslims were later cleared of any criminal activities in Thailand.
21. Interview with Mr. Sos Kamry on 2 April 2009.
22. The Mufti, Mr. Sos Kamry, showed me the letter that he received from the Senior Minister, Sok An, urging him and the Islamic Centre of Cambodia to revive the Ummul Qura. This was an attempt to quell the anger of the Muslims.
23. There was a popular perception among the Muslim population in Cambodia that the United States was behind the closure of Ummul Qura because the event took place pending the visit of the US Secretary of State, Mr. Colin Powell. In order to placate the Muslims the US Embassy in Phnom Penh made overtures to the Muslims in many ways to reassure them that they were not discriminated against.
24. The increase in the number of Muslim appointees from the CPP to important political posts like Secretaries and Under-Secretaries of the various Ministries encouraged greater political participation among them.
25. I personally witnessed the signing ceremony of the MOU between the two organizations. Yayasan Restu, Malaysia is a Muslim NPO which has been active internationally, promoting the publication of the Quran especially in the vernacular languages. There was also a suggestion made that a branch of Yayasan Restu be set up in Phnom Penh to realize the above objective.
26. This information was relayed to me by Mr. Zakaryya Adam in an interview in Phnom Penh on 31 March 2009. He explained to me in detail the significance of the meeting for the Muslims in Cambodia, for Mr. Othsman Hassan and for the Cambodian state.
27. Mr. Ahmad Yahya, the principal organizer of MUNADE, provided me with information on the conference that had just been held in February 2009. He also handed to me handouts distributed at the conference for my reference.
28. The aims and objectives of the conference were written in Khmer but these were translated into English by the Phnom Penh office of JICA at my request for my use. I would like to acknowledge with gratitude JICA's kind assistance here.

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9

The Peace Process in Mindanao and Its Global Dimension

Datu Michael O. Mastura with the assistance of Ishak V. Mastura

A global justice framework

Peace processes are essentially a third-party creation. On the part of the parties, a mutually 'hurting stalemate' paves a way out of the conflict processes with every need for help (facilitation) from outside themselves. Principles of obligation during the escalation of conflict in 2008 – in the aftermath of the rejection of the memorandum for self-determination via diplomatic negotiation of the Moro ancestral domain – made it imperative to seek consensus to achieve transformation through acceptance.[1] Although immediate peace must precede justice, peace is also a precondition for justice. That is why the very notion and discussion of global justice have entered the new vocabulary of terms in the politics of investing in 'peace' as it relates to humanitarian intervention in the interests of human security for internally displaced persons. This has much bearing on development aid leverage (as a form of pre-conflict pressure) before any international support for interventionist approaches can take place as a dimension of the responsibility to protect (R2P).[2] The broad issue is the overall impact of a sustained aid effort or leverage incentive in response to conflict-ridden processes and non-trivial corrective policies. (We return to this in the later part of the chapter.) Legitimacy has entailed building a creative Government–Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) negotiation process architecture by articulating the R2P advocacy.

The evolution of conflict in Mindanao and the parallel negotiations (as processes) at the current stage need help from outside in the search for a peace settlement. A *forward-looking* negotiation *without derogating prior agreements* was almost reached for a *common project* of a power-sharing solution. As Malaysia has shown, power accommodation

through negotiation and accompanying social bargains can be a basis for the longer-term stability of a coastal state. The same problematic of continuity is going on in the Philippine archipelago, studied conceptually as an artificial polity of colonized society: in reality 'colonial capitalism' without dismantling imperial historiography leaves out 'the politics of people' in favour of the elite in the metropole. Yet power falling into the hands of an imperial master is different from power in the hands of an indigenous successor elite with catholicity of vision.

From the perspective of civilians suffering in Mindanao, in particular Moro non-combatants, who were swayed by criticisms from human rights groups, there was a failure of human security in conflict zones.[3] But for Mindanao and Sulu, the geography of colonialism raises many unsettled issues traceable to the justness of the original position as they relate to a minimal threshold of legitimacy. More than a hundred years later, the frontiers demarcated in the modern map that sited and fixed the boundaries of what were to be the new colonial entities – and the integration that existed in the pre-First World War era – are now disaggregated under pressure of the external corruption of artificial polities and economies across borders. Just as economic theorists of foreign direct investments began to develop a 'dependency' critique of host-country governments, a political economy in mediation has built up the impetus towards negotiations. Scholars of the 'bargaining school' argued that host-country elites had not become pawns of foreign investors but could turn to 'sovereign' funds for market-transition programmes in divided societies. The substantive effects that markets have on culture associated with modernity are what critics cast within a framework of global justice rather than the wealth-creating power of markets. It may be that the formulation of a nationally scoped political alternative is linked to 'structural adjustment' and 'structural violence' to complement the armed activism as a combined form of struggle in the *common project* mentioned above.[4]

As part of a change in the public status and range of the chief peace advisor he/she always has the possibility of a direct access to the president, but in practice this route is channelled through a cabal of Cabinet security clusters. The first point is that discreetness in face-to-face peace talks and confidentiality as ground rules for negotiations produce a difficult tension, but that is precisely an essential character of diplomacy. Until the breach of the social fabric of trust over the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) the Government–MILF exploratory talks had been far from the reach of opinion editorials producing 'gainers and losers' in the democratic arena. Another point is

that it remains very hard to move away from formal justice when the public eye is given to perceive the very opposite. Winning 'hearts and minds' that could be captured by violent challenges opposed to foreign policy orientation (e.g., American visiting forces engaged in joint military exercises in the Philippines) is like promoting multi-donor inclination. Even where the peace process induces non-violent politics, separating aid from foreign policy (e.g., Canadian business interests mixed up with large aid-funded contracts in Sri Lanka) could result inter alia in drastic cancellation but has not appeared to bear fruit. Many donors have taken the alternative approach of channelling their aid to local civil society or NGOs. This is the larger issue in counter-insurgency: optional 'doing nothing' is weighted, or 'preferred harmony' in aid programmes is awarded only to moderates and moderation in deeply divided societies.

The internal–international axis

A serious snag in peace talks is the zero-sum framework for the national liberation movements (NLM). Having started from a condition of 'power asymmetry', the architecture of the stalled peace process between the Government and the National Democratic Front (also within NDF-CPP-NPA and the rejectionists) has not reached a condition of 'ripeness' parallel to the concrete case furnished by the Maoist radicalization in Nepal. The mutually hurting stalemate can push the parties into a mediated solution as the main goal rather than the 'totalist' non-pragmatic goals of NLMs. Still, what links the conflict processes and the peace processes in the GRP (the Government of the Philippines)–MILF peace negotiation is the readiness to facilitate the inclusion of others for political settlement. Generally, the Malaysian facilitation focuses on the process while the content level has been left to the GRP and MILF, and International Contact Group (ICG) experts have helped to structure and support it.[5]

This brings us to the *locus standi* of national liberation fronts and controversial problems posed by cases of violent self-determination. If the key to identifying armed conflicts is the concentrated use of violence over a long period of time or with an intensity which constitutes a threshold, the identification has always taken diverse typology, including unrecognized armed non-state actors (ANSAs).[6] Following a digression, there was a tendency in the discourse surrounding the peace process between Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) towards phased increments. In a display of resolve the operation

of its own clandestine weapons procurement showed its limitations when it lost Indian sponsorship in 1987. This offers an illustration of two steps forward and one backward with regard to the theory of political violence. The default for framing a way out of violence can be calibrated into 'structuration' of the polity[7] in the case of the Bangsamoro. When LTTE continued to complain about the international community's failure to recognize their 'parity of status' as a strategic foundation of the peace process, it showed preventive diplomacy has its limits.

Respect for territorial integrity remains, yet, with regard to non-interference a Briefing Paper says 'sovereignty over the non-insured populations living within such states has become internationalized, negotiable and conditional'.[8] Many observers appear to be puzzled by the seeming contradiction of US policy towards peace, for which reason Obama's remarks on a 'new beginning' in Cairo reverberated in the Pacific as the popular American President planned to visit Indonesia. Readers might ask why it was that the West in general insisted on a mediated settlement with a 'terrorist' entity when the Pacific Command still speak of the metrics question and 'incidents of violence', while there is 'a bit of blurry line' in some areas between criminal and terrorist activity.[9] The economic dimension of migrant communities and 'diasporan support' for LTTE into which they have been co-opted was linked to associated attacks against civilians, which posed challenges to host countries in view of the shift to terror tactics.

Why was it that the United States did not initiate a war against terrorism in Sri Lanka, unlike in the Philippines? The argument I make below depends on a weaker state but perhaps Sri Lanka could have been a 'test case' for an armed group engaged in a secessionist war to be brought back to the state system. But if that was the objective of mediated settlement and of the peace process that the global state system has been supporting since 2002, the conclusion is that the external actors would already have learnt a fundamental lesson: their role in reshaping the trajectories and outcomes of ethnic conflicts has continued to be limited.

That is why in the case of the Islamic movement the MILF leadership thinking has pragmatically embraced its ANSA status in the international diplomatic arena that evidences patterns of interconnectedness.

As a self-described 'non-state actor' (NSA) MILF is being pragmatic about the reality of international relations and avoiding the vulnerability of prematurely attempting to play states at their own game, which it is not yet ready for in terms of political and legal development. The term 'NSA' reflects a certain maturing political (not yet legal) status

for a force with both an 'armed wing' and a 'political wing' engaging simultaneously in political negotiations, diplomatic work and defensive armed struggle. MILF sees the term 'NSA' or 'ANSA' as compatible with a new Islamic international relations (*siyar as-siyasa*) theory that conceives of 'crossbreed' and 'homegrown' NLMs which intersect between armed and non-armed struggle, like the Islamic resistance movements which use the *hudna* (unilateral ceasefire); for example, the Palestinian Hamas.[10]

As a useful mode of justification, MILF does not in the short term aspire to have an unrealistic 'parity of status' with the Philippine state but only insists for now on 'parity of esteem' as distinct peoples; that is, Bangsamoro vis-à-vis Filipinos. As we know, in Mindanao 'representation of the self-governing entities in the central government is achieved qua cooptation'.[11] Indeed, central-level power-sharing is somewhat limited to the mandatory inclusion of members of the regional government in the national government, whereas the Moro population is territorially compact and so significantly beyond one-dimensional arrangements for asymmetry. The 'ummatic' imperative of Islam animates the Bangsamoro struggle because the original concept of *din-wal-daulat* (religion and state) is alien to the modern artificial construct of the Westphalian state-centric system. The insistence on 'First Nations' status recognized by international law is another strand of the international dimension of the Bangsamoro armed struggle as a liberating attitude, which unlike the LTTE is limited to striving for its rightful place in the Westphalian state-centric system.

Throughout the world the experience of oppression is a more important element than theology unless the latter is impelled by a transformative ideology (accepted on doctrinal matters as expressions of popular resistance by variant Filipino Catholicism) that creates the yearning for liberation. Interestingly for Latin America, Catholic liberation theology favours 'dependency' to debunk the notion of 'bourgeois development', so the churches (if not religions) have been co-opted.[12] The conservative milieu in which Manila Muslim intellectuals saw an 'emancipatory esteem' transformed them among the 'followers of Islam' via a return to the original religion of their forebears in the Philippines. Thus a historiography of the contextual Islam of Filipino 'converts' touched by the Muslim Brotherhood of the 1970s wanting to modernize Islam while being wary of the state is something that has remained intact. Converts to Islam were emulators of the movement initiated since the 1930s by the Muslim Brotherhood. What remains to be mentioned is that most of the Filipino Balik-Islam or new 'reverts' of the 1990s can be characterized

as heavily exposed to the doctrine of Wahabi Islam but not necessarily as militants.[13]

New formulas for RSD in a globalizing system

The organization of power and culture is still nation states (sans hyphen) in a globalizing system. Instead of entering into debates about balancing sovereignty and right to self-determination, we can turn to the legitimate claims of the Bangsamoro to their birthright and their homeland. But in the Mindanao case, this projected an innovative structural 'substate' arrangement closer to the model of an 'associated free state' before the mercantilist idea of a Philippine commonwealth was established. All this suggests commonwealth status was unique in US law to attain self-governance. With decolonization, Congress could grant freedom from control or interference in respect of internal government and administration subject to a legal framework for a referendum on final status.

That is why discussions and negotiations on the right to self-determination (RSD) are continuous. For not only is there a hierarchy of states but a variety of ways national sovereignty is limited in theory and practice. The colonial legacy is that the Moro nation reinscribed the American intervention discourse as an arena for the contestation of meanings – founded on different notions of sovereign authority – and their specific forms to put to work the power relations now invested in 'the people' in order to entrench 'plurinational' state structure in an asymmetrical federal system.[14] This option is well illustrated. Bougainville's autonomy is accepted within the confines of the unitary 'parent' state, yet blurring its sovereignty. Thus 'statehood' for Bougainville granted 'in the name of the technical statehood' to Papua New Guinea dislocates power; as a result, neither has statehood in the traditional sense.[15] In this new formula, the state's very unity is predicated on the negotiated autonomy solution.

The era of decolonization ended in 1969 and that of international trusteeship successfully ended in 1995 with the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia. This framework is instructive on stable 'outcome over process' lessons. As an external player, the international community has often promoted power-sharing in response to ethnic conflicts by the level of power granted to substate entities. Just as the framework for Kosovo provides a redefinition of the state through some variant devices of inclusion and equality, the Machakos Protocol has a power-sharing plan and transition process for SPLM/SPLA in South Sudan. The MILF

Draft of the Bangsamoro comprehensive compact adopts this framework device based on principles of balance and non-discrimination. Opting for associative power-sharing requires a balancing act of super-local options but incurs secessionist suspicion of armed struggles. So the MOA-AD was construed along these tendencies by the status quo faction of Manila Metropole. Yet in Tripoli in 2001 the Agreement of Peace was reached between GRP and MILF, designed to configure the territorial dimensions of ethnicity into power-sharing and wealth-sharing arrangements.

A cumulative regime of peace agreements can operate beyond *trusteeship* as a process of *conditionality* for political leverage without international imposition except for increasing coordination on the ground. This situation is seen most clearly with regard to the transition process to *full* sovereignty, which evokes absoluteness. Once the idea of 'nation' is linked to the identity of 'people' sovereignty suggests the indivisible quality of a nation. I argue that the use of other modifiers such as *conditional*, *earned* or *shared* sovereignty renders it meaningless. If so, why is opposition to RSD often discussed in terms of 'sovereignty'? Any conditional assertion that governments may face a 'condition' of emergency is an attempt to turn ethno-national equality claims (e.g. Quebeckers' preliminaries for secession) into a crisis. This is a major sticking point when normal constitutional rules have to be set aside if the state is to survive. The lexicon of R2P came against a backdrop of broad humanitarian concerns viewed as the state's protection tasks but conditional on less than full sovereignty. The Manila government spent 2008 in scandal and crisis; yet, some of the gloss had gone from the tragic violence in Mindanao and ad hoc approaches to internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Interim proposals for compromise

The 'Declaration of Continuity for Peace Negotiation'[16] signed between the GRP and MILF has the key element of gradation in shared authority:

- New formulas that permanently respond to the legitimate aspirations of the Bangsamoro people for just peace, freedom founded on parity of esteem, equal treatment for their identity, ethos and rights and for the Bangsamoro as a whole to exercise self-governance on the basis of consent in accordance to an agreed framework which shall be negotiated and adopted by the Parties;[17]

- In good, faith, building on prior consensus points achieved, these negotiations and their results will proceed on the basis of consent and

courses of action free of any imposition in order to provide the parties' definitive commitment to their success for peace settlement.[18]

Unlike the GRP, during the rounds of interim negotiations, the MILF negotiators tabled a clearly articulated Draft Comprehensive Compact with a clear sense of their best alternative negotiation position. Government negotiators came to the table with concrete proposals for compromise under the rubric of 'executive doables' on which solutions should be based. Polarized positions allowed the MILF leadership to articulate self-definition and provoked recognition to navigate the negotiation of compromise within 'proximity talks'. Beyond international tutelage, the less intrusive trusteeship role is the power-sharing arrangement used as a policy tool to stabilize divided societies after violent conflict as a viable alternative to territorial partition. The outcome of the multi-party talks for the Belfast Agreement was reached by process; but the Bangsamoro experienced 'constitutional processes' as another point of contention rather than as a framework for resolving disputes.

The starter in the MILF Draft could be the 'joint task' approach that was meant to open the self-conception of 'nation' to plural forms by 'sharing sovereign authority' for certain areas of jurisdiction. Arroyo's fallback positions were influenced by the popular perception that GRP had 'given away too much' and her last negotiating team tended to push the decision up the political ladder and await guidance. This fear was partly justified but that was not the only factor. The focus of MILF negotiators at the exploratory talks was to make the new formula concrete and to relate it to peace agreement solutions *without derogating from prior agreements*, and the theoretical discussions were to build on *prior consensus points achieved* in the interpretive framework.

The approach arose from the conviction of MILF leaders that beyond articulating core principles the Bangsamoro consensus position had already made compromises. Consider the historical episode in which there was a demand from the US government that the Moro nation be given the 'democratic option' to express their people's 'plebiscitary consent' on whether or not they wanted to be part of an independent Philippines.[19] There are far greater continuities, connections and ironies in the Bangsamoro's struggle for state formation than the Christian Filipinos have experienced. What holds true is that the elemental difference reflects the varying ways in which Washington acquired the territories, their population and size and the interest of the US legislators. Thus, that an opposition to the unitary state system is a central issue to the Mindanao conflict and

peace settlement is clear from the Drafts on interim agreements leading to a comprehensive compact.[20] A major premise of MOA-AD is that the highest form of autonomy was attained by compromise incorporated under the Moro Province. This phase is a recognition of the theory of a 'state right' to write the 'Moro' as a distinct 'people' in constitutional ideology. The disconnection is that the US Congress policy of termination reduced the Moro Province to constitutional dependency.

Ironically the Philippine commonwealth was a mercantilist idea. But, forged in the adversity of colonialism, it fitted the Wilsonian definition of 'self-determination' for diversity of political status in governance arrangement. That the referendum of the Moro population never took place has made such historical fact a permanent reservation brought forward to assert Moro right to self-governance based on consent at an appropriate time.[21] Unlike North Borneo (Sabah and Sarawak), West Papua and East Timor, where the United Nations or state colonial powers presided over their incorporation through a referendum, the Moro exhibited an 'unorganized' category in the past or an 'ungoverned' space in today's IR (International Relations) parlance.

Geopolitical equations and 'geoeconomics'

The Mindanao conflict ranks as the second longest after Sudan between Muslims and Christians. The semi-independent Moro Province set up by the American colonial administration of its unincorporated Philippine territory early in the twentieth century provided a linchpin for US policy in the region. The United States once created an arc of strategic bases from Cuba to the Philippines. Fear of 'Leftist' forces tapping the legacy of socialist revolution has been supplanted by the fear of 'Shi'ite' faith exporting revolutionary movements. The direct involvement of extra-regional actors in the Aceh peace process was an attempt to alter the path and create a different outcome from Indonesia's intense escalation in the Timor Este and in the communal violence in the Maluku linked to the Laskar militia.

The 1990s saw a Muslim world that was incorporated into the modern world economy. Since that time there has been a decline in adherence to the notion that political borders are immutable. Internal pressure related to regionalism, representation and self-determination is accompanied by the external demands of world markets and supra-national institutions. For example, EAGA-BIMP is an offshoot of regional economies called 'growth triangles' both cutting through and linking nations

(Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines). The asymmetrical relations between centre (metropole) and periphery have brought about a resurgence of separatist sentiments that draw attention to the phenomenon of internal colonialism.

Military-complex geopolitical concerns of the Asia-Pacific century that once caused the senior diplomats and 'securocrats' to become obsessed with preventing a 'domino' effect leading to the 'fall' of other countries in Asia have not been eagerly replaced by 'geoeconomics' manoeuvring except in the guise of environmental regimes. The US bases in the Philippines had fewer environmental benefits than these but considerable social costs until their removal by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption in Luzon. Despite the ending of one era of geopolitics, another dimension of global space and downside of a borderless economy is of a darker nature: human and drug trafficking, illegal migration, illegal arms trade. The impact of terrorism as a global phenomenon has constructed the enemy beyond the state as a territorial concept. But the phasing down of military activity came in the form of the United States Visiting Forces Agreement (USVFA) to support US counter-terror operations overseas and counter-insurgency policy.

Arguing about the 'state' makes it too unitary as a unit of analysis when the seminal ideas of Moro nationalism are considered. Some rework the 'empire' or 'revived caliphate' as a master category to counterpose political thoughts of the Schoolmen.[22] An adequate approach needs to address the mercenary or private militias, warlords and feudal orders. Currently the supra-state formation of the European Union (EU) and European Commission or regional organizations such as the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) can be seen as a powerful riposte to those who believe that international politics must always be seen as a zero-sum game. On the 'spiral model' of global human rights polity a certain threshold weight for collective voices of the ASEAN NGO SUMMIT captured the specific plights of the Rohingyas in Myanmar, of the Muslims of South Thailand and of the Bangsamoro of Mindanao, calling for justice and peace in its Bangkok Declaration for 'boomerang effect'.[23] The understanding of the subordinate social form of the organization of power and culture (tribe, village, kingdom, empire and network) where authority is socially conferred masks its origin in statecraft and popular sovereignty. This is the issue on which we focus the sovereign state when it creates modern conditions of citizenship. But what has globalization done to religious resurgence where ideational forces give rise to NLMs negotiating peace with the government?[24]

Islamic revolutionary fronts that function as 'states within states' seem unique to the Hezbollah entity embedded in diverse geographies. But the private military contractors out of Iraq, Afghanistan and the African conflicted zones all vie for control in shifting powers. Also, in addition to the shifting worlds of Islam, there is a binary stream between two regions: Middle East orthodoxy and heterodoxy in Southeast Asia. In this broad category, we make no attempt to quantify the religiosity dimensions, devotional or ideological, for there is an established network of scholarship. Quite a separate question is whether institutions and groups 'really follow' the teachings of Islam, and there is significant variance in the cumulative percentages of respondents who chose to really follow, somewhat follow or somewhat not follow.[25] Nationalist-inspired movements without principles that go beyond 'liberation and oppression' rarely translate into sustainable polity, except to restore legitimacy in collapsed states, but Moro societies define their own situations in opposition to the dominant state.[26] Is negotiating core grievances of MILF about foundational or organizational forms of governance to manage people and territory?

The ICG

The framework for the formation of the ICG for the GRP–MILF peace process defines the mandate with an international dimension for obtaining consensus.[27] The Mindanao peace talks provide leverage for 'reshaping the trajectories' and outcomes of ethnic conflicts with the important but limited role of the international community in coordination with the facilitating country. Given the full escalation of war-fighting, analytical scrutiny illustrates that the Sri Lanka peace process failed to benefit from third parties aiding or influencing adversaries to find a solution to their conflict. There was no publicly announced group of Friends of the Timor-Leste peace process considering that 'the official nature of such groups may require some compromise between political acceptability and effectiveness'[28] for coordinating support. The role of support groups for leverage in the Government–MILF peace talks was a choice: Friends of, Contact Groups, Eminent Persons and a Hybrid example.[29]

Drawing regional actors from member countries of ASEAN, OIC and EU and Japan to get involved in ICG has provided an innovative fusion of strategies and dynamics in the global state system. It is unique in the annals of international diplomacy in developing leverage (reciprocity) based on ongoing peace negotiations but testable in other negotiation cases. The core growth point in treaty law and practice is that no typical

Security Council resolutions mandated the core members: Japan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and hopefully the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The links between conflict actors (GRP–MILF) have increased in methodological facilitation with the participation of third-party NSAs: the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Conciliation Resources International, the Asia Foundation and the Muhammadiayah.

The IMT

The mission of the Malaysian-led International Monitoring Team (IMT) after a year of withdrawal in 2008 has become the basis for another round of assurances to the international community for weighing in the resumption of the talks and progress of negotiations. Malaysia, Brunei and Libya continue to compose the IMT's security component while Japan handles the socio-economic component of IMT. Norway has joined the security team, but made clear it will remain as facilitator for the Government-NDF peace process. The EU has assumed responsibility for the humanitarian, rehabilitation and development component of IMT with specific core tasks and associated tasks.[30] Writing the correct context into the ToR (Term of Reference) is essential to empower the conflict parties and the support recognition between them as constructed reality. The use of the term 'track' has described 'the various levels of decision-making and links' between actors working for persuasive progression.[31] Back-channel negotiation (BCN) was done in secret but iPhone-aided facilitation had to pass the draft 'Declaration of Continuity' to the front-channel delegation in time for the closure session of the GRP–MILF peace process.

The civilian protection component of IMT

I articulate the R2P threshold as a complementary tool to third-party facilitation knowing that there may be no complete way out in regard to the IDP protection dilemma. In the aftermath of the aborted signing of MOA-AD, the international response to the default was shaped by humanitarian concerns. This became apparent when a military spokesman of the 6th Infantry Division based in central Mindanao tagged Muslim civilians at evacuation centres the 'reserved enemy forces of the MILF' in an open briefing to the media in Cotabato City.[32] The risk of a full-scale humanitarian crisis in Mindanao in October 2008 sounded 'an external shock' with consequences 'which [are] . . . not under control' without contingency efforts. Intractability and chronic difficulty

in delivering humanitarian assistance to the Bangsamoro convinced MILF negotiators of the workability of the rights-based approach to non-combatants and civilian populations at risk.

As part of its response, the MILF peace panel embarked on a 'non-attributable non-paper' on the R2P framework.[33] The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released its final report *Responsibility to Protect* in October 2001. The report rejected 'humanitarian intervention' on definitional ground but linked the responsibility to the broader concept of *human security*. This concept has a significant Asian pedigree and Japanese leaders at ministerial level have promoted it vigorously. Rather confusingly, Filipino lawmakers titled the Anti-Terrorism Law 'Human Security Act' perhaps burdened by the understanding of security as protection of sovereignty and territory or non-interference in domestic affairs. A decade after the 1994 report on human security in UNDP entered the 'Asian security lexicon' the support for the main global initiatives directly tied to human security was preventing the use of child soldiers, and the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines.

The front-channel negotiations of GRP and MILF succeeded in reaching agreement with an international dimension in aid of the human security referent point. A substantial part of *Protecting and Empowering People* (Commission on Human Security 2003) dealt with situations of violent conflict, refugees and IDPs, and recovery from violent conflict. Human security thinking focuses on NSAs. The parties agreed to establish the civilian protection component (CPC) of the IMT under separate terms of reference.[34] The initial members of CPC consisted of the Non-Violent Peaceforce (NP), the Mindanao People's Caucus (MPC), the Mindanao Human Rights Action Center, Inc. (MinHRAC) and the Moslem Organization of Government Officials and Professionals, Inc. (MOGOP). Likewise, GRP–MILF signed the Implementing Guidelines on Clearing of Mines/Unexploded Ordnance with the Philippine Campaign to Ban Land Mines (PCBL) and the Fondation Suisse de Deminage (FSD) Project.

For the GRP as well as the MILF the convergence is on the basic protection issues. The duty of justice is not so much to pressure regimes to stop depriving people of their rights, as to deter state violence to ensure the state's responsibility to protect people and contain threats. The Government–MILF declaration considers it pivotal:

• The ultimate goals of the talks is [sic] to consider new modalities to end the armed hostilities with responsibility to protect and for human

security, in addition to resolve the legitimate grievances and claims for the people of Moro ancestry and origin.

This is the most important innovation in thinking about the 'humanitarian crisis' and 'the right to intervene' because of the need to forge principles and processes to protect people at risk. But the effort to establish a new humanitarian principle takes heart from the idea that foreign affairs are linked to domestic politics.

My argument for framing the issues of sovereignty and intervention in terms of the R2P advocacy is that it defines the *just cause* threshold though the system has not mastered transition. This instrument 'saves lives' but fails to restore livelihoods or rehabilitate economies. Precisely what counts as *just peace* in identity-based conflict where the 'ethnic' fault lines (as large group categories) have been central for ANSAs? In buffer zones where borders intersect, the discussion on RSD and separatist movements is almost continuous, being at the crossroads of economic and cultural interactions. I have sketched the ongoing series of GRP–MILF negotiations as two-pronged, process-oriented and problem-solving ways to achieve the specific goal of addressing the Moro Question. By contrast, the GRP-MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) 1996 Final Peace Agreement was supposed to be the fulfilment of 'a constitutional process' for an absolute deal. The MNLF's armed force integration into the military was integral to the maintenance of the status quo and the existing political structures, but it appears to have been a stage in the process of entry into normal peaceful politics.

The analytic armoury of economics to interpret the Moro Muslims' armed struggle in the southern Philippines can lead some observers to conclude that intervention to prevent or resolve such conflict is futile. From a global perspective, why then incur pointless risk investment in 'primordialism' – that is, the deep infusion of an ethnic identity-based worldview? Moreover, there is reluctance to be drawn into the sovereignty question so I mention it only to indicate how 'humanitarian intervention' may force us back to the sovereignty/ intervention dichotomy.

Categorization of ANSAs

Describing an ANSA is the task of the following section. First of all, categories and typologies require understanding of the process by which we organize and trace experience. My position is that we have to typify the category of 'ANSA' tested against the applicability, say, of international

humanitarian law (IHL) and the nature of conflict. I culled here some empirical data from 1989 at the end of the Cold War to 2003. At the onset of the twenty-first century there were 116 active armed conflicts in the world, of which only seven involved interstate conflict in some form. The other 109 were interstate conflicts, in particular NLMs.[35] Secondly, categories of Non-State Armed Group (NSAG) are still based on the traditional view of international law. International norms and practices based on European abstraction and Westphalian peace theory would view only three different types of armed conflict on the range of intensity: *rebellion* (rebels), *insurgency* (insurgents) and *belligerency* (belligerents).

Insurgencies are watched to aid understanding of the forces that underlie their movements. Other explanations point to their status, accorded according to the intensity of challenge posed to the state. This arises from the need to determine *the rights and obligations of the parties* to the conflict. An Islamic international relations theory is now matching the evolution of a non-Westphalian or Philadelphian experience in America in the Middle East as well as South Asia and South East Asia. Rethinking political strategy for engaging with non-violent 'Islamist parties' and/or movements bordering on democrats of the Westphalian and of the Malaccan or Meccan state model poses a challenge to ANSAs rather than NSAGs on foreign policy opinion. The relative emphasis of the culture-clash debate on the words and deeds concerning 'Political Islam' categories tends to replace ideology and independent variables. 'Who needs an Islamic state?' or 'Is it an Islamic party or movement?' debates preoccupy the political currents within ANSA in Muslim majority countries in the face of globalization. This can be more proactive to create typologies specific to political Islam at the very juncture that intersects between armed and non-armed struggle (more appropriate to those predominantly Muslim regimes) to assess the nuanced differences in NSGA and/or ANSA about contemporary 'Islamist' phenomena.

But we need not stop with three categories to lump them into a single typology. An additional category of ANSA is the NLMs. These are crossbreeds of indistinguishable origins, or homegrown movements or groups. Thus, the recognition procedures have failed to pin down the factors on the application of customary international law to the conduct of the parties of an internal armed conflict. Yet the privileged status of NLMs under international law and their use of armed force are key features that define successful insurgencies. The question of 'war of liberation' is consistent with a different perspective legally classified 'along

a continuum of ascending intensity' mentioned above.[36] How do NLMs adhere to or abide by IHL, and how are individuals involved with or supported by NLMs to be regarded? A South–South Network and Small Arms Survey gives detailed profiles of 14 rebel or NSAGs in the Philippines which provide guides to constructive engagement.[37]

Some commentators are on the right track, having shifted from 'roving rebel bands' to de facto governments or regimes with NSAG as a category. Nonetheless, using the term 'NSAG' does not settle the question of 'guerrilla warfare' in the context of NLMs, the main objective of which is to replace the existing state or form their own state. The crossbreed lies in the intersection of the ability of ANSA to claim under IHL or more recently to attribute failure of R2P to human security practice. What is factored in here is *intervention on humanitarian grounds* that led to the Timor-Leste and Kosovo cases for failed states. (I note that we cannot fully grasp sovereignty unless we experience intervention.) The Philippines is not a 'failed state' but is a 'fragile state' that can continue to deteriorate into a 'failing state' because of a dysfunctional system and a democratic deficit. Again, in this central problem of the disintegration of the rule of law in post-liberal society in the face of globalizing corporatist tendencies, it was not until the 1980s that the predominance of the nation-state began to be questioned. As the processes of globalization became obvious there was a rush of case studies to reopen the theory of the nation-state embodied in the intersection of state as polity and nation as community. The pretence of the state to be 'a neutral guardian of the social order' gives way to NSAs increasingly being recognized and treated as entities. The reality and self-consciousness of the state's separation from society is a corporate state.[38]

Peace agreements as law, IHL and HR

Some studies have shifted the analysis of the process from the three categories to using the term 'power' instead of 'state' in a broader sense to include other entities (such as the above-mentioned de facto and interim governments). This could mean that the exercise of power over certain territory by NLMs could prove itself to be an authority or a 'Power' within the meaning of the IHL to be bound by the Conventions and Protocols. For this factor to come about, that particular NLM would have to enjoy considerable recognition and the support of the civilian population. This has an elemental connection to RSD but it is not my purpose to elaborate on this here. What this could also mean is the applicability of IHL. Signifying 'peace agreement' and 'truce', the Islamic

term '*muhadanah*' is also a form of conjunction to lock in kindred substate actors. A debate remains among Muslim scholars on the flexibility of the *hudna* concept, that is, the religious Islamic classical notion of truce for easing pressure or for different goals. Is *muhadanah* (the offer) merely a tactical ceasefire or a more sophisticated practice, which lays the groundwork for non-violent solutions?[39] Contrived 'treaty' status between state and entity in effect is agreement *to be bound* by the MILF as if Bangsamoro representatives had signed directly. Thus the *hudna* legal form in 'war of liberation', being a crossbreed that correlates to the Islamic 'resistance movement', must be assessed differently to other types of documented agreement in positive law.

I particularly note that critics are able to explain the phenomenon of 'one foot in and one foot out' of government, as with Hizbullah and Hamas, to bring into line the humanitarian ambition of IHL. Framing options, we mention the two Islamic resistance movements (note here I avoid using 'Islamist') and lump them together into one category or another of NSAGs. Yet, strictly speaking, each Islamic resistance or Islamic movement is unique, which means detailed examination may not lead to identification (or 'typification') of a subgroup. What is common to Hizbullah and Hamas is: jihad is the heartbeat of the Islamic resistance.[40] The common underlying element is that the state (established to define their status) has not fulfilled its obligation to care for and protect the Bangsamoro people – an obligation that must be expected of a legitimate government. The historic antagonism has recurred through armed conflict. It is politically incorrect to say that NSAG is a 'status' and as such there can be a 'full NSAG status' as researchers discuss. The Islamic resistance actors do not really revert to armed struggle when the transition fails because there is as yet no real post-conflict or post-settlement transition to speak of seriously. That is why traditional international law is left incapable of dealing with ANSAs and the conflicts in which they are involved. Those who turn to domestic criminal law bring about instead confusion between law enforcement (policing) and defence security action (soldiering).

Conclusion: An invitation to come to terms

Legal categories are but 'two-dimensional shadows' that only partly capture the nature of the real people and objects (or memorandums of agreement) that they represent. By analogy, in Plato's allegory of the cave, the jurists (or judges) are people who have been in the cave for such a long time they take the shadows for the real thing and proceed

to act accordingly. The constitution (or law) is the sun that casts images on the wall of the cave. But the substantive rational judge would have been guided by peace agreements *as* law, and norms get confused with the law (or constitution) since these are a reference point for what the government and MILF have come to terms about under third party facilitation.

The substantively oriented Court failed to respond to the dimension of global justice and what the political exigencies of the day seem to require. At certain points even extralegal sources of authority may be antithetical or political to reduce the meaning to a set of distinctly legal categories unique to answer the questions a case poses (e.g. ancestral domain). In the end, the MOA-AD precedent has become a convenient form of governance to advance the interests of settler communities with the use of state power and a legal system of a tyranny of the dominant political class at the metropole. The MILF struggle delves more deeply into the particular nature of Moroism as an Islamic resistance yet not a violent Islamist extremism in the Malay world. It is typified by narratives that are acceptable to justify the Moro cause and 'justness of the original position'. As theirs is a homegrown armed struggle, the Bangsamoro people believe there is a way to end the political violence through a negotiated peace settlement. In general assemblies, MILF leaders engage in tranationalist dialogue which is a central theme involving the Declaration of Continuity of the peace process. They share an ancestry of institutional ideas beyond the supra-kinship patrimonial system espoused as a prototype state traced to their sultanates. If there is a solution to the Moro Problem, they have argued that it lies in the Islamic system of governance which is acceptable to them. It is clearly more politically correct to refer to the Bangsamoro Question, for there is an attempt to build a consensual set of relationships: 'new formulas' and 'new modalities' arranged with their consent as a whole, a land base of their own to govern with shared authority and shared resources with internal waters. For legal purposes, people who act in typical ways for their condition or situation proceed from similar motives and thus have a political common end in view.

Notes

1. As a backdrop, the rejection of MOA-AD precipitated armed hostilities in central Mindanao from August 2008 to August 2009, resulting in a humanitarian tragedy of 600,000 IDPs as reported by the Norwegian Refugee Council. The Supreme Court of the Philippines issued a Temporary Restraining Order on the signing of the MOA-AD between GRP and MILF, which was

scheduled on August 4, 2008 but initialled on 28 July 2008 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The Court Decision declared the MOA-AD 'unconstitutional and contrary to law' despite its being a product of almost five years of peace negotiation.

2. I draw here the relationships among domestic policy, third-party donor leverage and conflict in Mindanao on the state-aiding violence as an explanation of 'structural violence' embedded in the social system. See cases in Muscat (2002).
3. Terms of Reference of the Civilian Protection Component (CPC) of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) and other signed GRP–MILF agreements. Available in one volume are MILF and The Asia Foundation (2010).
4. This is relevant to the point that the GRP–MILF negotiation is at a more advanced stage than the GRP–NDF yet both involve third-party facilitation. Interviewed by the *Daily Manila Shimbu*n (19 July 2002), newly appointed OPAPP chief Teresita Deles said she 'thinks so'. Based on this thinking, the role of foreign governments in the peace talks and meeting with embassies to allow the ambassadors to coordinate with the MILF for visits touch on the resources in conflict-affected areas.
5. This paragraph draws on insights from Mastura (2009). Mediation or facilitation is more difficult without recognizable leaders within the conflict parties as in the Thai Muslim case; it is hard with spoilers as experienced in the GRP–MILF process, and harder still with internally divided conflict parties like the GRP–MNLF process.
6. See 'Non-State Armed Actors: Region & Country Survey' (4th edition, December 2001) prepared under the supervision of Eduardo Marino. Using this NSA database, Soliman M. Santos, Jr. has listed broad definitions and classifications of NSAG in Santos (2010). The Abu Sayab Group (ASG) and Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) are beyond the scope of this chapter though they may fall under the heading of birthright insurgencies and violent politics with distinct framing. A general observation is that ASG, like JI, have well-defined command structures with global reach but no coherent strategy that decouples war and politics for political ends.
7. Research is proceeding on the interdependence between various arenas of violence and players. See Kreuzer (2005); see further Kreuzer and Weiberg (2005). I should note that there is some confusion about clan *rido* and the 'feud' of political clans when they strive to penetrate the institutions of the state and behave with impunity backed up by the military and police. Amassing wealth and private arsenals, the warlords acquire unchecked power through patronage by successive governments in Manila. The world and country were shocked by the massacre of 57 men and women, some of whom were journalists, traced to the Ampatuan family in Maguindanao on 23 November 2009. The phenomenon of violent retaliations or killings and blood feuds cannot be resolved within the state system. It is of pre-Islamic provenance and mitigated by Islamic law of *ta'azer* and *diyat* (blood money). The database continues to grow based on input from the results of a study about *rido* (Torres III ed. 2007).
8. Sri Lanka is obviously the exception to the rule: see Chatham House (2005). Earned or shared sovereignty can occur as a result of guaranteed

arrangements. Interventions in Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq have been decided on the question of how populations are governed based on human security functions. President Barack Obama's speech (4 June 2009) at Cairo University now defines US relations with the Muslim world. BBC World reports that Obama has replaced the Bush policy of unilateral action, preventive war and democratic regime change with cooperation with friends and allies, diplomacy and development, and economic security. No more war on terrorism but war against Al Qaeda.

9. The Philippines–United States Visiting Forces Agreement (RP-USVFA) has allowed joint military exercises. But more significant is the fact that US Special Operations Command provides forces in conjunction with the armed forces in the Philippines in their struggle against violent extremism in Mindanao and the southern reaches of the county.
10. In an email reply to a query posed by lawyer and peace advocate Soliman Santos, Jr. on 11 August 2009 and on 9 November 2009, I gave this explanation of MILF's embrace of the term 'NSAs' rather than independent sovereign states.
11. I am grateful to Stefan Wolff, 'Complex Power Sharing and the Centrality of Territorial Self-Governance in Contemporary Conflict Settlements'; access his blog at the Centre for International Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution. There are a number of cases now in which an institutional accommodation of self-determination claims is achieved short of secession or partition. It has to be said that veto powers for the region are qualified or concurrent with parliamentary decision-making procedures but it is ultimately the Moro consent that holds the veto vote in a popular consultation or referendum.
12. Originally applied to the position of Catholics who refused to accept the reforms instituted by the Vatican (from 1950s to 1980s), the term 'integrism' was elaborated within the church as well as dominant today. A product of neologism, the connotation adapts itself well into the French schemata of Christianisme (for Christianity) and Islamism. In context, it is a description of a form of activism that emerged in the first quarter of the twentieth century. But it is acceptable to use 'integrists' as 'Islamists' (Arabic *islamiyyun*) to distinguish it from the term 'Muslims' (Arabic *muslimun*). It is useful to remember as well that 'Islamicity' or 'Islamicate' or 'Islamicism' was rather awkward. Using the term 'Islamist' came into vogue only in the 1990s contemporaneous with 'political Islam' as independent variables in the policy debates on Islamism.
13. A few migrant workers who are Balik-Islam activists founded the Raja Soliman Movement. See International Crisis Group (2005).
14. McGarry (2005) looked at why state nationalists opposed asymmetry and why minority nationalists proposed it. Negotiating arrangements in this way describes recognition of nationhood which is introduced in the MILF working Draft.
15. For a discussion of dislocation of power through devices see Bell (2008).
16. The Declaration of Continuity for Peace Negotiation between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and Moro Islamic Liberation Front was signed in Kuala Lumpur on 3 June. The Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process paid for a full page advertisement containing this

declaration with errors and omissions that appeared simultaneously in the *Philippine Daily Inquirer* and the *Philippine Star* on 6 June 2010. The correct and complete version was republished in the *Philippine Star* the next day, 7 June 2010. On this same date the *Philippine Daily Inquirer* published an erratum on the first two lines of the declaration and the second bullet point. The correct and complete version was republished by the Philippine Daily Inquirer on 08 June 2010.

17. This paragraph with the first bullet point was commented on by the GRP Panel Chairman Rafael Seguis in his closure statement read after the declaration was signed. His remarks on 'new formulas' in reference to the constitution and 'new modalities' to include 'all party talks' could be construed as disguised reservations.
18. This paragraph with the second bullet point was omitted in the full page advertisement. Seguis' unilateral remarks in reference to the customary rights of indigenous peoples under IPRA (the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act) law have not been agreed to by the negotiating panel as an interpretive framework. Reservations must be distinguished from 'derogations'.
19. The ideas behind this argument draw from the Cotabato Memorial of 1916, the Sulu Petition of 1921, the Declaration of Rights and Purposes or Zamboanga Declaration of 1924 and the Dansalan Declaration of 1934 addressed to the US President and the US Congress.
20. For the outstanding issues see Diaz and Rodil (2010). This appears also on Minda News and MILF Central Committee (www.luwaran.com) websites. Finally, Rodil argues for decolonization of the Philippines.
21. This point was raised by MILF when the GRP laid down the premise for negotiation that 'the outcome of the peace process is still a single State'. The Philippine Islands became a US 'unincorporated territory' acquired by cession for US$20 million, and by treaty-based rights with respect to the proto-state sultanates of Magindanaw and Sulu. American colonial outposts differed legally and historically between 'incorporated' and 'unincorporated' territories that were later admitted to statehood. At the beginning of the American twentieth century, the US Federal Courts ruled that 'incorporated' territories were those which Congress intended eventually to become 'states' of the union based on precedents of the mainland territories. The mandate for overseas 'unincorporated' territories was not necessarily destined for statehood but could pass through various stages.
22. I borrow this term 'Schoolmen' to refer to, for example, the Frankfurt School that began to retranslate Marxism into cultural terms in discourse so as to advance 'the equality of peoples' as its core principle. Theories of politics are constructed and the role of state is masked with ideological implications.
23. A 'boomerang' pattern of influence exists when the domestic groups in a repressive state bypass their state. They try to bring pressure to bear on their states from outside by directly searching out international allies of transnational opposition groups or INGOs (International Non-governmental Organizations). See Risse, Ropp and Sikkink eds. (1999). The Islamic Center in Bangkok hosted activists and members of the NGOs of the ASEAN region under the auspices of the Nusantara Initiative for Justice and Peace (NADI).

At the end of their Summit the group issued the 'People's Call for Justice and Peace' (16 October 2009).

24. A project of the Bishops-Ulama Conference codenamed *Konsult Mindanaw* has conducted 311 focus group consultations as a foundation and support mechanism for understanding (Konsult Mindanaw 2010). The report cites a Social Weather Station national survey that sees people searching for sincerity in reaching out to Muslim rebels. See SWS (2000).
25. This entails levels of analytical abstraction and various modes of practice. A more recent survey project on Islam in Southeast Asia carried out by Mikami Satoru for the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) appears in this volume to compare differing categories and determinants such as MILF, MNLF, ARMM, OMA, Ulama or Ustadz. I found useful discussions for constructive interpretation in Alatas ed. (2007). See particularly, Hassan (2007) in this volume.
26. I have dealt elsewhere with dialogical dimensions because many of the issues raised against MOA-AD were process questions: lack of consultation, transparency and participation. This is highlighted in a 'Policy Paper for the Next Administration: Reframing the Peace Negotiations in Mindanao' prepared by the University Network on the Mindanao Question, 8 January 2010, which was the product of several roundtable discussions meant to inform the political process. The substantial frameworks and modalities focus on the key issues of ancestral domain and governance.
27. Framework Agreement on the Formation of the ICG for the GR-MILF Peace Process, 15 September 2009, Kuala Lumpur.
28. Martin (2001). There was a functioning Secretariat in a self-styled Core Group.
29. Posted email between Michael O. Mastura and David Gorman of HDC, July 2009 sought the contribution of Teresa Whitfield, an advisor to the HDC. Whitfield (2007) to the drafting of the GRP–MILF Framework Agreement on ICG. The parties also approved the terms of reference initiated by the ICG core members.
30. Guidelines on the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development (HRD) Component of the IMT, 3 June 2010, Kuala Lumpur.
31. For the role and determinants on what makes the method effective see Mason (2007): track one (official level), track two (non-official level) and track three (civil society) or a combination which refers to processes involving a combination of actors.
32. There was no compelling cause to reach out to Muslim civilians above the current levels of assistance until 600,000 IDPs were reported to the humanitarian community. The health, education and livelihood project (HELP) was launched by the OPAPP and the Department of Social Welfare.
33. The idea of R2P as a basic element in the code of global citizenship is protection tasks, security sector reform and the use of civilian police in intra-state conflict. The final report was signed by former President Fidel Ramos as a member of the ICISS.
34. Agreement on the Civilian Protection Component of the International Monitoring Team, 27 October 2009, Kuala Lumpur. Terms of Reference of the CPC of the IMT, 5 May 2010, Kuala Lumpur.

35. I draw from Jadarian's (2007) insight that ultimately the failure of the international community to properly implement the formal framework of IHL in armed conflicts changed the constitution of armed conflict.
36. Much scholarly work on the status of NLMs in international law has been done. I found insightful the submission by Olalia (2002). See Appendix to Sison (2003). The author is the Vice President of the International Association of People's Lawyers (IAPL). This dimension has become more significant because of recent pronouncements by OPAPP Secretary Teresita Q. Deles at *Kusog Mindanao* forum on the lack of 'a clear national policy and coherent strategy for peace negotiations'. The new President Benigno Aquino III called the MOA-AD a 'patchwork of provisions that caused greater division than unity'. Why, in the first place, was it then allowed to be the object of litigation if the document was clearly intended to be completed?
37. The co-authors of Rodriguez (2010) published by the Small Arms Survey and the South-South Network led by legal writer Soliman M. Santos, Jr. build on the definition of 'armed groups' as 'groups that are armed and use force to achieve their objectives and are not under state control' and so excludes armed auxiliaries of the state. The survey investigates groups that are ideologically driven, predictable and supported by a part of the local population.
38. In a more articulated form Unger in *Law in Modern Society* (Unger 1976) builds upon his early work *Knowledge and Politics* (Unger 1975). A more recent work is that of James (2006), in which he points to 'the difficulty of treating an abstract community and associated bodies public as ongoing forms of social relations', calling this a persistent sticking point but a real question.
39. Hamas has adopted this policy on Islamic religious grounds although it needs to align its leading principle of armed struggle to justify jihad. See Khaled Hroub (2006). This might be argued with reference to MILF as but one type of practice. Because MILF is bound to its religious roots the offer of truce is justified on the flexibility and broad meaning of the concept of *hudna* in jurisprudence.
40. As the subtitle indicates: *Hizbullah, Party of God: An Islamic Movement Perspective* (Abdar Rhaman Koya 2006). Ustadz Salamat Hashim, the founder of MILF, espoused jihad in Salamat Hashim (2001).

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10

‘Red Mosques’: Mitigating Violence Against Sacred Spaces in Thailand and Beyond

Chaiwat Satha-Anand

Introduction

On 12 July 2010, the defence consultancy IHS Jane’s released a statement sent to them by the Patani Malay Liberation Movement (PMLM) declaring that the insurgents in southern Thailand had unilaterally suspended attacks on government targets and security forces in three districts – Rangae, Yi Ngo and Cho-Airong in Narathiwat province – for about one month beginning on 10 June 2010, expiring on 17 July 2010. The PMLM also pointed out that it ‘probably would be pleased to renew and extend the suspension of hostilities’ if the Thai government indicated its ‘commitment to a serious dialogue on the future of the southern provinces’ (*Bangkok Post*, 14 July 2010). They also qualified the ceasefire as covering only ‘organized attacks on security forces and attacks on government targets’ (The *Straits Times*, 14 July 2010). On 13 July, however, the government extended the emergency decrees in the three southern provinces for another three months until 19 October 2010, claiming that the decree was crucial for the security officials to do their job (*Bangkok Post*, 14 July 2010).

According to Jane’s, it was the ‘first ceasefire of its kind’ for southern Thailand (The *Straits Times*, 14 July 2010). At least four points need to be taken into consideration. First, the *Straits Times* in Singapore reported that Thai officials said they had no knowledge of any ceasefire, while the *Bangkok Post* reported that Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva said he was waiting for a report from the security officers to see if the number of insurgent attacks had actually gone down. Second, while the Singaporean press reported that the ceasefire statement was signed by

Mr. Kasturi Mahkota, the Sweden-based foreign affairs chief for the long-established Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO), the Thai press did not report this. Third, the global dimension of this conflict, that the statement was released by a group based in Sweden to the London-based Jane's and reported in greater detail in Singapore than in Bangkok, should also be underscored. More importantly, though, ten days into the unilateral ceasefire promise, a tragic event occurred in Pattani that would render any peace effort futile, the Thai government's willingness or unwillingness to engage in dialogue with the insurgents notwithstanding.

On 20 June 2010, a woman and two nine-year-old boys were injured when a grenade was thrown into a mosque in Sai Buri, Pattani, southern Thailand, where the majority of the population are Malay Muslims. This happened while these victims, and other villagers, were offering their early morning prayers (*subh*) before sunrise (*Bangkok Post*, 21 June 2010). In terms of the violence that has been prevalent in southern Thailand up to the present, this incident seems unremarkable, given that scarcely a month earlier another roadside bomb had exploded, killing two people and wounding 52 others in the nearby province of Yala. But in terms of its topography and temporality, the fact that it took place inside a mosque at prayer time, wounding people while they were praying, was indeed important since it represented yet another cultural line crossed.

The title of this chapter, ' "Red" Mosques', is a metaphor for the violence that occurs at mosques, which has painted a sacred space red. But this metaphor is drawn from a specific case that took place in Islamabad, Pakistan. In early July 2007, Lal *masjid* (mosque) was stormed by the Pakistani army, killing between 173 (government source) and 1,000 people (local sources). This mosque is commonly known as the 'Red Mosque'. Sadly this kind of violence occurs elsewhere. On 15 July 2010, in southeastern Iran at the Jamia mosque in Zahedan, capital of the mainly Sunni province of Sisan-Baluchestan, twin suicide bombings killed at least 27 people. While Iran blamed the West, Pakistan and Israel for the incident, condemnation came from the European Union as well as the United States, whose President Obama said in a statement that 'The murder of innocent civilians in their place of worship is an intolerable offence, and those who carried it out must be held accountable' (*Bangkok Post*, 18 July 2010).

Analysing two important violent incidents at two mosques in the context of the violence in southern Thailand over the past seven years, this chapter is an attempt to argue that the menace of violence against sacred spaces is making conflicts between different ethnic groups even

deadlier and mitigating them that much more difficult, because cultural lines that limit violence have been violated. Since this type of violence against sacred spaces is becoming a global phenomenon, there is a need to understand the dynamics of this global trend, to prevent existing religio-ethnic conflicts from becoming deadlier than they already are.

This chapter begins with a brief account of the violence in southern Thailand, followed by a note on the importance of mosques in Islam. Next, two cases of violent incidents at two mosques – Kru-ze, Pattani, in 28 April 2004 and Al-Furqan, Narathiwat in June 2009 – will be discussed. The shift of sacred sites from sanctuaries to scenes of violent confrontation will be critically analysed in terms of the violence against sacred spaces. Finally, using data on violent incidents against sacred spaces in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, the global nature of such phenomena will be briefly discussed and the need to foster global policy for the protection of sacred spaces if ethno-religious conflict around the world is to be prevented from escalating into a much deadlier form will be underscored.

Violence in southern Thailand: A brief history

Between 4 January 2004 and October 2010, there were 10,386 violent incidents in southern Thailand, killing 4,453 people and wounding 7,239. More Malay Muslims (52.02%) were killed but more Buddhists (60.13%) were injured (Jitpiromsri 2010b). The vast majority of the casualties were civilians (87.4%) rather than government officials (Askew 2010, p. 1113, fn. 9). If family members of the victims are included in the calculation of pain and loss, then approximately 53,000 people were affected (Jitpiromsri 2010a).[1]

This deadly conflict could be understood as two-dimensional: between the Thai state and the peoples of southern Thailand, and among different peoples in the south themselves. In a country of primarily Buddhists with more than 60 million people, approximately 7% are Muslims. But the Malay Muslims constitute the majority of 80% of the 1.8 million in the three southernmost provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat (McCargo 2008, p. 5). Due to historical circumstances that forced the former Kingdom of Patani into a part of Siam in 1909, the advent of the modern Siamese nation-state in the form of sweeping administrative reforms in 1903, geographical proximity with Malaysia, cultural affinity with the Malay cultural world, the Islamic belief among local Muslims, chronic economic problems in the area and widespread injustice at the hands of some government officials, violence in the

south between the Thai state and some among the local population who have been called 'insurgents' has been recurring, especially in the past 50 years. Factors that distinguish the recent violence from what has transpired in the past include the intensity and indiscriminate use of violence and the fact that it has seriously undermined the ties that bind the Buddhist minority and Malay Muslim majority in a once functioning political society. I would argue that since the problem of southern violence is primarily complicated and political, the solution must also be political (Satha-Anand 2006).

But what does it mean to say that this problem is 'political'? In *Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand*, Duncan McCargo spent a year in the southern provinces conducting intensive research, which included interviews with 270 people ranging across officials, ex-rebels, politicians, academics and local bystanders. He maintains that the southern conflict, primarily between Patani and Bangkok, is a war over legitimacy and that the present Thai state sorely lacks sufficient legitimacy to deal with the insurgents. His findings include the fact that the Thai security forces cannot prevail and that the militants, motivated by simple but passionate hatred of the Thai state for colonizing their homeland and subjecting them to the oppression of disdainful officials and predatory policemen, have won. This has taken place in the context of how the Thai government has tried to control the far south by co-opting local elites since the 1970s and 1980s. Local leaders who cooperated with the government have been rewarded with funds and positions. As more local leaders have been co-opted by the Thai government, their connections with local communities have been undermined while meaningful participation for locals has become difficult to find (McCargo 2008).[2]

But the likelihood that Thai society will move towards a political solution to its southern violence seems quite remote. I would argue that it is difficult because of three other realities: the dominant discourse concerning this violence is securitized and thus renders the problem as categorically militaristic, requiring violent solutions; the continuing violence not only causes grievances to victims but also produces benefits (e.g., an increase in the military budget) for many in the expanding insecurity industry. These realities work in tandem with the peculiarly delusional way that Thai society sees itself as always uniquely peaceful and eternally blessed by Buddhist culture (Satha-Anand 2009).

During these seven years, many believe that a most important incident affecting the landscape of violence in southern Thailand took place on 28 April 2004, when more than 300 Malay Muslims attacked

several government posts in the southern provinces. On that day, the most memorable took place at the old Kru-ze mosque in Pattani, where 32 militants, aged from 18 to 63, were killed by government forces inside the mosque (McCargo 2008, pp. 108–109, p. 141). To fully comprehend the impact of this incident when people were fighting from inside a mosque and killed there, it is important to first understand the importance of mosques in Islam.

Mosques in Islam

In Islam, a mosque is much more than a religious place of worship. Mosques have always been understood as having dual functions, religious and civil. Even in the time of the Prophet Muhammad, there were examples of men and women standing up to question policies and decisions taken, even those by the Prophet himself, at the congregation inside the mosque (Sardar and Davies 2004, p. 25). In Timbuktu, a city founded around the year 1,000 and ruled at the time by its scholars, its most important institution was the Sankore mosque, which like so many great mosques across the Muslim world was also a university (Ruthven 1997, p. 75). Some scholars explain that the collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty in the winter of 1978–1979 resulted from the power of the independent network of mosques allied with the traditional business sector. This alliance, in turn, made it possible for the Iranian religious establishment with Imam Khomeini as its spiritual leader to take power through its political wing (Cf. Ruthven 1997, p. 85). From Egypt to Algeria, mosques turn out to be centres of opposition, enjoying a certain privileged status and often outside the sphere of state control, especially in terms of a communication network that will always be partially independent (Ruthven 1997, p. 135). The ideas generated from these networks of mosques, the core of the Islamic religious structure, cut across national borders. From Friday sermons (*khutba*) to unofficial teachings and activities in the mosques across the Muslim world, customary values are perpetuated, political and social issues discussed and strategies for action planned. During the fasting month, the poor are fed; during crises, resources are mobilized; and for most of the year they serve as schools and educational forums (Ahmed 1992, pp. 195–197).

Because of the enormous significance and potential of mosques as political sites, during the present global war on terror American and some European governments have come to believe that mosques and madrasah (Islamic schools) are to blame for radicalization among

Muslim youths. Since 2002, the German police, for example, have raided more than 300 mosques on the grounds that radical Muslim militants were gathering there (Aslan 2009, p. 143).[3]

Most importantly, that a mosque can be so many things and perform important functions are due to the fact that for Muslims it is a sacred space. In its root meaning, a mosque should not be understood merely as a place, but as a place or occasion for worship in the form of humble prostration with all human organs – hands and feet, lips and voices, understanding and organizations in the service of God.[4] The Quran says:

> And the place of worship is for Allah (alone): so invoke not anyone along with Allah. (LXXII: 18)

The question is: what happens when sacred spaces are touched by violence?

Mosques as a place for violence: Kru-ze 2004 and Al-Furqan 2009

As suggested above, violence in southern Thailand is not a recent phenomenon. However, one factor that distinguishes past violence from its present form is that there existed a cultural limit to violence in the past. A mosque, or a Buddhist temple for that matter, served as a sanctuary from violence. Consider the incident at the Pattani Central Mosque in 1975.[5]

On 29 November 1975, five adult Malay Muslims and a thirteen-year-old boy travelling in Narathiwat, southern Thailand, were stopped and forced into a dump truck by a group of people dressed in dark green suits. When the truck reached the Kor Tor bridge separating Narathiwat from Pattani, the six civilians were stabbed in the back, their skulls crushed and their bodies thrown into the river. Fortunately, the boy survived, and the massacre was brought to public attention by a group of Muslim activists who began a protest.

The people started their non-violent protest on 12 December 1975, in the compound of the central government house in Pattani, then formed the Civil Rights Protection Center to keep the protest going. On behalf of the Muslims, the centre issued four demands to the government: arrest the criminals by rule of law; compensate the victims' families; withdraw government troops within seven days; and hold a meeting by

16 December between then prime minister, the late M.R. Kukrit Pramoj, and the people. The government did not seem to take these demands seriously, but the Muslims persevered.

On 13 December 1975, university students from institutions in the south came to join the protest. The military and the police surrounded the city of Pattani. During a panel discussion that evening, a bomb exploded among the people. One of the coordinators of the protest rushed to the microphone and shouted: 'Do not flee!' He was fatally shot on the stage. The police came and put an end to the protest. Twelve died and more than 30 people were injured, seven of whom were women and children.

This incident caused the Malay Muslims grave concern and sadness. On the same day, around 50,000 gathered again. This time they went to the central mosque in Pattani, patiently braving the torrential rain. In retaliation, schools in Pattani and Narathiwat were burned, and the people accused the soldiers of committing arson. One more officer of the Civil Rights Center was stabbed to death. The government did not yield, but neither did the people.

The government responded by saying that the protest was but a minor incident involving only a few hundred people, a claim that prompted a huge demonstration on 28 December. The mass of people formed themselves into a parade more than three kilometres long, marching in orderly fashion with Thai flags and portraits of the Thai king and queen leading their procession. Even heavy rain could not weaken their will as they walked towards the Toh Ayah graveyard. The organizers pointed out that this demonstration was an attempt to fight for justice, display the people's strength and demonstrate that the protest was not the 'minor' incident the government claimed it to be. The protesters prayed for the souls of the deceased and then dispersed at 6:00 p.m. On 10 January 1976, their representatives met with the prime minister, who promised to go to Pattani. The protest ended after 45 days with, among other things, the removal of Pattani's governor and his replacement with a Muslim.

I would argue that the demonstrators chose to hold their protest at the mosque because of its cultural and symbolic power. They used the government house and a bomb was thrown on stage. The choice of the mosque as a protest site could be seen as a shift from the secular to the sacred, from the state building to a house of God. If a state exists to protect the lives of its citizens from violence, it failed on 13 December 1975. It was therefore logical for the Muslims to move to the mosque and seek

protection from God with faith in His power over life and death. In addition, it is possible to imagine that the mosque was chosen for a strategic reason, namely that it would serve as a cultural limit to the violence they believed had come from the government.

If the choice of the Pattani Central Mosque in 1975–1976 because of its sacredness could not be completely ascertained, when it was again chosen as a protest site in 2007, research showed that this time this was indeed the case.

On 22 May 2007, a young Malay Muslim woman was raped and murdered along with her family in Yaha district, Yala province. Local people believed that the rangers did it and therefore a demonstration took shape with the initial demand that the government withdraw all troops and especially the rangers from the area. The case of Ms. Nurhayati was the last straw after 21 other innocent locals had been killed and no one was held accountable. The demonstration led by Muslim university students had ten demands, including: withdraw the troops and rangers; lift the curfew in the area; lift the emergency laws covering the four southern provinces; hold government officials who have committed crimes against the locals accountable; and refrain from arresting innocents.

From 31 May to 4 June 2007, a non-violent demonstration involving more than 8,000 local Malay Muslims took place at the Pattani Central Mosque, ending peacefully (Sombutpoonsirit 2009, p. 34). Though there are many factors in the peaceful conclusion of this non-violent protest, which include the fact that the demonstrators used non-violent action as the only means of protest and the authorities used non-confrontational methods and negotiation as the primary means of coping with the protest, the most remarkable factor is the strategic use of the Central Mosque as a protest site.

The chosen topography for the non-violent demonstration at Pattani Central Mosque contains within it both religio-symbolic and historical conditions conducive to a peaceful ending. As it is a religious space, the code of conduct of those using this space is predicated on religious injunctions coming with the mosque (e.g., a mosque is the house of God and therefore a place of prayer and cleanliness). Its legitimacy is also boosted by the fact that this very mosque was a significant historical site in the 1975 fight against injustice in the Malay Muslim imagination.

But if a mosque could be used with confidence as a sanctuary against violence in southern Thailand three decades ago, what took place in April 2004 effectively undermined this confidence.

Kru-ze Mosque, 2004

Kru-ze is an ancient, unfinished mosque standing by the main road about seven kilometres from the centre of Pattani, side by side with the shrine of the Chinese goddess. The mosque is said to have been cursed by a Chinese goddess. The myth has made the site historical, perhaps for the benefit of the tourism industry, with a large number of Chinese tourists coming in from nearby Malaysia and elsewhere. The protest from July 1989–1990 at the mosque appeared amid the changing local myths surrounding it, resulting, in turn, from the rise in the tourism industry and its official designation as a historical site at a time when global religious resurgence was on the rise. Due to its historical-religious-mythical significance and strategic location, 'Kru-ze' is ideal as a theatre for Malay Muslims to renegotiate their identities in Thai society (Satha-Anand 2005, pp. 60–77). Such negotiated lives can certainly take many forms, mainly non-violent as in 1989–1990, or violent as in April 2004.

On 28 April 2004, some 300 Malay Muslim militants attacked 11 government locations, seven in Yala, three in Pattani and one in Sabayoi district, Songkhla. When the violence ended that day, 106 Muslim militants were dead, along with five soldiers and policemen.[6] This deadly violence was fought between the Malay Muslim villagers and the Thai authorities. The villagers primarily used knives as their weapons in attacking the government officials, who were armed with guns. It was said that Muslim militants exercised some form of Islam-inspired magic to make them feel invulnerable to the danger.

Given the belongings that were found on the bodies of some dead Muslim militants, such as the booklet *Ber Jihad di Patani* (The Holy Struggle for Patani), which declares in the first paragraph that 'Religious warriors will rise in the land of Patani with the Light of fighting in the course of God'; their weapons of choice, primarily knives and machetes; and their willingness to use them against the authorities' guns, which reflected their willingness to die fighting; I would argue that there was a strong determination to commit the present to the memory of the future as the deaths of more than 100 'martyrs', 32 of them killed in the ancient mosque. A former security official claimed that as many as 20 men who died inside the mosque were innocent victims, *dawah* teachers (Muslim missionaries who try to recall Muslims back to their faith and practices) who came there to pray and were effectively hostages (McCargo 2008, p. 110). The mosque itself was attacked by the Thai troops, and grenades were thrown into the mosque, despite an earlier prohibition coming

directly from the deputy prime minister. Yet, according to McCargo, the military officers he interviewed had no doubt that the attack was justified. A colonel explained to him that he would not have waited half an hour to storm the mosque and added: 'If I agreed not to storm Kru-ze, I'd be agreeing to give up our Thai land' (Quoted in McCargo 2008, p. 108).

The militants' decision to fight the military from inside the mosque on 28 April 2004 could be seen as an astute political manoeuvre. If the military had backed off, the sanctity of the place would have been reaffirmed and its religio-historical-mythical status heightened. When the military decided to attack the mosque, the sanctity of the place was violated while the militants became martyrs, and the political cost of such an act in the eyes of Muslims, both in Thailand and abroad, has proved to be almost incalculable. Some military officers believed that storming the Kru-ze mosque won only a short-term success, but handed a 'huge propaganda victory to the enemies of the Thai state' (McCargo 2008, p. 109). After the incident, it was therefore not surprising to find the atmosphere in the south filled with animosity towards the Thai state, as reflected in an anonymous leaflet that reads: 'Who else burnt down the Kru-ze mosque, if not the *kafir* Thai government' (McCargo 2008, p. 109).[7]

Moreover, the deaths at the Kru-ze mosque allowed the militants to successfully enter the collective memory of the south as a new breed of martyrs who help change the landscape of violence in a way that has not happened before. There are at least three reasons for this.

First, their decision to attack government posts, perhaps partly informed by the belief in their magic, yet knowing the possible consequences, also suggests that their understanding of victory might not be defined by the number of people they killed, but from the way in which they died.

Second, Appadurai points out that one of the most intriguing realities of globalization is the proliferation of individual suicide bombers who with their bodies distributed their fragments and mixed them with the bloody parts of the civilian population they intended to kill, infecting the blood of the victims with those of the martyrs (Appadurai 2006, pp. 77–78). I would argue that inside Kru-ze mosque, the blood of the militants, shed by the shots fired from the non-Muslim government's guns, when splashed over the mosque helped make their deaths sacred, while the government act became an abominable violation of the sacred space in the Muslims' imagination.

Third, the political significance of the 28 April incident could be assessed by how their deaths have been remembered. Most of the bodies

were buried unwashed and without prayer as has been the religious tradition for those whose deaths were considered *shahid* (those who died at the hands of non-Muslims in the battle to defend Islam). Even in cases of those whose bodies were washed and prayers offered before burials, when a few journalists returned to the graveyards some two months after the incident, they found that the signs on their burial ground included the names of the deceased, ending with the word 'shahid'.

After the Kru-ze violence, several mosques had become targets of violence. For example:

- 5 April 2007, a *dawah* mosque in Yala was shot at by an M79 and other assault automatic rifles before a prayer, wounding some 20 Muslims.
- 29 April 2007, another mosque in Pattani was shot at, killing the Qateb (Friday sermon giver), wounding three others.
- 31 May 2007, gunmen attacked Kalamuda mosque in Sabayoi, Songkhla, killing seven Muslims who had just came out after prayers.
- 18 March 2008, a bomb exploded inside Al-madilah mosque in Yala, wounding two people.
- 1 May 2008, a bomb was thrown into a mosque at Lipasango village in Pattani while 12 people were praying their sunset prayers, killing two and seriously wounding five.[8]

Though there are other incidents of violence in sacred spaces, both Buddhist temples and Muslims' mosques, none was quite as dramatic as that which took place at Al-Furqan mosque in June 2009. So important is this that the Thai Senate has set up a special subcommittee to investigate the case.

Al-Furqan Mosque, 2009[9]

On 8 June 2009 at 7:50 p.m. gunmen used military weapons and other rifles to shoot into the Al-Furqan mosque, in I-pa-yae village, Cho-Airong district, Narathiwat, while Muslims were offering their prayers. Ten people died on the spot while 12 others were wounded. The authorities claimed that they found no evidence that anyone was intentionally targeted for death. Most of the more than 100 shells found were from three M16s, one AK47 and two shotguns.

It is important to understand that this mosque is a village mosque. This village, which the Thai authorities consider a 'red zone' and which

is home to many insurgency sympathizers, is a Malay Muslim community with a population of some 400. There is no school here and the young have to go to Cho-Airong for their education. Most villagers are rubber growers. The nearest village is Pa-pai village, which is largely Thai Buddhist with roughly the same population. In the past, these two villages had a cordial relationship, which has turned sour over the last three or four years. Now most Buddhists in the Pa-pai village do not go anywhere without their guns.

Before the shooting, villagers noticed unusual activities among the Buddhists in the area who came to hunt boars in the nearby forests, especially in the morning. On 8 June 2009, at 3:30 a.m., a 36-year-old Thai Buddhist in Ai-pasae village who worked at the queen's demonstration farm was shot dead by an M16 while going to milk his rubber. After the shooting, the perpetrators left a bomb near his body to be detonated when other Thai officials came to the crime scene. This time, however, the bomb was successfully defused.

At 7:50 p.m., there were 24 people in the Al-Furqan mosque offering their *Ei-sa* (night) prayers. They stood in two rows. While praying in the second *raqa-at* ()(unit in the Islamic prayers) in the sitting position, they stood up, following the imam. At this point, gunshots were heard from the door, directed from the rear at those who were praying. When the gunshots fell silent momentarily, the voices of the wounded were heard saying 'Allah-u-Akbar' (God is great). Then more shots were fired. Eyewitnesses saw six or seven perpetrators. All were armed and had concealed their heads and faces with masks. After this they left by the rubber plantation behind the mosque. Ten people including the imam were killed on the spot. All but one were local villagers. A youth who was sitting near the mosque told the Senate subcommittee that

> At the time of shooting, a few of us were sitting in a sala (pavilion) some 15 meters from the mosque. We crawled towards the mosque to see what had happened. We saw the perpetrators walking up the stairs into the mosque and shot at everyone to make sure that they are all dead. One guy was crawling to escape from the left door of the mosque, but he was shot dead by the door. The bullet mark there at the door is still visible.

After the violence at the mosque, people from other villages wanted to come for Janaza prayers (for the deceased), but they were blocked by the authorities for fear that those who came would stage a protest. Most villagers interviewed by the Senate subcommittee believed that the Thai

authorities knew full well who the shooters were, but they did not think that these people would be brought to justice. None of the relatives of those who were killed wanted to wash the bodies since they died while performing *salat* and can be rightfully considered *shahid*. But the Thai authority pressured religious leaders to wash the corpses. Villagers put the photos of those killed outside the mosque for others who came to pay their respects. Again the Thai authorities were not happy and told them to take down the photos. The Muslim villagers believed that the shooters were armed militia outside the control of the authorities. They believed that the militia were angry and wanted vengeance. Contrary to some officials' opinion that this violence was carried out by Muslim insurgents to incite hatred between the Buddhists and the Muslims, none of the villagers believed that any Muslim insurgent would have killed Muslims inside a mosque while praying.

On 14 June 2010, the police commissioner of the Cho-Airong provincial police station informed the special Senate subcommittee that two persons had been charged in connection with the killing at the mosque, a former ranger who is a Thai Buddhist and a Malay Muslim by the name Luqman. The former ranger turned himself in on 25 January 2010 and indicated that he was afraid for his life. He was later transferred to the responsibility of the central police unit and was freed on bail at the time of this writing.

It is not difficult to imagine the feelings of local Malay Muslims towards both the Thai state and their fate in it. The Muslim world reacted with grave concern. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), for example, issued a statement indicating that this incident was very grave and called for the Thai government to investigate and hold those responsible accountable (*Matichon*, 12 June 2009). Muhammad Asmi Abdul Hamid, Secretary General ofthe Sekretariat Himpunan Ulama Rantau Asia (SHURA), told the press that SHURA was writing to the Thai prime minister, urging him to launch an independent investigation into this incident. The statement was also signed by representatives of more than 300 non-government organizations with the aim of receiving 1,000 signatures.[10]

Four days later after the killing at Al-Furqan mosque, as predicted by many including myself, a Buddhist monk was shot and killed in Yala and another seriously woundedin what might be seen as a vengeful response contributing to the escalation of deadly conflict (*Bangkok Post*, 13 June 2009). Then, on 15 June, a man's body was found in Tarnto, Yala. The head of the 53-year-old Mr. Kimsiang Sae Tung had been cut off, his body stabbed several times and then burned. Next to the headless body,

a piece of paper was found with the following words written in Thai: 'This is vengeance for the innocents the authorities killed inside the mosque' (*Matichon* On Line, 15 June 2009).

Looking at the ways in which these sacred spaces have been sites of conflicts, a pattern seems to emerge. Reading the ways in which violence impacts upon sacred space, the relationship between Muslims in the context of deadly violence in southern Thailand and the Thai state can perhaps be critically elucidated.

Reading violence in sacred space: Malay Muslims, the Thai state and globalization

One of the problems that appears in any discussion of southern violence in Thailand is whether the insurgents are a part of the global jihadists bent on creating the world in the 'pure Islamic' image. Some security analysts might want to connect it with a larger plot of regional or international terrorism (cf. Abuza 2008). They will try very hard to look for incidents that connect the situation in the south with regional groups such as Jemai-ah Islamiya (JI), or even international groups such as Al Qaeda.[11]

But McCargo's 'negative findings' about southern violence are instructive in this context. He found that the southern Thai conflict is not about Islam and that it is not really a part of a global conflict, a global jihad or a global war on terror. In fact, 'the Islam underlying the Southern Thai conflict is local, "traditionalist" Islam, not the Islam of the Salafi-Wahhabi variety' (McCargo 2008, pp. 187–188). Put another way, while extremist groups such as Al Qaeda are the children of globalization, for their existence rests on a world without borders (Aslan 2009, p. 30), violence in southern Thailand is a local conflict bound by local geography and history. This does not mean that the conflict cannot be seen through an alternative trait of globalization, however.

It goes without saying that the concept of globalization can be quite problematic due in part to the fact that it points to contradictory processes of 'wall removing' and 'wall building'. Specifically, the modern world witnessed the dismantling of the Berlin Wall as part of the collapse of the Soviet system. At the same time there was the emergence of a new ideological 'Berlin wall' – between the East and the West – as the negation of the historical transactions and exchanges between cultures and civilizations over the centuries (Turner and Khondker 2010, p. 4 and Chapter 4). Perhaps less concretely, globalization could refer to both the compression of the world and the intensification of the consciousness

of the world as a whole (Robertson 1992, p. 8). In addition to technological connection and transnational relations, globalization is about 'one's sense of self in a world that is increasingly being viewed as a single space' (Aslan 2009, p. 19).

In this sense, 'globalization' as a phenomenon calls into question how humans identify themselves as parts of many larger public spaces. This is primarily because the sense of the self is 'no longer constrained by territorial boundaries' (Aslan 2009, p. 19). Appadurai argues that some kinds of social uncertainty, produced and exacerbated by globalization, result in the blurring of the lines between 'us' and 'them'. Violence then could be seen as a mode of producing certainty by mobilizing 'full attachment', especially when the forces of social uncertainty are combined with other fears about growing inequality, loss of national sovereignty or threats to local security and livelihood.[12] He also notices that since the 1990s, large-scale violence has often been accompanied by 'a surplus of rage' and 'an excess of hatred', produced by 'the narcissism of minor differences' (Appadurai 2006, p. 10).

But then I would argue that this 'surge of anger' and this 'excess of hatred' are best produced when social uncertainty appears in the world that has by and large become deterritorialized, while traditional boundaries lose much of their magic, and the barriers between the sacred and secular seriously weaken and for some all but disappear.[13] In this sense, a form of globalized violence is the use of violence without regard to the presence of the sacred as cultural limits, as has been the case in southern Thailand, among other places.

This is perhaps why when violence occurs in a sacred space the cases often turn global and the world – both the Muslim and non-Muslim world – reacts with concern that also transcends territorial boundaries. It is therefore important to ask: what does violence actually do to a sacred space when it takes place there, and conversely what is the impact of the sacredness of the space on the violence?

In *The Spaces of Violence*, James Giles examines ten contemporary American novels for the unique ways they explore violence and space as interrelated phenomena. Finding that violence is mythological and ritualistic in many of these novels, each of them is located on a continuum from the mythological to the naturalistic. He then argues that they represent a 'fourthspace' at the margins of physical, social and psychological space, a territory at the cultural borders of the mainstream. These textual spaces are so saturated with violence that they suggest little or no potential for change and affirmation and are as degraded as the physical, social and mental spaces from which they emerge. In the

fourthspace of these fictions, violence has been scrubbed clean of its potentially regenerative capacity and instead lurks within blood rituals waiting to explode into unintelligible excess (Giles 2006). What this means is that the shape of violence could be affected by the space it grows from. Giles found that in this unusual space, violence turns out to be without limit and with no regenerative potential. But what if the space where violence takes place is not Giles' limitless fourthspace but the *limiting* sacred space?

To deal with this question is to contemplate what one means by 'the sacred'. In *Violence and the Sacred*, Rene Girard suggests that the victim in ritual sacrifice becomes sacred because he/she serves as a focus of unanimous antipathy, so much so that when he/she is eliminated, the appetite for violence that earlier possessed everyone will be reduced, or ceased. The group will emerge with a new-found tranquility. The victim who lies before the group will appear as both the origin of the crisis and the one responsible for the miracle of peace. The victim becomes sacred because of his/her power to defuse the crisis and restore peace (Girard 1979). Perhaps, this is also the ambiguous power of a sacred space that normally both serves as a limit to violence and at times helps sanctify violence.

The Pattani mosque was chosen as a protest site by the demonstrators in both 1975 and 2007 because of its symbolic power derived from its inherent sacredness, among other factors. In this sense, the mosque became a sanctuary for those who fled from violence at the government house to continue their fight against injustice under its sacred shadow.

But when violence crosses this line, as it did at Kru-ze mosque in 2004 and Al-Furqan mosque in 2009, does it mean that the sacred has become profane? It is important to point out that the violent acts that took place at these two mosques are different. In 2004, the 32 people who were killed inside Kru-ze mosque were said to be fighters who decided to engage the force of the state with violence. It was principally the use of violence by the militants against that of the Thai state. Though violence did stop when the militants were killed inside the mosque, I would argue that both the sacred space and violence itself were being transformed. Violence against sacred space becomes unholy because it violates the taboo that separates the sacred from the profane, but at the same time, those killed inside the sacred space *while fighting what they believed to be the force of injustice* were not ordinary fatalities.

Those whose death came while praying to Allah inside His house at Al-Furqan mosque in June 2009 died with their empty hands praying to the Almighty. It is said that when a Muslim prostrates before God in

prayer, he/she is at his/her most vulnerable. Killing people while they were praying is almost like an act of vengeance carried out at a time when those who were to be punished were at their most vulnerable, and moreover in a sacred space to desecrate it. In the eyes of the killers, the sacred had vanished. Though the use of violence by the perpetrators was meant to be a sacrilege against the mosques, in the eyes of many Muslims, once a place is the house of God, it will always remain so. For those who were killed while praying, their blood would cleanse the holy space and heighten its sacred meaning in many believers' imagination. They could be seen as martyrs when their deaths occurred before the eyes of God and right there in His House.

Taken together, the relationship between the Thai state and the Malay Muslims in southern Thailand could be seen from the ways in which mosques have served as sanctuaries and were then later violated with violence. In 1975–1976, when a mosque was used as a site of protest by the Muslims, violence from the state seemed to stop at the mosque's gate. In retaining respect for the sacred space, a common cultural tie between the Thai state and the local Malay Muslims seemed to be in place. A seriously deadly conflict had reached its boundary. But in 2004, when the military decided to storm Kru-ze mosque and killed those fighting them from inside the mosque, the Malay Muslims could take this violation of their sacred space by the Thai soldiers as a further sign of the Thai state's determination to defend itself at all costs without concern for the Malay Muslims' sense of the sacred.

In the case of Al-Furqan mosque, the perpetrators' choice of killing the Malay Muslims in 2009 at prayer time inside the mosque strongly suggested that any semblance of respect for the limiting power of the sacred had all but gone. For the Malay Muslims, stories told about how people were killed there while fighting in the Kru-ze case and while praying in the Al-Furqan case, will continue to be told to Muslims; their martyrdoms powerfully strengthen the already sacred mosques, with the blood of fighters in the former case, and those of the devout innocents in the latter. The impact of these stories and the memory of how their sacred spaces have been violated will be conducive to the continuation of deadly conflict in southern Thailand and will make any attempt to put an end to it immensely difficult.

Conclusion: Violence, sacred spaces and globalization

Though the violence that has re-exploded in southern Thailand since early 2004 is a local phenomenon, the presence of religion in this local

conflict, especially the role of Islam as the language used to express it by some of those involved, lends itself to a perceived globality. Those interested in the global quality of this conflict could trace how the perpetrators of such a heinous act rely on teachings informed by Islam as a global religion, or how international bodies related to Islam and Muslim issues, such as the OIC, react to violence in southern Thailand.

From a critical perspective, the globality of this violence could be attributed to the global prevalence of such techniques of destruction as car bombings or the use of mobile phones to trigger explosions. Pursuing this trend, the image of globalization that emerges will primarily be technical, resulting only from the condensation of space in the world that makes both the knowledge about it and the material for it available all over the globe.

This chapter, on the other hand, addresses the relationship between religion and violence that renders the deadly conflict in southern Thailand global, especially as part of a global trend that makes conflict more intractable and more dangerous. When religion becomes a part of internal conflicts, the conflicts have been seen to become more intense than non-religious conflicts. In addition, they tend to be more intractable due in part to the 'non-negotiable' nature of the motivations among those involved (Fox 2004). The motivations of those involved aside, since religion expresses important primordial values that constitute a crucial dimension of collective identity, its symbolic dimension and consequently its mobilizing capabilities have been widely used as a means in political struggles (See Frisch and Sandler 2004). In this sense, the violence that took place inside mosques in southern Thailand could certainly be seen as part of a global phenomenon in terms of how a conflict between a state and its Muslim minority has escalated into a deadlier conflict with a strong tendency towards intractability.

With Appadurai's thesis as an entry point, this trend signifies a much more profound feature of globalization when the uncertainty it produces becomes frozen by the certainty of a polarized identity between 'us' and 'them'. However, the two cases of 'red' mosques discussed here reflect a much more complicated feature beyond Appadurai's 'fear of small numbers' thesis. I would argue that the use of violence against these two mosques was possible precisely because of the uncertainty of the cultural line separating the sacred from the profane spaces. Moreover, when these sacred spaces are attacked, it is their sanctity that generates a cultural power producing a collective identity, often through moral outrage. Because of this complex conditionality, Muslims, Christians or Buddhists, among others, who witness their

places of worship attacked by violence will react with outrage, and at times violence follows.

The use of violence against sacred spaces in southern Thailand is not only the story of Muslims' mosques being attacked by Buddhists or the non-Muslim Thai state apparatus. It needs also to be seen as the stories of Buddhist monks being killed while going out for their alms-begging ritual in the mornings in southern Thailand (Satha-Anand 2004), or Buddhist temples and monasteries becoming militarized when soldiers and police occupy them with guns and tanks to protect the perimeters from attacks. There are also stories of military monks, soldiers who are simultaneously ordained as monks, who pursue their work of protecting the sacred Buddhist space. This is another manifestation of the phenomenon of sacred spaces invaded by agencies of organized violence that, some have argued, is fuelling a religious dimension to the ongoing violence in southern Thailand (Jerryson 2009).

What has taken place at the two mosques and Buddhist temples in Thailand is not an isolated phenomenon. There seems to be a global epidemic of violence against religious places combined with the killing of religious personnel. For example, from January to December 2008, there have been 104 attacks against religious places and personnel. Looking at violence inside sacred compounds around the world, half of these, or 52 incidents, are Muslim-related. It should also be noted that there were nine such violent incidents in Southeast Asia alone. Mosques were targeted in southern Thailand and the Philippines, Christian churches and religious schools were attacked in Vietnam and Indonesia, and there was an explosion in a Buddhist temple in Cambodia. These violent incidents in Southeast Asia left 24 dead and 39 wounded.[14] More recent incidents include the hostage-taking of about 100 people inside Our Lady of Salvation Church in Baghdad on Sunday, 31 October 2010, killing 52 people and wounding 60 more. Most of the victims were women. Pope Benedict XVI denounced the attack, saying that this violence became more 'ferocious' because 'it was directed against unarmed people gathered in a house of God'.[15] On 20 December 2010, a grenade was thrown into the mosque of Grand-Bassam, some 40 kilometres from Abidjan, Ivory Coast, while people were waiting to pray with the Imam. The attack killed one and wounded many. Imam Sylla, who spoke for the High Council of Imams, told the press that they were in contact with Catholic leaders to prevent the situation from escalating through sectarian violence. After the attack at the mosque, there were reports that angry youths burned vehicles belonging to the police commissioner and a public television station.[16] Even more recently,

a bomb exploded right inside the al-Qiddissin Church in Alexandria, Egypt while about 1,000 Copts were attending a New Year's Eve service, killing 21 people and wounding 79 (*Bangkok Post*, 2 January 2011).

President Hosni Mubarak spoke on television after the incident, noting that it resulted in protests by Christians both in Alexandria and Cairo that

> The blood of their martyrs in Alexandria mixed to tell us all that all of Egypt is the target and that blind terrorism does not differentiate between a Copt and a Muslim . . . . This sinful act is part of a series of efforts to drive a wedge between Copts and Muslims . . . .[17]

Perhaps one way to predict the intensity of global violence is to assess the ways in which violence turns from being used against normal physical targets to symbolically endowed targets: persons and places, among other things (Galtung 1996). Attacking these targets is extremely dangerous because the targets are not individuals but communal, the site that hurts is not the body or physical entity but the self – at times collective. Violence around the world tends to escalate when perpetrators begin to target symbols, especially religious symbols. It goes without saying that violence against religious symbols will lead to the anger of those communities of faith who have been attacked, a kind of moral outrage as has been evident in the cases of southern Thailand, Ivory Coast or Egypt mentioned above. This in turn has the potential to generate further deadly conflicts.

Take the attack in Mumbai, India in November 2008 as an example. Two hotels – the Taj Mahal Palace & Tower and the Oberoi Trident – were among the targets. Six explosions were reported at the Taj Hotel and one at the Oberoi, killing 173 civilians and wounding 308. The Indian security apparatus later killed nine attackers, who were said to be Lashkar-e-Taiba militants from Pakistan. But what is most relevant to the present discussion is that some Indian commentators believed that this 2008 Mumbai attack resulted from a growing anger among Muslim communities in India, which in turn was connected with the demolition of Babri Masjid at the hands of Hindu fanatics in December 1992 (*The Times of India, April 7,* 2009). In fact, it was reported that when a man who had been taken hostage and was about to be executed asked the gunmen who were prepared to kill him why were they doing this to him since he had not done anything to them, one of the gunmen shouted in reply: 'Remember Babri Masjid?'.[18]

At least three main theoretical points could be derived from these examples from South and Southeast Asia. First, today about 40% of armed conflicts have lasted more than ten years (Marshall and Gurr 2005). The attacks against religious places/people that exist in the contexts of deadly ethnic conflicts would perpetuate more deadly conflicts. Second, violence against religious places can result in violence against secular as well as religious targets, such as hotels and their patrons in India, or monks and temples in Thailand. Third, the length of time it takes before avenging violence appears can vary, from 16 years in the Indian case, with the possibility of numerous connected violent incidents all through this time, to a matter of days in the Al-Furqan mosque case.In assessing some 50 variables responsible for protracted conflict, it was found that when the issues turn to matters of dignity, as when symbolic targets were destroyed, and relationships among people become destructive, among other things, conflict has a tendency to become protracted (Coleman 2003, pp. 1–37). In this sense, I would argue that this form of global violence against religious places/personnel has rendered ethnic conflicts increasingly deadly and protracted. Therefore there is a need a find a way to prevent this global phenomenon of violence against sacred spaces from worsening.

Since 2004, the International Movement for a Just World (JUST), based in Malaysia and headed by Prof. Chandra Muzaffar, has initiated just such a project to protect religious spaces by persuading the United Nations (UN) to come up with a resolution on the international protection of all places of worship. To do that, JUST embarked on a global campaign for the endorsement of its initiative, and by the end of August 2004 had received 11,670 endorsements from 56 countries around the world. Yet the expected UN resolution did not eventuate and the effort later fizzled out.

Given the state of violence in today's world, there is a dire need to at least try to pick up where the JUST project left off and introduce some kind of global policy to protect sacred spaces. The policy must be conducive to preventing conflict from becoming protracted and more deadly.

Notes

1. It should be noted that Askew argues that it is important that such statistics should be cited critically since some 30% of the violence that occurred in southern Thailand might be unrelated to the problem of insurgency. See Askew (2010, pp. 1115–1116).
2. See a critical review of this book by Imtiyaz Yusuf (2010).

3. Aslan, however, argues that this results from an erroneous understanding of the Muslims' conditions because it ignores the seismic social shifts that globalization has wrought upon the Arab and Muslim world over the last century – the rise in literacy, new technologies and the Internet, among others (Aslan 2009, p. xviii).
4. Ali 1977, p. 1628, fn. 5742. All citations from the *Qur'an* are from this translation.
5. The account of this incident is based on Satha-Anand (1987).
6. Parts of this account are based on Satha-Anand (2007, pp. 30–33).
7. *Kafir* means non-believers.
8. Data collected from press reports by the Nonviolence Witness Group, 2008.
9. An account of what happened at Al-Furqan mosque is based on the official minutes of a special subcommittee monitoring and assessing problem-solving and development of the Southern Border Provinces, the Thai Senate, 16 July 2009 with Khun Angkhana Neelapaijit as a member. Khun Angkhana 's kindness in sharing this data and latest information on the case with me is gratefully acknowledged here.
10. See 'Groups team up to send open letter calling for peace in southern Thailand', *The Star* online, 29 June 2009. http://www.thestar.com.my/story.aspx/?file=%2f2009%2f6%2f29%2fnation%2f4216814&sec=nation. (last accessed on 13 May 2014). See also, Askew (2010, p. 1128).
11. See a critical re-examination of 'the alarmist picture' of violence in Southeast Asia in connection with the 'Islamist threat' in Sidel (2007).
12. Appadurai (2006, p. 7). Appadurai maintains that this is one of the three interlocking ideas needed to better understand the connection between globalization and terror or other extreme violence. Two other ideas are the concept of 'national ethnos' which underlines the nation-state project and the anxiety of incompleteness (pp. 3–9).
13. As happens among the 'jihadists'. See Aslan (2009, p. 30).
14. Data collected by Janjira Sombutpoonsiri, Peace Information Center (PIC) and Center for Global Nonkilling (CGNK), September 2009.
15. 'Baghdad church hostage drama ends in bloodbath', BBC, 1 November 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11463544, 1 January 2011.
16. En.Aluka.net, published on 12/21/2010 –Ivory Coast
17. 'Egypt bomb kills 21 at Alexandria Coptic church', BBC, 1 January 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12101748, 3 January 2011.
18. Quoted in Moisi (2010, p. ix).

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11
Exploring Gaps Across Religions in Southeast Asia

Satoru Mikami

Introduction

This chapter explores whether and how opinions of Muslims and non-Muslims differ, using the survey data collected in four countries in Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. The surveys in Indonesia and Malaysia are nationwide while those in the Philippines and Thailand focus on certain regions, namely the National Capital Region (NCR) and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in the Philippines, and Bangkok, the proximal provinces (Songkhla and Satun) and the border provinces (Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat) in Thailand. The samples from Indonesia and Malaysia reflect the natural religious compositions of each country, while those from each location in the Philippines and Thailand are composed of the roughly equal-sized Muslim and non-Muslim populations. Detailed descriptive statistics are given in the Appendices at the end of this chapter.

The opinions of these groups to be compared are their attitudes towards democracy, understanding of the effect of free trade, level of trust in ASEAN and the intensity of their religious identity. We examine how these universal, transnational and globalized concepts and institutions are perceived by people who belong to different religious denominations. To guide our expectation, however, we first examine whether any systematic gaps exist between different religious groups in terms of the level of education achieved and the level of household income, both of which can underlie any differences in opinions.

Gaps in education and household income across religions

Indonesia

In Indonesia the level of education was measured on a ten-point ordinal scale: 1 = no formal schooling, 2 = did not finish elementary school or its equivalent, 3 = finished elementary school or its equivalent, 4 = did not finish junior high school or its equivalent, 5 = finished junior high school or its equivalent, 6 = did not finish senior high school or equivalent, 7 = finished senior high school or its equivalent, 8 = did not finish university/still student, 9 = finished diploma, 10 = finished university. Two respondents refused to answer (one Muslim and one non-Muslim). The left graph of Figure 11.1 shows the empirical cumulative distributions of Muslims (solid line) and non-Muslims (dashed line), excluding the two item-non-responses. Numbers on the x-axis represent the abovementioned level of education achieved, while those on the y-axis represent the cumulative proportion of respondents whose achieved education level is less than the level indicated by the figure on x-axis. In other words, one minus the proportion equals the cumulative proportion of respondents whose achieved education level is equal to or higher than the level indicated by the figure on the x-axis.

We see a large gap in the middle level, which suggests that the proportion of respondents with less than the middle level of education is larger among Muslims than non-Muslims. The difference, however, was negligible: the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, which is also known as the Mann-Whitney U test, could not reject the null hypothesis of equality in the educational level between Muslims and non-Muslims ($p = 0.106$).

Meanwhile, the level of monthly household income in Indonesia was measured on a five-point ordinal scale: 1 = less than 400 Rupiahs, 2 = equal to or more than 400 Rupiahs and less than 1,000 Rupiahs, 3 = equal to or more than 1,000 Rupiahs and less than 2,000 Rupiahs, 4 = equal to or more than 2,000 Rupiahs and less than 4,000 Rupiahs, 5 = equal to or more than 4,000 Rupiahs. Forty respondents refused to answer (35 Muslims and five non-Muslims). The right graph of Figure 11.1 shows the empirical cumulative distributions of Muslims (solid line) and non-Muslims (dashed line), excluding the 40 item-non-responses. As is clear in the figure, the curves differ little and the statistical test did not detect any significant difference ($p = 0.628$).

Malaysia

The achieved level of education in Malaysia was measured on a five-point ordinal scale: 1 = no formal education, 2 = primary school, 3 =



Figure 11.1 Gaps in education and household income across religions in Indonesia

secondary school, 4 = diploma/polytechnic/teachers college/vocational institute or 5 = university degree. Five respondents refused to answer (two Muslims, one Buddhist, one Christian and one Hindu). The graphs on the left of Figure 11.2 show the empirical cumulative distributions for each religious group. The upper left graph dichotomizes Muslims and non-Muslims while the bottom left graph further subdivides non-Muslims into Buddhists, Christians and Hindus. The dichotomized graph suggests that higher proportions of respondents with lower educational achievement are found among non-Muslims, while the subdivided version reveals the proportion of respondents who quit schooling after primary school is actually smaller among Hindus than among Muslims. The gap in education according to religion is statistically significant regardless of how we categorize groups: the Wilcoxon rank-sum test yielded a *p*-value of 0.011 and the Kruskal-Wallis test a 0.009. Specifically, the differences between Muslims and Christians on the one hand and Hindus and Christians on the other hand were statistically significant at a 5% level even when the inflation of the alpha level due to multiple comparisons is taken into consideration.

The level of monthly household income was measured on a four-point ordinal scale: 1 = equal to or less than RM (Malaysia Ringgit) 2000, 2 = from RM 2001 up to RM 3000, 3 = from RM3001 up to RM5000, 4 = equal to or more than RM5001. In total 77 persons refused to



Figure 11.2 Gaps in education and household income across religions in Malaysia

answer questions about their monthly household income (55 Muslims, six Buddhists, 13 Christians and 3 Hindus). The results depicted in the right graphs in Figure 11.2 differ depending on which categorization is examined: while the dichotomy yielded no difference ($p = 0.587$), quartering revealed large gaps ($p = 0.006$). Specifically, differences between Buddhists and Christians on the one hand and between Buddhists and Muslims on the other hand were statistically significant.

The Philippines

Educational levels in the Philippines were measured on a ten-point ordinal scale: 1 = no formal education, 2 = some elementary, 3 = completed elementary, 4 = some high school, 5 = completed high school, 6 = some vocational, 7 = completed vocational, 8 = some college, 9 = completed college, 10 = post college. As the left graphs in Figure 11.3 show, gaps in education across religions are large both in NCR and ARMM: the



Figure 11.3 Gaps in education and household income across religions in the Philippines (Upper: NCR; Lower: ARMM)

highest level of education achieved by Muslims tends to be lower. The differences were statistically significant ($p < 0.000$ in both regions).

Monthly household income was measured on a six-point ordinal scale: 1 = equal to or less than 5,000 pesos, 2 = more than 5,000 pesos up to 10,000 pesos, 3 = more than 10,000 pesos up to 15,000 pesos, 4 = more than 15,000 pesos up to 20,000 pesos, 5 = less than 20,000 pesos up to 25,000 pesos, 6 = more than 25,000 pesos. Seventeen respondents refused to give this information (seven Muslims and one non-Muslim in NCR, and five Muslims and four non-Muslims in ARMM). Empirical cumulative distribution curves indicate that gaps in income across religions are larger in NCR than ARMM. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test confirmed the cursory conclusions, yielding a *p*-value of 0.045 for NCR and 0.474 for ARMM.

Thailand

Education levels in Thailand were measured on an eight-point scale: 1= no formal schooling, 2 = junior elementary school or its equivalent, 3 = senior elementary school or its equivalent, 4 = junior high school or its equivalent, 5 = senior high school or its equivalent, 6 = vocational level or its equivalent, 7 = diploma level or its equivalent, 8 = bachelor's degree and above. All participants responded to this item. The left graphs of Figure 11.4 depict the cumulative proportion curves in each region, which reveal an apparently large gap across religions in the border provinces. A series of statistical test results indicated that slight differences observed in Bangkok and in proximal provinces were within the margin of error ($p = 0.579$ in Bangkok and $p = 0.430$ in proximal provinces) while the gap in border provinces was statistically significant ($p < 0.000$).

Monthly household income in Thailand was measured on a six-point ordinal scale: 1 = equal to or less than 10,000 Baht, 2 = more than 10,000 Baht up to 20,000 Baht, 3 = more than 20,000 Baht up to 30,000 Baht, 4 = more than 30,000 up to 40,000 Baht, 5 = more than 40,000 Baht up to 50,000, 6 = more than 50,000 Baht. Two non-Muslims refused to answer (one from Bangkok and one from a border province). As cumulative distribution curves (the right graphs of Figure 11.4) suggest, gaps in income across religions in Bangkok and border provinces are large, and were also statistically significant ($p = 0.001$ in Bangkok and $p < 0.000$ in the border provinces) while the slight difference observed in proximal provinces was negligible ($p = 0.200$).

In summary, we found no gaps across religions in Indonesia or the proximal provinces in Thailand. By contrast, statistically significant gaps



Figure 11.4 Gaps in education and household income across religion in Thailand (Upper: Bangkok; Middle: Proximal provinces; Lower: Border provinces)

in both education and income exist in NCR in the Philippines and in the border provinces in Thailand: for reasons apparently related to religious differences, systematic material deprivation of Muslims exists in these areas. Only a partial gap exists in ARMM in the Philippines and in Bangkok, Thailand: Muslims are deprived educationally in the former and economically in the latter. Gaps across religions also exist in Malaysia, but the picture is more complicated as there are more different religious groups: in terms of education, Muslims and Hindus have an advantage over Christians while Buddhists are neither advantaged nor disadvantaged; in terms of monthly income, Buddhists have an advantage over Muslims and Christians, with Hindus faring somewhere in between.

From these results, large differences in opinion across religions are expected in NCR in the Philippines and the border provinces in Thailand because Muslims and non-Muslims experience systematic differences in their education and income levels. We also expect certain differences in opinion to be observed in ARMM in the Philippines and Bangkok in Thailand, where there are differences in either education or income level between Muslims and non-Muslims. By contrast, there should be no differences in opinion along religious lines in Indonesia and the proximal provinces in Thailand because no material gap exists there between Muslims and non-Muslims. In Malaysia, while we do not expect differences between Muslims and non-Muslims, either Christians or Buddhists should differ systematically in their attitudes from other groups. In the next section we test these hypotheses.

Gaps in opinion across religions

Support for democracy

We first investigate possible differences in the normative attitudes towards democracy. Do Muslims desire this political system that essentially originates from Western (Christian) history and culture? If so, to what extent? In measuring attitudes towards democracy, we cannot simply ask respondents about the desirability of democracy because, as is widely recognized, the term 'democracy' is a heavily loaded concept. Thus, the following questions were employed to ascertain their real attitudes indirectly:

1. State your opinion on the following statement: competition among political parties will improve the way this country is run.

2. State your opinion on the following statement: every individual and organization has the right to form an opposition and oppose government policies.
3. State your opinion on the following statement: extreme groups, whose views deviate from those of the general public, have the right to express their opinions.

Under a democratic system, government formation results from the competition among political elites for the votes of people, behind which is the shared belief that competition should improve the quality of office holders and hence the governance as a whole. The first question intends to determine respondents' commitment to this belief. To make competition one of the real components of democracy, however, the possibility for opposition must be real. Any competition would be superficial if no substantial opposition existed or if there was no probability for a change in power. The second question tries to measure this aspect. Furthermore, competition must be inclusive so as to be fair and equal. No a priori limits on participants can be justified in the name of democracy. If respondents really support democratic principles, they should agree that even people they disagree with have the right to speak or hold office. This aspect should be measured by the third question. With these three indicators, which can be called 'competition', 'opposition' and 'inclusion', respondents' unobservable normative attitudes towards democracy are expected to be quantified in a comprehensive manner to some degree.

The responses to these questions were originally measured by a four-point ordinal measure: 'strongly agree', 'agree', 'disagree' or 'strongly disagree'. A preliminary review of the empirical distribution revealed that all three questions elicited non-negligible responses of 'don't know' or 'refused to answer' in each location, which is natural because political questions are hard to answer for ordinary people. List-wise deletion and recalculation of proportions, however, would lead to the distortion of results in this case. Therefore, I trichotomized responses into 'strongly agree', 'agree' and a third category including 'don't know' and 'refused to answer'. I included 'don't know' and 'refused to answer' in the 'disagree' and 'strongly disagree' categories because it is at least evident that these respondents did not affirmatively support democratic principles even though their real intentions are unknowable. The distributions of recoded responses by religion in each area to each of the above questions are displayed in Figure 11.5.



Figure 11.5 Levels of support for democratic principles (Left: Competition, Middle: Opposition, Right: Inclusion)

Although the regional, rather than the religious, differences are more salient, some religious differences are also recognizable from these figures. In Indonesia, the number of respondents in the 'strongly agree' category for all three indicators did not differ between Muslims and non-Muslims, while the numbers in the 'agree' category were consistently larger among Muslims. In Malaysia, Buddhists stood out for their less supportive attitudes towards competition and inclusion. The ARMM region of the Philippines demonstrated a consistent pattern: non-Muslims were more supportive of democracy in all indicators; however, religious difference was neither consistent nor clear in NCR. In Bangkok, the commitment to democracy was stronger among non-Muslims, especially in terms of opposition and inclusion. But the commitment was weaker among non-Muslims in terms of competition. In the proximal provinces the number of respondents in the 'strongly agree' categories for inclusion and competition was larger among Muslims, but seemingly no difference existed for opposition. Negative attitudes to competition and inclusion were more common among Muslims in border provinces, but the commitment was slightly stronger among Muslims in response to opposition.

To determine whether or not this finding is wording-dependent, I conducted a multiple group confirmatory factor analysis using the above three questions as categorical indicators. Confirmatory factor analysis assumes that unobservable latent variables are behind directly observable indicators: variations observed in indicators are the realization of effects of latent variables plus random errors which inevitably occur in measuring anything. Hence, according to this method, what we should compare is not indicators per se but the latent factors from which the values of indicators are supposed to stem.

When making comparisons, this approach additionally assumes that what are measured as latent factors are the same across different groups, imposing the same measurement structure (values of loadings, intercepts and thresholds) on different samples. If this assumption fits adequately with the observed data, then we can compare structured means of latent factors across different groups. If not, however, we cannot compare the factors in the first place, which indicates that the same indicators (for example, the wording of questions) had different meanings for different groups.

Following the standard procedures of structured latent mean comparison, I 1) constrained the factor loadings and thresholds of each indicator variable, and set the variance of latent factors for the Muslim and non-Muslim samples as equal to each other, and 2) fixed the mean of latent

factor of the Muslim sample at zero. If the freely estimated mean value of the non-Muslim sample is statistically significantly greater than zero, which represents the Muslim sample's mean, then we can conclude that non-Muslims are systematically more inclined to democratic ideas than Muslims and vice versa. Because the indicators are all categorical, latent continua were assumed behind each of the three-point ordinal indicators using a CATEGORICAL option of M-plus. Table 11.1 summarizes the results of comparison between Muslims and non-Muslims in the respective locations. Equality constraints up to common factor variance fit the data adequately in most locations. RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of Approximation) was substantially large in only the proximal provinces, which implies a bad fit and requires cautious interpretation of results.

As opposed to the expectation from the previous section, no differences between religions were found in NCR in the Philippines or the border provinces in Thailand. Rather, a statistically significant difference in means was detected in Indonesia, where no material difference, at least regarding education and income, exists: non-Muslims were, on average, less democratic than Muslims by more than 25% of the variance of the latent variable.

Both in Bangkok and ARMM in the Philippines, where some degree of interreligious difference was expected from the underlying material gaps in either income or education, the advantaged non-Muslims showed a higher level of support for democratic principles. The difference ranged from 10% to 30% of variance of the latent factor, respectively. However, in Malaysia, the economically advantaged Buddhists showed a weaker commitment to democracy. Meanwhile, disadvantaged Christians showed no statistically significant deviation from the reference category (Muslims). Lastly, the result of no difference in proximal provinces was consistent with the expectation, but this might be caused by the poor model fit.

Understanding of the costs and benefits of a free trade system

Largely the same procedures were followed to explore possible interreligious differences in the attitudes towards another globalized norm, 'free trade'. To develop as comprehensive an understanding of the balance between costs and benefits of free trade system for respondents as possible, I chose the following three questions:

How do you see international trade for the economy of your country? Does it have a good influence; rather good influence; neither good or bad influence; rather bad influence; or bad influence on:

Table 11.1 Gaps in the support for democracy across religions

	Indonesia		Thailand					
	Muslims	non-Muslims	Bangkok		Proximal provinces		Border provinces	
			Muslims	non-Muslims	Muslims	non-Muslims	Muslims	non-Muslims
Latent factor								
Mean	0.000	−0.252***	0.000	0.106*	0.000	−0.073	0.000	0.065
	–	(0.091)	–	(0.062)	–	(0.081)	–	(0.085)
Variance	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
n	2007	243	706	703	410	401	420	404
CFI	0.998		0.992		0.978		0.989	
RMSEA	0.024		0.066		0.129		0.045	

	Malaysia				Philippines			
	Muslims	Buddhists	Christians	Hindus	NCR		ARMM	
					Muslims	non-Muslims	Muslims	non-Muslims
Latent factor								
Mean	0.000	−0.503**	−0.107	0.176	0.000	−0.077	0.000	0.284***
	–	(0.216)	(0.175)	(0.129)	–	(0.127)	–	(0.103)
Variance	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
n	1157	135	143	175	300	300	300	300
CFI	0.932				0.925		0.997	
RMSEA	0.033				0.061		0.026	

Note: Standardized coefficients are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

- companies in your country;
- consumers like you; and
- job security of workers in your country?

After the inspection of empirical distributions I consolidated the original five-point ordinal scale into a three-point ordinal measure: 1 = 'Bad', 'Rather bad', and ' Neither' including 'don't know' and 'refused to answer'; 2 = 'Rather good'; and 3 = 'Good'. Figure 11.6 shows the distributions.

Unlike the level of support for democracy, this trichotomy revealed relatively consistent differences in response patterns between Muslims and non-Muslims. First, in all locations in Thailand, non-Muslims showed a tendency to assess the consequences of free trade system more positively in all three aspects than Muslims did. Relatively more negative assessments by Muslims were also apparent in ARMM in the Philippines, whereas in NCR Muslims' positive assessments of free trade with regard to consumers and job security were rather larger than that of non-Muslims. Comparatively stronger commitments to the free trade system were also consistently observed among Muslims in Indonesia and in Malaysia. The religious group which showed relatively negative attitudes towards free trade in Malaysia was, again, Buddhists.

Table 11.2 shows the results of a mean comparison test based on the confirmative factor analyses. The procedures are the same as the analysis in the previous subsection. This time, however, the model fitted well in all locations. Again, statistically significant interreligious differences were found in locations where no material difference was detected. Furthermore, the directions of differences observed were not consistent with each other: in Indonesia, Muslims were more supportive of free trade while in the proximal provinces in Thailand, non-Muslims showed a stronger commitment towards the free trade system.

In contrast, in areas with both educational and economic gaps between Muslims and non-Muslims, namely, NCR in the Philippines and the border provinces in Thailand, no statistically significant difference was detected. The interreligious differences observed in ARMM, especially the difference in the proportion of negative assessments, did not constitute a statistically significant gap. However, the difference we found in Bangkok was statistically significant: non-Muslims tended to appreciate the benefits of the free trade system more than Muslims. The distinctive attitudes of Buddhists in Malaysia were also statistically significant. They were systematically more antagonistic towards the free trade system than Muslims.



Figure 11.6 Levels of support for free trade (Left: effect for companies, middle: effect for consumers, Right: effect for job security)

Table 11.2 Gaps in the understanding of free trade across religions

	Indonesia		Thailand					
	Muslims	non-Muslims	Bangkok		Proximal provinces		Border provinces	
			Muslims	non-Muslims	Muslims	non-Muslims	Muslims	non-Muslims
Latent factor								
Mean	0.000	−0.285***	0.000	0.219***	0.000	0.134*	0.000	0.043
	–	(0.083)	–	(0.062)	–	(0.081)	–	(0.084)
Variance	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
n	2007	243	706	703	410	401	420	404
CFI	0.997		0.999		0.999		0.999	
RMSEA	0.048		0.047		0.032		0.022	

	Malaysia				Philippines			
	Muslims	Buddhists	Christians	Hindus	NCR		ARMM	
					Muslims	non-Muslims	Muslims	non-Muslims
Latent factor								
Mean	0.000	−0.410**	0.057	−0.035	0.000	−0.080	0.000	0 .161
	–	(0.105)	(0.103)	(0.094)	–	(0.136)	–	(0.139)
Variance	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
n	1157	135	143	175	150	150	150	150
CFI	0.995				0.998	0.997		
RMSEA	0.060				0.038	0.041		

Note: Standardized coefficients are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Trust in ASEAN

The third aspect of the opinions of these groups to be compared is the trust in ASEAN, a 47-year-old regional organization, which needs to earn trust both from Muslims and non-Muslims if it is to play an increasingly important role in the era of globalization. In the survey, the level of trust in ASEAN was explored in conjunction with trust in several other international organizations and foreign governments.

- Please rate your level of trust in the organizations below in dealing with international problems:
- ASEAN;
- UN;
- NATO;
- US government;
- Japanese government.

The responses were measured on a four-point scale ranging from 'a great deal' to 'not at all'. High rates of 'don't know' answers are a common occurrence in the survey regarding international affairs. Therefore, I dichotomized the responses, assigning 1 to respondents who chose 'a great deal' or 'quite a lot' and 0 to other responses including 'don't know'. The proportions of trust by each religious group in each area in these five international or foreign actors as international problem-solvers are shown in Figure 11.7.

The thick black lines connecting different groups in the same locations reveal how proportions of Muslim respondents who trust in ASEAN differ from proportions of non-Muslims in each location. In Indonesia, a slightly larger proportion of trust can be discerned among Muslims. The same applies to NCR in the Philippines and Bangkok in Thailand. By contrast, the proportions are clearly smaller among Muslims in ARMM in the Philippines and the proximal and border provinces in Thailand. In Malaysia, proportions are large among Muslims and Christians in comparison to the proportions among Buddhists and Hindus.

Except for Muslims in Malaysia and Bangkok, however, the proportions of trust in ASEAN are apparently smaller than proportions of trust in other organizations. If the average proportions of respondents who indicate trust in any organization differs from religion to religion, then a simple comparison of the absolute proportions might be misleading.



Figure 11.7 Levels of trust in international organizations and foreign governments

Note: The proportions of respondents who trust respective organizations 'a great deal' or 'quite a lot' are reported. Denominators include 'Don't know' answers.

We need to compare relative strengths of trust in ASEAN between different religious denominations.

Since each respondent answered on the levels of trust in each of the different organizations, the responses are nested within respondents. The same person can indicate trust in ASEAN and distrust of other organizations and vice versa. Or they can exhibit either trust or a lack of trust in both. By comparing the frequencies of mismatching responses, that is (1, 0) or (0, 1), we can quantify the relative strength of trust as follows:

$$\text{relative strength of trust} = (C - B)/(C + B),$$

where C refers to the number of respondents who trust ASEAN but do not trust other organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), and B represents the number of respondents who trust other organizations but do not trust ASEAN. Hence, if C and B are exactly the same, we get (even); the more respondents who trust only ASEAN, the closer to 1 the value will be and vice versa. The value ranges from –1 to 1,

Table 11.3 Gaps in trust in ASEAN across religions

ASEAN compared to		UN	ASEAN	NATO	US	Japan
Indonesia	Muslims	−0.348***	–	0.837***	0.678***	0.741***
Indonesia	non-Muslims	−0.760***	–	0.796***	0.423**	0.704***
Malaysia	Muslims	0.52	–	0.685***	0.726***	0.738***
Malaysia	Buddhists	−0.304	–	0.529	0.185	0.333
Malaysia	Christians	−0.500**	-	0.613***	0.191	0.659***
Malaysia	Hindus	0.739***	–	0.368	0.333	0.721***
NCR	Muslims	−0.254	–	0.563***	0.167	0.612***
NCR	non-Muslims	−0.699***	–	0.571***	−0.556***	0.94
ARMM	Muslims	−0.256	–	0.647***	−0.040	0.606***
ARMM	non-Muslims	−0.323*	–	0.586***	−0.365***	0.470***
Bangkok	Muslims	−0.072	–	0.603***	0.631***	0.750***
Bangkok	non-Muslims	−0.635***	–	0.365***	0.187	0.500***
Proximal	Muslims	−0.556***	–	0.273	−0.064	0.100
Proximal	non-Muslims	−0.767***	–	0.273	−0.064	0.100
Border	Muslims	−0.167	–	0.228	0.294	0.451
Border	non-Muslims	−0.280	–	0.325**	0.297	0.500***

Note: The results of the McNemar test for paired binary responses are reported. Significance levels are adjusted for multiple tests using the Bonferroni method. Figures represent the relative strength of trust in ASEAN compared to trust in the UN, NATO and the US and Japanese governments, respectively. A negative value means that trust in ASEAN is weaker than trust in the compared organization and vice versa; zero indicates equivalence in the strength of trust.

$*** p < 0.01$, $** p < 0.05$, $* p < 0.10$.

representing the difference in the relative strength of trust in the two organizations.

Meanwhile, matching responses, that is (1, 1) or (0, 0), are excluded from the count, leading to the statistical insignificance if the number of mismatching cases is small, as with the case in which most people do not change their attitudes (trust both or trust neither), even though the absolute value of the indicator is close to 1. The McNemar test is used for that purpose. Table 11.4 lists the calculated values of the relative strength of trust in ASEAN compared to each of the other four organizations and foreign governments (Table 11.3).

As expected, no difference was found in Indonesia between Muslims and non-Muslims in terms of trust in ASEAN. Both Muslims and non-Muslims tended to trust ASEAN less than the UN but more than NATO or the US and Japanese governments. Another location where we did not expect a gap between religions was the proximal provinces in Thailand. The patterns of trust were largely

Table 11.4 Religion gaps in identity

Religion	compared to	Religion	Locality	Nation	World	Asia	Southeast Asia
Indonesia	Muslims	–	−0.163	−0.720***	0.576***	0.771***	0.778***
Indonesia	non-Muslims	–	−0.250	−0.442*	0.429*	0.882***	0.871***
Malaysia	Muslims	–	−0.360**	−0.425***	0.712***	0.785***	0.844***
Malaysia	Buddhists	–	−0.833*	−0.789***	0.462	0.308	0.385
Malaysia	Christians	–	−0.619*	−0.750***	0.362	0.619***	0.805***
Malaysia	Hindus	–	−0.167	−0.667	0.556**	0.879***	0.667***
NCR	Muslims	–	0.493***	−0.314	−0.024	0.538***	0.806***
NCR	non-Muslims	–	−0.143	−0.667***	−0.457***	0.169	0.588***
ARMM	Muslims	–	0.562***	0.176	0.213	0.688***	0.806***
ARMM	non-Muslims	–	0.030	−0.397**	−0.053	0.366***	0.641***
Bangkok	Muslims	–	0.552***	0.176	0.213	0.711***	0.788***
Bangkok	non-Muslims	–	−0.273	−0.542***	0.132	0.583***	0.722***
Proximal	Muslims	–	0.778***	0.619***	0.477***	0.701***	0.925***
Proximal	non-Muslims	–	0.242	−0.189	0.364***	0.600***	0.811***
Border	Muslims	–	0.634***	0.196	0.483***	0.563***	0.751***
Border	non-Muslims	–	0.273	−0.434***	0.188	0.325***	0.586***

$***\ p < 0.01$, $**\ p < 0.05$, $*\ p < 0.10$.

similar between Muslims and non-Muslims: both trusted ASEAN less than the UN and were indifferent when ASEAN was compared to NATO and to the US government. But non-Muslims' trust in ASEAN was stronger in that they explicitly trusted ASEAN more than the Japanese government.

The most striking difference was expected in NCR in the Philippines and the border provinces in Thailand. However, the gaps found there were contradictory with each other: in NCR non-Muslims showed a lower level of trust in ASEAN while in the border provinces Muslims' level of trust was lower than that of non-Muslims. Specifically, non-Muslims in NCR trusted ASEAN less than the UN and the US government, while Muslims in the same areas trusted ASEAN more than the Japanese government. Both Muslims and non-Muslims trusted ASEAN more than NATO. In border provinces both groups trusted ASEAN more than the Japanese government but only non-Muslims trusted ASEAN more than NATO; Muslims were indifferent in this regard.

In ARMM, where non-Muslims have an advantage in education over Muslims, trust in ASEAN was lower among non-Muslims: they trusted ASEAN less than the UN and the US government while Muslims were

indifferent in these regards. In Bangkok, non-Muslims, who have an economic advantage over Muslims, again showed a lower level of trust in ASEAN; they explicitly trusted ASEAN less than the UN and were indifferent about trust in ASEAN compared to the US government, whereas Muslims showed a higher degree of trust in ASEAN here.

Lastly, in Malaysia relative trust in ASEAN was strongest among Muslims: they trusted ASEAN more than NATO, and the US and Japanese governments. They were indifferent regarding the comparative strength of trust between the UN and ASEAN. Buddhists, who hold economic hegemony over other groups, were consistently indifferent regarding trust in international organizations and foreign governments.

Religious identity

The last topic to be compared is identity. Do Muslims have a particularly strong religious identity compared to other groups? To answer this question, the same methods as those in the previous subsection were used. First, I simply compared absolute strengths of religious identity between Muslims and non-Muslims. After that, differences in the relative strength of religious identity were examined. The question used for the analysis was:

How do you see yourself? Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements?

- I see myself as a world citizen.
- I see myself as an Asian.
- I see myself as a Southeast Asian.
- I see myself as part of my nation.
- I see myself as part of my local community.
- I see myself as part of my religious community.

Unlike questions on international affairs 'Don't know' answers to this question were rare. Positive answers, namely 'strongly agree' or 'agree' reached more than 80% regarding most items in most locations. Therefore, this time I dichotomized the four-point ordinal measure by assigning 1 only to those who 'strongly agreed' and 0 to all others including 'don't know'. The proportions by religious groups in each locations are displayed in Figure 11.8.

At first glance, explicit differences are discernible only in Bangkok and in Malaysia: in the former larger proportions of non-Muslim respondents show strong religious identity while in Malaysia, Muslims register



Figure 11.8 Levels of identity
Note: The proportions of respondents who chose 'strongly agree' to the respective identification are reported. Denominators include 'Don't know' answers.

the largest proportion of strong identity in religion, followed by Hindus. In other areas, the absolute proportions of respondents who strongly agree to religious identification are roughly equal. However, when focusing on the relative position of religious identity in each group, we immediately notice that the proportions are the largest among competing identities in ARMM in the Philippines and all three locations in Thailand.

To investigate the statistical significance of the relative strengths of religious identity, the McNemar tests were implemented as in the last subsection. The results are shown in Table 11.4.

In Indonesia no interreligious differences were found: both Muslims and non-Muslims identified themselves more with their nation than their religion. But they had a stronger religious identity than supranational identity. In the proximal provinces in Thailand, too, we found no difference with regard to religious identity compared to supranational

identity. However, Muslims identified themselves more with their religion than with either their local community or nation, while non-Muslims were indifferent in these respects. Likewise, Muslims in the border provinces in Thailand tended to identify more with their religion than locality while they were indifferent about the relative strength of religious and national identity. By contrast, non-Muslims in the border provinces explicitly identified themselves more with their nation than their religion. They were indifferent about the relative importance of their locality and world as a source of identity as compared to religion.

Religious identity was stronger among Muslims in NCR in the Philippines, where Muslims are both educationally and economically marginalized. Their religious identity was stronger than their local, national and global identities while non-Muslims in NCR identified themselves more strongly with their nation and the world than their religion.

In ARMM in the Philippines and Bangkok in Thailand, where Muslims are partially marginalized, a common pattern was observed: there was no difference between Muslims and non-Muslims regarding the relative importance of religion when it was compared to global, Asian and Southeast Asian identities. But in both regions Muslims explicitly prioritized religion over locality and non-Muslims prioritized nation over religion.

Lastly, in Malaysia the religious group who identified most strongly with religion compared to other areas was Hindus: for all other groups local and national identities were more important than religious identity. The weakest relative religious identity was shown by Buddhists, the most economically advantaged group in Malaysia, who were indifferent towards the comparison of religious identity to global, Asian and Southeast Asian identities.

Concluding remarks

This chapter has explored interreligious gaps in Southeast Asia using the survey conducted in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. Table 11.5 summarizes the findings.

In Indonesia there were no interreligious gaps in terms of education or income. Thus, we expected no systematic difference in opinion between Muslims and non-Muslims. The expectation was partially correct in that no difference was found in terms of the trust in ASEAN and the intensity of religious identity. But, it turned out that attitudes towards democracy

Table 11.5 Summary of findings

		Education	Household income	Democracy	Free trade	ASEAN	Religions identity
Indonesia		N.S	N.S	Muslims > non-Muslims	Muslims > non-Muslims	N.S	N.S
Malaysia		Muslims & Hindus > Christians	Muslims & Christians < Buddhists	Muslims > Buddhists	Muslims > Buddhists	Muslims > non-Muslims	Hindus > Muslims > Christians > Buddhists
Philippines	NCR	Muslims < non-Muslims	Muslims < non-Muslims	N.S	N.S	Muslims > non-Muslims	Muslims > non-Muslims
	ARMM	Muslims < non-Muslims	N.S	Muslims < non-Muslims	N.S	Muslims > non-Muslims	Muslims > non-Muslims
Thailand	Bangkok	N.S	Muslims < non-Muslims	Muslims < non-Muslims	Muslims < non-Muslims	Muslims < non-Muslims	Muslims > non-Muslims
	Proximal	N.S	N.S	N.S	Muslims < non-Muslims	Muslims < non-Muslims	Muslims > non-Muslims
	Border	Muslims < non-Muslims	Muslims < non-Muslims	N.S	N.S	Muslims < non-Muslims	Muslims > non-Muslims

Note: N.S. refers to statistical insignificance at the 10% level.

and free trade were more positive among Muslims than among non-Muslims.

In Malaysia we detected educational marginalization of Christians and economic supremacy of Buddhists. Therefore, we expected some kind of difference in opinion along these religious lines. The prediction was partially correct in that Buddhists showed distinctive tendencies in three out of four aspects compared: they were less supportive of democracy, more antagonistic to free trade system and had the weakest religious identity. The last point is paradoxical.

In the Philippines, larger gaps across religions were expected in NCR because Muslims are marginalized both educationally and economically there. However, no significant difference was found in their attitudes towards democracy or free trade, although the trust in ASEAN was higher and religious identity was stronger among Muslims. In ARMM, where only an educational gap exists, a difference was found between religions in terms of the support for democracy in addition to the differences in the trust in ASEAN and identification with religion: Muslims were less supportive of democratic principles.

Lastly, of the three areas in Thailand examined, we did not expect any differences of opinion in the proximal provinces, where no systematic difference exists in terms of education or income. On the other hand, intense clashes of opinion were expected in the border provinces because Muslims there are disadvantaged both educationally and economically compared to non-Muslims. However, the expectation was not correct: the most intense difference was rather found in Bangkok, where Muslims turned out to be less supportive of democracy and free trade. Unexpectedly, no differences in either attitudes towards democracy or free trade were found in the border provinces, and only a partial difference was found in the proximal provinces. That is, Muslims' assessment of free trade was more negative than those of non-Muslims. Trust in ASEAN was higher among Muslims in Bangkok, but lower among Muslims in the proximal and border provinces. Religious identity was consistently stronger among Muslims across all regions in Thailand.

To summarize, the relationship between material difference and attitudinal difference tuned out be more complex than expected; the existence or non-existence of gaps across religions as well as the direction of differences are not necessarily consistent along religious lines. To understand possible sources and consequences of religion gaps, if any, we need a deeper contextual analysis.

Appendix *11.1* Descriptive statistics of the survey in the Philippines and Thailand

Descriptive statistics (Indonesia and Malaysia)

Item	Indonesia			Item	Malaysia		
	Category	**Frequency**	**%**		**Category**	**Frequency**	**%**
Gender	Male	1125	50.0	Gender	Male	824	50.2
	Female	1125	50.0		Female	816	49.8
		2250	100.0			1640	100.0
Age	18–23	213	9.5	Age	18–20	179	10.9
	24–29	256	11.4		21–25	234	14.3
	30–34	317	14.1		26–30	198	12.1
	35–39	344	15.3		31–35	158	9.6
	40–44	287	12.8		36–40	196	12.0
	45–49	254	11.3		41–45	141	8.6
	50–54	225	10.0		46–50	150	9.1
	55–59	125	5.6		51–55	122	7.4
	60 & OVER	212	9.4		56–60	107	6.5
	missing	17	0.8		61–65	79	4.8
					66 & OVER	76	4.6
		2250	100.0			1640	100.0
Religion	Islam	2007	89.2	Religion	Islam	1157	70.5
	Catholic	72	3.2		Buddhist	135	8.2
	Protestant	120	5.3		Christian	143	8.7
	Hindu	38	1.7		Hindu	175	10.7
	Buddhist	6	0.3		Others	29	1.8
	Confucianism	1	0.0		missing	1	0.1
	Others	3	0.1				
	missing	3	0.1				
		2250	100.0			1640	100.0

Educational attainment	No formal schooling	138	6.1	Educational attainment	No formal education	92	5.6
	Did not finish elementary school or its equivalent	393	17.5		Primary school	302	18.4
	Finished elementary school or its equivalent	584	26.0		Secondary school	989	60.3
	Did not finish junior high school or its equivalent	67	3.0		Diploma/ polytechnic/	156	9.5
	Finished junior high school or its equivalent	391	17.4		teachers' college/		
	Did not finish senior high school or its equivalent	55	2.4		vocational institute		
	Finished senior high school or equivalent	444	19.7		University Degree	96	5.9
	Did not finish university/student	27	1.2		missing	5	0.3
	Finished diploma	58	2.6				
	Finished university	91	4.0				
	missing	2	0.1				
		2250	100.0			1640	100.0
Monthly household income (RP)	<400.000	618	27.5	Monthly household income (RP)	<2000	1105	67.4
	400.000–999.999	744	33.1		2001–3000	218	13.3
	1.000.000–1.999.999	497	22.1		3001–5000	149	9.1
	2.000.000–3.999.999	235	10.4		5000+	90	5.5
	4.000.000+	116	5.2		Don't know	16	1.0
	missing	40	1.8		No response	60	3.7
					missing	2	0.1
		2250	100.0			1640	100.0
Province	NAD	50	2.2	State	Perlis	18	1.1
	SUMUT	130	5.8		Kedah	133	8.1
	SUMBAR	50	2.2		Pulau Pinang	83	5.1
	RIAU	50	2.2		Perak	142	8.7
	JAMBI	30	1.3		Selangor	289	17.6
	SUMSEL	70	3.1		Kuala Lumpur	90	5.5
	BENGKULU	20	0.9		N.Sembilan	57	3.5
	LAMPUNG	70	3.1		Melaka	52	3.2
	BABEL	10	0.4		Johor	187	11.4
	KEPRI	10	0.4		Kelantan	111	6.8

Appendix *11.1* (Continued)

Item	Indonesia			Item	Malaysia		
	Category	**Frequency**	**%**		**Category**	**Frequency**	**%**
	DKI	70	3.1		Tganu	71	4.3
	JABAR	390	17.3		Pahang	94	5.7
	JATENG	390	14.7		Sarawak	127	7.7
	DIY	30	1.3		Sabah	186	11.3
	JATIM	370	16.4				
	BANTEN	90	4.0				
	BALI	30	1.3				
	NTB	50	2.2				
	NTT	50	2.2				
	KALBAR	40	1.8				
	KALTENG	20	0.9				
	KALSEL	30	1.3				
	KALTIM	30	1.3				
	SULUT	30	1.3				
	SULTENG	20	0.9				
	SULSEL	80	3.6				
	SULTRA	20	0.9				
	GORONTALO	10	0.4				
	SULBAR	10	0.4				
	MALUKU	20	0.9				
	MALUT	10	0.4				
	PAPUA	30	1.3				
	IRAJABAR	10	0.4				
		2250	100.0			1640	100.0
Urban/Rural	Rural	1340	59.6	Urban/Rural	Urban	664	40.5
	Urban	910	40.4		Rural	976	59.5
		2250	100.0			1640	100.0

Appendix *11.2* Descriptive statistics of the survey in the Philippines and Thailand

Descriptive statistics (the Philippines)

Item	Category	NCR Muslim		NCR non-Muslim		ARMM Muslim		ARMM non-Muslim	
		Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Gender	Male	151	50.3	150	50.0	150	50.0	150	50.0
	Female	149	49.7	150	50.0	150	50.0	150	50.0
		300	100.0	300	100.0	300	100.0	300	100.0
Age	18–23	47	15.7	39	13.0	71	23.7	39	13.0
	24–29	59	19.7	39	13.0	47	15.7	41	13.7
	30–34	57	19.0	35	11.7	42	14.0	37	12.3
	35–39	42	14.0	33	11.0	41	13.7	44	14.7
	40–44	32	10.7	29	9.7	32	10.7	32	10.7
	45–49	22	7.3	28	9.3	21	7.0	41	13.7
	50–54	16	5.3	33	11.0	18	6.0	13	4.3
	55–59	12	4.0	24	8.0	10	3.3	20	6.7
	60 & OVER	13	4.3	40	13.3	18	6.0	33	11.0
		300	100.0	300	100.0	300	100.0	300	100.0
Educational attainment	No formal	7	2.3	0	0.0	33	11.0	17	5.7
	Some elementary	35	11.7	16	5.3	67	22.3	39	13.0
	Completed	34	11.3	21	7.0	42	14.0	41	13.7
	Some high school	61	20.3	27	9.0	44	14.7	53	17.7
	Completed high	68	22.7	105	35.0	43	14.3	44	14.7

Appendix *11.2* (Continued)

Item	Category	NCR Muslim		NCR non-Muslim		ARMM Muslim		ARMM non-Muslim	
		Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
	SOME VOCATIONAL	2	0.7	9	3.0	2	0.7	3	1.0
	COMPLETED	11	3.7	18	6.0	5	1.7	8	2.7
	SOME COLLEGE	43	14.3	58	19.3	33	11.0	51	17.0
	COMPLETED COLLEGE	39	13.0	44	14.7	27	9.0	36	12.0
	POST COLLEGE	0	0.0	2	0.7	4	1.3	8	2.7
		300	100.0	300	100.0	300	100.0	300	100.0
Monthly household income (PHP)	<3000	17	5.7	16	5.3	63	21.0	70	23.3
	3000–4999	37	12.3	24	8.0	68	22.7	62	20.7
	5000–8999	71	23.7	75	25.0	89	29.7	89	29.7
	9000–14999	79	26.3	72	24.0	42	14.0	33	11.0
	15000+	89	29.7	112	37.3	33	11.0	42	14.0
	DONT KNOW	5	1.7	1	0.3	4	1.3	4	1.3
	REFUSED	2	0.7			1	0.3		
		300	100.0	300	100.0	300	100.0	300	100.0
Urban/Rural	Urban	300	100.0	300	100.0	55	18.3	145	48.3
	Rural	0	0.0	0	0.0	245	81.7	155	51.7
		300	100.0	300	100.0	300	100.0	300	100.0

Descriptive statistics (Thailand)

Item	Category	Bangkok				Proximal Provinces				Border Provinces			
		Muslim		non-Muslim		Muslim		non-Muslim		Muslim		non-Muslim	
		Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Gender	Male	337	47.7	330	46.9	199	48.5	198	49.4	203	48.3	194	48.0
	Female	369	52.3	373	53.1	211	51.5	203	50.6	217	51.7	210	52.0
		706	100.0	703	100.0	410	100.0	401	100.0	420	100.0	404	100.0
Age	18–23	98	13.9	74	10.5	48	11.7	57	14.2	74	17.6	60	14.9
	24–29	78	11.0	80	11.4	75	18.3	61	15.2	61	14.5	68	16.8
	30–34	81	11.5	76	10.8	52	12.7	36	9.0	40	9.5	44	10.9
	35–39	74	10.5	82	11.7	50	12.2	50	12.5	50	11.9	42	10.4
	40–44	90	12.7	88	12.5	36	8.8	52	13.0	50	11.9	26	6.4
	45–49	71	10.1	83	11.8	45	11.0	31	7.7	33	7.9	51	12.6
	50–54	64	9.1	63	9.0	32	7.8	28	7.0	29	6.9	29	7.2
	55–59	40	5.7	65	9.2	24	5.9	28	7.0	27	6.4	25	6.2
	60 & OVER	110	15.6	92	13.1	48	11.7	58	14.5	56	13.3	59	14.6
		706	100.0	703	100.0	410	100.0	401	100.0	420	100.0	404	100.0
Educational attainment	No formal schooling	25	3.5	24	3.4	19	4.6	14	3.5	66	15.7	28	6.9
	Junior elementary school	149	21.1	165	23.5	96	23.4	115	28.7	98	23.3	89	22.0
	Senior elementary school	124	17.6	105	14.9	95	23.2	65	16.2	113	26.9	67	16.6
	Junior high school	118	16.7	116	16.5	64	15.6	54	13.5	56	13.3	51	12.6

Appendix *11.2* (Continued)

Item	Category	Bangkok				Proximal Provinces				Border Provinces			
		Muslim		non-Muslim		Muslim		non-Muslim		Muslim		non-Muslim	
		Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
	Senior high school	127	18.0	102	14.5	76	18.5	70	17.5	59	14.0	76	18.8
	Vocational Level	55	7.8	51	7.3	12	2.9	25	6.2	6	1.4	20	5.0
	Diploma level	33	4.7	40	5.7	25	6.1	22	5.5	10	2.4	25	6.2
	Bachelor degree and abose	75	10.6	100	14.2	23	5.6	36	9.0	12	2.9	48	11.9
		706	100.0	703	100.0	410	100.0	401	100.0	420	100.0	404	100.0
Monthly household income (Bath)	<=10000	161	22.8	148	21.1	108	26.3	131	32.7	171	40.7	98	24.3
	10001–20000	315	44.6	255	36.3	187	45.6	154	38.4	162	38.6	165	40.8
	20001–30000	108	15.3	114	16.2	49	12.0	66	16.5	61	14.5	80	19.8
	30001–40000	58	8.2	99	14.1	51	12.4	35	8.7	19	4.5	41	19.8
	40001–50000	25	3.5	40	5.7	7	1.7	8	2.0	3	0.7	7	1.7
	>50000	39	5.5	46	6.5	8	2.0	7	1.7	4	1.0	12	3.0
	missing			1	0.1							1	0.2
		706	100.0	703	100.0	410	100.0	401	100.0	420	100.0	404	100.0
Province	Bangkok	706	100.0	703	100.0								
	Songkhla					337	82.2	327	81.5				
	Satun					73	17.8	74	18.5				
	Pattani									145	34.5	141	34.9
	Yala									113	26.9	108	26.7
	Narathiwat									162	38.6	155	38.4
		706	100.0	703	100.0	410	100.0	401	100.0	420	100.0	404	100.0

12
Conclusion

Ken Miichi and Omar Farouk

A book titled *Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia* was published in 1997. Its editors rightly suggested that the Islamic resurgence in Southeast Asia bears the imprint of the modern nation-state (Hefner and Horvatich 1997, p. 10). However, it is clear that globalization has deepened more than ever since then. Transnational, trans-regional and global changes and dynamism should be taken into account in order to capture the dynamism of Muslims in Southeast Asia. As stated in the Introduction, globalization does not simply bring about homogenization but often causes nationalization and localization. The ways in which states in Southeast Asia seem to consolidate and historical and institutional differences among nation-states cause different effects and responses. Islamic political movements that were originally the same, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, are located on very different political maps in Malaysia and Indonesia. At the same time, although processes of globalization are localized in national or sub-national settings, they are still oriented towards global agendas and systems (Sassen 2006, p. 3). Phenomena such as trans-regional and global changes in Islamic learning and religious practices are vitally important to observe the dynamics of politics and society in Southeast Asia. With this consideration in mind, although the chapters and opinion survey in this volume also basically focus on particular countries, they include careful observations on globalization within national borders and more emphasis on relationships across regions and countries than previous studies.

Let us reorganize the arguments in this volume, focusing on the following topics: education; globalization within Islam; changes in political institutions; and conflict and peace. Insights from the analysis on the opinion survey will be incorporated in these arguments.

Role of education

The importance of education in general has been reaffirmed. As the opinion survey conducted in January–March 2010 by the Japan International Cooperation Agency Research Institute (JICA-RI) shows, it has been statistically proven that education makes a lot of difference. We find that educated people are more concerned with issues such as human rights, support democracy and prefer gender equality. On the other hand, religious differences are not very significant to distinguishing one's values. Education also influences religious attitudes and voting behaviour. Higher education and urbanization seem to encourage the personalization of religious practices and indifferent attitudes towards local popular religious traditions.

Islamic education has often wrongly attracted attention in the 'war on terror' following the 9/11 attacks in 2001. For centuries, Islamic education in Southeast Asia has been exposed to and has adapted well to global trends for renewal. It constitutes an important part of the national educational system in Indonesia and has been successfully internationalized in Malaysia. Religious education constitutes an integral part of ethical education in Southeast Asia.

The Middle East, especially Cairo, still attracts thousands of Muslim students from Southeast Asia. It functions as an important source for maintaining Islamic and Arabic language education at home. However, it has become less significant as domestic (both secular and religious) education has developed and other destinations of study have emerged. We also need to take account of the labour market inside and outside of Southeast Asia in order to understand the phenomenon of studying Islam abroad, as shown in the case of the Maranao of the Philippines.

Globalization within Islam

The 'Arabization' of Islam in Southeast Asia is one of the significant features to watch in this region. The penetration of 'Arabic' or 'transnational' Islamic movements has been widely perceived and often considered as a problem in Southeast Asia. There are political parties which are significantly influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in Malaysia and Indonesia. Even among the Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia, Salafi or Wahabi groups have taken root and sometimes bring about tensions within the local Muslim community. The followers of these groups believe themselves to be more 'authentic' but in the rest of society they are often considered to represent 'transnational' or

'foreign' Islam which is not suitable for Southeast Asia. It also should be noted that these 'Arabic' Islamic movements are diverse in character and often do not acknowledge each other. Furthermore, these movements are often treated as 'foreign' in the Arab countries themselves. In the Maghreb countries, the Wahabi movement is often perceived as the product of the Gulf Arabs.

Those who participate in 'transnational' movements are still small in number in Southeast Asia. Some of these movements have adapted themselves to local and national conditions, as did reformist movements in the early twentieth century. Still, their effects on society are wide and deep. Pressure on folk cultures and customs that may be deviant from Islam have become intensified. Indifference towards folk cultures and customs among urban and educated Muslims can be interpreted as changes occurring along with globalization within Islam.

Democratization and Islam in politics

As we have recently seen, the rapid spread of people's movements against dictatorships in the Middle East has also been a function of globalization. In Tunisia and Egypt, where these changes started, the conditions were prepared by economic neo-liberalism and people's movements driven by social networking services resulting from the rapid development of information technology. On the other hand, most Southeast Asian countries have more democratic systems compared to Middle Eastern countries (see, for instance, EIU 2012).

Several Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and Cambodia experienced important political changes and adopted more democratic systems in the 1990s. The consequences of these institutional changes, especially for Islam and Muslims, have become clearer in the last few years. The democratization in Cambodia created opportunities for its Muslim community to participate in the political process and to connect with Muslims outside the country, empowering them in the process. As shown in the case of Indonesia, democratization and Islamization do not necessarily bring about the radicalization of Islam but let people chose realistic political options. The violent attacks against Western targets, deviant groups and non-Muslims have been conducted by criminal elements who do not represent all of Islam or all Muslims. There is a need for civics and human rights education in Indonesia. On the other hand, Muslim minorities in South Thailand and the Philippines have not been fully incorporated into the democratic system.

Conflict and peace

The two chapters on the conflicts in Thailand and the Philippines argue that, although the backgrounds of the conflicts should be understood in the domestic context, their effects can be global, and they should be a matter of concern to international society and supranational bodies. After 9/11, conflicts involving Muslims have often been regarded as issues related to 'global terrorism'. It may be true that there are influences of global militant ideology in Southeast Asia and we should take note of them seriously to try to understand them. However, it cannot be denied that the fundamental causes of most of the regional conflicts are often due to domestic economic and political conditions. What is obvious here is that a global solution like a 'war on terror' is not going to help. We need a more realistic global approach which could inspire the support and cooperation of all parties to try to weed out religious radicalism and militancy. Given the global tendency that has seen sacred sites become targets of violent attacks, broad awareness and cooperation to prevent further escalation is needed. The involvement of international society, whether by state or non-state actors, is important. Rather than military solutions, advocacy and the implementation of universal legal norms are vital for the peace process. That would be a realistic consideration, including legal acknowledgement of the role of armed non-state actors such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the case of the Philippines.

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Note: The letter 'n' following locators refers to notes.