lakatos meth sci research phil papers 1 pdf

METHODOLOGY OF SC! F.NTIEC RESEARCH PROGRAMMES Duhem accepts the conventionalists’ position that no physical rheovv ever crumbles rnerelv under the weight of •refutations’, but clairrts that it still crulllble under the weight of •continual 1 epairs. and lilanv tangled-up slavs’ when ‘the wornl-eaten colurnns• cannot support •the tottering building’ anv longer;’ then the theory Ioscs its original simplicirv and has to be replacet-l_ But falsification IS then to subjective taste or, at best, ta scientific fashion, and too nruc•h leewav is for angmatit• adherence to a Pax nnrite theory. Popper sel out to find a criterion which is both more objective and Inorc hard-hitting. Hc could act-cpt thc clnasculation ot enopiri Lisl”, inherent even in l)llhelll’s approach, and proposed a method- ology which allows experiments to he powerful even in ‘ nrature science. Popper’s methodological falsificationislll is both convention- alist and falsificatiomst, but he ‘differs froin the Iconserva[ivel con- ventionalists in holding that lhe statements decided bv agreement are [spatio-temporaliyl universal bill Ispatio-lelnporallvl singular ‘ and he differs from the dogmatic falsificationist in holding that rhe truth-valuc of such statcrncnts cannot bc proved by facts but, in sornc cases, rnav be (let-ided bv agreement. Che Duhemian conservative (or • Illethodologica) ius- lomsl ‘ if vou wish) makes unfalsifiable bv fia! some (spatio- teniporallv) universal theories, which are distinguished by their ex planatorv power, sirnplit•itv or beau (v. Popperian revolutionan conoenftonalist (or Inelhodological falsificationist makes unfalsifiable bv fiat sonle (spatio-temporallv) singular statements which are distin- guishable bv the fact that there exists at the thne a ‘relevant technique such that ‘anvone who has learned it’ will be able to decid? that the statement is •acceptable •.5 Such a statelnent may be ( alled all ‘observational’ or ‘basic’ statetnent, but only in inverted commas. Indeed, the very selection of all such statements is a matter of a de elsion, which is not based on exclusively p.svchologica! considerations. I his decision is then followed by a second kind of decision concerning the separat;orl of the set of accepted basic statelilellls from lhe lest. These decisions t-nrrespt-n.cl In the n! ‘Ingmar 1″ falsificationistn. But there are ilnportant differences. Above all, the methodological falsificanonist is not a justificationist, he has no illu- slons about ‘experitnerllal proofs’ arid is hillv aware 01 the fallibilitv 01 his decisions and the risks he is raking 903], chapter v J. sec(lnr, 10, For a further discussion of below. pp. 96—101 Popper section In Popper’s I-fens, smna.s Jor for cf. p. Popper [inn Cir.. 28. For thc non-basieness of these rnethodoiogicailv bas:c’ state Lnents. e.g. Popper dad Popper p