
RE-IMAGINING
THE OTHER
Culture,
Media, and
Western-
Muslim
Intersections
Edited by
Mahmoud Eid &
Karim H. Karim

Re-Imagining the Other

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To those who endeavor to bring about
a better understanding between
Self and Other

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Contents

Preface

This book addresses the historical and contemporary conceptualizations of the Other carried out by Western and Muslim societies. Both have had a 14-century old relationship during which a vast number of images have been produced of each other in the contexts of conflict as well as of collaboration. Current discourses tend to be largely unaware of the complexities and subtleties of Western-Muslim intersections, which are usually hidden under the dominant image of unremitting conflict. Therefore, we invited leading scholars to write about specific aspects of the perception of the Other. They discuss the cultural expressions manifested in various forms of relations between Western and Muslim societies—colonial, commercial, intellectual, linguistic, literary, media, religious, and translational.

Re-imagining the Other: Culture, Media, and Western-Muslim Intersections is simultaneously published with its companion volume *Engaging the Other: Public Policy and Western-Muslim Intersections*. The main aims of these books are to study in an original manner (1) the role of mutual cultural ignorance as a cause of conflict between Western and Muslim societies and (2) the possibilities of engaging constructively with each other. This set of publications examines the complex relationships between the two civilizations by drawing on historical and contemporary material. Whereas several books on related topics have been published in the last decade, this project is a unique and innovatively structured multidisciplinary endeavour that builds a new theoretical model and approaches the issue from the perspectives of both Western and Muslim societies. Whereas each book stands on its own, we believe that *Re-imagining the Other* appeals to readers specifically interested in the study of communication, conflict, conflict resolution, crisis management, culture, history, imperialism, intercultural and international relations, Western-Muslim interactions, media, the Middle East, migration, multiculturalism, peace making, postcolonialism, security, race, and religion.

This set of books appears at a timely juncture that marks the withdrawal of Western military forces from the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even as

the conflicts between Western and Muslim societies proliferate, public support for expensive and bloody wars has declined and policymakers are more receptive to consider alternatives to militarization and securitization. The intensification of the debates on Muslim immigration to Western countries provides a domestic frame for the project's topicality. Despite their differing values, Western and Muslim civilizations overlap with each other in many ways and have demonstrated the capacity for productive engagement. It is unfortunate that, in spite of a mountain of academic research produced on the shared Abrahamic heritage and the long history of collaborative relationships, our time is marked by an escalation of the clash to a global scale. Much of Western-Muslim interaction is characterized by a mutual lack of awareness of the history in which each culture played a vital role in shaping the other.

This project draws from the critique that the clash of ignorance poses. The concept was initially proposed by the late Edward Said in a brief magazine article. A growing number of academics, policymakers, religious leaders, and media commentators are making references to this idea; however, it has not yet been fully developed as a theory. We published a well-received article exploring the basic ideas of the clash of ignorance thesis in 2012 in the *Global Media Journal—Canadian Edition*. The present project provides theoretical and empirical substance to this thesis in a multidisciplinary and internationally authored set of volumes. Contributors are from the academic fields of architecture, communication and media, conflict resolution, education, international relations, Islamic studies, law, literature, Middle-Eastern studies, political psychology, politics, social anthropology, theology, and translation.

This timely and innovative project that takes the lead in the elaboration of the undertheorized and underresearched clash of ignorance paradigm coincides with the twentieth anniversary of Huntington's introduction of the clash of civilizations thesis, which has run its course. As Western and Muslim societies are experiencing exhaustion from the decade-long "war on terror," students, policymakers, and publics are well disposed to alternatives to the conflict model. The project makes a compelling argument for shedding the old and tired modes of understanding intercivilizational relations and offers fresh and thought-provoking possibilities for productive interactions between cultural and religious groups in the twenty-first century.

Mahmoud Eid and Karim H. Karim

CHAPTER 1

Imagining the Other

Karim H. Karim and *Mahmoud Eid*

The relationship of "Judeo-Christian" and Muslim civilizations is like that of amnesic siblings: both have trouble remembering the Self's kinship with the Other. Memories of their shared Abrahamic parentage appear to be lost in a foggy haze; yet, they persist in an old sibling rivalry. Ironically, each imagines the Other to be alien in values, even though Judaism, Christianity, and Islam share a fundamentally core vision about humanity's relationship with God and about the necessity of universal ethics to order human relationships (e.g., Arkoun, 2006; Armstrong, 1994; Chandler, 2007; Gopin, 2009; Volf, 2011). There are significant differences between the Abrahamic traditions in theology and ritual practice; however, no other three religions "form so intimate a narrative relationship as do the successive revelations of monotheism" telling "a single continuous story" (Neuser, Chilton & Graham, 2002, p. viii) that runs from the Old Testament to the New Testament and from the Bible to the Qur'an.

Not only do the worldviews of these religions have a common basis, but their historical relationships are also profoundly intersected (e.g., Goody, 2004; Hobson, 2004; Matar, 2003). Despite the contemporary characterization of "the West" as primarily "Judeo-Christian," Muslims have been integral to the evolution of European civilization. The Renaissance and the Enlightenment would not have been possible without the vast infusions of knowledge from Muslims in the later medieval period (e.g., Al-Rodhan, 2012; Belting, 2011; Garcia, 2012; Tolan, Laurens & Veinstein, 2012). Among the vital contributions of numerous Muslim scholars is the influence of Ibn Rushd (known in Latin as "Averroes," d. 1198) on the development of European philosophical rationalism, Ibn Tufayl ("Aben Tofail," d. 1185) on epistemology, Ibn al-Haytham ("Alhazen," d. 1040) on scientific

empirical observation, al-Khwarizmi ("Algoritmi," d. 850) on mathematics, Jabir ibn Hayyan ("Gerber," d. 815) on chemistry, al-Razi ("Rhazes," d. 925), al-Zahrawi ("Abulcassis," d. 1013) and Ibn Sina ("Avicenna," d. 1037) on medicine, and al-Idrisi (d. 1165) on geography. As Hobson notes in this book, the rise of Western civilization would not have been possible if not for Europe's borrowing from the scientific and technological advancements produced by Muslims. The "voyages of discovery" would have not occurred without the vital transfers of maritime knowledge and instruments necessary for long sea journeys.

Muslims also owe important debts to other civilizations. Islam's cosmology was drawn from the sacred histories of its Abrahamic antecedents. The Prophet Muhammad was clear on his message's close connection to the Judaic and Christian traditions. Jack Goody's chapter in this book discusses how early Muslims adopted the cultures of existing civilizations neighbouring the Arabian peninsula. The formulation of Islamic philosophy, theology, and law was significantly indebted to learning acquired from Jewish and Christian teachers (Fakhry, 1983). The followers of Judaism and Christianity as well as those of other religions played a significant role in "Islamicate" civilization (Hodgson, 1974).[1] However, the contributions of each to the other have generally been written out of Western and Muslim societies' respective historical memories. This has promoted a cultural ignorance that has had the consequence of seeing each other as profoundly alien.

The vital role of Muslim philosophers and scientists is generally presented as a mere footnote in contemporary narratives of Western history, and the Jewish and Christian foundations of Islamic creeds remain largely unacknowledged by Muslims. On both sides, educational curricula, popular history, and the media are largely silent about the interdependent development of Western and Muslim civilizations. Their reciprocal tendencies of viewing the Other with suspicion does not allow for the inclusion of the history of mutually beneficial and productive relations stretching over 1,400 years. On the other hand, the intermittent conflict between them is singled out as a primary form of engagement between the two. These mutual perceptions are not unique to the relationship between Western and Muslim societies; they are typical of the social constructions (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) that shape the ways in which human beings view each other (Vuorinen, 2012). However, the primary images of the Other reciprocally held by these two groups have had a global impact on promoting major conflicts in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

It is human tendency to imagine the world as divided into the Self and the Other. Such concepts operate in the mind as primary organizing ideas

that shape discourse about relationships; they are cognitive frameworks that we use to compartmentalize information about the world (van Dijk, 1980). The mind is constantly receiving information through the senses and would be quickly overwhelmed if it was not grouped into separate cognitive categories. Concepts of Self and Other are primary forms of such mental compartmentalization (Karim, 2001). Human beings and nonhuman entities such as institutions, technology, nature, and divinity are placed into the categories of either the Self or the Other in the process of determining one's relationship to them. Whereas this categorization enables one to develop identifications of various entities, the relationship between Self and Other is not necessarily that of an essentialized binary in which they are closed off from each other.

Engagement with the Other (Karim & Eid, 2014) occurs according to the ways in which it is imagined by the Self. It is common to think of the former as a threat to the latter, but this is not fundamental to their relationship. The Bible exhorts: "love thy neighbor as thyself" (Leviticus, 19:18) and the Qur'an encourages nations to "know one another" (49:13). The work of the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1969) was important in initiating the contemporary discussion on radical otherness. However, he does not favor the idea of the Other as a rival or an enemy, which has come to prevail in dominant discourses. In many cases, the Other is the foil that enhances the existence of the Self (Kristeva, 1986). Whether hostile or not, the former is usually the entity in relation to which the latter defines itself wholly or partially, depending on the context of interaction. Human existence is filled with the tension of differences; but this tension is often a creative force that is a vital source of life's dynamism. The Self, in some cases, may seek to unite with the Other, seeing its destiny as the fulfillment of such coming together. Unions of the male with the female and of the human worshiper with the divine are among the primary themes in art, music, and literature.

The nation is a major entity in which the Self is conceptualized. Benedict Anderson (1991) asserts that nations are imaginary communities because their members, despite thinking of themselves as belonging to the same collectivity, will not personally get to know all of their compatriots. This observation also applies to other large formations such as religious groups. The communal Self can include millions of people with whom the individual identifies. However, the same entities that are accepted as members of the Self can be viewed as part of the Other in a different context. In varying circumstances, the Self can be I, my family, my neighbourhood, my culture, my ethnic group, my religious group, my country, or humanity. Similarly, the Other can be a spouse, an adjacent community, a neighbouring state, or another civilization. The worldview of each culture and the circumstances of its particular discourses at a given time shape the specific identities that are

placed within the cognitive frameworks of Self and Other. An entity that is imagined as Other in one situation comes to be seen as part of the Self in an alternative placement; for example, a rival ethnic group is incorporated into the larger Self under considerations of nationalism; similarly, an enemy state's otherness is diminished in the contexts in which one identifies with all of humanity.[2]

Circumstance and subjectivity color the lenses through which Self and Other are viewed. These are not objective categories that are determined only by empirical data. They shift in response to changing cultural, economic, and political conditions. Whereas the dominant Western image of Muslims is constructed in terms of an alien Other, history provides multiple examples of personal, social, cultural, political, military, commercial, and intellectual alliances. There were strong liaisons between specific groups of Muslims and Christians during various military struggles in medieval Spain and during the Crusades (e.g., Kohler, 2013; Maalouf, 1984; Trow, 2007). The career of the famous medieval Spanish military hero, "El Cid," was characterized by a complex series of alliances with both Christian and Muslim forces. Indeed, the hispanicized title "El-Cid" comes from the Arabic, *al-Sayyid*, "the master," which is what his Muslim followers called him. In contemporary times, Turkey has been a long-standing member of NATO—the Western military alliance—and was at the frontline of the Cold War because it shared a border with the Soviet Union. Even though Muslims were not unambiguously part of the Western Self in both these cases, they were also not an alien Other.

It is noteworthy that whereas Western history books tend to marginalize the vital part played by Muslims in the revival of learning in medieval Europe, there are some significant acknowledgments of these contributions in certain artistic representations in some important buildings where the Muslim Other is given a place in the Western Self's ambit. They occur as individual figures in depictions of a series of persons or entities engaged in intellectual pursuits. *The School of Athens* in the Apostolic Palace in the Vatican, one of the most famous frescoes by the Italian Renaissance painter Raphael (d. 1520), mainly portrays ancient Greek philosophers—with the sole exception of the image of "Averroes." The twelfth-century Andalusian thinker is depicted as a dark-skinned figure among the 21 individuals in the painting. This appears to provide a view into a Renaissance artist's imagination regarding the place of Muslim philosophy in reintroducing Europe to ancient Greek learning (Sonneborn, 2006). The Princeton University Chapel, rebuilt in the 1920s, has beautiful stained glass windows that largely draw from biblical imagery. However, one window portrays al-Razi, a tenth-century Persian physician, scientist, and philosopher and another Baruch Spinoza, a seventeenth-century philosopher of Jewish background (Selden, 2005). A painting under the

dome of the main reading room in the Library of Congress shows various parts of the world as contributing specific aspects of knowledge to modern civilization: "Islam" is depicted as a turbaned man with a beard representing "Physics" (my LOC, 2012).

An integration of Christian motifs in the art of Muslims appears in a number of works produced in the medieval period. A Syrian flask in the Louvre's collection depicts Christian iconography of the "Mother of God and Child with scenes from the life of Jesus" (Cardini, 2012, p. 141). The thirteenth/fourteenth-century "d'Aremberg basin" in the British Museum's collection portraying the resurrection of Lazarus is described as an "example of Islamic art with Christian subject matter" (Ibid.).

> In Europe, the Islamic countries of the Mediterranean had gained access to a huge sales market for consumer goods made of pottery and glass, as well as rare luxury products made of precious materials, such as ivory and rock crystal . . . Local [European] goldsmiths would prepare them for ecclesiastical use by setting them in metal mounts, and they found a place in Christian culture as liturgical vessels and reliquaries. (Hattstein & Delius, 2013, p. 172)

Following the decline of Arab principalities in medieval Italy, there continued to remain a strong presence of Muslim craftspeople in Palermo under royal Christian patronage. The fine silk materials produced there included ceremonial clothing embroidered with gold and pearls and bearing inscriptions in Arabic and Latin, such as the coronation garments of Roger II (1130–1154), William II (1155–1189), and Emperor Frederick II (1220–1250) (Hattstein & Delius, 2013). Even though Muslims were expelled from Italy by the emperor and later from Spain by its rulers, they left strong traces on European culture (e.g., Hattstein & Delius, 2013; Taj, 2014).

The Other has been imagined in varying manners in Western-Muslim relationships over the last 14 centuries. This is not a linear history of viewing her as an unremitting enemy who is to be shunned or to be attacked on sight. The intersections between the two civilizations have been varied and complex, including those that were across and within borders.

Norman Daniel notes that the "notion of toleration in Christendom was borrowed from Muslim practice" (1960, p. 12). It is all the more ironic, then, that several contemporary Muslim-majority states are reported to be remiss in their treatment of non-Muslims. Current international human rights codes, especially those pertaining to the protection of religious minorities, have been the result of Western philosophical endeavors in the Enlightenment and the post-Enlightenment periods. Under these standards, some majority-Muslim countries (among other states) are found wanting. The U.S. Department of State's "International Religious Freedom Report" (2013) cites them as being

among the worst offenders of the religious minorities' rights—particularly those of Christians.[3] The governments of a number of majority-Muslim countries are in the process of amending their national legislation in response to international human rights regimes (Van Engeland-Nourai, 2014). However, several criticize these regimes of being Western "manifestations of a highly parochial cultural and historical experience" (Little, Sachedina & Kelsay, 1996, p. 213).[4] Rubenstein's chapter in this book notes that

> many Westerners seem to have suppressed their own history of othering the members of competing faiths, including Jews and Muslims . . . The result of this selective memory is to make the [present-day] regime of relative tolerance seem a timeless, essential feature of the Western character, as opposed to the alleged fanaticism and intolerance of Muslim, Hindu, Eastern Orthodox, and Chinese civilizations.

The recognition of religious minorities in Muslim polities can be traced to the earliest period of Islam. It is noteworthy that the term *ummah* (community) was initially used by the Prophet Muhammad to include the Jews of Medina, where he had established a city-state. As the number of Muslims grew across Arabia, "his umma came more and more to consist only of his proper followers, the Muslims" (Paret, 1953, p. 603). In this way, the Self as Muhammad's community came to be defined more tightly. However, this did not mean that religious Others were excluded from consideration. The Qur'anic term *ahl al-kitab* (people of the book), as a theological category of the religious Other, included Jews, Christians, and Sabeans (e.g., Esposito, 2003; Martin, 2005) "on account of their possessing divine books of revelation . . . which gives them a privileged position above followers of other religions" (Goldziher, 1953, p. 16).

Additionally, *dhimmi* (protected peoples) is a juridical category that is "open-ended and extendable" and has also been inclusive of Hindus and Buddhists (Shah-Kazemi, 2012, p. 60). The concept of *dhimma* (protection) was expressed in a series of agreements that Muhammad made with various groups. "The precedent was faithfully followed by the Prophet's immediate successors, and established a standard of tolerance by which all subsequent Muslim regimes could be judged" (Ibid., p. 62). However, history shows a series of deviations from the norm by rulers who mistreated non-Muslims. Nevertheless, religious minorities in Muslim domains on the whole enjoyed freedoms that were afforded only in rare circumstances in premodern Europe, as Matar's chapter in this book discusses. Instead of the Islamic tithe (*zakat*), a poll tax (*jizyah*) was collected by the state from the *dhimmi*. Several Jews and Christians played a vital role in Muslim polities (e.g., Fischel, 1937; Haddad, 1970; Van Doorn-Harder, 2005). When the Jewish community in Muslim

Spain was threatened by the rise of the Almohad dynasty, Maimonides—one of the greatest medieval Jewish scholars—traveled not to Christian Europe but to North Africa. He later rose to the prestigious position of court physician in Cairo.[5] The institution of *dhimma* has come under sharp attack from critics such as Bat Yeor (1996), who has coined the pejorative term "dhimmitude," which she presents as being a severe form of oppression. Reza Shah-Kazemi counters that "the argument against the *dhimma* ignores the fact that, for intelligent contemporary Muslims, the *dhimma* is a medieval socio-religious construct, appropriate and even 'progressive' for its times, but not necessarily so for ours" (2012, p. 63).[6]

Quite apart from the ways in which the religious Other was conceptualized within Muslim domains, there existed a separate form of imagining the external Other. The world was generally divided into two parts: the territory of Islam (*dar al-Islam*) and the territory of war (*dar al-harb*). A third category existed according to the Shafii school of law—the territory of treaty (*dar al-sulh* or *dar al-ahd*), which referred to lands occupied by rulers who had made treaties with the Muslim state. The territory of Islam could be transformed into the territory of war under three conditions according to the Hanafi school:

1. Application of the laws of unbelievers;
2. Adjacency to the Territory of War;
3. Absence of the original security of life and property for the Moslems and the protected non-Moslems (*dhimmis*) (Peters, 1979, p. 12)

In so far as this formulation of the Muslim Self included the non-Muslims under the protection of the Muslim state, it was *not* analogous to the later exclusive dichotomizations of humanity by political philosopher Hugo Grotius (d. 1645) between Europe and the non-Christian/non-civilized Other, which remained extant in Roman Catholic discourses until Vatican II (Arkoun, 1994).[7] Nevertheless, the relationship between Self and Other in both these cases was imagined as being confrontational; religious ideology exhorted followers to commit themselves to challenge the Other.

One of the earliest documents of Enlightenment thought on the protection of religious minorities was John Locke's *Epistola de tolerantia* (Letter Concerning Toleration) written in 1689. This publication, which played a vital role in laying the foundations for a new international paradigm of interreligious relations of mutual respect and protection, appears to have been influenced by the example of Muslims. It was a plea to European Christians to renounce religious persecution and lamented that whereas Christian denominations could exist untroubled in the Muslim domain of the

Ottoman sultan, Christians were carrying out "inhumane cruelty" and "rage" against their own co-religionists (Ibid.).[8]

One of the bloodiest conflicts in Europe was fought in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries between adherents of Christian denominations during which hundreds of thousands of people were killed and destruction of property occurred on a massive scale (e.g., Aslan, 2011; Dunn, 1971). The Thirty Years War was brought to an end by the Peace of Westphalia, which was a series of treaties that culminated in 1648. European powers agreed that each state would provide some safeguards for the practices of minority Christian denominations. Although religious minorities continued to be persecuted by individual rulers, we have in this development the earliest Western declaration of the former's rights (e.g., Gross, 1948; Packer & Myntti, 1993). However, even as protections for Catholic and Protestant minorities were strengthened over time, discrimination and communal violence continued to be conducted against Jews in Europe—leading to the Holocaust under the Nazis. Soon after World War II, the Western-dominated United Nations organization adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose article 18 stated:

> Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948)[9]

This development also came near the end of the period of European colonialism that had witnessed the brutal suppression of the rights of people in southern continents, including hundreds of millions of Muslims.

Ratification of the Universal Declaration has been contentious for several Muslim-majority states; one of the major issues has been the prohibition of apostasy in dominant Islamic discourses. According to this view, a member of the religious Self cannot renounce her adherence to Islam and convert to another faith. However, arguing for a contemporary "rigorous and sympathetic reexamination" (Little, Sachedina & Kelsay, 1996, p. 213) of the *Shariah*, several scholars have argued in favor of Qur'anic ideas of religious liberty over the legal restrictions imposed many centuries ago. Abdullah An-Naim, a leading figure in the study of Islamic law, proposes that "the legal concept of apostasy and all its civil and criminal consequences must be abolished" (1990, p. 109). An-Naim would prioritize the Qur'an's message of "universal solidarity" over its verses regarding "Muslim solidarity" (Ibid.), therefore privileging the sense of a Self that is inclusive of all humanity.

Other debates rage on issues of human rights and religion in Western countries; in most of them the Self is imagined as secular or "post-Christian." The concept of the separation of Church and State, however, has not removed all traces of religion from the public sphere, as noted by Talal Asad (2003). Official and unofficial symbols, public ceremonies, common linguistic phrases, and so on are often based on religious culture. Even though the spiritual significance of Christmas and Easter may not be acknowledged in official government discourses, these events are commemorated as holidays in the national calendars of Western countries where Sunday is also the weekly day of rest. This includes France, notwithstanding its rigorous application of the policy of *laïcité*. Some links of the state to religion are more overt, such as the phrase "In God We Trust" that appears on U.S. currency. Additionally, important ceremonies involving the country's leadership are conducted in the Washington National Cathedral, whose proper name is the Cathedral Church of Saint Peter and Saint Paul. In the United Kingdom, the monarch is also the head of the Church of England. In Canada, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms starts with the preamble, "Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law" (Constitution Act, 2013).

Jürgen Habermas (2008) points to the increasing influence of churches and religious organizations in shaping Western public opinion and public policy. He also notes the impact on Europe of the contemporary intensification of religious discourse in majority-Muslim countries and the growing presence of non-Christian religious communities resulting from large-scale immigration. These developments, according to Habermas, have led to the emergence of "post-secular society" (Ibid.) in which the Western Self has become a complex conglomeration of secular and religious, indigenous and immigrant. However, several Western governments have sought to limit the rights of religious groups, particularly those of Muslims. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Muslims and others thought of being Muslim have been the victims of racial profiling and other forms of harassment by the state and some societal institutions (e.g., Eid & Karim, 2011; Eid, 2014; Hennebry & Momani, 2013; Perigoe & Eid, 2014). Additionally, various European governments have placed restrictions on the wearing of the veil (*hijab*) by Muslim women (McGoldrick, 2006). Similar rules had been in place in Turkey and Tunisia as these countries debated the identity of the Self as secular, modern, and Muslim.

The 14 centuries of interactions between Western and Muslim societies have seen various episodes of conflict as well as the steady exchange of people, culture, and ideas. Both sides have added to the knowledge received from the Other and contributed to the advancement of humanity. However,

neither sufficiently acknowledges the debt that each owes to the Other. Those Muslims who have taken up militancy often tend to do it out of opposition to Western powers' hegemony, which they view as a primary cause for the perceived ills in their own societies. Early twenty-first-century Western interventions in Muslim communities were explained by the need to maintain national and global security by conducting a "war on terror," which was often interpreted by Muslims as a "war on Islam" (Masud, 2008). Neither seems to trust the other despite their common Abrahamic roots as well as their long and mutually beneficial relationship. Binary perceptions of the Self as moral and the Other as immoral color their relationship. The Other's culture and ideas are generally imagined as barbaric—a view that appears to be blind to the truth that Western and Muslim civilizations have been mutually constitutive. Such ignorance has been perpetuated by individuals who include scholars, politicians, religious figures, military leaders, and journalists (e.g., Karim, 2003; Said, 1978). Their motivations are not clear but they appear to include fear and hatred of the Other as well as a profound lack of understanding about how the conflict harms the respective Self's fundamental interests in an interdependent world.

Samuel Huntington's assertion that there exist unbridgeable "fault lines" between "the West" and "Islam"[10] (1996) shows itself to be uninformed and playing to the historical ignorance that has been derived through the filtering out of information about the two civilizations' productive intersections. Emphasis on the episodes of conflict in historical times and dominant media depictions of strife in the present have developed a general sense that the supposed "fault lines" between them are as much part of nature as those in Earth's crust. Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis gained credence in the context of the dominant discourse regarding the supposedly endemic animosity between Western and Muslim societies. Given the general tendency to view Muslims as the enemies of Jews and Christians, it is not surprising that these ideas seized the imagination of policymakers and military planners in Western governments—especially following al-Qaeda's attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001 (e.g., Eid, 2008; Tanguay, 2013). The dominant rhetoric of militant Muslims appears to show that they also agree with Huntington's premise: "Islam" is essentially different from "the West," and Muslims have a religious obligation to attack Western targets (Lawrence, 2005). Ideological and religious fundamentalists on both sides hold up mirror images of the Other, which they regularly use in making the case for violence. Also among those promoting this view are those who reap vast financial profits from war (Exoo, 2010).

The clash of civilizations thesis disregards the complexity of human identities. To present the hugely pluralist and mutually intersected "West" and

"Islam" as static, monolithic entities is to misunderstand the intricate dynamics of culture. There exist widely held, albeit vague, notions of what a particular civilization contains; but a closer look reveals unresolved questions about who is to be included or excluded. Evolving relationships between sections of different civilizations produce shifting parameters of belonging. The debates among various groups on what sets of identities comprise the Self and the Other often give rise to some of the most bitter disagreements. Is Turkey part of Europe? What place do Jews have in Arab civilization? Are Muslims integral to Indian culture? No civilizational identity is racially or religiously "pure." Therefore, a thesis that constructs a world neatly divided into monolithic civilizational blocs and then pits them against each other is dangerously simple-minded. It is a view of the world that ideologues, who wilfully ignore intercultural links, promote to pursue the path of war.

Several commentators have noted that rather than a clash of civilizations, a "clash of ignorance"[11] provides for a more informed framework to understand the causes of conflicts between segments of Western and Muslims civilizations (e.g., Asani, 2003; Georgiev, 2012; Hunt, 2002; Mishra, 2008). Ignorance, here, is not merely the lack of knowledge but a state of mind that is shaped by cultural, political, and ideological manipulation to benefit specific interests (e.g., Betancourt, 2010; Proctor, 1995; Proctor & Schiebinger, 2008; Smithson, 2008).

> This is an idea insufficiently explored by philosophers, that ignorance should not be viewed as a simple omission or gap, but rather as an active production. Ignorance can be an actively engineered part of a deliberate plan. (Proctor, 2008, p. 9)

Most writings in the new scholarly area of agnotology (the study of ignorance) have to date dealt with the manipulation of knowledge about science (Proctor, 1995; Proctor & Schiebinger, 2008) or the economy (Betancourt, 2010). The present book and its companion volumes (Karim & Eid, 2014) examine the construction of intercultural ignorance.

Left unchallenged, the prevailing ignorance between Western and Muslim societies will continue to cloud the analysis of unfolding events and most likely perpetuate senseless conflicts. Edward Said (2001, October 22) coined the phrase "the clash of ignorance" in a seminal magazine article published six weeks after the 9/11 attacks. It examined the possible motivations for promoting the clash of civilizations thesis, the reformulation of the Cold War conflict model, and Western policymakers' adherence to Huntington's paradigm of inexorable clash. Said discussed the ways in which ignorance was promoted through the disregard for complex histories, the monolithic presentation of

multifaceted entities—particularly "the West" and "Islam," and the barriers placed against the entry of Muslims into Western domains and discourses. He commented on how those primarily motivated by the pursuit of power, on both sides, sought to mobilize collective passions to gain geopolitical advantage, distort religious teachings, and make ready calls to crusades and *jihads*. He also criticized the failures by Muslims to acknowledge their own integration of Western technology and culture into their lives and the reduction of Islamic humanism, aesthetics, intellectual quests, and spiritual devotion to harsh penal codes by the leaders of some majority-Muslim states.

The complex dynamics between knowledge and ignorance are shaped by culture, ideology, politics, and economics. A fundamental problem that "the clash of ignorance" thesis identifies is a set of prevailing distortions about the relationship between the Self and a particular Other. The central assumption here is that differences with the Other are insurmountable and that interaction with her inevitably leads to clash. Another supposition is that one is engaged in a zero-sum game in which gains by the Other necessarily mean a loss for the Self. Ignorance is furthered through particular readings of the history of the relationship between Self and Other. These readings are shaped by the religious and political biases that remain in place, generation after generation, each producing "facts" and interpretations that come to form thick sediments of untruths. The cognitive frameworks shaped by the long-term maintenance of such ignorance contribute to the repeated imagining of the Other in dominantly negative terms, and the operation of cognitive dissonance tends to filter out even first-hand observations that contradict received "knowledge" (Festinger, 1962). Despite painstaking efforts to uncover the layers of misinformation and to expose the ways in which knowledge and ignorance are constructed, the ingrained manners of presenting the Other continue to be promoted by those who benefit from them (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). It is in the self-interest of people in power to continue these tendencies in order to preserve their hegemony (Karim, 2003).

This multidisciplinary volume brings together historical and contemporary studies to understand better the *longue durée* of the relationship between Western and Muslim societies. Its contributors examine the ways in which the Other has been imagined from the perspectives of social anthropology, history, literature, international relations, terminology, media discourses, conflict resolution, and translation. Knowing the historical range of cultural relationships between Western and Muslim societies reveals the narrowness of the contemporary constructions of the reciprocal Other. Most opinion makers in both groups are unaware of the centuries-long engagement and they propagate views about the Other that are not informed by the profound commonalities of the Abrahamic religions or the rich exchanges of

ideas between their adherents. Widespread Western images about Muslims as endemically violent and barbaric, on the one side, and pervasive Muslim perceptions about Westerners as immoral and driven by the lust for imperial power, on the other, underlie a significant part of their respective political and media discourses.

Chapter 2 addresses the nature of civilization. Jack Goody describes how the relationships between Europe and the Near East, beginning before the rise of Christianity and Islam, were determined to a significant extent by their relative access to natural resources and the trading patterns between them. They were mutual Others, but the multiple forms of cultural engagement seemed to have prevented casting each other in the guise of aliens. The chapter describes the impact of Muslim knowledge on Europe and how it led to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Infusions from the architecture, music, literature, linguistic phrases, codes of chivalry, cuisine, clothing, design, and household and ceremonial materials of Muslims vastly enriched European lifestyles. The chapter provides a sharp contrast with dominant Western discourses that tend to give the science, philosophy, and cultures of Muslim peoples a cursory treatment. Goody shows how the self-image of Western self-sufficiency has concealed the extent to which Europe was marginal to global developments until relatively late in its relationship with Eastern civilizations.

Chapter 3 takes up a particular strand of the story of the intersections of Eastern Christians and Muslims with Europeans before Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in the late eighteenth century. The latter led to colonization and opened up a completely new chapter in the two civilizations' relationship, which has been written about substantially. However, Nabil Matar scrutinizes here a part of history that has remained understudied in the historical interactions between Europe and majority-Muslim lands. He points to the privileged access that Arab Christian travelers had to Europe compared to Arab Muslims. The older form of interchange had largely ended between Muslims and Europeans but was continued by Eastern Christians. The dominant traffic of cultural goods was reversed from previous times to a flow from West to East. Muslims remained largely unaware of the new sciences, technologies, and political institutions that were transforming Western societies. This changed after the arrival of the French in the Middle East, and led to the Arab Renaissance (*Nahda*).

Chapter 4 moves to Iran in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, examining memoirs and fiction by Persian travelers to Europe and America. The chapter is revealing of Iranian responses to European colonialism in the nineteenth century and the travel of Persian-language writers to Western countries in the twentieth century.[12] Stereotypes produced by the fear of the

Western Other in Persian literature provide a glimpse into some of the ways that Europeans and Americans were perceived before the Iranian revolution. Mohammad R. Ghanoonparvar also looks at materials developed in print and video by Western visitors (including Iranian diasporians) to Iran. He offers intriguing insights into the manners in which former residents conduct an "othering of the former Self" in their narrations of visits to the old country. They portray the diasporic Self as both American and Iranian.[13]

Chapter 5 shows how the idea of the clash of civilizations attributed to Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington in the late twentieth century had actually emerged over a hundred years earlier in the midst of European imperialism. John M. Hobson discusses the role of Eurocentrism and "scientific racism" in shaping Western constructions of Muslims. He examines European and American conceptualizations of Eastern societies in the context of imperialism and the late twentieth century, which began to present the Other as different from the Self in essential manners.

Matar, Ghanoonparvar, and Hobson's writings paint a complex picture of several distinct but interconnected threads relating to Western-Muslim interactions in the last two hundred years. They show how, compared to earlier periods, the relationship underwent a qualitative change under the conditions of colonial and postcolonial imperialism—Western societies forgot their debt to Eastern civilizations and came to see it as endemically backward. There was a major rupture in cultural meanings attached to constructions of the Self and the Other during the period of colonial imperialism in the racial categorization of humanity by Europeans.

Chapter 6 discusses studies conducted at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century about perceptions of Muslims in Western societies. Mahmoud Eid provides a critical review of these contemporary imaginaries, showing their overwhelmingly stereotypical construction. Depictions of the Muslim as monolithic, fanatic, anti-Western, and violent, especially after the attacks of 9/11, occurred across the board in numerous Western media sources. This has been done in ways that position Muslim immigrants culturally as deviants and has had a significant impact on integration of the adherents of Islam into Western societies. Certain perceptions of the Muslim Other developed in recent history remain resilient in our times, as is demonstrated in Eid's critical review of Western perceptions in recent decades.

Chapter 7, moving squarely into the twenty-first century, addresses the ways in which cultural meanings of race influence the constructions of male violence against women in Muslim and non-Muslim cases, respectively. The former is "otherized" to appear as a peculiar category under the rubric of "honor killing" rather than viewing it through the perspective of the societal problem of femicide. Yasmin Jiwani scrutinizes media coverage of a murder

trial of an immigrant Muslim family in a Western society. She does this from postcolonial and race perspectives to analyze the dominant reporting of the killing of Muslim women by Muslim men within the framework of a culture clash rather than in the context of the larger problem of domestic violence. Jiwani illustrates how contemporary constructions of adherents of Islam in an officially multicultural country are shaped by stereotypes drawn from the racist imaginaries of the colonial period.

Chapter 8 examines the political and ideological use of terminology about Muslims in contemporary times and explores its key role in shaping the Muslim Self and the Muslim Other, respectively. Karim H. Karim scrutinizes the ways in which the terms attached to Muslims, used by both Muslims and non-Muslims, undergo change according to ways in which the Self and the Other are positioned with respect to each other. "Islam," "Islamic," and "Islamist," are terms that have become fodder for contemporary government and media narratives about Muslims. Both Muslims and non-Muslims manipulate such terminology for their respective purposes, thus enhancing ignorance and raising the potential for clashes. Karim proposes more ethical uses of language by public opinion makers.

Chapter 9 looks forward to explore religion as a means of conflict resolution. Richard Rubenstein notes the linkage between empire-building and the rise of religiously motivated violence through history and in contemporary times. Communities threatened by imperial expansion respond defensively and produce a sacralization of conflict. The interaction of systems of belief and systems of power generates conflict with the Other. When a group's cultural identity is threatened by an imperial force or by globalization, it responds strongly. Rubenstein suggests that, notwithstanding the widespread views of religion as the cause of violence, it bears a strong potential for conflict resolution.

Chapter 10 proposes that the clash of ignorance that pits Western and Muslim societies against each other be considered through the perspective of the translation paradigm. Salah Basalamah asserts that the process of translation falls within a deliberate project of a social harmony and global coexistence where a politics of recognition leads to an ethics of reparation. The chapter draws on contemporary philosophy on translation to seek to overcome the ignorance between Western and Muslim societies that has been produced over time. Basalamah's approach underlines the search of meaning that goes beyond merely understanding and moves toward reforming and transforming.

Chapter 11 concludes that the immense loss of blood and treasure resulting from Western-Muslim conflicts makes it imperative that the Other be reimagined in the broader context of the mutually beneficial intersections that have occurred in the long term. Karim H. Karim and Mahmoud Eid explain that both sides have systematically used violence to further their respective

ends. This is based on ignorance of the possibilities of mutual benefit to be derived from collaboration. It is incumbent upon all the three peoples of the Book to re-imagine their mutual relationships through the commonalties of belief and history that have been ideologically obscured. This endeavor is best engaged in a manner that is genuinely interfaith, intercultural, and interdisciplinary and conducted with utmost integrity within an equality of relationship. The emergent relational theory provides a supportive intellectual framework for re-imagining the Other in opposition to discourses that depict Western-Muslim relations as separated by "fault lines."

Notes

1. See the chapters by Matar and Karim in this book.
2. Also see Kristeva (1991) for her concept of "foreigner" and Ricœur (stick to the way the name is spelled in p. 199). (1992) for his discussion of "oneself as another."
3. Also see Badran (2003), Esack (1999), and Walbridge (2005).
4. Also see Kull (2014).
5. However, there has been a retreat on this front in contemporary times: non-Muslims are prevented from occupying high public office in several Muslim-majority states (Little, Sachedina & Kelsay, 1996).
6. Also see An-Naim (1990), Esposito and Voll (2001), Little, Sachedina, and Kelsay (1996).
7. This exclusivist binary formulation also shaped the way the separation between the communist and capitalist blocs was generally imagined during the Cold War. It was later echoed in a different context by U.S. President George W. Bush after 9/11: "You're either with us or against us in the fight against terror" (You are . . . , 2001, November 6).
8. See Matar's chapter in this book. However, whereas protection was generally granted by Muslim rulers to non-Muslim groups, there seems to have been less tolerance of minority Muslim denominations. It was not until 2005–2006 that major steps toward mutual recognition were officially taken between various Sunni, Shia, and Ibadi branches of Islam; a document to this effect was signed by all the member states of the Islamic Conference Organization (The Amman message, 2007). However, some of these governments still continue to practice discrimination against minority-Muslim groups. Also see Hirji (2010).
9. Also see the UN's Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981).
10. See Karim and Eid (2012) for discussions on the problematic nature of these categories.
11. This concept is discussed at length in Karim and Eid (2012).
12. See Abdel-Malek (2000) for views of Arab travelers to Western societies.
13. For a similar account in the Macedonian-Australian context, see Kolar-Panov (2003).

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CHAPTER 2

Religion and Civilization

Jack Goody

The ancient Near East, later the Islamic Middle East, was the origin of our modern written civilizations. "Modernity" started with the Age of Metals that we call the Bronze Age. The fertile valleys of Mesopotamia were farmed with the newly invented plow, using animal traction, to produce enough surplus food to allow for the development of specialist activity in the towns. These civilizations of the Bronze Age had very few metal sources of their own. To get metal they had to exchange their food and manufactured products (such as wool) with the hill peoples around them, the "barbarians" who were ignorant of the urban arts but were the suppliers of the metals used for the plow as well as for crafts. This fundamental exchange gave birth to the first writing system that possibly developed from the earlier use of tokens that has been described as an accountant's script, recording the amount and later the items that were transferred. Inscription led to a more comprehensive system of writing, which in turn crystallized, in a permanent form, speculations about man, gods, and nature and took the written form of "philosophy," of natural as well as moral science, of thoughts that could be laid out and thought about. In this way a "tradition" of philosophy grew up that could be handed down (*traditio*), considered, and disputed.

Urban civilization spread eastward to India along the Eurasian corridor and then to China, while westward it reached Phoenicia, Troy, Greece, and Rome. Most of these civilizations in Eurasia sprang from a common ancestor. That civilization, comprising intensive plow agriculture carried out in river valleys, together with accountancy (to record that exchange), then full writing, libraries, and the use of metals began in Mesopotamia, and spread eastward as agriculture itself had earlier done. It should not be surprising

that there are commonalities in the literate and cultural traditions of the area. These commonalities were especially strong in the Near East where subsequently three major written religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) also spread in both directions and derived from a common source, ancient Judaism. All three religions have a common holy book, the Jewish Old Testament, and therefore accept the same "commandments" and have elements of a similar philosophical approach to life. Despite the common origin of these and of "civilization" in general in the city-building countries of the Near East, division arose on a supernatural level, on the way to approach the "other" world. However, this world may have developed in similar ways, all moved from hunting and gathering to food production and took up the Neolithic mode of living, but they diverged substantially in the way they dealt with the nonnatural. In many cases, there was a plurality of agencies but often with one Creator God, for the act of creation was often seen as being unique. In such religions that particular deity was seen as having special powers and there was, therefore, a tendency toward raising him/her above the rest that some have seen as a trend to monotheism. But that meant not only recognizing a unique creator but also eliminating other agencies. This is what happened under Akhenaten in Egypt when other agencies were discredited. More spectacularly it occurred in the Semitic world of the Near East where monotheism became institutionalized. Although there was thus recognition of only one God, different ways of approaching him arose. And these different ways gave birth to the various religions of the Near East.

Monotheists thought that their belief in one God helped to conquer the enemy, but did it? The belief may have inspired warriors to greater deeds, but the enemy too would have been equally motivated—as in the case of the Crusades, for example. However, these are monotheistic religions, which make them reject other approaches to God and his word. Each is bound to God in a way that differs profoundly from the polytheistic religion of India and the Far East where creeds can live more easily side by side, and indeed can be viewed as supplementing one another pluralistically rather than being in opposition. Monotheism, however, sees only one way to truth, a notion that led to the bloody battles of the Crusades as well as to the claims of particular sects—Catholic and Protestant, Sunni and Shia—to have unique access to "God's truth" and to the correct knowledge of his ways. It is not simply monotheism. Any "looking back" to a fixed truth has a similar effect, one of fixity, but if this had religious backing it was clearly more problematic to avoid. A sectarian approach too meant the denial of any alternative. This happened in early Christianity when classical writings were set aside as "pagan," especially the speculations on the natural world since that area had already

been laid down in the Holy Text. However, that restriction on inquiry was occasionally lifted not only in the West but above all in the East. For example, in Baghdad during the Abbasid regime, a revival of classical science took place that led to many Muslim contributions before Sunni orthodoxy took hold. Almost all Greek and Roman works in this field were translated into Arabic, many from Syriac, and circulated on paper from China. Large libraries were built by rulers. This meant that after the virtual hiatus in the "science" of the Christian Middle Ages, the "new learning" of the Renaissance could then link up with the old, some of which had come down to Western Europe through these translations that were made available to their scholars though the former Muslim centers of Toledo in Spain and Palermo in Sicily. There is little doubt that it was this push from the East rather than any indigenous development, such as the Protestant ethic, that helped local scholars (mainly Catholic) to catch up with and then to surpass the superior knowledge of the natural world that had accumulated in China and elsewhere. The absence of material sources in the Near East had meant that the "evolutionary" growth from earlier civilizations did not occur there but in the extremities of the East and West.

However, the Near East remained at the center of the "civilized" written world even after the early rise of Italy. The revived trade between the two that had been broken after the collapse of Rome and now so stimulated that economy stretched to India for its colored and plain cottons, valuable steel, wood, precious stones, and variety of spices. This trade also extended to China for its bronze, important ceramics, silks, paper products, as well as knowledge. The Near East lay at the center of the important exchanges and helped Europe too on its triumphant way in the Age of Metals, which was also the Age of Miners and of the modern factory. But the great problem for the Near East—before and after the rise of Islam—was that it did not itself have the metals or, before oil, the means to produce cheap power.

The sharp distinction drawn by participants between various monotheistic religions, despite their common roots in their approach to God, has meant that commentators have dwelt on the supposed differences at the civilizational level. In fact, religion and "civilization" have been seen as closely intertwined, as in Weber's highly Eurocentric thesis about the Protestant ethic. That is to say, urban society in the Near East was well established long before the emergence of Islam or any monotheism. I will argue that we need to treat religion and "culture" as relatively distinct variables, in the sense that Muslim governments inevitably took over much of what already existed. From an economic standpoint, the ancient Near East was well to the fore of other areas. Mesopotamia had been very advanced in matters of exchange, depending upon the surplus production of the river valleys for the buildup of

specialist labor in the towns, for the exchange of agricultural and urban produce with their "barbarian" neighbors to get the absent metals they needed and for the development of a recording system to keep track of these multiplex exchanges. In this way, an elementary accountancy developed and all that was further extended in classical times with expansion down the Silk Road for exchange with China, especially in silks, porcelain, and paper. Nor was there much of a decline in the East with the fall of the Roman Empire. Trade with Europe fell away radically, especially with the advent of Islam, but it continued with India and the East. Urban life evolved, even though Europe declined into the rural "self-sufficiency" of feudalism. But in the Near East urban existence grew, and economic and intellectual exchanges developed. At the time of the Crusades, the material and intellectual life in the area exhibited a higher level of attainment than in Europe. In subsequent centuries, that somewhat backward continent restarted exchange with the East, not only but most importantly in metals. In exchange, it received the products (especially spices) and the knowledge (especially on paper) from further east. Europe had the advantage of an ample supply of the metals along with cheaper power in the form of wind, water, and coal (or coke), which was required to fuel mass production and mass literacy. The Near East had few of these resources; it lacked not only metals to create machinery, but the large-scale non-human power to drive them, at least until the advent of oil. Meanwhile Europe developed a skill in mining and metal work (especially for weaponry), long a specialty of Germany, that eventually led to the conquest of the world, not only by firearms but also by metal technology and machinery, a conquest that had ultimately less to do with religion than the control of resources. It was not Christianity that conquered the world, except in a secondary way, nor yet the exploitation of labor, but rather the provision and development of resources.

The question of conflict between religious groups takes place not only between the major religions themselves, but also between their internal divisions. It could be a matter of life and death whether you prayed in a Shia or a Sunni way, as we see in the Near East today. Equally, Christianity was divided between Catholics and Protestants, between Orthodox and Arians or Nestorians, who spent many years at each other's throats. Each of these subgroups thinks that their own way of approaching God is the only correct one, though both are Muslim or Christian. That is one of the consequences of monotheism that advocates a single-stranded approach to the "truth."

However, many of the specific values sometimes thought to be characteristic of Christianity are equally prized in Islam. For example, charity is greatly valued in Islam, as we see not only from the weekly *sadaqah* but also from the money given to *waqf* for religious, family, or general charitable purposes. The injunction to love thy neighbor (presuming he is one's co-religionist) is as

common in the East as in the West. And love in a sexual sense was as central to Muslims as the poetry of the troubadours was to Europe; it was enjoined not only by the poet Rumi (d. 1273 CE)—even in a homosexual way—but also earlier by Ibn Hazm (d. 1064), the Andalusian author of *The Ring of the Dove*. Indeed, any idea of the European invention of romantic love has to take into account the earlier prevalence of love poetry among the Arabs as well as in ancient Egypt and China. Equality of access is not only a long-standing "ideal" of Christians but according to a Christian admiral in the Turkish navy it was much more apparent there, where a man might rise from the ranks to command the whole fleet and where Christian boys, forcibly converted to serve with the Janissaries, could in principle become commanders. Although Islam had hereditary rulers, and although descent from the Prophet himself remained important, Muslims also emphasized achieved leadership, not only in the armed forces but also in the civilian administration. Indeed that was a more prominent feature than in the West.

One of the other crucial differences between Europe and the Near East in medieval times was the use of paper, the manufacture of which the Muslims had obtained from China, possibly at the Battle of Talas in Kyrgyzstan in 751 (or possibly through the Mongols). In any case, Baghdad had its mills on the Tigris and it was being manufactured in Transoxiana in the eighth century. It was exported from Damascus to Europe but was not much used there until the fourteenth century. It was then used for keeping records and also for wrapping commodities and, as Rabelais reminds us, for hygienic purposes. By and large, the Muslim East was much more hygienic than Europe for they had to wash five times a day before saying prayers whereas Christians were always wary of baths, which were identified with "other" Abrahamic religions, not with theirs. The Crusaders, struck by Muslim domestic architecture and living arrangements, brought these ideas back to Europe. That continent had been seen by Muslims such as Al-Tartushi (d. 1127) as a dirty place. Indeed, the magnificent Roman bath of my own hometown of St. Albans, with the well-known head of the sea god, suffered from the Christian destruction of Verulamium and the absence of any equivalent until the modern period. It was the Near East that was known for its clean homes, not Christian Europe.

The main use of paper was for the transmission of information. In the famous Jewish Geniza collection in Cairo it was used for personal letters as well as for translations of the Holy Book. During the Renaissance, the extraordinary volume of religious literature was largely due to a shift from manuscript to printing, which depended on paper and promoted knowledge in a wide variety of fields. Printing and the press, which unlike paper did not spread through Muslim lands since Islamic beliefs of that age prohibited the

automatic reproduction of God's name (and his word), ensured the much wider exportation of the Christian Bible in its newly conquered territories of Western colonialism, a reproduction that was often organized by the state as well as by the privileged missionaries. The expansion of knowledge through the press was extraordinary. Earlier it had been Muslims who had led the world; their libraries, using paper, were huge in comparison with those of northern Europe that depended on the hide of cows, wax, or occasionally the import of papyrus. About the year 1000 there was a huge information gap between the Christian and the Muslim worlds, the latter being in contact with the East in a vast common market made possible by the spread of the Islamic religion. This situation existed until the emergence of the printing press in southern Germany, which was rapidly adopted in Europe; but the contemporary Islamic orthodoxy forbade the printing of the name of God. They stuck to the scriptorium, which had in the past already produced the great libraries. As a result, there was clearly a complete reversal in the speed and ease with which information circulated.

Under the Abbasid rulers in Baghdad, paper was the foundation of the growth of knowledge, which provided a translation of all available scientific works produced in antiquity, including manuscript material that was brought from Byzantium, for classical work was often rejected by the Christian West (in its Catholic form) as pagan. Nor was this knowledge only left in books. It stimulated much scientific activity among Muslims, such as the astrolabe, including the dubious work of the alchemists but which in turn contributed to the birth of the chemistry of Renaissance Europe. Although Muslim science and technology were considered backward by Westerners in the nineteenth century, this was certainly not the case in earlier periods when numerous Arabic words appeared in European textbooks; for example, alcohol and alchemy. Just as important was the work in medicine, carried out in collaboration with Jews, Christians, and even Hindus at the Sassanian town of Gundeshapur (also known as Jondishapur) in Persia, which had become a medical center for the entire Near East.

This, however, was not the only field that was dominated by work in Arabic. The inhabitants were great travelers throughout the Muslim lands, using one holy language and adhering to the one creed, which for religious reasons not only forbad the mechanical reproduction of God's name but prized calligraphy rather than printing. In all this traveling, the orientation toward Mecca and the timing of prayers became important. So that geography and timekeeping were prized everywhere, and Muslims made important contributions to both of these endeavors. Large observatories were built in India and to the north, and geography books, such as Al Idrisi's (d. 1165) *Book of Roger*, were indispensable for the mapping of the world.

Meanwhile it was not only later from Palermo that Muslim knowledge spread westward but from Andalusia, especially from Cordoba where we find the caliph's huge library in the Alcazar. These places also had paved roads and street lamps long before London and Paris had anything of the kind. The first "university" institutions in Europe also seem to have developed there. In 1031, the Ummayad dynasty fell and many small states emerged. In their capitals, the growth of the arts and sciences was greatly encouraged. Meanwhile the *Reconquista* of the Christians had begun, and with the fall of Toledo in 1085 some of the Muslim knowledge passed to the West through the translation movement. Scholars from northern and western Europe flocked to Toledo (as well as to Palermo) where they encouraged Arabic-speaking Jews to translate various texts into modern European languages and so augment the sum of its knowledge that led eventually to the Italian Renaissance. Palermo in particular continued to be a center of such learning and attracted scholars like Adelard of Bath (d. 1152) who translated Euclid's *Elements* and the works of al-Khwarizmi, who gave us the name *algorithm*. In Spain, Gerard of Cremona, who lived in Toledo till his death in 1187 CE, organized a team of Jewish interpreters and Latin scholars to translate some 90 books including those on Euclidean geometry and Arab trigonometry. Many of the so-called advances of Europeans came in this way from the Arabs. A translation of the Qur'an was also made for the purpose of conversion and so too works of Galen and Hippocrates came down to us with their medical knowledge and moral codes. The Andalusian physician "Abulcassis" (Abu al-Qasim al-Zahrawi, d. 1013) was noted for his description of surgical instruments (Muslims were free to practice surgery). In 1000 CE he completed his largest work, which is said to have revolutionized medicine in Europe.

However, the greatest impact was on agriculture, for the Arabs were the experts in water control and irrigation, using large water wheels for mechanized milling. They also introduced sugar to the Western Mediterranean and used it to flavor much of their food. In textiles, they brought cotton to Egypt as well as silk and its weaving to southern Europe. Meanwhile they also acted as intermediaries in bringing various citrus fruits and dates from the East. It was water-power, too—not available in the Near East to the same extent—that enabled the irrigation of Spain and the introduction of rice. In earlier times, water-control had been largely for urban rather than rural purposes. Now irrigation meant that various monsoon crops could be introduced from the East.

Agriculture in southern Spain went through what has been called the Andalusian agricultural revolution in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, which involved specialist gardens and much experimentation, as well as promoting scholarship in botany and related fields. At that time the Mongols

opened up the Silk Road again, possibly leading to the advent of gunpowder and rockets and even guns to Europe, which were clearly central to that continent's expansionist activities.

Art too was affected by the contact with Muslims. The first influences on Venice were Byzantine, the second Arabian, especially in the architecture of the Piazza San Marco in its the display of colored mosaics. From the East also came the use of gold leaf and ultramarine, previously reserved for Gothic altarpieces, now found in merchant houses as in the Near East. In southern Europe decoration was influenced by Muslim abstract designs, especially in Spain with Mudejar (i.e., of Muslims in Christian Spain) art and strengthened by the Italianate style of the Renaissance.

The influence of Islam extended to literature with the translation of Indian-Persian writing, promoting the development of *adab*, a sophisticated prose literature, as well as a guide to refined manners. The translation of Arabic texts included animal fables, possibly originating in India, influenced Chaucer's (d. 1400) narrative art. Fables were used in an allegorical way, for fiction and drama were not favored under Islam, except for the "Arabian Nights," which also possibly came from India. What marked European literature in the medieval period above all was the Arab invasion of France, the activities of Charlemagne (d. 814), and the composition of *La chanson de Roland*. After the battle at Ronsenvalles, Charlemagne then withdrew and pulled out of Spain. Not long after that, the Crusades began with the attempt to capture the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. But it was around the deeds of Charlemagne that there sprang up a whole body of legend about his war with the Muslims, especially in *Orlando Furioso* by Ariosto some few hundred years later. The earlier corpus about the Saracens was essentially Christian propaganda.

The Arab tradition of love poetry, which was cultivated well before the coming of Islam and may have influenced the work of the troubadours, is often seen as creating the tradition of Romantic love in Europe in the twelfth century. But in fact that turn may well have been transmitted from Spain, being especially apparent in the work of Ibn Hazm (d. 1064) and of bards and "wandering minstrels" moving between the border principalities of France and Spain. These courts were crisscrossed by poets and by singing-girls sent to France by Spanish courts with which they were in close contact socially and intellectually. Christian Europe was not alone in its ideas of love but part of a wider ecumene.

Muslim music also had an important influence on Europe, especially on flamenco where their half-tones were of special significance. The lute, or *oud*, the musical instrument closely identified with Renaissance Europe, in fact, came from the East. It was brought to the West by the Crusaders through

Spain. A refugee from Baghdad, one Ziryab (d. 850), settled in Cordoba where he founded a school for the instrument and for Arabic singing. He also invented the fifth string for the lute—one of many changes of its kind introduced from the East.

Many of the goods and other influences from the East came through Venice. The city-state had long had links with Byzantium and then with Istanbul; it was there that Carpaccio (d. 1525) drew his oriental figures and in 1511 that Dürer painted *A Turkish Family*. Turkish and oriental themes became very important features for writers too, especially in travel books. The Turks were the essential intermediaries with eastern countries, but there was always fear of this Turkish presence in Europe even though this country served as a model for Biblical themes, especially when the military threat was lessened after the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 and the breaking of the siege of Vienna in 1683. Then the fascination with the Orient could be given full rein and the age of *turquerie* and *chinoiserie* became part of the rococo style. Orientalism became the vogue, especially with the letters of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu from Istanbul. Many paintings included toilet scenes in the harem, and these works were accompanied by a taste for Arabic and Persian literature, especially with the translation of *A Thousand and One Nights*. In France that taste influenced Montesquieu, Voltaire, as well as Diderot and, in Germany, Goethe. But it was not only in music and literature that the influence of the East impinged upon Europe but also in food—sugar came from India, coffee from Africa, rice and citrus fruit from the East, pasta and dried fruit from the Mediterranean. These food items radically changed Europe's way of eating, especially in festival foods for Christmas fare. In all these respects contact with Muslims profoundly altered our way of life.

This "civilization" in the Near East was one, but religions, especially monotheistic, differed and opposed one another, even though the existence of Islamic or Christian law enabled trade to operate more widely. The resulting clash of religions is certainly real, but in terms of morality and philosophy this notion of a clash can be a little misleading. It is true that one can select differences but in many respects similarities were more important. Nevertheless, the differences had consequences. Islamic orthodoxy had effectively prohibited printing, thus placing its authority behind fine calligraphy; the restrictions led to a comparative decline in the wider distribution of knowledge, such an important feature of the Italian Renaissance. The use of paper by Muslims had earlier developed the scriptorium as a means of duplicating books and for this it used Chinese paper when the Europeans were writing on skins or wax tablets. And so it was the Near East that produced a flowering of knowledge and of Arabic science and then the early Renaissance of Greek and Roman "scientific" learning. They also engaged in a fertile exchange with

the Far East, in commodities as well as knowledge, as witnessed by the magnificent collection of Chinese porcelain in the Topkapi Museum in Istanbul. The high-heat pottery, valued as much as precious metal, could not be made in the West until at Meissen, Germany, in the eighteenth century. Until then the West used earthenware or trenchers; in this the Near East was influenced by China long before Europe.

However, religion did not inhibit trade in any major way. For a while though, the coming of Islam assisted in the decline of trade with the East, and there were periods when trade was forbidden, as the Pope tried to do with war material. But the drive to exchange overcame most of these restrictions, especially in non-military materials, and trade again flourished. The Prophet himself was a trader, and by the seventh century Muslims were established in Guangzhou (Canton), a center of the sea-borne exchange between Cairo and China. It was this exchange that in many cases spread the monotheistic religions. In West Africa, traders were responsible for most of the initial expansions of Islam. The international trade between the East and the West was carried on by members of these various Abrahamic religions, by Jews, by Muslims, and by Christians; it was a scene in which they all thrived and expanded. Hence the Muslim, Jewish, and Nestorian Christian communities were scattered all the way along the Silk Road to China along which so much else traveled in each direction. All three communities were earlier participants in those trading activities, and it is an error to see any one as being altogether inhibited by laws of usury or similar prohibitions. They had little to learn from the later Protestants as far as commercial activity and accumulation were concerned. This trade included transactions between Jewish, Muslim, and Christian merchants. Although Europeans have tried to see differences between the operations of Mediterranean and European merchants that related to the emergence of "capitalism" in the latter, this is to take on a too restricted view of lawful transactions as well as of "capitalism" more generally.

Of course adherence to a monotheistic creed provides its believers with a kind of solidarity, "law," and certainty that polytheism rarely does, since the latter involves a search among various possibilities and the exchange of beliefs as well as of commodities. That certainty is what the adept craves for and monotheism brooks no other; its God is a jealous God. Such certainty is anathema to science as much as uncertainty is to the monotheisms. Science flourished in polytheistic antiquity where it advanced by exploring unknown realms, which were settled in monotheistic discussions. Indeed, to establish a canon in any field, religious or not, is to fulfill a desire for closure, for fixity, for certainty. And if you have that certainty, there is little need for Popperian testing that is so intrinsic to many other forms of knowledge. The canonization of knowledge is not necessarily religious; it may be Confucian

or Aristotelian. Of course, in any such domain some knowledge has to be accepted as a starting point for further written exploration; some of which is necessarily arbitrary such as the letters and the order of the alphabet. Some less so such as numbers. However, one needs a minimal degree of agreement on "basics" before one can proceed further.

Even though they sought dominance, these Abrahamic religions did not have it all their own way. The Jews of course later took a minority position within the Christian world, as they had done in the Roman, even if their God was the only true one. The Muslims from Arabia conquered Egypt, the Near East, the North African littoral, crossing into Andalusia in southern Spain, with a similar belief. They also acquired some of the islands in the Mediterranean, contributing at first to a decline of East-West trade in post-Roman times. In their northward surge they took over the Holy Land of Palestine, which created problems for Christian pilgrims who were keen to visit their sacred places—jointly sacred but held by Muslims. One of the supposed reasons for the Crusades was to open such access, but many knights looked for land to provide an income.

By taking control of the Near East, the Arabs had effectively cut Europe off from its direct trade connection with the East, which had already suffered because of the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West. The revival of this link with the Near and Far East was important both for trade and for knowledge; it happened only slowly at first. The revival occurred in the Near East itself, which developed a bourgeois trading culture. Later still, the revival did happen in the West rather than in the Near East. It was the Near East where development took place. Why was this so? Not primarily because of religion. The ancient Near East had seen the birth of urban society, the invention of writing (and later the acquisition of paper), the development of complex exchange, as well as of accountancy and the growth of manufacture of metallurgy and of textiles—wool, silk, and cotton The Near East thus developed the prerequisites for "capitalism." It had the textile industry that was the basis of early English production: wool in very early times, cotton later from India, and silk from China. It had the long-distance trade that saw many goods arriving from and going to the East, as well as to the West. It had the beginnings of large-scale production in textiles (*tiraz*) in state-owned factories. It had a sound economy that relied on Sudanese gold; business and exchange were widespread and the bourgeoisie were an important constituent of the social system, whether in Cairo or in Syria, where at one stage they took over the government and some towns and where its activity has been compared to those of North Italy in the Renaissance period. The busy commercial and manufacturing activity produced a lively middle class. However, the production in the East gradually became less important and the dynamism slipped

away to the West. Several important industries traveled westward—in particular with the importation to Europe of raw cotton and silks, but also the manufacturing of Syrian (and earlier Egyptian) glass as well as soap from the oil of Mediterranean olives (which also provided light and oil for cooking), and the use of paper needed for the circulation of scientific and religious information. All these industries were taken up by a less advanced culture that had greater access to the power and to the metals needed to build machinery to advance their manufacture. The Near East lacked the wood or coal needed to heat ovens, the metals to put in them, and the water in sufficiently fast streams to power them. Until the advent of the internal combustion engine that uses oil and natural gas, it was poor in such resources.

Setting aside for the moment the religious divide, the links between East and West had originated in early Bronze Age society, if not before. Muslims had taken over the lands of the Near East where urban society was born. We have to make a distinction here between the birth of Islam and the cultural inheritance and achievement that long preceded its arrival. In the Near East, Muslims inherited many of the features of earlier cultures, for example, of the Sassanian (Iranian) state. The process was especially clear in the administration of the country, but it also marked the material and intellectual contributions of a town such as Gundeshapur. The town was noted not only for its monotheistic Jewish, Christian, and Islamic, but also for its more pluralistic Hindu elements. The emergent Muslim polity looked even further back to the earlier achievements of the area, with its important Sanskrit contacts, in the field of astronomy and, in a broader context, this tradition led the regime in Baghdad and the Syrian church to revive the whole tradition of Greek and Roman science. There was subsequently a contribution from Muslims, just as there was in Persian astronomy, not a complete hiatus or a conceptual gap. An interruption did later take place caused by Islamic orthodoxy of the Sunni variety, which involved a rejection of other forms of knowledge in favor of canonical doctrine, but not by Islam per se.

From my perspective, the apparent "clash of cultures" has little to do with their basic features that were derived from a common root. This is especially true of the Abrahamic faiths that had common written texts and shared many injunctions for daily, and even supernatural, life. They differed in the way people approached the same God. What led to divergence was the claim that only one variant of these faiths alone held the truth and that others need to be "converted," or eliminated, as in the case of the Huguenots. The result of these divergences was considerable suffering and conflict not only between "religions" but also internally with the different ideas of participants about "incarnation," or about the method of praying. The result was much bloodshed and struggle of a less violent kind.

CHAPTER 3

On the Eve of the Napoleonic Invasion: Arab Perceptions of the World

Nabil Matar

The French Revolution was the first European movement of social and intellectual transformation to leave an impact on the Arabic-speaking world. Nine years after 1789, the forces of that Revolution reached the East as Napoleon's armies and navies invaded Egypt and Palestine. From that year on changes began—specifically in Egypt—that led to extensive interactions with French institutions and with European culture, thus heralding the Arab *Nahda* (Renaissance).

How did the Arabs see themselves before the beginning of what Eric Hobsbawm has called the "Age of Revolution" (1789–1848) and the imperial rivalry between France and Britain? This question was asked over half a century ago by Albert Hourani. He wondered whether the region of the Fertile Crescent had been "decaying or lifeless" before the arrival of the "modern West," or whether the *Nahda* was a development "of movements already generated in the very heart of Near Eastern society" (1957, p. 91).[1]

Before revisiting the question, there is need for some clarification of terms that will be used in this essay.

Arabs: In this chapter, the term refers to a linguistic community without any of the nineteenth or twentieth century nationalistic implications (e.g., Harvey, 1985–1986; Tamari, 2010). Arabs were those who spoke and wrote Arabic in their domestic, public, and religious spaces, both Muslim and Christian, living in the region known as *barr al-Arab*/Arab land from Iskanderun to Tangier. While Jews also spoke Arabic in the

period under study, they produced no historical or geographical writings in Arabic.

Eve of the Napoleonic Invasion/Early Modern Period: Historians have associated the rise of the "early modern" in the West with the development of Eurocentrism. As Europe's religious and military expansion was launched, the history of all parts of the world with which Europeans came in contact, whether by conquest, as in the Americas, or by trade and military conflict, as in North Africa and the Middle East, became Eurocentric.[2] From this perspective, the year 1492 marked the birth of modernity (e.g., Amin, 1989; Dussel, 1995; O'Gorman, 1961). But the conquest of America had no immediate impact on the peoples of the Arabic-speaking world; rather it was the conquest of their lands by the Ottomans in 1516–1517 that changed the course of their history. In that year, Ottoman armies marched across Syria and Palestine, then Egypt, and continued all the way to Algeria (a name coined by the Ottomans), thereby uniting European regions with Asia and Africa, and facilitating travel and trade from Bosnia to India. So 1517 is the beginning of the "early modern," while the *terminus ad quem* is the year 1798 with its Napoleonic invasion and the beginning of Western domination (Algeria 1830; Egypt 1882; Sykes-Picot Agreement 1916).

The World: Muslim and non-Muslim. In regard to the latter, the Arabs knew Western Europe from France and Spain to Malta and Italy, with England becoming a strong contender from the early seventeenth century on. Eastern Europe was chiefly known through Russia. Except for one visitor-writer in the 1660s, America had not yet been discovered. In regard to the Muslim world, the Arabs traveled, traded, and went on pilgrimages to all regions, from Morocco to Iraq, from Bosnia to Yemen, and beyond to India.

The sources for the study of the Arab view of the world are varied. In regard to Europe and Europeans, Arabs did not leave behind many writings about them. Explanations as to why they did not produce more accounts have varied, with some historians advancing the psychological absence of "curiosity" among Muslims (e.g., Göçek, 1987; Lewis, 1982), and others crediting Islamic narrowness to the injunctions of jurists, especially the Malikis of North Africa.[3] Such explanations are inadequate because they ignore a major factor that militated against Arab and Muslim writing about Europeans and other non-Muslim regions: namely, the infrequency of their travels. It should be noted that travel to Western Christendom nearly always took place aboard sturdy Dutch, English, and French ships, many of them built to sail in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Be they ambassadors from Istanbul or from the Maghrib, princes fleeing from Mount Lebanon (Fakhr al-Din), or priests on their way to Rome and America from Iraq (Hanna al-Mawsuli), all boarded European ships because they believed them to be safe and seaworthy.[4]

Europeans were fully aware of this dependence and manipulated relations by providing—or denying—travelers, traders, and envoys access to their ships. By so doing, they controlled the number, frequency, and possibility of Arab visits. Muslims, from both the Mashriq (the Arab East) and the Maghrib (the Arab West), were at the mercy of the Europeans since they could neither visit nor conduct diplomatic, commercial, or religious activities independently of the transporters.[5] This factor helps to explain why it was that Christian Arab clergy, and they alone, were able to spend long periods of time in Western Christendom, and to visit Rome or Paris or Moscow, and then write about them. Europeans were willing to grant passes to Christians from the East in a manner that they did not to Muslims. That is why the longest travel account in all early modern Arabic travel literature about Europe/Russia was written by a Christian Arab of the Antiochean patriarchate in Aleppo. It also explains why the first account about America in Arabic was by a Catholic priest.[6] It is not surprising therefore that, even in the eighteenth century, the only information that a Moroccan ambassador to Spain had about *Marka*, as he called America, came from hearsay: about the initial discovery of the continent, and the revolt of the colonies against Britain, along with the Boston Tea Party episode (al-Miknasi, 1965). Arguments about the psychological lack of curiosity toward the West among early modern Muslims and Eastern Christians or about theological and religious anxieties ignore the simple fact of the lack of accessibility.

Studies of Arabic views and histories have been chiefly based on European sources: commercial reports, missionary accounts, travelogues/memoirs, and chronicles. At the same time, historians of *Bilad al-Sham* ("Greater Syria") have relied heavily on the juridical material in the Arabic and the Ottoman archive, ranging from *fatwas* to court determinations. These latter sources have furnished a detailed description of affairs inside cities and ports, with emphasis on interreligious relations between Muslims and Ottoman minorities, as well as on agreements and exchanges among merchants, local and foreign. But these sources do not address the views and opinions of the Arabs in regard to other communities beyond their city borders, since they remain confined to litigations and negotiations.

The following sources contain information about the Arabic view of the world that range from the local to the international and from the communal to the foreign.

1. *Pilgrimage/Travel Accounts*: Visits to the holy sites in Jerusalem, Mecca and Medina, and to Sufi shrines; and by Arab Christians to Moscow, Rome, Egypt, Palestine, and various sites of European Christian missions from Mexico to India. As in the European tradition, pilgrimage

accounts included descriptions of geography, ethnography, and religious and political activity. Travel accounts were written by Muslim ambassadors reporting back to their courts, or by job hunters seeking new opportunities. There were also writings and publications by Catholics who went to Western Europe to pursue higher education. In 1584, the establishment of the Maronite College in Rome opened the door for novices and priests from Lebanon and Syria to study, translate, edit, and print material in Arabic, Syriac, and Latin in Italy, France, and Spain—that gave their congregations in the East a glimpse of the West.

2. *Biographical Dictionaries*: One of the most popular genres in Arabic writing, these dictionaries furnish a vast amount of information about local and regional history, especially about travel, migration, and captivity.
3. *Oral Communication*: The Arabs of North Africa learned about European and world affairs from the thousands of captives, resident workers, merchants, and converts who lived among them from Salé to Tripoli in Libya. As early as the mid-1570s, the Moroccan ruler Muhammad al-Mutawakkil wrote to Queen Elizabeth I of England telling her how he wanted to continue the good relations with all Englishmen in his realm, the "traveler and the resident, the exporter and the importer, the virtuous and the libertine, the buyer and the trader" (bin Tawit, 1958–1959, p. 52).[7] Furthermore, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Muslims in the Levant saw and learned firsthand about Christian religious practices and customs from French priests teaching and preaching in their midst, as well as from their counterparts from Spain who lived in Moroccan cities to minister to captives and to the local population. Meanwhile, in Aleppo and in the trading centers of *Bilad al-Sham*, there were "Englishmen, Italians, Frenchmen, Dutchmen" and other Europeans with whom the local inhabitants interacted (Biddulph, 1609, p. 83).[8] Orthodox and Catholic Christians learned about Europeans and the rest of the world from missionaries and ecclesiastical envoys who lived among them from Alexandria to Aleppo; there were also ascetics/*mahabis* who sought caves in Mount Lebanon and Palestine to live in meditation.
4. *Correspondence*. These are of two categories:
   A. Royal and Ambassadorial Correspondence. Hundreds of letters have survived at the level of rulers: kings and queens, sultans, beys, deys, princes, and envoys. In North Africa, such letters were often read in mosques and Sufi circles in order to alert the populace, from pious worshippers to sea-faring privateers, about relations with a particular country.

B. Personal Correspondence. Unfortunately, the personal letters that have survived between Arabs and Europeans are few and far in between—especially those that report on relations at a level beyond the public and the international. Still, there are some letters of a personal nature that have survived from North Africa, especially from Morocco between, for instance, Abdallah ibn Aisha and the French court at the end of the seventeenth century.

I will rely on some of these sources to address Hourani's question. These sources have not received adequate attention from historians because they appear to be more "literary" than "documentary," and more anecdotal, especially in the biographical dictionaries, than "historical" (Murphey, 1990, p. 299). True, they do not present information in a structured manner, nor do they focus on institution or economy or law. But what they do furnish is description of intellectual and social facets in the lives of the Arabs that do not appear in other sources. Whether travelers or biographers, jurists or priests, Muslims or Christians, they described an Islamicate world of tremendous diversity and space (Gabrieli, 1964). Admittedly, there are no texts from the period that can furnish a macrohistorical interpretation of the world: There are no dense analyses such as by Ibn Khaldun or Hasan al-Wazzan (notwithstanding its Italian inception). But different geographies and different time periods produce different sources for study, which, in turn, require different methods of analysis. By turning to these hitherto ignored sources, it will be possible to accumulate a new body of information that shows how the Arabs were not "lifeless." At the same time, it will show that, before the *Nahda*, the Arabs did not break out from their religio-cultural parameters of knowledge.

From 1517 on, the Ottomans ruled the region from Syria to Arabia to Algeria, beginning the period of the *pax ottomanica*. The peoples in this region were Arabic speakers, largely Muslim, but with a sizeable Orthodox and Catholic Christian population, as well as a Jewish minority. These Arabic speakers became part of the Ottoman world, influencing the Turks at the same time that they were influenced by them. The only Arabic-speaking population that remained culturally and linguistically unaffected by Turkish-Ottoman power was the Moroccan. To evaluate the views of these societies, I will turn to two groups of Arabic writers from the Eastern Mediterranean, both under Ottoman rule:

1. Eastern Christian writers from *Bilad al-Sham*/Greater Syria;
2. Muslim writers from *Bilad al-Sham* and the rest of the Islamicate world (e.g., Matar 2003a; 2003b; 2009).

Each group gave expression to a view of the world that was generated by its unique set of experiences. The Eastern Christians wrote about Central and Western Europe, Syria, Palestine, and Sinai—regions of pilgrimage and migration; while their Muslim brethren described the whole world of Islam—from Morocco to India and from Bosnia to Iraq. All the writers, Muslim and Christian alike, shared in the commonality of the Arabic language, producing thereby a distinctively Arabic, non-Turkish, perspective.[9] And all the writings appeared in an Arab-Islamic culture that was still without print, which is why writers had little reason to embellish or exaggerate: very few included preposterous or outlandish descriptions (Adams, 1962). Rather, the writings are empirical and informative, and altogether reveal a world in which jurists and ambassadors, priests and teachers, merchants and carpenters, traveled to Western Europe and Russia, to Bosnia and Iraq, to Anatolia and Arabia—all the way to Hadramaut in Yemen and Hyderabad in India. It was a vast open world that witnessed numerous localized conflicts and violent military upheavals, but nothing as vast in its devastation as the Thirty Years War, or the intercontinental and maritime wars between France and Britain from the Mediterranean basin to North America. This was a relatively safe interconnected set of lands, much more so than the sea that was dominated by Iberian, French, and British navies that had conquered many port cities in the Western Mediterranean and North Africa.[10] As a result of the danger of the sea, no consciousness of a "Mediterranean" or an equivalent to the *mare nostrum* appears in Arabic histories or chronicles, either Muslim or Christian.[11]

The World through Eastern Christian Eyes

The Arab writers who left early descriptions of Western and Central Europe were the Eastern Christians, Orthodox, and Catholic subjects of the Ottoman sultan. It bears noting that inside the borders of this empire lived the largest indigenous Christian population in the world outside Western Europe. In the Eastern Mediterranean, this was an Arabic-speaking population, largely integrated into the social and historical geography that had been growing in number and cultural expression since the Arab conquest in the seventh century. Oddly, the beginnings of "Christendom" in western historiography are often associated with Charlemagne (crowned emperor in 800 CE). However, when Charlemagne was proclaimed Holy Roman Emperor over "Christendom," there were more Christians living in the Islamicate world—from Baghdad to Jerusalem and Alexandria—than there were in Western Europe.[12]

In the Ottoman Empire, Christians and Muslims lived cheek by jowl, learning each other's customs and sharing in baths and markets, courts and sometimes shrines. These Eastern Christians were alone among the Ottoman

population to learn about European Christendom (the first Turkish account about Western Europe—France—was written in 1720, although earlier there had been an account about Vienna and parts of Eastern Europe by Evliya Çelebi). At the risk of generalizing, it is possible to state that the Orthodox Christians of the Aleppo Patriarchate were the ones to learn about Russia; and the Maronites in Lebanon and Syria about Italy and France. Like their Muslim counterparts who traveled in pilgrimage or in search of work, Eastern Christians also went on pilgrimages in Palestine and Sinai, visited Moscow, studied in Rome, trained in Paris, and attended church councils wherever they occurred. They went as ecclesiastical delegates, often marketing their knowledge of Eastern languages: Arabic, Syriac, Hebrew, Coptic, and others. Given their church associations, the world they described reflected their perspective as monks and priests, ascetics, and scholars.

How Christians fared in the Ottoman polity is a topic that has always been approached from the angle of their *dhimmi* status. In an essay on *Dhimma in Early Islam*, C. E. Bosworth observed the following.

> Although protected by the contract of *dhimma*, the *dhimmis* were never anything but second-class citizens in the Islamic social system, tolerated in large measure because they had special skills such as those of physicians, secretaries, financial experts, etc., or because they fulfilled functions which were necessary but obnoxious to Muslims. (Bosworth, 1982, p. 49)

This and other similar views have been advanced by Western scholars of the Christian minority in the early modern Ottoman Empire (e.g., Heyberger, 1994; Rustim, 1958). That the minorities of the empire did not have the same privileges or opportunities as the Muslim majority, and that they were marginalized and sometimes maltreated, is not contested, especially if attention is paid to the writings of the European visitors. With very few exceptions, these visitors-cum-writers relentlessly described the "persecution," "torture," and forcible conversion of the Eastern Christians—at the same time that they denounced them for their superstitions (the Protestant view) or stubbornness (the Roman Catholic view).

There were periods when Christians and Muslims suffered under tyrannical rulers, starting with the stream of deys and beys in seventeenth-century North Africa to Ahmad Pasha the Butcher in late eighteenth-century Palestine. But if we consider the Eastern Christian community through the record of its own writings, and view it in the context of the emerging world empires, we meet with a religious and cultural community, surprisingly active, producing and translating hundreds of manuscripts about comparative religion, biblical exegesis, homiletics, liturgies, church councils, histories, disputations,

and other material (Nasrallah, 1979–1996). The library catalogues are rich with the variety of Arabic writings[13] of which a few examples will suffice.

In the case of the Orthodox: A treatise on comparative religion discusses theological differences with Islam, but differences are not presented as avenues to cultural opposition or subversion. *Bahjat al-mu'min* (*The Happiness of the Believer*) was written by the "noble shaykh and perfect philosopher 'Abdallah ibn al-Fadl al-Antaki," and transcribed by "Thalja, brother of Melatius, Metropolitan of Aleppo in the year of the Hijra 1032." He does not include a Christian date, suggesting integration into the Islamic calendar. The treatise is a translation from Greek into the language of the Arabs, *lughat al-irab,* and is in the form of a question, followed by the word answer (*jawab*), underlined in red. The translator explains that he found members of his Orthodox congregation, *al-milla al-orthodoxiyya*, inquiring about certain ideas and expressing wrong views, even *kufr sarih* (blatant error). So he decided to write the treatise for the benefit of the educated (al-Antaki, 1052). The questions vary widely, from a discussion of the four elements and creation *ex nihilo*, to how man is in the image of God and other philosophical and doctrinal matters (Ibid.). Some questions are presented as if they came from Muslim interlocutors, and the answers include a calm explanation of doctrine and of the Christian worldview.

The manuscript is in over two hundred beautifully written folios, written in 1623 CE, over hundred years after the Ottoman conquest of Syria. And this manuscript is one among many. Dare we think of parallels by native people in the Americas who had been conquered by European Christians just about a quarter of a century before the Ottoman invasion of 1517 (e.g., Aouad & Fadlallah, 2009; Gemayel, 1984)? Even after the Native Americans were made to adopt European languages, it was generations before they began to write about their history, belief system, and culture.

Bulus son of Macarius, the patriarch in Aleppo, wrote a travelogue in which he described various scenes of socioreligious cooperation in the Ottoman dominions: Muslims, Christians, and Jews went to the shrine of one Shaykh Abu Bakr in Aleppo to celebrate the arrival of special water brought from Persia to repel locusts. At the head of the procession were the Muslims who were singing, followed by Christians chanting in Greek, and all together, they went around the wall of the city, in a most orderly fashion (al-Halabi, 1930). Attending the celebrations of Easter, the sultan "enjoyed them so much that he gave one thousand piasters" to the congregation, as reported Bulus al-Halabi. There were numerous manifestations of such inter-religious activities, especially around saints, venerated by Muslims and Christians alike (Heyberger, 2001). Bulus al-Halabi wrote the longest Arabic account in the early modern period about a journey to Europe—Russia. Thus

the longest travel account to Europe was written by an Ottoman Christian. Other members of the Orthodox community wrote about pilgrimages to holy sites—from Jerusalem to Mount Sinai—as in the case of Khalil Sabbagh the Damascene in 1753. With a group of fellow pilgrims, and accompanied by Bedouins, *irab*, he went to St. Catherine's Monastery where, as the pilgrims approached the bush that burned before Moses, they started chanting and praying and were joined in invocations by their Muslim guides.[14]

Another account about Russia, written in 1758, was full of praise not only of Russia but also of all *Urubba* (Europe). The author stated that his book was taken from the writings of numerous travelers, all of whom concurred that "those who have diagramed the earth, the historians, the lawmakers, the dealers with civic matters, the famous heroes, and the technologically advanced in warfare" are all from Europe. The author wanted to write a history of Russia and other countries/peoples of the world, describing "their fruit and fertility, seas and lakes . . . and all forts, courts, churches, and temples." He opened with praise of the Europeans (*ahl Urubba*), who, according to all historians, he affirmed, "are gentle and well-mannered, more so than all the other rough peoples inhabiting the third part of the world. They are kind and they love strangers and offer courteous greetings. They tend to mercy, justice, and generosity, have affable faces, and have a way of action and thinking that they have learned either from habit or education." The religions of the Europeans are first, and best, Christianity, which is three groups: Eastern, Western, and Lutheran/Calvinist churches; then the religion of the Ottomans and of the Jews. Not only were Europeans better than the other peoples of the earth, but indeed, it was because they had attained success (*najah*) that they had been able to "conquer other kingdoms in the other hemisphere where they have imposed their laws on people, taught them their crafts and sciences, and subdued them by the strength of their technology and their industry of war."[15] Specifically about the Russians, the author praised their physical prowess, their strength, their eating habits, houses, and feasts.

In the case of the Catholics: There was extensive interaction with Western Europeans. Maronite men of the cloth wrote about Western Europe to their congregations at the same time that they participated in the efforts of the French monarchy and the Vatican to print material in Arabic and Syriac for use among their home congregations. Like Bulus, who furnished his readers with a vast description of the world outside their homes—from Anatolia to Russia—the Catholic clergy also provided their congregations with news about European cities, based on personal visits or historical documents. The interest in Western Europe of these Catholic, and Orthodox-turned-Catholic/Uniate, clergy was wider than that of their Eastern Orthodox counterparts. To them, understandably, Rome was of central importance and clergy went

on pilgrimages, while Lebanese youths went to the Maronite College where they were trained in various disciplines of the humanities. The college offered total immersion in new languages and new religious mores so much so that many of the clergy became bi- or trilingual. In the first half of the seventeenth century, Gabriel Sionita/Jibrail Sahyuni introduced Arab-Islamic, as well as Aramaic, sources to his European hosts at the same time that he introduced Roman Catholic doctrine and ecclesiastical information to his Arabic- and Syriac-speaking countrymen. There is an informative description of Rome and Italy that was written in the late 1660s by the Iraqi priest, Hanna al-Mawsuli, while a nineteenth-century manuscript records the poetry of Jibrail Farhat, written at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Farhat mentioned his 1711 visit to the land of the West (*bilad al-gharb*) that included Malta and Rome where he visited St. Peter's Basilica. From 1712–1748, an anonymous Jesuit deacon from Damascus visited Rome, Palermo, Tripoli (Lebanon), Jerusalem, Napoli, and Palermo and Tripoli again, where his account ends.[16] Among all the Arabic-speaking peoples of the Ottoman polity, the Catholics had the most extensive knowledge of the non-Muslim world.

Where the Orthodox admired Moscow and its institutions, the Catholics admired Rome—to the point of adulation. In an account reproduced in an eighteenth-century manuscript, the anonymous author states that he recycled material from earlier sources, but that the information was quite accurate about this "glorious city." Rome, we are told, is surrounded by the sea from three sides, and land from the fourth, and has seven gates, with a river running through it called Constantine. In the middle is a church named after Saints Peter and Paul, who are buried in a marble urn. The author then continues with descriptions of other churches—one named after St. Stephen and another after Iris the deacon. Actually, the author explains, there are 1223 churches in the city, along with 10,250 cells for ascetics, and 12,000 *suks* (markets). The account goes on with fantastical exaggerations about gold and silver gates, pillars of pearls, and 6436 copies of the Bible, using rather curiously the word *masahif* (plural of mushaf, which is often used for the Qur'an), all of them covered in gold and precious stones. The text was clearly intended to show the glory of the city, its wealth, and its invincibility since, the author asserts, none has ever been able to conquer it.[17]

These few examples give a glimpse of the extensive interactions that were taking place between the Catholics, the Orthodox, and *ahl Urubba*. There is little doubt that intellectually and culturally the Catholics gained more by their interaction with Europeans than the Orthodox (e.g., Aouad & Fadlallah, 2009; Hage, 1990–1991). Still the writings of these two groups of Eastern Christians are significant since they emerge from the midst of a sometimes exclusionary Ottoman society. All written in Arabic (although

there were writings also in Syriac, especially among the Maronites), they give expression to engaged religious congregations, traveling, writing, preaching, and like Bulus and his fellow travelers, singing psalms on the road to Jerusalem. The fact that they were *dhimmis* in the Islamic polity was not discussed in his travelogue. Perhaps, as with al-Mawsuli, who visited South America where he witnessed the plight of the native Indians, these Christian "subjects of the sultan," to use Suraiya Faroqhi's (2005) phrase, were grateful that the Turkish conquerors had not treated them in the manner that the Spanish or English Christians had treated the peoples they had conquered.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that the latitude shown to Christian priests in the Islamicate world, both Ottomans and Europeans, was in sharp contrast to the practices in Protestant or Catholic Christendom. For instance, after Pope Gregory XIII established the Maronite College, Lebanese priests trained there and returned to their parishes to spread the teachings and ideology of the Vicar of Christ—under the very noses of the Ottomans whose chief enemy was that same Roman Vicar.[18] That a military payoff was envisioned by the papacy was certain: 20 years later, in 1605, Pope Clement VIII (reg. 1592–1605) considered, unsuccessfully, a joint Catholic-Druze crusade against the Ottomans in the Eastern Mediterranean. Meanwhile, an English Catholic under Queen Elizabeth I secretly traveled to the seminary in Douai (and then Rheims) to master Catholic teachings. He then returned to serve his Catholic community, was captured, drawn, hanged, and quartered as a spy of the Vicar of Christ.[19] Both Queen Elizabeth I and Murad, devout Christian and devout Muslim, respectively, wanted to convert the heretics and the unbelievers; but unlike Queen Elizabeth, the Ottoman Sultan did not see in Christian mission a foreign project of subversion and domination. Which is why no Catholic priests in his dominion had to hide inside priest holes similar to what was built into Roman Catholic houses of early modern England.

The World through Eastern Muslim Eyes

Among the Muslim populations in *Bilad al-Sham*, knowledge of the world extended to the vast regions of Islam, from Morocco to India (e.g., Weintritt, 1998). There are numerous accounts of pilgrimages to the holy cities of Jerusalem, Mecca, and Medina, as well as journeys to Istanbul, the administrative center of the Ottoman polity. The main sources that present us with an overview of their understanding of the world are the biographical dictionaries. Two of the most important ones were written at the end of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by Muhammad ibn Fadlallah al-Muhibbi (d. 1699) and Muhammad Khalil ibn - al-Muradi (d. 1791). The genre of biographical dictionaries was one of the most continuous in the Arabic tradition, and

until the modern age, there was no society as rich in biographical dictionaries as the Arab (e.g., al-Qadi, 2006; Sabbagh, 1986).[20] al-Muhibbi was a contemporary of the Englishman Anthony Wood (1967) who compiled the biographical dictionary of the graduates of Oxford University. The similarities between their two projects are striking in that both relied on personal information, documented material, and oral communications. But in the case of the two Arab biographers, they did not just focus on the men of one institution, Oxford, but on men who belonged to Sufi orders and *madrasa*s, to government offices and religious institutions, and to scholarly and jurisprudential professions. They wrote about the society of a whole century. Both authors were based in Damascus; both collected hundreds upon hundreds of biographies, in the case of al-Muhibbi, around 1,400 entries, and al-Muradi, around 1,000. The biographies ranging in length from a few lines, to multiple pages, recorded everything about the subject: birth, education, travel, profession, family, teachers, mentors, conflicts, writings, readings, schools attended, Sufi orders joined, idiosyncrasies, virtues, vices, miracles (*barakat*), and death. It is tempting to see these two men as the panopticon of a cohesive and interlinked Arabic-speaking world, which could be encompassed from one observation point. It was a world of extensive information networks, where a resident in Damascus, knew about rulers in India, or scholars in Jerusalem, or siege operations in Crete,[21] or poems recited in Fez (al-Muhibbi, 1966, p. 434).

Such knowledge was possible because a vast part of the world was under the authority of the Ottomans.[22] The Ottoman polity provided continuity and contiguity, which made the lives of the Arabic-speaking subjects revolve around axial cities such as Istanbul/Qustantiniyya, Damascus, Jerusalem, Cairo, Mecca and Medina. Nearly every man in the dictionaries lived or studied or traded in one or more of those cities. Other cities included Gaza and Nablus in *al-diyar al-muqaddasa*/the holy lands,[23] Aleppo, Tripoli (Lebanon), and Bursa. Further west into Europe, there are references to Bosnia, Crete, Malta, Sofia, and Belgrade (at one time a jurist is taken captive by the Maltese; at another, the mufti of Jerusalem is sent to serve in Belgrade). The Muslim Maghrib is there, particularly Morocco, but few go there, while Moroccan scholars travel east via Tunis and Libyan Tripoli to the axial cities of knowledge and pilgrimage (e.g., Orlov, 2009).[24] East of Damascus and Jerusalem, the road was open to Baghdad, after its Ottoman reconquest in 1638; and from Mecca and Medina to Yemen—especially to Tarim, the theological, juridical, and academic center of the Hadramaut Valley—and then to and from India.

Muslims of the *Mashriq* (the East) could move across three continents without encountering barriers in language or worship. If we recall the European Grand Tour, which has always been touted as the mark of Western

curiosity and desire for knowledge, then both its geographic scope and its ethnic diversity are dwarfed in comparison to the intercontinental travels of the Muslim, his exposure to cultural and ethnic diversity—Arab and Turk, Kurd, Persian, Armenian, and Indian—and to the variety of Sufi and religious traditions. It is also differentiated by the socioeconomic factor: only wealthy Europeans could go on the Grand Tour, preferably accompanied by tutors, while in the Islamicate world, a barber or a carpenter, an Indian ascetic or an Anatolian official or a Tunisian scholar could move, and settle, and then move on again. A carpenter by the name of Abd al-Rahman al-Khulani used to make his living by traveling to fix mosque doors. He was also a linguist and a calligrapher who had mastered the Qur'an; so after fixing the doors, he would inspect the copies of the Qur'an in the mosque. He would go through them to ensure that the scribes had made no errors in copying. And if he found the text unsatisfactory, he would produce for the mosque a new copy, made of paper that he made with his own hands, to ensure purity (al-Muhibbi, 1966).

All those who wandered were men. In the tomes of the two biographers, only one woman is mentioned. There are references to wives and mothers—some rather forward in their behavior—as well as to the hundreds of women who used to visit the ascetic of Damascus, Hasan al-Ghariq (al-Muhibbi, 1966), or to those who participated in the funerals of pious men (Ibid.). al-Muradi mentioned one woman—Zubayda, who was a poetess and lived in Istanbul. She was a voracious reader, studied the Qur'an, literature, and jurisprudence, and wrote poetry in Persian and Turkish. She became so famous that she was given permission to enter poetry contests with men, after which her poetry appeared in a volume that included her father's and brother's verse (al-Muradi, 1966). But no Arab traveler or writer described the women of his own community—nor any of the numberless women who traveled from as far as Baghdad and Tetouan to Mecca and Medina on pilgrimage. No biographer wrote about women—although pilgrimage accounts from Morocco sometimes referred to the women cutting across deserts and tumbling on camelbacks.

The vast majority of men traveled in pursuit of *ilm* (knowledge). Of the 1,290 biographies by al-Muhibbi, 1,100 are about scholars wandering in a world of theological and jurisprudential specialization. A student who wanted to master al-Bukhari, compiler of one of the two standard collections of *Hadith*, for instance, would seek the best teacher, even if that teacher lived thousands of miles away. He would pack up and leave. Shaban al-Fayyumi had hundreds of students in his Azhar classes from all over the Muslim world (al-Muhibbi, 1966, p. 231), and when the Moroccan Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Maqqari lectured in Damascus, thousands attended from as far as India. On his last day of lectures in 1037 AH/1628 CE, al-Muhibbi reported

that tears ran like rivers among his devotees (1966, p. 328). Also included in the quest for *ilm* were the visits to libraries and shrines of eminent scholars.[25] In a biographical dictionary about eighteenth-century Jerusalem, Hasan ibn Abdallah al-Husayni described Muslims flocking to the holy city not only to visit the Dome of the Rock but also to offer prayers at sites associated with prophets of Judaism and Christianity. It is described by al-Husayni that men from all over the Islamicate world gathered at prayer niches that he and other Muslims associated with David, or Moses, or St. George/*al-Khidr*. Even Rabia, famous for her asceticism in the eighth century, had a corner where pilgrims offered prayers. Obedient to Qur'anic teachings, al-Husayn (2010) celebrated with Muslim travelers the monotheistic revelations of *al-Quds al-bahiyya*/glittering Jerusalem.[26]

Only on rare occasions is there mention of any of the areas of *ilm* that the Arabs had mastered in the medieval period: mathematics, astronomy, and medicine (e.g., al-Muhibbi, 1966; al-Muradi, 1966). Biographers noted a few names, associated interestingly, with India: the Moroccan-born Ibn Sulayman al-Fasi studied in India, and "invented a large globe that superseded the old one and the astrolabe, and its use spread in India, Yemen, and Hijaz" (al-Muhibbi, 1966, pp. 306–307). But for the two dictionary authors, scientific knowledge was firmly associated with Persia and India—which is why many students traveled there.[27] There are no discussions of Arab/Arabic scientists or innovators (Clarence-Smith, 2006), and among the Sufis, there is not a single expression of interest except in meditation and asceticism: vast numbers of men traveled far and wide on their spiritual *siyahat* (journeys), but they sought the knowledge of God not of the world and its societies.

Only the *maghariba* (residents of the Maghrib) interacted with Europeans through commerce and piracy, friendship and chicanery, multilingual amity and even marriage. Euro-Christians were part of North African interaction so much so that numerous jurisprudential decisions focused on their legal needs along with entries pertaining to business relations with them. There are numerous ambassadorial accounts written by *maghariba* describing in great detail the European countries they visited: Spain, France, Holland, Italy (the kingdom of Naples and Sicily), and Malta—in contrast to the single account about Italy and Malta written by a *Mashriqi*—the secretary of Prince Fakhr al-Din c. 1618. At the same time, the Europeans were sending, and the North Africans were demanding, the novelties of western material culture. There are dozens of lists of gifts that were sent by British and French emissaries to the rulers and members of the courts in Morocco and the Ottoman regencies (Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya), affecting thereby a transfer of domestic culture and consumer goods. The British consul to Tunis in 1730, for instance, presented the Bey with a desk, a bookcase, and "Japan Cabinet," a telescope,

eyeglasses ("a reading glass") and "Two Gorgons." To the Kakhiya, he offered green tea, "Twelve Chocolate cups," and a silk handkerchief. To others at the court, he sent caftans and brocade, teapots and coffee cups, decanters and crystal mugs (National Archives). Similar lists of gifts go back as far as the end of the 1570s and continue well into the modern age. Consumerist products of Western European culture were becoming known in North Africa, but not their means of production.

By Way of Conclusion

So how much of the world and its diversity of peoples, religions, and histories did the Arabic-speaking populations of *Bilad al-Sham* know before Napoleon?

The Lands of Christians

The Eastern Christians knew about Central and Western Europe, long before their Arab-Muslim compatriots "rediscovered" Europe in the nineteenth century (Abulughod, 1963). Because of religious proximity, they did not feel too anxious about the foreign countries they visited, although Catholics seemed to have been more comfortable than the Orthodox. Their accounts present Western Christendom as an advanced civilization (from print to weaponry to state and ecclesiastical institutions), different in its social order from theirs, more sophisticated in its theology and intellectual search, and clearly wealthier. It remains a mystery as to why the Ottoman administration never made use of their writings in diplomatic and political negotiations. While European Catholic and Protestant missionaries furnished extensive information about the eastern Mediterranean (and other parts of the world) to their congregations, monarchs, and trading companies, the information gathered by Christian Arabic writers remained confined to the scriptoria and the ecclesia. There is no evidence that Turkish ambassadors to Russia in the eighteenth century, for instance, familiarized themselves with Bulus's work.

The Lands of Muslims

The lands of Muslims furnished economic and educational opportunities for people to travel and relocate in a largely unified cultural and religious space. A man could be born in Damascus, of Bosnian origin, study in Cairo, practice medicine in Istanbul, seek jurists in Jerusalem, enjoy (or declaim against) tobacco in Aleppo, drink coffee in Tripoli, teach chess (which was very popular) in Bursa, fight in Crete, wander in Salonica, write about astrology or

alchemy in Kashmir or Hyderabad, and die in Medina or San'a or Mosul (al-Muhibbi, 1966). The world was Ottoman, with the exception Morocco and India, although all were majority Sunni; but, al-Muhibbi included biographies of Shia men,[28] and of the *darawish,* the dervishes, "the poor of the *ajam* (al-Muhibbi, 1966, p. 290).[29] Meanwhile, and within the Islamicate polity of the Ottomans, Christians traveled to shrines and holy sites in provinces that had large numbers of their compatriots.

Only the *maghariba* from among the Muslim Arabs learned of the European changes just a strait away from them. But they did not adopt them. Nor did the Arabs of the *Mashriq*. From Marrakesh to Mount Lebanon, and from the early seventeenth century on, Arabs knew, for instance, about print. But at no point did any early modern Muslim Arab express interest in adapting print to the needs of his society. Prince Fakhr al-Din of Lebanon, after spending five years in Italy, and witnessing firsthand the printing press in Florence that produced Arabic texts, sought from his hosts assistance in building and baking, agriculture and animal breeding, but not print (Matar, 2003b). It is noteworthy that the man who introduced print to the Ottoman metropolis, Ibrahim Mutafariqah, was a Hungarian who converted to Islam. He managed to publish only 23 books that were not widely disseminated. Still, he pointed in the right direction by introducing his Ottoman compatriots to the advances in Western knowledge, from geography to political theory. Unfortunately, his death in 1745 put an end to this translating-cum-publishing project. At the same time, the Jesuit Missionary Père Pierre Fromage arrived in Tripoli (Lebanon) in 1710 and established a printing press in the monastery of Saint John in Dhour al-Shuwayr in Lebanon. However, he used the press to print Catholic doctrinal treatises rather than to introduce the readership to contemporary European science and discovery (e.g., Levenq, 1925).

Of all the manuscripts that have survived from the Christian Arabic corpus, there are no treatises about developments in astronomy or physics, no travelogues about the distant seas and continents, and no information about the pioneering work of early modern philosophers—from Bacon and Descartes to Kant. Similarly, in the thousands of pages of biographical dictionaries, there is not a single allusion to sociopolitical development, nor are there descriptions of European medicine, surgery, or engineering—except to wonder at them in the writings of Moroccan envoys. There is no mention of global navigations or of the peoples of the new worlds (except in al-Mawsuli's account). The Muslim Arabs of *Bilad al-Sham* were self-contained—intellectually productive, but not innovative. They were curious, traveling far and wide, but they did not cross the boundaries of religion or tradition.

I started by referring to Albert Hourani's argument that in the eighteenth century "the increased influence of the West, in commercial as well as

political life, as also in the minds of men entered as a factor" changed the lives of the peoples of the Fertile Crescent (1957, p. 91). This influence may have been felt by the Christian travelers, but their impact on their region was so minimal that there is no reference to a single Christian in any of the Muslim-authored biographical dictionaries of the period under study—in contrast to medieval Muslim-authored dictionaries where Jews and Christians were always present (Hourani, 1957). Furthermore, the Christians who acquired their education in Catholic and Orthodox countries focused on scholastic studies, with emphasis on logic and rhetoric, and not on the sciences that were changing rapidly. While some of them learned to write creatively about Aristotelian logic in Arabic (e.g., al-Qifti, 1903), and many could cite the works of Augustine or Chrysostom and controvert fine theological problems about the *per filium* or the early church councils, no attempt was made to make them conduits of the industrial, geographical, or intellectual innovations that were transforming Europe. Meanwhile, and in Egypt, economic prosperity in the eighteenth century led to the building of schools and to a marked increase in book copying and library collections. But as much as there was intellectual fervor among Muslim scholars, teachers, and jurists, it remained limited in scope and did not introduce the scientific and industrial world that was being consolidated on the European side of the Mediterranean (e.g., Hanna, 2003).

And so it may well be that Napoleon's artillery woke the Arabs up, as George Antonius wrote in 1933. And so did American artillery, since the U.S. fleet attacked Libyan Tripoli three years after Napoleon. Soon after, Muhammad Ali in Egypt (1805) sent Arabic-speaking Egyptians to Europe to learn about scientific modernity and religio-political reform, heralding thereby the Arabic *Nahda* of the nineteenth century.

Notes

1. See a further discussion of this question in Bu Alwan (2002).
2. For a critique of Eurocentrism, see Moghadam (1991).
3. In a seventeenth-century manuscript of jurisprudential decisions by Abd al-Aziz al-Zayati (1698), *al-Jawahir al-Mukhtara*, the Maliki jurist was asked whether Muslims should go to Christian Sicily. He replied in the negative because Muslims had gone there to sell wax, meat, saddles, wool, caftan, carpets, and other material to the Sicilians, thereby strengthening them in their aggression against Muslims. As the title explains, the text is "*nawazil*/judgements about *jihad* and all that pertains to it."
4. When Fakhr al-Din left for his five year exile in Italy and Malta in 1613, he and his large entourage could not but rely on Flemish and French ships; when the priest Hanna al-Mawsuli sailed to Italy in 1668, he boarded a French ship.

5. In 1615, Mulay Zaydan sent an ambassador to Holland in the hope of reaching France and negotiating the release of captives. In a letter to the States-General, Zaydan complained how his ambassador, who had "traversed seas and distant countries until he drew near" to his destination, found the French king denying him a ship and therefore shutting "the door in his face and forbidding him from even reaching him" (de Castries, 1906–1923, p. 604).
6. See also the very brief travel account by an Iraqi metropolitan to India (Khalil, 1979–1980).
7. See also Layla Sabbagh (1989) and Taylor (2006), which provides an interesting case study of Moroccan-English familiarity.
8. Such diversity would have been inconceivable in London or Paris, to have Moroccans, Egyptians, Persians, and Turks, for instance, engaged in trade at the same time.
9. Although some Arabs mastered Turkish (and Persian) in the period under study, there are very few writings in Turkish by Arabs.
10. Moving geographically from East to West, these were the Portuguese and Spanish conquests in Morocco alone: Melilla 1497; Sebta 1415; Tanga 1471; Asila 1471; Al-Araish 1489; Anfa 1469; Azammur 1513; Al-Jadida 1514; Asfi 1508; Al-S. uwayra 1506; and Aghadir 1505.
11. The "Mediterranean" has become a huge area of study. Yet scholars completely ignore Arabic perspectives, notwithstanding the fact that the inhabitants of over half the basin, from Tangier to Iskandarun, were Arabic-speaking who neither used the name "Mediterranean" (instead, they used *Rumi*) nor conceived of the basin as unity.
12. Since the end of the fifteenth century, also in the Islamicate empires, there was the largest Jewish population in the world.
13. Although Carl Brockelmann's *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur* remains the most comprehensive bibliography, I wish to draw attention to the catalogues of microfilms of Arabic manuscripts at Center for Archives, Manuscripts, and Bilad al-Sham Studies at the University of Jordan, prepared by Professor Adnan Bakhit from 1985–2000. The collection is most convenient as it includes reproductions of Arabic manuscripts from libraries all around the world. I am grateful to Professor Bakhit for his help during my research visit in summer 2012.
14. BnF, MS Arabe 313.
15. British Library, MS 10 ISL 2449, fos 3v–4r.
16. BnF MS Arabe 5085.
17. BnF MS Arabe 312; Bodleian Library, Oxford, Canon Orient MS 113.
18. The curriculum of the Arabic-speaking Maronite youths, who were sent to Rome to train for the priesthood, included disputation with Muslims in which they learned to use the Qur'an and other books to convince them of Christianity (al-Jumayyil, 1993).
19. The persecution of Catholics continued. During the Civil Wars and the Interregnum, especially in Ireland (the massacre of Drogheda); even John Locke (1689) famously excluded them when advocating religious toleration in *Epistola*.

20. The editions that are used in this chapter are al-Muhibbi (1966) and al-Muradi (1966).
21. Ibn Turkman was a Damascene who fought in Crete.
22. Interestingly, there is little hostility toward the Ottomans in Eastern Muslim Arabic writings. al-Muhibbi praised the sultan although he was critical of corrupt administration and poor governance, and mentioned regional conflicts with the *Turk,* in Yemen and Mount Lebanon. The Ottomans shared both religion and language with their Arab subjects, and so the world of learning and poetry, of teaching and jurisprudential instruction, remained an Arabic world. There were strong friendships, family ties, marriages, and patronages across ethnic and linguistic difference, with customs and dialects interfusing, some of which have remained till today—by far more than between the Ottomans and the Moroccans. Neither in al-Muhibbi's nor in other dictionaries is there a description of *al-turk* as aliens or as "imperialists."
23. Gaza the end of the holy land (al-Muhibbi, 1966).
24. For Malta captivity, see al-Muhibbi (1966) and al-Murādī (1966).
25. To use the library of a jurist with his thousand copies of the *Hadith* (of Bukhari), see al-Muhibbi (1966) about Abu Ghayth al-Qashshash. See other references to libraries in al-Muhibbi (1966) and al-Muradi (1966).
26. Another biographical dictionary by Abu al-Wafa ibn Umar al-Uradi (1992), consisting of a mere 78 biographies of Aleppans, shows a world of nearly total Sufi seekers, some so drawn to God that they certainly were insane—but somehow venerated for their piety.
27. See Sabbagh's (1986) discussion—although she gives too much credit to the "sciences."
28. Sabbagh (1986) lists all their names.
29. Actually, his grandfather wrote about Cairo, Istanbul, and Tabriz after living in all three countries (al-Muhibbi, 1966, p. 322).

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CHAPTER 4

Through Tinted Lenses: Iranian and Western Perceptions and Reconstructions of the Other

Mohammad R. Ghanoonparvar

A look at Iranian relationships with Western societies, especially in the past three decades, shows the dissatisfaction of Iranians with the Western "Other," as was manifested in the anti-Western slogans of the Islamic Revolution in 1978–1979 and has continued to the present day. A great part of this negative attitude is undoubtedly the result of political conflicts; but, of course, it seems to be also rooted in what can be termed "cultural conflict." While in recent centuries, Iranians have become aware of having fallen behind Western societies with regard to sciences and technological advancements, and therefore they look upon those that have made great progress in these areas with a combination of admiration and envy. Although Iranians have tried to emulate them in these respects in terms of acquiring modern scientific knowledge, often they have been reluctant to accept, and even apprehensive, regarding the manifestations of Western culture, which they have viewed as threatening to their own culture and values. For this reason, their attitude toward Western societies has been ambivalent. On the one hand, they desire the gains of Western knowledge and technology; on the other hand, they reject what they see as the decadent aspects of Western civilization. On the other side, the Iranian/Islamic Other in Western perceptions seems to evoke a different kind of ambivalence. An examination of the works of professional travel writers, documentary makers, and even journalists reveals an attraction to the "otherness" of what these travelers convey as the exotic social, political, and cultural aspects of Iran under the regime of the Islamic Republic and its citizens, in a sense expressing empathy with the

subject. At the same time, these travel accounts inherently convey a sense of superiority to the Iranian Other.

Even in our so-called information age the images that we have formed in our minds about other countries and cultures are usually inaccurate and often wrong. Information is generally selective, adulterated, altered, misunderstood, and wrongly interpreted by the transmitters. And even when it is accurately presented, we still have to use our own cultural perceptions, the way we are accustomed to understanding and relating to things, which are sometimes biased and inevitably mislead us in our interpretation of the Other and other cultures.

As a student of two distinct cultures and also a comparatist critic and translator who continuously shifts back and forth between two languages, Persian and English, and their two cultures that, as one observer describes, "are not even on speaking terms," and also because of the constant difficulties I encounter in trying to transmit ideas from one into the other, I often feel that mine is a futile effort altogether (Sprachman, 1985, p. 14). The differences and the sources of misunderstanding between the two cultures appear so large and seem so insurmountable that I even become grateful for the modicum of genuine communication that takes place between them. I am, of course, being overly cynical. In any case, this is a curse of translators. However, in practice, when one looks at the general outcome, communication does take place, and cultures somehow manage to understand one another.

The Exotic West in Nineteenth-Century Travel Writing

Prior to the last couple of centuries, the average Iranian had very little contact with and knew very little about Western societies. For the most part, of course, the West meant Christian Europe. What Iranians perceived of Western societies was based on second-hand information transmitted through other Muslim peoples who had had some direct contact with Europeans. In the earlier centuries of Islam, through the Crusades and beyond, these Muslim perceptions divided the world into *dar al-Islam* (the abode of Islam) and *dar al-harb* (the abode of war). In short, the West, or as Iranians called it, *Farang* or *Farangestan*, was a remote, vague, strange place that did not even occupy much space in Iranian people's imaginations. From the late eighteenth century, and particularly in the nineteenth century, a change began to take place with regard to Iranian perceptions of Western societies. Small numbers of Iranian travelers, mostly government officials or affluent and adventurous people, began to visit Europe.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the genre of the *safarnameh*, or the travel memoir—an established genre in Persian letters for many centuries—became quite popular in Persian letters. Although there is some attempt on the

part of these travelers to document for their compatriots back home aspects of Western societies and Western culture, there is a strong tendency among the majority of these travelers to show an exotic place, in some respects akin to the image of the Orient that existed in Western minds. Titles and subtitles such as "book of wonders" that are given to these travel accounts reinforce this notion. This sense of wonderment concerns not only what the observers see in the strange customs and habits of Westerners but also the innovations and inventions in technology and advancements in sciences. About the prosperity of Europe, one such traveler comments:

> Means of pleasure and all sorts of comfort can be found plentifully. All the people live such comfortable and affluent lives that the poor cannot be distinguished from the rich. Everyone wears expensive clothes made of silk and broadcloth, adorned with jewelry. Every home and building is like a royal palace. Gardens and orchards in the city and outside the city are like Paradise, and homes are furnished in luxury that is indescribable . . . They have created all sorts of parks, forests, and artificial lakes in the countryside, where people go on excursions in carriages . . . and do not allow any sadness or sorrow to enter their hearts. The means for a comfortable life are provided for them; their income is secure, and they know what their expenses will be; and their wealth is abundant. They do what they please and go where they please. They can say what they wish and buy whatever they see.[1] (Farmanfarmian, 1981, p. 248)

Despite the utopian picture that this traveler paints, at other times he has some harsh criticism of Europe. He describes public dances held in various parts of Paris as parties that are organized for men and women alike to find lovers. For this reason, he comments: "There is not a chaste woman to be found in Paris" (Farmanfarmian, 1981, p. 238). Concerning various kinds of entertainment in Paris, such as theater, circuses, and cabarets, he observes that they are used to rob people of their thinking faculties, and writes:

> People spend most of their time watching such comedies and plays. Religion, faith, spirituality, truth, humanity, chastity, chivalry, and honor can by no means be found. That which is widespread is absolute ignorance, superficiality, appearances, perdition, depravity, and aberration. May God protect any human being from such places, save the followers of Islam from coming to this land, and protect Moslems from dying in such places. (Farmanfarmian, 1981, pp. 247–248)

Overall, one can say that the attitude of most Iranians who saw Europe firsthand in the nineteenth century is ambivalent. With regard to the political systems and the relative freedom they see in the West or the freedom that

European societies allow women, while approving of them in one breath, they attack them in the next. One traveler praises the European custom in which boys and girls associate with each other prior to marriage as well as their choice of a spouse, but immediately criticizes the European institution of marriage and the freedom given to women in rather harsh terms:

> In that city, men cannot control their wives. If a woman so wishes, she is free to go with any man, even a stranger. Her husband cannot protest and prevent her, because that woman is free, and Europe is the land of freedom. Hence, the meaning of freedom must be merely the woman's choice to be unchaste; otherwise, in the West, the people are not free at all. (Farmanfarmian, 1981, p. 286)

Within a period of about a century, more than five hundred travel memoirs were written by Iranians in Persian, of which nearly 200 deal with travels to the West. By the end of the nineteenth century, the West was no longer merely a forgettable figment of imagination, not only for the educated, the affluent, and the upper classes, but also for many Iranians who lived in the large cities of Iran. These travel memoirs contributed to an understanding of the West that was contrasted with the backwardness of Iranian society—the West became a model, an ideal, and worthy of emulation. For the average person, the memoirs also created an exotic picture of the West. In other words, the travel diaries had reconstructed a fictional West in the Iranian psyche.

Twentieth-Century Literary Portrayals of the West

An Iranian play called *Jafar Khan az Farang Amadeh* (Jafar Khan Has Returned From Europe) written and performed in the early twentieth century humorously depicts aspects of reconstructed fiction.[2] Preparing for Jafar's return and trying to anticipate how he will have changed after having spent several years among the Europeans, Jafar's mother converses with his cousin, a would-be fiancée. The younger woman asks the older one, "Is it true that in Europe they eat the flesh of bears and monkeys and such things?" The mother answers:

> Of course it is. These infidels will eat anything. They drink strange liquors. I heard from a friend of mine whose husband has just returned from Europe that in Europe they drink a kind of liquor that they extract from the skin of their priests when they die. (Moqaddam, 1922, p. 3)

The would-be fiancée adds, "God forbid. I have heard that cognac is made from old shoes and dirty socks" (Moqaddam, 1922, p. 3). But the purpose of the play, overall, is not to create an exotic picture of the West. On the

contrary, focusing on the differences between the cultures, it provides a lesson to its audience; on the one hand, do not blindly accept everything Western; but on the other hand, the West has good things to offer.

These impressions of the West found in nineteenth-century travel memoirs and also in various literary forms in the early twentieth century show both aspects of the West in the Iranian psyche—first, as an exotic place and, second, as a culture toward which Iranians have had a kind of love-hate relationship, one that has persisted in the works of Iranian literary artists to the present. Political intrigues by the nineteenth-century superpowers in the region, namely Russia and England, created a negative image of these two cultures for Iranians. At the same time, the presence of the British in particular and Westerners in general helped bring about changes in Iranian society that are generally regarded in a positive light. For instance, the Constitutional Revolution in Iran in the early years of the twentieth century could not have occurred had the Iranians not become aware of the sociopolitical advancements in the West. On the other hand, because of the British involvements in the region and the British machinations that resulted in the loss of territory and prestige for Iran, a very negative image of the British developed in the country; an image that persists in the minds of many older Iranians even today.

In a popular novel of the early 1970s, *Dai Jan Napelon*, which was translated into English by Dick Davis (1996) as *My Dear Uncle Napoleon*, the social satirist Iraj Pezeshkzad creates the remarkably true-to-life, albeit caricatured, title character to demonstrate Iranian attitudes toward the British (Pezeshkzad, 1978).[3] The story takes place during World War II in Tehran, and the characters are members of an extended aristocratic family in a compound of houses surrounded by beautiful courtyard gardens. The eldest member of the family, Uncle Napoleon, is regarded by other members of the family as the head of their clan and, therefore, with a certain degree of awe. But because of his obsession with the famous French general, whom he quotes *ad nauseam*, the children have nicknamed him Uncle Napoleon, and to some degree, he is the target of ridicule by every member of the family.

Uncle Napoleon's obsession with and devotion to Napoleon Bonaparte is related directly to his hostility toward the British. He is possessed by fear of the British, and claims that he has fought them in battle as a young man. What is intriguing is that Uncle Napoleon sees the hand of the British behind everything that occurs outside or inside the family compound. He spends his life waiting for an opportunity to take revenge on the British, who he thinks are sending secret agents to discredit and destroy him. His anglophobia often causes him to fight other members of the family whom he accuses of being British spies. In one instance, he accuses his faithful servant of being a British spy. The poor servant, who has no idea what a spy or even what an

Englishman is, does not want to contradict his master and admits to being a spy and having been instructed to kill Uncle Napoleon. Having heard so much about British intrigues from his master, the servant firmly believes that the British are capable of making him a spy, even without his knowledge. Interestingly, while the generation of Uncle Napoleon had this negative image of the British, they continued to send their children to England to be educated and regarded the British with fascination and envy.

After World War II, and particularly after the 1953 CIA-supported *coup d'état*, which resulted in the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq and the reinstitution of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, American involvement in Iran increased and with it America and Americans, to some extent, replaced Britain and the British (Roosevelt, 1979). In a sense, the latter inherited the image of the former. The picture that gradually developed of America and Americans in the post-World War II period, like that of the British or the French earlier, is often a reconstructed fiction. An example is found in a short story by the famous Iranian writer and social critic, Jalal Al-e Ahmad, "*Showhar-e Amrikai*" (The American Husband) (Al-e Ahmad, 1976). In this story, Al-e Ahmad, who like many other Iranians, especially the intellectual and educated classes, had been angered by the American-executed *coup d'état*, wrote the story to take revenge on its perpetrators. For this purpose, he employs the monologue of an Iranian woman who has recently divorced her American husband as a storytelling device to increase the distance between the Self and the Other, and to vilify the Other. Initially, upon meeting the American, the woman and her family are most pleased and excited that he wants to marry her, especially since they think that he is an educated person, in fact, a lawyer. Later the woman finds out that her husband is not a lawyer but actually a gravedigger. The source of misunderstanding is the fact that she has mistaken the English word "layer" for "lawyer," since both words are transcribed identically in the Perso-Arabic script, and hence pronounced the same. A reader with no knowledge of English would assume that "layer" is the English word for gravedigger. As is the case in his popular polemic essay, *Gharbzadegi* ("Plagued by the West"), Al-e Ahmad has a polarized view of the world; that is, the East and the West (Al-e Ahmad, 1977). For him his essay is a wake-up call to the Easterners not to be dominated by Western culture, which he considers as inferior to that of the East. In "The American Husband," the narrator describes an American woman, the wife of a member of the Iranian Parliament, in the following terms:

> The woman spoke with a Texas drawl—no, don't laugh; I'm not kidding—and she would open her mouth so wide. You could see that she obviously used to wash large piles of dishes every day. And then, do you know what she said? She

> said, "We have come here and brought you civilization and taught you how to use a gas stove and a washing machine," and things like that. From her hands you could tell that in Texas, she still washed clothes by hand in a tub. And they put on such airs! She was the daughter of a cowboy—not the kind who discovers oil on his land and gets to be too big for his britches. No, she was one of those who tended to somebody else's cattle. (Al-e Ahmad, 1976, p. 69)

Al-e Ahmad extends his negative portrayal of America and Americans in this short story to the entire capitalist system, with a curious view of the funeral industry in the United States. Inquisitive about her husband's place of employment, the narrator visits the funeral home that she describes as follows:

> With all the attractive pictures of parks, trees, and lawns, if you did not know what the place was for, you would think they were building homes for honeymooners. And everything with charts and maps, all with dimensions, sizes, hinges, and handles on both sides, and flowers on the top. And what kind of wood would you prefer? And what kind of cloth would you like to cover it with? And what kind of service? And the hearse that takes you away, how many horses should it have? Or, if you wish, we can use an automobile, which is cheaper. Such a mechanized system! How many people you want in the procession, and what their wages would be, and how much emotion they should display, and each of them will play the role of a relative, and how they will dress, and what church. (Al-e Ahmad, 1976, p. 76)

With this description of the American funeral industry, Al-e Ahmad presents the United States as a country and culture in which even death is treated as a capitalist commodity. In this story, Al-e Ahmad uses the marriage between an Iranian and an American as a metaphor for relations between Iran and the United States. Referring to the American husband's profession, an Iranian friend of the wife comments that Americans "are all of this profession; they do it for the whole human race" (Al-e Ahmad, 1976, p. 80). Al-e Ahmad's fictional reconstruction of American society and his arguably inaccurate picture can be justified since, except for a short visit, most of his knowledge of the United States and the people there came secondhand.[4]

In the 1960s and 1970s, the negative image of America and Americans in many parts of the world was to some extent a result of the Vietnam War. In countries such as Iran, where television had just recently become available to a wider audience for the first time, the viewing of nightly programs and films about the war contributed greatly to the enhancement and perpetuation of this negative image, especially in the minds of various strata of Iranian society. Hence, Al-e Ahmad's portrayal of America and Americans, in a sense based

on ignorance and bias, is not unique. Another writer of some fame, Nader Ebrahimi, who was more than a decade younger than Al-e Ahmad, presents a similar, though seemingly a more "realistic" image of the United States and its people in a short story written in the mid-1970s. The scene of *Tappeh* ("The Hill") is an American army hospital where we meet Jack, a wounded war veteran (Ebrahimi, 1979). In this first-person narrative, Jack, who has studied philosophy in college, reminisces about the bitter experiences of the war and the loss of his friends and comrades, and reflects on what it means to be an American, on America, and on the role his country plays in the world. One of the images that Ebrahimi presents us of the United States through this fictional Iranian-created American character is based on American life as presented in Hollywood movies and American soap operas, which had become very popular in Iran by the early 1970s. While Jack calls the nurse to give him a drink (since he is accustomed to having a drink around sunset), his thought processes are fabricated by the writer based on such movies and television serials:

> These pretty nurses in the army are really a great gift. By the way, what would we do if we did not have all these soft, warm nurses? War would indeed lose all its depth and meaning. War is like cinema, like the movies, it needs pretty actresses. (Ebrahimi, 1979, p. 76)

After Linda, the nurse, tells him that hopefully he is not expecting her to have a drink with him, he responds: "No, I understand the concept of being on duty very well, even though all of us are 'on duty,' a sacred historical duty, believe me" (Ebrahimi, 1979, p. 76). And when the nurse comments that he seems to have strange ideas, Jack pontificates: "After all, I am an American philosopher . . . I have two flaws. I am both a philosopher and an American" (Ibid., p. 76). Later on, when Linda asks him if he is sorry that he is an American, Jack pontificates further:

> Oh no . . . no, Linda, I even like the ugliest of the ugly things about me; but I am not defending them. You know, we Americans are not bad people; we are just too emotional, with tender and sappy hearts. We even feel sorry for an ant when we see that it cannot hunt a live grasshopper. We feel so sorry for the poor ant that we immediately finish off the grasshopper. The only little thing that is wrong with us is that we do not feel sorry for the grasshopper. But, on the whole, when you look carefully, you can see that we are constantly feeling sorry. (Ebrahimi, 1979, p. 77)

The images of the United States taken from popular American cultural products around the world, including novels by Ernest Hemmingway, are also a

source of misreading the American Other in the story. About war in Hemmingway's work, Jack says, "Hemmingway worked very hard to show the reality of war," but he comments further that one enjoys Hemmingway's stories and then "war becomes a story, a novel, a film in which you see Gary Cooper, Ava Gardner, and such dolls, not things that one can only witness in wars" (Ebrahimi, 1979, p. 78). Finally, Ebrahimi sums up the American identity in his narrator's words:

> We want to make all the people in the world understand that their thinking is wrong, and that they "must" think correctly . . . We walk on our own feet voluntarily to Golgotha, and we are crucified without having one iota of Christ in us. (Ebrahimi, 1979, p. 82)

When the Exotic Becomes Alien

Following the 1978–1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, a large number of Iranians left Iran to live in Western societies. Unlike many students in the 1960s and 1970s who went to Europe and the United States to study with the intention of returning home and, therefore, did not feel that they had to spend the rest of their lives in the alien Western culture, many of those who left after the Islamic Revolution went to Europe and the United States to stay. For this reason, their experiences of life in Western societies have been more intimate. What is revealed in the works of fiction writers who have experienced exile in the past three decades is a sense of loss, the loss of their own culture, without having been able to absorb and be absorbed fully by Western societies.

A postrevolutionary novel by Mahmud Golabdarrehi, *Dal* ("Eagle"), is based on the experiences and encounters of Iranians who have lived in the West since the Islamic Revolution (Golabdarrehi, 1987).[5] The main character of *Eagle* is Nabi, a writer-translator, who has finally decided to join his wife and two daughters living in Sweden, after having lived five years in Iran apart from them since the Revolution. His wife and his daughters—one is in elementary school and the other a teenager—appear to have adjusted well to life in their new country. His wife has found a job, and the children attend school. Their adjustment to Swedish life and values, however, also indicates to Nabi such a transformation that he can no longer relate to them as members of his own family. While he has reluctantly fled his home country, because the government has moved in a direction opposed to his vision of a secular society, Nabi's escape to Europe faces him with a world that appears more alien and even more unbearable than the country he left. He begins to become aware of the pronounced sense of otherness of his new surroundings

on his first night in Sweden. In their small apartment, sitting next to his wife whom he sees as a stranger, they watch a television program in which several characters are having an argument. Nabi, who does not speak Swedish, asks his wife to explain. She says:

> The guy is a Turk. And that is his wife sitting next to him. His wife is Swedish. They have two kids. He has beaten one of them. The government found out about it and took the child away from him. They asked the boy about it, and he corroborated the charge. So, they took the second child away as well. The Turkish man has threatened that if they don't return his children to him, he will kill the children, his wife, and himself. Now, the Swedish government is in a dilemma as to what to do. There is a law that if a parent beats his or her child, the government will take the child away. But there is no law about returning the child. Now they have all gotten together and have been discussing what to do for a month. They want to convict the Turk and say to him: You have been in Sweden for fifteen years and are aware of and benefit from all Swedish laws. You benefit from insurance, vacation pay, and all the resources of the factory and other things. How is it that you did not know about this law and you beat your child? The Turk is becoming tamed gradually and is giving in. At first, he only cursed and shouted. But now, look at him, sitting quietly not saying a word. (Golabdarrehi, 1987, p. 14)

Having escaped the autocratic rulers who dictated how people should live their private lives, imposing dress codes and modes of behavior on adults and young people alike, Nabi now feels that the new society he has fled to is ruled by yet another type of dictatorship. He realizes that in exchange for all the amenities provided by the Swedish government to its citizens as well as to refugees like him, including free education, health care, job training, and even stipends while they learn about their adopted country and its rules and customs, it takes away from them certain "freedoms" that he had considered his natural right in his previous culture and community. His gradually formed perceptions about Swedish society are reaffirmed by other events that he witnesses or learns about. It seems odd to him, for instance, that one of his Iranian acquaintances, arrested for spousal abuse, is taken to a mental institution instead of prison to be treated for his mental disorder. Another Iranian refugee, who has been living in Sweden for a long time, sums up for Nabi what he has been unable to articulate in the confusion of his new environment.

> If a person is trapped in that institution, he is there for good. Even if they let him go, he will come back like he is addicted to the place, like a hand-trained pigeon, Mr. Nabi. That's the way they are themselves, and they want to make

> us become like them. If we fight and refuse to become like them, they tame us by force of pills and injections. They calm us down. They make us patient, compliant, meek and quiet. To tell you the truth, it's not just us; those who come to this society from other places must become like them after a while. If they don't, they can't go on living. If they refuse to do so, they make them become like themselves with a thousand tricks, just like themselves. (Golabdarrehi, 1987, p. 103)

Inevitably, Nabi also comes face to face with what he considers the dictatorial rules and norms of Western societies, when in the midst of a heated argument with his wife, he breaks some household items. The incident is reported to the police by his teenage daughter, whom Nabi perceives as someone who has been transformed into a person he no longer recognizes. He is then arrested and taken to the mental institution for treatment, where they give him injections to treat his disorder. Subsequently, Nabi succumbs: "His sense of honor and pride, his complaining, moaning and groaning, protestation, and anger were eradicated from his veins, arteries, and roots" (Golabdarrehi, 1987, p. 317). Reminiscent of Ebrahimi's strategy of using an American as the narrator in "The Hill," discussed earlier, Golabdarrehi also employs a Western character, Nabi's Swedish doctor, to authenticate the image he has presented of the West and the Western Other in his novel. After a failed attempt by Nabi to escape from the institution in which he has been confined, the doctor who seems baffled by Nabi's behavior says to him:

> I would like to ask, why were you trying to escape through the window? If you wanted to leave, you should have said so; we would have sent you on your way. We did not ask you to come here. You came of your own accord. And, now that you are here, why do you want to leave? If you want to, you can leave. But, if you want to stay, if you want to stay here, you cannot be the Nabi that you were. This is not what I want. It is not what medical science and the Swedish Medical Board want either. It is what you want . . . It does not matter where you were before and what was or is there. That does not concern us. You should have left the Nabi that you were, as you left the place that you left to come here. Did you not leave the place where you left? . . . If you want to stay here, you must become our Nabi. You must become like us. (Golabdarrehi, 1987, p. 319)

Unlike Al-e Ahmad and Ebrahimi, whose portrayal of Western societies is based on their rather hostile political views regarding the West formed in many parts of the world in the postcolonial decades, Golabdarrehi presents us with an image of the West that is more haunting; it is an image of a Brave New World in which the West with all its might is trying to transform or reform the Other and its identity into that of the Western Self. Golabdarrehi's

portrayal of the Western Other, however, appears to be an attempt, albeit perhaps a failed one, at a better understanding of the Other.

Western Perceptions of the Iranian Other

The urge to understand the Other, which is generally coupled with misunderstanding and misperceptions based on preconceived notions, goes both ways. Similar to the Iranian perceptions of the West and the Western Other, Western perceptions of the Iranian Other are also tinted. To explore this phenomenon, I would like to review briefly the history of the writings of travelers to Iran, and then examine a number of narratives of such travelers in recent decades, including both Westerners and Iranian Americans, in terms of the travelers' selected subject of observation, narrative style, intended audience, and cultural or political implications.

In a book called *Mosaferan-e Tarikh* (Travelers in History), published in 1985, the author, Masud Nurbakhsh, provides us with a history of travelers to Iran from ancient times to the twentieth century in nearly seven hundred pages (Nurbakhsh, 1985). A look at the history of these travelers, who have left behind accounts of their travels in some detail, reveals that many, if not most, of them embarked on their journeys for purposes of business or trade and occasionally for diplomatic reasons. During the Safavid period (1501–1722), for instance, a list of European travelers includes British, French, Italians, Germans, and others. While Nurbakhsh lists a few dozen European travelers to Safavid Iran, a partial list of European visitors to Qajar Iran (1785–1925), in particular during the nineteenth century, contains about two hundred names of officials, scholars, and tourists, many of whom recorded their travel accounts in writing, at times supplemented with drawings and photographs. Often characterized by exoticism, pre-twentieth-century travel accounts of Westerners to Iran and the region as a whole convey a sense of otherness of the people and the cultures the travelers visited. Along with the improvements in roads and easier transportation facilities, and thereby an increasing number of visitors and tourists during the Pahlavi era (1925–1979), gradually, the exotic was replaced with the familiar, and the distance between the Western traveler's Self and the Iranian Other began to diminish. The events that took place in Iran in the last two decades of the twentieth century, including the Islamic Revolution, the taking of American hostages, and the eight years of the Iran-Iraq War, not only made traveling to Iran less desirable for Western tourists, but the restrictions imposed by various countries as well as Iran itself on visits by Westerners gradually brought back the exotic to the writing and other travel accounts of a much smaller group of travelers to Iran. In a sense, the distance between the Western Self and the Iranian Other once again began to increase. Interestingly, a survey

of conventional travelogue writings, such as Colin Thubron's (2007) *Shadow of the Silk Road* and Christiane Bird's (2001) *Neither East Nor West: One Woman's Journey through the Islamic Republic of Iran*, seems to convey an attempt on the part of the authors to reduce the distance between the Self and the Other, an attempt that at times appears to have the reverse effect on the reader (Thubron, 2007). At times, however, even in these works, the reader finds occasional traces of exoticism. For instance, Thubron, a professional travel book writer who is perhaps targeting a particular type of reader, unabashedly describes the women in the city of Mashhad in words reminiscent of nineteenth-century travel writings that are at times referred to as "books of wonder."

> As for women, framed in chadors leaving the face bare, they seemed scandalously exposed. I stared at them rudely as they passed. They had feathery brows and dark, swimming eyes and lashes. Many were softly beautiful. Some wore a brazen hint of lipstick or eye-shadow. They might have been naked. (Thubron, 2007, p. 263)

In contrast to Thubron's observations are Christiane Bird's descriptions of Iran, which she visited in the fall of 1998. For her, the visit is a personal quest of sorts. Having lived in Iran as a child with her parents for three years, she embarks on this journey with a sense of nostalgia, as if trying to recapture her younger days in a country that now seems shrouded in mystery. The connection she has with the culture and the people of Iran helps her to narrow the cultural and even political gap, which she transmits to her readers. At the end of the journey, her concluding reflections convey her success in narrowing the gap between her Western Self and what she had initially imagined to be the strange alien Other represented by the new revolutionary, highly religious people in the Islamic Republic.

> For me, the veil that had descended over the country after the Islamic Revolution deepened its attraction. Iran was a secret place, an enshrouded place, a very private and enormously rich place to which I, by what often seemed a great stroke of good fortune, happened to have very personal ties. Always I felt it a privilege to be in Iran—the *hejab* seemed a small price to pay. Always I felt it a privilege to be invited into people's homes—whether I agreed with their religious beliefs and politics or not. Sometimes I worried that I was somehow missing the "real" Iran or clomping clumsily about on a culture I didn't understand. But then those moments passed and there I was again, surrounded by an astonishing world. (Bird, 2001, p. 386)

Similar to Colin Thubron, Rick Steves is known as a professional travel writer who also makes travel documentaries; but unlike Thubron, in all his travel accounts, he makes an attempt to present the Other as familiar. His

well-known documentary called *Rick Steves' Iran*, made for American Public Television in 2009, begins with these words:

> Hi, I'm Rick Steves—in what just might be the most surprising and fascinating land I've ever visited. We're in Iran—here to learn, to understand, and to make some friends. Thanks for joining us.
>
> Like most Americans, I know almost nothing about Iran. For me, this is a journey of discovery. What are my hopes? To enjoy a rich and fascinating culture, to get to know a nation that's a leader in its corner of the world—and has been for 2500 years, and to better understand the 70 million people who call this place home.
>
> We'll show the splendid monuments of Iran's rich and glorious past, discuss the 20th century story of this perplexing nation, and experience Iranian life today in its giant metropolis, historic capital, and a countryside village . . . Most important, we'll meet and talk with the people whose government so exasperates America. We'll go to Friday prayers in a leading mosque, consider the challenges confronting Iran's youth, enjoy the hospitality of a family dinner, and survive the crazy Tehran traffic before experiencing the tranquility of rural life and meeting joyful school kid.s on a field trip.

Even though as in much of his work, Rick Steves' effort is to make the unfamiliar familiar by showing similarities in peoples and cultures, still he often falls into the trap that other travel writers have fallen into and presents his audience with images that enhance the exotic. An example is found on the cover of the video of the documentary, a photograph in which he poses in a squatting position in front of some 20 young women, all veiled in black.

Holly Morris' (2002) *Adventure Divas: Iran, Behind Closed Cha-dors* is another travel documentary made by a professional travel writer and filmmaker. As the title of the series suggests, Morris travels with an agenda, namely to find women who challenge the status quo in their societies and try to create change, especially with regard to the role of women. She presents the viewers with an account of life in Iran, not only from her own Western perspective but from the perspective of what she calls Iranian "divas," including a feminist women's magazine publisher, an artist who also serves as an adviser to former Iranian president Khatami, a woman entrepreneur who has created her own small taxi company to serve women, a film director, and an elderly woman in her 70s from a small village who paints colorful scenes and portraits, sometimes with nude subjects. Like Rick Steves, Holly Morris, in a different way, tries to make the unfamiliar familiar; but the choice of subject,

Iranian "divas," creates for the viewers an othering effect similar to that of the video cover photograph of Rick Steves.

The Othering of the Former Self

For people from different societies and cultures to contribute consciously or subconsciously to the othering of the Other may seem inevitable. But, such othering is sometimes also done by expatriates who have had to leave their country of birth or have done so by choice and now upon visiting their former homeland find themselves to be distanced from its people and way of life. Although this type of othering is different from that of the Westerners who write about their encounters with the Iranian Other, such "othering" effects can also be seen in the travel accounts of Iranian Americans who return to visit their place of birth. For example, the well-known television journalist Christiane Amanpour's (2000, February 27) *Revolutionary Journey*, which aired on CNN, is indeed more than a journalist's report on Iran. As the word "journey" in the title suggests, for Amanpour, it is a different visit to Iran than merely that of a journalist. For her, it is a personal journey; and although she reports on political and other newsworthy issues, she takes the audience to her former home, to the house in which she lived with her parents, and nostalgically describes how the living room was decorated, their private courtyard, and her own room.[6] With her father and cousin, she reminisces about her childhood years in Iran, and with younger relatives, she converses about life in the Islamic Republic. *Revolutionary Journey* is in fact a going-back-home account, a going back to a home that she cannot go back to and call home again.

Another nostalgic return journey is Jahangir Golestan's (2003) *Iran: A Video Journey*. Golestan, who describes himself as a businessman and independent filmmaker, has set his mission as trying to create a better understanding between the people of his birthplace, Iran, and his adopted country, the United States. Despite this stated quest, however, his travel video is motivated by and a product of his nostalgic sentiments about his younger days. With his video travel account, he takes the viewer to historic sites in Tehran, Isfahan, Kashan, and the village of Abyaneh. He spends much of this one-hour video in Isfahan in particular, enthusiastically showing off his city of birth, and nostalgically filming and describing the traditional life of his own family. Although, like Rick Steves and Christiane Bird, he strives to shorten the distance between Iran and his American audience, this penchant for focusing on historic sites and traditional Iranian culture rather than presenting a rapidly—both socially and economically—developing country and a people whose lives and preoccupations mirror those of the rest of the world in many ways seems to widen the gap and perpetuate the exoticism of the subject.

The saying, "a picture is worth a thousand words," may be applicable to the new travel media accounts insofar as a one-hour video journey may convey a larger volume of information than an hour of reading a travelogue. What remains the same, however, is the tinted lens that is used by both travel writers and filmmakers. After all, no matter how objective any traveler tries to be when recording his or her observations about the people and places being visited, that which is observed and recorded is viewed through a cultural lens and is inevitably tinted, if not altogether distorted.

This cursory look at relationships between Iranians and Western societies and the perceptions of each regarding the other shows the distrust on both sides and the tension that has been intensified over many centuries, especially during the past several decades. On the Iranian side, this distrust of the Western Other, has been manifested in various international and intercultural forms, such as the anti-Western slogans of the Islamic Revolution in 1978–1979, which have continued to the present day. Much of this attitude is undoubtedly the result of political conflicts that have developed over many years, but, of course, it seems to be also rooted in what can be termed cultural conflict. In recent centuries, Iranians have become aware of having fallen behind the Western societies with regard to sciences and technological advancements. Hence, they look upon those that have made great progress in these areas with admiration and envy and have tried to emulate them in terms of acquiring modern scientific knowledge. At the same time, they have often been reluctant to accept and even been apprehensive regarding the manifestations of Western culture, which they have viewed as threatening to their own culture and values. For this reason, their attitude toward Western societies has been ambivalent in that, on the one hand, they desire the gains of Western knowledge and technology, and on the other, they reject what they see as the decadent aspects of Western civilization. On the opposite side, the Iranian/Islamic Other in Western perceptions seems to evoke a different kind of ambivalence, usually based on preconceived negative notions about the Eastern, and in particular Muslim, Other. All this presents us with a rather grim and gloomy picture regarding the likelihood, or even the possibility, of what the former Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami, most optimistically called in the early years of the twenty-first century "a dialogue between civilizations," unless and until a sense of need and willingness to understand the Other develops on both sides.

Notes

1. All translations from Persian are mine unless otherwise indicated.
2. An English translation of this play is being prepared for publication by Maryam Shariati.

3. Pezeshkzad's novel became even more popular after it was adapted for a television serial by Naser Taqvai.
4. Al-e Ahmad's visit to the United States was in the summer of 1965, when he spent a brief period of time at Harvard University as part of a visiting fellowship program.
5. I have discussed this story in a somewhat different context in *In a Persian Mirror* (Ghanoonparvar, 1993).
6. Amanpour herself states on Charlie Rose's television program that she wanted to bring a "personal perspective" to this television special.

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CHAPTER 5

The Clash of Civilizations 2.0: Race and Eurocentrism, Imperialism, and Anti-Imperialism

John M. Hobson

Introduction

Samuel Huntington's famous "clash of civilizations" thesis had not only a large impact in the 1990s but its popularity was boosted even further after 9/11 and indeed continues to dominate popular thinking about world politics in general and the relationship between Muslim and Western societies in particular. The imaginary civilizational clash between Muslim and Western societies stems back at least as far as Bernard Lewis, much as one can find antecedents to Edward Said's (1978) book *Orientalism*. In this spirit of tracing genealogies, I want to argue that the work of Lewis and Huntington, as well as William Lind, represent what I shall call the "second wave" of the civilizational clash thesis of world politics in general and of the relationship between Muslim and Western societies in particular. For it was during the 1889–1945 era, when scientific racism was a key metanarrative of much of Western international thought/theory, that the first wave of the civilizational clash thesis was born—or what might be called "the clash of civilizations 1.0." This is significant because by drawing the parallels between these two waves, we can glean new insights into understanding the contemporary thesis—or what I am calling "the clash of civilizations 2.0." For the parallels emerge most clearly when we recognize that Huntington's clash thesis is highly Eurocentric.

While I am by no means the first to make this claim (e.g., Bowden, 2009; Chan, 1997; Hall & Jackson, 2007; Salter, 2002), in this chapter I seek to

shift the analysis several notches along. First, while most people associate Eurocentrism with an imperialist mind-set, I shall argue that the work of Huntington and Lind exhibits an anti-imperialist Eurocentrism. This is not to discount the point that there is also an imperialist clash of civilizations theory, though I will not consider this here.[1] Rather, I will focus on the point that Huntington and Lind hark back to the first wave of anti-imperialist scientific racism, espoused most famously by the likes of Lothrop Stoddard, Charles Henry Pearson, B. L. Putnam-Weale, and Madison Grant. Indeed, Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations* takes us back to the future of a number of scientific racist treatises including Stoddard's *The Rising Tide of Color* (1920) as well as his *Clashing Tides of Color* (1935), and, albeit less directly, Putnam Weale's *The Conflict of Colour* (1910) as well as Basil Mathews' *The Clash of Colour* (1926) and his *Young Islam on Trek: A Study in the Clash of Civilizations* (1927). This is not to tarnish Huntington's theory with a scientific racist brush, for I believe that Eurocentric institutionalism is quite different from scientific racism. Despite the different variants of "Orientalism" that these theories exhibit, they nevertheless share one major claim in common—that the barbaric Other constitutes a threat both to world order and, above all, to Western civilization. At the end of the nineteenth century many Western scientific racists constructed China as the clearest example of the barbaric peril, framed as the "yellow peril," much as Huntington does today.[2] Less prominently, majority-Muslim societies were sometimes singled out by various racist thinkers—most notably Lothrop Stoddard—though it would be fair to say that the trope of the "barbaric-Islamic threat" gains much greater purchase in the "clash of civilizations 2.0." However, although Muslim and Western societies are the prime focus of this volume, it is the general metanarratival foundations of the clash thesis that interest me here.

The advantage of my genealogical approach is that it recasts the contemporary "clash thesis" in an altogether different historical light to that which is conventionally imagined. In this way I can simultaneously reveal the different forms that both "generic Eurocentrism" can take and the concomitant variants of the clash thesis that are embedded within the different Eurocentric metanarratives. This chapter is divided into two key sections. The first section will detail the shared overlaps between the anti-imperialist variants—that is the post-1889 scientific racist-thesis and the post-1989 Eurocentric-thesis. This focus seems appropriate given that it is Huntington's theory that is conventionally most closely associated with the idea of the clash of civilizations thesis. In the second section, I begin by drawing out some of the principal aspects of Huntington's Eurocentric "monological" approach before going on to provide an alternative non-Eurocentric dialogical account of the relationship between Muslim and European societies—in historical perspective. This

will examine some of the many ways in which the Muslim Middle East helped enable the original rise of the West. In essence, this leads to a gestalt-switch away from what has been called the "substantialist" account of inter-civilizational relations toward a "relational" framework (Jackson, 1999). Thus rather than treating civilizations as autonomous and self-contained, self-generating entities that are often diametrically opposed, I will treat the Muslim and Western worlds as promiscuous civilizations that are significantly "other-generated" as they entwine in mutually co-constitutive and promiscuous ways.

The Post-1989 Anti-Imperialist "Clash of Civilizations 2.0" in the Post-1889 Scientific Racist Mirror

Here I will reveal six key areas of overlap that Huntington's (and Lind's) theory shares with the anti-imperialist racist version that was first advanced by Charles Pearson and later by Lothrop Stoddard and Madison Grant. It is noteworthy that both these thinkers were prominent scientific racists of their time. Pearson was a seminal figure and in many ways stimulated the new phase of scientific racist international theory after 1889. In particular, he was the first scientific racist to talk about the nonwhite threat to white racial supremacy, and in many ways he helped usher in the new "high-anxiety genre" of scientific racist thought that existed in the 1889–1945 era. Certainly no scientific racist up to that point had predicted the impending demise of the white race in the face of the yellow peril. Stoddard—a famous American eugenicist-racist—echoed Pearson's dire prophecy, as did his mentor, Madison Grant. Interestingly, as a leading eugenicist Grant's book, *The Passing of the Great Race* (1918) was a key inspiration for Adolf Hitler. Hitler wrote Grant stating that the latter's book constituted "my bible." His work was also highly influential within the United States, and he has often been credited with influencing the 1924 Immigration Act as well as the various eugenicist laws that were passed by the U.S. government.

Still, while I draw a series of parallels and overlaps between Stoddard/Grant and Huntington/Lind, it is vital to appreciate that I am in no way trying to smear the latter thinkers with the scientific racism of the former. For the "clash of civilizations 2.0" is grounded in what I call *defensive Eurocentrism*, which differs to what I call *defensive scientific racism*. I distinguish these metanarratives on the basis that scientific racism places a strong degree of emphasis on genetics and biology as underpinning difference, even though this was often accompanied by a deep emphasis on climate and physical environment. By contrast, what I call *Eurocentric institutionalism* defines difference in terms of cultural and institutional factors. Thus the West is thought to be civilized on the grounds that it had developed rational institutions and

culture while the East is deemed to be governed by irrational institutions and culture. I refer to both of these discourses as "defensive" on the grounds that they are largely preoccupied by the so-called "barbaric threat" while seeking politically to defend the West from its pernicious effects. My claim then is that Huntington and Lind work within a defensive (anti-imperialist) Eurocentric institutionalism that exhibits overlaps with Stoddard and Grant's defensive (anti-imperialist) scientific racist eugenics in terms of the *content* of their theory rather than in terms of their precise metanarratival foundations. In short, then, Huntington's thesis was clearly Eurocentric but certainly not scientific racist.

The Demographic Roots of Western Civilizational/White Racial Decline

The first area of overlap concerns the "problem" of relative demographics and global Malthusian crisis. As Mark Salter (2002) points out, one of the key aspects of much of scientific racism was its preoccupation with relative demographics and Malthusian crisis. While Thomas Malthus (1798; 1971) believed that the demographic threat lay *within* European societies rather than between them and the non-European world, the clash thesis that was articulated by Stoddard and Pearson emphasizes the demographic explosion of non-Western populations—especially the Chinese and the Muslims—on the basis that this would come to threaten Western civilization directly. That is, the population explosion in the East would lead to a wave, if not a tsunami, of incoming non-Western peoples—or "surplus colored people" as Stoddard called them—as they flooded out of their congested homelands to look for a space to live within the West. Or, to paraphrase the old Nazi expression, for the defensive racists the movement of the Eastern peoples into the West was perceived as a kind of "Drang nach Westen" ("drive toward the West"). Stoddard laments that "prophets" of impending white decline such as Meredith Townshend (1911/2010) and Charles Pearson (1894) had been largely ignored (e.g., Stoddard, 1920), and in seeking to puncture this bubble of white hubris he proclaimed that the white race must wake up and acknowledge its relative and absolute decline.[3]

Regarding the relative decline of the white race, Stoddard argued that it was being numerically eclipsed by the supposed rapid population spurt of the nonwhite races. And regarding the absolute decline of the white race—a point that is less widely understood—when many scientific racists, especially eugenicists, talked about white racial vitality they in fact had in mind the vitality of the upper class whites only. Indeed, for many eugenicists and Darwinists, white racial vitality was a euphemism for white elite vitality. Thus

the survival of the white race lay in the hands of the superior white elite that comprised the white "neo-aristocrat" as opposed to the white working class "under-man" (Stoddard, 1922b), "sub-man" (Freeman, 1921), or as the socialist, Leo George Chiozza Money (1925) put it, the "white peril." Significantly, Freeman (1921) sees in the British sub-man a lowlier figure than the Negro. One expert summary has it that the white "unter-mensch," to borrow a phrase that was later embraced by Nazism, constituted "the enemy of whiteness, an enemy who is both a racial throwback and a harbinger of an anarchic future" (Bonnett, 2004, p. 19). Finally, the Eastern population explosion marked a distinct threat to white racial vitality because it would be harnessed to the expansion of the economic and military power of Muslim and Chinese/Japanese states and societies. And this in turn would directly fuel the imperialist drive of the Muslims and the Chinese/Japanese (as I explain later).

Similarly, in Huntington's book *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996) the roots of the barbaric threat that the Chinese and Muslims in particular pose for Western civilization are located within a neo-Malthusian framework that begins with the Eastern population explosion (Lind, 1991), which issues a wave or tsunami of surplus population that washes into the West in general and the United States in particular. Moreover, rapid population growth in Muslim-majority countries is dangerous because the disproportionate rise in the numbers of adolescent youth feeds directly into the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalist movements that stand opposed to the West. And more generally, the escalating population growth limits their societies' capacity to accommodate such rising numbers and thus leads to expansionist tendencies that impact directly on their neighbors in the first instance and on the West in the last.

Awarding the Barbaric Races/Civilizations High "Predatory" Agency

A second key shared property between Huntington's modern anti-imperialist Eurocentrism and anti-imperialist racism lies in the propensity to award the barbaric races high, if not extremely high, levels of Eastern agency. At first sight this will no doubt appear most perplexing to the reader, given that the received understanding of Orientalism/Eurocentrism as bequeathed by Edward Said (1978) assumes that the Eastern peoples enjoy little or no agency. Thus it is usually assumed that "agency" in world politics and world development is the preserve or monopoly of the West. However, while many scientific racists subscribed to this view including the likes of Lester Ward (1903/2002), Karl Pearson (1905), and Benjamin Kidd (1898), some awarded high levels of agency to certain Eastern races. Here it is helpful to appreciate perhaps the most counterintuitive point that exists within the

scientific racist, white supremacist literature: for while many assume that eugenics promoted a strong sense of Western supremacy and white racial self-confidence, in fact many eugenicists and social Darwinists were wracked by a sense of impending doom as far as the white race was concerned. And, as noted earlier, Charles Pearson was probably the first to enunciate this sense of white racial anxiety. So significant is this point that it is worth dwelling on.

In his seminal book *National Life and Character: A Forecast*, Charles Pearson (1894) argued that white racial supremacy was being superseded by very high levels of predatory Eastern agency. Indeed, "[i]n attributing historical agency to the 'black and yellow races', Pearson posed a radical challenge to conventional race thinking and to social Darwinists such as Benjamin Kidd, whose *Social Evolution* was published the following year in 1894" (Lake & Reynolds, 2008, p. 88). In many racist texts, it was assumed that the whites are destined to expand while the lower races will remain within their stationary limits, destined to die out in the fullness of time. But in Pearson's racist imagination, this picture is almost completely inverted. It is the white West that is fated to remain within its stationary limits while the yellow races are destined to expand and triumph over the higher whites.

Likewise, for Stoddard the key problem facing Western civilization that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century is the threat that the browns and yellows posed to the white race. So dire did he perceive this threat that his whole book was issued as a means to challenge the hubris of the white race as it rested on its laurels secure in the belief of white supremacy and brown/yellow racial inferiority. To this end he proclaimed:

> Too many of us still think of the Moslem East as hopelessly petrified. But those Westerners best acquainted with the Islamic world assert that nothing could be farther from the truth; emphasizing on the contrary, Islam's present plasticity and rapid assimilation of Western ideas and methods. (Stoddard, 1920, p. 60)

Moreover, as he notes in his book *The New World of Islam*, Muslim societies have not passively imitated the West but are attempting "a new synthesis—an assimilation of Western methods to Eastern ends" (Stoddard, 1922a, p. 50). Ultimately, though, for all its vibrancy and indeed creativity, Islamic agency is constructed as predatory, given his claim that "Islam is militant by nature, and the Arab is a restless and war-like breed" (Stoddard, 1920, p. 102). Also of note is that he viewed the yellow races—the Chinese and especially the Japanese—as equally plastic and capable of significant material development. Indeed, the browns and the yellows were imbued with such high levels of (predatory) agency that they would come to colonize large parts of the world.

Lying behind this racial analysis is Stoddard's deep anxiety, if not sheer panic, that had emerged initially after the Japanese victory over the white Russians in 1905. Indeed, references to this "seismic" event are peppered throughout the book, the most dramatic of which asserts that

> [m]ost far-seeing white men recognized [the Japanese victory] as an omen of evil import for their race-future . . . [The Japanese victory was] momentous . . . for what it revealed. The legend of white invincibility was shattered, the veil of prestige that draped white civilization was torn aside, and the white world's manifold ills were laid bare for candid examination. (Stoddard, 1920, pp. 171, 154, 12, 21)

The general direction of Stoddard's thinking lay in the perception that after four hundred years of white racial pre-eminence during the Columbian Epoch, the Japanese defeat of Russia marked the very high tide of white supremacy, with only its subsequent ebbing away in prospect. For this event signaled, in no uncertain terms, the rapid and virulent rise of the yellow and brown tide.

Huntington very much echoes this analysis by granting various Eastern societies high levels of agency. As he put it, during the twentieth century, "[f]ar from being simply the objects of Western-made history, non-Western societies were increasingly becoming the movers and shapers of their own history and of Western history" (Huntington, 1993, p. 53). This refers to their ability to develop economically as well as to resist the influence that the West had previously imposed upon Eastern societies via imperialism. Moreover, Huntington echoes Pearson's anxiety vis-à-vis the Chinese as well as Stoddard's anxiety vis-à-vis the Chinese and the Muslims. As he put it in his 1993 article:

> After World War II, the West . . . began to retreat; the colonial empires disappeared; first Arab nationalism and then Islamic fundamentalism manifested themselves; the West became heavily dependent on the Persian Gulf countries for its energy; the oil-rich Muslims countries became money-rich and, when they wished to, weapons-rich. This centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent. On both sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilizations. (Huntington, 1993, pp. 31–32)

William Lind reinforces this message when he asserts that

> [A] potential threat from Islam may develop if the Soviet Empire breaks up. [If so] the West's great right flank . . . will almost certainly be endangered as the Islamic republics seek to join their Muslim brethren . . . [such that] the

> twenty-first century could once again find Islam at the gates of Vienna, as immigrants or terrorists if not as armies. (Lind, 1991, p. 45)

Overall the clearest point of overlap between all these thinkers lies with their implicit notion of Eastern predatory/barbaric agency since China and especially Muslim societies constitute the antithetical threats to Western civilization and to world order.

Constructing "Globalization-As-Barbaric Threat"

A third overlap exists in the shared perception of globalization/rising global interdependence, or what might be referred to as the trope or idiom of "globalization-as-barbaric threat." For they all view rising globalization as delivering the barbaric peril onto the doorstep of Western civilization. At the end of the nineteenth century, the phrase—the "closing of the world"—was used as a euphemism for what we today call "globalization." Focusing in particular on the Chinese threat Pearson argues that it is likely to mobilize against the West in the coming years as China's burgeoning population inevitably spills out into the wider world. Moreover, this race's ability to flourish in the tropics and the Europeans' preference not to work alongside inferior races means that it is only a matter of time before the Chinese expand successfully at the expense of the whites. Thus he claimed that a

> hundred years hence, when these races, which are now as two to one to the higher, shall be as three to one, when they have borrowed the science of Europe, and developed their still virgin worlds, the pressure of their competition upon the white man will be irresistible. He will be driven from every neutral market and forced to confine himself within his own. Ultimately he will have to conform to the Oriental standard of existence. With civilization equally diffused, the most populous country must ultimately be the most powerful; and the preponderance of China over any rival—even over the United States of America—is likely to be overwhelming. (Pearson, 1894, pp. 137–138)

Accordingly, the most fertile parts of the earth will be taken over by the predatory and regressive barbaric races. In general, he concludes that "the black and yellow belt, which always encircles the globe between the tropics, will extend its area and deepen its color with time" (Pearson, 1894, p. 68). All of which leads him to argue that residing within the non-temperate zone offends natural laws, with the result being that the white race will be pushed back into the confines—or what he in effect envisaged as a ghetto—of the small temperate zone (Ibid.).

The famous black intellectual and activist, W. E. B. Du Bois, opened his book, *The Souls of Black Folk*, with the prophecy that "[t]he problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line—the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the seas" (Du Bois, 1905, p. 13). Pearson did much the same, but inverted the racial hierarchy that Du Bois had in mind. According to Pearson, the white races would be constrained and confined within a narrow belt of the temperate zone, while the black and yellow races would effectively hem them in and develop their own vitality while sapping that of the whites. And it is in this context that Pearson offers up his famous prophecy:

> The day will come, and perhaps is not far distant, when the European observer will look round to see the globe girdled with a continuous zone of the black and yellow races, no longer too weak for aggression or under tutelage, but independent, or practically so, in government, monopolising the trade of their own region, and circumscribing the industry of the European. The citizens of these countries will then be able to take up into the social relations of the white race, will throng the English turf, or the salons of Paris, and will be admitted to intermarriage. It is idle to say that if all this should come to pass our pride of place will not be humiliated. We shall wake to find ourselves elbowed and hustled, and perhaps even thrust aside by peoples whom we looked down upon as servile, and thought of as bound always to minister to our needs. (Pearson, 1894, p. 89)

Huntington echoes this approach and argues that one principal reason for the clash of civilizations since 1989 is that

> [The] world is becoming a smaller place. Interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences. North African immigration to France generates hostility among Frenchmen. Americans react far more negatively to Japanese investment than the larger investments from Canada and European countries. (Huntington, 1993, pp. 25–26)

Or as he put it in his later follow-up book *Who Are We?* the identity crises of Western peoples are in general caused by the "emergence of a global economy, tremendous improvements in communications and transportation [and] rising levels of migration" (Huntington, 2004, p. 13).

The Critique of Multiculturalism/Liberal Cosmopolitanism

The fourth area of shared overlap is the critique of multiculturalism and liberal cosmopolitanism. For both Huntington and Lind, what makes the rise of China

and Islam in general, and the exodus of Chinese and Muslims that then washes into the West in particular, so virulent is the stimulus that it provides to the growth of the political virus of home-grown Western multiculturalism. Thus while the exodus of non-white peoples from the non-Western world provides the trigger for the crisis of American civilization, the indigenous growth of multiculturalism within the Western citadel provides the bullet. And just as Western liberal sentimentalism or liberal cosmopolitanism helped fuel and nourish the "colored immigration peril" according to Stoddard, so for Huntington it constituted the Trojan Horse that served to open the Western citadel's floodgates to the incoming tsunami of non-Western immigrants. Interestingly, James Kurth (1994) argues that the "real clash" is between Western civilization and multiculturalism *within* the West. For both Huntington and Lind, maintaining the cultural purity of America in the face of this "barbaric-cultural invasion" is a vital factor in renewing America as the ultimate defender of Western civilization, much as it was for Stoddard and many other defensive racists. And much as Stoddard was deeply anxious about the declining white racial unity as a result of domestic factors, so for Huntington and Lind homegrown multiculturalism serves not only to boost the vitality of "foreign cultures" within the West but simultaneously dilutes the hegemony of Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture.

In order to counter this multicultural threat Huntington prescribes that the prime responsibility of the United States today is to police the Eurocentric line of civilizational apartheid in order to keep the contaminating influence of non-Western cultures at bay, thereby maximizing the distance between Anglo-Saxon and nonwhite cultural elements. As Huntington put it in the all-important final chapter:

> The futures of the United States and of the West depend upon Americans reaffirming their commitment to Western civilization. Domestically this means rejecting the divisive siren calls of multiculturalism. Internationally it means rejecting the elusive and illusory calls to identify the United States with Asia. [For when] Americans look for their cultural roots, they find them in Europe. (Huntington, 1996, pp. 307, 318)

Moreover, in *Who Are We?* Huntington (2004) launched into a critique of multiculturalism at home and of Latin American immigration and the contaminating influence upon the American Creed that "Hispanization" entails.[4]

Critically, such an analysis harks back not just to Stoddard and Charles Pearson but also to the arch-eugenicist and anti-immigrationist, Madison Grant. In this context Grant's complaint is prescient—to wit the

> result of unlimited immigration [into the United States] is showing plainly in the rapid decline in the birth rate of native [white] Americans. The native

> American is too proud to mix socially with [the immigrants] and is gradually withdrawing from the scene, abandoning to these aliens the land which he conquered and developed. The man of the old stock is being crowded out . . . by these foreigners. These immigrants adopt the language of the native American, they wear his clothes . . . but they seldom adopt his religion or understand his ideals and while he is being elbowed out of his own home the American looks calmly abroad and urges on others the suicidal [multi-cultural or multi-racial] ethics which are exterminating his own race. (Grant, 1918, p. 91)

Still, while Huntington calls for strong nonwhite immigration controls, he also argues that nonwhite immigrants *can and must be* culturally fully assimilated to the American creed. Of course, this might imply that the parallels with the nineteenth- and early–twentieth-century racists diverge at this point, given that the latter were highly critical of nonwhite immigration for the racial-miscegenation (the interbreeding of whites and nonwhites) threat that it posed, as well as for the "fact" that inferior nonwhite races were unable to assimilate culturally. While this was certainly the case for Stoddard, Grant, and many others, many scientific racists believed that even under conditions of non-Western immigration, Western civilizational purity could be maintained through cultural assimilation. This position often emerged as a function of Lamarckian-racist input. In this particular respect, Huntington's argument finds its closest parallel with Lamarckian-inspired racists such as John W. Burgess, who asserted that

> I consider . . . the prime mission of the ideal American commonwealth to be the perfection of the Aryan genius for political civilization. *We must preserve our Aryan nationality in the state, and admit to its membership only such non-Aryan race-elements as shall have become Aryanized in spirit and in genius by contact with it*, if we would build the superstructure of the ideal American commonwealth. (Burgess, 1895, p. 407, *emphasis added*)

Here, then, Huntington's defensive Eurocentrism finds its closest scientific racist parallel with parts of Lamarckian-inspired international theory, which allows for the cultural conversion or cultural assimilation of nonwhite races to white Anglo-Saxon or Teutonic racial culture. It is important to note that Lamarckianism rejects the view of racial characteristics as fixed or permanent. Rather, it sees them as capable of change and improvement under the "right" social conditions.

In particular, the ultimate problem with multiculturalism as far as the defensive scientific racists were concerned is that it promotes miscegenation, whose dysgenic effect would be to degenerate the white race through creating a breed of inferior hybrids. In the work of Grant any number of quotes could

be marshaled to this effect. But the closing words of his introduction to Stoddard's (1920) book are as good as any.

> Democratic ideals among an homogeneous population of Nordic blood, as in England and America, is one thing, but it is quite another for the white man to share his blood with, or intrust his ideals to, brown, yellow, black, or red men. . . . This is [race] suicide pure and simple, and the first victim of this amazing folly will be the white man himself. (Grant, 1920, p. xxxii)

This was the exact same logic of Stoddard's argument in which he concluded the following.

> It was typical of the malaise which was overtaking the white world that the close of the nineteenth century should have witnessed an ominous ignoring of white solidarity . . . [and that multicultural] internationalists caressed visions of "human solidarity" culminating in universal race-amalgamation. (Stoddard, 1920, p. 170)

For Stoddard, like Grant, viewed race amalgamation in the gravest of terms, seeing it as the ultimate dysgenic form of white racial suicide.

Anti-Imperialist Eurocentrism in the Anti-Imperialist Racist Mirror

The fifth parallel between Lind/Huntington and Stoddard as well as Pearson and Grant comprises their anti-imperialist politics. Stoddard rejected Western imperialism in Asia on the grounds that it served only to alienate the yellow and brown races that would then seek to avenge the West, while Pearson believed that the game was up for Western imperialism for a number of reasons.

Stoddard's (1920) critique of imperialism had several prongs, the first of which is that it had helped Asian societies to develop economically. Ominously, this helped fuel their subsequent expansion out of their confines within Asia, with all the perils that he associated this with s far as white/Western supremacy was concerned. Second, the cause of national imperialism within the West was extremely fraught as this effectively helped divide the white race along self-defeating lines. In particular, he was especially critical of the "Prussian plotters of Weltmacht" whom he indicts for the conflagration (i.e., World War I) that unintentionally undermined white racial unity while simultaneously promoting the colored racial cause. Here he singles out for particular criticism the famous racist, Houston Stewart Chamberlain (one

of the precursors to Hitler), and his Pan-Germanic propaganda. Ultimately, Stoddard is highly critical of the cause of national-imperialism not for the destruction that it caused in the East but for the fact that it exhibited a "callous indifference to larger [white] race-interests" (1920, p. 204), effectively sacrificing white racial unity on the altar of short-sighted individual national interests. Here too Stoddard described World War I as the "modern Peloponnesian War;" an argument that fed directly into the arguments of a string of "pacifist eugenicists" such as G. F. Nicolai (1918), Helene Stöcker, and Alfred Ploetz, all of whom lamented the war on the grounds that it weakened and divided white civilized Europe. What then was to be done?

Stoddard's political prescription was to take on many Western imperialists and to insist on the need for the whites to retreat from their imperial bases in Asia, thereby leaving the land to yellow and brown self-determination. As he explains elsewhere, while Western imperialism had previously been beneficial, nevertheless, by the twentieth century its repressive *modus operandi* served only to alienate thoroughly the rising brown and yellow races (Stoddard, 1922a). And, in particular, because the yellow races had "always sought" to develop in isolation of others, so he deemed it an egregious mistake that the white race had ventured there in the first place. Given the strength of these rising races and their desire for emancipation in the face of declining white vitality, the whites would be far better off relinquishing their imperial control of Asia. This might also help placate these particular colored races in the hope that this could act as an implicit *quid pro quo* for maintaining the security and purity of what Stoddard referred to as the "inner white dikes."[5] To this end, he asserted dramatically that

> One thing is certain: the white man will have to recognize that the practically absolute world-dominion which he exercised during the nineteenth century can no longer be maintained. Largely because of that very dominion . . . [we now witness] a widespread [nonwhite] ferment . . . which is destined to grow more acute in the near future. (Stoddard, 1920, p. 228)[6]

Similarly, Pearson (1894) emphasizes the point that the rise of the Eastern races lies in the help that they have been given by the British imperial civilizing mission. For having delivered the accouterments of Western civilization, the resulting prosperity triggered a non-white demographic explosion. Coupled with the point that the white races in the colonies seek to avoid work, so eventually they will be absorbed and displaced by the nonwhites.[7] Important here is Pearson's argument that colored and white races cannot exist side by side. This argument is complemented by his emphasis on the degenerative impact that the tropical climate imposes on the white race. Crucially, civilized

white races cannot colonize India or China, Central Asia, Malaysia, or Africa, owing to their hostile climates. This leaves only Eastern Afghanistan and Western Turkestan as possible outlets because they could support the white race climatically. But, in turn, these were discounted as viable options on the grounds that they were destined to come under future Chinese control.[8] Thus for various reasons, the Western civilizing mission had now reached its limits and was destined to die out in the near future.

Last but not the least, Grant echoes Stoddard's ambivalent critique of white imperialism. Drawing on the familiar racist tropes of the perils associated with tropical climate and miscegenation, Grant (1918) argues that colonialism in Africa, Asia, and Latin America has served only to weaken the white race. He even goes as far as to argue that the Nordic race is unable to survive south of the line of latitude where Virginia is because of the detrimental impact of the hot climate. But like Stoddard, Grant (1918) produces an ambivalent and at times contradictory critique of white imperialism. In particular, he argues that the whites have successfully exterminated the natives of Australia and New Zealand and will accordingly play a significant role in the future history of the Pacific. And, although the climate of India undermines white genetic vitality, nevertheless he suggests at one point that colonizing India *is* possible as long as it is done by a very small group of Nordics who must keep away both from the native population for fear of racial contamination and from the degenerative effect of the sun's actinic rays.

Huntington and Lind echo much of this even though they do not subscribe to a scientific racist metanarrative. Notable here is Lind's following assertion.

> A defensive stance should facilitate alliances with other cultures. [But] it is important to emphasize that the call for a culturally oriented foreign policy is not a call to revive Western imperialism. Rather it is a call for the West to prepare to defend itself. As such, it need not be threatening to anyone else, and should be carefully presented as nonthreatening. (Lind, 1991, p. 48)

Similarly, Huntington's anti-imperialist defensive Eurocentric angst leads him to this conclusion.

> The belief that non-Western peoples should adopt Western values . . . is immoral because of what would be necessary to bring it about . . . Imperialism is the necessary logical consequence of [such a] universalism . . . Western universalism is dangerous to the world because it could lead to a major intercivilizational war between core states, and it is dangerous to the West because it could lead to the defeat of the West . . . A multicultural America is impossible because a non-Western America is not American. A multicultural world

> is unavoidable because global empire is impossible. The preservation of the United States and the West requires the renewal of Western identity. (Huntington, 1996, p. 318)

Or as he warned in more succinct terms, it is "most important . . . to recognize that Western intervention in the affairs of other civilizations is probably the single most dangerous source of instability and potential global conflict in a multicivilizational world" (Huntington, 1996, p. 312).

All in all, the political overlap between the two anti-imperialist theories of the clash of civilizations comes together in their shared belief that the white races/Western peoples must renew their civilizational purity and huddle together inside the walls of the Western citadel, batten down the hatches, raise the drawbridge, and lower the portcullis in the face of this incoming barbarian tsunami. For in the absence of such a defensive strategy, nonwhite immigration, when combined with the "Trojan horse" of homegrown multiculturalism and political correctness, will serve only to subvert the underlying structure of Western civilization thereby fatally bringing the citadel's inhabitants to their knees. In summary, Huntington and Lind share with the racist cultural-realists—Stoddard, Grant, and Pearson—an overarching desire to maximize the distance between East and West, especially by curtailing non-white immigrants and by policing and protecting the boundary between white and non-white, Western and non-Western, civilizations.

The "Fundamental Clash" between East and West

Finally, this all culminates in the point that Huntington and Lind share with the scientific racists—a fundamental belief in a great divide between East and West. Clearly for Grant, Stoddard, and Pearson, the core dynamic of world politics was the clash between the "barbarous East" and the "civilized West." However, my general reader might assume that such a binary conception is missing in Huntington's work. For it is often thought that Huntington specified the existence of eight civilizations precisely so as to transcend the allegedly "essentialist" East/West divide.[9] But it turns out that his Eurocentric approach leads him to demarcate just such an "essentialist divide;" to wit his conclusion that

> On a world-wide scale civilization seems in many respects to be yielding to barbarism, generating the image of an unprecedented phenomenon, a global Dark Ages, possibly descending upon humanity . . . In the clash of civilizations, Europe and America will hang together or hang separately. In the greater clash,

> the global "real clash" between Civilization and barbarism . . . [the advanced Western countries] will also hang together or hang separately. (Huntington, 1996, p. 321)[10]

Re-imagining the Dialogue of Civilizations: Muslim Origins of Western Civilization

In order to counter the monological-substantialist approach developed by Huntington I will advance in brief form a non-Eurocentric framework that brings the dialogues between Muslim and Western societies to the fore. In this gestalt-switch, a set of affiliations emerge such that these two civilizations are no longer presented as self-constituting, self-generating billiard ball-type entities, but are (re)presented as hybrid amalgams. Nevertheless, this is not to discount the conflicts that have punctuated the long historical interactions between these two civilizations that, of course, began *officially* in 1095 when Pope Urban announced the beginning of the Christian Crusades against Muslims (even though Christian-Muslim relations stem back to the eighth century). Rather, my simple claim is that the "media-friendly" headlining discourse of the clash of civilizations has obscured the more peaceful and far less dramatic *dialogical interactions* that have long underpinned the relations between Muslim and Western societies. While Europe entered into all manner of dialogues with a variety of civilizations, the two that were most important were those with China and with Muslims. In what follows I will provide a very quick overview of the historical dialogues between Muslim and European societies that were in turn critical in enabling the rise of the West between about 650 and 1500.

The development of "Europe" (or Christendom) after about 650 CE owes much to what could be called the "Eastern Age of Discovery" that began around 500 CE (Hobson, 2004). After 650 it was the West Asian Muslims who played a critical role in stimulating Afro-Eurasian trade. The Ummayads, Abbasids, and North African Fatimids were vital insofar as they united various arteries of long-distance trade known in antiquity between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean—or what one author calls the "Middle" and "Southern" trade routes—(Abu-Lughod, 1989).[11] Significantly, while Eurocentric world history praises the Venetians in stimulating international trade after about 1000 CE, it is important to recognize that while the Italians might well have been key players within Christendom, they were, nevertheless, mere middlemen or intermediaries in the much larger Eastern trading system. Indeed, they always entered the nascent global trading system on terms dictated by the West Asian Muslims and especially the North Africans.

Later, with the Fall of Acre in 1291, the Venetians had no choice but to rely on the Southern route that was dominated by the Egyptians. Indeed, from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century Egypt constituted the key player in the Afro-Eurasian trading system (Abu-Lughod, 1989). And to an important extent it was only the goodwill of the Egyptians that enabled the Venetians to maintain their modest intermediary place in this trading system in the period down to 1517.

However, the Muslim influence upon Italy and then on Christendom was not confined to trade but extended into a series of other significant areas. In this respect, Muslim influence upon the rise of the Italian financial revolution was striking. The so-called Italian creation of the *collegantzia* (or *commenda*) trading partnership institution turned out to be an exact replica of the Muslim *qirad* trading partnership that had been pioneered many centuries earlier. Moreover, all the remaining financial institutions, including banks, bills of exchange (*suftaja*), checks (*hawala*), and insurance schemes originated in Sumer and Sassanid Persia before they were developed much further by the Muslims. The Muslim origins of Italy's so-called financial revolution linked in with the world of Islam's primacy in trade, given that it was Italy's extremely close trading links with Muslim West Asia and North Africa that enabled the diffusion of these Muslim financial institutions in the first place (Hobson, 2004).

No less important to the rise of Italy and to Europe more generally was the Renaissance. This is related by Eurocentric historians as a pure "European" phenomenon that harken back to the so-called originary genius of the ancient Greeks. To the extent that the Muslims are given any credit at all, it is usually done on the basis that they were mere librarians who simply handed the ancient Greek texts back unchanged to the Europeans. It is certain that at the House of Wisdom (*Bayt al-Hikmah*), which was founded in the early ninth century by the seventh Abbasid caliph, al-Mamun, a large number of important and key ancient Greek texts were translated into Arabic from which the Muslims learned a great deal. Arab scholars also drew heavily on Persian, Indian, African, and Chinese thinking to craft a corpus of knowledge that greatly extended, and at times transcended, the earlier Greek texts. It is also the case that the Muslims were often critical of Greek knowledge and sought to take it in new directions. However, rather than go through the huge number of Muslim ideas that stimulated the European Renaissance, I will simply refer my reader to other sources (e.g., Bala, 2006; Ghazanfar, 2006; Goody, 2004; Hobson, 2004; Joseph, 1992; Raju, 2007; Saliba, 1994).

Another crucial contribution of Muslim societies to the rise of Europe was in making possible Europe's so-called "voyages of discovery." However, before proceeding to consider the Muslim contribution, it is worth noting that these

voyages discovered nothing that was not already known to many of the Asian peoples, given that so much of Asia and indeed Afro-Asia was already linked in to the nascent global trading system through the trading activities of their merchants. Moreover, these interlinkages stem back to the second half of the first millennium CE (i.e., about a millennium before Vasco da Gama set sail). Accordingly, the term European "voyages of *re*discovery" might be a more appropriate term. In fact, 1492/1498 did not mark the initial moment in the rise of a proto-global economy, for it represented the moment when the Europeans *directly* joined the extant Afro-Asian-led global economy, which stemmed back to its initiation after about 600 CE.

How then did the Muslims enable the voyages of rediscovery? There was a series of important innovations. First, it is highly probable that the Iberians derived the lateen sail from Muslim ship design. This sail was crucial in enabling oceanic sailing. In particular, when the Iberians began to travel down the west coast of Africa, they would of course have encountered the violent headwinds that blow just south of Cape Bojador. These could only have been negotiated with a lateen sail (given that it enables the ship to sail directly into a headwind). Second, because the lateen sail promotes a zig-zagging (triangular) path, the Iberians would have had to rely on geometry and trigonometry in order to have been able to calculate the linear distance path traveled. This mathematical knowledge was passed on to the Europeans from Muslim West Asia, which in turn had been a key factor in promoting or enabling what has been termed the European Renaissance. In addition, because the strong tides south of Cape Bojador could beach a ship, knowledge of lunar cycles was required (given that the moon governs the tides). This knowledge also came from Muslim scholars, though interestingly, it was the Jewish cartographer Jacob ben Abraham Cresques, who relayed this information to the Iberians. (Note that he had been a resident in Portugal.) It is noteworthy that the Iberians relied on a number of Jews who resided in their territories, in spite of the fact that they could not be openly seen courting Muslim knowledge, since Europeans defined themselves negatively against the Muslim Other. Recall that Christendom was borrowing large amounts of knowledge from the West Asian Muslim world, beginning roughly at the same time that it was waging war on the Muslims during the Crusades. Thus while the official line was for the Europeans to oppose Islam, the reality was that behind these dramatic headlines lay a regular and intensive dialogue between them, even if the knowledge flowed from East to West. Last but not least, there was a whole series of further Muslim contributions to the European navigational and nautical revolutions, including the borrowing of solar calendars, more accurate navigational charts, latitude and longitude tables, as well as the astrolabe and quadrant (e.g., Hobson, 2004; Seed, 1995). All in

all, it would seem fair to conclude that without this vitally important Muslim-European dialogue the Europeans would most probably have remained confined to the Muslim Mediterranean.

In general, it is notable that Muslim presence in Europe was significant for its symbiotic and largely peaceful, cosmopolitan relations with the Europeans. Indeed, behind the dramatic headlines of the "Crusading clash with Islam" existed a more mundane, everyday reality where Christians and Muslims as well as Jews peacefully co-existed for many centuries in cosmopolitan Muslim Spain (Menocal, 2002) and elsewhere in Europe and in West Asia. Moreover, a striking paradox emerged in the fact that under Muslim rule in West Asia, Jews and Christians were tolerated and protected in ways that even certain Christian sects had not allowed (e.g., in Jerusalem). In summary, far from constituting a bridgehead from which the Muslims sought to launch attacks on the rest of Christendom, *al-Andalus* formed the final rampart of the Muslim "bridge of the world" across which Muslim and other Eastern resource portfolios diffused, thereby fueling the progressive development of Europe.

Conclusion

My basic political conclusion is two-fold. First, I argue that Huntington's Eurocentric policy prescriptions for "renewing and preserving the West" serve only to enshrine and perpetuate the conflictual dimension of the relations between Muslim and Western societies. If we recognize that the West is a poly-civilizational amalgam that is significantly constituted by Muslim ideas, technologies, and institutions, then we can puncture the very Western hubris that marks the essence of the idea of the clash of civilizations. Second, this Western hubris can be deflated by recognizing that the West owes a considerable debt to the East. For it is debatable as to whether the West would have risen in the absence of Muslim help. Thus rather than seeking to other the world of Islam negatively in order to preserve and nurture a falsely pure sense of Western Self, we would do better to recognize the inherent affiliations between these civilizations. And these two acknowledgments should constitute the point of departure for the long walk toward genuine reconciliation between Muslim and Western societies.

Notes

1. For further reading on this, see Hobson (2012).
2. The term the "yellow peril" was used first by Hungarian General Turr in relation to the rising Japanese threat in June 1895, as well as by Kaiser Wilhelm in

September 1895 following Japan's victory over China. Wilhelm used this construct in order to support his militant imperialist posture, writing Theodore Roosevelt: "I foresee in the future a fight for life and death between the 'White' and the 'Yellow' for their sheer existence. The sooner therefore the Nations belonging to the 'White race' understand this and join in common defense against the coming danger, the better" (cited in Weikart, 2003, p. 287).

3. Various *imperialist* scientific racists also perceived various non-white races—brown Muslims but especially the yellow Chinese and Japanese—as a barbaric threat to Western civilization. Alfred Mahan spoke of "the stirring of the East" and "its entrance into the field of Western interests, not merely as a passive something to be impinged upon, but with a vitality of its own, formless yet, but significant" (1897, p. 97). His solution was for the Anglo-Saxon races to bandwagon together and then, go on the imperialist offensive so as to contain the barbaric threat. Halford Mackinder (1904) argued along similar lines. But neither saw the white races as undergoing an internal decline, unlike Pearson and Stoddard.
4. Note that while Mexico, of course, lies in the same line of longitude to the United States (as does Africa vis-à-vis Europe), nevertheless Mexican culture is seen as inferior to American civilization.
5. By the "inner white dikes" Stoddard (1922a) had in mind the heartlands of the white race: Europe, North America, parts of South America, Australia and New Zealand, and South Africa.
6. However, despite Stoddard's (1920) general anti-imperialist thrust, his position in this respect is certainly qualified by the fact that he was not calling for an end to white imperialism. For he insisted that the white colonial strongholds in black Africa and red South America must be retained because they constituted giant barricades or breakwaters to any potential advancing brown/Muslim and yellow/East Asian imperialist wave. This derived from his belief that "Pan-Islamism once possessed of the Dark Continent and fired by militant zealots, might forge black Africa into a sword of wrath, the executor of sinister adventures" (Stoddard, 1920, p. 102). This feeds into his claim that the blacks are susceptible to this kind of external influence given their passivity coupled with their intensely emotional predisposition. Moreover, in Latin America too, which is populated by a similarly static, as well as being a highly degenerate, colored race, "the whites must stand fast—and stand together" in the face of an impending tsunami-like yellow imperialist invasion.
7. The idea that the white races could not work in the open fields in the tropics as the sun's actinic rays would lead only to white racial degeneration was a trope of much of scientific racist thought.
8. Although the idea of the tropics constituting a dysgenic effect on the white race was a commonplace, the irony is that such an argument tended toward an anti-imperialist politics. Ironically, then—given the common misperception that scientific racism was inherently imperialist—it was the imperialist racists who were forced to re-work quietly the tropical dysgenic argument in order to retain their imperialist visions.

9. Or seven civilizations if the "marginal case" of Africa is omitted (Huntington, 1996). Interestingly, this compares closely with Stoddard's (1920) specification of five main "civilizations," though these are defined on racial grounds. Moreover, while Huntington describes the boundaries of civilizations in cultural terms and as blood-stained, Stoddard talks about the racial frontiers between the whites and non-whites as marked by flesh and blood.
10. Moreover, this complements his claim in *Who Are We?* in which Huntington (2004) asserts that "No society is immortal. As Rousseau said, 'If Sparta and Rome perished, what state can hope to endure forever?' Even successful societies are at some point threatened by internal disintegration and decay and by more vigorous and ruthless external 'barbarian' forces. In the end, the United States of America will suffer the same fate of Sparta, Rome, and other communities" (Huntington, 2004, p. 12).
11. Note that the Middle Route began in Syria/Palestine and then tracked both eastward and overland to China as well as southward through the Persian Gulf and thence into the Indian Ocean and beyond. The Southern Route went from Alexandria/Cairo and tracked southward down the Red Sea and then into the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.

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CHAPTER 6

Perceptions about Muslims in Western Societies

Mahmoud Eid

Introduction

In today's world we rely heavily on the media for knowledge and information about people, cultures, and actions around the globe.[1] However, most often we fail to acknowledge the media's influence and become desensitized to their tendencies of stereotyping and framing. The conceptual media frames structure public perceptions in society (Goffman, 1974).[2] The mainstream media continue to be a major source of information about Islam and Muslims for Western audiences (Eid & Khan, 2011). Muslims worldwide represent around one-quarter of the global population. One-fifth of the world's Muslim population inhabits countries where Islam is not the majority religion, including Western societies where Islam is the principal minority faith, and Muslims are the fastest growing religious groups. While this belief system involves a myriad of practices within the general scope of its tradition, Islam is also misunderstood and misrepresented in various contexts.

Despite some efforts by Western mainstream media to provide fair and objective portrayals of Muslims, the dominant portrayals tend to be negative. In fact, while a variety of different sources of information contribute to negative public perceptions with regards to Muslims, many scholars argue that the media are the most influential (e.g., Aguayo, 2009; Gerges, 1997; Trevino, Kanso & Nelson, 2010).[3] The media have perpetuated negative stereotypes about Muslims, resulting in distorted public perceptions of the religion and its followers (Christensen, 2006). The systematic media stereotyping of Muslims can be a result of individual prejudice by media practitioners or can be traced to the institutional operational dynamic of media outlets. Indeed, the

emergence of different media platforms, regimes of power, and empires has resulted in significant change in Western media portrayals of faith groups (e.g., Aguayo, 2009; Bailey, 2010).

The dominant tendency of negative depictions of Muslims in Western mainstream media enhances the Self/Other dichotomy between Western and Muslim societies. Edward Said (1978) establishes a link between the manner in which perceptions of the Other are conceived through the individual learning process and the institutions that influence societal views. In addition to the academy, the corporations, and the government, the media play a fundamental role in this regard (Said, 1981). Therefore, it is important to study the perceptions about the Other that have resulted mainly from media images and portrayals.

Literature on the intersections between Western and Muslim societies includes perceptions about each other in relation to media portrayals and governmental policies. This chapter aims to provide a critical review of the recent literature on the most dominant perceptions about Muslims in Western societies—mainly Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United States—primarily in relation to media portrayals. It discusses how: (1) Western societies perceive Muslims within the Self/Other dichotomy; (2) Western (mis)perceptions about Muslims fall within two main categories: *a homogenous community* and *rooted in fanaticism/oppression*; (3) Western media portray Islam and Muslims within two main frames: *in clash with "the West"* and *associated with terrorism/extremism/violence*; and (4) Muslims in Western societies face the heat of *racism*, *discrimination*, and *dehumanization*.

Muslims Imagined by Western Societies: The Other

Muslims are most commonly represented as outsiders in Western societies. While fair and informed discourses exist, stereotypical discourses and media portrayals about the followers of Islam are widespread, characterizing the existence of Muslims in Western societies as exterior to the dominant group; thus, Muslims are perceived as lacking the ability to participate as equal citizens. Western political discourses and media portrayals tend to promulgate racialized Orientalist stereotypes, create a Muslim enemy Other, and depict Muslims as irrational, uncivilized, backward, threatening, corrupt, oppressive, deviant, exterior to the dominant culture, and uniquely fundamentalist Others (e.g., Jackson, 2005; Khan, 1998; Macdonald, 2003; Malcolm, Bairner & Curry, 2010; Martin & Phelan, 2002; Muscati, 2003).

> A suspicion of the Other and a need to control the definition of that Otherness have been integral elements of the creation and legitimation of British

> imperialism and colonialism. Discourses that have rendered Islam different, and inferior, have been part of this history; and processes of domination and exploitation of peoples of the Islamic faith have been part of British imperial history. (Alam & Husband, 2013, p. 237)

Western media stereotypes construct a naturalized binary opposition in which Western cultures and societies are depicted as superior and normal in comparison to Eastern cultures and societies, thus reinforcing political, economic, and cultural domination of "the West" over "the East." Such media images reinforce the representation of people from the Orient as incapable of defining themselves and needing to be either controlled or feared (e.g., Khalema & Wannas-Jones, 2003; Mishra, 2008). Orientalist stereotypes offer "a framework through which the West examines what it perceives as the foreign or alien, consistently figuring the East as the West's inverse: barbaric to its civilized, superstitious to its rational, medieval to its modern" (Saeed, 2007, p. 453).

The media portrayals of Muslims as an Other in Western societies can be implicit or explicit through the use of "us" versus "them" terminology (e.g., Bullock & Jafri, 2000; Gilbert & Viswanathan, 2007; Henry & Tator, 2005; Mahtani, 2001). These depictions tend to focus on the danger of Islam as foreign, reinforcing a sense of national cohesion among those who are perceived to be threatened by such outsiders or "aliens" (e.g., Geaves, 2007; Jiwani & Dakroury, 2009; Kabir, 2008). This is demonstrated in the continually negative coverage of Islam and Muslims, portraying followers of the Islamic faith as extremists, violent, and involved in terrorist activity (e.g., Manning, 2003; Steuter & Wills, 2009).

Even though some Western media try to provide fair and balanced representations of Muslims, stereotypical media depictions of them are more common in Western societies. In Australia, Anne Aly (2007) discusses that the media tend to portray Muslims as threats to the Australian liberal and secular culture. When the so-called Lebanese gang rapes occurred in August 2000, these acts were linked to Islam.[4] As a result, issues such as Islamic law punishments, female genital mutilation and honor killings, which have cultural rather than religious bases, were brought up by the media as Islam's incompatibility with the values of liberal democracy. The intensity of these portrayals increased after 9/11. Moreover, Islam was portrayed in the Australian media as backward, oppressive, and uncivilized; Muslims as terrorists, enemies from within, illegal, and ungrateful; and Muslim women as oppressed, with the veil (*hijab*) as a tool of oppression.

In Britain, the media commonly describe followers of the Islamic tradition in terms that connote their existence in society as un-British, self-segregating,

living in parallel cultures, and aliens to the British society (Saeed, 2007). Muslim communities in Britain after 9/11 "were increasingly framed in political and public discourse by an almost seamless reiteration of their aberrant cultural traits, which rendered them marginal to British life and made their assertions of embracing British identity ring hollow" (Alam & Husband, 2013, p. 243). Muslims have been represented as an immigrant group that has "brought alien values and practices into the UK threatening '[their] values'" to the extent that 9/11 created a climate "in which the outcomes of neoliberal restructuring of the economy could easily be displaced onto the problems of 'Muslim integration'" and that Muslims are an immigrant group that is "a drain on resources" (Poole, 2011, p. 59).

In North America, the mainstream media have a tendency to portray the 9/11 attacks as a threat to Canadian and American values and freedom. As a result, public perceptions about Muslims tend to be negative, narrowing the view of collective belonging (Eid & Karim, 2011). Despite religious diversity in Canada, media organizations tend to ignore religious and ethnic minorities, often deeming them insignificant, unfavorable, and invisible. Islamophobia embodies a deeply embedded element of the mainstream culture of Canadian media coverage of Islam.[5] Muslims face constant scrutiny in the public spotlight, which is largely fueled by the proliferation of images, texts, and messages that stereotype Islamic followers as incompatible with Canadian society (e.g., CRTC, 2008, January 17; Eid & Khan, 2011). Muslims in Canada commonly find themselves in the precarious position of being made to feel that their national and religious identities are exclusive to one another (Riley, 2009). Particularly in times of crises, Muslims appear in Canadian media as an Other (Perigoe & Eid, 2014). Similarly, most media outlets in the United States have depicted Muslims and Islam as intolerant, anti-democratic, violent, and terrorists. Islam is also depicted as a male-dominant religion and women are represented as victims, passive, veiled (thereby oppressed), and exotic/erotic (e.g., Harb, 2008; Jafri, 1998; Munro, 2009, August 5).

Muslims and Western (Mis)Perceptions: Homogeneity and Fanaticism

In the light of the Self/Other dichotomy, Western media portrayals of Muslims fall within two main categories of (mis)perceptions: *a homogenous community* and *rooted in fanaticism/oppression*.

Western media regularly characterize followers of the Islamic faith as a homogeneous group, failing to acknowledge the vast diversity that exists within this dynamic religion, denying Muslims their heterogeneity, and portraying Islam as one monolithic and undifferentiated cultural identity (e.g.,

Karim, 2002; Saeed, 2007). Islam is generally imagined in Western societies as a rigid entity of a global set of adherents (Karim & Eid, 2012). In fact, due to global participation in this belief system, Muslims comprise a faith group of vast heterogeneity. Muslims come from various parts of the world, thus facing different religious interpretations and demonstrating a wide variety of cultural practices (e.g., Caidi & MacDonald, 2008; Karim, 2009). Muslims exhibit important cohort differences due to many aspects, one of which is the variety of branches within Islam such as Sunni and Shi'i. A wide range of cultural and religious behaviors exists among Muslims; therefore, it is misleading to use the term "Islam" as a singular bloc or to present it as a monolith.

Islam is represented in Western media as a faith from medieval times, not based on reason, but rather on fanaticism (e.g., Awan et al., 2007; Eid & Khan, 2011). These representations employ descriptions of Muslims' brutality and zeal, commonly correlating these behaviors to the oppressive treatment of women. These depictions imply that Muslims are inherently primitive, leading them to conduct themselves as violent, irrational, and grounded in a mixture of fear and resentment toward "the West" (Jiwani, 2004). The contextualization of Islam in Western media as a religion that encourages inequality among men and women is fueled by negative portrayals of some religious traditions such as the wearing of the *hijab* and polygamous marriages (e.g., Kassam, 2008; Riley, 2009).

Thoughtful representations of Muslims do occasionally appear in Western mainstream media. In the U.S. media, a documentary by the PBS, "Saudi Women behind the Veil," depicted Muslim women in a realistic light by representing their roles and diversity within society (e.g., Harb, 2008; Jafri, 1998; Munro, 2009, August 5). Also, some Canadian media have attempted to correct misrepresentations of Muslims and refute and criticize stereotypes by including Muslims in the production process and by producing shows that provide a satirical comedy on Muslim stereotypes—most notably, "Little Mosque on the Prairie" on CBC Television, showing Muslims as ordinary Canadians with problems and lifestyles that are shared across Canada (e.g., Dakroury, 2008; Eid & Khan, 2011).

However, despite the existence of some informed representations, Muslim women in Western societies are often portrayed through inaccurate stereotypes and ignorance. The *hijab* is a common theme depicted in Canadian media, for example, when discussing Muslim women (e.g., Haque, 2010; Khan, 1995). In Canada, 57 percent of Muslim women wear no head covering at all, 38 percent wear a *hijab* (a scarf that covers the hair and neck), and only a very small percentage wear full coverings of the body (CBC, 2007, February 13). The *hijab* is commonly associated with oppression in the media; prevailing discourse presents Muslim women as bound to a religious tradition

that inhibits their ability to function normally in society. The *hijab* is also used as a signifier for communicating dogmatic attention to tradition—for example, women who are portrayed as voluntarily wearing the *hijab* are perceived as being brainwashed by the patriarchal structures of Islam, and thus as having no agency (Jiwani, 2004). Although not all Muslim women wear the *hijab*, it has become the quintessential signifier of the Islamic woman in the media, and is commonly associated with oppression, restriction, patriarchy, and victimization (e.g., Macdonald, 2003; Todd, 1998).

Homegrown terrorism is a common topic of Western media coverage in understanding how Muslims are personified as outsiders within Western societies (e.g., Ismael & Measor, 2003; Smolash, 2009). However, stories about honor killings, which are framed as emblematic of exotic cultures, are more likely to receive media attention than those focused on homegrown domestic violence (e.g., Fisk, 2006, June 10; Jiwani, 2009). For example, in December 2007 when an Ontario man turned himself in to authorities for strangling his daughter, Aqsa Parvez, most Canadian media immediately declared the tragedy an Islamic honor killing due to his daughter's refusal to wear a *hijab* (Henry, 2010).[6] The issue was generalized in the mainstream media to include other Muslim girls.[7]

Muslims in Western Media: Anti-Western and Violent

The conception of Muslims as a negative Other for Western societies and the general Western (mis)perceptions about Muslims are strongly linked to Western media portrayals of Islam and Muslims within two main frames: *in clash with "the West"* and *associated with terrorism/extremism/violence*.

The polarization of "the West" and "Islam" as two different entities characterizes "Islam" as oppressive and mysterious, while "the West" is depicted in relation to freedom and stability (e.g., Byng, 2010; Saeed, 2007). In this polarized scenario, Western and Muslim societies are positioned on opposing sides. Faith-based arbitration is used as a prominent example of how "Islam" clashes with "the West." While Western media coverage on Islamic law is sometimes positive, investigating the equality of the sexes in the Qur'an and pointing out the law's flexibility depending on the context, it is generally a negative portrayal of Islamic law as a driver of violence, biased against women, and regressive to Western values (e.g., Abu-Laban & Trimble, 2006, December; Henry, 2010).

Although stereotypical Western media coverage was prominent prior to 9/11 (e.g., Bramadat & Seljak, 2005; Odartey-Wellington, 2009; Sharify-Funk, 2009), increased media portrayals of Muslims with regard to violence and terrorism were amplified following this event (e.g., Adelman, 2002;

Belkhodja & Richard, 2006; Jiwani, 2005a; 2005b; Kutty, 2001). Following 9/11, there has been a dramatic increase in the use of stereotypes and discriminatory rhetoric against Muslims and Islam in Western media. Such depictions are commonly discussed by scholars in relation to Said's (1978) *Orientalism*, which argues that cultural stereotyping of Muslims identifies them as violent, irrational, and backward. These unfavorable viewpoints of Muslims often blame conflict in the Middle East, specifically Muslims, as something inherent within the Islamic religion. That is, people who subscribe to this tradition are not compatible with "the West," and thus express their anti-Western sentiments through violence and coercion (Celermajer, 2007).

The association of Islam with terrorism has come to be accepted as part of the discourse on security and terrorism, to the extent that terms such as "Muslim" and "terrorist" have become almost synonymous. The tendency to label Muslims as terrorists is a trend that has emerged over the last three decades. Themes of extremism, violence, and militancy are commonly associated with Muslims in Western media that portray Muslims as villainous assassins, kidnappers, hostages, and/or terrorists. Terrorism is portrayed as an act carried out by people claiming to commit such violence in the name of Islam (Karim, 2002; 2003). Due to Western dominance in international communication and global influence, these views have developed and normalized over time so that they are no longer questioned (Karim, 1997). Such depictions frequently relate the teachings of Islam to terrorism, destruction, and conflict. Through false assertions, distortions, and the presentation of fringe elements, the media portray incidents such as honor-related, protest-related, and militant-related violence as being representative of Muslim tendencies toward violence and militancy (e.g., Henry & Tator, 2002; Mack, 1999, September 28).

In the years following 9/11 there have been innumerable media reports that demonstrate explicit links between terrorism and "Islamic" fundamentalism (Caidi & MacDonald, 2008). For example, Canadian media coverage of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq reinforce the broader political framing of Muslims as terrorists, mobilizing other negative metaphors and representations that fabricate an "enemy versus the West" dichotomy (Steuter & Wills, 2009). Islamic law, Qur'an, Muslim prayer, and religious education are presented as fundamental parts of terrorist training, representing private and public places of worship, especially mosques, as centers for terrorist planning and fundraising (e.g., Awan et al., 2007; Cañas, 2008).

Elizabeth Poole (2011) explains that the most significant shift in the coverage of British Muslims after 9/11 was their association with terrorism, because despite being the prevailing global image prior to 9/11 British Muslims were not directly labeled; instead, Muslims in Britain such as exiles, dissidents, and

asylum seekers were categorized as extremists. Poole's recent qualitative studies on British media have detected several common elements in the coverage of raids on trials of suspects: *categorization*, *agency*, *decontextualization*, and *othering*. Several labels categorized what is predominantly defined as "Islamic terrorism," including: bombers, Islamic fundamentalists, violent Muslim fanatics, and Islamic extremists. There has been an interchangeability of these categorizations in the British media, making it easy to replace one term by another, and therefore using terms such as extremist or militant infuses the idea of terrorism. The central actors in the media coverage are "terrorists" whose actions are always negative against the less frequently featured heroic action of the police and public. The coverage focuses on the activity prior to a verdict (the raids against and trials of suspected terrorists), giving more attention to the guilt suspicion over the not guilty end of stories. The core explanation of terrorist behaviors focuses on adherence to extreme Islamic beliefs and strict observance that are intent on murder, rather than providing historical or political context about motivations. A process of negative othering also occurs through individualizing, criminalizing, and then linking the perpetrators to radicals—outside the United Kingdom—who have brainwashed them with extreme religious ideologies. In doing so, the coverage divorces the perpetrators from the wider Muslim community in Britain, defending against any accusation of racism, and blaming Islamic ideologies and radical outsiders.

Most Western mainstream media have made Muslims suspect of almost any terrorist event. In the British anti-Islamic environment, pre- and post-9/11 and 7/7 (the 2005 bombings in London), the "sudden emergence of 'home-grown bombers' created a reality in which every Muslim resident in Britain became a potential suspect" (Alam & Husband, 2013, p. 246). Canadian mainstream media tended to promote the notion of "guilty until proven innocent" (Yousif, 2005, p. 52).[8] By framing 9/11 within the context of Islam, U.S. mainstream media tended to make all Muslims suspect, unless they could prove themselves innocent of either being terrorists or sympathizing with terrorists (Abrahamian, 2003).

Muslims Face Western Heat: Racism, Discrimination, and Dehumanization

Overall, the conception of Muslims as a primary negative Other for Western societies, the general Western (mis)perceptions about Muslims, and the Western media portrayals of Islam and Muslims have been amplified by *racism*, *discrimination*, and *dehumanization* against Muslims.

Racist and discriminatory depictions, discourses, accusations, and generalizations about Muslims in most Western mainstream media dehumanize

Muslims and ultimately deem them inferior to the dominant group in society. The manner in which racism appears discursively as either "direct and explicit" or subtle and under the surface depends upon the construction and normalization of racialized discourse as "a convincing rationalization" (Li, 2007, p. 51). In North America, white elite racism has been a dominant ideology in the media, directed against Muslims associating them with exoticized images such as the *hijab* and imagined concepts such as fundamentalism, terrorism, patriarchy, and misogyny (Perigoe & Eid, 2014). Headlines such as the *Vancouver Sun's* "Two Unveiled Women Murdered: Muslim extremists suspected" and *The Globe and Mail's* "Wearing a uniform of oppression" are examples of Canadian media coverage that reproduce and reinforce racist discourse, including bias against religious communities (Bullock & Jafri, 2000, p. 35).

Since 9/11, Islamophobia has been widespread in British and European political discourse, invoking elements of both an Orientalist ideology and conceptions of Muslims as threatening, and mobilizing imaginaries of a range of beliefs, feelings, and behavioral dispositions to foster hostility toward Muslims (Alam & Husband, 2013). Islamophobia is characterized as a fear or hatred of Islam and its followers. It translates into individual, ideological, and systematic forms of discrimination and oppression (Watt, 2008). According to Alam and Husband, it includes eight constitutive negative components that are based on "'closed views' of Islam (as opposed to open views that reflect the positive connotations of ethnic and cultural diversity)" (2013, p. 237): Islam is seen as (1) a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities; (2) separate and other; (3) inferior to the West, barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist; (4) violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, engaged in a clash of civilizations; (5) a political ideology used for political or military advantage; (6) that its criticisms of "the West" are rejected; (7) that hostility toward it justifies discriminatory practices against Muslims; and (8) that anti-Muslim hostility is accepted as natural and normal.

Soon after 9/11, polls in Western societies have demonstrated that Muslims in Western societies were the target of racism and discrimination. As the community most commonly linked to Osama bin Laden,[9] Muslims bore the brunt of hate and discriminatory incidents (Biles & Ibrahim, 2002). In Canada, for example, an Ipsos-Reid/CTV/*Globe and Mail* poll released on September 24, 2001, demonstrated that a strong majority (82 percent) of surveyed Canadians were worried that Muslims in Canada may become the target of racism[10] or personal attacks in the wake of the terrorist attacks in the United States. In a press release on November 20, 2001, the Council on American-Islamic Relations Canada (CAIR-CAN) reported 110 anti-Muslim incidents across Canada in the two months following September 11.

Many incidents were reported to the Toronto Police Service in 2001: 57 hate and bias incidents aimed at Muslims including 1 case of arson, 13 assaults, 2 bomb threats, 5 criminal harassments, 20 mischief, 1 robbery, and 15 threat incidents (Biles & Ibrahim, 2002).

However, in some Western mainstream media, attacks on Muslims in the wake of 9/11 even became invisible. For example, in Canada *The Gazette* stopped publishing stories about attacks on Muslims on September 18, 2001, a week after 9/11 during which it reported on examples of arson, spitting, insults, and threats against Muslims, despite the continuous instances of racist attacks on Muslims that were recorded by the Montreal Police Department, thus making the attacks and the people injured invisible (Perigoe & Eid, 2014). Project Thread[11] is an example of racial profiling of young Muslim men that have not received enough attention in the media, especially when the security allegations against the men were dismissed (Shephard, 2006, July 6), or in the political discourse (Shephard & Verma, 2003, November 30), due to concerns raised in relation to Canadian federal government intelligence services. *Toronto Star*'s Michelle Shephard, who wrote the most about the argument that a two-tier system of justice exists for immigrants and Canadian citizens—not charging the owner of the illegitimate Scarborough school, Ottawa Business College, while charging the students with fraud (Shephard, 2004, October 6).

Research indicates a relationship between government legislation and the practice of racial profiling (e.g., Kruger, Mulder & Korenic, 2004; Razack, 2008).[12] In the United States, observers of the American scene with regard to the negative news coverage of Islam and Muslims "find it difficult to delineate the complex relationship between the mainstream media and U.S. policy" (Gerges, 1997, p. 73). Canadian Muslims, for example, have received unwanted attention from security officials in Canada following 9/11. Reports by CAIR-CAN document troubling tactics used by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and the police to obtain information from the Muslim community. CAIR-CAN (2004) reveals patterns of disturbing instances in the behavior of security officials toward the affected community in the form of statements to discourage legal representation and assistance, aggressive and threatening attitudes and verbalizations, work visitations, as well as problematic questions and statements. Canadian security agencies, such as CSIS, asked Canadian Muslims a number of questions regarding their faith, including their "level of commitment to the Islamic faith," which CAIR-CAN notes as "problematic because they insinuate that a commitment to Islam is undesirable and potentially dangerous to Canada" (2004, p. 17). In the United States, the backlash against Muslims included verbal and physical assaults, discrimination at

work, and special scrutiny at airports, to the extent that over 1200 Muslim immigrants became known as the "disappeared" because they were imprisoned without officially being charged or even having access to lawyers, their families, human rights organizations, and their consulates, which is in violation of the Geneva Convention on Consular Relations (Abrahamian, 2003).

Despite high levels of educational attainment and involvement, Muslims suffer from high unemployment rates in Western societies. For example, Muslim women in particular hold twice as many post-graduate degrees in Canada as Canadian women in general, but they are among the poorest women in society and tend to work part-time hours in low-paying jobs (Canadian Council of Muslim Women, 2007). Testimonies of Muslim immigrants in various Canadian cities indicated that clothing (including *hijab*) and having a beard are examples of discriminatory factors in the workplace (Caidi & MacDonald, 2008). The post-9/11 climate has even affected Muslim Canadians' information practices, including their use of various sources of information and their attitudes and perceptions regarding their information rights (e.g., Hatem, 2005; Jaffer, 2005; Ruby, 2006).

Muslims have experienced increased fear and anxiety (Eid & Karim, 2011). They face various obstacles in integrating within Western societies. Integration and existence in Western society can be challenging due to the news media's persistent proliferation of stereotypes that distort images of Muslims. Attitudes toward immigration to some Western societies have become substantially negative as a result of the 9/11 attacks. Some media coverage in Canada, for example, has gone so far as to urge the government to eliminate multiculturalism and prevent further immigration of Muslims to Canada (Awan et al., 2007). Immigration laws have been questioned in both Canada and the United States, and there has been a call for these laws to be tightened (e.g., Adelman, 2002; Moore, 2002). Polls in North America have demonstrated the heated environment in which Muslims face major challenges. Polls by Gallup in the United States and EKOS in Canada reveal that the public believes that increased security and tighter immigration controls are needed (Esses, Dovidio & Hodson, 2002).

In the United States, less than a year after 9/11, polls demonstrated that nearly two-thirds (63 percent) of the public thought that Americans were more fearful of Muslims rather than felt sympathy for them (Nacos & Torres-Reyna, 2007). In Canada, on September 5, 2002, a poll released by Ipsos-Reid, CTV, and the *Globe and Mail* showed that a larger number of Canadians were personally more suspicious of Muslims, compared with a survey released on September 21, 2001 that asked exactly the same question in the aftermath of 9/11 (an increase from 27 percent to 35 percent in almost one year). Denise Helly (2004) shows the results of a survey conducted in

September 2002 in which 33 percent of Canadian respondents declared that they had heard racist comments against Muslims. In the same year, 55 percent of Canadian respondents thought that religion causes conflict between people, 13 percent of them thought that Islam promotes confrontational relations. Another survey found that 45 percent of the randomly selected Canadians believe that Islam teaches violence (Geddes, 2009, April 28). Also, beyond the immediate impacts of 9/11, such as the defacement of mosques and a dramatic increase in aggression toward Canadian Muslims, institutionalized discrimination against Muslims persists (Caidi & MacDonald, 2008). On March 21, 2005, the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Ipsos-Reid surveyed Canadians on their attitudes about discrimination and racism in their communities and in the workplace. Among the groups that Canadians believed to be most targeted, Muslims received the highest percentage.

There has been also a constant Western media tendency of habitually framing Muslims in animalistic terms. For example, reports on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are commonly punctuated by language expressing notions of pursuit, capture, and entrapment through the use of vocabulary that relies on animal-related metaphors such as "hunt," "trap," and "snare," replacing neutral terms such as "search" or "look for" by the dominant hunting model, which demonstrates the "hunt for terrorists" (Steuter & Wills, 2009). By dehumanizing Muslims, the media provide the public with the justification to distrust them (Henry, 2010). This characterization of Muslims employs a rhetorical strategy that fosters images of inferior repugnant creatures: "Within this metaphorical framework, enemy movement is often figured as subterranean; it occurs invisibly and relentlessly, eating away at the ground beneath our feet, invisibly undermining structures we assumed were safe" (Steuter & Wills, 2009, p. 15).

As a result, Muslims in Western societies feel that their religion and identity are under attack. Muslims were taunted and threatened, their places of worship desecrated. Several Muslim schools in numerous Western cities were closed, and many Muslim children were kept home from public schools for fear of physical attacks. Muslims believe that news media portrayals of their culture and religion are unethical.[13] In the United States, focus group sessions were conducted within the Muslim communities in New York. The project at Columbia University in the spring and summer of 2003 revealed that most Muslim Americans believed that the news media portrayal of Muslims and their religion was unfair, negative, stereotypical, and not at all reflective of the true nature of Islam and the vast majority of its followers (Nacos & Torres-Reyna, 2007).[14] In Canada, a 2008 study of the sentiments of minority groups revealed that Muslims who have been subjected to stereotyping

and discrimination by the public blame the media for the negative portrayal of Muslims because they ingrain the public with false preconceptions about Islam (Ipsos Reid Public Affairs, 2008).

Conclusion

The media play a fundamental role in the ways that specific groups within a society are imagined. By communicating ideas about what is considered external or foreign, the media can participate in the formulation of a society's norms and values. This influences how people understand their interactions with others and can dictate how people distinguish between those who are considered internal or external to an imagined community. The widespread Western mainstream media portrayals of Islam and Muslims as a threat to Western values and freedom have negative influences on public perceptions and have narrowed the view of collective belonging.

Despite the fact that the media are seen as major drivers of social cohesion in multicultural Western societies because they construct and define communities, the majority of mainstream media tend to ignore Islam and Muslims until the occurrence of negative circumstances. Balance and fairness are sought to diminish isolation and alienation and to encourage social cohesion (e.g., Dakroury, 2008; Jiwani, 2005b). Due to their pivotal role, the media carry many duties with regards to ethics and responsibilities within society (e.g., Henry & Tator, 2003). However, media ethics and social responsibility remain questionable—that is, while issues with representation and misrepresentation of minority groups plague the media, many individuals and communities continue to be excluded or scrutinized as a result of stereotypes and distorted images of their culture and traditions. The media have the moral and social responsibility when constructing identities, framing stories, deciding on content-worthy issues, and classifying content. This responsibility includes unbiased, balanced, truthful, and accurate representation (Eid, 2008a).

Western media representations of Islam and Muslims have contributed to the Self/Other dichotomy, imagining Muslim societies as the alien Other. This imaginary community has been (mis)perceived as a monolith rooted in fanaticism and oppression, portrayed as violent and in clash with "the West," and attacked in racist, discriminatory, and dehumanized images. Despite existing efforts toward fair and ethical representations, the dominant negative Western media representations of Muslims have been commonly justified by a desire to protect and communicate patriotism. In this, the majority of media practitioners fail to uphold objectivity, which is antithetical to effective journalism. That is, the post-9/11 media climate that has been preoccupied

by unfavorable depictions of Muslims demonstrates an inability on behalf of media outlets to conduct themselves in a professional and ethical manner (Steuter & Wills, 2009). While scholars continue to debate the motivations for negative ideologies surrounding Muslims, most Western media practitioners are commonly unfamiliar with, and unknowledgeable about Islam; thus lacking the ability to provide accurate illustrations of this religious tradition and its followers (e.g., Karim, 2002; Mahtani, 2009). This lack of knowledge about Islam and Muslims contribute to a level of ignorance that may rationalize clashes between Western and Muslim societies (Karim & Eid, 2012). This has been the widespread pattern of imagining the Other in Western societies. Media portrayals that re-imagine the Other, in objective, balanced, and responsible ways, may contribute to eliminating these clashes.

Notes

1. The Australian and Canadian media, for example, are the dominant sources of information through which the public in Australia and Canada gain information about their nations, shaping perceptions of their fellow citizens and surroundings (Dunn & Mahtani, 2001, January).
2. Decisions and actions pertaining to what information is to be included or excluded in the media is a process commonly referred to as media framing. Media contents are comprised of frames and filters that work to satisfy the expectations of the dominant forces that shape the organizations' hierarchies.
3. For example, a poll of Canadian university students conducted by the Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC) following the second anniversary of 9/11, showed that "more than one-third of students associate that horrific event with Islam and that more than three-quarters of respondents obtained all of their information about Islam and Muslims from the mainstream media" (Henry & Tator, 2005, p. 258).
4. Also known as the Sydney gang rapes, these were a series of ethnically motivated rapes committed by a gang of Lebanese Australian youth against European-origin Australian women and teenage girls in Sydney, Australia, in August 2000.
5. The CIC annual media research reports (2000-2004) demonstrate that the *National Post* uses the most negative portrayals of Islam and Muslims, followed by *The Toronto Star*, *The Globe and Mail*, *The Gazette*, and *La Presse* (CIC, 2010).
6. Aqsa Parvez, a 16-year-old student of Applewood Heights Secondary School in Mississauga, Ontario, Canada, who grew up in a Muslim family of Pakistani origin, was murdered on December 10, 2007. On that day, her father Muhammad Parvez, a taxicab driver, called 911 claiming he had killed his daughter, but it was learned in court in 2010 that it was her brother, Waqas Parvez, who had strangled her for not wearing a *hijab*, causing her to die later on in hospital. Both the father and the brother pled guilty to the second-degree murder of Aqsa Parvez and were sentenced to life imprisonment, with no eligibility for parole until 2028. While the case was denounced by Muslim leaders who considered it a

murder within the context of family and domestic violence, the media portrayed it as an honor killing case and opened debates about the status of women in Islam.

7. For instance, an article in *The Globe and Mail* stated that "if a girl is too immodest or defiant, she may be slapped or beaten. If she acquired a Western boyfriend, she may be shipped back home to Pakistan or Bangladesh for marriage" (Henry, 2010, p. 50).
8. Despite the fact that the Syrian-Canadian Maher Arar was not tried in a court of law, many Canadian media treated him as guilty of terrorism. For example, the *Ottawa Citizen* headlines read as follows: "U.S., Canada '100% sure' Arar trained with al-Qaeda" (Yousif, 2005, p. 54). The majority of Canadian media have failed to take responsibility and to be held accountable for their role in framing Arar as guilty without allowing for the right to be presumed innocent; the presentation of misinformation that creates an enemy out of a victim goes without rebuke or reprimand (Mitrovica, 2008).
9. For details about how Arabs and Muslims perceive Osama bin Laden, see Mahmoud Eid (2008b).
10. The incarceration of Canadian Omar Khadr at the U.S. prison camp at Guantánamo Bay is an example of how race, religion, and gender are interwoven in the relationship with the Other, and demonstrates the continuing stigmatization and penalization of Muslims post-9/11 (Jiwani, 2011).
11. Project Thread is the Canadian case in which 31 students (30 Pakistanis and 1 Indian) were initially targeted, 23 detained, and 19 arrested as alleged members of an al-Qaeda sleeper cell. Later, the case turned into a routine immigration process and security allegations were withdrawn (e.g., Hall, 2003, September 25; Powell & Shepherd, 2003, September 5).
12. For example, a study by Anna Pratt and Sarah Thompson (2008) probes the perception of security officials and demonstrates that racism toward different nonwhite groups is prevalent. They investigate the Canadian Border Services Agency's (CBSA) claim that racial profiling does not occur and reveal how this racialized practice does indeed take place at land border crossings in Canada. They note that the ambiguous definition of racial profiling might be the source of the problem, which has led to the increased acceptance of nationality-based criminal profiles, and a furthering of the practice of racialization, and the continued denial of the racial profiling. The study reveals that the CBSA profiles individuals based on physical appearance (the most widely considered notion of race) and nationality. Those working in the CBSA are influenced by mediated information in relation to terrorism, especially when related to 9/11, as are those in CSIS who share information relating to terrorism with CBSA.
13. Muslims in North America have expressed several sentiments toward the treatment of their issues through governmental policies with regard to immigration and national security (Eid, 2014).
14. For opinion trends about Muslim Americans and Islam in the aftermath of 9/11, see Costas Panagopoulos (2006).

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CHAPTER 7

A Clash of Discourses: Femicides or Honor Killings?

Yasmin Jiwani

Introduction[1]

The clash of ignorance (Karim & Eid, 2012) characteristic of Western media discourses concerning Muslims as alien Others, and Muslim women, in particular, is especially evident in cases concerning intimate/domestic violence within Muslim families. Indeed, the victimization of Muslim women by an ultra-patriarchal construction of Islam has been a constant motif paving the way for convenient and ideologically charged rescue missions. It is thus not surprising that when compared to the generally pedestrian news coverage pertaining to stories about domestic violence, the subject of honor killings eclipses all else.

In 2011 and culminating in early 2012, the Canadian print and electronic media were heavily saturated with the coverage of a high profile "honor killing" trial—the Shafia case—involving the murders of three young women (Zainab, Safar, and Geeti), and their stepmother (Rona Amir), who was the first wife of Mohammad Shafia, the patriarch in the family. This case also received significant attention in the media of other Western countries. The categorization of the murders as "honor killing" sparked a major debate, the reverberations of which were addressed by some commentators and columnists. My question in this paper is not to address the accuracy of the term "honor killing" but rather to uncover its ideological baggage and potency, and its utilization as a label in this particular context. Labels, as Hall and colleagues (1978) argue, "are important, especially when applied to dramatic public events. They not only place and identify those events; they assign events to a context. Thereafter the use of the label is likely to mobilize *this*

whole referential context, with all its associated meanings and connotations" (1978, p. 19, *emphasis in original*). Hence, it is the stickiness of this label that I am most interested in tracing—what makes it stick and how does that in itself contribute to perpetuating the clash of ignorance?

If we are to embrace the view that violence is a continuum stretching from the verbal to the physical and the institutional, then the kinds of violence that are heavily reported in the national media indicate violence that is legitimately recognized as such; violence that is intelligible against the backdrop of other, perhaps more insidious forms of violence, that may be muted or silenced altogether. Honor killings constitute one form of violence but their amplification in the theatre of national opinion (as bounded by the media) serves to elide the background of persistent and subtle violence that are enacted on a quotidian level. What then is served by the mobilization of the frame of honor killing as opposed to the rendering of a story as a case of domestic violence? In this chapter, I draw from stories that have appeared in the national Canadian press regarding domestic violence and honor killings, paying particular attention to the coverage generated by the Shafia murders.

As a caveat, while there are definitional differences between domestic and intimate partner violence versus those classified as honor killings, there are nonetheless commonalities that underpin the stories and compel an analysis, particularly from a critical race and anticolonial perspective. First, there is the notion that gender-based violence operates on a continuum. In the context of intimate partner violence and honor killings, which involve the murders of dependents (e.g., daughters, wives, sisters, etc.), it is the gendered nature of these crimes and the relative powerlessness of the victims that sutures the connection. Familial killings and intimate partner femicides are ultimately crimes of power. The critical question, and one that this paper attempts to address, is how these crimes of power are rendered intelligible and what do the derived meanings suggest about how power is reproduced. In other words, how are these crimes discursively communicated? And what is their attendant effect? In addition, and in keeping with Foucault, the emphasis here is on the discursive construction of such crimes given that it is not a "question of whether discourse is true or false . . . than whether it is effective in practice" (1980, p. 131).

Gendered Violence—The Backdrop

Statistics Canada (2011) estimates that an average of 58 women are killed every year across the country (from 2005 to 2012, this would amount to approximately 362 domestic femicides). In Quebec alone, the Sisyphe website has documented the murders of 149 women and 27 children during the same

period of time (2005 to 2012) (http://sisyphe.org/spip.php?rubrique118). Yet, a search of the Canadian Newsstand Proquest database of *The Globe and Mail*, one of Canada's two national dailies and newspaper of record, using search terms "murder (women or woman) and domestic violence" revealed only 59 articles (from 2005 to 2012) that dealt with various forms of intimate partner violence. While this is not an exhaustive search, the hits suggest some interesting insights that I explore below.

A further search of the same database using "Shafia" as the search term yielded an additional 66 stories. The result suggested that while femicides may be common, their coverage depends on the kind of identifiers that journalists use; for example, the name of the victim or perpetrator, the geographic site where the murders took place or the background of the perpetrators or victims. Each of these discursive moves, I argue, camouflages the prevalence of and the gendered nature of the violence. Moreover, each identifier serves to contain the violence to a particular individual (e.g., the pathological serial killer), a place, or to a particular cultural/racial group.

Leaving aside the coverage dealing with the Shafia case, 32 of the articles found in the original search in *The Globe and Mail* referenced particular cases of femicide involving victims who were murdered by their spouses. Three dealt with serial killers, and the remaining covered government or police reports/advisories or policies, medical response to abuse, personal recollection or opinions, and accounts memorializing particular victims. A general read of all the articles seems to suggest that most victims of domestic violence are women from racialized communities and specific ethnic/cultural backgrounds (22 in total). Most of those named as victims implied that they were of South Asian backgrounds, with one from Africa (who was Muslim), another two from China, and one who was Korean. The overall impression that one garners from reading the newspaper is that gendered violence culminating in femicide is a problem particular to specific communities. Indeed, the coverage in *The Globe and Mail* examined here included several articles that echoed these very sentiments, as articulated by the Toronto police and various government officials. This impression is reinforced when one examines the coverage of women who were similarly killed by their spouses but where the victims' names suggest a European background. In the latter cases, the coverage tended to individualize the violence by singularly focusing on the spouse committing the murder and pathologizing his actions. In these cases, there were no references to culture or ethnic backgrounds.

In contrast to the European/white Canadian victims, victims of femicide from racialized or immigrant communities were clearly identified through the details provided within the stories. The most common way was to include reference to culture or religion, immigrant status, country of origin, or time of

migration. For example, in a story about the murder of Shaher Bano Shadady, the reporter writes, "Abdul Malik Rustum, whom she'd sponsored to join her in Canada just months earlier, faces a first-degree murder charge" (Mehler Paperny, 2011, August 9, p. A7). Another way of attributing difference was to reference the community's reaction: "The Indo-Canadian community in Surrey braced for the worst when news broke that a woman who worked at a Punjabi-English newspaper was fatally stabbed at the office" (Bailey & Matas, 2011, July 29, p. S1). Additionally, the stories cast blame on the individual's particular cultural mores as evident in this statement: "Sixteen-year-old Aqsa Parvez was murdered by her father and brother in 2007 for her desire to shed the *hijab* and wear western clothing" (Baluja, 2011, May 9, p. A10). Violence as a particular predilection of a specific community was also apparent in the following type of reporting: "Mr. Panghali's killing was one of three high-profile attacks on South Asian women in B.C. [British Columbia] in a two-week period" (Dhillon, 2011, March 26, p. S4); or "Domestic violence is the dark underside of the South Asian immigrant success story" (Wente, 2006, November 2, p. A25), and "The Parvez males came from a backward rural town with strict Islamic values and a culture of domestic violence" (Wente, 2010, June 17, p. A23). In another instance, the media quoted a statement by the British Columbia Attorney General that domestic violence was a "cancer" in the South Asian community (Dhillon, 2011, March 26, p. S4). Such statements seem to suggest that domestic violence and femicides are absent in other cultural communities and unimaginable among white Canadians. In all of these cases, counter opinions were scant. The definition of these killings as emanating from particular cultures or as inherent to particular communities remains uncontested.

This breakdown, while not quantitatively rigorous, paints, in broad strokes, the general pattern of news reporting regarding cases of femicide. As a backdrop, it implicitly feeds into the kind of intelligibility that is required among readers to make sense of honor killings as a category of gendered violence rooted in particular cultural traditions and hence, outside of the Canadian normative structure.

Honor Killings

In her insightful thesis on the coverage of honor killings in the Canadian press, Saima Ishaq (2010) makes a critical observation regarding the heightened salience of the honor killing frame in the Canadian press. She remarks that prior to 2001, there were two familial homicides resembling honor killings that were not categorized as such. It was only after the bombings of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon that Muslims became identified in the

popular Canadian mainstream press with honor killings. Indeed, Pugliese argues that the Muslim body is captured in a field of "compulsory visibility" through the ex-nomination[2] of whiteness. He notes, "whiteness denegates its own apparatuses of violence and terror, resignifying its own racially marked somatechnologies of violence as neutral and benign, whilst simultaneously inscribing a range of other racially charged somatechnologies" (2009, p. 28) The focus on the Muslim body becomes more pronounced in Canadian news coverage when it concerns domestic violence and gender inequality (e.g., Jiwani, 2010; Razack, 2008) as these become ways to inscribe racially charged meanings.

In coverage about domestic violence, Muslim identity and Islam as a whole, have become weighted with culturalist interpretations. Thus, gendered violence within Muslim communities is now cast as peculiar and particular and as emanating from arranged and forced marriages, the imposition of *Shariah* laws, stipulations over the *hijab* and *niqab*, and honor killings (Werbner, 2007). Indeed, as Grewal (2003) reminds us, Islam has become a racialized signifier, invoking a range of connotations inscribed within the language of Orientalism (e.g., Hage, 1998; Meer & Modood, 2009; Pugliese, 2009).

There is now a substantial Western literature concerning honor killings, or crimes of honor, as they are sometimes called. Despite the currency of the term, the category of "honor killing" or "crimes of honor," itself is a moot issue. Sever and Yurdakul define honor killing as referring to the "premeditated murder of preadolescent, adolescent, or adult women by one or more male members of the immediate or extended family" (2001, pp. 964–965). Mojab (2012) argues that honor killings differ from domestic violence precisely because of the support of the extended kin as well as the community's sanctioning of such crimes. Women, as bearers of honor, are regulated by honor codes (e.g., chastity, moral comportment, gender roles). Their sexuality becomes a property that is communally owned and directly related to the social standing of the family and kin. Hence, when a woman has violated such honor codes, she has shamed the family. Her death becomes a vehicle through which the stain of dishonor is removed and honor restored.

The debate surrounding the term "honor killing" stems from what I would loosely conceptualize as a culturalist versus structuralist argument bearing in mind that these are ideal types and a range of hybrid forms exist in between. On the one hand, the culturalist argument adheres to the view that such killings are motivated by a cultural logic and hence can be explained only in cultural terms. Within such a framework, specific cultural groups practice honor crime as this method of killing is predicated on cultural beliefs and values (Chesler, 2010). Hence, the crime is linked to specific parts of the world and to particular cultural and religious systems for example, Islam in various

Middle Eastern countries, to Hinduism in India. On the other hand, the structuralist argument is that honor crimes like other crimes against women are driven by a misogynistic logic that is shared among all human societies. For example, Baker, Gregware, and Cassidy (1999) offer a convincing argument suggesting that the specific components of an honor system are prevalent in both the East and the West, but that in the West, these components have become individualized in such a way that honor now rests with the individual man rather than his family/tribe or clan. However, Mojab (2012) argues that honor killing is a specific kind of crime and that its particularity needs to be recognized. She suggests that flattening the distinction between honor killings and domestic violence universalizes the latter and fails to attend to the specificity of women's lives in particular cultural and national settings. She reasons:

> While pre-Islamic in origins and non-Koranic, honour killing is sanctioned in *shari'a* texts, which in turn inform modern penal codes that do not criminalize it or are lenient in punishing the killers. Honour is, rather, a complex social institution, which is crucial for the (re)production of patriarchal social relations. In this sense, honour is not a *private* matter, it also has a *public* function with the power to transcend the notion of domestic or interpersonal in the understanding of the phenomenon of violence against women. Furthermore, patriarchy does not assume sovereignty; that is, it is not constituted independent of culture, religion, nationalism, or racism. (Mojab, 2012, p. 129)

From a communications perspective, it is this public aspect of honor killings that deserves attention. For, in making a crime widely known and in eliciting widespread approval and sanction, the honor crime has to be an event that garners public attention. In other words, it demands an audience whose approval is then contingent on the "success" of the crime insofar as it removes the individual, who has stained a family's honor, absolves those who are dishonored and restores honor. I will return to the notion of audience involvement and approval in a later section where I discuss the Shafia case coverage.

In both the honor driven and domestic, or individual, perpetrated murder of a close family member, the issue of cultural and symbolic capital appears central. For instance, Sever and Yurdakhl (2001) specifically draw attention to the communal nature of an honor crime and its sanctioning by the community at large. The concept of "*izzat*" or "*namus*" in the Turkish cases they discuss relates to the standing of the patriarch in the extended family and community. Women belonging to the clan, tribe, or community are then seen as repositories of this honor, and women's deviance from the normative moral code is seen as a violation of honor resulting in the decline in social

standing of the patriarch and his family. Cees and Saharso (2001) maintain that with migration, whole villages have moved to specific countries in the West. In the face of exclusion of the larger society, mediated by racism, unemployment, and social marginalization, these communities turn to the cultural systems they have brought with them as a way of maintaining social standing or cultural capital within the community. Yet, it can be argued that in Western cases of domestic violence that result in femicide, the man obtains his standing through his ownership of "his" woman. Her behavior, if it violates normative codes concerning marriage (common law or otherwise), is seen as a direct insult to his manhood. Hence, murdering his spouse vindicates his notion of Self and restores his masculinity (e.g., Baker, Gregware & Cassidy, 1999). The reality that women are most often killed when they leave or threaten to leave the relationship gestures to this notion of ownership as perceived by the patriarch.

In an insightful analysis of the judicial Eastern and Western penal codes, Abu-Odeh (1997), lends credibility to the structuralist argument. She demonstrates how the "passion of the West" parallels and meets the "honor of the East" in terms of circumscribing women's rights and accentuating their vulnerability to and victimization by male violence. Indeed, until the 1970s, crimes of passion were a valid defense in France and other European countries. While both honor and passion collude in femicide, Abu-Odeh draws out some striking binaries that are noteworthy here: act versus actor; necessity versus excuse; and collective versus individual. It is the justification provided (or lack thereof) that seems to highlight the major distinction between honor crimes and the more individualist Western variants of spousal homicides or serial murders. In the latter case, the rationale for the crimes is seen to be rooted in the psychology of the individual, most commonly posited as being influenced by a bad childhood, and/or lack of nurturing leading to his sociopathic or psychopathic personality. In the case of honor killings, the justification provided is anchored in the very concept of honor as cultural capital. Thus, the focus is on the act, and the sanity of the perpetrators remains unquestioned or even, as in the case described below, emphasized so that the integrity of the cultural logic informing such crimes is retained and the culture is framed as deviant/pathological rather than the individual.

It is this slide in logic from individual responsibility to collective deviance that works so well to seal a commonsense interpretation of honor killings; that an act that is perceived as having no cultural basis becomes reduced to individual pathology, but an act construed and rooted in a cultural framework becomes a sign of a deviant culture. This effectively serves to obscure and occlude an examination of dominant Western culture as a culture of violence (Jiwani, 2006).

Abu-Odeh elaborates on other facets that differentiate honor killings from crimes of passion.

> The idea of honor is based on the notion of justification, where the stress is on the nature of the act, rightful or not, not the actor. Self-defense is the paradigmatic example of an act that is justified. Alternatively, the idea of passion is based on the notion of *excuse*. "It is always actors who are excused, not acts. The act may be harmful, wrong, and even illegal, but it might not tell us what kind of person the actor is." . . . It appeals to our sense of compassion for human weakness in the face of unexpected, overwhelming circumstances. (Abu-Odeh, 1997, p. 292)

This point is particularly relevant in differentiating the type of coverage that serial killers and convicted spousal killers receive as compared to honor killers. Serial killers tend to be described as sociopaths or as suffering from pathology. The same is true of perpetrators of domestic femicides. Here, it seems as if the identified individual has lost his ability to reason and committed murder in a moment of insanity. Carll (2003) has observed the same pattern with representations of domestic homicides portrayed as crimes of passion in his sample of American newspapers. A quintessential example of this kind of reporting found in my limited corpus of news stories is evident in the account about Doug Holtam, who bludgeoned his wife and two kids to death: "He was Mr. Average, the judge at his trial remembers. There were no warning signs that on Oct. 8, 1997, Doug Holtam would murder his pregnant wife and six-year-old daughter with a hammer, then beat his eight-year-old-boy nearly to death" (Hunter, 2008, April 25, p. S3). The same lack of early warning signs was ascribed to serial killer (ex) Colonel Russell Williams, who as one article opined, "[i]t is the dichotomy between the commander's accomplished life and the allegations against him now which has left those who knew or worked for him reeling. He is described by subordinates as both friendly and thoroughly professional" (Blatchford, 2010, February 10, p. A1). These "early warning signs" rest on a psychological understanding of these crimes and the individuals involved. Interestingly, the same does not hold true when the killers are men of color. As Zareena Grewal (2009) observes:

> In cases when white males perpetrate violence the focus is on the psychological portrait of this individual: family history, childhood, mental health. Yet when a Muslim woman is killed violently by a Muslim man, we are willing to accept culture as an explanation in a way that would never be satisfactory if the perpetrator were white, just as we tend to look for cultural explanations for teen pregnancy among blacks and Latinos but treat pregnant white teens as individual cases. (Grewal, 2009, p. 4)

In the Shafia "honor killing" case that was part of the corpus examined, the attribution to culture was more specific and focused on the appearance and comportment of the accused as can be seen in the following description of Tooba Yahya Mohammad, the mother of the three murdered daughters: "Slight and pale, wearing a modest black tunic top over matching pants, cuffed at the wrist and ankle, her small chin quivered now and then, but she held it together—she is an Afghan, after all, tough and proud" (Blatchford, 2009, July 24, p. A2). There was no attribution to culture in the reportage concerning Canadian serial killers (ex) Colonel Russell Williams (convicted of murdering two women) or the infamous "pig farmer" Robert Pickton (convicted of murdering six women), though in the Pickton case, references were made to his class and rural upbringing (e.g., Jiwani & Young, 2006). Razack succinctly captures this dichotomy when she argues:

> A crime of honour is a crime originating in culture/race, whereas a crime of passion originates in gender (abstracted from all other considerations). A crime of honour thus involves body, emerging as it does as a cultural tradition, and a crime of gender is mind, a distinctly individualized practice born of deviancy and criminality. The honour/passion distinction not only obscures the cultural and community approval so many crimes against women have in majority culture, but it reifies Muslims as stuck in premodernity while Westerners have progressed as fully rational subjects with the capacity to choose moral actions, even if the choice is a bad one. (Razack, 2008, p. 128)

In their analysis of the media coverage of honor killings in the Netherlands and Germany, Korteweg and Yurdakul (2009) observe that the coverage reinforces an "us" versus "them" distinction and cements boundaries of difference and separation between immigrants and the older inhabitants of these nations. One could argue that a similar mechanism is in effect in the Canadian papers but that it also leaks into the coverage of domestic homicides involving racialized minorities, i.e., femicides that are not categorized as honor killings. In either case, the references to nationality, immigrant status, and the cultural tools of violence (e.g., Grewal, 2009) are highlighted against the backdrop of other cases of femicide. The latter are explained away in terms of individual pathology, whereas in the former, it is the cultural background that is pathologized.

Interestingly, it is possible to draw parallels between honor killers and serial killers. In the latter case, the murderer often sees himself as an individual cleansing society of deviant women who have violated the normative constructions of femininity, as most blatantly conspicuous in the case of serial killers who murder sex trade workers. The serial killer goes after those who are

powerless; a powerlessness predicated on their social location—as homeless, vagrants, sex workers, women who are alone and children, elderly women, etc. (e.g., Egger, 2002). In effect, the reporting of serial killers and their murdered victims serves as a morality tale—telling women that they should not go to certain parts of the city unattended by male companions and that they should not engage in particular behaviors (Walkowitz, 1982). Seen in this light, the honor killer murders his victims because they do not comport themselves in accordance with the moral standards he demands. He thus neutralizes the ensuing charge of immorality by killing the offenders. Despite this similarity, the serial killer is always understood and his actions explained away in terms of psychopathology, whereas the honor killer remains a fixture rooted in culture.

The Shafia Case

> It is difficult to conceive of a more despicable, more heinous crime . . . the apparent reason behind these cold-blooded, shameful murders was that the four completely innocent victims offended your completely twisted concept of honour . . . that has absolutely no place in any civilized society.[3]
>
> Ontario Superior Court Judge Robert Maranger (Bascaramurty & Freeze, 2012, January 30, p. A1)

On July 23, 2009, Mohammad Shafia, an immigrant from Afghanistan, his second wife Tooba Mohammad Yahya and their eldest son, Hamed Shafia, were each charged with four counts of first degree murder of the three Shafia daughters—Zainab, Sahar, and Geeti, (aged 19, 17, and 13, respectively) and Mohammad Shafia's first wife Rona Amir (aged 52). The victims' bodies were found in a car that had sunk to the bottom of the Rideau Canal at Kingston Mills in Kingston, Ontario. On October 20, 2011, a trial was convened. Spanning approximately ten weeks, featuring 58 witnesses, and 162 exhibits, the trial generated considerable coverage in the national and international print and electronic media.

The analysis I present below is based on 60 stories, captured in the Canadian Newstand database search, after eliminating letters to the editor, film and book reviews, and accounts, which while mentioning the case, were not substantively related to the issue. The predominant frame that the press utilized was one that rested on Muslim and/or Middle Eastern cultural patterns whereby the patriarchal father resorts to violence to discipline and control the women in his household. According to this leitmotif, the young Shafia women were engaged in behaviors that violated Afghan normative values; values that were often ascribed to Islam or to Afghan culture. They wore

makeup, had boyfriends, went out with friends, and resisted the prescribed norms imposed by the father. Rona Amir, the first wife of Mohammad Shafia, was the outcast of the family; her inability to bear children confined her to a secondary and subjugated status within the household. Various accounts suggest that she had been abused. Tooba Yahya, the second wife, and mother to all the Shafia children (including the three that she was accused of murdering with her husband and eldest son), was the obedient wife. Her position as the favored wife also allowed her to abuse Rona Amir mentally. In short, the Shafia women were killed because of a *culture clash*; a clash between East and West.

In the trial coverage examined here, the prosecution's framing of the murders predominated. In part, this is not surprising given the procedural character of the trial in terms of which party presents their evidence first. However, Benedict's (1992) research on the coverage of sexual assault trials in the American media demonstrates that the media tend to privilege one interpretation of the case. In the cases she examined, it was the defense that was given more legitimacy than the prosecution. Notwithstanding this, in their path-breaking work on law and the news media, Ericson, Baranak, and Chan argue that:

> in any given crime story of crime, law, and justice there is much more at stake than the resolution of a particular tragedy or trouble. The society's system of institutional authority and morality is at stake. Ultimately, a single criminal act provides the occasion not simply for a primary factual account of what happened, but for a morality play for how what happened fits into the order of things. (Ericson, Baranak & Chan, 1991, p. 74)

It is this moral grounding of crime news that is of relevance here. How a murder story gets covered then not only "fits into the existing scheme of things" as Hall (1979) puts it, but also how it buttresses and reproduces the moral order. With respect to the Shafia trial then, the immorality of the actions becomes the focal point of the coverage and through the extensive publicity accorded to the case, call upon the audience to engage in the process of "lived hegemony"—obtaining consent for the maintenance and reproduction of the social order.

Two versions of the Shafia murders were presented to the jurors: The first, put forward by the prosecution (Crown), focused on honor killing as the explanatory frame for the crime. The defense's argument rested on the explanation of the crime as resulting from an accident. According to this logic, when the family had stopped for an overnight stay at a motel on their way back home from a holiday at Niagara Falls, Zainab, the eldest daughter, had

borrowed the keys to the car (a Nissan), ostensibly to get something from the car. She never returned and apparently took the car out for a joyride. Her younger sisters and Rona Amir, the first wife, accompanied her. The women went for a drive to the Kingston Mills Locks, where they ended up in the water. Hamed, their brother, had followed them and he allegedly saw the car tip over; he rushed to the site, honked his car horn, lowered a rope and attempted to rescue them. When this failed, he drove to Montreal where he had a minor accident that damaged the front-end of his car. The prosecution's argument was that the damage on the car was a result of his attempting to use his car to push the Nissan over the edge. Critically, none of the women could swim and hence were thought to have drowned. However, further examination revealed that three out of the four victims had fresh bruises on their heads.

The prosecution's argument rested on the evidentiary material presented at the case—that the splinters of Hamed's car had been found at the lock where the victims' bodies were found, that the cell phone towers confirmed that Hamed was in the area that night and forensic evidence suggested that the women had been murdered prior to their drowning. Furthermore, the family had only booked rooms for six out of the ten family members at the motel that night. Additionally, an examination of Hamed's laptop computer revealed incriminating evidence suggesting that he had researched the most advantageous site for the murder and whether, if incarcerated, Mohammad Shafia could control his financial investments. Most importantly, however, the prosecution's case centered on the expert testimony of Professor Sharzhad Mojab, a scholar who has an extensive record of research on the phenomenon of honor killings and who had previously testified, as an expert witness, in another such case.

Specific themes emanating from this coverage included the following: (1) the portrayal of Canada as a just and civilized society, committed to fairness and equity in all matters including the trial of the accused; (2) Canadians as being overly tolerant and Canadian borders as being too porous; (3) immigrants as practicing "un-Canadian," backward, and traditional practices, and immigrant men, such as Mohammad Shafia, as ultra-patriarchal (as a result of their Muslim heritage) and oppressive to women in their households; (4) honor killings as medieval remnants that Muslim immigrants insist on maintaining; and (5) the failure of social services to intervene effectively in the family and to save the daughters. There were a few accounts that articulated a counterdiscourse, distancing the crime from Islam and other Afghan-Canadians or emphasizing the failure of social services. Throughout, stories of the young women, Zainab, Safar, and Geeti and the first wife, Rona Amir,

threaded the narrative shifting the focus to their worthiness as victims, and the unworthiness of the perpetrators.

Several binaries are apparent in this coverage: civilized versus uncivilized (medieval, backward); modern versus premodern (read traditional); egalitarian versus patriarchal or ultra-patriarchal; benevolent versus conniving/opportunistic; libertarian versus oppressive; secular versus religious. Below, I address some of these salient themes and offer examples drawn from the coverage. Thereafter, I discuss this coverage within a broader framework, linking it to the debate regarding the efficacy of the characterization of the crime as an honor killing.

Observations

What is immediately striking about the coverage in *The Globe and Mail* is the persistent use of quotation marks around the term honor killing. In the absence of using them, the reporter usually prefaced his use with the word "alleged" or "so-called" suggesting that the newspaper was not entirely committed to framing the crime as such. Yet, in the majority of the accounts examined here, rarely were there any alternative words used to describe this crime, as for example, femicide. Indeed, it was not until after the trial had concluded and the judge had rendered his verdict, that one article (reflecting a counter discourse), referred to the crime as a "quadruple-homicide" (Freeze, 2012, February 1, p. A3). However, even here, the article included the term "honor killing" in its title. As Hall (1979), Hall, Connell, and Curti (1976), and Hartley (1982) and others have argued, the definition of an event set by the media overrides or delimits the power of counterdefinitions if that one definition is privileged as "the way" to see things. In the absence of other ways of construing the crime, the "honor killing" label remained as the only definition in place.

Victims and Perpetrators

Worthy Victims

The Shafia daughters and Mr. Shafia's first wife, Rona Amir, were portrayed in highly sympathetic ways. They were worthy victims whom, unfortunately, the state had not been able to rescue from the clutches of a patriarchal tyrant. The accounts continually revisited the plight of the Shafia victims noting how Zainab had fled to a woman's shelter just a month before her murder after being beaten by her father and brother. She was the "defiant" one according to one headline (Appleby, 2012, January 26, p. A4); Sahar had told her boyfriend's mother how her father would kill her if he found out about

her relationship. She had also attempted suicide and Geeti showed signs of depression and was playing truant from school. The testimonies of the school personnel, child services agencies, and police were highlighted demonstrating how the girls had attempted to reach out and find refuge elsewhere. These narratives of suffering hinged on the argument that the girls were victims of a culture clash, underscoring their desire to be "normal" like their non-Afghan counterparts in school.

The sense of intimacy, cultivated by the coverage about the young women, is most evident in Judith Timson's account.

> We've come to know such intimate and tender things about these girls and women, their belly button studs, their purple nail polish, the lushly romantic texts their forbidden boyfriends sent ("I want only you to be the owner of my heart"). I've become especially moved by Sahar—her choice of boyfriend, her spirit, her clear sense of danger—to the point where, when I remind myself how she died, I am shocked all over again. So-called honour killings are a crime against nature, against humanity, against family love and, above all else, against females. (Timson, 2011, December 2, p. L3)

Combined with the details provided of their lives and the traumas they endured, the news stories repeatedly reproduced sizeable photographs of the victims taken from their cell phone cameras. Each of these showed the young women and the first wife in ways that highlight their beauty and normality—they were made to look just like "us."

Dressed in Western clothing, the aesthetic appearance and class background of these victims comes through. They do not resemble the profiles and pictures of the victims of serial killers, like Robert Pickton, whose reprinted photographs were primarily consisted of mug shots (e.g., Pratt, 2005). Instead, they appeal to a sense of middle-class normalcy.

The press reporting also included excerpts of the witnesses' recounting the girls' hopes and aspirations, as well as their fears, often in the very words used by the victims:

> "She said: 'I wanted to die. I'd had enough. I wanted to die," Josee Fortin recounted Sahar Shafia telling her in May 2008.
>
> The 16-year-old listed an array of reasons for her despair and decision to swallow a heavy dose of sedative pills: verbal and physical abuse at the hands of her older brother Hamed; her parents' insistence that she wear a hijab, the Muslim head scarf; isolation from other family members; pressure to quit school. (Appleby, 2011, November 24, p. A11)

The very idea of a teenager wanting to end her life, combined with the reference to the forced wearing of the *hijab*, an imposition that has long been regarded in Western quarters as a sign of gender oppression and is highly contested (Jiwani, 2010), seals a representation of Sahar as a victim of violence. In the case of her sister Zainab, the reporting invoked familiar sentiments of sympathetic identification based on her romantic involvement with a Pakistani man who did not meet her father's standards. Both Sahar and Zainab's texts professing their love to their respective boyfriends were also published verbatim.

While the news accounts did not focus as heavily on Geeti as they did on the other sisters, there were several stories that centered on Rona Amir as the discarded wife. Here too, the reporting, based largely on what was said by the prosecutor in court and excerpts from witness testimonies, dwelt on her subordinate and subjugated status in the household, as well as the physical and psychological abuse directed at her by her husband and his second wife. Amir's diary was one of the exhibits submitted by the prosecution and it detailed the abuse she faced, as well as the constant fear with which she lived. According to the testimonies reported in the press accounts, Amir was a threat to the Shafia family because her illegality (as a wife in a polygamous marriage) threatened their standing and put them at risk of deportation. Testimonies by her sister and brother reconfirmed that she feared for her life, and that Mohammad Shafia had intended to kill her and Zainab. Another relative counseled her not to be afraid, as "this is not Afghanistan, this is Canada, nothing will happen" (Appleby, 2011, November 29, p. A11).

The retelling of these stories of violence evoked so much sympathy that when the trial ended and the judge had issued his verdict, lead prosecutor Gerard Laahuis, was quoted in the paper saying, "This verdict sends a very clear message about our Canadian values and the core principles in a free and democratic society that all Canadians enjoy and even visitors to Canada enjoy" (Appleby, 2012, January 30, p. A8); the reference to "visitors" here obviously referencing Rona Amir's legal status.

The Perpetrators

In contrast to the effusive and manifest sympathy invoked by the victims' stories, the perpetrators were portrayed as murderous, duplicitous, and manipulative. Mohammad Shafia was repeatedly referred to as the "patriarch" and his wealth, temperamental disposition, and miserliness were duly noted as was the fact that he was an immigrant whose wealth had allowed him to secure entry into Canada. The evidence indicated that he had planned to kill Zainab whom he described as a whore, and as having betrayed his religion, culture,

and family. According to court testimony reported in the paper, he had told a relative the following.

> She keeps going to library and [on the] Internet . . . She doesn't work at home. She goes outside and she has Canadian, other friends and she has contact with them and she has contact with a Pakistani guy and she wants to marry him and these are the reasons I want to kill her. This is against custom and our culture. (Jones, 2011, November 8)

In a wiretapped conversation that the police presented to the court, he is heard telling his wife Tooba Yahya and son Hamed, "It was all treason, they committed treason from beginning to end." "They betrayed humankind, they betrayed Islam, they betrayed our religion and creed, they betrayed our tradition, they betrayed everything" (Appleby, 2011, November 15, p. A5). Thus, the prosecutor deemed that Mr. Shafia not only had motive, but also had premeditated the murder as corroborated by another witness. Interestingly, it was Mr. Shafia himself who brought up the reference to Islam and continued to do so in his rebuttal to the coprosecutor's accusations: "I'm a strict Muslim, but I'm not a killer" (Appleby, 2011, December 10, p. A4).

While Mr. Shafia was portrayed as an unreasonable, acrimonious, and violent ultra-patriarch, Tooba Yahya was represented as the malevolent second wife. According to press reports, not only had she planned and executed the murders of her children, she had also lied to the police, given contradictory testimony, and was manipulative. Columnist Christie Blatchford of The *Globe and Mail* wrote about Yahya at great length (and had her articles published in various other affiliated papers) consistently disparaged her, calling her "mama bear:"

> Combining the modern sensibility of crying for the television cameras with the *great Afghan tradition of telling any listener what he wants most to hear*, Ms. Yahya said then, between sobs, the family had come to Canada for the children ("In Afghanistan, no study . . . no rights"), while Mr. Shafia generously allowed, "It's not Canada's mistake, it's my family's mistake." (Blatchford, 2009, July 24, p. A2, *emphasis added*)[4]

The coverage paints a picture of Yahya as having no credibility as a witness. She was described as "alternately insistent and vague," unable to recall details, and as offering misleading information (Appleby, 2012, January 11, p. A5). As the second wife and the mother of seven Shafia children, she was portrayed as a heartless and competitive woman. News accounts mentioned that she was religious and prayed five times a day, as did Rona Amir. However, unlike Yahya, Amir's religiosity and piety were explicitly described as not

being fundamentalist (e.g., Appleby, 2012, February 2), which implied that Yayha was more zealously devoted to Islam.

Islam

The Globe and Mail's reportage on Islam was complex and nuanced. On the one hand, an editorial opined:

> While there is no honour in killing, honour-based violence does exist. It is a manifestation not of religion, but of culture, and is more prevalent in countries with patriarchal traditions where adultery is punishable by law, such as Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Canada is not immune from such influences . . . Condemning this form of violence is not an assault on Islam, but an important chance to speak out against all domestic abuse and ensure no Canadian uses the excuse of patriarchal tradition to justify acts of intimidation and physical abuse against women. Gender equality is important to all Canadians. And domestic violence is not an issue particular to one culture, but a societal problem generally. (Editorial, 2011, December 19, p. A14)

While this view reflects a progressive stance by linking these murders to the domestic violence in general, it also defines honor killing as a specific form of gendered violence, and yokes it to culture. Indeed, the very title of this editorial, "Truly honourable" makes an explicit connection to Islam as it begins with a laudatory gesture toward the efforts of some imams to condemn domestic violence in Muslim communities. On the other hand, the paper locates honor killings as engrained in the cultures of specific communities and nations such as Afghanistan. Titled "The Barbarism in Our Midst," another editorial argues for a law and order approach to the "medievalism of honour killings," states, "But any Afghan-Canadian or other community in which honour killings are found needs to confront attitudes that lead to the murder of children and women (2012, January 31, p. A12).

This reference to "barbarism" incites a chain of signification that draws upon old Orientalist stereotypes of Muslim men as being barbaric (e.g., Karim, 2003; Said, 1979; Salaita, 2006; Shaheen, 2001). Furthermore, and unlike the columns, the editorial reflects the stand of the paper as a whole. In this regard, it reveals several assumptions shared by the paper. First, while gendered violence is present in all ethnic groups (read racial minorities generally), it is absent in the majority or dominant culture that, through exnomination, is not regarded as ethnic. Such an interpretation is affirmed in light of the preceding sentences of the editorial, which I have not quoted here but that specifically refers to new immigrants.[5] Second, if honor killings require such a punitive response, the implication is that domestic violence

and femicides as committed by majority group members do not merit the same response. The reference to Islam then enters the narrative through the language of cultural attribution and through repetition in other stories, and becomes conjoined as signifier: Islam=Afghanistan=Muslim.

Columnists well known for their biases, as for example, Margaret Wente and Christie Blatchford, penned articles that confirmed this culturalist interpretation, weaving in representations of cultural and racial minorities as unfit citizens and attacking multiculturalism for diluting the Canadian fabric. The attribution to Islam as the source for legitimizing honor killings is more apparent in the writings of the latter as the following excerpt reveals:

> Was this a gaudy example of those magnificently misnamed "honour" killings, the extrajudicial killings of people by their own kin for real or perceived infractions of the Islamic moral code—almost invariably by women, often involving alleged sexual or behavioural transgressions, like showing a bit of ankle to a male not a relative? These happen often enough, in the family's native land and in neighboring Pakistan (and usually go unpunished or lightly punished) . . . Young Muslim men behaving badly may not be encouraged, but even in the most backwards parts of the Islamic world, they aren't killed for dating a blonde or drinking a beer. Girls and women are punished for even more minor offences (disobeying, not marrying the old bag of bones daddy chose, appearing in public unveiled, etc.), often with death. (Blatchford, 2009, July 24, p. A2)

However, while this tenor of writing is expected of both Blatchford and Wente, who are renowned for imputing blame on racial and cultural minorities for all things rending the Canadian social fabric, it was the articles authored by Muslim and South Asian women that were most revealing. For these native informants, being members of the targeted groups positions them as "Authentic Insiders." Narayan comments,

> The "Authentic Insider" position sets up a "proprietary relationship" between Third-World individuals and the "culture" of their nation or community, in ways that have the potential to function as a set-up. One of the ways in which this happens is when a particular Third-World individual is the only person in a particular discursive situation "positioned" to address "Third World perspectives" or "Indian Women's problems" or the like. When a single voice is positioned as the proprietary "Authentic Insider" with respect to Third-World contexts in general, or to a particular third-World context, the "singularity" of that voice and its perspective tend to be effaced, and it comes to stand for things like "the Third-World position on human rights" or "the Indian feminist position on development." (Narayan, 1997, p. 143)

One such "Authentic Insider" is Sheema Khan, a monthly columnist at *The Globe and Mail*. As a strong advocate for Muslim women's rights, her column often provides a progressive analysis of the contemporary issues facing Muslim communities. She, unlike Ayan Hirsi Ali, a writer who has renounced Islam, is regarded as a moderate Muslim. As an advocate, then, her analysis of the Shafia murders would have considerable gravitas. At the time when the Shafias were arrested and charged, Khan wrote a column, "The Shame of Honour Crimes," where she linked these crimes to Islam and the cultural traditions of diasporic communities from particular parts of the world. Beginning with a brief sketch of honor killings that have already occurred in Canada, and detailing the findings of a study focusing on immigrants and their children from various countries in the Middle East, Khan writes:

> These barbaric acts should be clearly designated as honour crimes, making it clear that such customs are unwelcome and will be severely punished. There should be a wide publication of the long prison sentences meted out. Community leaders must unequivocally condemn imported misogynous practices and attitudes. They should deal with the root causes of gender-based violence head on, rather than blaming the media for image problems. It's time for a critical examination of violence rooted in *religious* and cultural tradition. A comprehensive effort must be made to reach vulnerable families in communities that value family "honour" above all else . . . Women are dead as a result of breaching family honour. Who knows how many live under the threat of violence? It's time to take off the gloves of political correctness and stop the importation of this murderous custom. (Khan, 2010, June 22, p. A21, *emphasis added*)

Thus, even prior to the actual trial, the frame of "honor killing" was already in place, its mooring secured by the anti-immigration, conservative voices of columnists such as Wente (2012, January 31, p. A13) and Blatchford on the one hand, and progressive and liberal opinions by Khan and others, on the other hand. This frame continued until after the Shafia verdict had been announced.

Immigration

Running through these and other articles there is a constant reference to immigration and the failure of immigrants to assimilate. For instance, in an article entitled "Culture Experts Not Required," "Authentic Insider" Nazneen Sheikh wrote the following.

> The father who feels let down, even inferior, because his pretty young daughters have boyfriends, wear makeup and may not bag the right Afghan husband

> should emigrate not to Canada but to some backward country that can offer him face-saving solutions. Mr. Shafia should have stayed in Dubai, his previous home, and Canadian immigration authorities should have examined the family's financially leveraged entry criteria more thoroughly. (Sheikh, 2012, February 1, p. A13)

This discourse on immigration was apparent in other articles that focused on statements made by key political figures; for example, Conservative Senator Pierre-Hugues Boisvenu, who declared that the Shafias should be deported rather than be incarcerated in Canada where the costs (amounting to ten million dollars) would have to be absorbed by the Canadian government. Boisvenu also advocated that immigrants should be filtered for anti-Canadian values. He rhetorically asked reporters, "Shouldn't these cases be treated parsimoniously, with a much more thorough investigation, than people coming from France or the United States where there is much more respect for women?" (Appleby, 2012, February 2, p. A4). Immigration discourse also entered the narrative through repeated references to Mohammad Shafia as an immigrant who had "bought his residency in Canada under the federal investor-immigrant program" (Appleby, 2012, January 30, p. A6). That aside, Mr. Shafia's first wife, Rona Amir Mohammad, had entered the country illegally—as a visitor—given that Canada does not recognize polygamy. This duplicity, on the part of Mohammad Shafia, underscored his lack of fit as a potentially good Canadian citizen.

The Liberated West

Underpinning many of these accounts is an implicit, and sometimes explicit, assumption that the West is more liberated than the East. In such a relational binary, immigrant girls and women migrating from the East would necessarily find the newfound freedoms of the West enticing. Yet, their immigrant parents are likely to cling to the old culture, making a culture clash inevitable. The discourse of a culture clash is thus rooted in this assumption of an archaic; tradition-bound East meeting a liberated and egalitarian West. Throughout the coverage examined here, the theme of culture clash permeated the writing. For instance, John Allemang, one of the few reporters to critique the failure of state-mandated social service agencies to respond to the Shafia daughters, wrote, "In the Shafia case, a conflict between teenagers and parents has taken on a new significance with the explosive addition of competing cultural values." He adds, "According to the prosecution, the sisters died because they chose to behave in a more modern Canadian way than their patriarchal family leaders could tolerate" (2012, January 28, p. A6). So

much is taken for granted here in terms of what "modern Canadian ways" actually stand for.

"Authentic Insider" Nazneen Sheikh articulated the most explicit formulation of the progressive versus traditionalist binary. Referring specifically to South Asian communities in Canada, she wrote:

> A large number of people belonging to South Asian communities in Canada believe that women of Judeo-Christian cultures are the worst role models. They have sexual freedom, they wear indecent clothing, they have children as single mothers, they demand equality in every aspect of life—this is not what these communities desire for their daughters. The rise of South Asian matrimonial dating and marriage websites in the West is not as innocent as it may appear . . . In Afghanistan, Mr. Shafia could have easily locked his daughters at home if they disobeyed him. In Canada, the solution was to kill. (Sheik, 2012, February 1, p. A13)

In other words, there is nothing "innocent" about any of the activities that South Asians or other Muslim minorities undertake. Not being in their home countries, they are forced to resort to drastic measures to retain control over their wives and daughters. Such a view fails to discount the kinds of gendered violence that run the gamut through various sectors of Canadian society.

Rescue

In a feminist analysis of Orientalism, Yeğenoğlu remarks:

> [T]he declaration of an emancipated status for the Western woman is contingent upon the representation of the Oriental woman as her devalued other and this enables Western woman to identify and preserve the boundaries of self for herself . . . To be Western here implies feeling that one is entitled to universalize one's particular achievements and interests. The effacement/erasure of the particularity of Western women in the name of universality has the effect of legitimizing the colonial-feminist discourse as an act of generosity and as an act of conferring upon Middle East women the privilege of participating in Western women's universalism rather than a denial and negation of difference. (Yeğenoğlu, 1998, p. 102)

The self-definition of the Western woman as liberated then rests on the perception of the Eastern/Other woman as oppressed. The celebratory ethos of gender liberation can be found in several articles by Judith Timson. Interestingly enough, these articles were all relegated to the back pages of the newspaper.

> In Western culture, wives and mothers who fought for equal rights and participation in all public spheres also acted as guides for a younger generation of women so they would never know the demoralizing feeling of having certain doors closed to them because they were female . . . When you are a woman with real power, you are neither a vigil-auntie nor a victim. You are not Tooba Yahya killing your rebellious daughters and a pesky rival because they offend an inhuman sense of family honour that literally could not survive in a world where women are equal to men.
>
> You are not Rona Amir Mohammad, with nice jewellery and no future. You are you, educated, free, you have your own income and your own choices. You have a world of possibility and real power available to you. Isn't that what every girl—in every culture—deserves? (Timson, 2012, February 3, p. L2)

Implicit in this view is the notion of rescue. The failure of social services to come to the rescue of the murdered women then became a site of investigation underpinned, I would argue, by the need to make sense of how the Shafia girls could not be rescued. However, even here, out of three stories that focused on the witnesses from various social service agencies and the police who testified, two were critical while the third recast the blame on culture. Clearly, all three of the Shafia daughters had asked for assistance from teachers and had even called the police in one instance. Yet, there has been no criminalizing of this lack of response or an interrogation of why charges have not been laid against these services. Instead, the focus has been on "lessons learned" and the push has been toward implementing more coordinated services and providing service providers with more education regarding early warning signs and how to deal with other cultures. Again, it can be seen how a cultural frame (honor killings as rooted in Afghan tradition) summons forth culturally based solutions.

Counter-Discourses

Out of the 60 articles examined in this corpus, only four could be loosely described as offering a counternarrative. By counternarratives, I am referring to stories that either attempted to demonstrate that not all Afghans subscribe to the values that uphold honor killing, or stories that reflect on the nuances within Muslim communities and the progressive measures that they have initiated. For instance, in an article titled "Shafia Crimes Horrify Afghan Community," reporters Les Perreaux and Colin Freeze write about how other Afghans have responded. They interview several Afghan-Canadians and discuss their contributions to creating a supportive community. Yet, even

here, the culturalist frame is apparent. They include an interview with Nasir Zaheer, a former Kabul police officer who now works as a clerk in an Afghan grocery store in Montreal's south shore who stated, "If you come here believing freedom is just for the man, it's not the place for you" (2012, February 4, p. A14).

A third counter-narrative article focuses on Muslims leaders who have taken a public stance against domestic violence and honor killings. Here, So and Friesen's report outlines how 60 Muslim associations issued a statement "saying the practice [of honor killings] has nothing to do with Islamic teachings and violates clear and non-negotiable Islamic principles." They interviewed Mr. Soharwardy, the head of the Jamia Riyadhul Jannah mosque in Mississauga and quoted him saying, "'They use Islam to justify their violence' . . . As an imam, this is my responsibility and other imams' responsibility that we speak out against these misunderstandings of Islam, intentional or unintentional" (2011, December 6, p. A4). Yet, even here, despite showing the positive steps being taken by this coalition of Muslim leaders, So and Friesen situate this action as a reaction. In the very first sentence of their article, they note that these leaders "*seized* on the December 6 anniversary of the killings at Montreal's École Polytechnique to speak about violence against women" (*emphasis added*). In other words, were it not the anniversary of an infamous mass murder, committed in 1989 in Montreal by an avowed anti-feminist Marc Lepine, the Muslim coalition might not have taken such a public stance or joined forces with other antiviolence groups to condemn gender-based violence.

Nonetheless, and unlike many of the articles examined here, these counter-narratives do center and include Muslim voices and make notable mention of the range of perspectives inherent within Afghan-Canadian communities.

Expert Testimony—How Culture Got in the Way

As noted previously, the prosecution's frame relied heavily on the designation of the murders as honor killings. To support its argument, the prosecution utilized the expert testimony of Professor Shahrzad Mojab. While *The Globe and Mail* did not cover Mojab's expert testimony in any great depth—aside from quoting excerpts of it that made mention of the victims' suffering and the definition of honor killings; other papers apparently did. In an article critiquing the media coverage of the trial, Mojab writes the following.

> During my testimony on Dec. 5, 2011, the crown prosecutor asked me to read a passage from the United Nations Commission on Human Rights' report of

> the "Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences" (dated Jan. 31, 2002), which states: "Honour killings in West Asia have their roots in the crude Arabic expression 'a man's honour lies between the legs of a woman'" (p. 13, Sec. 28). Most media reports highlighted the quotation and erroneously attributed the quote as my own on the issue of religion and culture (The Huffington Post, Toronto Star, and National Post); this is by no means a minor oversight. I am not the source of this quotation, which is overtly racist, nor was it my choice to use it in my testimony.[6] (Mojab, 2011)

The absence of this mention in *The Globe and Mail* attests to the paper's more cautious approach when covering issues concerning Islam and Muslims, and corresponds to its continual use of quotation marks when mentioning honor killings. That other papers chose to reprint the contentious paragraph from the report she was asked to read suggests a more explicit embrace of the racist, culturalist logic that more generally informs coverage about Muslims in the Western press. *The Globe and Mail*, as I have previously argued, employs a more coded approach (Jiwani, 2012).

In another, more scholarly, account of giving expert testimony, Mojab mentions two other factors that directly relate to my analysis of the coverage here. First, she refers to her intellect as being culturalized.

> [M]y Iranian origins—my shared language and culture with the perpetrators—became more prominent than my knowledge of the topic. Then, the notion of shared culture was problematized by the defence as a means of discrediting my expert status by differently 're-culturalizing' me. (Mojab, 2012, p. 119)

Here, Mojab is in fact referring to her positioning as an "Authentic Insider" by the prosecution; a position that then leaves her open to attack by the defense counsel who, in playing up the particularity of her heritage, demotes her intellectual expertise. Mojab adds:

> What disappeared from this culturalization and re-culturalization process was my "Canadianness," as did the "Canadianness" of the perpetrators. This undue emphasis on the history and culture of the Middle East and Asia potentially contributes to the culturalization of the honour crime; it primordializes, stigmatizes, and demonizes the community, and eventually contributes to outright racism. (Mojab, 2012, p. 119)

Indeed, as both Mojab (2012) and Razack (2008) have pointed out, the culturalization of honor killings as a culturally encoded form of violence separates out race and gender oppression. Gender oppression comes to the forefront while racial oppression remains in the background. The murdered

Shafia women are rendered victims because they not only look like "us" and want to be part of "us," but their racial ascription and the experiences of being racialized women in a white dominated society is elided. Renowned feminist theorists such as bell hooks (1990), Angela Davis (1983), and Patricia Hill Collins (1998), have specifically referred to this common strategy of disarticulation used to contain, neutralize, and evacuate the significance of race and racism. Culturalism then is a vehicle that makes possible such a disarticulation, discursively highlighting gender while overshadowing the impact of race.

The Audience

In an analysis of the media coverage concerning the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001, Nacos (2002) argues that such events can best be understood as "propaganda of the deed" in that they are intended to be widely publicized. One could argue the following: if honor killings were based on eliciting approval of the community, then the more widely publicized they are, the more likely they are to gain public approval, pending of course, that the community being so appealed would sanction such crimes. This then begs the question: Who is the audience here? While the local Afghan community would necessarily be the closest such audience, most of the Afghan-Canadians interviewed in *The Globe and Mail* were highly critical of honor killings. The Canadian coalition of Muslim imams also condemned the killings. And, as one news account reported, the Afghan embassy in Ottawa, also released a statement condemning the killings and making it clear that such a practice was neither part of Afghan tradition, nor inherent to Islam. In such a scenario, the only kin that might approve of such killings and perceive them as a way for Shafia to regain his honor would be his closest family, who, as the news accounts indicate, are scattered across the globe. It would seem, then, that though widely publicized by the Western press, these murders did not achieve a collective approval especially of the kind that would exonerate Mohammad Shafia, Tooba Yahya, or Hamed Shafia.

On the other hand, what did the Canadian media achieve in publicizing this case so extensively? What is the role of the audience that so avidly consumed details upon details of the numerous testimonies and comments made about this trial? An audience study would uncover many of the nuances extant within the different interpretations that audience members exercised upon reading these accounts. However, since journalists, reporters, and media organizations are part and parcel of the larger society, their selection of stories and the way they report them, are also indicative of how audiences in general would apprehend news about honor killings. In this regard, it is worthwhile noting that several high-profile incidents involving Muslims (and by proxy,

Islam) have become flashpoints galvanizing a growing Islamophobia. As Jasmine Zine so eloquently observes:

> Orientalist fears and fantasies of the violent and pathological Muslim are codified and reproduced in the apparatuses of the state and through relations of ruling. These forms of governmentality produce the subaltern status of Muslim populations in growing Western diasporas. Increasingly positioned as anti-liberal, anti-democratic and unamenable to the requirements of modernity, Muslims represent the "anti-citizen." (Zine, 2009, p. 148)

Zine further argues, using the case of Hérouxville as a point of departure, that the strategies of exclusion utilized by the state to cast Muslims out are based on three interrelated themes: (1) disciplining culture, (2) death by culture, and (3) death of culture. I would argue that in the Shafia murder trial, the media participated in the act of disciplining culture by demonstrating that honor killings are not permitted in Canada. In other words, more routine forms of domestic violence can be tolerated but honor killings, because of their specificity (as demonstrated above), are outside the boundaries of civilized states. Second, the media colluded in activating the trope of "death by culture," portraying through the use of witness accounts, the subjugation and oppression of the victims by aspects of their culture (aspects interpreted through Mohammad Shafia). These two themes then underpinned the organization of these stories in ways that made them intelligible to a wider audience.

Against a backdrop of the growing Islamophobia, scattered references in the press to statistics that declare that "Muslims not trusted" (Boswell, 2012, March 21, p. A13), stories about Muslims being arrested on grounds of terrorism (Odartey-Wellington, 2009), and Muslims as condoning honor killings as shown in the BBC Panorama newsmagazine TV documentary (BBC One, 2012, March 25), the focus on the Shafia trial assumes another level of significance. Indeed, if we are to apply an informal Foucauldean genealogical method to these different flashpoints, it becomes evident that the Muslim body is being constructed as unfit for inclusion in the Western nation-state. Thus, the audience becomes a collusive force, through the operation of "lived hegemony" (Ericson, Baranek & Chan, 1991), in achieving this outcome. Honor killings then remain outside the pale of civilization where gendered violence continues to be a dominant thread in the body politic.

Conclusion

In charting this terrain of inquiry, my aim has been to interrogate the ideological weight and mobilization of the label "honor killing." Examining this

corpus of news accounts from a reputable (as opposed to tabloid) newspaper, it is evident that while *The Globe and Mail* pursued a cautious strategy in covering this crime, the encoded meanings privilege an interpretation that particularizes and popularizes this crime as being indelibly linked to and rooted in Afghan culture, and through the conjoining signification of Afghanistan with Islam, yoked to the latter. However, when compared to the coverage that *The Globe and Mail* allocates to femicides committed in racialized communities, it is apparent that the language of culture is used to enframe and enfold all these stories, making it seem as if racialized immigrant groups are the only communities that engage in acts of femicide.

Culture, then becomes a way, to communicate a variety of different messages, all cohering around the racialized body as a body that is unfit (unless it is assimilated) for inclusion in the Canadian state. The binaries deployed in the various news accounts—civilized versus barbaric; progressive versus traditional/tribal, and liberated versus oppressed, serve as focal points suturing the narratives. Threading through are constructions of the worthy victims who could not be saved and the vengeful perpetrators whose tribal roots cannot be expunged. In the end, a culturalized interpretation of the crimes committed foregrounds gender oppression and evacuates race oppression.

Mohammad Shafia was a wealthy immigrant who "bought" his way into the country and this, as the news accounts suggests, cannot be permitted. What then can be permitted? It would seem that immigrants, who pass the stringent criteria of the immigration system and who wait long enough for a backlog to clear up, can come into the country. However, upon arrival, they will have to occupy the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder. As cheap labor, they may be acceptable, provided that they assimilate into the dominant ways. That assimilation seems to require a social distancing from Islam, and an embrace of "Canadian ways"—whatever they might be. And the overall message, as the current Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, Jason Kenney, has stated in his guide to new citizens, is "No 'barbaric cultural practices' here" (Stone, 2009), making specific reference to honor killings.

Notes

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2. Gabriel (1998, p. 13) defines ex-nomination as "the power not to be named."
3. The judge continued to describe the murders as an "honourless crime" (Appleby, 30 January, 2012, p. A8).
4. Christie Blatchford has since left *The Globe and Mail* to join *The National Post*, another national Canadian daily that has a more conservative political orientation.

5. The editorial reads: "Some may feel broad statements of community values ("no stoning of women") need to be thrust in the style of Herouxville, Que., at new immigrants. Others may propose that newcomers be made to watch videos about national values, as they are in the Netherlands." The reference to Hérouxville alludes to a media scandal that erupted when the town issued a Code of Life calling on immigrants to refrain from engaging in behaviors that were contrary to the norms. The Code specifically prohibits immigrants from stoning women, forbidding women to drive and a range of other stereotypical behaviors, which have popularly been ascribed to Muslims in general (e.g., Zine, 2009).
6. This article appeared in an online publication, *The Mark*. http://www.themarknews.com/articles/7884-honour-killings-and-the-myth-of-arabness/.

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CHAPTER 8

Islamic, Islamist, Moderate, Extremist: Imagining the Muslim Self and the Muslim Other

Karim H. Karim

Human beings appear to have an inherent tendency to divide the world into Self and Other. These categories operate in the mind as primary organizing ideas that influence the way we imagine and engage in social relationships. They are mental containers for a series of images and thoughts that range from the microcosmic to the macrocosmic: the Self can be conceptualized as "I" or as the entire universe and, similarly, the Other can be "you" or something as large as nature. An entity that is viewed as an Other in one situation comes to be seen as part of the Self in an alternative placement; for example, a rival group is incorporated into the larger Self in the situations where one identifies with all of humanity (Karim & Eid, 2012).

Naming is crucial to developing such identifications. The names and labels attached to particular groups indicate where they are placed on the sliding scale between Self and Other. As perceptions of specific groups change, their names tend to undergo a redefinition; for example, the term "Islamist" has been repositioned in recent times (as will be discussed below). This process is taking place among Muslims and non-Muslims, since both are engaged—in different ways—in continually reshaping what constitutes the Self and the Other in discourses that include and exclude (Waldenfeld, 2011).

Public commentators on the religio-political activism among Muslims have generated a vocabulary that includes "political Islam," "Islamism," "Islamic fundamentalism," "Islamic extremism," "Islamic radicalism," "Islamic militancy," "Islamo-fascism," "Islamic terrorism," "jihadism," "Islamic suicide bombers," and "Islamic bomb." Such terminology is characterized by ambiguity and loose

usage. This chapter discusses its internal inconsistencies and contradictions. Nevertheless, academics, politicians, policymakers, journalists, among others, tend to wield the words as though they have fixed and stable meanings. This tendency speaks to the relationship between language, knowledge, and power, or more precisely, the power that comes from constructing knowledge in particular ways (Foucault, 1980). Edward Said (1978) demonstrated the manners whereby the knowledge developed by Orientalists contributed to the colonial attitude of domination. European colonists held that their perceptions were a true understanding of "the East" and that there was no need to corroborate them with the locals.

> Knowledge of the Orient, because generated out of strength, in a sense *creates* the Orient, the Oriental, and his world . . . Orientalism, then, is knowledge of the Orient that places things Oriental in class, court, prison, or manual for scrutiny, study, judgment, discipline, or governing . . . [It provides] a vocabulary, imagery, rhetoric, and figures . . . (Said, 1978, p. 40–41, *emphasis in original*)

The perch of colonial domination lent a presumption of an all-knowing authority that produced a vocabulary for governing. That attitude of domination is replicated in contemporary times by societal elites.

Using certain words in formal settings like press conferences gives the impression of being knowledgeable. A politician or policeman speaking confidently of certain Muslims being "self-radicalized" (Shane & Barry, 2013, April 30) tends to produce the effect of authoritativeness on audiences. It gives the sense that the speaker knows about what she is talking, indeed that she has a profound knowledge of the issue. Giving a name to a social phenomenon that is difficult to comprehend, such as "self-radicalization," produces the perception that it has been demystified and understood, and that the problem can be managed (Gusfield, 1981). The name gives the sense of overcoming the social phenomenon's incomprehensibility; the more technical or foreign-sounding the term (e.g., *fatwa*, *jihad*, or *Salafi*) the greater the impression of the speaker's knowledge and authority. However, in reality, the use of such terminology is often a veil for ignorance. Even though commentators speak in a matter-of-fact way about issues such as "radicalization," they usually have insufficient comprehension of the social, psychological, existential, and other complex processes through which an apparently ordinary and peaceful individual becomes a terrorist.

Misuse of the terms related to Muslims is endemic in transnational media. A significant part of the reporting serves more to mystify than to explain events occurring in Muslim societies.

> It has given consumers of news the sense that they have understood Islam without at the same time intimating to them that a great deal in this energetic coverage is based on far from objective material. In many instances, "Islam" has licensed not only patent inaccuracy but also expressions of unrestrained ethnocentrism, cultural and even racial hatred, deep yet paradoxically free-floating hostility. All this has taken place as part of what is presumed to be fair, balanced, responsible coverage of Islam. Aside from the fact that neither Christianity nor Judaism, both of them going through quite remarkable revivals (or "returns"), is treated in so emotional a way, there is an unquestioned assumption that Islam can be characterized limitlessly by means of a handful of recklessly general and repeatedly deployed clichés. (Said, 1981, p. ix)

Words such as "Islam," "Muslim," "Islamic," and "Islamist" become bottomless receptacles into which a seemingly endless and often contradictory series of meanings are poured.

Even though Muslims have become the objects of daily news in Western countries, the vast majority of people in these countries have very little knowledge about the adherents of Islam. The reasons for this partly lie in educational curricula, which have sidelined the substantial and productive engagement that Europe had with Muslims over many centuries (e.g., Jonker & Thobani, 2010; Thobani, 2014). Many journalists, including those whose beats involve frequent coverage of Muslims, remain woefully ignorant about them. For example, the religion reporter for the premier Canadian daily, *The Globe and Mail*, who was writing about a letter from Toronto's Jaffari Islamic Centre to the government (Kapica, 1992, December 11), failed to recognize the Muslim greeting "Salaam alaykum" (peace be upon you), which is synonymous to the Jewish salutation "Shalom aleichem." The letter, which was about a Canadian visit of the controversial author Salman Rushdie, was not signed by the writer but ended with "Salamun Alaykum." However, the reporter misinterpreted the Muslim greeting to be the writer's name and referred to him as "Mr. Alaykum" throughout the article.

Of course, religious illiteracy is not the monopoly of people in the Western societies. Many Muslims are also ignorant of the beliefs and terminology of religions. For example, it comes as a surprise to some that Arab and Southeast Asian Christians use the Arabic word "Allah" for God in their native languages. This issue has been politicized in Malaysia where the government has sought to ban the use of the word by Christians (Sithraputhran, 2013, July 17). Conversely, certain Western discourses tend to use the term "Allah" as being distinct from God, seemingly to create a separation between the respective divinities of Muslims and Christians (Karim, 2002). There is also a tendency among some Muslims to think that Arabic and Persian names of people are more Islamic than those derived from other cultures. This is a

result of Islam having been present longer among Arabs and Persians than most other peoples. Nevertheless, there is nothing inherently Islamic in Arabic and Persian names. Many Muslims are ignorant of the vast diversity in the forms and practices of Islam that exist in different parts of the world. This is not only limited to variances among Sunni and Shia Muslims but includes the centuries-old religious customs that have developed in Muslim societies. The response on the part of some orthodox authorities is often to name such practices as deviant or heretical (Wagemakers, 2009). Despite the limited understanding of some "men of knowledge" (*ulama*), they often do not hold back from exerting power to determine who is allowed to be a member of the communal Self (Karim, 2009).

The inclinations to produce distinctions based on naming appear to be at least partly an effort to emphasize exclusions between the Self and the Other. However, the category of the Other is not inherently a rival (Levinas, 1969); it can merely be a way to make sense of various kinds of differences such as those based on gender, ethnicity, and religion. Nevertheless, the Western and Muslim Self and Other are often reciprocally conceptualized in a negative manner in contemporary discourses. This may occur due to ignorance or be a result of the exaggeration of differences for political purposes (Karim, 2010). The connotations that are frequently given to words such as "Islam," "Islamic," "Sunni," and "Shia" in Muslim and Western discourses have become part of the respective constructions by both Muslims and non-Muslims to benefit specific interests. An individual or group's ability to position another entity in relation to the Self is integral to the knowledge-power dynamics that shape intergroup relationships.

Islam, Muslim

The term "Islam" is used in different and often contradictory manners. Mohammed Arkoun remarks that "We can no longer use the word 'Islam' without quotation marks. It has been so misused and distorted by the media, Muslims themselves, and political scientists that we need a radical reworking of the concept" (1990, p. 50). In this, it is not only some non-Muslims who position the religion negatively, but various Muslims also tend to present to it in ways that suit their own purposes. The word has become a receptacle for many meanings

> In our world, Islam is a challenge, a mystery and an enigma . . . Islam is not only attractive mystical poetry, superbly symmetrical architecture and esoteric Sufi thought; Islam is also mobs in the street, young men attacking embassies and images of self-flagellation on the television screen. Islam has become

> all things to all people. It is not only theology; it is polemics, debate, media images, conflict, and a point of view. (Ahmed, 1999, p. xi)

The origin of the term is to be found in the Qur'an, where "Islam" occurs several times (3:19, 3:85, 5:3, 6:125, 39:22, 61:7). Its technical meaning is the monotheistic believer's humble submission or surrender to God/Allah; this is synonymous with embracing, bowing, agreeing, and accepting unreservedly and with deep love the lordship of the omnipotent yet compassionate divinity. "Etymologically, in Arabic the word *islam* means 'to give something over to someone.' Here it is a matter of 'giving one's whole self over to God,' of 'entrusting all of oneself to God'" (Arkoun, 1994, p. 15). Toshihiko Izutsu notes that "*islam*, as its name itself suggests, is based on such ideas as humbleness, patience, reliance, lack of self-sufficiency, etc." (2002, p. 190, *emphasis in original*). The linguistic root of I-**s**-**l**-a-**m** is formed by the Arabic equivalents of the three letters **s**, **l**, and **m**. Other words derived from this root include: ***aslama*** (to submit), "***salim***" (to be saved from danger), "***salam***" (peace/well-being), and ***taslim*** (a salutation of peace). The Qur'anic use of "Islam" therefore implies an embracing of God's lordship that will be rewarded with well-being, peace, and salvation.

However, this simple word has acquired a seemingly endless number of connotations in religious, political, and media discourses. Its decontextualized translation as "surrender" or "submission" has been used to present the religion as a source of tyranny, which demands forced capitulation. For example, the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh and prominent critic of Islam Ayaan Hirsi Ali made a film called *Submission* in 2004 to depict what they viewed as the Qur'an-sanctioned oppression of Muslim women. Muslims themselves have produced various meanings of "Islam," sometimes offering contrasting views that are variously inclusive or exclusive in relating to the Self and the Other.

A key term that is derived from the same root as that of "Islam" is "Muslim," which occurs in the plural in the Qur'an (3:64, 5:111, 10:84, 22:78, 41:33) as "*Muslimun*." The name refers to those who worship or surrender to God. It is noteworthy that three of these five verses refer to the respective contexts of Abraham, Moses, and Jesus. All those who conduct the monotheistic submission to or acceptance of the one God are presented in the Qur'anic worldview as Muslims in the broad sense, with Abraham being the first to do so. Nevertheless, the first people in history to self-identify specifically with the term "Muslim" were the seventh-century inhabitants of the Arabian peninsula who accepted Muhammad's teachings regarding monotheism. The concept of the *ummah* (community) initially in the Prophet's time was inclusive of Jews and pagans of Medina, but was later limited to Muslims (Watt,

1956). Notwithstanding the Qur'anic inclusion of Jews and Christians in the broad prophetic tradition, insular elements among Muslims have sought to mitigate the status of fellow "People of the Book" (*Ahl al-Kitab*) (Wagemakers, 2009).

Branches among Muslims, such as the Sunni and the Shia, have also produced some exclusionary tendencies. Some Sunnis do not view the estimated 165 million Shia as Muslims and some Shias hold the majority Sunnis as unbelievers. Additionally, certain groups in Pakistan succeeded in the 1970s in having the government declare the Ahmadis, who view themselves as Muslims, as non-Muslim (Gualtieri, 2004). Writing about the varying claims on Islam by different Muslim interests, Akbar Ahmed wrote the following about this period.

> Bengalis, for instance, viewed the Pakistan army as a violent instrument of oppression; many Afghans accused the *jihad* of their compatriots of being funded and organized by the American CIA; many in Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran, including the Ayatollah himself, criticized General Zia's Islamization efforts in Pakistan as inadequate; in turn, many Muslims in the Middle East and South Asia condemned the Ayatollah's revolution in Iran as excessive. Critics were quick to point out the connection between military regimes and the use of Islam: to them Islam in Numeiri's Sudan and Zia's Pakistan was reduced to the chopping off of hands and whipping of petty criminals. Some scholars were cynical of colleagues who attempted to 'Islamize' knowledge, since merely appending the label 'Islamic' was no guarantee of academic quality. Sectarian champions, Shia or Sunni, denounced their rivals and proclaimed their exclusive ownership of the truth; smaller groups, like the Ismaili, Ahmadi and Baha'i, were dismissed as heretics and sometimes physically persecuted. (Ahmed, 1992, pp. 36–37)

Power and politics are operative here, even as "knowledgeable" arguments are constructed from the Qur'an and other Muslim sources to justify particular positions.

It was long the practice in European discourses to call Islam "Mohammedanism" and Muslims "Mohammedans" (Gibb, 1962). A European term that had been in use prior to the time of Muhammad to refer to Arabs was "Saracen" (Fletcher, 2003, p. 10); it became another name for Muslims. Berber, Arab, and African peoples living in Spain and parts of Italy in the Middle Ages were generally referred to as "Moors," a term often used to denote "Muslim." "Arab," to this day, tends to be viewed among many in Western societies as the equivalent of "Muslim" even though all Muslims are not Arabs and all Arabs are not Muslims. Originating in seventh-century Arabia, the religion of Islam spread west to the Maghrib, east to China, southeast to Mindanao (the

Philippines), southwest to Africa, and northwest to Europe. Arabic became the lingua franca in what are now seen as Arab countries, and the terms such as "Arab science" became prevalent because Muslim scientists of various ethnic backgrounds wrote their works in Arabic. The word "Turk" became synonymous with "Muslim" in the Balkans and neighboring parts of Europe because of long Ottoman rule in the region. "Mussulman," a Turkish derivation of "Muslim," spread as far as South Asia and has also been adopted as the French term for a follower of Islam.

It is important to pause here and consider the potential for pluralism in an individual's religious identity. Dominant discourses, influenced by positivist ideas, generally assume that religious identities are unitary, i.e., a Muslim identifies only with Islam and not with any other faith. However, human beings are complex and some have multiple affiliations that defy easy categorization into just one religion. The growing literature on hybrid identities has enabled the understanding of fluid interactions across ethnicities and religions. For example, Dominique-Sila Khan's work has shown that intersections between "Muslim," "Hindu," and others in South Asia have tended in many cases to defy unitary identifications with particular religions (Khan, 2004). Cultural interactions between Jews, Christians, and Muslims have also demonstrated the hybridity of religious expression across supposedly impermeable religious boundaries (Cardini, 2012). This, nevertheless, remains an under-researched area and deserves a fuller examination that goes beyond the dominant perspectives of viewing religious adherence only in unitary forms.

Islamic, Islamic World, Islamicate Society

If the meanings of core terms such as "Islam" and "Muslim" are under contestation, it follows that the adjectives that are derived from them, like "Islamic," also stand on shifting ground. The discourses of Muslim groups often attempt to legitimize their actions with references to "*Islamic* history," "*Islamic* peoples," "*Islamic* revolution," "*Islamic* republic," and so on. In the absence of a singular authoritative "Church," any Muslim entity can supposedly claim that its actions follow Qur'anic prescriptions. Nevertheless, the transnational media and many other commentators tend uncritically to accept the attributions of Islamicness by some groups, such as al-Qaeda, without putting them into the context of the rigorous debates among Muslims. Consequently, the term "Islamic" in non-Muslim eyes comes to have the same value in the phrase "Islamic prayer" as in "Islamic terrorism"—it is not surprising then that media representations about the violent actions of some groups claiming to act in the name of Islam often include images of Muslims praying (Karim, 2003).

Due to the many cases of disagreements about what is truly Islamic, it is necessary to distinguish between two dimensions in which the religion manifests itself. Arkoun suggests that the adjective "Islamic" be reserved for the "metaphysical, religious, spiritual" (Arkoun, 1983, p. 51) dimension of the faith, limiting it to the fundamental aspects of Muhammad's message as it appears in the religion's primary sources (the Qur'an and the *Hadith*—the Prophet's oral traditions). In this view, "Muslim," as an adjective, stands for "the second level of signification, [which] is the sociohistorical space in which human existence unfolds" (Ibid.). Such definitions of "Islamic" and "Muslim" help to distinguish between the religious (i.e., "Islamic") ideals and the reality that believers (i.e., Muslims) encounter in pursuing these ideals. Muslims adhere to the religion of Islam, but all that they do and claim is not Islamic. In this sense, there are histories of respective Muslim peoples and governments of various Muslim-majority countries, rather than "Islamic history," "Islamic peoples," or "Islamic governments." Edward Said notes that "the word *Muslim* is less provocative and more habitual for most Arabs; the word *Islamic* has acquired an activist, even aggressive quality that belies the more ambiguous reality" (Said, 1993, December 12, p. 64). "Islamic" is also used ideologically by certain Muslims to promote their own formulations as adhering more closely to Islam than those of others.

The acts of terrorism and other crimes by individuals, groups, or governments professing Islam, viewed through Arkoun's perspective, also belong to "the sociohistorical space in which human existence unfolds" (1983, p. 51). These actions are willy-nilly part of the history of certain Muslims who carry them out and, by extension, of the histories of their specific (regional, national) communities and even the global Muslim community, in so far as significant acts carried out by members of these groupings are part of these respective histories. However, bombings carried out by groups such as al-Qaeda cannot be considered "Islamic" since these acts do not constitute part of the essential metaphysical, religious, or spiritual dimension of the faith. They cannot even be considered to be expressions of "*Muslim* terrorism" if this were to be posited as an essential feature of Islam. Nevertheless, the individuals who profess Islam and carry out terrorist acts could be viewed as "Muslim terrorists"—one would then similarly refer to "Christian terrorists," "Jewish terrorists," "Hindu terrorists," "Buddhist terrorists," and so on. Distinguishing between the two dimensions helps to identify the ideological use of terminology in Muslim and non-Muslim discourses.

One of the primary problems that underlies dominant constructions of Muslim societies is the failure to acknowledge the diversity of the estimated 1.5 billion Muslims living around the world. This is not only a problem among non-Muslim observers but also among Muslims. There is a significant

pluralism in language, culture, and ethnicity and also in religious behavior among Muslims (e.g., Esack, 2003; Hirji, 2010). Whereas the followers of Islam adhere to a set of beliefs in common and tend to hold a general self-image of a broadly unified Muslim *ummah* (community), Aziz Al-Azmeh asserts that "there are as many Islams as there are situations that support it" (1993, p. 1)—this may be hyperbolic but it speaks to the importance of acknowledging the diversity of Islamic contexts.

Notwithstanding the ideal of a united *ummah*, the phrases "Muslim world" and "Islamic world" reinforce the false impression of a monolithic global religious entity. Such terms also give the incorrect sense that there is a region of the world where there are only Muslims. Indeed, if there is a "Muslim world," it is religiously pluralistic and transcontinental, including countries where Muslims are in majorities and minorities. The phrase "Muslim country" also provides an inaccurate picture of only one religion's adherents living in a particular society, which is not true even of Saudi Arabia where non-Muslim expatriates reside on a constant basis. The more precise term would be "Muslim-majority country."

Marshall Hodgson coined the term "Islamicate society" to be inclusive of the religious diversity of majority-Muslim societies: it "would refer not directly to the religion, Islam, itself, but to the social and cultural complex historically associated with Islam and the Muslims, both among Muslims themselves and even when found among non-Muslims" (1974, p. 59). The many contributions of Christians, Jews, Hindus, Zoroastrians, Buddhists, and others to Muslim civilizations are recognized through such a term. It points to the historical confluence of faiths, cultures, and ethnicities comprising the public cultures of the Ummayad, Abbasid, Fatimid, Safavid, Mughal, and Ottoman territories as well as of contemporary Muslim societies. The vast diversity of material conditions and cultures in places ranging from Albania to Zanzibar gives the lie to the idea of a single monolithic Muslim civilization in the past or the present.

Moderate, Extremist, Radical

There is a 14-century-long history in the relationship between European and Middle Eastern peoples. Their reciprocal views have ranged from those who see the Other as all bad or as divided between the good and the bad. Mahmood Mamdani states that,

> After an unguarded reference to pursuing a "crusade," [following the September 11, 2001 attacks] President Bush moved to distinguish between "good Muslims" and "bad Muslims." From this point of view, "bad Muslims" were

> clearly responsible for terrorism. At the same time, the president seemed to assure Americans that "good Muslims" were anxious to clear their names and consciences of this horrible crime and would undoubtedly support "us" in a war against "them." But this could not hide the central message of such discourse: unless proved to be "good," every Muslim was presumed to be "bad." (Mamdani, 2005, p. 15)

It appears that "good Muslims" have to demonstrate visibly, loudly, and repeatedly that they are vigorously engaged in combating "bad Muslims"—preferably in the ways prescribed by Western elites.

The notion of the "good Muslim" as a subservient ally of Europeans has been present since at least as early as the seventeenth century in the figure of the "noble savage;" this idea presented the Other as distinct from the civilized European Self but submissive to the latter's will. Whereas the concept has been used numerous times to depict, in fiction and non-fiction, a wide variety of peoples who are presented as subservient to the Western Self, it is noteworthy that the earliest-known English language reference to this term occurred in John Dryden's 1672 heroic play *The Conquest of Granada*. A character playing the role of a Spanish Muslim refers to himself as a "noble savage." He is portrayed as a "good Muslim" who actually turns out to be a Christian in the play. Many movies made in North America and Europe have used this trope (Shaheen, 2001). For example, the depiction of Muslims as the noble savages in the 1962 Hollywood film, *The Lawrence of Arabia*, based on a book by T. E. Lawrence, showed the desert-bound Arabs as the "good Muslims" who fought with the British against the "bad Muslims" in the form of Ottoman Turks.

The "good Muslim"/"bad Muslim" binary has also been frequently presented in news media within the political framework of "moderates" versus "extremists." This has become a handy frame for some Western journalists who do not understand the nuances of the politics of particular situations in Muslim societies. Often, "moderates" are constructed as those who side politically with Western interests and "extremists" as those who speak or act against them. The *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) defines "moderate" as "characterized by restraint in conduct or expression; temperate" and "A person who holds moderate opinions in politics, religion, or any subject of controversy" (*Oxford English Dictionary*, 2013). Over time, moderates have been contrasted with "extremes," "high flyers," "intemperates and the fanatics" (Ibid.). "Pragmatist," a particular variation of "moderate," has appeared in Western media reports about Muslim leaders such as the former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was viewed as wanting "to reach out to liberalize the economy, bring in technocrats from international financial

institutions, and maybe even begin rapprochement with the United States" (Fisher, 2013, May 22). There has been a similar tendency in characterizing president Hassan Rouhani (Euronews, 2013, June 18).

"Extremist" is defined by the OED as "One who is disposed to go to the extreme, or who holds extreme opinions; a member of a party advocating extreme measures." In contrast to the characterization of Islam by some non-Muslims as inspiring extremism, the Qur'an (2:143) addresses Muslims as "a middle community" (*al-ummat al-wasat*) and exhorts them not to transgress the limits of proper conduct (2:187; 2:229). Whereas the quest for justice is primary, punishments are to be modulated by mercy and charity (4:45). The favoring of moderation and abhorrence of extremism has long been adopted in dominant Muslim discourses. Ironically, it has even been used by some Muslims in ideological ways to marginalize certain groups whose interpretations of Islam vary from theirs. The Penguin *Dictionary of Islam*'s entry on "extremism" reads:

> In Muslim contexts the idea occurs in the writings of heresiographers, where the concept of exaggeration in belief or action was often used to stigmatize groups that did not meet a particular standard of orthodoxy. Such groups were then accused of being *ghulat* (exaggerators), a pejorative term meant to designate the extremism of their belief. Some Sunni writers used the term for Muslim groups, Shia or Sufi, with whose views they disagreed. (Nanji, 2008, p. 49)

As discussed above, it is human tendency to employ various forms of naming to deny Others membership in the righteous Self.

"Radical" is a term that is used increasingly in Western discourses as a synonym of "extremist." This is a word with different meanings in several areas (mathematics, chemistry, politics, etc.). It has a complex and contradictory history even only in the political sense. The OED describes it as:

> Advocating thorough or far-reaching political or social reform; representing or supporting an extreme section of a party . . . *(a) Brit.* belonging to, supporting, or associated with the extreme wing of the Liberal Party which called for a reform of the social and parliamentary system in the late 18th and early 19th cent. . . . *(b) U.S.* belonging to a faction of the Republican Party seeking extreme action against the South during the Civil War and Reconstruction. Now more generally: revolutionary, esp. left-wing. On the continent of Europe in the 20th cent., parties bearing the title of 'Radical' have in fact frequently tended towards a centrist or even conservative standpoint. (Oxford *English Dictionary*, 2013)

Raymond Williams notes in *Keywords* that "**radical** (with *militant*) does service as a contrast with *moderate* (which in practice is often a euphemistic

term for everyone, however insistent and committed, who is not a **radical)**" (Williams, 1983, p. 252, *emphasis in original*). Western political and journalistic discourses about "bad Muslims" are nowadays frequently peppered with references to "radical Islam" and "radical Muslims."

Whereas the entry under "radicalism" in the OED states that "the term often refers to the appeal to religion in order to legitimize violence, terrorism, and repression," Esposito notes that

> Distinguishing between radicalism and legitimate resistance is often difficult in contemporary circumstances. However, Islamic law regulates the use of violence, restricting it to self-defence and warfare initiated by a duly constituted government, with due warning, holding noncombatants immune, etc. (Esposito, 2003, p. 259)

Some Muslims draw from another meaning of "radical," i.e., that of going to "the root, basis, or foundation" (*Oxford English Dictionary*, 2013) of Islamic ideas, in order to challenge the characterization of Islam as essentially extremist. For example, the organization *radicalmiddleway.org* (2013) cleverly seeks to subvert the word "radical" as it is often used in descriptions of Muslims by incorporating it in its name: "Founded in the wake of the 7/7 attacks on the London underground, we promote a mainstream, moderate understanding of Islam that young people can relate to." In another context, Arkoun has argued for a better appreciation of "the *radical imaginary* common to the societies of the Book/books" (1994, p. 9), namely, Jews, Christians, and Muslims. The "radical imaginary" is viewed here to be the common Abrahamic root of these believers' respective sets of symbols, which could be tapped to understand the true universals shared by these communities and to produce better intercommunal relations.

Fundamentalism, Islamism, Political Islam, Shia, Sunni

The term "fundamentalist," which has been frequently applied to Muslims, is derived from the practice of various Protestant groups in the United States who conduct literal readings of the Bible—a movement that appeared in early twentieth century. Among the first-known applications of "fundamentalism" (and "Islamism") to Muslim contexts was in the May 9, 1935, issue of the *The Syracuse Herald*, published in New York state: "The leaders of Mohammedan fundamentalism . . . are urging fierce doctrines of pure Islamism and a return to the austere, desert-born fervor of their faith" (*Oxford English Dictionary*, 2013). However, it was in the wake of the Iranian Revolution that the phrase "Islamic fundamentalism" appears to have become common. The

movement was, in partial similarity to Protestant fundamentalism, driven by changes brought about by developments such as modernization and secularism. According to Nanji,

> Among some Muslims such fundamentalism, which can be separated from conservative interpretations, focuses on what is believed to be core doctrines and practices set out in the Quran and SUNNA, to the exclusion of historical developments and diverse interpretations which are regarded as "departures" and even heretical. (Nanji, 2008, p. 53)

This quest for returning to the "self-defined fundamentals of faith" (Esposito, 2003, p. 88), which has tended to be exclusive in its conceptualization of the righteous Islamic Self, seems to disregard the inclusive nature of Muhammad's message.

The term "Islamism" has increasingly come to be synonymous with "Islamic fundamentalism," but appears to have some distinct nuances. It is interpreted in various ways. Whereas "Islamists (al-Islamiyyun) are committed to implementation of their ideological vision of Islam in the state and/or society" (Esposito, 2003, p. 151), Islamism "has also more broadly been applied to those who seek to establish norms of Muslim conduct in the affairs of society without necessarily seeking to challenge those in authority or encouraging extremism, including the use of violent means" (Nanji, 2008, p. 83). This term's fluidity is producing a range of statements about it by Western policymakers. In an interview with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the country's prime minister stated in 2011 that "the major threat is still Islamicism [sic]," which he linked to terrorism (CBC, 2011, September 6). On the other hand, a senior unnamed U.S. State Department official said in 2012, "Now that we have killed most of al Qaida, now that people have come to see legitimate means of expression, people who once might have gone into al Qaida see an opportunity for a legitimate Islamism." This outlook, in the words of the *National Journal*, came at that time from a belief among American officials that "It is no longer the case, in other words, that every Islamist is seen as a potential accessory to terrorists (Harper, 2012, April 23). The initial Western response to the election of "Islamist" governments in Egypt and Tunisia seems to have been influenced by this evolving position. Similarly, the Associated Press, the leading international American wire service, changed its entry on "Islamist" in April 2013 to present it as a broad term rather than "a synonym for Islamic fighters, militants, extremists or radicals" (Euro-Islam, 2013, April 11). This redefinition seems to have allowed for the tentative acceptance of "Islamists" as "good Muslims."[1]

There are also some interesting developments among certain Muslim actors with respect to gaining ownership of "Islamist" as a self-designation. Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, former Iranian president Ahmadinejad's chief of staff, asserted (somewhat incoherently) in May 2013,

> I've said tens of times which Islamism is coming to an end. Today there are those in Syria who kill people by beheadings and bombings and they also yell "Allahu Akbar" and speak of Islamism. When I had spoke earlier about the end of Islamism, this is the type of Islamism I was speaking of . . . The era has arrived that anyone in a general way speaks of Islamism, and especially after the victory of [Iran's] Islamic revolution, a new era has arrived, and not everyone can claim Islamism . . . Can we endorse the form of Islamism of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt or Qatar? (Karami, 2013, May 3)

It appears that those in the Muslim Self who are seeking to define righteous Islamic conduct as including a religious activism are jostling over the idea of a true "Islamism" and also over the leadership of "Islamists."

Another related term is "political Islam," which has been used in the context of the political actions of "Islamic fundamentalists," and "Islamists." This phrase is problematic since it implies that "Islam," otherwise, has nothing to do with politics. Arkoun asserts that "It is true that even from its early Qur'anic phase the religious perspective mixed with profane concerns so that Islamic thought came to claim that the interweaving of the religious [*din*], the profane [*dunya*], and the political [*dawla*] is characteristic of Islam" (1994, p. 16). The difference, however, is that contemporary "Islamism" is politicizing the religion to an extent that did not occur historically.

The "good Muslim"/"bad Muslim" dichotomy has also often appeared in various Western discourses in making distinctions between Sunni and Shia Muslims. This was particularly the case following the 1979 revolution in Iran, when the staunch U.S. ally, the Shah, was overthrown and eventually replaced by a theocratic government. Very few Americans appeared to have heard about Shia Muslims (who are in a majority in Iran) and came to see them as essentially "bad Muslims" (Karim, 2003).[2] The frame of "good Muslim"/"bad Muslim" coalesced with a perceived conflict between Sunnis and Shias. It was frequently used in the coverage of the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s. Iraq, led by the nominally Sunni Saddam Hussein, was viewed at that time as a Western ally against "Shia Iran" in a war that was actually political and economic rather than religious. Iraq was often portrayed as valiantly defending the Persian Gulf kingdoms and emirates (whose rulers were Sunnis) from "Shia fundamentalism." This passage from an article in *Maclean's* newsmagazine during that time seems ironic in the light of Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait:

> Should Iraq lose the war, the neighbouring Kuwaitis are clearly concerned that they would be next in line. The Sunni-ruled state has contributed millions of petrodollars to Iraq's war effort, making it a logical target for Iranian subversion. (Levin, 1987, June 17, p. 16)

The Shia-Sunni conflict frame is a popular theme among journalists who specialize in drawing up grand scenarios about apocalyptic clashes in the Middle East (Karim, 2003). These binary constructions fail to account for the complexities of the multiple vectors of religion, ethnicity, class, and politics that actually shape loyalties and alliances. For example, the reporting of the conflict between the "Shia," "Sunni," and "Kurds" in contemporary Iraq fails to account for the religious background of the Kurds, who are mostly Sunni, or the existence of other religious groups such as Christians and ethnic groups such as the Turkoman.

Jihad, Mujahideen, Homegrown Terrorist

An additional manner in which the dichotomy of "good Muslim"/"bad Muslim" appears, particularly in Western discourses, is in appropriating terminology related to *jihad*, which is incorrectly translated in a uniform way as "holy war." The technical meaning of this word is to strive, to exert oneself, or to struggle in the way of faith (e.g., Esposito, 2003; Nanji, 2008) and it is used in many Muslims discourses in its non-violent forms (e.g., Yasin, 2002, June 6). However, the dominant sense of the term involves the use of violence, which is regulated by religious law and rules regarding the protection of non-combatants and property (Peters, 1996). Nevertheless, this is generally viewed from most non-Muslim perspectives as an illegitimate form of violence, despite the existence of parallel concepts such as that of "just war" in Christianity (Vaux, 1992).

One of the more ironic uses of Muslim terminology by Western journalists in the 1980s was in the references to "*mujahidin*" (Karim, 2003). This term means "those who are engaged in *jihad*." Despite the generally unfavorable connotations to *jihad* in Western discourses, the word *mujahidin* was usually presented within positive frameworks in Western media. It was generally reserved for Muslim guerrilla groups fighting the enemies of Western interests, particularly the Afghans who were battling the Soviets with the support of the CIA. The word largely dropped out of Western usage following the end of that war. Instead, the term "jihadist" (Nanji, 2008, p. 91) is widely used in reference to those who conduct the violent *jihad* and is often used synonymously with "Muslim terrorist." Whereas "*mujahidin*" were the "good Muslims," "jihadists" are the "bad" ones.

There is an interesting twist in the way in which the Self and the Other are constructed in the increasingly used term of "homegrown terrorists." It tends to be largely applied to Muslims, either born and/or raised in Western societies, who turn to using violence in the name of religion. Although the person is part of the national Self and, despite the use of the prefix "home," the term is actually used to produce the sense of the domestic Muslim as distant Other. The existence of terrorist acts conducted by non-Muslim citizens in the country is almost completely erased by the overwhelming focus on the "homegrown terrorism" by individuals of Muslim backgrounds (e.g., Wasiak, 2011). Through emphasis on the Muslim rather than the Western identity of the "homegrown" criminals, it becomes possible to avoid consideration of even the remotest likelihood that some of the causes of deviance may find their sources in the Self. The Self is kept pure by disregarding the hybrid nature of young Western residents of various origins who conduct political violence—the blame is placed on what are viewed as the inherently violent characteristics of their alien heritage (Karim, 2010).

Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the brothers born in the Caucasus region and suspected of carrying out bombings at the Boston Marathon in April 2013, were described as "homegrown" because they spent a long time in America after arriving as young boys (Bender, 2013, July 14). They were largely presented as alien Others by the American media. In response to this discourse and referring to Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, Nasser Rabbat wrote the following to *The Boston Globe*:

> He is American. He lived here for 11 formative years. His acculturation is total. His radicalization, if that is what led to the crimes of which he is accused, was acquired in America. Heck, it could have been influenced by the glorification of violence incessantly beamed at his generation. As a culture, we ought to stop and think: How does a boy in America today turn into a nihilistic terrorist? Then we should begin to address these possible causes instead of blaming foreigners. (Rabbat, 2013, April 25)

By endowing the "homegrown terrorists" with the primary identity of the Other, the Western Self does not have to deal with the uncomfortable thoughts of how "Islamic" violence against the nation could be engendered from within. In reality, the multicultural as well as the increasingly hybrid constitution of the populations of many countries are making it increasingly untenable to depict people of varying ethnicities and religions in essentialist manners. Yet, dominant discourses persist in presenting the Self as monolithically pure. The attribution of an essentially violent nature is used as a way to construct the domestic Other as a "homegrown terrorist" even though extensive violence is

carried out by elements of the Self as well. A healthier society would attempt to come to terms with all forms of conflict in its midst. Whereas some violence by its citizens may be inspired by foreign sources, it is vital to acknowledge the complex relationship between Self and Other.

Conclusion

Given that the vocabulary regarding Muslim actions in contemporary political life is utilized to comment on significant events in various parts of the world, it behooves its users to become more ethically responsible in its application. This does not pertain only to non-Muslim observers, but equally to Muslims themselves. It seems that the increasingly ideological manipulation of words related to Islam by certain prominently placed Muslims has facilitated the widespread abuse of this terminology. To cite one of the more egregious examples, former prime minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, spoke of developing an "Islamic bomb" in an expression of religio-political bravado (Nasr, 2001). Such uses of language have made Muslims particularly prone to negative representations. Public vocabulary that would parallel terms such as "Islamo-facism," which an American president used in a speech (Bush, 2005, October 6), is rarely applied to people who politically exploit Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, or other religions.

This chapter has discussed some of the ways in which the names and descriptions attributed to social actors are part of ideological strategies to present specific views of the world. Inclusive and exclusive constructions of Self and Other and the shaping of the "good Muslim" and the "bad Muslim" are integral to the politics of both Muslim and non-Muslim societies in contemporary times. The identities applied to various kinds of people are generally shaped by those who hold discursive authority: politicians, senior public officials, religious leaders, journalists, and others who speak to the public. They claim to have knowledge that serves as the basis of their discursive power; to rephrase Edward Said, this power *creates* the Muslim in various forms—"moderate," "extremist," "radical," and "homegrown terrorist." It produces a narrative that enables the exertion of authority over the Muslim "in class, court, prison . . . [and for] study, judgment, discipline, or governing" (Said, 1978, p. 41).

However, it is not only those suspected of being "bad Muslims" but all those who are identified as Muslims in terms of name, ancestry, physical features, clothing, affiliation, or personal history who potentially become vulnerable to scrutiny and discipline (Jiwani, 2011). The loose use of language as in "Islamic extremism," "Islamic radicalism," "Muslim terrorism," "Muslim

suicide bombers," and "Islamic bomb" has made "Islamic" and "Muslim" what Gordon Allport has called "labels of primary potency" that "act like shrieking sirens, deafening us to all finer discriminations that we might otherwise perceive" (1958, p. 175). The vast majority of Muslims who hold "Islam" as a source for human well-being, peace, and salvation are lumped together with the few who see in it a rationale for their vengeful violence. Consequently, the constructed "Muslim" is made subject to racial/religious profiling and manipulation by the agents of the state and others who have come to see all of "Islam" as the problem (Eid, 2014).

The interpretations of words shift with the passage of time. This happens as worldviews and material circumstances change, or as meanings are manipulated ideologically. The link between language, knowledge, and power gives elites the ability to use words to favor their own interests. Those who communicate to the public bear the ethical duty to engage in responsible uses of language. Leaders seeking to promote social peace through healthy intergroup relations would be expected to obtain an informed understanding of the words that have become everyday speech in multicultural and multifaith societies. Sadly, this form of knowledge does not appear to be a priority for many members of societal elites. Instead, they are wittingly or unwittingly encouraging clashes borne of ignorance.

Notes

1. In contrast to the State Department official's presentation of "Islamism" as a legitimate means of expression, the term "Islamic fundamentalism," however, still appears to be seen as an expression of unmitigated religious fanaticism.
2. It is noteworthy that the term "Islamism" is rarely used in connection with the Shia, even when describing religiously inspired activism among them. The term occurs usually, in such contexts, in reference to Sunni individuals and groups. It appears implicit in these discourses that the name "Shia" connotes an inherent "Islamism."

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CHAPTER 9

Religious Conflict, Empire-Building, and the Imagined Other

Richard Rubenstein

The Surprising Resurgence of Religious Conflict

The resurgence of religious conflict on a global basis from the late 1970s onward has been one of the great surprises of the modern era. When the Iranian Revolution erupted in 1978, few analysts suspected that it would become the first mass-based, religiously motivated revolution to succeed since the English Revolution of the seventeenth century. Nor, even after the Ayatollah Khomeini's remarkable triumph, did many foresee a great outburst of sectarian strife in Muslim societies, the rise of Hindu nationalism in India, the emergence of militant religious movements among Palestinians and Israelis, Muslim-Christian conflict in Africa and Southeast Asia, the rise of anti-Western jihadism in Asia and Africa, or the emergence of fundamentalist Christianity as a significant factors in political conflict in the United States.

One reason for this surprise, at least among Western academics, was the prior commitment of many scholars to modernization theory—an updated, Hegelianized version of Weberian social theory that included secularization as part of the inexorable movement of societies from a traditional to a modern state (e.g., Keddie, 2003; Latham, 2000). As modernization proceeded, the world was expected to follow the lead of Western societies, which had responded to their own era of religious wars (roughly 1520–1690 CE) by depoliticizing religion, secularizing the state, developing a culture of religious tolerance and pluralism, and lowering the general level of religious intensity to the point that violent manifestations of religious zeal became rare occurrences. The causal nexus between almost two centuries of savage

Catholic-Protestant warfare and the subsequent era of de-Christianization and state-building in Europe seems quite clear, although many Westerners seem to have suppressed their own history of othering the members of competing faiths, including Jews and Muslims (e.g., Dunn, 1979; Holt, 2005; Vovelle, 1990). The result of this selective memory is to make the regime of relative tolerance seem a timeless, essential feature of the Western character, as opposed to the alleged fanaticism and intolerance of Muslim, Hindu, Eastern Orthodox, and Chinese civilizations.

What remains, then, of the assumption that all systems will tend, over time, to converge on some variant of Western-style modernization? Some analysts, following Francis Fukuyama, portray the rise of religious zealotry as an atavistic response to change, fated to disappear as capitalism and democracy become worldwide (Fukuyama, 1993). These optimists remain wedded to the notion that human history is, at bottom, the history of Reason, which flowered definitively in the European Enlightenment but continues to put out shoots everywhere. To them the chief factor shaping the imagination of the Other in conflicts associated with religion is the location of each side on the scale of modernization. Conflict parties rating higher on the scale tend to portray their enemies as primitive revenants from an early period of development, while those at the scale's lower end consider their adversaries the soulless, corrupt products of modern power and privilege. The notion that modern religious rebellions represent a reactionary protest against progressive social change—a sort of theological Luddism—is quite widespread, although we will see shortly that it represents only part of a more complex picture (Appleby, 1999).

What separates Fukuyama-style optimists from pessimists like Samuel P. Huntington (1996) is the former's confidence that, despite the resurgence of religious violence, modernization is an irresistible and benevolent force destined to become global. To Huntington, by contrast, religiously motivated conflicts are symptomatic of an intractable clash of civilizations. Advocates of this view see Enlightenment values as inextricably linked to Western culture and predict a long period of violent conflict between large cultural units ("civilizations") defined in terms of non-negotiable religious or quasi-religious commitments (e.g., Rubenstein & Crocker, 1994). Like Thomas Hobbes's *homo lupus*, each civilization is an enemy to every other civilization, with the master conflict that pits "the West against the Rest." Huntingtonians expect such culture clashes to continue even after each civilization modernizes (witness the Chinese road to modernity) (e.g., Huntington, 1996; Peerenboom, 2008). The lesson for the West that they do not hesitate to draw is: keep your powder dry! For, if value-based clashes are primary and the consequences of modernization secondary, there is no reason to believe that the forms of

imagining the Other in the twenty-first century are any less virulent than their nineteenth- and twentieth-century predecessors.

These two perspectives may seem diametrically opposed, but they are not quite as contradictory as they appear. Each theorist remains a Weberian at heart, with Fukuyama promoting Max Weber's rationalist universalism, while Huntington emphasizes his cultural particularism, especially with respect to religious worldviews. Neither school of thought theorizes Western-led globalization critically or evinces any real interest in exploring the social-structural changes that generate religious conflicts and produce images of the Other as an evil enemy. Both approaches, in fact, are currently employed by U.S. policymakers in their current search for "moderate" Muslim regimes and parties—those willing to accept Western exports, investments, sociocultural norms, and political leadership—in order to counter religiously motivated insurgents of various stripes (e.g., Esposito & Mogahed, 2008; Muravchik & Szom, 2008). In philosophical terms, U.S. foreign policy in the present era may be said to reflect an uneasy balance between modernization-theory optimism and clash-of-civilizations pessimism, the Fukuyama carrot and the Huntington stick.

That said, neither view seems satisfactory either as a theoretical explanation of the resurgence of religious violence or as a guide to constructing conflict-resolving public policies. Four decades of social strife involving religious organizations and beliefs constitute neither a hiccup in the modernization process nor an expression of some inevitable civilizational clash. To focus on modernization as an abstract, autonomous process is to ignore its concrete, power-based dimensions—precisely those aspects of social change that are most crucial in generating religious revolts. What generates the imagined Other in such conflict situations is not each side's preexisting cultural repertoire alone, but an *interaction* between culture and context, systems of belief and systems of power and status (e.g., Avruch, 2012; Demmers, 2012). Therefore, to account for the style and content of such imagining requires more than a catalogue of popular narratives, beliefs, images, and other cultural praxes. It requires an understanding of the interaction between a people's deep culture and the social transformations generated by an aggressively globalizing, elite-dominated, capitalist order. Without an appreciation of imperialism as a mode of structuring relationships, it is impossible to offer an adequate explanation of modern religious conflicts (Galtung, 1971).

In what follows, I will argue that exploitative globalization, under certain circumstances, impels people to mobilize en masse under the banner of political religion. Because such conflicts are rooted in this interaction, not just in inherited cultural norms, there is cause to hope, *pace* Huntington and the cultural determinists that they may one day be resolved. But the assumption that

modernization under Western auspices is the cure seems to me equally untenable. It is only by restructuring relationships between "the West and the Rest" that the current plague of religious violence can be brought under control.

Sacralization and Violence

"Religious conflict" remains an opaque phrase that begs the question of how religion is associated with other factors in generating, maintaining, escalating, or resolving social conflict. At one extreme, a communal religious identification can function as a mere badge of ethnicity, class, or caste—as in Northern Ireland and, with respect to the 2005 riots by Muslim youth, in France. Northern Ireland's warring Catholics and Protestants did not do battle over differing interpretations of the Eucharist or disagreements about Papal infallibility. Their struggle was rooted in bitter social inequalities and political insecurities afflicting their communities over the course of three centuries. The salient issues were jobs, dignity, and group identity, not religious beliefs. Similarly, French Muslim youths burning cars in Strasbourg and Lyon were not acting as believers in the Qur'an or members of the *ummah*, but as protestors akin to the African-Americans who burned their ghettos during the racial uprisings of the 1960s. Again, nonideological issues of poverty, discrimination, and lack of group recognition were paramount.

At the other end of the continuum, however, certain violent struggles do appear to be motivated by specific religious beliefs as well as by other causes. Iran's "revolution of the mullahs" is one example. Others are the poison gas attack on Tokyo's subway system by the Japanese apocalyptic sect, Aum Shinryko, the assassinations perpetrated by certain ultra-Orthodox nationalist Jews in Israel and certain anti-abortion militants in the United States, the suicide bombings sponsored by Islamic Jihad and Hamas, and al-Qaeda's persistent efforts to cleanse Muslim societies of "Jews and Crusaders" (Juergensmeyer, 2003). Because religious ideology clearly plays an important role in such cases, some analysts have attempted to explain them primarily as the product of theological commitments or attitudes. According to Jonathan Kirsch, for example, the villain is militant monotheism, a belief system in which a jealous God demands the suppression of all other deities and belief systems (Kirsch, 2004). Other commentators have attributed responsibility to "religious fanaticism"—a phrase frequently used to describe the excessive zealotry of others, as opposed to our own intense beliefs. But such explanations ignore the fact that each religious faith possesses texts and traditions that can be used to justify war or peace, violence or nonviolence, intolerance or tolerance (Gopin, 2002). Moreover, virtually all cases of religiously motivated violence are "mixed" in the sense that they involve *superimposed* conflicts in

which issues of economic exploitation, social inequality, political repression, and unsatisfied psychological needs are also present (Pearse, 2007).

On the one hand, religious factors in conflict are clearly more than epiphenomenal. As Christopher Hill demonstrated in his path-breaking studies of the English Revolution, even a Marxist analysis must recognize the extent to which religious ideas and organization inspire, shape, and limit certain social movements (Hill, 1997). On the other hand, religious traditions alone do not explain why some groups resort to violence instead of working out their differences with others peacefully. With these principles in mind, we can restate the question. What we want to understand is the *relationship* between social situations and cultural traditions in the production of violent conflict. Which social environments are most likely to germinate political-religious movements? Which religious beliefs and sentiments are most likely be politicized or to lend themselves to violent mobilizations? How are images of the Other generated in such situations, and what role do they play in the dynamics of religiously motivated conflict? The answers to these questions, even if tentative, may throw some light on how such conflicts may be prevented or resolved.

A rich source of data for such inquiries is the transformation of initially secular social struggles into religious conflicts. Since the 1970s, this surprising *sacralization* of conflict has taken place in a number of arenas, including Israel-Palestine, Sri Lanka, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Somalia, and, to some extent, Pakistan and India. In each of these and other cases, ethnic or national conflict was initiated, organized, and fought out by secular leaders wielding secular ideologies, until, at a certain point, a pronounced turn toward religious leadership, ideology, and popular mobilization took place. Four related conditions seem to be necessary for this sort of sacralization to occur.

First, the conflict becomes protracted, so that no quick victory or defeat seems likely. The time-perspective of one or more conflicting parties lengthens, sometimes to an extent portending a transgenerational struggle.

Second, the secular leadership is discredited by lack of military success, political corruption, and inability to maintain morale. Religious struggle almost always directs popular wrath against both a "near enemy" and a "far enemy" who, we will see, are often imagined in similar terms.

Third, military or political reverses compel one or more disputants to choose between surrendering, agreeing to a disadvantageous compromise, and continuing the struggle. Frequently, the group or faction most intensely committed to religious ideals rejects the proffered compromise as shameful and promises to "keep the faith."

Finally, religious allies elsewhere produce much-needed financial, logistical, and moral support for the struggle. As the conflict is sacralized, it is

internationalized; foreign sponsors and volunteer fighters make their appearance, and there is a tendency for coreligionists to link up across national boundaries.

The apparent salience of these conditions directs one's attention to conflict locales such as France, where Muslim youths rioted with very little reference to religious leaders or doctrines, and Pakistan, where existing civil structures are under increasing attack by an assortment of religious and ethnic parties. If the underlying issues generating this sort of conflict are not identified and dealt with, the struggle may well become protracted, fulfilling the first condition for sacralization. This, in turn, suggests a more general question: Under what conditions are social conflicts likely to become violent and protracted? Confronted by serious challenges to their authority, many states respond either by attempting to suppress rebellious groups violently, bargaining with them, or combining coercion with negotiation in some measure. The difficulty, conflict resolution theorists have discovered, is that violent suppression and peaceful negotiation are not the diametric opposites they may at first seem to be. Employing direct coercion and "bargaining from strength" are but two sides of the same power-based coin. Neither technique identifies the underlying causes of the conflict or generates mutually agreeable methods of eliminating or mitigating them.

A key distinction often used by conflict resolution specialists is that between interest-based and needs-based conflicts. Disputes based on clashing interests (commercial disputes, for example, or political struggles within the context of a consensually accepted political system) may often be settled either by threatening or applying coercive force or through hard bargaining. Conflicts based on clashing core values or unsatisfied basic needs, on the other hand, are *not* deterrable or negotiable in this sense, since they involve drives for identity, recognition, justice, coherent meaning, and autonomous development which are deeply rooted in human personality (e.g., Burton, 1990a; 1990b; Galtung, 1996). When a disputant's identity is defined at least in part by religious affiliation, threats to this identity can make the religious component more salient or even "total." Furthermore, the failure to satisfy needs of this sort is likely to be systemic, implicating existing social structures (Rubenstein, 1999). Resolving religiously motivated conflicts, therefore, means moving beyond bargaining and coercion to an *analysis* that identifies these deeper sources of conflict and a *re-visioning* that generates new methods of reconstructing collapsed or failing systems.

The Context of Religious Conflict: Varieties of Empire-Building

What are some of these deeper sources? Some have said that the culprit is globalization, but it is important to distinguish between globalization *tout court* and its specifically imperial form. Globalization is a multifaceted,

self-engendering process involving the rapid multiplication and proliferation of transnational contacts and relationships of all sorts. Empire-building is globalization promoted, directed, and ultimately limited by national or multinational political and economic elites. Since ancient times, the construction and expansion of empires has provoked violent religious rebellions and generated movements of violent repression (Horsely, 2003; 2008). In attempting to understand the sources of modern religious violence, it is useful to distinguish between three periods of imperial rule: ancient (from the empires of Egypt and Assyria through those of Babylon and Persia), middle (from the Chinese, Hellenistic, and Roman empires through the period of Arab and Persian rule), and modern (from the Ottoman and Western European empires to the current American dominated era) (Burbank & Cooper, 2011).

One can learn a good deal about social conflicts in the ancient period from the discourses of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Second Isaiah, and other prophets of the Hebrew Bible (Rubenstein, 2006). But for those interested in modern religious revolts, the middle period provides the most suggestive material. A seminal event is the Maccabean revolt of the second century BCE against King Antiochus Epiphanes and the Seleucid Greeks (Goldstein, 1976; 1983). Analyzing this conflict, one sees an aggressive, worldly, militarily dominant, and commercially expansive Greek civilization attempting to integrate a semi-peripheral subject people—the Jews of Palestine—into its world system. The overwhelming threat to Jewish national and religious identity posed by this expansion generated dramatic acts of fundamentalist terrorism followed by a long guerrilla war. As we know, the upshot was to drive the occupiers out of Palestine and create the independent, although short-lived, Hasmonean state (Grainger, 2012).

Two features of this episode are particularly significant for present purposes. To begin with, the exercise of imperial power was perceived by those subject to its demands not just as an imposition but a *desecration.* (Antiochus' attempt to introduce a statue of Olympian Zeus into the Jerusalem Temple seems to have been the final straw.) From this point on, the Greek Other was imagined not only as a powerful, idolatrous conqueror who must be placated—a normal image since the rise of the Assyrian Empire six centuries earlier—but also as an atrocious desecrator who must be resisted. Between the age of Isaiah and Jeremiah, prophets who went as far as to portray Assyria and Babylon as instruments of divine justice, to that of the Maccabees, called on by God to do battle against the Greeks, a transformation has clearly taken place. This transformation converts the imperial power from a mere looter or engine of taxation into an aggressive force for cultural change, and turns the empire's subjects from passive victims of exploitation into enraged defenders of a threatened cultural identity. Not imperial power alone, but great power

associated with apparent threats of cultural pollution, drives the subject population to engage in religiously motivated rebellions.

Relative to the Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian empires, Greek and Roman imperialists were more inclined to interfere with local economies and cultural practices—a fact that helps explain not only the Maccabean revolt but also the messianic agitation by Christians and others two centuries later (Horsely, 2008). Following a second transition from the middle to modern periods, however, empire-building becomes a far more transformative process than it had been earlier. As has frequently been remarked, capitalist transformations leave virtually no social or cultural institution untouched (Magdoff, 1978). As a result, religiously motivated revolts against the Western European imperial powers were frequent occurrences in the nineteenth century, only ceasing temporarily when "wars of national liberation" took place under nationalist or socialist leadership following World War II. One recalls the popular resistance to the French in the Maghrib, to the British in old China, India, and East Africa, to the Russians in Central Asia, and to the United States in the Middle East. Everywhere secular leadership was unwilling or unable to push back against foreign political and economic domination, religious leaders mobilized mass insurgencies by fusing traditional values and behaviors with modern ideas and organizing techniques.

Religious movements not only offer followers the opportunity to purify themselves and defend their traditions, but they may also provide the only opposition capable of organizing resistors across the lines of class, region, and ethnicity. Moreover, they often link the promise of personal transformation—repentance and spiritual rebirth—to the achievement of social reform. At times they practice what they preach by organizing social welfare and relief programs that corrupt or callous governments seem incapable of providing, as well as organizing resistance to imperial claims and impositions. These examples of sacrificial action linked to promises of personal and social transformation appeal to many believers at a time when secular movements that promised radical change have been discredited, and when Western thought no longer inspires movements of cultural revival and national liberation. Given the choice between a pallid, collaborationist secularism and a fiery religious fundamentalism, it is not surprising that many people yearning for change prefer the latter.

Ironically, the religious turn in movements of resistance to empire is often the unintended result of the empire-builders' own policies and activities. By outlawing India's secular nationalists, Great Britain inadvertently laid the groundwork for the Mahatma Gandhi's *satyagraha* movement—a movement inspired, at least in part, by certain Indian religious traditions and attitudes. By its activities in the Cold War, the United States deprived the Third World

of militant secular leaders and—in Afghanistan, in particular—actively promoted the rise of an extremist religious alternative. Similarly, the rise of Iran's theocratic government can be traced to America's overthrow of the secular nationalist, Mohammad Mosaddeq, in the 1950s. Following the defeat or neutralization of leftist forces from the 1980s on, religious organizations became the prime organizers and ideologists of anti-imperial revolt. The roles of the United States (in Afghanistan) and Israel (in the Gulf States) in helping inadvertently to orchestrate this change is well documented (Johnson, 2004). But even without this assistance, assuming a continuance of anti-imperial grievances, religious organizations were best situated to take advantage of the decline of the Left.

Consider the response of Osama bin Laden, the late leader of al-Qaeda. What galvanized his opposition and led directly to attacks on U.S. targets (as he declared many times prior to September 11, 2001) was the presence of Western troops on the sacred soil of Saudi Arabia and of Israeli forces in the holy city of Jerusalem (FBIS Report, 2004). The "far enemy" whom he frequently labeled "Crusaders and Jews" was defined not so much by its unbelief in the true Qur'anic faith as by activities apparently aimed at subverting and replacing true belief: for example, the enlistment of Muslim leaders in military campaigns against fellow Muslims, the corruption and suborning of local elites, the export of unclean and forbidden products, and the dissemination of heretical ideas and social practices. It is noteworthy that, in objecting to various types of perceived desecration, bin Laden and other Islamist rebels did not necessarily propose to "turn the clock back" to an era of earlier simplicity and purity. Their underlying aim was not only to protect a threatened identity but also to assert their own community's power to determine its course of development.

Clearly, imagining the Other as a cultural polluter—a source of social and spiritual infection—poses special dangers. One cannot forget the vicious uses to which such imagery was put by the Nazis in Europe, the Americans in Japan, and the Hutus in Rwanda, among others. At the same time, the assertion of a right to control one's own communal development may also suggest possible opportunities for conflict resolution, since it is not only the infidels' infidelity that is complained of but also their aggressive promotion of their own interests and values in other people's communities. The Crusader image that plays such an important role in Islamists' imagination of the Western Other is a key to their motivation; the Crusader is, of course, an unbeliever, but his primary offense is to presume to legislate for the *ummah* as well as for his own people. Similarly, whether advancing neoliberal market theories, human rights justifications, or theories of the need to intervene in "post-conflict zones" and "failed states," modern Western elites assume the right to

decide how others should live. Arguably, altering this behavior would remove local incentives to rally behind religious zealots who offer to defend the community against political and cultural defilement.

As for the empire-builders, they have come to imagine the enemy Other in terms far more religious than they are ordinarily prepared to recognize. I will describe this sort of *othering* in more detail in the next section of this chapter. For now, it suffices to say that since the middle period of empire, imperialist forces have portrayed potential subjects and rebels against their authority as uncivilized savages. Frequently, as Edward Said (1978) and others have pointed out, the same imperial gaze that scorns its subjects' barbarism sentimentalizes and romanticizes their apparent spontaneity, freedom from civilized hypocrisies and constraints, and natural nobility. But the same sociopolitical changes that produce religiously motivated rebellion tend to generate a religiously imagined Other. Today's jihadist or suicide bomber is pictured as a satanic figure—not just a benighted native trying to defend his way of life, but an implacable enemy of the Good. To be sure, there was always an element of strong moral disapprobation contained in the definition of savagery. Even so, violence by jihadists and other religious rebels seems to provoke a defense that joins the issue on the terrain of absolute moral values and that justifies imperial violence by reverting to presecular enemy images. The jihadist is portrayed not merely as a savage (an image that rests largely on the subject's ignorance), but as a maliciously knowing adversary.

The Maccabean revolt also demonstrates how certain forms of religious thought may serve as vehicles for political mobilization against the "near enemy." As Paul Johnson (1987) and others have noted, that rebellion was aimed both at the foreign imperialists and their Jewish collaborators, a large and influential Hellenizing party strongly attracted to Greek culture as well as the advantages of Greek trade. In his important 2007 study, *Violent Politics*, William R. Polk points out that, in most protracted insurgencies, the rebels' primary initial targets are domestic forces that collaborate with foreign occupiers. This has two implications worth noting here: (1) Antagonism to the local elite fuels activity against the imperial power, and vice versa, increasing both the scope and intensity of the violence; and (2) The enemy Other is imagined in a way that permits inclusion of both near and far enemies under the same rubric. A clear example is the charge of corrupt character and practices leveled by religious rebels against both far and near adversaries—a practice with roots in America going back to the denunciation of British and Loyalist corruption by colonial preachers during the run-up to the Revolution of 1776–1781.

To this analysis we can add a further psychological and spiritual dimension. Both in the cases of the Maccabean and later religious insurgencies, what fuels many uprisings is not only rage against local collaborators but also the

self-loathing produced by the insurgents' own inclination to collaborate. The temptations presented by a powerful empire representing a sophisticated, worldly culture, and offering access to forbidden pleasures, are undeniably powerful. One can easily imagine the guilt that yielding to these pleasures often generates, especially in the hearts of educated, relatively prosperous "natives" caught between the stern demands of their own tradition and foreign blandishments. Under these circumstances, religious militants can offer these sufferers one of religion's traditional benefits: the opportunity to purify themselves and the people by engaging in sacrificial action on behalf of the faith. Thus, al-Qaeda and other religious-nationalist organizations present violent self-sacrifice as an answer to the problem of pollution that has infected the self (Rubenstein, 2002). If one imagines the enemy Other as the "non-I," the role of fighter/martyr expresses radical opposition to the self-centered, passive hedonism that the empire's subjects imagine characterizes their oppressors' character and lifestyle.

Diabolical Imagery in Religiously Motivated Conflicts

In intensely violent conflicts, conflicting parties tend to imagine the enemy Other in terms strongly influenced by inherited conceptions of personified evil. Christopher Mitchell has pointed out that, even where the disputants are self-described secularists, they often describe their own actions as compelled by necessity, while attributing the adversary's conduct to free choice—a classic distinction, at least in Abrahamic religious thought, between innocent and malicious behavior (Mitchell, 1989). In a recent book on justifications for war in America, I describe American concepts of the enemy as strongly influenced by traditional Christian images of Satan, the source of absolute evil (Rubenstein, 2010). The enemy Other is frequently imagined in specifically diabolical terms as the following six examples show.

He is malicious. In nations whose culture is strongly influenced by a Christian heritage, evil is commonly defined in Augustinian terms as the product of a perverse, congenitally disobedient will. Satan, the personification of evil, chooses to act destructively because of a deep-rooted preference for bad behavior. (Thus, the differential voluntarism described by Christopher Mitchell.) The fallen angel also represents the dark side of the Good, a characterization that may be especially relevant in cases of religious conflict, when the alleged enemy wears the robe of a cleric and claims to be fulfilling God's will. It goes without saying that where malice is seen as the root of an adversary's behavior, a violent response, as opposed to attempts to alter the conditions shaping such behavior, seems the only sensible strategy.

He is deceitful and clever. We know the devil as the Father of Lies. The satanic Enemy is known for his contempt of truth and willingness to advance

his interests by speaking falsely. If he were not so persuasive—if he did not present a simulacrum of sincerity, playing skillfully on our trusting instincts—he would not be so dangerous. But he uses his wits to deceive us and tempts us to believe him, and when we do so, we fall. Such a characterization of the enemy proves as potent an inducement to violence as his megalomania or cruelty, since if one cannot believe what the other party says, especially if one thinks that his real aim in speaking is to deceive and humiliate us, negotiations of any sort are out of the question. "You can't negotiate with terrorists" is a typical application of this defeatist doctrine.

He is inhumanly cruel. A fixed aspect of evil enemy discourse is the adversary's extreme cruelty, which often takes the form of ghastly atrocities, including torture, rape, and mass murder committed against captured soldiers, political opponents, and vulnerable domestic or colonized populations. Before World War I, reported German atrocities against Belgian civilians, wildly exaggerated by U.S. newspapers and magazines, prepared Americans to fight the barbaric "Huns" (Peterson, 1939). In part because of disenchantment with these exaggerations, the U.S. press greatly understated Hitler's mistreatment of the Jews in the early 1940s and basically missed the story of the Holocaust (Lipstadt, 1986). The Japanese, on the other hand, were considered the masters of cruelty because of their often sadistic treatment of prisoners and subject populations, and because it was easier for white Americans to picture them as subhuman Oriental monsters (Dower, 1987). In religious conflicts, there is also a strong tendency to emphasize the cruelty of punishments administered to traitors or hostages (e.g., beheading) and to link this cruelty to the perpetrators' alleged barbarism.

He is tyrannical and corrupt. Satan wants above all to be God. Not only does the diabolical enemy crave absolute power, but he also misuses it because of his destructive impulses and lack of self-control. The evil enemy is often imagined as addicted to power, which he exercises to satisfy corrupt desires, including a love of domination, financial greed, depraved personal tastes, and sadistic impulses toward those subject to his will. From George III of England to General Santa Anna, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Adolf Hitler, and Saddam Hussein, the standard image of the villainous tyrant in American culture combines excessive power with vicious personal habits. The image is more difficult to substantiate in the case of religious leaders such as Osama bin Laden; however, descriptions of such leaders frequently emphasize their "cult-like" absolute power over their followers, which they may use to gratify personal appetites.

He seeks world domination. Like John Milton's Satan, the Evil Enemy is not content merely to reign in hell; he wants to rule heaven. A particularly bizarre example of this sort of stereotyping is the propagandistic conversion of Kaiser

Wilhelm II of Germany, formerly considered a harmless, slightly ridiculous figure into a monster bent on world domination: the "Beast of Berlin." In American discourses of violent conflict, one can detect a fairly consistent pattern in which foreign leaders once conceived of as locally ambitious thugs (e.g., Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi) are reframed as diabolical, megalomaniac adversaries. Applied to religiously motivated figures like bin Laden or the Taliban, this aspect of the enemy image induces otherwise sensible critics to imagine a plot by Islamists to convert the entire world to their brand of Islam. The image functions as a way of obscuring the essentially defensive posture of anti-imperialist rebels and picturing them, instead, as fearsome aggressors.

He is radically unlike us. This decisive attribute of the imagined evil enemy is often symbolized or crystallized as a difference in skin color and racial features. From America's Indian Wars to the wars against Filipino insurgents, Japanese, North Koreans, and Arab rebels, the enemy has been imagined as an inferior, nonwhite Other. Even when physical differences between white Americans and their adversaries were nonexistent or minimal—in the case of Germans in the two world wars, leftist rebels in Latin America, or Arabs and Persians in the so-called War on Terrorism—cartoons, posters, and other visual representations frequently used racial or ethnic stereotypes to portray the enemy as a swarthy villain. The persistence of these images in "post-racist" America is incontrovertible. Their moral implications are particularly worth noting, since images of the Other not only define a self-image by contrast, but also serve as its shadow double, reflecting aspects of the imperial character of which we are ashamed (Volkan, 1998).

The repression via projection of this shadow double—the violent, "uncivilized" people Westerners have long feared they really are—plays a particularly destructive role in cases where they intervene militarily for humanitarian reasons, claiming to be disinterested liberators, not imperial occupiers. The *locus classicus* for this sort of behavior, originating a pattern often repeated, was United States' war against Spain in 1898, a popular struggle fought by a nation determined to liberate Cuba and other territories from Spanish oppression. When a massive anti-American insurgency erupted in the captured Philippines, the United States suppressed it at a cost of more than 200,000 Filipino deaths, using techniques of relocation, destruction of crops, torturing of prisoners, and collective punishment that were precisely those employed by the Spanish against Cuban independence fighters, and that have since become standard features of imperialist warfare (Anderson & Cayton, 2005). The strong tendency of the self-proclaimed liberator to mimic the tactics of the oppressor is notable in subsequent U.S. wars in Indochina, Iraq, and Afghanistan, as well as in multiple smaller interventions.

What, then, of the rebel side's diabolization of its imperialist enemies? On the one hand, we know that diabolization occurs; why else would Iran's revolutionary leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini, refer to the United States repeatedly as "the Great Satan," or other Arab leaders and journalists brand the Jews malicious, deceitful, megalomaniac seducers and destroyers? Indeed, there are important similarities between Christian and Muslim concepts of the devil's origin and characteristics, just as there are similarities between the two faiths' concepts of good and evil. However, there are also differences that may make devil-images somewhat less powerful in the Islamic than in Christian and post-Christian imaginings. Shaytan is not as powerful a figure in Islamic theology as Lucifer is in the West (Spronk, 2004). That said, unless one or more combatants in conflicts involving religion embrace an available tradition of nonviolent action, there is a marked tendency on their part to ascribe an evil character to the Other and to forego negotiation or other peaceful interactions. Eastern religions are, perhaps, less burdened by the tradition of diabolism than are the Abrahamic faiths, but as the Sri Lankan conflict demonstrates, the movement toward sacralization of conflicts can be quite as lethal for Hindus and Buddhists as for Christians and Muslims.

Re-Imagining the Other: Religion as a Force for Conflict Resolution?

A final question of great concern is whether lethal disputes involving groups mobilized under the banner of religious faith are resolvable through nonviolent means. In particular, is there a role that religion itself may play in preventing or resolving violent struggles of the sort described here? A growing literature explores the issue, emphasizing the possibilities of using the major faiths' doctrinal, spiritual, and practical resources to mitigate conflicts and reconcile enemies (e.g., Gopin, 2009; Johnston, 2008; Smock, 2002). Although interesting and potentially quite useful, many of these approaches fail to prescribe for the social and geopolitical dimensions of conflicts in which religion provides an ideological and organizational basis. Restating the question, then, one can ask whether religious ideas and resources might be used to help conflicting parties re-imagine the Other in cases in which religion is linked with anti-imperial revolts and violent responses to rebellion by imperial (or neo-imperial) powers. My response will focus on the Abrahamic faiths, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, but similar principles apply, it seems to me, in the case of other "universalistic" religions, including Buddhism and the great secular faiths of the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment eras.

From the time of the Hebrew prophets onward, it has been religion's historic task not only to define the identities of particular peoples but also

to suggest a road forward toward the moral integration of humanity. Isaiah and his successors understood that the great empires arising during their lifetimes aspired to "erase the frontiers of peoples" and to create a universal world order subject to their rule (Isaiah, 10:13). But this project involved an insoluble contradiction. A global community could be defined and brought into existence only to the extent consistent with continued domination by its Assyrian, Babylonian, or Persian masters. The assumption of imperial superiority doomed any attempt to found a world order on the principles of human unity and the equality of nations. This is why Isaiah insisted that only when God's authority, expressed in terms of a universal ethic of peace and justice, was recognized as superior to that of any human emperor, would war give way to peaceful dispute resolution and the nations "hammer their swords into plowshares, their spears into sickles" (Isaiah, 2:4). Essentially, similar ideas underpin the prophetic tradition in Christianity and Islam, although, at times, all three faiths have also embraced particularistic deviations from the universalistic norm (e.g., Armstrong, 1994; Heft, 2005; Kimball, 2011). The same contradiction dooms all modern attempts to create a peaceful and just world order on the basis of any nation's or multinational coalition's hegemonic power. One watches with grief and anger as the United States and other great powers proclaim the rule of law, political democracy, human rights, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as universal principles, and then proceed to qualify these universals to the extent needed to reward those who uphold their power and to punish those who defy it. President George W. Bush (2005, October 6) for example, defined "Islamic radicalism" as a malicious, totalitarian force that can be countered only by violent suppression. However, the prophetic tradition of Abrahamic religion suggests that the appropriate answer to violent fundamentalism is not a violent defense of the empire against rebellion, but a global reformation that moves toward realization of the prophetic idea that one God means one Humanity. The goal, made clear by Isaiah, is a world community composed of equal, autonomous nations, freed of war, and united in a spirit of mutual empathetic concern. In the future that he envisions, all nations recognizing the primary values of justice, righteousness, and peace will be blessed. "Yahweh of the Hosts will give his blessing in the words, 'Blessed by my people Egypt, Assyria my creation, and Israel my heritage'" (Isaiah, 19:23–24).

Such a transformation would clearly require a *re-imagining* of the Other, drawing on resources more constructive and profound than traditions of religious diabolism. Some commentators have emphasized the usefulness to peacemaking of spiritual praxes advocating mercy and forgiveness, but forgiveness may extend to the Other's actions without altering one's imagination

of his or her situation and character. What is required, in my view, is a re-imagining based on three principles: with regard to character, the Other's essential similarity to oneself; with regard to situation, his/her role in the system of global power and exploitation; with regard to future prospects, his/her capacity for transformation in conjunction with a transformation of the system. Religious traditions possess resources that can be mobilized to assist in all three forms of re-imagining, but it is clear that they require strengthening by the inclusion of concepts and values associated with what Robert Bellah termed the "civil religion," a fusion of older ideas and practices with those deriving from the "secular religions" of the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment periods (e.g., Agrosino, 2002; Bellah, 1967). Traditional religions can provide theological warrants for human similitude, the imperatives of social justice, and the capacity of individuals and for moral transformation. But effective re-imagining of the Other also requires an understanding of basic human needs, the rebel's position in an elite-dominated global system, and the possibilities of social reconstruction. Religious initiatives in this expanded sense can play an important role in mitigating the causes of religious violence.

The great practical question, of course, is how to get from here to there. How to move from a world in which violent mobilizations based on religious affiliation are the last line of defense for groups struggling for their identity and autonomy to one in which religion rediscovers its historic peace-making and world-unifying role? In the space remaining I can only suggest a few general principles and practices that might help to lead in this direction.

The first requirement is the urgent need to develop analytically sound, imaginative, and practical alternatives to imperial and neo-imperial models of world order. In the United States, which does not like to recognize itself as an imperial power, the difficult task is to convince the public and policymakers that both the older and newer imperial models are bankrupt, and that "soft power," "smart power," and multilateral interventions do not represent new approaches to global governance. In the time of the prophets, Cyrus the Great of Persia, who allowed the Jews and other captives to return to their homelands, represented "soft power." But Cyrus's successors, challenged by rebels throughout their empire, returned to the vicious repressive tactics of earlier empires. Soft power is not the opposite of violent power—it is a phase in the development of empire, which almost always gives way, when challenged by revolts, to violent repression. Nor does the replacement of unilateral U.S. initiatives by "multinational" interventions featuring NATO members and others alter the basic dynamics of empire, including invidious imaginings of the Other. The great desideratum, as prophets ancient and modern have

understood, is to move from the power-based mode of dealing with systemic problems to a consensual, analytical, problem-solving mode.

For this reason, in response to violent challenges to the existing order, social groups and nations need to practice analytical conflict resolution, not just the suppression of dissidents. Conflict resolution is not a method of bargaining or compromising—it is an attempt to imagine feasible ways of reconstructing systems that threaten people's identities and that generate violence in their communities. The key is to assist parties in conflict to identify the sources of the violence and to envision, evaluate, and implement mutually acceptable ways of dealing with them (e.g., Kriesberg & Dayton, 2012; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011; Sandole et al., 2008). My colleagues in the field of conflict resolution have already made some progress in adapting and applying methods of peacemaking used successfully in cases of ethnic, racial, and national violence to religiously motivated struggles. We need to intensify our efforts to convince the public and policymakers that coercive responses merely inflame such conflicts—and that creative, practical alternatives are available.

The most serious obstacle to making use of these alternatives, perhaps, is the addiction to power and privilege by those who wield it—an addiction far more destructive to humanity than enslavement by any merely chemical drug. This is where religion may have a particularly important role to play, since its prophets insist on the primacy of ethics over power. *The most significant movement of our time is the process by virtue of which former strangers around the globe have become neighbors*. Those formerly isolated now talk to each other, visit each other, contract each other's diseases, marry each other's children, do business with each other, work in each other's factories, and sing each other's songs. Re-imagining the Other, in fact, is less a utopian goal than a process naturally furthered by nonexploitative globalization. Generic globalization, as opposed to imperialist domination, creates the need for a new global ethic.

What *are* our ethical obligations toward these new neighbors? Is there an ethical core, shared by all major religions, whose identification and adumbration could help make the "human family" more than a hopeful metaphor? One is aware, of course, of the danger of attempting to impose a false universalism on the diverse components of a world society in the making. Even so, it seems clear that some agreement on fundamental principles is possible, based on re-imagining the Other as a fellow human being in need of liberation (Armstrong, 2011). A new global ethic, arrived at through interreligious dialogue in the broadest sense, might well help to create a genuinely human community. Perhaps, in pursuing this globalization of the spirit, religions East and West will at last rediscover their world-transformative role.

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CHAPTER 10

Translating Otherness

Salah Basalamah

Introduction

There are stumbling blocks in the present relationship between Muslim and Western societies, misunderstandings in their present exchanges of communication, and blind spots in the systems of perception on each side. Indeed, in an era of new communication technologies, globalized information, and knowledge societies, one might well wonder at seeing Muslim and Western societies continue to misjudge, misunderstand, and even ignore each other. The interdependence of these two entities poses the significance of looking into whether there exist realities outside their conceptual integration and hence a *space for negotiation* that would make it possible to bridge the widening gap of representations in the imaginations of peoples swayed by polarizing and sensationalizing media coverage. One might also wonder whether it is possible to imagine the very existence of such a space, considering the unequal power relations between the two entities; to what extent these relations lie within the framework of the more general relation of identity to otherness, of Self to Other; and how the ethical consequences of these relations lead to contemplation of the processes, levels, and conditions of mutual communication.

This chapter treats the relationship between Muslim and Western societies along three axes of conceptualization—*otherness*, *paradigm of translation*, and *reflection*. The first deals with the notion of *otherness* that presents itself as the unavoidable challenge of existence. As a philosophical question par excellence, the presence of the Other and her recognition as such forces consideration of the Self's relationship to her, to situate the Self, and to outline the general directions of the action to be undertaken in this regard. Between

identity and difference, the reality imposed by otherness testifies to human finiteness, incompleteness, even fragility. The second axis is that of the *paradigm of translation*, conceived as both an epistemological framework for the following reflection and a heuristic conceptual tool for considering the processes of transformation motivated by the duty of coexistence imposed by a globalized world. Whereas otherness is conceived as the object to be translated, and since translation represents the conceptual space for the treatment of our object, the third axis of *reflection* accommodates the actual condition of possibility of the first two; in other words, the elements of knowledge without which otherness is neither translatable nor perceptible in what constitutes its distinctive specificity without damage or alteration. But, as Marshall McLuhan asserted long ago (McLuhan, 1964), content is indistinguishable from its form or from its medium; therefore, the knowledge of otherness is only possible through the vehicle of its discursive dissemination or transmission. The notion of the substance of otherness as knowledge to be acquired and transformed involves reflection on the mechanisms by which the representations that shape our imagination appear on the scene through "media" or signifiers in the semiotic sense of the term (Danesi 2002).

This chapter begins with a synthesis of representations of otherness, whose theoretical framing is conducted from the vantage points of both Western and Muslim societies. Reflecting on the representational and discursive tensions that pit them against each other, it then attempts to explore the motivations, relevance, and applicability of the translational postulate developed in this reflection. Indeed, if translation as an interlinguistic transfer teaches us how to overcome the deficiencies in understanding meanings of unknown languages, it seems therefore opportune to consider to what extent its conceptualization as a paradigm is applicable to the correction of the failings that cloud the mutual understanding between Muslim and Western societies by the sole fact of their coexistence. This chapter explains why translation is a conceptual tool of choice, and how it is articulated at the quasi-civilizational level, according to specific criteria and conditions. Finally, the chapter gives direction to this translational enterprise by specifying the general outlines of its teleology. Although the usually practical character of translation highlights its operational dimension in particular, the onus remains to offer a reflection on its aims. The chapter explains how this process should be carried out in the framework of a specific project, goal, and ethical motivation.

Understanding Translation

Given the context of globalization and the resulting *de facto* interconnectivity among multiple sources and destinations, the relativity of points of

view regarding the topics exchanged as well as the heterogeneity of the perspectives, understandings, and interpretations become unavoidable. In other words, since this multiplicity of languages, narratives, and perceptions takes place in a globalized world, since the semiotic space provides the means of achieving the greatest impact on the masses today, and since people cannot coexist without acting together for the good of the greatest number, what type of global undertaking could be promoted to the rank of concerted action?

Whether this reflection is pursued from the vantage point of Western or Muslim societies," the result would be the same. Although tackling it from the former, one could recall the work of Baker and Henry (2010), who in reflecting on the effort made by "the West" to understand "Islam" better, highlighted the opposition between the cultural relativism that consists in recognizing a privileged access to one's own culture to the detriment of others' and the interpretive ability that attempts to find points of intersection between the "discursive commitments" (Brandom, 1998) of different cultures. For Baker and Henry (2010), the existence and very possibility of translation is proof that it is possible to share the understanding of some elements of other cultures (even those to which one might object) and that there do exist common spaces where discursive commitments that influence behavior could be rationally interpreted, negotiated, recontextualized, and reformulated. Baker and Henry also warn against ethnocentric pseudo-interpretations and "*refusing* to *try* to interpret [people from other cultures]" (2010, p. 188, *emphasis in original*). One can reach other cultures by making the dual effort to 1) postulate the identity of the cultural element perceived by the interlocutors at the moment of interpretation and 2) identify the shared spaces by opening oneself to the discovery of new, recognizable, normative contents, even in those that one might consider open to dispute. Thus, "understanding the Muslim world" (Baker & Henry, 2010, p. 177) consists in rejecting the sociologizing recourse of external behavior alone in order to understand Muslim practices, and in contrast favoring an approach that brings the respective values of interlocutors into contact "by keeping normative score" (Ibid., p. 197) in order to "manage and negotiate the areas in which they differ and build upon the areas in which they do not" (Ibid., p. 198).

Although Baker and Henry (2010) seem to use the terms "interpretation" and "translation" interchangeably, they highlight the importance of a theory of culture interpretation by means of social practices.

> The point is not just better understanding, but highlighting opportunities for cooperation on shared projects as well as developing strategies for more constructive engagement over contested practices . . . A social practice theory of cultural interpretation can thus *improve* our practice of interpreting other

> cultures by making that practice explicit to us, and at the same time, *explain* the process by which cultures change, so critical to understanding contemporary Islamism, in terms of interpretative interactions across cultures and within them. (Baker & Henry, 2010, p. 179, *emphasis in original*)

Translating is not merely understanding or making something understood, it is also reforming and transforming; in other words, *acting upon the relation* that sets us against the otherness and even going beyond the awareness of elements of common values, meanings that had not been understood before, and textual and contextual knowledge that constitutes the precondition. In the extension of Marx's position that "Philosophers have only interpreted the world in certain ways; the point is to change it" (Marx & Engels, 1970), the translation effort consists in going beyond the Orientalist project for a "better knowledge" of otherness—which is just as necessary under some conditions—and attaching to it that of a rapprochement (between "East" and "West") or of an integration (of "Islam" into "the West" and vice-versa). In fact, in order to understand why resorting to this concept in dealing with knowledge and the relation to otherness, the logic of its process, and its direct and related fields of application, one needs to measure the scope of what is meant by "translation" in this context.

What is understood as "translation" here depends on the goals assigned to it. If an instrument is necessary to overcome deficiencies of knowledge and understanding between Muslim and Western societies, it is just as important to ensure that the concept that designates it applies appropriately to its referent. A problem is faced when a notion is used outside of its principal meaning consists in the nonobvious character of its figurative usage: the literal meaning is generally qualified as "primary," being the one that most immediately comes to mind, whatever the context. The figurative usage is considered secondary because it is both less frequent and less direct, that is, it requires the detour of a displacement of meaning between two different conceptual domains: the (more concrete) source and the (more abstract) target. This is the definition of the "conceptual metaphor" (Kövecses, 2002, p. 6). It is this paradox of the secondary nature of the figurative (compared to the literal) meaning combined with the recurrence of the metaphor that makes up the first specificity of translation. On the one hand, the translating action is located "downstream" from what is commonly known as the "original creation" and is therefore secondary. On the other hand, it not only participates in the actual development of our conceptual system but also the word translation is linked etymologically to metaphor—one of the terms dedicated to it in ancient Greek is *metapherein*. Translation is therefore metaphorical by definition.

A number of disciplines are turning to this concept of translation as metaphor because of its heuristic power to represent and clarify the phenomena of transmission and transformation beyond the linguistic domain. Relying on the knowledge and experience gathered in linguistics, fields such as anthropology, sociology, political science, economics, marketing, cultural studies, and postcolonial studies are using the concept of translation to describe the processes of interpretation, adaptation, or displacement of cultures, powers, or even people (with the accompanying cognitive or psychological repercussions). So translation in the metaphorical sense consists in considering distinct objects whose meanings are perceived from different perspectives, transforming them from reciprocal points of view, and observing the types and degrees of changes brought about as well as possible modifications in content and form.

Translation metaphors are multiple and, in a complementary manner, cover several aspects of the translational process that can be organized into three main categories. The first is *communicative* and made up of two interdependent sections. On the one hand, as in the hermeneutical tradition in philosophy, translation is equivalent to the act of understanding, interpreting, and grasping; and on the other hand, it is the other face of this—the corresponding process that consists in making understood, expressing, (re) formulating, or clarifying. Thus, from Heidegger to Gadamer and Derrida to Ricœur, translation has represented both aspects of the communicative process.

> Translation is formally and pragmatically implicit in every act of communication, *in the emission and reception* of each and every mode of meaning, be it in the widest semiotic sense or in more specifically verbal exchanges. To understand is to decipher. To hear significance is to translate. (Steiner, 1998, p. xii, *emphasis added*)

The second category is *transformative* since it refers to the process of progressive or sudden change that occurs between two distinct states of the same object or individual. To illustrate this, one could take the example of the idea of translation as a political reform, substantially inspired by the works of Mouffe since she considers that sociopolitical movements cannot deal with the hegemony of liberal globalization without forming "chains of equivalence" (2000; 2005), that is, translations. Through *articulating* disparate political forces, the formation of the chain consists in agreeing on the smallest common denominators in ideology and strategy in order to effect a transformation and thereby form an "agonistic" opposition in view of fighting the designated political enemy democratically (Basalamah, 2008).

The third and last category is both *transactional* and *recursive*. Translation is transactional inasmuch as it plays a role in managing difference, in negotiating between poles of meaning that, in a last phase of the transformation, must reduce tension and find a balance. Translating, therefore, consists in making at least two shapes, objects, or individuals converge and negotiate their coexistence. To do so, one cannot be satisfied with only one movement in the process of searching for stability, but with a succession of convergences starting from each of the parties. Thus, after the first transactional movement, the next ones will follow and so on recursively until the point of equilibrium and rapprochement between the parties involved is found. This is, for example, Habermas's (1985) logic of "communicative action" or Gadamer's (1996) "fusion of horizons" in which recursive translation represents the ever-renewed process of looking for common understanding, or consensus.

Through its three complementary facets, translation conceived as a *philosophical paradigm* develops a competence with social and political functions that are considerable and are finally beginning to be recognized (Basalamah, 2010; 2012). Ricœur resorts to translation to explain its conciliatory, or even healing, virtues in the context of globalization and generalized heterogeneity: "translation is from end to end the remedy for plurality in a world of scattering and confusion" (2007, p. 28). In the Babel of the third millennium, translational capacity provides a means of resistance *par excellence* to the "infirmity" attributable to the plurality of languages and cultures. The acknowledgement of human fragmentation and the impossibility of understanding one's own identity without seeing oneself as understood by others, are the conditions for the advent of a translational ethic—a "linguistic hospitality" as Ricœur would say—that leads to a capacity for political management of plurality. Transposed into the space of sociopolitical plurality in today's world, according to Ricœur, translation becomes the model of an activity that makes it possible to overcome deficiencies in understanding that place a burden on intercultural and political relations, and also reduce visible distances and differences in the sense of a rapprochement between parties.

Plurality is a battle, and translation is enlisted to take up the challenge of human conflicts by the best possible management of both the circulation of "blocks of meaning" (Ricœur, 2007, pp. 29–30) of social or opposing political groups, and the rapprochement that could result. As such, translation is imperative for a rapprochement between Muslim and Western societies. This being the case, it would be appropriate to look for the context that can enable this enterprise and thus allow the dyad in question to shift from an antagonistic relationship of enmity in the manner of Schmitt, to one of "agonistic" adversity (political aspect) according to the terms of Mouffe (2000; 2005).

Knowledge and Translation

Thus far, reasons have been formulated to justify the recourse to translation as a heuristic concept to represent the complementary processes of communication, transformation, and recursive transaction. However, one might wonder how this type of translation takes place and under what conditions. Although numerous elements determine this process, if referred to the linguistic model that serves as the ultimate referent to support the metaphorical use of the concept of translation, this reflection will be limited to the notion of *knowledge*. Because on the one hand, although knowledge can constitute the actual object of the translational process (Eid & Basalamah, 2012), it is also one of its fundamental conditions; and on the other hand, it responds to the acknowledgement of a "clash of ignorance" that has been discussed at some length by Karim and Eid (2012).

In interlinguistic translation, the translational process can only take place convincingly and successfully insofar as it depends on a collection of knowledge that involves the target and, even more importantly, the source, language, and culture. If one refers, for example, to the interpretive translation theory of the Paris School (Lederer, 2003), it appears that one of the fundamental conditions for success in the translational activity consists in its recourse to three areas of knowledge: the first is "cognitive baggage" or both linguistic and thematic encyclopedic knowledge preexistent to the reading, and situated in the translator's long-term memory. The second is the "cognitive context" or knowledge proceeding from the source text and acquired at the moment of reading. The third is the "cognitive complement," which integrates the new elements from the cognitive context into the cognitive baggage selected from the translator's long-term memory, resulting in what Lederer calls "hypotheses of meaning" (1994, p. 181).

In addition, Sperber and Wilson's (1995) "relevance theory of communication and cognition" applied to translation (Gutt, 2000) constitutes another example where shared knowledge is a fundamental element for explaining the translational process as a communicative performance. This theory stipulates that the human faculty of inference of meaning can be detected by the principle of relevance that consists of reaching a maximum level of meaning with a minimum of means of expression. Between the descriptive use and the interpretive use of language, translation falls rather under the latter inasmuch as it seeks to resemble its original in an interpretive manner. Thus translation is governed by the principle of relevance in the sense that its objective tends to be "adequately relevant to the audience—that is, that [it] offer[s] adequate contextual effects [as it] should be expressed in such a manner that it yields the intended interpretation without putting the audience to unnecessary

processing effort" (Gutt, 2000, p. 107). In other words, the cognitive process that enables communication (whether intralinguistic or interlinguistic) depends on what shared knowledge the faculty of inference discovers between interlocutors: the more knowledge they have in common, the more efficient the translation-communication.

As such, these various facets of knowledge testify to the need for the translational process to depend on sufficient extralinguistic apparatus to permit an interpretation that is both a relevant one of the translated object and one that is clarified by the communication situation of the extralinguistic apparatus. Transposed into the anthropological domain, one can thus assimilate this interpreted knowledge into the knowledge that makes up Weber's "webs of significance" referred to by Geertz (1973, p. 5) to describe the situation of the human being within the culture that she produces herself and whose meaning she interprets. This means, by extension, that in order for Muslim and Western societies to be translated, it is necessary, or even unavoidable, for the various types of knowledge to be mobilized and for the process of communication-transformation-transaction to be clarified by a "thick" (Geertz, 1973, p. 6) description-interpretation.

It follows that inasmuch as there can be no translation between Muslim and Western societies without the fundamental condition of depending on knowledge to enable their interpretation and of situations in their sociohistorical relations, the clash of ignorance criticized by Said (2001, October 22) for the lack of knowledge in the discourses that attempt to represent and translate either Muslim or Western alterities.

However, one could object to the type of position that Muslim otherness is so radical for some people in "the West" (and vice-versa) that translation is deprived of its very condition of possibility, that is, the minimum common human basis that is a benchmark for placing elements from the other culture in one's own symbolic framework. In other words, one would thus be brought to such a level of radicalism in the difference between Muslim and Western societies that the only way to establish ties would be through Quine's (1960) philosophy of anthropological translation. Quine considered that the translational process of the anthropologist-translator's attempt to understand foreign meanings directly is impossible without both projecting some familiar symbolic shapes onto it and connecting them to a specific communicative situation informed by the perceptive stimuli that are common to the participants. Moreover, even in this last case, the translation remains *indeterminate* inasmuch as the reference to a term corresponding to a shared, observable situation obliges the anthropologist-translator to formulate hypotheses to infer all possible meanings without being able to verify the correctness of any particular one. Also at play is the conditioning of the cultural background of

the anthropologist-translator, and her inability to step outside of her epistemological enclosure and her need therefore to construct an understanding of otherness from the vantage point of her own symbolic system.

It is, for instance, by pushing the distancing from Muslim otherness to this limit that the most alienating discourses seem to force it to be translated so radically (Smith, 2011), whereas the common historical, cultural, and religious bases are legion and no longer need to be proven further (e.g., Hunke, 1985; Wallace-Murphy, 2006). It is important to stress, together with Burgat (2005), that the fundamental problem with "Islam" is not so much the absence of a shared ground with "the West" as its representation as a foreigner to it and (total or partial) ignorance of its "parlance" and symbols. If the Muslim frame of reference needs to be translated, it is in order to understand its symbolic system to the point that its representation would not embody a power relation but, rather, be a space for explanation and mutual interpretation of respective meanings, as well as for cooperation. Of course, the same argument could be brought forward about "the West" from the point of view of Muslim societies.

Qualities of Translation

Generally, one can say that translation is characterized by two qualities: firstly, it is *incomplete*, in the sense that, in the manner of Gadamerian conversation or Habermasian deliberation, the adjustment of mutual understanding is always being reinitiated. Secondly, it always contains a *resistant*, *irreducible* dimension; communication in one way or another constantly suffers from "noise." Translating the Other is wearisome, even laborious, since it is necessary to go through the discomfort of her proximity in order to return to oneself. By pushing the reflection a bit farther, one could even say that Dilthey's notion of "Widerstand" (resistance) (2010, p. 19) is the very condition of knowledge and recognition of the existence of that which is outside us. Thus, to understand and to translate otherness requires that one experiences a hindrance to one's deliberate movement by that which does not belong to our representations; in other words, the foreigner. In this regard, Gadamer (2004) proposes thinking of the emergence of otherness as "Anstoss," that is, both "impulse" and "clash," which means that the relation to the unknown element that interrupts our intellectual routine is challenged by an obstacle that is at the same time the impulse that prompts the will to understand her.

It appears, therefore, that the roughness, or even difficulty, of the translational process is the inescapable reminder of the mediating presence of "disruptions, rejections, misunderstandings, and conflicts that can occur—and, most importantly, the ideological (and perilous) role of the translator

himself" (Bachmann-Medick, 2008). Precisely, due to the human characteristic of this presence, its complex nature must be pointed out. In fact, one might even say that the accumulation of (1) the overlapping of the stages of the translational process, (2) the inescapable human factor of which it is the center, and (3) the ternary structure of the relation, is where a mediation is interposed that attests to its complexity. Wolton even considers that "*thinking about incommunication means respecting the Other and understanding the foundations of otherness. Thinking about incommunication is the highest stage of communication*" (2005, p. 139, *author's translation*). The obstacle to the flow of communication is what creates the conditions and need for communication.

In other words, taking into account the particularity of the task of translating otherness and the responsibility this involves for rendering its multidimensional complexity, the need to recognize two fundamental aspects immediately follows: both the highlighting of the *subject* at the origin of the process, her subjectivity, and her agency, as well as the *ethical* requirement that characterizes her action.

In contemplating the most articulate studies on the advent of the modern subject in the Western tradition (e.g., De Libera, 2008; Taylor, 1992), it emerges that the "modern me" (especially for Taylor), by the actual process of its dialogical constitution and its continuous search for the good, is defined by its positioning with respect to moral and spiritual matters (Taylor, 1992), by commitments and strong distinctions between different life styles, actions, or feelings considered to be "incomparably higher than others" (Ibid., pp. 19–20). This is where one also situates the simultaneous appearance of the terms "responsibility" and "irresponsibility," for which the modern subject will serve as a medium for applying the "*responsibilizing interpretation of action*" (Genard, 2006, p. 16, *author's translation*), which will make it possible, especially in the practical domain of law, to pass "*from an 'objective' law to a 'subjective' law*" (Ibid., p. 17, *author's translation*). In translation studies, the same interest can be seen for the translating agent since, according to Snell-Hornby (2006), we are supposedly in the "sociological turn," which would support Chesterman's suggestion of adding, among the sub-domains of the discipline that of "TranslaTOR Studies" (Chesterman, 2009, p. 13), which "covers research which focuses primarily and explicitly on the agents involved in translation" (Ibid., p. 20).

The Media, Ethics, and Translation

In the globalized information era, one of the most prominent translating agents are undoubtedly the media. In the present attempt to show how translation cannot take place without knowledge, it is remarkable to notice to

what extent the very similar process of conveying "reported discourse" (Mossop, 1983), that is, media, is clouded by ignorance (Karim & Eid, 2012) in its two meanings of absent and hidden/rejected knowledge. In addition to ignorance, however, one should also mention *emotion* and *fear* as the result of screening and selection of knowledge in the overwhelming flow of signs that depict Others. Between ignorance and fear there is a dialectic relation as each one is the factor and the consequence of the other—ignorance feeds on fear and vice-versa (Robin, 2004). Paradoxically, although the mandate of media would be obviously to convey knowledge, media logics, however, lead to a goal of profit, a power lever that entails a deliberate will to use fear as its main emotional drive, and eventually yield ground to ignorance (e.g., Bauman, 2006; Glassner, 1999; Robin, 2004). Hence, the matrix of political-economic interests is a powerful source of influence in constructing knowledge about the Other and shaping the relationship to her.

Since these power relations are increasingly revealed on the representational level, the mass media constitute the sector where responsibility leads to serious reflection in the domain of intercultural relations. Indeed, it is precisely because of this ethical dimension that journalistic reporting is assimilated to the translational activity.

> Journalists in the field of international coverage are in an important key position because they are *cultural translators*, interpreting what they perceive to be cultural motives in other countries and comparing them with their home cultures. There is an inherent *danger that journalists promote a false understanding of cultural incompatibility as a result of their own biases, stereotypes and insufficient knowledge of cultural contexts and that their reports reinforce the perception of historically grown antagonisms*, for example, between Islam and the West . . . instead of emphasizing the shared meaning that exists between symbols of different cultures. (Hafez, 2000, p. 15, *emphasis added*)

The journalistic agent constitutes one of the focuses of modern subjectivity for the ability to redistribute meaning between cultures, according to the frame of reference that determines the meaning in question.

The media are required to choose between one of two positions. On the one hand, they present a rigid stance that *fails to translate otherness,* but rather appropriates it to the point of either identifying it with itself or radically devaluing it according to stereotypes. On the other hand, their stance translates otherness in such a way as to let the meanings or even forms of other cultures show through without concealing the transformational process undergone out of respect for the Other's difference and specificity. If the ethical dimension of the translational process shows through in such an obvious manner in the practical

rationality of media activity, it is because, first, reference could not be made to translation if it did not have to be included by definition, and second, the very purpose of journalistic work at the international level is considered by some to be a form of contribution to the "pacification" of interhuman relations.

> Ethical behavior will result when and if the individual journalist is conscientious while his or her organization systematically supports social responsibility . . . [Hence it is] proposed to build into law guarantees against media monopolies and for systemic media competition. If such policies are adopted, the media as a whole will probably introduce more investigative depth and balance into the reporting of national and international conflicts. That clearly is a precondition of the media to act *as peacemakers* rather than as unwitting promoters of national, ethnic, or religious stereotypes and prejudices. (Tehranian, 2003, p. 89, *emphasis added*)

The mandate of the media has included values of human dignity and respect for otherness, and at the same time anticipated rules that would regulate the practice of the journalistic profession without violating freedom of expression. In addition to this, one can consider Bauman's (1989) figure of the "intellectual-interpreter" the embodiment of a process that is in a position to orient social discourse while renouncing any claim to "legislate" it by making declarations of authority or arbitrating controversies of opinions. In an era that comes many years after the Enlightenment, the scholar's role is no longer articulated in terms of a knowledge, legitimized by a higher authority, but rather in terms of mediated and articulated interpretations.

Thus, the metaphor of the intellectual-interpreter reveals to us that knowledge is no longer merely the condition for the translational process that brings together the meaning of the related parties; it is also both the vehicle and the message. In fact, the diversity of postmodern society is such that sharing worldviews is no longer taken for granted by all members, which promotes communication between traditions to the rank of "the major problem of our time . . . [which] therefore calls urgently for specialists in translation between cultural traditions" (Bauman, 1989, p. 143). Short of any pretension to universality of meaning, truth, or judgment, the interpretation strategy of the postmodern intellectual can no longer differentiate among communities producing meaning other than by agreeing to assign to each one the meanings that are due to it. On the other hand,

> What remains for the intellectuals to do, is to interpret such meanings for the benefit of those who are not of the community which stands behind the meanings; to mediate the communication between "finite provinces" or "communities of meaning." (Bauman, 1989, p. 197)

Process and Project of Translating Otherness

The conceptual frameworks of social and political philosophies applied to Western sociopolitical realities should also include the democratic aspirations of non-Western peoples. If relationships between Muslim and Western societies are not reduced to the international dimension alone but also include the (intra)national dimension of the Muslim presence in Western societies, one cannot avoid an overall reflection that would include a critical theory of modernity and also philosophies both of translation and of action. This is why, to complement what was expressed in the previous sections with regard to translation, this part offers a short exposition of certain contemporary social theories, and how they are linked both to the *process* and the *project* of translating otherness.

If one supposes that the locking of identities into relations of confrontation represents the organizational system of modern capitalistic societies from whose domination one must free oneself, one can adopt the Hegelian and Marxist inheritance of social philosophy, as well as that of the critical theory of the Frankfurt school, and of Habermas (1985) especially, including his theory of communicative action. As part of the tradition of the Frankfurt school, which sanctioned the critique of universal rationalization, this theory proposes a practical space for the formation of social harmony thanks to the public use of argumentative reasoning aimed at reaching agreement on common concerns.

More specifically, one can observe how Habermas (2008) applies his communicative theory in the "post-secular" space of Western societies through the concept of translation. Actually, in these heterogeneous, pluralistic societies, the task of integrating religions and their respective discourses into the public sphere is far from complete. In order to allow religions to participate in the proceedings of secular civil society, Habermas proposes—following Rawls (1997)—introducing a *proviso* that specifies the need for the religions represented to submit to an exercise of translation.

> They would . . . have to accept that the potential truth contents of religious utterances must be translated into a generally acceptable language before they can find their way onto the agendas of parliaments, courts, or administrative bodies and influence their decisions. (Habermas, 2011, p. 25–26)

Translation acts as a filter through which informal public communication must pass to reach the processes of formal political deliberations in order to establish coercive legal decisions. Translating the language of religious traditions into one of the more shared secular societies is coupled with a translation of their ethical contributions and, thereby, with their frames of reference, thus contributing to the development of translational skills within

the religious communities but also among secular citizens of all affiliations. The responsibility for translating is thus reciprocal.

> Religious citizens who regard themselves as loyal members of a constitutional democracy must accept the translation proviso as the price to be paid for the neutrality of the state authority toward competing worldviews. For secular citizens, the same ethics of citizenship entails a complementary burden. By the duty of reciprocal accountability toward all citizens, including religious ones, they are obliged not to publicly dismiss religious contributions to political opinion and will formation as mere noise, or even nonsense, from the start. (Habermas, 2011, p. 26)

In spite of the reciprocity and equality in principle of the relations between the two groups, Taylor deplores the fact that, in moving toward the context of religious and nonreligious diversity, religion is still perceived as "the problem." "Much of our thought, and some of our major thinkers, remain stuck in the old rut" of casting religion as a problem in itself (Taylor, 2011, p. 49).

Thus, religious reasoning would constitute a questioning of secular reasoning, although Habermas, according to Taylor, "has always marked an epistemic break between secular and religious thought, with the advantage for the side of the first" (Taylor, 2011, pp. 49–50). In other words, religious reasoning would always be a bit less "rational" than that of purely secular reasoning (Ibid., p. 51)—an opposition that Habermas refutes further on, even as he maintains the distinction (Mendienta & Vanantwerpen, 2011). This being the case, the fact remains that what Habermas emphasizes is that these different rationalities constitute conceptual and referential languages that refer each speaker to her community of affiliation apart from the fact that he recognizes in the secular language a universal or neutral quality that qualifies it to become the ideal place for translating the cultural specificities represented.

Taylor has expressed some legitimate reservations concerning the use of the concept of translation to explain the phenomenon indicated, because of the supposed Habermasian claim to exhaust the meaning of the ideas of the Other (and thereby of what makes up her otherness) when transposed into the form of the Self. Nevertheless, he reminds us indirectly of a notion that could explain his dissatisfaction with the translational process proposed by Habermas: *recognition* (Taylor, 1994). Indeed, noting that in the context of multicultural societies an increasing number of communities, groups, and individuals are expressing the need to be identified according to particular features or qualities, Taylor stresses that only recognition of these elements of identity, "a person's understanding of who they are, of their fundamental characteristics as a human being" (1994, p. 25), will make the constitution of

free and worthy individuals possible. These qualities that remain at the heart of contemporary democratic ideals show in contrast that "Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in false, distorted, and reduced mode of being" (Ibid., p. 25). In Western and worldwide contexts, many Muslims—both national citizens and citizens of the world—ask no less than to be recognized in what sets them apart on the condition that the representational filter preserves their dignity as well as that of their main referent, Islam. Any human being—Western or non-Western—would ask for the same. As Hegel had suggested in his *Phenomenology of Mind* (1977), in conclusion to his demonstration on the dialectical master-slave relation, the domination relationship is a vicious circle that ends up destroying those concerned, *unless they recognize each other as equals*. According to Taylor, who calls upon Mead (1934), the point is to recognize Others as "significant others" (Taylor, 1994, p. 32). In other words, the representation of the Other—its translation—should not only take place with the fewest distortions possible, but it must also be carried out in recognition of all the dimensions of her value and of the elements that determine her identity. Since the formation of one's being is dialogical and can only take place in mutual, egalitarian recognition of what defines this being, it becomes obvious that there is only intersubjective existence, and that consideration of otherness can only occur through the dynamic process of translation; being means being vis-à-vis the Other, by means of her mediation and recognition, and vice versa. Translation and recognition are not mutually exclusive.

Thus, the "politics of difference" defended by Taylor calls for the same ethical requirement as does translation. In fact, without it, the power relations between the dominating and the dominated—whether they realize it or not—can be such that they may even integrate the subjection and inferiority of the latter (Fanon, 1986), so that recognition, like translation, can play a restorative and compensatory role wherever dignity and self-esteem are most lacking.

Translating the Inner Dimensions

Although Taylor has not produced a theory of recognition in the full sense of the term, Honneth—building on communicative foundations acquired from Habermas—has developed this concept to the greatest extent (e.g., Honneth & Margalit, 2001; Honneth, 1992; 1995; 1996; 2006; 2007). Not being satisfied with the legal-political dimension of recognition, Honneth adds those of love (recognition of physical and emotional needs) and solidarity (recognition of qualities and skills). Enriched by these two elements, recognition is not merely a contractual relation but also possesses a deeper scope since it

now includes emotional and moral dimensions. If these are not taken into account, an injustice or "disrespect" results (Honneth, 1992; 2006; 2007). It is in this sense that Honneth (2007) identifies the "pathologies of the Social" and proposes the concept of recognition to remedy this at more than one level.

Indeed, while in the previous sections I had underlined the importance of knowledge, as opposed to ignorance, in the process of social translation between cultures and worldviews in relationship, it should be noted that recognition boasts a supplementary meaning in that it adds to the acknowledgement of the substantive and cognitive reasons of differences with the Other, and the psychological and moral dimension of the effects of the treatment from which it benefits. The concept of recognition according to Honneth (1992; 1996) develops a critique of the pathological evolutions of contemporary societies based on a theory of social conflict, "*whose underpinnings are a practical experience actually lived by the social subjects and carrying moral requirements*" (Voirol, 2006, p. 19, *author's translation*). In other words, and more particularly thanks to these requirements (which could be described otherwise in terms of ethics), recognition is to social pathologies what translation is more generally to cultural and referential misunderstandings.

In this regard, one could turn to the example of the crisis of the caricatures of Muhammad in 2006, published in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*. One can detect in the reaction of a number of critics a lack of mutual *knowledge* (on the one hand, of the significance of the Prophet in the Muslim imaginary and, on the other, of that of caricatures in Western culture). Additionally, there was an absence of *recognition*, not to mention a *disrespect* of Western and non-Western Muslims in how they would feel both as citizens and as human beings regarding what distinguishes them from other religious communities and what integrates them into the whole of humanity. The same, of course, could be said of any other group or group member. Recognizing the Other thus no longer constitutes merely the condition of her cognitive comprehension in her representation but also the egalitarian and just (normative) response to the existence of her preexisting qualities that must be sought and discovered. Thus enlightened by knowledge and nourished by the ethical and psychic depths of recognition, the translation of otherness ought to reach its maximum levels of performance and efficiency.

This being the case, since the translational challenge is located more particularly at the level of representation, Honneth (2006; 2007) also allows one to consider one of the processes of his structure, notably at the level of his third mode of recognition: *self-esteem*. Indeed, in the first part of an important article with Margalit (Honneth & Margalit, 2001), he relies on the metaphor of the *invisibility* of the dominated in a society through the vision of

the dominant, which results in the discrediting and humiliation of the former by the latter. Being socially invisible means feeding a sentiment of nonrecognition and disrespect that can lead to a reaction in which a denied subject tries to make herself perceived. If servants were invisible to nobles (Honneth, 2006) and blacks to whites (Honneth & Margalit, 2001), Muslim minorities are no less so in the view of Western majority societies today. Actually, it is not so much about an invisibility that is limited to neglect of the Other and her real effacement, but rather a moral invisibility whereby the Other is not perceived as an equal, a peer, but rather as a social remnant that one can, at best, tolerate. The paradox being, however, that this treatment most often affects individuals and groups that are usually described as "visible." This is because the visibility is physical, perceptible, and representational, while the invisibility is social, qualitative, and moral.

Conclusion

In order to overcome the "clash of ignorance" there is a need for an effort of translating the unknown or the hidden that otherwise would be a source of ignorance. This chapter has emphasized and put forth conditions of the translation process as necessary components to reach its main goal of demystifying the Other. The first of these conditions is *knowledge* as no sense of the Other's idiom or frame of reference could be made without it. The next is a logical corollary of the previous: translation should be *reciprocal* as it is the most effective way to reach mutual understanding and reduce the inevitable power differential. Although conceived as both a *project-oriented* and *ethical* task, translation should integrate the factor of *resistance*, not only as the realistic quality of any move toward the Other but as the very motive of this move. Finally, the last condition of translation is the multidimensional and complementary recognition of the *external* signs of otherness (cultural, religious, social, and political) as well as of the *internal* ones (representational, emotional, psychological, and symbolical).

Seen from a different angle though, overcoming the clash of ignorance is not only an attempt to correct the lack of knowledge or the actual distorted objects of knowledge that are clashing, it is also emphasizing that ignorance is the *cause* of bad relationships and propensity to distance the Self from the Other. However, this does not reveal anything about the *process* of a possible intercultural communication. If "clashes" have been the overarching feature in the representations of the relationships between Muslim and Western societies over the centuries, it is not necessarily the only way to describe all the types of their intersections. In fact, in a hyper-mediated world of communication technologies, clashes are increasingly of a symbolic kind, diffused

in discourses and representations. Whereas the reach of media has extended to the farthest corners of the world, the capacity of targeting and hitting the Other with weapons of mass influence and disinformation has proportionally increased. The more (quantitative and/or qualitative) distance there is between them, the more disparaging may be the clash—albeit subtle and blood free. Therefore, it is necessary to conceive of the translational process more than just a means for a better knowledge of each other and mutual understanding, but also, on the one hand, as a space of *actual rapprochement* and that of realization of the "empathic disposition" and its extension to all otherness (Rifkin, 2009); and, on the other, as a ground for *vital cooperation* in order to coexist fruitfully in a unified and shrinking world. In summary, if knowledge is the main condition to translate otherness and overcome ignorance, it is also definitely that of any convergence toward a common course of action.

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CHAPTER 11

Re-Imagining the Other

Karim H. Karim and *Mahmoud Eid*

The Other is not inherently alien to the Self, but is often imagined as such. Whereas Western and Muslim societies have had intermittent clashes for over a millennium, there is overwhelming evidence of them engaging productively with each other for most of this time. However, this knowledge is overshadowed by the dominant discourses that accentuate conflict. The news media are the major vehicles disseminating such discourses (e.g., Hafez, 2000; Karim, 2003; Perigoe & Eid, 2014; Poole, 2002), but other cultural forms such as children's toys, bedtime stories, educational materials, paintings, songs, plays, novels, film, television entertainment programs, and computer games also play a significant role (e.g., Karim, 2003; 2012; Shaheen, 2009). Some voices in Western and Muslim societies have sought to revive memories of long-standing collaboration, but the dominant discourses in both emphasize the adversarial aspects of the relationship with the Other. This has tended to encourage forms of thinking that promote terrorism and war, both of which have seen an intensification in the twenty-first century. Richard Bulliet urges for "a fundamental reconsideration . . . of the long-term sibling relationship" between Christians and Muslims; without a reappraisal, the future of their relations "will be thorny and unpredictable, haunted by dashed hopes and missed opportunities" (2004, p. 133). Given the scale of death, destruction, and expense resulting from Western-Muslim conflicts, it is imperative that the Other be re-imagined in the broader context of the mutually beneficial intersections that have occurred in the long term.

The march of history shows that human knowledge has been produced in various parts of the world and each civilization has learnt from others. Western societies' currently ascendant position was arrived at over many centuries

after learning from other cultures, particularly those adjacent to Europe's southern Muslim reaches. Openness to other civilizations was also vital to the religious, cultural, and intellectual growth of Muslim societies. Upon migrating to the lands neighboring the Arabian peninsula, the adherents of Islam learnt about mathematics, science, philosophy, architecture, agriculture, and banking, from Eastern Christians, Jews, Sabeans, Zoroastrians, Egyptians, Assyrians, Hindus, Chinese, and others. This part of the world was the cosmopolitan meeting place of various intellectual traditions, including those of ancient Greece. The foundational development of Islamic theology, philosophy, and law drew from the knowledge of older cultures. These borrowings have been an integral part of Islam for many centuries, but their "non-Islamic" origins have been largely lost to the contemporary communal memory of Muslims. Similarly, the remembrance of the vital Muslim contributions to Western societies is also almost nonexistent in North America, Europe, and Australasia.

Several authors in this volume refer to multiple forms of interaction between Western and Muslim civilizations over many centuries. Their intellectual, commercial, and cultural lives were profoundly linked even though they often kept each other at arm's length. The greater beneficiaries in this relationship were the Europeans, who were given access through Muslim lands to other domains to the East. The intellectual traffic was almost completely one-way for many centuries. This situation allowed Europeans to re-familiarize themselves with ancient Greek scholarship (largely lost due to the Church's restrictions on disseminating ideas that challenged its doctrines) and to acquire the vast advancements made by Muslims, including those in epistemology, scientific method, and technology. It is inconceivable that the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the "voyages of discovery," and the contemporary technological revolution would have occurred when and in the manners they did without Europe receiving the fruits of Muslim learning. Hobson's chapter in this book suggests that if not for the borrowing of the Muslim knowledge of trigonometry, "solar calendars, more accurate navigational charts, latitude and longitude tables, as well as the astrolabe and quadrant . . . Europeans would most probably have remained confined to the Muslim Mediterranean."

Western civilization's rise coincided with a reciprocal decline of its Muslim counterpart, whose scholarly culture began to stagnate and decay. Muslim travel in Europe was restricted; only Christians from the East were permitted to have access to Europe's growing intellectual and material resources, as Matar describes in his chapter. Middle Eastern Muslims did not seem to realize the significance of the rapid progress in Western societies until they received the shock of Napoleon's quick victories in Egypt in the late

eighteenth century and the American attack on Libya in the early nineteenth century. Western advancements in armaments had the most tangible results for worldwide developments: Muslims and other peoples were overcome and colonized in swift succession in Africa, Asia, Australasia, and the Americas. The victors wrote the history of the world in which Europeans were presented as a people apart from all others—intellectually and morally superior by dint of their "race." As Hobson notes, knowledge about the enormous intellectual and material borrowings from Muslim societies was excised from the narratives of the rise of Western civilization; if mentioned at all, Muslims are only credited for preserving ancient Greek texts. It is ironic that schoolchildren in Western societies learn vastly more about the ancient Egyptians and Mesopotamians than about 14 centuries of the more recent history of Muslims with whom their civilization has a more direct relationship. Islam's close affinity with the Biblical religions is suppressed and its adherents are generally constructed as an alien Other who have very little connection to Western societies. Muslims are implicitly portrayed in the form of what Hobson describes as "predatory/barbaric agency" and as "antithetical threats to Western civilization and to world order." On their side, some Muslims have reciprocated by disavowing their Abrahamic commonality with Jews and Christians and have made Western societies their enemies (e.g., Bergen, 2001; Eid, 2008b; Lawrence, 2005; Meijer, 2009). In his chapter, Rubenstein asserts, "It is only by restructuring relationships between 'the West and the Rest' that the current plague of religious violence can be brought under control."

Hobson advocates for a *relational* approach to understanding the "mutually co-constitutive" interactions between Western and Muslim societies. The emergent relational theory provides a supportive intellectual framework for re-imagining the Other in opposition to discourses that depict Western-Muslim relations as separated by "fault lines" (Huntington, 1996). Whereas most of the work to date on relational theory focuses on the individual's relationship to other individuals and collectivities, it can be extended to examine relationships between groups and civilizations. "Through its lens, it is said that we can see the ways in which being in relationship is integral to self-understanding and to interactions with others at individual, collective, and even institutional levels" (Downie & Llewellyn, 2012, p. 4).

Self-knowledge is arrived at by understanding how the Self has imagined the Other. The imagined Other is not an expression of reality but a reflection of one's own projection—an extension of the Self. Therefore, in gazing at its construction of the Other, the Self sees itself (e.g., Euben, 1999; Kabbani, 1986; Karim, 2003). Both Western and Muslim societies stand to know themselves by examining their respective constructions of the Other. The relational approach also enables the re-imagining of the Other through

reflexive means that interrogate the Self's motivations for its constructions of the Other. It helps to deconstruct the manipulation of knowledge that highlights or conceals certain pieces of information for reasons of self-interest. Societal elites may see benefit for themselves (as distinct from the rest of society) in publicly depicting the Other to be essentially different from the Self. Huntington's (1996) declared objective in developing the clash of civilizations thesis, which presented "Islam" and China as unremitting threats to the United States, was to ensure how American foreign policy could benefit in a time of global realignments following the Cold War. His prescriptions stood mainly to benefit U.S. capitalist and military interests (Exoo, 2010). The Self's violence and discrimination against the Other can be prevented by deconstructing the nature of information generated about the latter: "the ability of individuals to break the cycle of ethnic violence will depend on their access to honest information from their neighbors, media, and leaders regarding the nature of the 'enemy'" (Sherwin, 2012, p. 22). Re-imagining an Other that has been ideologically depicted as completely alien and harmful to the Self requires not merely the reconstruction of the image but also unpacking its very construction, followed by an informed, ethical, and conscientious reconstruction of the memories of relationships with the Other (e.g., Campbell, 2012; McLeod, 2012).

Assumptions drawn from liberal philosophy have often produced the adversarial positioning of various entities in Western political and legal institutions. Relational theory, largely formulated by feminist thinkers, critiques traditional liberalism's emphasis on the individual as a separate, self-contained subject. Operating as an oppositional framework for structuring social life, the relational approach foregrounds the *connectedness* of human beings "as essential to understanding the self and to its making and remaking" (Llewellyn, 2012, p. 90). The Self is seen here as benefitting from ensuring that its relationship with the Other is given primary consideration in organizing society. The authors of actions, shaped by such considerations, would be mindful of their impact on both sides. When the Self is viewed as having a connection with the Other, its well-being is seen as being influenced by the condition of the Other. Re-imagining the relationship between the two in this manner would have a substantial effect on the ways in which the Self depicts and takes actions regarding the Other.

Several contributors to this book discuss the role of power in the relationship between Western and Muslim societies. Eid, Jiwani, and Karim point to the enormous influence of the media to shape the words and images that become the receptacles for containing depictions of Muslims. Eid explains that the media often communicate "ideas about what is considered external or foreign," participating "in the formulation of a society's norms and values,"

and as a result influencing "how people understand their interactions with others," dictating "how people distinguish between those who are considered internal or external to an imagined community."

Rubenstein draws attention to the enormous imperial power of Western capitalism in the form that globalization has taken shape: power associated with "threats of cultural pollution" has distorted relationships and given rise to violent responses from Muslims who employ religious rationalizations. What is required, according to Rubenstein,

> is a re-imagining based on three principles: with regard to character, the Other's essential similarity to oneself; with regard to situation, his/her role in the system of global power and exploitation; with regard to future prospects, his/her capacity for transformation in conjunction with a transformation of the system.

Western leaders and ideologues favor speaking from positions of power and Muslim militants seek to regain lost power by re-establishing what they conceive as a truly Islamic polity. Both sides have systematically used violence to further their respective ends. This is based on ignorance of the possibilities of mutual benefit to be derived from collaboration (Karim & Eid, 2012). Breaking the cycle of conflict can be achieved by re-imagining the Other, leading to self-transformation and transformation of the ways in which the Self engages with her (Karim & Eid, 2014). Basalamah's chapter asserts that such an engagement "would not embody a power relation but, rather, be a space for explanation and mutual interpretation of respective meanings, as well as for cooperation."

However, such a space appears to be largely absent in a world where political actors work within a system in which the dynamics of power and hegemony are primary features. The space can be developed by a commitment to what Jennifer L. Llewellyn (2012) terms *equality of relationship* that is formed by a commitment to respect, concern, and dignity and is characterized by being contextual and grounded. Here, respect is "not founded upon disinterest or self-interest as it is in many contemporary liberal approaches" (Ibid., p. 94), but it is based on concern for the Other. Within the context of relational theory, "we cannot respect ourselves or others without such concern and interest" (Ibid.). Self and Other are intimately connected in this perspective, which also promotes the principle of dignity—understood as reflecting "our own value and that of others" (Ibid., p. 95) as a consequence of our interconnectedness. This involves a constant effort to account for the values of the Other[1] in dealing with matters of common interest. Basalamah's chapter proposes that translation between communities involves "*acting upon the relation* that sets us against

the otherness and even going beyond the awareness of elements of common values, [to] meanings that had not been understood before."

These views have a resonance with Charles Taylor's (1994) ideas about the "politics of recognition" in the context of multiculturalism. A society that contains diverse groups cannot function effectively without the dominant groups recognizing the needs and values of others and establishing institutions to accommodate them. Basalamah notes that

> In Western and worldwide contexts, many Muslims—both national citizens and citizens of the world—ask no less than to be recognized in what sets them apart on the condition that the representational filter preserves their dignity as well as that of their main referent, Islam. Any human being—Western or non-Western—would ask for the same.

Whereas Islam is an Abrahamic religion, it is distinct from Judaism and Christianity and its followers ask for this recognition. The Qur'an states, "O humankind, We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another" (49:13). Diversity and recognition are interlinked in this view. Re-imagining the Other does not mean the erasure of differences, but their acknowledgment within the framework of an equality of relationship. Relational theory has sought to balance the connectedness of social actors with the importance of self-determination and agency. "This balancing is reflected in the image of the relational self as constituted in and through relationships" (Downie & Llewellyn, 2012, p. 5). A dignified dialogical engagement between Self and Other, resolutely avoiding power plays within a framework of mutual respect and seeking to understand each others' values and aspirations, would provide space for agency within an equality of relationship.

Muslim minorities in Western societies deserve to be recognized and accommodated and the same is due to religious minorities in Muslim-majority countries. There is agreement among a significant number of contemporary Muslim scholars (e.g., Abou El Fadl, 2002; An-Naim, 1990; Arkoun, 2006; Ramadan, 2009; Soroush, 2000) that the Qur'an encourages the posture of mutual respect between religious communities.[2] However, several Muslim-majority states have been cited because of discrimination against groups such as Christians and Hindus (International religious freedom report for 2012, 2013). The concept of *dhimma* discussed by Karim and Eid in the introductory chapter of this book was a medieval construct by the Muslim state to provide protection for minorities. It incorporates basic Islamic principles for accommodating non-Muslim communities; however, its operational modes appear out of date in contemporary times. Referring to

the *jizyah* tax collected from *dhimmis*, Khaled Abou El Fadl notes that "there are various indicators that the poll tax is not a theologically mandated practice, but a functional solution that was adopted in response to a specific set of historical circumstances" (2002, p. 22). Even though the Qur'an refers to the advantages of human diversity in several verses, exploration of the meaning of intergroup engagement "remained underdeveloped in Islamic theology" (Ibid., p. 16). A contemporary re-imagining of engagement with the domestic Other by Muslim-majority states within the context of a "commitment to human diversity and mutual knowledge" necessitates a rigorous examination of the reasoning behind the construction of historic social institutions and "requires moral reflection and attention to historical circumstance" (Ibid.).

It is very difficult for believers to conduct a critical study of their religious texts and history. The tendency is usually to fall into apologetics, defending one's religion and rationalizing even what may be abhorrent actions by one's fellow believers. However, a steadfast commitment to the truth, however unpleasant, is common in the teachings of religion—the Self cannot be exempted from this. Jack Goody's chapter in this book explores the exchange and knowledge sharing between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. He finds that the clashes between their adherents has little to do with their basic religious orientation, which is derived from the common root of Abrahamic monotheism. Whereas religious practices have diverged between these three traditions, they all originated from a similar vision of humanity's relationship to God. The commonality of the "great themes that constitute religious belief"[3] underlying Judaism, Christianity, and Islam remain concealed under the layers of historical constructions. Mohammed Arkoun suggests that "deconstructing this structure . . . in order to show its material and historical contingency, is retreading in reverse the course followed by classical theologians and metaphysicists" (Arkoun, 2006, p. 113). With a rigorous "multidisciplinary and crossdisciplinary analysis" of the many sediments of dogma that serve to separate rather than encourage a better understanding, it may be possible to "penetrate to the *radical imaginary* common to the societies of the Book/books [i.e., Jews, Christians, and Muslims]" (Arkoun, 1994, p. 9, *emphasis in original*). This radical imaginary is viewed as the fundamental root of the common Abrahamic vision that appears in the three books—the Old Testament, the New Testament, and the Qur'an. Together they constitute "the Book" and the communities attached to them are the "societies of the Book."

The contemporary conflict between Israelis and Arabs has served largely to obscure the long-standing relationship between Jews, Christians, and Muslims, particularly that between Jews and Muslims.[4] A strong affinity is projected by the Qur'an with respect to the Abrahamic traditions,

notwithstanding the political and military confrontations that the Prophet Muhammad had with certain Jewish tribes in Medina and Khyber (Watt, 1981). Jews and sectarian Christians in neighboring lands were very poorly treated by the dominant Byzantine Church, and they supported the Muslims in their siege of Jerusalem in 637CE (Lewis, 2008). The Catholic Church in seventh-century Spain decreed that "all adult Jews were to be sold as slaves and their children distributed among Christian families" (Ibid., p. 117). Therefore, Jews also welcomed the Muslim conquest of Iberia, where the adherents of the three Abrahamic faiths were to live in a general state of harmony under Muslim rule that was exceptional in medieval Europe.[5] In the twentieth century, however, relations between Jews and Muslims took a bad turn over the struggle between Israelis and Palestinians, which has engendered war and terrorism with worldwide consequences. The mutual vilification and violence that the sibling communities carry out against each other stand in stark contrast with the centuries of productive engagement. Ideologues on both sides are intent on demonization; they veil knowledge of the mutually beneficial interactions of the past with the apparent objective to promote clashes of ignorance. There is a desperate need for re-imagining the Other by both Jews and Muslims to recall the past and promote a future based on an equality of relationship within a relational framework.

Whereas anti-Semitic attitudes and violence continue to occur in Christian and post-Christian Western societies, there has been a remarkable reversal in the persecution of Jews from the historical trajectory that saw medieval European oppression; the Inquisition and expulsion of Jews (and Muslims) from Spain; vilification, discrimination, and pogroms even during the Enlightenment period; and the genocidal Nazi Holocaust. From the 1950s, the reparation of Jewish-Christian relations has been encapsulated in the term "Judeo-Christian" as "the perfect expression of a new feeling of inclusiveness toward Jews, and of a universal Christian repudiation of Nazi barbarism" (Bulliet, 2004, p. 6). "Judeo-Christian civilization" has almost become synonymous with "Western civilization."

> Common scriptural roots, shared theological concerns, continuous interaction at a societal level, and mutual contributions to what in modern times has become a common pool of thought and feeling give the Euro-American Christian and Jewish communities solid grounds for declaring their civilizational solidarity. Yet the scriptural and doctrinal linkages between Judaism and Christianity are not closer than those between Judaism and Islam, or between Christianity and Islam; and historians are well aware of the enormous contributions of Muslim thinkers to the pool of late medieval philosophical and

> scientific thought that European Christians and Jews later drew upon to create the modern West. Nor has there been any lack of contact between Islam and the West. (Bulliet, 2004, p. 6)

Richard Bulliet makes a vigorous case for reframing contemporary civilization as "Islamo-Christian." He empirically traces the ways in which the sibling societies of Western Christianity and Middle Eastern Islam began to have a critical mass in the same historical period, went through similar developmental stages, and faced analogous internal problems. He states that the "historical development of Western Christendom and Islam parallel each other so closely that they are two versions of a common socioreligious system" (Bulliet, 2004, p. 15).

Bulliet observes that from the sixteenth century CE, the paths that the two took began to diverge with Western societies building maritime empires and the Muslim domain mainly growing on land—the former spreading its increasingly secular culture through imperial might while the latter's followers doubled in size mostly due to the work of peaceful Sufi movements. Even then, the very mode in which their rivalry has unfolded to this day continues to express its sibling nature within the common Islamo-Christian civilization.

> *The past and future of the West cannot be fully comprehended without appreciation of the twinned relationship it has had with Islam over some fourteen centuries. The same is true of the Islamic world.* (Bulliet, 2004, p. 16, *emphasis in original*)

Despite this connectedness, both Western and Muslim opinion makers tend to disregard the similarities between their two cultures and highlight the differences to the detriment of their respective communities and of humanity at large.

In considering a re-imagining of the relationship between Self and Other, the relevant dynamics do not only include those between religious communities but also that between religion and secularism. Basalamah notes that it has been habitual among secularists to view religion as the problem. Rubenstein asserts that religion has played a significant historical role in resolving conflicts and can do so again.[6] However, he suggests that such an approach to re-imagining relationships will require the inclusion of concepts and values associated with what Robert Bellah termed the "'civil religion,' a fusion of older ideas and practices with those deriving from the 'secular religions' of the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment periods." Basalamah notes that present-day philosophers, such as Jürgen Habermas, have remarked that Western societies have moved to a stage of being postsecular, where both the secular and the religious can coexist and cooperate in the public sphere.

Several authors in this book directly or indirectly advocate for the need for an ethical comportment for ensuring better relationships between Self and Other. Eid, Jiwani, and Karim's respective chapters note the need for conscientious modes of communication in naming and narrating the Other. Eid contends that fair and balanced media portrayals about the Other would aid in re-imagining relationships with the Self. He explains that the media in Western and Muslim societies have the moral and ethical responsibility[7] to avoid stereotyping and distorting images about the cultures and traditions of the Other in order to contribute to the elimination of clashes of ignorance. Jiwani's chapter demonstrates the outcomes of exaggerating differences in values between immigrant Muslims and the larger society. The uninformed and often manipulative uses of terminology compounds ignorance and aggressive attitudes toward the Other, as discussed by Karim.

Ghanoonparvar raises the issue of inevitable subjectivity (and superiority) in the narrator and translator's voice, even when efforts are being made to understand the Other. Basalamah proposes that the responsibility of translating otherness's multidimensional complexity necessitates both the "highlighting of the *subject* at the origin of the process, her subjectivity, and her agency, as well as the *ethical* requirement that characterizes her action." How does the subject strive to interpret another culture in a conscientious manner as a way to mitigate her subjectivity? Basalamah offers the figure of the "intellectual-interpreter" and Abdul JanMohamed (1992) of the "specular border intellectual" who, having resources that are not accessible to most other members of society, has the ethical responsibility to disengage as far as possible from allegiance to any one community in providing her analysis of the interactions between the Self and the Other.[8] Academics, media workers, diplomats, and others who occupy a privileged position as interlocutors in the spaces between cultures would come under the category of the specular border intellectual. Theirs would be a constantly self-reflexive process in which one seeks to remain aware of the Self's ethical responsibility to the Other in an equality of relationship.

Whereas the "voyages of discovery" are generally presented as a feature linked to the rise of Western civilization, Hobson provides historical perspective in observing that "1492/1498 did not mark the initial moment in the rise of a proto-global economy, for it represented the moment when the Europeans *directly* joined the extant Afro-Asian-led global economy which stemmed back to its initiation after about 600 CE." Rubenstein states that the processes of contemporary globalizing are carried out in the interests of capitalist and imperialist domination and have structured relationships in a manner that has drawn humanity into a cycle of war and terrorism. He suggests that a restructuring of international relationships and

the institution of a new global ethic through inter-religious dialogue can mitigate conflict and help to create a genuinely human community. This "cosmopolitan ethic" (Aga Khan, 2008, p. 130), unlike the hegemonic modes of globalization, would move away from the power-based mode of international relationships. Such an approach would have to be truly global and take into account the values and visions of all human communities. Discussing "the new ethics" needed for varied transnational contexts, such as pandemics and threats of war and terrorism, Susan Sherwin states the following.

> Ethics must help us learn to see . . . interconnections and provide guidance on the appropriate kinds of responsibility in complex cases . . . [T]he ethics needed will have to be developed through collaborative efforts of an interdisciplinary, international collection of scholars, activists, practitioners, and communicators. It requires empirical as well as theoretical knowledge, including expertise in human behaviour, politics, economics, national and international law, religion, and the ability to stimulate the moral imagination. (Sherwin, 2012, pp. 24–25)

It is vital that such an endeavour would consciously eschew power politics and hegemonic structures that plague present-day global affairs in favor of an equality of relationship.

Rubenstein proposes that the place of "the West" has to be re-understood under changing global conditions in order to construct less hierarchical and conflict-inducing international structures that would be shaped through consensus. It is a common attitude for Westerners to see their societies as bastions of civilization and the rest of the world being mired in barbarism. These views are manifested in narratives such as the media reports about immigrant Muslims scrutinized by Jiwani in this book. Ghanoonparvar relates how a Western society works to transform the immigrant Other and incorporate her into the Western Self without recognizing her identity or giving it value. Hobson's examination of early twentieth-century materials produced from the perspective of European imperialism reveals that Huntington's (1996) fear that the barbaric Other poses a threat to Western civilization and world order had an older genealogy. These narratives have been formulated within the amnesic theoretical framework that has systematically filtered out the relationship and interdependence of Western and Muslim civilizations. Hobson states that "a falsely pure sense of Western Self" has emerged over the last few centuries. He proposes that "if we recognize that the West is a poly-civilizational amalgam that is significantly constituted by Muslim ideas, technologies, and institutions, then we can puncture the

very Western hubris that marks the essence of the idea of the clash of civilizations." This, in his view, "should constitute the point of departure for the long walk towards genuine reconciliation between Muslim and Western societies."

Such a reconciliation would also include a general recalibration of Muslim perceptions of Western societies. Shaped over a long period in which European and American imperialism has exploited, vilified, and brutalized their communities, Muslim views of "the West" have to be modulated to account for nuances and differences in what is often presented as a monolith. Their own interconnectedness with Western societies for almost a millennium and a half and the contemporary integration of Muslim diasporas into them should prompt the reconsideration of the relationship between the Muslim Self and the Western Other. For Muslims to deny their kinship with Judaic and Christian monotheism would be disingenuous. It is incumbent upon all the three peoples of the Book to re-imagine their mutual relationships through the commonalties of belief and history that have been ideologically obscured. This endeavor is best engaged in a manner that is genuinely interfaith, intercultural, and interdisciplinary and conducted with utmost integrity within an equality of relationship.

Notes

1. Richard Bulliet notes that American Policy circles seem incapable of imagining a Muslim model of modernity. "Like latter day missionaries, we want the Muslims to love us, not just for what we can offer in the way of technological society, but for who we are—for our values. But we refuse to countenance the thought of loving them for their values" (Bulliet, 2004, p. 116). However, a number of Muslims appear to hold a mirror image of Americans with respect to values; Sayyid Qutb, whose writings serve as an inspiration for some Muslim militants, stated that "I fear that a balance may not exist between America's material greatness and the quality of its people. And I fear that . . . America will have added nothing, or next to nothing, to the account of morals that distinguishes man from object, and indeed, mankind from animals" (Qutb, 2000, p. 10). Also see Ghanoonparvar's chapter in this book.
2. The Qur'an (like the holy books of other religions), however, can be interpreted to present the opposite view. Abou El Fadl remarks that "[i]f the reader is intolerant, hateful, or oppressive, so will be the interpretation of the text" (2002, p. 23).
3. This would include "revelation, the Word of God, creation, the Covenant, or the Alliance (*mithaq*, *ahd*), prophetic mission, prophetic discourse, holy Scriptures, the Book, the Canon of the Scriptures, faith, loving obedience to God, trust in God, man in the image of God, Divine Law, justice, worship, resurrection, eternal life, immortality, salvation, and so on" (Arkoun, 2006, p. 112). Also see Lorca (2003) and Neuser, Chilton, and Graham (2002).

4. Jewish communities were protected in Muslim domains, where they administered their own family law. Individual Jews also rose to high positions in the Muslim state (Fischel, 1937).
5. Also see Taj (2014).
6. Also see Chandler (2008) and Gopin (2009).
7. Also see Eid (2008a).
8. Also see Karim (2003).

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